Cruisers many DD [Destroyers] bearing 006 120 speed 15.” As the author emphasizes, this seemingly comprehensive message obscured more than it illuminated. “It failed to mention whether the ‘120’ referred to the enemy’s course or his distance from the reference point. It also did not explicitly mention what reference point was being used, the actual known location of Lexington when Smith [the pilot] launched or the Point Zed reference point he was supposed to use to confuse the enemy (In this instance, Point Zed was approximately 65 miles northeast of the launching point).” (218)

Modern positioning and communications satellites are not subject to the stresses that Second World War combatants were under as they sought to transmit enemy strength and positions as tersely as possible while always under threat of detection and fiery death.

Once battle was joined over both Japanese and American task forces shortly before noon on May 8, Stern’s account shifts from the tedium of hunt and search to the gut-wrenching ordeal of naval combat. Much of it makes painful reading from an American perspective as the Combat Air Patrol comprised of woefully inadequate Douglas SBD scout-dive bombers and poorly positioned fighters was simply outmaneuvered by the initial incoming Japanese formations from carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku. Thereafter, the Americans redressed the balance in their attack on the enemy force, sinking no carriers in exchange for the loss of Lexington, but badly mauling Shokaku and badly weakening Zuikaku’s air group.

While the subject of quite a number of books, the Battle of the Coral Sea has found in Stern, this generation’s master story teller. His research into sources on both sides is exhaustive and he has used Japanese translators where necessary and appropriate to best illuminate materials. The photographs and diagrams he has included add to an impressive you-are-there effect. As the above quoted passage suggests, he has placed us back in 1942 on every page, the best kind of history. His effort has taken years of meticulous scholarship and it shows. At the same time, the general reader will enjoy and benefit from this account of the U.S. Navy’s first serious battle of the Pacific War as much as the professional scholar.

At a time when future naval combat is envisaged in terms of hyper-advanced technologies—Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, robotics and the like—it is good to be reminded that there was a time within the living memories of a declining number of us when mass, ignorant armies clashed by day and night, vast air armadas dumped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs on hapless civilians in often indiscriminate “area” bombings, and admirals flung their young fliers out into the void with nothing in hand save their own eyesight in chancy hopes of finding an elusive enemy.

Highly recommended.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


This volume describes naval officer development in seven different nations. Of these, Britain, France, Spain and the Dutch Republic are the four which have the deepest stamp on previous
historiography. Chapters on Sweden, Denmark and Russia extend the book into lesscharted seas. While discussing all commissioned officers, the book does shine a bit more of its light on the lieutenants within each navy. As part of the Palgrave Macmillan War, Culture and Society series, the book examines the period from 1750 to 1850, though the content focuses largely on 1680 to 1815.

The editors’ goal was to place in one text, descriptions of various European navies that went to sea, in order to exert their nation’s political and economic ends, during the long eighteenth-century. Each deals with the education and employment of officers and the growth of professionalism within each nation’s navy during the period. The authors make an effort to compare their country of focus to others described in the collection, and Evan Wilson provides more comparison in a short, concluding chapter.

Wilson authors the first chapter which focuses on British naval officers, their background, entry, training and service within the navy. It is a summary of much that was included in his previous book, *A Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775-1815*. He focuses here on how officers were trained, selected for promotion and taught to view combat. Wilson credits the necessity of passing a lieutenant’s exam as setting the bar for midshipman and master’s mates who wanted to become commissioned officers. This process required six years of training at sea in all aspects of the ship and sailing. The vast majority who passed the test were qualified to proceed to learning how to command a ship.

Drawn mainly from the middle class, British officers depended on relatives, or patronage, to get to sea, and patronage to assist in their promotion into the right ship, on the right station. Middle- and upper-class officers were promoted at the same rate across the century, a bit different from the Swedish navy, and the French up to 1763. A strong sense of duty, along with public and government expectations led to the Royal Navy’s aggressiveness in battle.

Olivier Chaline examines the French navy, finding it to be unique among European navies in how its officers experienced their careers. France entered the eighteenth century with a strong navy, but within twenty years, it had collapsed. The Crown’s attitude towards the navy’s cost, and failure of naval administrators to convince the King of its vital need, were at the root of the fall. The mid-century War of the Austrian Succession provided a turning point, increasing the navy’s size. The Seven Years War only increased the need for officers, as France’s navy grew again. Prior to the 1760s, most naval officers were recruited from among the nobility. They entered into one of three naval cadet units, and as gentleman, were taught math, hydrography, fortification, small arms, cannon drills, and dancing. Sea experience was gained aboard a frigate, during summer cruises.

French officers changed ships after every cruise. When going to sea, they assembled their own junior officers and crew. With the American War of Independence, the demand for officers required enlisting outside of the nobility, breaking their previous hold on commissioned ranks. By the late-1780s, French naval officers were drawn from the middle and upper classes.

The Spanish naval officer’s career path is described by Pablo Ortega-del-Cerro. The modern Spanish navy began as the Bourbons assumed the throne after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Successive monarchs and naval administrators
constantly tinkered with naval reforms. This chapter examines the context of those reforms, the career of midshipmen, officer promotion and evaluation, and finally the officers’ interaction with the larger Spanish society. Between 1766 and 1793, a series of new regulations served to solidify “institutional effectiveness and administrative coherence.” To become an officer one had to be of noble birth. By mid-century there were three academies to study at, and most candidates entered as Guardiania (midshipmen). Mainly lower nobility sought these posts with the patronage of senior members of the nobility, or the church. Theoretical education was followed by sea training, much like the French system. Promotions were, by mid-century, based largely on seniority, service rendered, and “person circumstances.” A complex method of evaluation of officers, along multiple dimensions, was in place from 1793 through 1813. Spanish naval officers conducted research, exploration and mapping of colonial possessions. They held positions among the intellectual community, promoted trade and were connected to local political power sources.

Gils Romelse surveys the Dutch Republic’s navy noting how its prowess, “its political identity, and its naval officer corps” were intertwined creating a unique context within which naval officers developed and served. In the late seventeenth century the Dutch navy had become the realm of a professional seaman, who saw the service as a life commitment. It attracted noblemen from inland, seeking positions in the national service. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Dutch Republic was in financial straits, and remained in a state of peace until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84). A downsized navy performed convoy duty protecting the Baltic and overseas trade. Many officers sought employment in the navies of other countries. By mid-century, the Dutch had established two training colleges where theory was taught, with practical sailing skills gained at sea. When war with Britain erupted in 1780, the Dutch navy was in need of officers, as many of those in the upper ranks were not fit to go to sea. In the years following the war, many of the officers not promoted during the conflict left the Dutch service. Rommelse gives three case studies demonstrating the influence of peace, war, and state fiscal conditions on the careers of Dutch officers. Stiff competition among officers for positions and patronage led to some brutal reviews of officers’ performance.

Sweden’s naval officer development is discussed by AnnaSara Hammar. The Swedish navy had peaked in the 1500s, declining to a low point by 1700. Three wars with Russia, the Seven Years War, and war with Denmark stimulated naval reforms across the century, but the Swedish navy’s efforts left much to be desired. The only notable success was in the third war with Russia (1788-90), with a major Swedish victory by its inshore squadron. Swedish naval officers were part of a highly valued military class in society. Sailors were recruited by the farmers and burghers. Captains were responsible for the training of their junior and warrant officers. Naval officers were encouraged to read and explore new scientific ideas on navigation, ship construction, and exploration. Many first went to sea in merchant ships, gaining invaluable experience. The Swedes formed a cadet school in 1756 for theoretical education but like the British, most officer development occurred at sea. Throughout the century, many Swedish officers served in the navies of other countries. Officers were judged largely on their
merit, thus the navy “attracted ambitious” middle-class men. A dearth of nobility (who were to hold flag ranks) led to some of these middle-class men being raised to nobility.

Jakob Seerup focuses on the Danish navy’s unique set of contextual factors influencing officer development. In order to rid itself of foreign officers, Denmark established a naval academy, and from 1701 onward it was the single entrance route into the navy. Academic work was followed by summer sea training cruises. The nobility and middle class sent their sons to the academy. Education often continued after graduation as officers were encouraged to develop more knowledge in the sciences.

Copenhagen served as the country’s main naval base and construction yard. Ideally located, Denmark held a key position at the narrowest point of the vital Baltic trade route. The ironic twist was that it experienced a tense but stable peace for eighty years of the century. Instead of advancement based on war-time experience, Danish officers were promoted based on seniority and the number of positions available in the shore divisions in Copenhagen’s dockyard, moving from the dockyard to a ship posting when a cruise was required. At the beginning of an officer’s career (especially for lieutenants) foreign service was typical.

While all the other navies discussed had a lengthy history, the Russian navy literally began on the eve of the eighteenth century. As Brian Davis states, the Great Northern War saw the first service of the Baltic Fleet, contributing to the Russian victory. Dutch influence was essential in creating and commanding the ships, as the Russians depended on foreign officers for the first half of the century. Russia established a naval school early in the century, but students were sent to the Dutch Republic and England for sea experience. Fiscal problems, a line of monarchs with varying degrees of interest in the navy, little merchant shipping, and the fact that Russia was predominantly a land-based power, resulted in an unstable path of naval development. With little combat experience, officers rose based on patronage and “technical-administration skills.” Some officers, such as Vitus Bering, gained important experience and notoriety by engaging in exploration. Empress Catherine the Great took interest in reforming the navy, an effort that culminated in Russian naval victories in the Russo-Turkish War (1768-74), in the Mediterranean.

Wilson concludes that eighteenth-century officers created a line of quasi-inheritance where their sons entered the service and rose through commissions, in a form of self-regeneration for the officer corps. For France and Spain, nobility played a role in shaping those nations’ officer corps, while the Danes and British relied more on officers from the middle class. Young men went to sea in the British, Dutch, and Swedish navies to learn their profession, while France, Spain, Denmark and Russia sent theirs first to an academy to learn the theory, before heading out to sea. In preparation for war, Denmark created the most efficient, highly structured naval organization during eight decades of peace. Wilson offers an additional comparison of the nations addressed in the book to the naval officers of the Ottoman and American navies, although a chapter comparing each of these to the various European nations would have been more profitable for the reader.

The book also demonstrates how a navy’s essential role in empire-building fostered martial experience, exposed officers to the technology and ideas of other nations, and to opportunities for
promotion. Across the seven examples, each nation saw the development of state centralization of control over entry, education and advancement of its naval officers. The creation and reforming of rules and regulations governing the officers played a central role in this gradual professionalization.

Two maps appear in chapter four, concerning Spanish naval bases. Nine figures and twelve tables appear throughout the book detailing demographic elements of the officer group under discussion, including their pay, political affiliation, and promotion possibilities. Endnotes follow each article, with no overall bibliography. The index is comprehensive. The volume reveals that there are marvelous sources in various national archives, ready for data-mining for demographic and career-path information for officers (see Sweden’s merit lists, and the Danish records).

This book will appeal to those interested in naval officer development, in the context of growing centralized state control. Social historians will appreciate the effort to explore the social background of officers, their path within each nation’s navy, and their standing in society.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


Espionage has been part of world history since ancient times. In the period between the First and Second World Wars, Imperial Japan came to see the United States as its principal foe in future wars. In that light, Japan maintained an extensive espionage system in North America, including radio interception posts in Baja California, Mexico. Since there is no substitute for first-hand observation of one’s enemy, the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, in the then-American territory of Hawaii, was an extremely important base for intelligence on the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Navy (USN), based in Pearl Harbor. Among the Consulate staff was a clerk named Takeo Yoshikawa, in reality a spy for the Imperial Japanese Navy. His memoir, Japan’s Spy at Pearl Harbor. Memoir of an Imperial Japanese Navy Secret Agent, appears in English translation for the first time.

Yoshikawa was born in 1912; he entered the Etajima Naval Academy in 1930 and graduated from there. A perhaps promising navy career was cut short by ill-health; he was retired at a very young age but then assigned to work in intelligence with the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (IIN). In that role, he analyzed intelligence reports and advised the IIN of the capabilities of its potential adversaries—the British Royal Navy, the Dutch East Indies Navy, and the USN. In early 1941 Yoshikawa was posted to the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. His ostensible duties were to deal with applications from Japanese citizens wanting to relinquish their nationality and become American citizens. This was hardly an onerous task, allowing Yoshikawa ample time to travel around Hawaii and see for himself the various military installations and civilian airfields throughout the Hawaiian Islands. His findings were duly transmitted to the IIN.

Yoshikawa turned out to be very good at espionage; he often penetrated