

Grainger considers political, geographical, and incidental factors in the naval developments and fates of each player, making extensive use of primary sources, both literary and epigraphic. In cases where there are conflicting or unclear sources, the author typically mentions all the relevant sources, while expressing his own views and impressions, accompanied by arguments explaining his interpretation.

The chronological organization is paralleled by a geographical organization. The events and the activities of the Hellenistic powers of eastern Mediterranean are examined in roughly the first third of the book. Grainger deftly weaves his way through the tangled politics and relations of the Hellenistic kingdoms with one another and with the other powers in the region.

The middle third of the book shifts the focus westward to Carthage and the emerging power of Rome. While the events described in this section are largely contemporaneous, there was minimal overlap between east and west, so the geographic transition is far more conducive to maintaining clarity than a strictly chronological format would be. This period in the west featured fewer significant powers, and in many cases more detailed sources regarding particular events; thus, the challenge of making an understandable presentation of the events is significantly reduced. This is not to say that Grainger's work on this section is less skillfully wrought.

The final third brings east and west together, with Rome's emergence as the dominant power, first in the western Mediterranean, and then in the entire region—a situation that would endure for the next three centuries. Notably, Grainger refutes the common view that the Romans paid little heed to naval matters, effectively showing that, while rarely spotlighted in the sources, the

Romans certainly did not ignore the importance of the sea in exerting control over their interests.

While the work is, overall, quite successfully presented, there are a few areas of concern. One is the use of Hellenized forms of ancient names. Spelling conventions are often outlined in the introduction, and this work lacks that. The use of Hellenized forms is particularly problematic in the latter parts dealing with the western Mediterranean and Rome, as many of the names are far more familiar to readers in their Latinized form, e.g., Rhegium rather than Rhegion (used by the author). This also presents a problem with the maps, as some use Hellenized names and some Latinized names. Maps of the western Mediterranean and entirety of the Mediterranean would be worthwhile, as would a map of the harbour of Carthage, considering its mention as one of the "four particularly notable harbours" (xii). Lastly, conceptual diagrams and illustrations of the significant vessels would be highly useful.

The aforementioned concerns are not significant enough to affect the overall success of the work. The author does an excellent job of presenting one of the most involved and difficult-to-understand periods of Greco-Roman history, addressing a somewhat overlooked aspect of that history. The book is both accessible to the lay reader and thorough enough for students and academic readers, making it a welcome and important addition to the libraries of those interested in the ancient Mediterranean world.

Ronald Atchison
Pensacola, Florida

John Grehan and Martin Pace. *Despatches from the Front: The Battle for Norway 1940-1942*. (Originally pub-

lished 2015). Barnsley, S. Yorks: Pen and Sword Maritime, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2020. 186 pp., illustrations, appendices, indices. UK £12.99, paper; ISBN 978-1-52678-213-7. (E-book available)

Norway essentially played three different roles during the Second World War. It started as a stalwart neutral power, then a hapless victim of invasion and finally the scene of several key commando attacks led by its belated, and ultimately unsuccessful, former protectors. This paperback reprint focuses on the last two stages of Norway's experience during the war. Compilers Grehan and Pace have selected a number of "despatches" or reports that are intended to provide more information on how England tried to stem and then counter the German invasion and occupation of this neutral country. The authors have contributed to most, if not all, the books in this series that cover England's various campaigns throughout its modern history, and their experience shines through.

As this volume shows, once England withdrew from Norway, it chose to mount several commando raids in the Norwegian archipelago. These kept Hitler's forces off-guard and forced him to maintain fairly strong forces in that beleaguered country. Naturally, this slim volume doesn't deviate from the well-established series format. Each of the chapters detail selected actions, focusing on both the relatively contemporaneous general summary reports that were filed by various commanders, as well as a selection of appendices that add additional commentary and observations from other officers and commands. The majority of the dispatches in this volume were penned by naval officers, which underscores the importance of Norway to the Royal Navy in this far-flung theatre of the war. Their

scope includes military operations during the ill-fated attempt to counter the German invasion, reports on both the naval battles and land battles around Narvik, as well as commando and naval raids in Norwegian waters. The text is well-butressed by a limited number of very well-chosen and relatively contemporary photographs. Given the type of paper chosen for this edition, the images are remarkably sharp. Additional support for the text is provided by a helpful list of abbreviations, plus indices of key persons and naval, military and air units.

Overall, the strength of this volume is found in the actual dispatches themselves. While many could argue that one or another operation had been overlooked, one cannot dismiss the ones that made the cut. Overall, they are presented in a highly readable fashion and have been faithfully reproduced from the originals. The only concession to modern publishing restraints is placing footnotes at the end of the dispatches. Perhaps the most disjointed attempt at historical accuracy is that the compilers' insistence on using a capital "I" instead of a numeric "1" when citing times. The decision of the commander of the Lofoten Island raid of March 1941 to sink the German fish oil tanker *Hamburg*, instead of attempting to seize her as a prize vessel, is an example of the kind of situational operation information that is to be found in these dispatches. Given the nature of this work, it does not include a bibliography, but more casual readers might have been better served with a small list of suggested readings to investigate the story of these events further.

One thing that seems striking is that, apart from the Arctic convoys and air-raids on German bases and warships, the Allies shied away undertaking any major raids or joint operations in Nor-

way after 1942. Nonetheless, the raids of 1941 did manage to persuade Hitler to greatly overvalue Norway's importance during the Second World War. A rather significant event that is glossed over is the sinking of HMS *Glorious* by the German battlecruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. This omission is all the more striking because of recent revelations about the true cause of her rushed exit from Norwegian waters in June 1940. One unintended consequence of the Lofoten raid that could perhaps have been mentioned was its political repercussions within German-occupied Norway. Nevertheless, given the defined mission for volumes in this series, the compilers were perhaps wise to steer away from these issues.

Despite these very minor quibbles, the work stays true to its mission and the series format. Even now, its contents offer a valuable contribution to the growing literature of Norway's role and importance during the Second World War. The dispatches presented provide a more "boots on the ground and on board" perspective on the Norwegian campaign and the sometimes cheeky antics of the British commandos who participated in these actions. This volume is definitely worth reading, or even a second read, by anyone interested in the conduct of the Second World War in this region.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Clare, Quebec

Aaron S. Hamilton. *Total Undersea War. The Evolutionary Role of the Snorkel in Dönitz's U-Boat Fleet 1944-1945*. Barnsley, S. Yorks: Seaforth Publishing, www.seaforthpublishing.co.uk. 2020. 416 pp., illustrations, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. UK £35.00, US \$52.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-52677-8 8 0-2. (Distributed by Naval Institute Press)

Until recent years, most books relating to the U-boat war in the Battle of the Atlantic suggested that the major threat was pretty well over after May 1943. By then, Admiral Dönitz temporarily withdrew most of his boats after suffering unacceptable losses. More recent, careful research, however, has shown that the battle was by no means over until the last days of May 1945. The continuing threat of submarine attack around Britain has become known as "The Inshore Campaign." U-boats were still very much a threat. They even claimed HMCS *Clayoquot* on 24 December 1944 and HMCS *Esquimalt* on 16 April 1945 off the coast of Canada. These successes, in the *Kriegsmarine's* view, were largely thanks to new equipment that is the subject of this excellent and carefully researched book.

As Royal Navy historian, Captain Stephen Roskill, commented; "We never gained a final mastery over the U-Boats" (*Darkest Before Dawn: The Sinking of the Empire Heritage*, 2011). Or, to quote the Duke of Wellington; "It was a near run thing!" Much of the delay in providing new technologies that were being developed for Germany's U-boat arm should, in retrospect, be credited to the RAF and American bombing campaign. To reduce the serious destruction of the shipbuilding yards and technical production facilities located primarily in the northwest, Germany diversified production farther east and south, becoming experts in partial construction, including even U-boat hull sections and engines. But this forced them to depend on rail and river barge shipping, which the Allied air forces then demolished, slowing and too often destroying those critical supply lines—and cargoes.

While the *Kriegsmarine* did indeed get a few of their much-modified U-boats to sea, they were too little and too late to influence the final outcome.