

Kennedy and his surviving crewmen. Kennedy was later awarded a Navy and Marine Corps Medal (the highest non-combat USN decoration for heroism), and continued to serve in the USN until he was medically discharged due to injuries he suffered when PT 109 was sunk.

Kennedy's political career took off in 1947 when he entered the House of Representatives (Boston) and by 1953 he was a Senator for Massachusetts. When he became President in 1960, his wartime exploits came to the fore and a search began for his wartime saviour. Eventually, Evans and the Solomon Islanders were located and Evans and Kevu later visited Kennedy in the White House in 1961-62. The men who saved Kennedy and his crew were later immortalised when the movie *PT 109* was released in June 1963. Kennedy also met with the commanding officer of *Amagiri*, Lieutenant Commander Kohei Hanami during a visit to Japan in 1962.

The book, however, does not just cover the lives of Kennedy and Evans or the tactical events involved in the rescue of Kennedy and his crew. Woven throughout the book is the higher-level story of Australian and American relations from 1941 onwards. Before Pearl Harbor, the average Australian knew little about the United States other than imported vehicles and what they saw in the movie theatres. This was all to change in early 1942, when the first US soldiers arrived in Brisbane in a troop convoy diverted from the Philippines. The men were the first of many thousands of US service personnel who arrived in Australia from 1942-45 and changed the strategic focus of the country from Great Britain to the United States. Author Brett Mason, a former Australian Senator, diplomat and academic, has done an excellent job detailing the shift in Australian foreign policy through the lens of the fighting in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, where the Australian and American forces fought side by side to defeat the Imperial Japanese forces. That road was not always smooth, either tactically or strategically, but it was a path that both nations willingly chose.

My only concern with the book was the vague or poor use of some military and naval terminology, but overall it is a very good read, especially for those seeking a better understating of the background of the creation of the Australian-United States strategic alliance.

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**Andrew Monaghan and Richard Connolly (eds.). *The Sea in Russian Strategy*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, [www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk](http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk), 2023. 272 pp., illustrations, index. UK £14.99, paper; ISBN 978-1-5261-6878-8.**

This compact book is a collection of seven papers that examine Russia's resurgent maritime strategy from several angles. The writing is succinct and cogent. The authors are subject experts from the United Kingdom and United States. They include naval historians Geoffrey Till and Andrew Lambert, and American military analyst Michael Kofman, who has become a familiar commentator on the war in Ukraine but in this book writes about how Russian naval doctrines have evolved from Soviet roots. Andrew Monaghan and Richard Connolly are British analysts who have been studying modern Russia for decades. They provide impartial discussions of issues from a Russian perspective based on systematic study over time of media and other sources. The use of Russian material is impressive. Another seasoned US analyst, Dmitry Gorenburg, describes current naval shipbuilding programs and missile development. This is a book about strategy and how it is manifested in the types of new weapons being produced. It does not examine training or speculate about tactical proficiency – or how capable contemporary Russian submarine and warship crews might be.

So, what are some of the take-aways from this book? Since around 2000 the sea has become more central to Russia's grand strategy. In part this is due to the effort to develop natural resources in the Arctic, which involves increasing use of the Northern Sea Route, and ongoing efforts to pivot to Asia. Till and Connolly forecast that Russia will also assert its interests in the Pacific over the next decade (p. 68, p.125). The Russian state has always prioritised security. Despite the decade-long chaos that followed the collapse of the USSR, the percentage of GDP allocated to defence has never dropped below 2.5 percent. In terms of purchasing power parity, Russia's naval expenditure is probably the third- or fourth-highest in the world (p. 141). The Russian navy and merchant fleet are a shadow of their Soviet predecessors; however, over the last two decades there has been steady investment in shipyards and the development of new classes of civilian and naval ships and types of naval technology. As the book comments, "Together, the combination of thirty to forty small combat ships (frigates and corvettes) and fifteen to twenty nuclear-and diesel-powered submarines – all armed with cruise missiles – will allow the Russian Navy to maintain its ability to protect its coastline and to threaten neighbouring states. While it will not be able to project substantial combat power globally, Russia's naval capabilities will be sufficient to achieve its main maritime goals" (p. 171). By the mid- 2030s, "we should expect to see a confident, capable and competitive actor in large parts of the world's oceans, including the Arctic, the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, as well as closer to Russia's borders such as the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas" (p. 161). It is only fair to note that Richard Connolly wrote this before Russian aggression caused Sweden and Finland to abandon their traditional neutrality and join NATO, and before Russia largely

lost its dominance of the Black Sea to Ukraine.

While it now has a capitalist economy, a state-owned firm operates the bulk of Russia's merchant ships. The merchant fleet is a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, but over half of its vessels are ice-class. Overall, less than 10 percent of the fleet is Russian built (p.146). The shipbuilding industry is also state-owned (p.129). A noteworthy development here has been the expansion of the Zvezda shipyard northeast of Vladivostok, now the largest in Russia. This is the yard where Soviet nuclear submarines were dismantled in the 1990s under a program financed in part by the US and Canada. Zvezda is now building Arctic Liquid Natural Gas Carriers and icebreakers, including a nuclear-powered one. The other major Pacific yard is the Amur Shipyard in Siberia, which, as in Soviet times, builds warships. But it no longer builds nuclear-powered submarines, which are now constructed only in the Arctic at Severodvinsk on the White Sea.

It is predicted that "Submarines will remain the strength of Russia's naval force for the foreseeable future. The renewal of the nuclear submarine fleet has been the highest priority of the Russian navy throughout the post-Soviet period" (p. 171). Ballistic-missile submarines carry close to one-third of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads. The current force structure of the Russian navy is intended to protect its coastline and the strategic missile submarine "bastions." Among its missions in war would be attacks on enemy infrastructure and carriers (pp. 210, 212). Russian warships are multi-mission platforms. Cruise missiles have given the Russian navy a land-attack role against critical infrastructure. The best-known of new post-Soviet weapons are Kalibr cruise missiles, which have been in service since 1994. They come in three types: land attack, anti-ship, and anti-submarine. They are fired from vertical launch tubes fitted across a variety of warship and submarine classes. Before the Russian full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022, its navy projected power during the intervention in Syria. Corvettes in the Caspian Sea fired Kalibr missiles across Iran 1200 km away at targets in Syria in 2015 and 2017. There were further attacks from missile-armed conventional submarines in the Mediterranean. In July 2024, the Russian navy claimed that submarines and ships in the Black Sea had fired land-attack Kalibr missiles at 200 targets in Ukraine over the previous 12 months.

There is a useful index, and the text is buttressed by useful tables and diagrams. Having said this, because the newer types of ship and weapons discussed are probably unfamiliar to the reader, the lack of photographs or graphics is a real limitation. Russia, which once again has become a disruptive adversarial power, is described by Andrew Lambert as "an empire of anxiety" (p. 50). It views geopolitical issues through a lens shaped by its own history. Dispassionate analyses based on Russian perspectives is a hallmark of this

book. *The Sea in Modern Strategy* is recommended as an accessible and authoritative outline of why the Russian regime is developing its maritime capabilities.

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**Hanne Elliot Fønss Nielsen. *Brand Antarctica: How Global Consumer Culture Shapes our Perception of the Ice Continent*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, [www.nebraskapress.unl.edu](http://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu), 2023. xiv + 250 pp., illustrations, notes, index. US \$60, cloth; ISBN 978-1-4962-2121-6.**

The name Antarctica evokes more or less immediately a wide range of stereotypes and perceptions ranging from an ice-covered continent to penguins and heroic stories of exploration. Marketing specialists have successfully used these stereotypes for more than a century to develop marketing campaigns for all kinds of products as well as to fundraise for Antarctic research and exploration. In addition, Antarctica has become a synonym for pristine and clean wilderness, regardless of whether this is really true. Hanne Elliot Fønss Nielsen's new book *Brand Antarctica: How Global Consumer Culture Shapes our Perception of the Ice Continent* provides for the first time an analysis how Antarctica has been used in the context of branding and marketing, and has become a brand in and of itself and an integral part of modern-day consumer-culture.

Divided into six main thematic chapters, the book covers topics from sponsorship during the heroic age of Antarctic exploration, via cold-weather branding, ice-washing and protection of penguins, to Antarctic tourism of today. Altogether Nielsen is telling a carefully researched and convincing story about how Antarctica itself has been developed into a brand despite the no-commercial-activities goal of the Antarctic Treaty. Of course, the commercialization discussed is mainly taking place outside Antarctica, and thus it might be argued that the regulations of the treaty do not apply to this type of commercialization or even that the no-commercial-activities approach for Antarctica itself is part of the commercialization of Antarctica in the rest of the globe.

While the chapters on sponsorship during the heroic age of Antarctic exploration and cold weather branding provide a conventional history of advertisement related to the seventh continent, the following chapter on ice-washing and penguins provides a novel and convincing approach by discussing how the continent has developed into a symbol of pristine nature and purity, and how penguins developed into a universal symbol with a variety of meanings