or paid typists were not to produce the final typed submission!

The doctrine used throughout the war game was a mixture of inter-war doctrine (big-gun battleships and heavy surface units have primacy) and wartime doctrine stressing the importance of aircraft carriers and submarines. The destruction of the enemy via a ‘decisive battle’ vice attrition was key for the US forces, while for the weaker Purple force, the goal was to avoid action and attrite the enemy by use of land-based aircraft and submarines.

In the end, the Soviet forces are defeated, and I am sure the students learned (or re-learned) valuable tactical and operational lessons concerning employing naval, land and air forces in a war in the Pacific. Some key aspects of maritime operations were discovered, or strengthened, such as aircraft carrier operations in Arctic conditions are very difficult if not impossible, logistics support in the vast Pacific Ocean is vital as are forward operating bases, that an enemy with a large submarine force will cause significant losses (regardless of having a weaker surface fleet) and that airpower remains a vital part of gaining sea control.

But what about the ‘strategic’ picture? This is somewhat unclear as the author skirts around the issue for most of the book and what data, if any, was provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unknown. Did Spruance deliberately choose a Pacific Ocean war game to remind the Joint Chiefs that the post-war reduction of the US Navy, particularly in the Pacific, was a dangerous move? In 1946 the Soviet Union was weak in the Pacific, while Western Europe, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf were seen as the ‘main game’; but once bitten—twice shy.

Interestingly, part of the war game actually predicts the Korean War (1950-53) but it’s the Communist Chinese forces who support North Korea in this venture. Stalin was asked, by Mao Tse Tung in 1951, to commit land and sea forces to the conflict but he refused as he did not want to give the United States, and her allies, any opportunity to expand the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, was the use of inter-war doctrine deliberate to prove it was weak compared to the wartime reality of carrier aviation and submarines having a major effect on the outcome of hostilities? That the US Navy continued to push ahead, post-Second World War, with a substantial aircraft carrier fleet, submarines and anti-submarine assets might be linked to these war games. The author finally starts to pulls some very loose threads together in the conclusion, but I am not sure many who pick up this book will ever make it to page 405 to find out.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


Hugh John Lambert (1937-2016) was a trained draughtsman and Royal Navy veteran who became a prolific author of magazine articles and a collaborator on books about modern warships. Although most of his output covered Second World War British warships, he also illustrated systems produced for other navies. His forte was producing
detailed but clear technical drawings based on prodigious research of weapons systems and ship fittings. His work was prized by both readers looking for details of how warships were equipped and how their armament functioned, and model builders. He was working on a compendium of drawings about naval weapons in Second World War British warships of destroyer size and smaller when he died aged 79. This handsome volume publishes Lambert's unique drawings of systems in escorts and minesweepers plus a few miscellaneous items not included in a companion volume about destroyer systems. As John Lambert had not been able to write up descriptions of the systems he had illustrated, the American naval analyst, Dr. Norman Friedman, has provided an introduction that occupies about a quarter of the book.

The drawings start with profile views of several classes of anti-submarine escorts and minesweepers. There are six drawings of Flower-class corvettes that trace their evolution from 1939 to 1944. These reflect the research behind Flower Class Corvettes (2008) which John Lambert had produced with Les Brown. There are no drawings of the other classes described in Friedman's introduction: the River-, Loch- and Bay-class frigates, Castle-class corvettes or the US-built escorts—the Four Stack destroyers transferred in 1940, or the later Captain- and Colony-class frigates. There is a cramped profile drawing of a Bangor class minesweeper and a dense one (too small to be useful) of an Algerine class sweeper. These are followed by many pages of detailed drawings of guns of 4-inch calibre and smaller, along with other weapons systems including anti-submarine projectile launchers and minesweeping devices. The drawings are a real treasure trove for model builders as they include minesweeping deck equipment, depth-charge rails, signal projectors and type 271 radar. Finally, there are drawings of several other weapons fitted in capital ships and cruisers. Each drawing is crammed with distilled information gathered by Lambert. Several include a concise informative “History” which outlines their origins and where fitted. Some have three-dimensional views of details or cutaway diagrams that illustrate how a system like ammunition-feed functions. The John Lambert drawings are interpretive and convey far more than a standard blueprint-type plan can.

The best feature of the introductory text is the almost 50 excellent photographs with particularly useful generous captions in the trademark Friedman style. Rather than describing weapons systems individually by groupings, the 45-page text is a discussion starting in the Great War of how British minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare ships and systems evolved. It is dense with details apparently based on a synthesis of official records. The introduction covers much of the same ground as David Brown's Atlantic Escorts: Ships, Weapons & Tactics in World War II (2007) and Peter Elliot's Allied Escort Ships of World War II (1977).

There are no footnotes and no bibliography. The narrative is dependable when discussing numbers and programs but its reliability on wider issues is undermined by assertions based on questionable assumptions. On page 13, for instance, the Grand Fleet is said to have sometimes lacked enough destroyers to go to sea during the Great War because of the danger posed by German submarines. This is probably an extrapolation from a post-war statement by Admiral Jellicoe that in early 1915 it was “desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour except in an emergency” (The Grand
Another dubious assertion occurs on page 19 during a discussion of interwar thinking about the threat posed to ocean commerce by surface raiders, which, the reader is told, might be armed, high-speed merchant ships. Because their guns would have to be hand-served, rather than seated on elaborate gun mountings, the calibre would be limited to 6 inches since a shell of this size, weighing 100 pounds, was the limit of what a seaman could lift when loading a mounting. After explaining that this is why so many British merchant ships were armed with 6-inch guns, the text goes on to assert that this also must be the reason why the Admiralty considered that 6-inch guns were sufficient in interwar cruisers whose main role would be trade protection. In fact, the Royal Navy interwar cruisers were built after the London Naval Treaty of 1930 which limited the total tonnage but not the number of 6-inch-gun cruisers that Britain could construct.

A statement on page 53 that the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy were largely responsible for Atlantic convoys when the USN entered the war is correct, but it is incorrect in asserting that the RCN was under British operational control. This had been exercised in the western Atlantic since August 1941 by the USN “Support Force”, later TF 24, under Anglo-American agreements made at the Argentia Conference.

British Naval Weapons of World War II. The John Lambert Collection Volume II has been produced in an attractive large size that shows Lambert’s unique drawings with their rich detailed interpretive notes clearly. The numerous excellent photographs and their comprehensive captions are a pleasure to study. This project by Seaforth Publishing and the US Naval Institute Press to make John Lambert’s painstaking re-

search available is commendable.

Jan Drent
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Historical echoes can be eerie. As I prepared to write this book review, cities across the United States erupted in protest over the violent murder of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis and the systemic injustices African Americans regularly encounter. Protestors demand change. They demand their voices be heard. Similarly, repressed cries from the seventeenth century can be heard in the voices of the convicts, sailors, indentured servants, and the enslaved examined in Johan Heinsen’s Mutiny in the Danish Atlantic World. They, too, acted. They mutinied, deserted, and turned pirate. They resisted and challenged an exploitative imperial and economic system meant to exert control over their lives and labour through violence. In this creative book, Heinsen attempts to recapture “the voices of those men and women whose labours built and shaped empires” (177) through the “echoes” ignored by generations of historians (Chapter Two: “Echoes”). This study reminds us of the need to listen to oppressed voices.

The study of convicts and seafarers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has many challenges, not least the shortage of first-hand accounts and the dominance of elite narratives. Heinsen identifies this problem early, asking readers to join him on a journey through