

Nonetheless, *Pearl Harbor Survivors* is an excellent resource for studying the Second World War or military history. Beyond the 24 accounts is an appendix that consists of the ships present during the attack, names of those who died, military rankings, and President Roosevelt's speech after the attack. The accumulation of sources in this book is why it should be added to any researcher's arsenal. The book's conciseness makes it an easier read, as it does not bore the reader with lengthy analysis or disorganization. Besides historians, this book would be an excellent read for the general public interested in the Second World War or Pearl Harbor.

Overall, Harry Spiller's *Pearl Harbor Survivors: An Oral History of 24 Servicemen* is a fresh take on a heavily written subject. Adding a human dimension to a highly technical event allows the reader to comprehend what the men experienced on the morning of 7 December 1941. It is inclusive of all branches present, not just the Navy, and recounts the experiences of those ranked both high and low. While that day will continue to live in infamy, we now have the opportunity to explore new, first-hand accounts of how the survivors themselves experienced Pearl Harbor.

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Corbin Williamson. *The U.S. Navy and its Cold War Alliances, 1945-1953*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, [www.kansaspress.ku.edu](http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu), 2020. xiv+354 pp., illustrations, tables, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. US \$50.00, cloth; ISBN 978-0-7006-2978-7. (E-book available)

It has long been believed that close ties between the United States and its wartime allies were severed at the end of

the Second World War, cutting wartime connections between the anglophone navies. These naval links were then rebuilt during the Korean War as the Cold War threatened to become hot. In this excellent book, Corbin Williamson demonstrates that this assessment may be accurate as far as intergovernmental links were concerned, where the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was sacrificed to a war-weary American populace, and the time-honoured American aversion to 'binding alliances', but it was not the case for navy-to-navy links, exercises, intelligence sharing, doctrine development and weapons procurement. The highly effective operations of anglophone navies off Korea from 1950 to 1953 reflected post-1945 links, joint exercises, information sharing and access to US Navy practices that equipped British, Canadian and Australian forces to work seamlessly with the Americans. All three navies used standard American procedures during this conflict, because they were fitting into American-led forces. The reverse was true when the British were the larger force. Curiously the American decision to deny the British access to the US Naval War College was driven by a desire to avoid any connection with France, which was viewed as unreliable, a security risk and potentially communist.

The book is based on a rich and thorough range of sources, including public and private archives in Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States, and several recent PhD theses and related publications that track key elements of the relationship, with Malcom Llewellyn-Jones' work on the dawn of modern anti-submarine warfare an obvious highlight.

Whatever American politicians might have hoped, and their public expected, the end of the Second World War did not lead to a return to pre-war norms at sea.

The USN found itself drawn into new regions and missions by the rapid demobilisation of the Royal Navies. The war had ruined the British economy, there was no possibility of resuming pre-1939 deployment levels. The USN was dragged into the resulting vacuum. Twice in the late 1940s American capital ships had to be sent to Istanbul, to deter Soviet aggression. For much of the previous 150 years that mission, linked to command of the Mediterranean, had been a British task. Roosevelt's fateful choice to work with Stalin had not succeeded, and the Soviet regime was rapidly consolidating its dominion over eastern Europe. Anglophone naval intelligence agencies assessed Soviet naval capabilities would be enhanced by captured German equipment and technology, notably the fast submarines of the Type XXI and Walter types. This was a field in which the USN had relatively limited experience. The British and Canadian navies had dominated the Battle of the Atlantic, so early moves were made to share analysis of captured German submarines.

Along with anti-submarine warfare, the USN recognised the Royal Navies had an edge in key aspects of naval activity: ship-handling, seamanship, personnel, use of sensors and communications, if not in their design. On the other hand, American carrier operations and aircraft, logistics and resources were a standard that the others could not match. The example was powerful: off Korea, British and Australian carriers generated very high sortie rates, while British afloat support moved to a new level. They waged war as equals based on established practices, and recent interaction.

The biggest problem facing attempts to integrate the Royal and US Navies was cultural, a largely Pacific-focussed war experience of carrier operations, fleet battle, and Navy-Marine amphib-

ious warfare meant the USN saw itself as a stand-alone force, rather than an important component in a tri-service approach to war that ultimately delivered effect on land. Furthermore, the tortuous history of post-1945 American defence reform and the emergence of the US Air Force focussed a lot of Navy attention on the real battle, over budgets and status in Washington. Having strong, effective allies might weaken the case for the US Navy. Predictably, officers in all four navies found aspects of the continuing co-operation a challenge, but those who had worked closely with allies in wartime were better informed and made fewer assumptions.

Wartime experience and ingrained command cultures meant American operational orders, developed for large, complex and necessarily pre-programmed carrier-strike missions, were, by British standards, overly detailed and unduly restrictive. The Royal Navy had emphasised, and expected initiative. Giving junior level leaders responsibility and agency helped select the best senior officers.

In a book that comprehensively overturns accepted wisdom, Williamson stresses that the modern relationships between the anglophone navies were built during the Second World War, and continued at the intelligence and operational level through the 1940s, before being formally re-established in the 1950s. Working with allies became the norm for all four navies, all four nations have benefitted enormously, achieving economies of effort that pre-1939 fleets could only have dreamt of—without standardization.

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