
Colin Helling puts forward the position that the Royal Navy and its responsibilities to both Scotland and England under the regal union of 1608 contributed to the parliamentary union of 1707. The Royal Navy, in being the Crown’s navy, and the single Crown ruling in both nations, was the single force common to both countries. Helling acknowledges, however, that it was not a typically shared institution, since the navy’s materiel and monetary resources and overall control resided in England. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the realization of the navy’s importance in shielding Scotland, to prevent invasion of England via the Scottish borders, came into clear focus, playing an important role in the political union.

In the first portion of this story, from 1608 through to 1640, England and Scotland struggled to sort out jurisdictional issues under the royal union. Scotland did not have the resources for a permanent navy, nor the tariff base to help support the English navy. What they did have was an extensive fishing ground to which they allowed England access in return for naval protection. The Dutch maritime strength, both in naval and fishing fleets, drove this development forward. Yet here, as throughout the century, Helling notes that English shores always drew the bulk of the navy’s attention.

Charles I’s effort to bring religious union to the two countries resulted in two Bishop’s Wars, 1639 and 1640. Though the English navy underperformed, their ability to enforce a blockade did serve to undermine Scottish security. Scottish army success against the English led, in part, to a revolt in Ireland in 1641. At peace with England, Scotland offered to have its army deal with the Irish rebels, if the English provided naval protection for the convoy. The Scottish parliament could not afford transport and naval protection. England sent two ships. Over the next two years, the two countries negotiated a Scots guard, consisting of English ships to protect the Scottish coast and shipping.

Scotland’s reliance on English naval power proved catastrophic as Cromwell invaded the northern country in 1650-51. English ships supported the army allowing for its concentration and victories. The Scots were even unable to muster privateers to harass English shipping. Helling suggests that at the point of Restoration the Scottish elite had realized the importance of naval defence. The First and Second Dutch Wars further underlined the need for a single navy to protect the two countries. In mid-century, battle tactics shifted from pell mell to line of battle. Larger ships with more powerful guns were involved, increasing the capital outlay, maintenance costs, and harbour facilities. Scotland could never afford these expenditures, making it ever more
Negotiations redefining the union, moving towards a political union began in 1670. Among the many issues were security of fisheries and merchant shipping, and thus a navy. The reign of James VII saw the navy play a crucial role in defeating the Earl of Argyll’s rebellion, though the lack of local Scottish support for the earl’s invasion from the United Provinces, certainly helped. Incidents of seizing Scottish merchant vessels trading with England’s enemies and the sorting out of saluting protocol when Scottish and English ships met in each other’s waters, dominated the 1790s. This raised the idea of a separate Scottish navy, but the costs were simply impossible. The decade ended with the Scottish government at Holyrood, realizing that to have access to the superior English navy, concessions had to be made.

Continued Anglo-Scottish tensions over governance resulted in Scotland re-establishing a small naval element. War with various factions in Europe, the presence of French privateers and continued threats of invasions served to ensure English naval ships plied the waters off Scotland. This co-operative thrust was cemented by the Act of Union in 1707, in which one British navy was created for the protection of the entire island (and Ireland), its trade, and colonies.

Scots had served aboard English ships throughout the century, though never under impressment. Scottish officers commanded ships and Scots had served in the various Privy Councils and Admiralties governing naval affairs. But as Helling suggests, a British navy had never really been on the minds of the typical Scottish citizen; the Scots never saw themselves on equal footing with the English when it came to creating and maintaining a naval force. So how did the navy become so important in the political union of Scotland and England? How was it a shared institution leading to union? The land border between England and Scotland was the most significant threat to England’s security. Shifting to parliamentary union was seen as securing that frontier. As part of the union, the British Navy would move resources to Scotland from the south of England for permanent protection of northern Britain. Thus, the navy’s security role for both England and Scotland was the shared factor.

This is a complex story stretching over a century of wars and political upheaval. As the Scots tried to keep their political independence, they never negotiated for an integrated Royal Navy, with significant Scottish investment and presence, nor did the English. The Scots negotiated their army and fishing rights to gain English naval protection. The English sent ships north to either invade a rebellious Scotland or protect the northern access to England from a foreign invasion. Once Parliament in London included Scottish representatives, the navy was then cast as British. Helling’s evidence leaves this reviewer seeing the British navy as a result of the union, more so than the Royal Navy.
serving as a cause of the union. The navy was really the English navy, upon which the Scottish government called for protection.

The notes and bibliography reflect Helling’s extensive research. A map of Scotland and a table of the number of ships entering Leith in 1639 are the only illustrations. The book has a thorough index.

This is not a book for anyone without a background in the long seventeenth-century history shared by Scotland and England and to some degree, their neighbours. It will appeal to those focused on the roots of the British navy, Scottish involvement in that navy and the interplay between naval decisions, economic trade, politics and state formation.

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This work is number 375 in Osprey’s Campaign Series and the author’s ninth contribution to the Osprey catalogue. In less than 100 pages, Herder expands on earlier works in the series covering the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa by delving into “the epic air-sea actions that raged both in support and defiance of the American landings” (5). The book follows the usual Osprey Campaign format, with examinations of opposing commanders, force dispositions, operational plans, and the campaign itself. For Herder, this latter section covers three operations, Detachment, Iceberg, and Ten-go, all of which were intertwined in their execution and intersection. An impressive number of original colour photographs are integrated with the text, along with maps and graphics to illustrate battle plans and attack tactics. A short selected bibliography and quick reference index round out the work.

The pre-campaign sections of the text offer a solid background to the commanders, their mindsets, morale, and logistical situations faced by both the Americans and Japanese in the lead-up to Operation Detachment. In addition to basic information, Herder offers some insight into the personalities of the various leaders, including the post-campaign fates of several Japanese officers wracked by guilt over the lives loss. The order of battle for Operation Iceberg and relevant Ten-go forces is suitably impressive, clearly demonstrating the overwhelming might of the Allied naval forces in the late war compared to Japanese defenders. Japan’s final realization of the need for inter-service cooperation is noted from surviving documentation, as is the opposition to