promotion. Across the seven examples, each nation saw the development of state centralization of control over entry, education and advancement of its naval officers. The creation and reforming of rules and regulations governing the officers played a central role in this gradual professionalization.

Two maps appear in chapter four, concerning Spanish naval bases. Nine figures and twelve tables appear throughout the book detailing demographic elements of the officer group under discussion, including their pay, political affiliation, and promotion possibilities. Endnotes follow each article, with no overall bibliography. The index is comprehensive. The volume reveals that there are marvelous sources in various national archives, ready for data-mining for demographic and career-path information for officers (see Sweden’s merit lists, and the Danish records).

This book will appeal to those interested in naval officer development, in the context of growing centralized state control. Social historians will appreciate the effort to explore the social background of officers, their path within each nation’s navy, and their standing in society.

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Espionage has been part of world history since ancient times. In the period between the First and Second World Wars, Imperial Japan came to see the United States as its principal foe in future wars. In that light, Japan maintained an extensive espionage system in North America, including radio interception posts in Baja California, Mexico. Since there is no substitute for first-hand observation of one’s enemy, the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, in the then-American territory of Hawaii, was an extremely important base for intelligence on the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Navy (USN), based in Pearl Harbor. Among the Consulate staff was a clerk named Takeo Yoshikawa, in reality a spy for the Imperial Japanese Navy. His memoir, *Japan’s Spy at Pearl Harbor. Memoir of an Imperial Japanese Navy Secret Agent*, appears in English translation for the first time.

Yoshikawa was born in 1912; he entered the Etajima Naval Academy in 1930 and graduated from there. A perhaps promising navy career was cut short by ill-health; he was retired at a very young age but then assigned to work in intelligence with the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (IJN). In that role, he analyzed intelligence reports and advised the IJN of the capabilities of its potential adversaries—the British Royal Navy, the Dutch East Indies Navy, and the USN. In early 1941 Yoshikawa was posted to the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. His ostensible duties were to deal with applications from Japanese citizens wanting to relinquish their nationality and become American citizens. This was hardly an onerous task, allowing Yoshikawa ample time to travel around Hawaii and see for himself the various military installations and civilian airfields throughout the Hawaiian Islands. His findings were duly transmitted to the IJN.

Yoshikawa turned out to be very good at espionage; he often penetrated
military bases, talked with many Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, monitored the comings and goings of USN vessels, especially the warships. In one famous act, ordered to determine whether anti-submarine and anti-torpedo nets were present, he climbed into the waters of Pearl Harbor, swam to mid-channel, and stayed there. He held onto a rock to keep submerged and breathed through a bamboo pole. At one point, a sentry nearly saw him. But Yoshikawa emerged unnoticed and reported to his superiors that he was unable to determine the presence of anti-submarine and anti-torpedo nets.

The IJN attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 (local calendar) came as no surprise to Yoshikawa and his co-workers; many knew that some kind of action against the USA was imminent. About two hours after the initial attack on Pearl Harbor, local police entered the Japanese consulate and arrested all present, including Yoshikawa. While American authorities strongly suspected Yoshikawa of being far more than a mere consulate clerk, nothing was ever proven against him. As part of the consulate staff, he had diplomatic privileges. Instead of being imprisoned, the Japanese consulate staff was isolated in a hotel room, then taken to the American mainland where all concerned spent several months in a ranch in rural Arizona. Then, as arrangements were completed for the exchange of American diplomats in Japan and Japanese diplomats in America, Yoshikawa and his colleagues traveled by train to New York City. The long train trip gave Yoshikawa a chance to see the vastness of America and its economic potential. The Japanese diplomats were placed on a Swedish liner, which sailed across the South Atlantic, around the southern tip of Africa, and finally landed at Lourenço Marques in then-Portuguese East Africa. There Yoshikawa saw the American diplomats returning to the USA; they carried cheap leather or cloth bags, while the Japanese diplomats carried leather suitcases. From that incident, Yoshikawa began to sense that perhaps, Japan had acted rashly in attacking the USA.

After his return to Japan, Yoshikawa spent the rest of the war as a technician at the IJN General Staff. He compiled reports, interrogated prisoners of war, and even found the time to get married. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Yoshikawa spent time “on the run,” as he feared he would be exposed as the spy he had been. Eventually, he returned to his family, opened a gasoline station, and became a member of his town council. He even took part in an American television program in 1961 which commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. He died in 1993.

A recent article on Yoshikawa (Brian Walsh, “In Plain Sight,” World War 2, November, 2017, pp. 38-45) states that Yoshikawa’s memoirs have appeared three times: in 1963 (which is this translation), in 1985, and a revised version published posthumously in 2015, as well as in magazine and newspaper articles and various interviews. It is, therefore, difficult to know which version of his memoirs is the most accurate one.

Nevertheless, this book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Pacific War and also espionage. It gives an in-depth glimpse into espionage techniques, some of which are still valuable today. Yoshikawa reprinted many of his cables to the IJN and these add to the value of this book. The translation, by Andrew Mitchell of Toronto, is excellent and the narrative reads in a conversational, easy-to-follow style. In addition, Mitchell added endnotes
which explain many concepts Yoshikawa mentioned which are unfamiliar to those not versed in Japanese history and culture.

In Yoshikawa’s opinion “[T]he U.S. was the underlying cause of this war [the Pacific War.]” (163) While this could be attributed to Japanese patriotism, a revisionist school of history places the blame for the Pacific War on inept American diplomacy. Although that point is debatable, it is worth considering. In any case, this book is a good read and is recommended.

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BACK LIST


The history of oceanography presented in Soundings and Crossings as a collection of essays—written with a wide-reaching historical imagination—that is as varied in subject as it is in the background of the authors. Topics like the production of nautical charts, the existence of marine stations, international and national science, ocean biology, marine meteorology, the practicalities of scientific diving, and the representation in art of the marine environment and its organisms. On occasion the stories are interesting to read, but sometimes they are just too, to put it mildly, mechanical and formal to arouse any curiosity whatsoever.

In spite of some weaknesses, the idea behind the book is good. Not everyone will appreciate all the essays,