

fought three naval wars. Each side, well led by experienced officers, focused on an offensive strategy deploying heavily armed, technologically advanced ships, directed by well-organized administrative structures, which were called to address complex logistical challenges. The remaining essays in this section touch on the continuing wars of the eighteenth century with one notable exception. While it fits into this time period, Hattendorf alters course slightly here, offering a well-crafted essay on the extraordinary career of Admiral of the Fleet James, First Baron Gambier, GCB.

In Part 5, “Maritime History of, at, and near Newport, Rhode Island,” Hattendorf displays his talents, not only as one of America’s premier naval historians, but also as a scholar closely attuned to his community of Newport, Rhode Island, and the institution he has served so well, the United States Naval War College.

While most of these essays have been published elsewhere, the Naval War College Press has done an extraordinary service bringing them together in one place. Beyond this collection, Hattendorf has been central to the Press’s overall success in this series, serving as editor for seven previous volumes. Indeed, recognizing his role, Volume 26 in the series bears his name, *The Hattendorf Prize Lectures*. While impressive, *Reflections on Naval History* represents only a portion of Hattendorf’s work, and, according to the bibliography, at least two more essays are forthcoming.

Since all reviews need some modicum of criticism, maps and illustrations would have been useful.

William M. Fowler
Boston, Massachusetts

Thomas C. Hone and Curtis A. Utz. *History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1915-2015*. Washington, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command, Department of the Navy, www.history.navy.mil, 2023. xxiv+649 pp., illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-943604-02-9 (cloth). (Free PDF download available)

Official history occupies a specific place in the institutional and corporate memory of governmental organizations. Like most of the US armed services, the United States Navy (USN) has an established historical branch, staffed by professional and contract historians, with a long record of publishing official histories on a wide variety of administrative, industrial, and operational topics. Official histories are usually long in gestation and benefit from privileged access to permanent government records. The centenary of the USN’s top leadership position – the Office of the Chief Naval Operations (CNO) – is a

worthy occasion to reflect on the organization, its development and travails, and the admirals who have filled that post since its creation in 1915. The book is divided into twenty chronological chapters, with appendices giving a table of the persons occupying the positions of secretary of the navy and CNO over the years, and a list of abbreviations. Organizationally, the CNO performed a planning function. From modest beginnings, its organization and purpose evolved depending on need, the personalities involved, and dynamics inside and outside the Navy. Individual chapters are organized around the person or persons holding the navy's top position set in the context of restructuring and organizational changes, relations with engaged secretaries of navy and defense, presidential administrations, and prevailing strategic and fiscal environments.

Hone and Utz are careful to point out exactly what the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was meant to do at a given time, in particular with respect to procurement and strategy. The actual execution of operations resided elsewhere. The CNO was responsible for making sure the navy was in fighting form with the right ships and people to protect the nation and face the dangers of the day, increasingly as a globally deployed force. Soon after the creation of the office by legislation in March 1915, the US joined the First World War, and the first CNO appointee, William Benson, tackled the tremendous expansion in numbers of ships and personnel once the country went on a war footing with only limited staff. He also had to manage the relationship with Secretary Joseph Daniels, who himself held strong views on running the Navy. In the interwar years that resulted in the "Treaty Navy", Robert Coontz, Edward Eberle, Charles Hughes, William Pratt, and William Standley steered the US Navy through naval arms limitation, tightening fiscal restraint and retrenchment, development of war plans (called fleet problems), and replacing older warships with newer, adequately manned vessels. In the 1940s, William Leahy and Harold Stark enjoyed good relations with President Franklin Roosevelt and mobilized the Navy following the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Ernest King was the irascible and efficient head of the US Navy during the Second World War, combining the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet (COMINCH) and CNO positions. He later sparred with Secretary James Forrestal over materiel, organization, and other matters. During the postwar years, Chester Nimitz, Louis Denfeld, and Forrest Sherman handled demobilization, legislative proposals for service unification, the onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the conflict in Korea.

The presidency of Dwight Eisenhower and his "New Look" strategy brought a build-up of nuclear retaliatory capability to offset conventional deficiencies and another round of reorganization initiatives, challenges faced head-on by CNOs William Fechteler and Robert Carney. Arleigh Burke brought the US Navy into the missile and digital age, serving three terms as CNO and

putting his own stamp on the organization in a very energetic fashion. Greater rigor in programming and budgeting brought on by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his whiz boys brought about assertion of civilian control; this taxed George Anderson, David McDonald, and Thomas Moorer to the upmost and almost uprooted the traditional naval establishment. The divisive Elmo Zumwalt promised change in the organization and largely delivered with reinvestments in personnel and by addressing longstanding inequities. James Holloway III undertook fleet modernization despite a deep inflationary crisis and instilled a new sense of purpose with the Maritime Strategy, which saw the US Navy taking the fight right to the doors (naval bases) of the Soviet Union. The realignment continued under Thomas Hayward. The challenges continued under James Watkins, Carlisle Trost, and Frank Kelso as the Cold War drew to a close with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Kelso also shouldered much of the public and political disquiet over the shocking revelations from the Tailhook scandal. After Michael Boorda's efforts to refashion and improve many navy processes were cut short by his suicide, Jay Johnson took over and filled the role with remarkable competence and forbearance.

As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pushed modernization and business practices onto the services through "transformation," Vernon Clark made sure the navy was ready for action after the terrorist attacks on American shores in September 2001, supporting special operations and land campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and maintaining the American naval presence around the world. This was made harder by increasing technology costs, which forced Michael Mullen to make hard choices about force levels, which he attempted to offset by encouraging greater cooperation with allied navies through the "1,000 ship" navy concept. Gary Roughead emphasized information in operations and joint capabilities that ran up against economic downturn and intractable acquisition problems, with littoral combat ships and the latest destroyers the most egregious and costly. In a bid to stay up-to-date technologically and streamline the procurement process, the US Navy actually went down rabbit holes that imperiled its status as a superpower. Jonathan Greenert, the last CNO covered in the book, handled political uncertainty within the corridors of power, persistent problems on the shipbuilding front, keeping the Marines on board and satisfied, growing cyber warfare threats, and a hidden sexual assault crisis amongst the ranks. Of note, but not covered in the book, was the August 2023 appointment of Lisa Franchetti as the first woman to hold the post of CNO, a landmark and overdue appointment.

Official histories are necessarily geared toward an institutional audience and are products of the sponsoring organization. Hone and Utz have done their best to make the text readable and comprehensive in detail and context. The decision to focus on the personalities and organizational changes wrought

is appropriate for this particular official history. *History of the Chief of Naval Operations* is a large book, running to nearly 600 pages of main text. Accompanying photographs of the individual CNOs, plus tables and diagrams provide some respite from the dense narrative, which is divided by bolded headings. A very useful index appears at the end. The book is recommended for readers interested in the history of administration and planning within the US Navy. Take advantage of the free text-searchable PDF download available on the Naval History and Heritage Command website.

Chris Madsen

North Vancouver, British Columbia

Angus Konstam and Edouard A. Groult (illustrator). *German High Seas Fleet 1914-18: The Kaiser's challenge to the Royal Navy.* Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, 2023. 80 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, index. UK £15.99, US \$23.00, CAN \$31.00; ISBN 978-1-4728-5647-0 (softcover), ISBN 978-1-4728—5645-6 (Ebook), 978-1-4728-5644-9 (PDF).

Imperial Germany's High Seas Fleet (*Hochseeflotte*), which Winston Churchill derisively called the Luxury Fleet, failed to reach its full potential during the First World War. It had been built up under the tutelage of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz to secure Imperial Germany's colonial possessions and its "place in the sun." The *Kaiserliche Marine* overtook France as the second ranking navy in Europe behind Great Britain's Royal Navy and, with introduction of the revolutionary dreadnought battleship, the two navies tried to outbuild the other in a naval arms race. Navies of the time were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, who stressed the importance of the decisive battle. Maneuvering for this blowout battle proved elusive in the war, the closest being the Battle of Jutland/Skagerrak. The naval war settled into a Royal Navy blockade to cut off vital resources and supply to Imperial Germany and a counter-campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare by the *Kaiserliche Marine* to do the same against Great Britain. Angus Konstam, a former naval officer and curator of the Royal Armouries turned historian, authors the second contribution in Osprey's Fleet series focused on the ships, organization, and operations of the German High Seas Fleet. Edouard Groult, a London-based illustrator and graphics designer, provides commissioned original artwork in colour.

The book follows the standard format for Osprey's new Fleet series at 80 pages in length with four unnumbered sections, a list of further reading, and an index. Black and white photographs and colour reproductions of oil paintings