the relative dominance of the offense and defense. If modern analysts are to be believed, and technological change is faster now than it has ever been in the past, that rebalancing might create rapid changes in the military dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and affect defenses against the threat of the missiles.

Doyle and Herzinger’s *Carrier Killer* offers a thoughtful, thorough, and clear-eyed analysis of the possibilities created by China’s deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles. Rather than “silver bullet” weapons that change the balance of power in the Pacific, the authors demonstrate that these weapons are complex and unproven. At the same time, they certainly represent a threat to the safety of American aircraft carriers and the power projection mindset of American naval thinking. The vulnerability of the carriers has been a subject of debate for almost a hundred years. The authors do an excellent job of placing these new weapons in their technological, military, diplomatic, and informational context, backed up with excellent illustrations, maps and historical background. As a quick primer on important developments in the Pacific world, *Carrier Killer* offers naval professionals, contemporary analysts, historians, and students a valuable resource to help them understand the complexity of today’s Sino-American naval competition.

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In the years immediately following the First World War, the Royal Navy engaged in an undeclared war by undertaking defensive and offensive operations in the eastern end of the Baltic Sea against the Bolsheviks and German elements trying to prevent the emergence of new nationalist states seeking independence. Commitment to the enterprise within higher Allied councils and Britain’s Lloyd George government was tepid at best, save the constant urgings of munitions, war, and air minister, Winston Churchill. Lack of clear political direction meant goals were left ill-defined, and naval officers commanding the squadrons, such as admirals Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair and Walter Cowan, creatively interpreted the instructions given. Royal Navy warships brought arms and ammunition for the hard-pressed nationalist forces, provided bombardment and fire-support when necessary, patrolled in the face of significant dangers from mines and adversarial naval forces, and launched
attacks against Soviet fleet units inside the formidable main naval base at Kronstadt. Meanwhile, sailors, and even some officers, questioned why they were still fighting and suffering under austere conditions when the rest of Great Britain had returned to peace. Most poignantly, ships were sunk and lives were lost during this fitful period. An accomplished author with several books focused on naval biography and the Royal Navy before and during the First World War, Dunn highlights the complexities involved and the role played, in particular, by the Royal Navy in creating the countries of Estonia and Latvia.

The book is divided into 22 chapters and eight appendices. On the whole, Dunn provides a conventional operational and battle history that incorporates the political machinations as well as the personal reflections from participants to capture sentiments in their own words. The first chapters chart the decline of the Imperial Russian Empire and rise to power of the Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin, assisted in no small part by the Germans, who were rewarded by the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk taking Russia out of the war. After the 1918 armistice, the Germans never really left the occupied eastern territories, and the beleaguered Bolsheviks confronted a succession of distinct ethnic peoples in lands on the edges eager to gain independence, foreign intervention by the Western powers, and White Russian military forces trying to restore the Tsarist monarchy and turn back the revolution in an emerging civil war. The Royal Navy sailed into this maelstrom with the intent of upholding British interests and assisting friendly aspiring countries where possible, most particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Poland was considered a preserve of France based on that country’s own relationships. Resources were short, and the ships dispatched were often old and worn-out, crewed by a mix of war-emergency and regular navy members. Alexander-Sinclair had no doubt had enough once relieved by Cowan, who applied himself with particular rigour to the mission and taskings at hand.

The middle chapters describe the interactions with principal figures such as the resourceful General Johan Laidner, commanding the Estonian land forces, and German General Gustave Rüdiger von Goltz with direction over the troops, ex-POWs, and free-booters (freikorps) seeking land and influence at the expense of the nationalists and Bolsheviks, to create a pan-German eastern enclave. It was often hard to determine who was fighting whom on land, though at sea it was somewhat easier because the Royal Navy pressed its presence strongly into the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland right up to the harbours.

The main obstacles were mines laid in fields, the natural hazards of relatively shallow and ill-charted waters, and occasional sorties by units of the Soviet fleet – mostly light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Reinforced by additional naval forces, including an aircraft carrier, destroyers, and
minesweepers, Cowan established a forward operating base and airfield in the Björkö (Koivisto) islands group close enough to observe and meet any movements from Kronstadt harbour beyond the minefields. Augustus Agar, a naval officer sent out to ferry spies for espionage purposes, demonstrated the utility of fast torpedo-carrying motor boats (CMB) in sinking the protected cruiser Oleg, which coalesced into a larger operation codenamed “RK” to strike directly inside the main Soviet naval base supported by an aerial diversion. Like most such affairs involving small forces in a heavily protected anchorage at night, mishaps and missed timings involved comparatively dear losses for the attackers, though two battleships and a submarine tender were heavily damaged or sunk (disputed by the Bolsheviks). If the attack against Kronstadt represented perhaps the high-point and defining event for the Royal Navy’s time in the Baltic, the remaining chapters detail the dreary ordeal of working in a cold climate far away from anything, the occasional losses to accident and naval action, and mounting discontent amongst the deployed personnel over food, leave, pay, and uncaring leadership – the classic causes of mutiny. When certain crew members refused work or openly protested, Cowan was decidedly unsympathetic and responded with harsh measures. The previous spring, French sailors aboard warships in the Black Sea mutinied for similar reasons and faced equally dire consequences, especially those identified as instigators or ringleaders. Eventually, the British government decided that keeping naval forces on station in the Baltic cost too much when times were toughening and other priorities took precedence, and withdrew them with little fanfare, not even a special medal for service.

The Royal Navy’s contributions in the struggles for independence by Estonia and Latvia are remembered in a number of memorials, thanks to the determined efforts of the failed British politician and academic, George Howard, the 13th Earl of Carlisle. The appendices provide a useful basic timeline, article 12 of the armistice respecting withdrawal of German troops, Admiralty expenditures on the Baltic operations, manning of CMB used in the Kronstadt raid, a description of Bolshevik legate Maxim Litvinov’s demi-official overtures in Copenhagen, as well as figures on personnel and ship losses and numbers of Royal Navy ships deployed broken down by type.

The production quality of the book is exceptionally high, with a pleasing layout and look. Each chapter has a bolded heading and further sub-headings separating sections. Photographs are placed in the book’s middle section on glossy paper, representing ships, well-known and lesser-known personalities, and memorials. These come from the author’s own collection, as well as official repositories. The cover of the book reproduces a striking colour painting by Cecil King showing HMS Caledon in the ice at Libau harbour, from the Imperial War Museum’s holdings.
**Battle in the Baltic** is recommended as a very readable and up-to-date narrative that puts the Royal Navy’s operations in the Baltic after the First World War into context and pays homage to the men who served and died there. The sources and perspective are mostly British and share many similarities to Geoffrey Bennett’s *Freeding the Baltic* (TNM XXVIII/1 Winter 2017, pp. 39-41), which it builds upon. Greater appreciation of the Russian, Finnish, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish, Danish, and French sides is achieved to a limited degree. Historians and general readers interested in that part of Europe and the time period will find the book worthwhile.

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The relationship between Europe and the sea has been the subject of many books and exhibition projects over the last decades and thus, it needs to be asked if this book brings something new to the table or not?

First, it must be recognized that the authors are not maritime historians or scholars, but rather, five retired admirals who have served with five different European navies and, more importantly, have worked together for a substantial period on European maritime security issues. Consequently, instead of presenting a traditional, scholarly analysis, the book discusses the maritime past and present of Europe, mainly as a background for present and future decisions on the maritime dimension of European security policy.

Basically, *Europe and the Sea* is divided into three main sections (past, present, future) plus one shorter section that deals with European strategies related to regional seas. This structure, while obvious, is most appropriate. The historical section covers the whole period from antiquity to the present day in less than 75 pages, making a broad-brush approach unavoidable. Unfortunately, it remains unclear to the reader why certain innovations like the Viking sun-compass are described in detail, while major ship innovations like the medieval cog are not mentioned at all. Since the authors were not aiming for an historical study, however, but an analysis of contemporary and future challenges, such details may be irrelevant for an evaluation of this book. In the end, the whole historical section is simply an easy-to-read and understand history of how and why some European nations developed into