

# Professional Port Police: Donald Cassidy's 1967 Reports on Policing and Security in Canadian Commercial Ports

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*In response to a troubling rise in criminal activity in some of Canada's major commercial seaports during the mid-1960s, the federal Department of Transport engaged a former Royal Canadian Mounted Police/Gendarmerie royale du Canada (RCMP/GRC) member seconded from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics to study the scope of the problem and suggest possible improvements. Two reports were prepared, an internal one for the government harbours board and a public one for the private association representing port managements. A key outcome was creation of the National Harbours Board Police, a new federal police force distinct from the RCMP/GRC. This commentary compares the reports with a table showing the principal recommendations.*

*En réponse à une augmentation inquiétante de l'activité criminelle dans certains des principaux ports maritimes commerciaux du Canada au milieu des années 1960, le ministère fédéral des Transports a engagé un ancien membre de la Royal Canadian Mounted Police/Gendarmerie royale du Canada (RCMP/GRC) détaché du Bureau fédéral des statistiques pour étudier l'ampleur du problème et suggérer des améliorations possibles. Deux rapports ont été préparés, l'un interne pour le conseil gouvernemental des ports et l'autre public pour l'association privée représentant les*

*gestionnaires des ports. L'un des principaux résultats a été la création de la Police du Conseil national des ports, un nouveau corps de police fédéral distinct de la RCMP/GRC. Ce commentaire compare les rapports avec un tableau reprenant les principales recommandations.*

In 1997, the Ports Canada Police (PCP) fell victim to federal government budget cuts, restructuring, devolvement of responsibilities within the port system, economic interests, and denial on the part of port authorities and politicians that crime existed in the country's principal national seaports.<sup>1</sup> As a result, unlike other jurisdictions around the world, Canada possesses no dedicated port police forces and relies on a mix of private security and coverage by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police/Gendarmerie royale du Canada (RCMP/GRC), Canada Border Services Agency/Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (CBSA/ASFC), and local police in municipalities adjoining federal port lands. Port policing is nominally held to be a provincial law enforcement responsibility, which in real terms remains chronically under-resourced and subject to jurisdictional, regulatory, and governance mismatches.<sup>2</sup> This situation is far removed from the vision expounded by the main architect behind early organization of the National Harbours Board Police, the PCP's original forerunner. Donald Cassidy delivered dual reports that recommended its creation and in turn became director general of the new National Harbours Board Police in 1968.

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<sup>1</sup> Mary R. Brooks, "A New Direction or Stay the Course? Canada's Port-Specific Challenges Resulting from the Port Reform Program of the 1990s," *Research in Transportation Business and Management* 22 (2017): 161-170, doi: 10.1016/j.rtbm.2016.08.002; Michael Toddington, "Port Policing: Has Canada dropped the ball?," *Frontline Security* 2, no. 3 (2005): 23-25; Minister of Transport David Anderson wrote to the Solicitor General of Canada Herb Gray: "I agree with you that there is no requirement for an enhanced RCMP[GRC] presence at the six ports where Canada Ports Corporation (CPC) police detachments could be eliminated. As the Commissioner of the RCMP [GRC] indicated to your Deputy Minister, Mr. Mulder, in his letter of December 4, 1996, there is no demonstrated need for such measures. Should the circumstances change in the future, this decision can be revisited. As you suggested, it is only sufficient to assure the general public that the RCMP [GRC] have in place adequate resources to ensure effectiveness in the areas of national security, intelligence gathering, and federal law enforcement." Memorandum, Françoise Lang to Hélène Parent, Correspondence Unit Solicitor General's Office, 23 December 1996, RG 73 BAN 2015-01178-1, box 16, file 7000-19, pt. 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).

<sup>2</sup> Kevin F. Quigley and Bryan Mills, "'Set Adrift': Fatalism as Organizational Culture at Canadian Seaports," *Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management* 13, no. 1 (April 2016): 191-218, doi: 10.1515/jhsem-2015-0030; and Peter German & Associates Inc., Policing Our Ports: A Report to the City of Delta (12 September 2023), [https://issuu.com/deltapolice/docs/policing\\_our\\_ports\\_document\\_design?fr=xKAE9\\_zU1NQ](https://issuu.com/deltapolice/docs/policing_our_ports_document_design?fr=xKAE9_zU1NQ).



Ports Canada Police shoulder patches. (Author's collection)

Port policing constitutes a highly specialized sub-field in the law enforcement and security sectors integral to the state, national security, and free movement of goods in national and international economies. Cassidy's reports, therefore, represent seminal documents for understanding Canada's overall approach in the wider marine port security context – past and present. The Canadian government subscribes to a common code and standards set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and maintains national legislation and regulations for implementation.<sup>3</sup> Marine port security, of which port policing forms a significant constituent part, involves multiple stakeholders and remains inherently inter-agency, especially in the North American context.<sup>4</sup> The degree of attention given to policing in commercial seaports typically draws a correlation to real and perceived levels of criminality either from within the waterfront workforce and port staffs or from outside criminals looking for easy payoffs and transit points facilitating other lucrative criminal enterprises.<sup>5</sup> Either way, the common motivating factor remains profit from ill-gotten gains.<sup>6</sup> The problem of theft, pilfering, and other criminal activity

<sup>3</sup> Mary R. Brooks, "Maritime Security in Canada," in Khalid Bichou, Joseph S. Szyliowicz, and Luca Zamparini (eds.), *Maritime Transport Security* (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 141-158.

<sup>4</sup> Russell Brewer, *Policing the Waterfront: Networks, Partnerships, and the Governance of Port Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 33-37; Anna Sergi, Alexandria Reid, Luca Storti, and Marleen Easton, *Ports, Crime and Security: Governing and Policing Seaports in a Changing World* (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021), 53-57.

<sup>5</sup> Chris Madsen, "Pacific Gateway: State Surveillance and Interdiction of Criminal Activity on Vancouver's Waterfront," *Salus Journal* 6, no. 1 (2018): 27-28; Yarin Eski, *Policing, port security and crime control: an ethnography of the port securityscape* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Anna Sergi and Luca Storti, "Survive or perish: Organised crime in the port of Montreal and the port of New York/New Jersey," *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 63 (December 2020): 100424, doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2020.100424; Luca Storti, Anna Sergi,

became so endemic by the mid-1960s in some major Canadian seaports that the situation could be neither ignored nor tolerated, thereby forcing a response from the federal government. Donald Cassidy was a former RCMP/GRC staff sergeant, at that time engaged with the Bureau of Dominion Statistics setting up a uniform crime reporting program nation-wide, secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and national president of the RCMP Veterans Association.<sup>7</sup> He was therefore well-placed by professional background, informed knowledge, and contacts to investigate the scope of criminality afflicting Canadian seaports and then make recommendations for addressing any deficiencies uncovered. Cassidy was seconded to the National Harbours Board from the statistics bureau for a period of six months.

The two reports prepared by Cassidy, one internal for the National Harbours Board (NHB) and the second public one delivered a few months later to the Canadian Port and Harbour Association, are held in separate record groups at the Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa.<sup>8</sup> The former runs a detailed 120 pages in length, while the latter shorter version stands at sixty-five pages. Both shared a common preamble:<sup>9</sup>

This report concerns the policing and security of some of the ports of the National Harbours Board, namely, the Ports of Montréal, Halifax, Saint John, and St. John's.

It is the first of two reports in keeping with the Terms of Reference of the Special Project dealing with the policing and security of Canadian ports and harbours on behalf of the National Harbours Board and the Canadian Port and Harbour Association.<sup>10</sup>

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and Yuliya Zabyelina, "Private Port Authorities and Organized Crime," in Yuliya Zabyelina and Kimberley L. Thachuk (eds.), *The Private Sector and Organized Crime: Criminal Entrepreneurship, Illicit Profits, and Private Sector Security Governance* (London: Routledge, 2022), 356.

<sup>7</sup> D.N. Cassidy, "International Cooperation in Port Policing," *RCMP Gazette* (January 1972): 3; Cassidy's son remembered his father and mother running the affairs of the association out of the basement of the family's Ottawa home. Donald J. Klancher, *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Veterans' Association 1924-1999* (Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police Veterans' Association, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> "Report on Policing and Security of National Harbours Board Property," 14 December 1967, RG 73 acc. 1984-85/562, box 10, file LE 2004-3-1.8, LAC; and "Report on Policing and Security Prepared for the Canadian Ports and Harbours Association," 8 May 1968, RG 27 L-4-ii, vol. 3409, file f, LAC. It was Cassidy's idea to prepare two reports. National Harbours Board, "Chronological Review of Criminal Activity and Preventative Measures taken at the ports of Montreal (1960-1968) and Quebec (1963-1966)," 19 February 1969, 112, RG 27 L-4-ii, vol. 3410, file h, LAC.

<sup>9</sup> Please note that anachronistic and prejudicial language has been updated to reflect modern sensibilities.

<sup>10</sup> E.J. Alton and E.B. Griffith, "Canadian Port and Harbour Association – Report of Committee on Pilferage," 17 August 1967, RG 66 acc. 1983-84/50, box 6, file 125-C-1 pt. 7, LAC; G.S.

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**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

The Terms of Reference for the survey given to the writers are as follows:

1. Establish systems and methods of crime prevention and law enforcement for the security, protection of property, and revenue of the ports;
2. Coordinate the policing and security activities of the several port police and security forces with other law enforcement agencies whose potentialities are related to the common task of dealing with the problem;
3. Maintain a central collection, recording, storage, retrieval, and dissemination system of information and intelligence for port police and security agencies and law enforcement agencies in general;
4. Conduct effective liaison with the Canadian Port and Harbour Association, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and other associations concerned with the protection and security of the ports and harbours.

In keeping with the Terms of Reference a separate report will be made for the [National Harbours Board/Canadian Port and Harbour Association].

This report is aimed at improving the police services in the ports which come under the authority of the National Harbours Board by focusing upon problems of crime which seem inherent in all ports and the policy designed to combat these problems and others in relationship to the internal management, organization, and administration of the Board's several police forces. Obvious to such a task is the obligation to prescribe treatment for discovered weaknesses and would improve the use of existing assets.

It will be appreciated that in the time available an in-depth study of the police services of the Board at Halifax, Saint John, and Montréal was not possible. Time did not permit visits to the remaining ports which come under the authority of the Board. Therefore, the survey concentrated mainly on the need to develop a respect for law and order in the ports, the difficulties involved to accomplish this formidable task, and steps which should be taken to improve the overall policing and security of the ports from the viewpoint of policy, organization, and administration.

The survey was commenced on 4 July 1967, by examining the administrative files available at the Board's Headquarters at Ottawa. Visits were then paid to the Ports of Montréal, Saint John, Halifax, and St. John's, and discussions were held with port management including a physical inspection of port properties. The Commission Ports at Toronto and Hamilton were also visited. At the ports, meetings were held wherever possible, with shipping companies, shipping agents, marine insurance agencies, private security forces, police forces (municipal, provincial, RCMP/GRC, and others having

an interest in the ports). In addition, meetings were held with the RCMP/GRC, Customs, Immigration and Labour Departments, and Municipal Grants Office of the Department of Finance at Ottawa. A meeting was also held with Commissioner Joseph Kaetz and Chief Investigator T.F. Jones, Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor.<sup>11</sup>

The Board received compliments from business firms, police forces, government departments, and port officials for instigating the survey and that someone was finally doing something. It is obvious to the writer that many people are worried about the deterioration of the ports brought on by the actions of the criminal element.

### **CRIME ON THE WATERFRONT**

It is desirable to have an appreciation of the nature and extent of the crime problem in the ports and the need for high quality policing and security designed to protect the lives and property of persons using or employed in the ports, vehicle and pedestrian control for traffic safety, and to prevent and discourage crime by creating a fear of detection.

It is well known that all types of crime are committed in Canadian ports. This is not a problem unique to Canada but apparently exists in all other major ports of the world. The Board's Port Managers at Halifax, Saint John, and Montréal, the General Managers of Commission Ports at Toronto and Hamilton, senior police officials at these points and at Baltimore, Boston, New York, and New Orleans have told me that crimes take place in their harbours and the situation is very serious. These crimes, in general, are pilferage (theft of part of the contents of a package), theft (cartons, packages, pallet loads and truck loads), gambling, loansharking, kickbacks for preferential treatment, prostitution, smuggling, assaults, and occasionally murder...

The itinerant nature of the labour force on harbours: longshore workers, truckers, ships' crews, and chandlers, etc., combined with the quantity and variety of cargo, the competitive aspects to load and unload ships to move cargo through the port, and the sprawling harbour facilities located in congested downtown areas creates a difficult and almost impossible situation in regard to security.

Adding to the problems are the traditional policies whereby:

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<sup>11</sup> For the longstanding problem of organized crime and criminal activity on the New York waterfront see Alan A. Block, "On the Waterfront Revisited: The Criminology of Waterfront Organized Crime," *Contemporary Crises* 6 (1982): 373-396 and Peter B. Levy, "The Waterfront Commission of the Port of New York: A History and Appraisal," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 42, no. 4 (July 1989): 508-523.

- shipping companies and shipping agents cut cargo protection costs and compensate their losses by letting marine insurance agents pick up the tab;
- competition among stevedoring companies to load and unload vessels and the willingness to depend on insurance to protect them from loss or damage to cargo;
- the fact that the longshoremen occupation attracts criminals to its ranks by the very nature of the work;<sup>12</sup>
- the fact that importers and exporters employ or hire truck drivers and assistants willing to steal or to conspire to commit theft;
- the fact that due to labour conditions the trucking industry is forced to employ the so-called ‘drifter’ to meet the demand of the labour force;
- port authorities, with few exceptions, attempt to keep costs down by employing token and untrained policing and security forces incapable of maintaining the respect for law and order in this vulnerable and potentially dangerous environment.

Waterfront crimes involving property and the person are rarely reported to police authorities.

Property crimes are not reported for several reasons:

- the desire of shipping companies and agents to keep cargo moving through the ports at all costs;
- the fear of reprisals and work stoppages;
- the unwillingness of shipping and stevedoring companies to become involved in court cases;
- the willingness to let their insurance meet the losses;
- the practice of marine insurance companies to pay claims with practically no investigation thereby encouraging a ‘soft’ attitude towards pilferage and theft;
- the fact that the insurance investigation is to survey the claim to establish liability and not for criminal prosecution;
- the fact that claim settlements are reflected in increased insurance rates with insurance companies compensating for losses by adjusting rates on the whole range of their loss experience;
- the difficulty of identifying and proving ownership of stolen cargo and that goods were actually landed, all necessary ingredients for successful court prosecution.

Offences involving the person, such as, gambling, loansharking, kickbacks, prostitution, etc., are personal to those involved and rarely will they be reported to the police because they have been a willing participant or fear reprisals. The unwritten code of the longshore worker ‘that you don’t take it

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<sup>12</sup> The RCMP/GRC reported that twenty-five percent of longshore workers possessed criminal records. “Cassidy Report,” 1967, 56.

to the police' must also be considered.

Crime on the waterfronts of Canada presents a serious problem to society, governments, port management, and law enforcement. The problem is not unique to Canada. Its existence is perpetuated in an atmosphere of self-interest, lack of moral responsibility, fear of reprisals and threat of physical harm on the part of the users of the port facilities and the labour force. It is damaging the reputation of the ports and affecting the economy.<sup>13</sup>

Cassidy understood that port police needed to address specific problematic areas that impeded economic prosperity and restore the good name of Canada's major seaports as safe and secure places for the movement of goods.

The main difference between the two reports was the inclusion of commentary and the substance of interviews conducted by Cassidy about the levels of suspected crime and the state of policing, which only the internal version covered. The public report, by contrast, went from the preamble quoted above straight to a shortened list of recommendations. The additional sixty-seven pages provided to the National Harbours Board documented Cassidy's examination of conditions inside selected ports in Eastern Canada under federal jurisdiction with sea access, notably Montréal and Halifax, and the few Great Lakes ports with police coverage. Neither Vancouver, then the second largest seaport in Canada behind Montréal, nor smaller west coast ports such as New Westminster and Prince Rupert were visited in person, though limited correspondence indicated that reported theft and pilferage of cargo was comparable, if not greater in some instances.

The general perception among policing officials and port managers in Montréal was that the situation was bad and only getting worse in terms of criminal activity inside the port. The reported crimes shown in Table 1 over a two-year period prior to Cassidy's investigation indicated increases in seriousness of offences, numbers of persons arrested by police, and labour discord related to collective bargaining and other issues with the dominant waterfront unions.<sup>14</sup> But those figures only captured part of the problem because much crime went unreported or undetected. For the Port of Montréal, the Canadian Board of Marine Underwriters recorded theft and pilfering

<sup>13</sup> "Cassidy Report," 1967, 1-8; "Cassidy Report," 1968, 1-6.

<sup>14</sup> Alexander C. Pathy, *Waterfront Blues: Labour Strife at the Port of Montreal, 1960-1978* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 32-35; International Longshore Association Local 375 represented most longshore workers in Montréal, led by the intractable Jean Marc St-Onge. Roger L. Fournier, Industrial Relations Officer to Bernard Wilson, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Labour, 5 December 1966, RG 27 B-7, vol. 3482, file 1-101-96, pt. 2, LAC; Stephen T. Wace, "Industrial Relations in the Longshoring Industry, prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations," 31 March 1968, RG 27 acc. 1986-87/13, box 5, LAC.



claims between June 1965 and September 1966 totaling \$650,000, while the estimated actual loss was closer to \$3.5 million.<sup>15</sup> Shippers were disinclined to make insurance claims for fear of higher premiums and chose instead to accept a certain amount of loss as the cost of doing business. However, when losses mounted, shippers one-by-one started to stay away from Montréal's port and seek other alternatives in Canada and the United States. Cassidy acknowledged that the lack of good data about crime and criminal activity, not only at Montréal but at most Canadian ports, made the large gap between reported and estimated crime hard to verify.

**Table 1. Reported crime by local National Harbour Police in Port of Montréal (Cassidy Report, 1967)**

Crime	1965	1966
Theft	202	233
Possession stolen property	3	22
Breaking and entering	5	2
Arson	0	2
Assaults	2	14
Armed robbery	0	1
Attempted murder	0	1
Adults and juveniles arrested	303	359
Traffic and parking court appearances	1571	1507
Turned over to RCMP Customs and Excise	27	13
Bomb scares	48	13
Fatal accidents	14	11
Sudden deaths	10	7
Bodies recovered from river	14	21
Labour strikes and walkouts	4	12
Motor vehicle accidents	379	575

Longshore workers, checkers, truckers, warehouse workers, and even some police members and security guards looking the other way were behind goods regularly disappearing from the docks. The presence of organized criminal elements was also raised since the RCMP/GRC confided that “organized crime appears to be involved with labour and crime on the Montréal waterfront and persons connected with the waterfront are related to or working for a leading gang in the Montréal underworld.”<sup>16</sup> Ethnic gangs from Irish and

<sup>15</sup> “Cassidy Report,” 1967, 8.

<sup>16</sup> “Cassidy Report,” 1967, 16; Royal Canadian Mounted Police “Brief – Organized Crime and Law Enforcement in Canada,” November 1965, MG 32 B4, Maurice Sauve, vol. 121, file 7, LAC.

Italian immigrants were heavily involved in gambling, prostitution, protection rackets, and other illegal activities in the city, and used those as leverage for entry to the waterfront.<sup>17</sup> Mafia crime families from New York operated in Montréal through the likes of Vic Cotroni and Carmine Galante, the port an easy target for theft rings and the drug trade from Marseille, France into North America.<sup>18</sup> Gangsters cultivated contacts with just the right amount of persuasion and if necessary physical coercion, and provided outlets for the resale and distribution of stolen goods. Consequently, Cassidy feared that crime on the waterfront was extremely organized, targeting both higher and lesser value items, far ahead of police efforts to counter the criminals and their connections.

Existing police forces available in Canada's commercial ports, Cassidy concluded, were woefully inadequate to deal with the nature of the problem. Basically, each port was responsible for providing its own policing and law enforcement arrangements. This was achieved largely through bylaws and regulations issued by port authorities to govern operations. Some ports maintained local police services. Montréal had separate port and bridge police. Other ports relied on the services of adjacent municipal police forces provided through grants-in-lieu of taxes and assessed port fees. Vancouver, on the other hand, only had a security force and no dedicated police. The RCMP/GRC pursued drug investigations, enforced federal statutes, and collected intelligence of national security value, largely from sailors off the ships, which left patrolling and lower-level crime interdiction to local police services depending upon their authorities and legal status. The degree of cooperation and working collaboration with provincial and municipal police forces varied widely from port to port. In Montréal, relations were so poor that the Service de police de la Ville Montréal, ostensibly the police of jurisdiction in criminal matters, was not even allowed to enter the port without authorization. Interviewed by Cassidy, that police service's director offered that the "untrained, poorly equipped, undermanned so-called police force operated by the [National

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<sup>17</sup> Magaly Brodeur, *Vice et corruption à Montréal 1892-1970* (Québec, QC: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2011), 63; D'Arcy and Miranda O'Connor, *Montreal's Irish Mafia: The true story of the infamous West End Gang* (Mississauga, ON: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> Jean-Pierre Charbonneau, *La Filière Canadienne* (Montréal, QC: Trait d'union, 2002); Peter Edwards and Michel Auger, *The Encyclopedia of Canadian Organized Crime* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2012), 63, 88-89; Ironically, American commissions and inquiries into Mafia syndicates in the United States pushed gangsters into Canada seeking safe haven and a good place to conduct criminal activity. Translated French radio broadcast "Royal Inquiry Board on Organized Crime," 24 October 1963, RG 18 F-1, vol. 7535, file HQ-330-Q-1, Supp. 2 pt. 5A, ATIP A-2018-01164, LAC; Anna Sergi, "Playing Pac-Man in Portville: Policing the dilution and fragmentation of drug importations through major seaports," *European Journal of Criminology* 19, no. 4 (2022): 678-679.



Port of Montréal, 1966. (Archives de la Ville de Montréal VM94-Ad-028-009)

Harbours] Board at Montréal is completely incapable of functioning as a police force and should not be called a police force.”<sup>19</sup> Criminal intelligence was not shared, and serious crimes left imperfectly investigated according to standard procedures. Cassidy learned that policing in other smaller commercial ports was little better. In Halifax, police and security guards avoided parts of the port at certain times as too dangerous without risking physical assault or worse.<sup>20</sup> The longshore unions relied on criminal acquaintances to provide muscle during strikes and in confrontations with employers and the police. Tires on police cars were slashed, windows smashed, and threatening phone calls made to private homes. Local police forces resident in the ports, often fearing for their own personal safety, were too small in numbers and semi-trained to be truly effective and efficient. Cassidy felt that law enforcement needed to take back the initiative from the criminals and stem the outflow of goods from continuing theft and pilferage through better professional training and organization of dedicated port police on a national basis.

The centralization and focused effort required of a federal police force, whether the existing RCMP/GRC or a new one, to be made responsible for port policing in National Harbours Board jurisdictions stemmed from Cassidy’s findings. Table 3 compares the specific recommendations as numbered in the

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<sup>19</sup> “Cassidy Report,” 1967, 25.

<sup>20</sup> Billy Taylor with Andrew Safer, *Cracking the Theft Rings: The Story of a Cop at the Port of Halifax* (Halifax: Frontlist Publishing, 2008), 85-86. The Port of Halifax experienced declines in shipping volumes in the years 1967 and 1968 that necessarily made longshore workers desperate and cut-throat. Sandy MacDonald, *The Halifax Longshoremen’s Association 1907-2007* (Halifax: International Longshore Association Local 269, 2007), 23.

two reports. Many overlapped between the internal and public versions, while others were intended for consideration only within the confines of government. In recommendations fourteen through sixteen of the NHB report, Cassidy advocated for creation of a police and security program under the supervision of a director located in Ottawa, reporting directly to the board's chair. The pages numbered ninety and ninety-one, which detail the next four recommendations in that report, are missing from the retained copy in the archives. This curious gap might be explained by pressure on the gendarmerie RCMP/GRC to take on port policing as a function, instead of establishing a new federal police force for the purpose, as suggested by Cassidy. The RCMP/GRC possessed a well-established training system and clear professional standards, a larger establishment of personnel, a national criminal intelligence network, and extensive experience handling major crime and industrial disputes.<sup>21</sup> Creating another federal police force simply duplicated something that already existed.

The challenges of establishing an entirely new federal police force so narrowly focused on port policing certainly were considerable. It would be spread across the country in various provinces bordering the sea, and remain very limited in numbers and capability. The RCMP/GRC previously turned down a request in January 1966 by the National Harbours Board to have the gendarmerie assume port policing, citing lack of language-qualified bilingual staff to cover all the major ports.<sup>22</sup> The RCMP/GRC provided policing and security in selected international airports, and based on that experience, was not keen on expanding into a similar role in the ports under the National Harbours Board. The employment of well-trained constables for security-like duties seemed a misuse of scarce resources. Indeed, the RCMP/GRC refused to lend any assistance to a concurrent study of thefts and pilferage conducted by Jules Deschênes on behalf of the Montréal Port Council finished about the same time as the first Cassidy report and submitted to the council on 11 January 1968.<sup>23</sup> Besides describing many deficiencies in working arrangements, the police structure, and port administration in Montréal, Deschênes also reviewed

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<sup>21</sup> *RCMP Operational Manual*, PRO-inv1109, "Procedure – Investigational," 18 September 1970, RIOI-975, "Riots, Demonstrations and Unlawful Assemblies," 15 December 1968; Greg Marquis, *The Vigilant Eye: Policing Canada from 1867 to 9/11* (Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood, 2016), 112-113; Nora and William Kelly, *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: A Century of History* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973), 292.

<sup>22</sup> "Cassidy Report," 1967, 31-32.

<sup>23</sup> "Report submitted to the Montreal Port Council by Mr. Jules Deschênes, Q.C., LL.M., on the matter of thefts and pilferage in the port of Montreal," 30 December 1967, RG 27 L-4-ii, vol. 3409, LAC. The NHB paid a third of the cost of this report and asked for the RCMP/GRC's cooperation. National Harbours Board press release, 4 February 1970, RG 12 A-1, vol. 2789, file 260-34, pt. 1, LAC.

the sentences and punishments handed down by the courts against offenders, one hundred and eighty in total, between January 1965 and October 1967. He ventured that the year 1967 represented an improvement over the immediate previous years due to a decline in overall business activity through the port and the NHB's applied corrective measures on the security side, somewhat contradicting Cassidy. The report looked forward to the introduction of containers for shipping which would reduce opportunity for theft and pilferage, though the National Harbours Board, and the Port of Montréal in particular, were wholly ill-prepared for the changeover to keep pace with competitor ports.<sup>24</sup> The establishment of a new federal police force under the National Harbours Board therefore addressed a specific problem that was well on its way to being solved and a role that the RCMP/GRC could logically have assumed.

During several meetings in early February 1968, the National Harbours Board accepted sixty recommendations made in Cassidy's internal report and made further amendments for a statement on policing and security. A press release on 20 February 1968 announced "that the administration and direction of its police and security forces will be gradually assumed by the Headquarters at Ottawa. The Headquarters staff will be headed by a Director of Police and Security and will include a police training officer."<sup>25</sup> Two days later, Donald Cassidy became the first director general of policing and security in the National Harbours Board. Leslie Hobbs and Roland Brunette moved from the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) of the Montréal city police to be the director and assistant director respectively over NHB police forces in the Port of Montréal – the formal handover in that port happened on 10 April 1968.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Peter Hunter, *The Magic Box: A History of Containerization* (Ottawa: International Cargo Handling Co-ordination Association (ICHCA) Canada, 1993), 88-89; Tareq Abu Aisha, Mustapha Ouhimmou, Marc Paquet, and Julio Montecinos, "Developing the seaport container terminal layout to enhance efficiency of the intermodal transportation system and port operations – case of the Port of Montreal," *Maritime Policy & Management* 49, no. 2 (2022): 181-198, doi: 10.1080/03088839.2021.1875140.

<sup>25</sup> National Harbours Board press release "N.H.B. Police and Security Re-organization," 20 February 1968, RG 27 acc. 1986-87/393, box 94, file 329-1-7, pt. 1, LAC; National Harbours Board, *Annual Report*, 1968.

<sup>26</sup> National Harbours Board, "Chronological Review of Criminal Activity and Preventative Measures taken at the ports of Montreal (1960-1968) and Quebec (1963-1966)," 19 February 1969, 115-117, RG 27 L-4-ii, vol. 3410, file h, LAC.



National Harbours Board Police and Security shoulder patches. (author's collection)

**Table 2. Block syllabus for two-week NHB basic police training delivered in Montréal, RG 66 A-5, vol. 23, file 244-37, pt. 1, LAC.**

Serial	Subject	Periods	Instructor
1	The Professional Police Officer	2	Staff Inspector E.L. Martin
2	Public Relations	1	NHB public relations officer
3	Criminal Code of Canada and Selected Federal Statutes	38	Staff Inspector E.L. Martin
4	RCMP-GMC Preventative Services Customs Act, Narcotics Control Act	2	RCMP-GMC lecturer
5	Preventive Patrolling	4	Captain J.R. Charbonneau; Constable J.M. Bélanger
6	Note Books and Report Writing	6	Assistant Director R. Brunette
7	Traffic Enforcement	3	Captain B. Rapin; Constable J.M. Bélanger
8	Criminal Identification	2	RCMP-GMC lecturer
9	Courtroom Procedure	2	Mr. P.H. Vanasse
10	Cargo Documentation	2	Mr. M.W. Roberts
11	Foot Drill	5	Constable R. Martin
12	Police Defensive Tactics	5	Constable Gavreau
13	Space Periods	9	All instructors
14	Tests and Examinations	9	All instructors

Experienced police officers were soon found to fill out key executive, administrative, and operational positions at the headquarters and in the ports. Staff Inspector Ernest Martin was charged with overseeing training in the National Harbours Board police and security force. Table 2 indicates that Martin accounted for roughly half the content periods taught on the basic police training course instituted that covered a range of relevant topics. In the nascent

National Harbours Police under the care of Donald Cassidy, Canada now had the makings of a professional port police force for its major commercial ports.

**Table 3. Numbered recommendations from the respective reports prepared by Donald Cassidy.**

Recommendation	National Harbours Board Report Recommendation Number	Canadian Port and Harbour Association Report Recommendation Number
Every effort must be made at the ports by management, users, labour, and others connected therewith to prevent crime before it happens by reducing the opportunity to commit crime, and by strengthening law enforcement.	1	1
Every person, business organization, port management, association and all levels of government must take responsibility for planning and implementing changes if crime is to be reduced.	2	2
The Board should be the catalyst to bring under control and reverse the crime trend in the harbours under its jurisdiction.	3	
The Board [port management] should implement and promote a crime prevention program to reduce crime. The program should be directed to business firms to take preventative and security measures to prevent crime. It should also be directed to the public to report to the police anything of a suspicious nature.	4	3
The Board should encourage shipping companies, shipping agents and marine insurance companies [Shipping companies, shipping agents and marine insurance companies should be encouraged] to establish a Cargo Loss Bureau with branch officers in the principal ports. It should be mandatory to report cargo losses to the Cargo Loss Bureau for investigation to distinguish legitimate losses from actual thefts. Theft cases to be reported to the port police having jurisdiction for investigation and prosecution. The Bureau would collect meaningful statistics to help delineate the problem.	5	4

The annual reports of the Board's [port] police forces should be prepared under the rules and definitions of the Uniform Crime Reporting program.	6	5
The submission of statistical returns on police administration, crime and traffic enforcement statistics to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics should be discontinued until there is a marked improvement in these data.	7	6
The Board [port management] should be alert to the menace of organized crime and take steps to make its police forces reliable and form a criminal intelligence unit so they can become part of the criminal intelligence network.	8	7
All necessary steps should be taken to correct the deficiencies in the Board's police forces which make them suspect by other police forces. [Steps should be taken to correct any deficiencies in port police and security forces which make them suspect by other police forces and to ensure full and continued cooperation in all matters of mutual interest.]	9	8
The Board should establish a policy on policing and security to ensure the continuance of sound and economical measures to preserve the peace and prevent the commission of illegal acts on Board property.	10	
The Board [ports] should continue to maintain its [their] own force of duly sworn peace officers to patrol and guard Board property, to enforce the law and keep order, to investigate illegal activities, incidents and recover stolen goods, to cooperate with other police forces as required to gain added security and to exchange information in the interests of the Board.	11	9
The Board [ports and harbours] should raise the standard of its police and security forces to a reliable level in the interest of Canada's national security.	12	10
The Boards' [port] police and security forces should be included in emergency measures planning in the event of nuclear attack or natural disasters.	13	11



The ports should establish a procedure for the routine inspection of its policing and security operations.		12
The responsibility for the direction and administration of the Board's police and security forces should be transferred from port managers to headquarters in Ottawa.	14	
The Board should appoint a Director of Police and Security to be located at the headquarters, Ottawa, to direct and administer its police and security forces and all matters connected therewith.	15	
The Board should give consideration to having the Director of Police and Security report directly to the Chairman.	16	
The requirements of patrol, investigation, equipment, transport etc., should form part of the organization and establishment of port police and security forces.		13
There is a need to establish an identification section at the Port of Montréal. One man, properly trained and with the necessary equipment should be sufficient.	21	14
The requirements of a criminal intelligence system should form part of the new plan of organization and establishment.	22	15
The Board [port management] should consider using policeman-dog teams to patrol its property and they should form part of the new plan of organization.	23	16
There is a need to establish a method for internal investigations which should form part of the new plan of organization and establishment.	24	17
The services of a police training officer should be obtained to organize police and security courses for recruit, in-service and roll call training, their content and duration. The training officer should be located at headquarters, Ottawa, and under the direction of the Director of Policy and Security. [Possibly a police training officer located at NHB Headquarters, Ottawa, could be the focal point for developing and planning training programs or training keys specially designed for port police forces.]	25	18

Consideration should be given to organizing a Port Police College where high level courses would be held for selected members of all port police and security forces. It might be possible to hold these courses at the Canadian Police College operated by the RCMP at Ottawa.		19
The members of the Board's police forces should be sworn as peace officers under the National Harbours Board Act upon qualifying as trained policemen.	26	20
The full and proper powers of a peace officer continuing automatically until leaving the police force, as defined in the Criminal Code, should be made applicable to the Harbour Commissioners and Harbour Commission Acts as it now is in the NHB Act.		21
The Board [ports] in cooperation with the Customs and Immigration Departments should give careful consideration to having the members of its [their] police forces sworn as 'officers' for the prevention of smuggling and the enforcement of the Customs Act, and the enforcement of the Immigration Act.	27	22
There seems to be no reason why qualified members of the Board's police forces should not be allowed to carry firearms, provided they are fully trained in its use and their powers as a peace officer to use it.	28	23
Members of the harbour [port] police [forces] should receive training in marine cargo shipping documentation.	29	24
The policy should be adopted that the Board's [port] police and security forces are commanded by capable and experienced police administrators at each harbour.	30	25
Capable and experienced policemen, or former policemen, knowledgeable in all aspects of police work, should be recruited to command the Board's police and security forces at Halifax, Saint John, Québec, Montréal and Vancouver. [Where required, capable and experienced policemen or former policemen, knowledgeable in all aspects of police work, should be recruited to command port police and security forces.]	31	26

A new chief and deputy chief of the harbour police should be recruited immediately for the Port of Montréal. They should be capable law enforcement officers, good administrators, experienced and knowledgeable in the ways of the Montréal underworld and respected by local police forces.	32	
In the interest of efficiency and effectiveness the harbour and bridge police at the Port of Montréal [where two separate police forces exist at harbours, consideration] should be [given to their integration] integrated under the command of the chief of the harbour police [of one chief or director of police].	33	27
A senior position in the restructured organization should be found for Inspector I.G. Watson, under the Chief and Deputy Chief, possibly the Assistant Chief in charge of the Uniformed Branch or something equivalent.	34	
If the proposed restructured organization is accepted by the Board and the Chief of harbour police forces are made responsible to the Director of Police and Security at Headquarters, Ottawa, disciplinary cases should be handled by the Chiefs of harbour police rather than by Port Managers, and be subject to ratification by the Director of Police and Security.	35	
Any attempt on the part of members of the Board's [port] police and security forces to become members of a trade union should be prohibited.	36	28
For purposes of uniformity, good management, career planning and personnel rotation between ports the pay of non-commissioned officers and constables should be standardized. The pay for senior police administrators should be determined on the basis of their responsibility.	37	
The Board [Port management] should issue instructions that members of its police and security forces cannot moonlight as cargo watchmen on Board [port] property.	38	29

Immediate steps [Port management] should be [aware of the need] taken to improve the accommodation of the harbour police, and to make their uniforms and equipment both standard and attractive.	39	30
A new police headquarters building should be provided at the Port of Montréal.	40	
A uniform system of reports and record-keeping practices should be instituted for the Board's police and security forces.	41	31
[Written agreements] Agreements should be developed between the Board [ports], provinces and municipalities covering the law enforcement services to be mutually performed by the Board's [port] police force and the local police, and the deduction to be made from grants in lieu of taxes for the law enforcement service provided by the Board. [**this last part of the sentence is omitted from the public report**]	42	32
Regulations should be enacted so that goods placed on Board [port] property are stored and sorted in such a way as to make it convenient for pick-up by consignees, the application of customs duties and to prevent theft and pilferage.	43	33
Regulations should be enacted permitting for the disposal of unclaimed goods, and goods where the owner is unknown as preventative measures against theft and pilferage, without liability to the Board [port] , with the proceeds going to the Board [port] and Customs.	44	34
It should be mandatory that shipping companies, exporters and importers report cargo losses to the proposed Cargo Loss Bureau and thefts to the harbour police [or other police having jurisdiction].	45	35
Consideration should be given to licensing and revoking licenses of stevedoring companies. Licenses should not be granted if the applicants have been convicted of certain crimes, paid kickbacks to carriers for contracts or to labour organizations or their representatives for favours.	46	36

<p>Consideration should be given to registering longshore workers, to check their criminal background and antecedents and to give them an identification card if they qualify for registration. The registration should be refused if the longshore worker has been convicted of certain crimes, advocates the overthrow of the government by force or whose presence on the waterfront constitutes a danger to the public peace and safety. Hearings could be instituted to grant, refuse or revoke registration.</p>	47	37
<p>Consideration should be given to making it mandatory that checkers be bonded and the Board might assist by applying Regulation 17 of By-law A-1 which states that the Board may, without cause, stop entry of any person upon Board property or eject any person from Board property.</p>	48	38
<p>The personal identification papers of truck drivers and their assistants should be checked and the information recorded when they enter Board property to pick-up or deliver cargo. The information to be recorded would be the full name, address and number which would be taken from his driver's license and at Montréal, the Trucking Parity Committee's registration card.</p>	49	39
<p>No vehicle should be excused from registering when entering the harbour, i.e., freight pick-ups, ship services, etc., with the exception of emergency vehicles such as, fire trucks and ambulances.</p>	50	40
<p>The Board might consider a pilot project of employing special constables and renting their services out to leasees of their property to guard cargo.</p>	51	41
<p>If the pilot project is successful pertaining to the use of special constables, consideration should be given to amending the National Harbours Board Act to include the appointment of special constables as peace officers.</p>	52	42

When the Board's [port] police and security forces are fully qualified as peace officers, the permission of the RCMP should be requested to have at least some of the members sworn as supernumerary special constables under the RCMP Act [extending their authority throughout Canada].	53	43
Members of private security guard services to take training, wear at least a uniform cap, keep a notebook and record required information, notebooks to be subject to inspection by Board's police forces and sign an attendance register at the police station.	54	44
Port guards and watchmen should not be permitted to belong to the same union as longshoremen.	55	45
The Board should consider strengthening the law enforcement powers of the National Harbours Act dealing with arrest, search, reviling peace officers, prevention of theft, gambling, possession of liquor, opening packages with intent to steal, breaking seals on containers and drinking or wasting liquids.	56	
A planning and research section should be established as part of the proposed police and security program to investigate, plan, develop and implement security measures.	57	

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