view that may or may not accord to reality in the ports. Whether the arguments that police and others make are convincing remains a matter for debate. The authors run together the separate words global and local into “glocal,” a social scientist nod at cleverness. Moreover, the focus on Brexit and on-going trade disputes between the United States and China in the chapters and conclusion distracts from broader understanding of port policing and security relevant to a far larger number of countries.

The book is available in both hardcover and electronic formats. The bibliography does not provide URL links to all open access entries, including my own article “Pacific Gateway” in the Salus Journal (https://salusjournal.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Madsen_Salus_Journal_Volume_6_-Number_1_2018_pp_26-4.pdf). The e-book in the Adobe PDF format allows limited links between the text, bibliography, index, and outside sources. The e-book, however, does not come with additional layers of data sets, information, and illustrations (pictures of the authors, for example) which are now possible. Publishers like Bristol University Press are simply content to make a digital copy of the traditional book with the same pagination, at a lower price point. The publisher may restrict the use and availability of content in the digital format at a later date. For this reason, the hardcover paper book sitting on a shelf still has a certain cachet. Ports, Crime and Security is recommended as a primer for anyone from the policy, law enforcement, national security, port management, shipping, and organized trade union communities interested in framing port policing and criminal activity inside major seaports.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


This is a reprint of Smith’s 2006 study on the decision making processes of commanding officers during the five carrier battles of the Second World War in the Pacific Theatre. Six central chapters focus on the engagements from a primarily American perspective, although Smith includes some of the Japanese rationale as well. Drawing from an impressive array of sources, he aims to illustrate the factors that led to the offensive mindset of American commanders and their ability to make quick and effective decisions in combat situations. Maps and diagrams used throughout the work chart the movements
of both surface vessels and aircraft. Additionally, an appendix of the Japanese plans regarding the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere appears at the end to aid in understanding some of the Japanese planning and mindset. An extensive collection of endnotes, a bibliography, and an index round out the work. Smith’s extensive footnotes contain additional information rather than just source citations.

Prior to describing the carrier battles, Smith spends thirty-two pages discussing the prewar education of the American naval officers involved in wartime operations. Largely focusing on how men were taught “the wrong stuff” in the “right way” to encourage tactically-offensive decisions, this segment includes examinations of the perceived role of air power along with a rather interesting examination of the infamous court martial of Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell (9). The chapters that follow represent the five carrier battles, with relevant pre-engagement data discussed within each. The length of discussion varies, with twenty-eight pages devoted to the Battle of Santa Cruz, while the eponymous Battle of Midway boasts sixty-eight pages. The Battle of Coral Sea section includes an account of the attack on Pearl Harbor, extending the average discussion of the four of the five battles to around thirty pages each.

Smith’s analysis of the engagements is quite complimentary to the American commanders, particularly Admiral Frank J. Fletcher. A man often maligned for abandoning the Marines on Guadalcanal, Fletcher’s decisions are defended via historical analysis and direct primary source citation, lauding his decision to preserve the carriers and surface vessels for future engagements. The author’s breakdown of engagements and decisions is fairly detailed, highlighting the American ability to deviate and improvise in ways alien to the highly orchestrated plans of Japanese naval warfare. He believes that the pre-war American textbook, Sound Military Decisions, served as the key educational cornerstone for the American naval officers involved in the carrier battles, and consistently drives home how the lessons and techniques the men were taught in their pre-war education gave them the foundation to succeed in actual combat scenarios. Smith further breaks down his analysis of battles in retrospective conclusions, where individual decisions are given a school-type “grade,” an admittedly more subjective part of the work.

Nevertheless, several suggestions for improvement come to mind. The book makes very little use of photographs, generally placing a single small image at the start of each chapter. Including a few more of the many images available to illustrate personnel, ships, and engagements would help with the visualization of both the personalities involved and the situations faced during the battles. There is a wide range in quality of both maps and engagement diagrams from highly detailed examples to almost useless, unlabeled shapes.
The replacement of the more crude diagrams from the Naval War College with more detailed scaled examples would be greatly appreciated. Furthermore, the Japanese perspective was relatively lacking. The expansion of the analysis to better examine Japanese pre-war training, commanders, and their decision-making would further enhance the work and help account for why one nation’s officers triumphed over another’s. Finally, the foreword seems almost disconnected from the rest of the work, focusing more on the submarine war than dealing with carrier battles. Addressing these issues in a future edition would definitely strengthen the work.

Carrier Battles is a good resource for those interested in the role of American commanders in the Pacific Theatre. It is by no means perfect, with several venues available for improvement and expansion. For students of American naval tactics, however, or those interested in the actions of Admirals Fletcher, Nimitz, Kincaid, and Spruance, and scholars seeking a compendium of key carrier actions during the Second World War, the work offers a solid compilation of data and analysis. Hopefully Smith will further refine his work to improve on his relatively solid foundation.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Most naval memoirs spotlight the exploits of well-known commanders who participated in one or several historic battles. In a refreshing departure More Lives Than a Ship’s Cat focuses upon a young sailor whose Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) was not combat. He was a clerk, who earned the distinction of being The Most Highly Decorated Midshipman in the Second World War. Of obscure Ashkenazi roots, Gordon Alexander (Mick) Stoke was the last to be admitted into the Paymaster Branch Class at Dartmouth Royal Naval College, but finished with a first in his group. That was in January 1940. Paymasters spend much of their time ciphering and deciphering signals for the commander, and are concerned with accounting, distributing pay, secretarial work, victualling, clothing, stores, and performing secretarial work for senior officers. This MOS, although significant, was an unlikely path to become a highly distinguished naval officer. Yet Stoke excelled as a student, athlete, and valued junior officer, rising through the ranks from midshipman, the lowest