Some of the images such as those showing combat scenes from the Spanish-American War are too small, making it hard to discern details. Increasing their size would increase their effectiveness. Removing the rather noticeable “Getty Images” banners across two images would also improve their usefulness. (4, 35) The profile illustrations, while detailed, lack an indication as to the size of the vessels in comparison to each other. This could be accomplished via the addition of a scale or a side-by-side comparison of line profiles for the different classes. Finally, there is mention early in the design section of armour types accompanied by a table on equivalency without a statement as to what the information is equivalent to. Given the importance of armour to the design of these cruisers, a more in-depth explanation of the different types and the reasons for their varied effectiveness would be appreciated.

*US Navy Armored Cruisers* serves as a decent primer for those interested in American armoured cruisers at the turn of the century and the First World War. Herder offers insight into each of the vessel designs and covers their major actions in terms of combat, accidents, and their role at the dawn of naval aviation. The coverage of cruiser participation in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba is solid for those studying the Spanish-American War, and the inclusion of information on all three cruisers lost in the 1910s offers insight to readers interested in German operations off the Atlantic Coast, salvage operations, and the effects of rough weather on capital ships. While the text could be expanded to add more detail on the nuances of design and the post-war service of surviving vessels, *US Navy Armored Cruisers* offers an introductory exposure to an often overlooked ensemble of warships.

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This book is a history of the United States Navy (USN) during the first third of the Cold War, which was that period of intense rivalry, verging on warfare, between countries of the Communist Bloc and the West following the Second World War. The period covered is a turbulent phase of American history with the “Red Scare” playing out in the press and in society after a long period of western co-operation with the Soviet Union and China. The aim of the book is unequivocal: “to develop the story of this global institution as a protector of the national interest” (4). The title is based on a quote from Themistocles, a Greek naval strategist, which appears at the beginning of the
book: “Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything”. The author promises an interweaving of politics and naval activities, wide-ranging and intimate: “This is a book about the Navy, but it’s also about foreign affairs. It’s about presidencies, war and peace, and America in the world. Politics and policy, morals, and war” (xvii). The author then tells us that the scope of naval history “can encompass the full variety of technical programs in naval aviation, submarine and amphibious warfare, surface ship tactics, intelligence, administration, shipbuilding, basing, and operational stories.”

The action unfolds, being divided between political and strategic decision-making and the level of action of individual ships and people. Hornfischer’s style is very active and language aggressive, as in the Contents listing for Chapter 16, “Strike From the Sea”: ‘‘A Great Deal of Sport’: American Aviators versus the North Korean Army” (xiii) and, Chapter 21 entitled “Heavy Metal”, “Navy pilot Royce Williams kills four MiG-15 over the Sea of Japan” (xiv). At times, the author is jocose, prone to making anecdotes or flippant remarks that are unusual in a standard history. His description of the aftermath of Operation Crossroads, in which ships, equipment, and “biological test material” (pigs and goats), were assembled at Bikini Atoll for atomic bomb test explosions in 1946, records that a Navy cook pronounces a surviving dog to appear to be healthy, although it is a “hot dog radiologically speaking” (103).

Thirty chapters cover the leading actors, major themes and events in USN history. Actors include important politicians, members of the diplomatic corps and senior officers of the Navy and its Marine Corps (USMC). Themes include the quest to develop new technology across the entire spectrum of warfare, especially nuclear weapons and propulsion systems. Missile development begins with the adaptation of German liquid propellant rockets for use in strategic bombardment from the sea. Later developments including the Polaris ICBM and the highly successful air-to-air Sidewinder missile. Treatment of these highly technical subjects is at a superficial level. Developments related to USS Nautilus require a whole chapter, while the voyage to the North Pole requires another. A major theme that runs throughout the book is the replacement of Pax Britannica by the USN, most dramatically in the Mediterranean Sea in the years immediately following the Second World War. Including the chapter on the Suez crisis, this process requires three chapters. The “special relationship” between Britain and America is evident in the deference shown individual vessels of the British navy throughout the text. US and British commanders who are mentioned in the text also receive an entry in the index. No Soviet ranking naval officer and only a single vessel makes an appearance. Political themes include the unification of the armed services; Navy rivalry with the US Army Air Force and later the US Air Force, for a role in strategic (nuclear) bombardment. Another theme is the struggle of the US
Chapter One, “Fleet at a Crossroads”, covers post-war demobilization and alludes to the USN’s embrace of an uncertain nuclear future with Admiral Halsey barnstorming New York for a share of the glory and a post-war future. Major players in the Navy and State Departments are introduced: James Forrestal as a prodigy of defence planning with George Kennan of the State Department in Moscow. The atomic bomb is described as having “transformative power” in that it “ended one war and started another. In the offices of Congress and in the angular corridors of the Pentagon, the longest running civil war in American life flared anew: the quest of the generals and admirals to bring the other service to heel” (11) and a “ferocious existential struggle with the Air Force over roles and missions” (118). The National Security Act of 1947 was a major event with the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Air Force (USAF).

The most detailed account of an event is of the Korean War which requires six chapters. Although it was supposedly a United Nations (UN)-run operation, there is little or no mention of the UN, its functionaries or important allies, like Canada. The account covers the land campaign as well as the naval war from the perspective of the USMC and USN, because the USMC was integral with US Army in the land campaign and both were transported and supported by the USN. The anomalous position of the USMC among the US armed services becomes clear during the Korean conflict. It appears as a unit of the USN and also is treated as though it were independent. In addition to functioning on the ground with the Army, the USMC had its own air force. The USN air war also has a chapter devoted to it. On many occasions, the performance of the USMC air units is compared favourably in ground co-operation functions with the USAF. In this history of the Korean War, the Canadian naval effort is reduced to “a number of light combatants.” The second failure to acknowledge contributions from Canada in a major UN operation is in the account of the Suez Crisis. While there is no mention of them, Canadians under the auspices of the UN, notably Lester B. Pearson, succeeded in separating the warring parties by sending the aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent, loaded with a fleet of trucks and a contingent of fully-trained regular Canadian Army service personnel. They would be the first relay of Canadian forces who would enforce a peace over the next decades in Sinai and Gaza. Lester Pearson would win world acclaim for his efforts with a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.

The other services usually fare badly in terms of treatment: during a retreat in Korea, units of the US Army, despite strong support from the Navy “disintegrated into a leaderless mass whose survivors—fewer than half its complement…” By contrast USMC units are described in the same retreat as being in good order with their wounded and equipment. Photographs of people
are almost all official portraits of senior officers posed formally, showing lots of braid and medals. Most prominent photos of US Army generals from the Korean conflict are among those captured and killed.

Chapter 28, “SIOP”, an acronym for “Single Integrated Operational Plan,” seems to reprise Eberstadt and Forrestal’s dream of a system that integrates thought and action in warfare throughout the economy and life itself, which is a concept worthy of Dr. Strangelove. The last Chapter, “From the Deep to the Target,” details the successful struggle to launch the solid-propellant ICBM Polaris from underwater, which leaves the ballistic missile submarine firmly in the ascendent.

If ever a work needed a list of abbreviations and acronyms, this is it, containing sprawling historical USN contractions such as CINCPAC, CINCNELM, COMNAVFORCONAD, or BuAer’s taxonomy of airplanes, such as, F9F and PBY. Sentences like “When the proposal was shown to SACEUR, it was delivered on a NONFORN basis—no foreign recipients” illustrate the need. The index can only be described as idiosyncratic, being an attempt at pre-coordination of subjects and, relies on placement to indicate hierarchy, making it difficult to use. Coverage is more complete early in the period, based on the documentary sources listed in the bibliography. Most are from the period 1946 to 1949.

We are told in the preface that there was “thoroughgoing, comprehensive, and hopelessly incomplete” research. Sources listed in the bibliography include interviews and testimony of the highest-ranking politicians and naval officers, like Secretary of the USN and high-ranking officers, in the form of “oral histories.” There are also “official documents” of bodies like the US National Security Council and the Foreign Relations Committee. There is extensive use of quotations throughout, which, while being attributed to various players, are without the notes that would link them with the original source. Thus, normal academic practice, which would allow verification and further study, is largely missing. The handling of two famous quotes is curious. Harry Truman reacting to an attempt by a US Senator to have a member of the USMC on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is quoted as retorting: “The Marines is the Navy’s police force and, as long as I am president that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s” (247). This quote, which throws into relief the attempt of the USMC to become a separate armed service, was widely published in the press and debated. The second is Dwight Eisenhower’s warning to the American people to beware the “Military-Industrial Complex” (314). The quote is not recorded, the author merely alludes to it in order to make an obscure point about democracy. The author fails to report that Ike’s main message was an impassioned warning, made in his televised farewell speech to the American nation, on the basis of
50 years of service in the army, to beware the warfare business.

The book fulfils its aim of promoting the USN and USMC although it is problematic. It is a polemic, although it is intended to look like an academic treatise. It does, however, describe and give the background to the immense political and financial reach of today’s USN.

As a reviewer I had numerous issues with the propagandist style of the book basically promoting the US Navy and the US Marine Corps. The publisher should have required the elementary link between quote and source, usually in a note, despite the fact that the author had died previous to publication. I also question the dismissal of Canada’s role throughout the Cold War, not just the efforts of Lester B. Pearson. Desmond Morton cites negotiation between Pearson and the Egyptian government that sent RCASC and support troops to replace combat troops. Similarly, the author ignores the Canadian navy’s role in the Korean War. Meanwhile, all references to British navy vessels receive the designation HMS. Hmmm.

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Though maritime archaeologists and scholarly historians may not all participate in the craft of modelmaking, they would concede that ship models and those who build them have had a major impact on our understanding of maritime history. Ship models, in fact, constitute some of the earliest evidence we have of ship construction, design, technology and culture. Found mainly in ancient tombs, the oldest models offer vital clues to solving these questions in the absence of other forms of evidence. The modern era of ship modeling, by contrast, is often supported with ample material to corroborate our conclusions about a given vessel’s structure and features. Models of famous eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century naval vessels tend to be very exact in their details as a result. That said, our knowledge of those ships, even ones as famous as HMS *Bounty*, are not always buoyed with such strong documentation. This is where Kerry Jang’s excellent model shipbuilding guide makes its mark.

*Bounty* was, of course, the setting for the best-known naval mutiny in history. Originally built in 1784 as the collier *Bethia*, it was purchased by the Royal Navy in 1787, essentially to serve as a “floating greenhouse.” Under the supervision of botanist Sir Joseph Banks, the ship was converted for use