uted to their inability to come to terms with the United States, which in 1941 began supplying Chiang’s Nationalists with Lend-Lease aid while embargoing oil exports to Japan. Though the Japanese government wanted to reach a settlement with the Roosevelt administration, neither side could accept the other’s terms to begin negotiations. For the Japanese, this made war the more acceptable alternative, even if the odds of victory were long.

Roughly half of Frank’s book is devoted to the period between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the fall of the American outpost on Corregidor five months later. These were the months when Japanese forces dominated the western Pacific and Southeast Asia, sweeping all before them. Frank details all of the major land and naval battles, including the sinking of the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Battle of the Java Sea, and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s raid into the Indian Ocean. In the process, he debunks many longstanding misconceptions about the war, including the speculation that the Japanese could have destroyed the oil farms and repair facilities at Pearl Harbor in a third wave of attacks. Frank dismisses this argument by pointing out that the time it would have taken to prepare and launch such an attack would have meant that the returning strike force could not have made it back to their carriers before nightfall.

Such sound analysis is just one hallmark of Frank’s fine study. Though limited to English-language sources and translated works, he has mined archival resources on three continents and benefited greatly from recent studies on the war in China and India. Taking these materials together, he has brought about a long-overdue corrective to the more limited approaches adopted in previous accounts of the Second World War in the region. The result is revisionist history of the highest order, one that hopefully will alter how students of the era interpret the conflict. If the later volumes measure up to the standard set by this one, the series will likely serve as essential reading on the Second World War for decades to come. Hopefully, we will not have to wait long for Frank to follow through on the promise of this truly excellent book.

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Bottom Line up Front: I recently read Norman Friedman’s excellent book, Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War. In that book he clearly explains the war-gaming at the US Naval War College, in the period 1920-1940, and its impact on US Navy force design and strategic planning to counter a war with Japan. I was expecting that Hal Friedman’s book regarding war gaming at the US Naval War College, in 1946-47, with the Soviet Union as the ‘enemy’ would be equally enlightening; I was sadly disappointed.

This 450-plus-page tome, with the exception of the first and last chapters, literally ‘bored me to tears’. If you want to know how to run a maritime war game down to the last minute decision, the last gallon of fuel, the last air sortie, the last shell fired and the last course alteration then this is your book,
as chapter after chapter explores this in
infinite detail. There is gold in the book
but you have to sift a lot of gravel to
find it!

So what is it all about? The classes
at the college in 1946-47 were com-
posed of naval commanders and cap-
tains (or US Marine Corps, Army and
Army Air Corps equivalents). All of
them had extensive real-war experience
in the recent Second World War. There
were no civilians, females or foreign of-
icers at this stage of the College’s his-
tory. The 1946-47 war-game, chosen by
Admiral Raymond Spruance (President
of the War College during 1946-1948),
was War Plan Purple (with the Soviet
Union as the adversary in the Pacific)
and also later, a re-run of War Plan Or-
ger (with a resurgent Japan as the ene-
my) in 1947-48. Both were effectively
a repetition of the Pacific War 1941-45.
In his conclusion, Hal Friedman final-
ly questions the validity of these war
games when the bulk of US focus, at
the time, was on the threat posed by the
Soviet Union in Europe, the Atlantic,
the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

The ‘War’ starts in 1950 with the
Soviet Union invading the island of Attu
in the Bering Strait (a re-run of Japa-
nese operations in mid-1942 when Attu
and Kiska were invaded), along with an
invasion of South Korea, northern Chi-
na, Manchuria and an attempt to invade
Japan. It assumes (although not stated)
that the Nationalist Chinese have de-
feated the Communists in the Chinese
Civil War (vice the actual Communist
victory in early 1950). The Russians
are provided with a fictitious naval or-
der of battle including aircraft carriers,
battleships, heavy cruisers, destroyers,
submarines and fast attack craft. The
reality is the Russians possessed no
aircraft carriers until the 1970s, had
only two battleships (both in European
waters) and few cruisers. The Sovi-
et Navy was secondary to its land and
air forces and was rather a ‘sea denial’
navy of destroyers, submarines and fast
attack craft.

Why the Soviet Union attacks is un-
clear and the potential reason for it—
to tie down US forces in the Pacific while
the major conflict occurs in the Atlan-
tic and Europe is never really explored.
Team Purple is always fearful that the
US will attack first to seize the Kam-
chatka Peninsula and Sakhalin in order
to isolate the main Soviet base at Vlad-
ivostok and that the US will use atom-
ic weapons; which they do in the war
game, but to stop Japan being invaded.
Ultimately, the Soviet attacks appear to
be generated by a desire to expand their
‘empire’.

Strangely, the war games make no
reference to US allies in the Pacific;
Australia, Canada, the Philippines, New
Zealand or the United Kingdom, who
operated land, sea and air forces in the
region (some as part of the British Com-
monwealth Occupation Force in Japan).
Canadian naval forces from Esquimalt,
British naval forces in Shanghai, Hong
Kong and Singapore or the use of bases
in the Philippines are equally ignored.
Despite the fact that the Second World
War was fought by a ‘coalition’ in the
Pacific and the Korean War fought by a
UN ‘Coalition’, this new Pacific War is,
oddly, a purely American problem.

In addition to their participation in
the war games, the students were re-
quired to write two theses; firstly, Re-
lations between Russia and the United
States and their influence on US For-
eign Policy and secondly, The Influence
of the Atomic bomb on Future Naval
Warfare. While these were linked to the
later war games the benefit of this study
and analysis on the thinking of both the
Purple and Blue teams is rarely stated,
although students were reminded that,
if they used classified data, their wives
or paid typists were not to produce the final typed submission!

The doctrine used throughout the war game was a mixture of inter-war doctrine (big-gun battleships and heavy surface units have primacy) and wartime doctrine stressing the importance of aircraft carriers and submarines. The destruction of the enemy via a ‘decisive battle’ attrition was key for the US forces, while for the weaker Purple force, the goal was to avoid action and attrite the enemy by use of land-based aircraft and submarines.

In the end, the Soviet forces are defeated, and I am sure the students learned (or re-learned) valuable tactical and operational lessons concerning employing naval, land and air forces in a war in the Pacific. Some key aspects of maritime operations were discovered, or strengthened, such as aircraft carrier operations in Arctic conditions are very difficult if not impossible, logistics support in the vast Pacific Ocean is vital as are forward operating bases, that an enemy with a large submarine force will cause significant losses (regardless of having a weaker surface fleet) and that airpower remains a vital part of gaining sea control.

But what about the ‘strategic’ picture? This is somewhat unclear as the author skirts around the issue for most of the book and what data, if any, was provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unknown. Did Spruance deliberately choose a Pacific Ocean war game to remind the Joint Chiefs that the post war reduction of the US Navy, particularly in the Pacific, was a dangerous move? In 1946 the Soviet Union was weak in the Pacific, while Western Europe, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf were seen as the ‘main game’; but once bitten—twice shy.

Interestingly, part of the war game actually predicts the Korean War (1950-53) but it’s the Communist Chinese forces who support North Korea in this venture. Stalin was asked, by Mao Tse Tung in 1951, to commit land and sea forces to the conflict but he refused as he did not want to give the United States, and her allies, any opportunity to expand the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, was the use of inter-war doctrine deliberate to prove it was weak compared to the wartime reality of carrier aviation and submarines having a major effect on the outcome of hostilities? That the US Navy continued to push ahead, post-Second World War, with a substantial aircraft carrier fleet, submarines and anti-submarine assets might be linked to these war games. The author finally starts to pulls some very loose threads together in the conclusion, but I am not sure many who pick up this book will ever make it to page 405 to find out.

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Hugh John Lambert (1937-2016) was a trained draughtsman and Royal Navy veteran who became a prolific author of magazine articles and a collaborator on books about modern warships. Although most of his output covered Second World War British warships, he also illustrated systems produced for other navies. His forte was producing