and succeeded in shooting down at least one and perhaps more Iraqi fighters. Only one Tomcat was lost to enemy action.

Cooper’s book is a valuable addition to the literature on the F-14. As an Austrian, Cooper had access to all sides – American, Iranian, and Iraqi – that used or confronted the F-14. Cooper starts by relating the design and development of the F-14, noting that the aircraft was originally intended to be powered by the TF-30 jet engine. That engine had numerous issues and it was not until the 1980s that a more reliable engine became available to the F-14s in service. Ironically, F-14 production was about to end in 1974 when the Shah of Iran—the then-ruler of Iran—ordered 80 F-14s for his air force. The Shah’s decision to purchase those F-14s kept the production line open. A loan from the Shah to Grumman also kept Grumman in business and enabled the USN to purchase additional F-14s. (The Iranian F-14s are still in service with the Islamic Iranian Air Force. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Iranian F-14s were very successful against their Iraqi opponents.) Cooper does not focus on the F-14 alone; he looks at the various aircraft opposing the F-14, primarily Iraqi Mirage fighters and the various Soviet fighters in the Iraqi Air Force inventory. Moreover, Cooper includes many photos of Iraqi personnel – controllers, pilots, and related equipment – which provides an overall picture of the forces opposing the F-14 in the air and ground.

The book is well-illustrated with many photographs of F-14s in action, Iraqi aircraft and ground equipment, maps showing the locations of Iraqi airfields, charts showing the various F-14 squadrons and the carriers on which they served, and a very useful colour centre section showing profiles of F-14s, an Iranian F-4 Phantom, and Iraqi Mirage fighters and MiG fighters. These profiles will be helpful to modellers and historians. The endnotes contain useful information and the bibliography is extensive and will be a resource for historians.

In short, this is a very useful work for the aviation historian and naval aircraft enthusiast. While the F-14 was phased out of American service in 2006, it remains an iconic aircraft, one that served the USN well in wartime. This book is a fine tribute to that aircraft.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


This is another quality book by medical doctor and historian, Jon Diamond, in his Images of War Series. Diamond has produced over a dozen books concerning Second World War campaigns and battles in this series, using photographs from several sources as well as from his own collection gathered from various locations over many years.

The Japanese had been invincible in the first six months of the war, seizing Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and portions of northern New Guinea. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, where a combined US/Australian naval force turned back a Japanese invasion fleet bound for Port Moresby, was the first time that the Japanese advance had been stopped. While
tactically considered a draw in ships and aircraft lost on both sides, it was of great strategic importance, as it now forced the Japanese into attempting to take Port Moresby by land. The fighting which followed in New Guinea (and the Solomon Islands) in 1942-43 destroyed the myth of Japanese invincibility and, coupled with the US victory at the Battle of Midway, paved the way to victory in the Pacific three years later.

Diamond describes the events leading up to the Papua, New Guinea offensive and the subsequent fighting along the Kokoda Track and at Milne Bay, where the mainly Australian forces halted the Japanese advance. As Field Marshall Sir William Slim is quoted, “we should never forget it was the Australians who finally broke the spell of invincibility of the Japanese with their victories at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda Track.”

While this is true, the extremely harsh jungle conditions, for which the Japanese were completely unprepared, also seriously blunted their offensive. Rampant tropical disease and lack of adequate supplies forced them into a slow retreat while fresh Allied forces moved in and began to push them back towards the north coast. Unlike the previous fighting in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (with relatively flat jungle terrain, substantial roads and bridges), the almost complete lack of infrastructure in New Guinea with, at best, mud tracks and log bridges, over steep mountain ranges, fast flowing rivers, and torrential rain, came as a shock to Japanese forces. But it was a close-run matter; when the Japanese advance finally faltered at Imita Ridge, they were less than 25 miles from Port Moresby.

With the Japanese now falling back and the Australian forces exhausted, fresh United States troops from the US 32nd Infantry Division (later joined by the US 41st Infantry Division) then entered the fray. Along with two brigades from the Australian 7th Division they commenced the long, hard slog along the Kokoda Track to push the Japanese back to the north coast villages of Gona and Buna, which had been captured in early 1943. The fighting in the green hell of New Guinea is described in great detail and strongly supported by photos of the terrain and conditions in which the fighting took place. Diamond’s images of the haggard and gaunt faces of the Australian, American, and Japanese soldiers tell the story of the constant and difficult jungle fighting better than any words could.

The photos play a major role in this written history, including several from Japanese sources previously un-seen in other books. Photos from the Australian War Memorial (AWM) collection and the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) are well used to explain the battle as well as the weather conditions, terrain and equipment used. The photos of the dead and wounded from both sides are as disconcerting now as they were when first published during the Second World War.

The author explores the political dimension as well, with Australian and US commanders being removed from their commands if deemed not ‘aggressive’ enough by their superiors (General Blamey for the Australians and General MacArthur for the United States). These were contentious events and seen by many as inappropriate actions by senior commanders who had scant knowledge of the actual conditions in which their troops were living and fighting.

Although well researched and written, the book’s references are generally secondary sources and quotes are un-cited. I would have liked to
have seen more use of both the Australian and US official histories of the war. Nonetheless, this is a very good book and a great first read for anyone wishing to learn about this campaign, which is often over-shadowed by the better-known fighting at Guadalcanal, the Philippines, and the island-hopping fight northwards. This campaign was the turning point in the war in the Pacific as it stopped the Japanese southerly advance and put the Allied forces well and truly on the offensive.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


In this critical new assessment, William Dudley, Director of the US Naval Historical Centre between 1995 and 2004 and founding editor of the essential *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, addresses the maritime dimension of a conflict that has long been at the centre of American naval identity, as visitors to the Naval Academy at Annapolis will have observed. Dudley shifts the focus of attention from combat to administration, from the high seas to Washington, DC, and the shore stations, coastal and lakeside, where ships were built, maintained, and equipped. The central figures are the three Secretaries of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, William Jones, and Benjamin Crowninshield, together with their small administrative staff, while shipwrights and naval architects are a critical resource. The US Navy did not enter the war with the manpower, ships or bases necessary for a conflict with the global naval hegemon, while the money needed to expand the fleet remained in short supply throughout the war. Successive Democratic and Republican administrations under Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had failed to renew the sea-going fleet – no new frigates were built after 1800 – putting their faith in coastal defences and gunboats while cutting the budget. This policy left the United States without the power to influence British economic warfare policy – policy that had been critical to Britain’s war effort since 1803, when the Napoleonic conflict turned the Atlantic into the front line of a total war. By 1812, the American seagoing fleet was small and relatively old. Dudley’s examination of the supply of cannon and powder reveals the limits of American industrial production, and the significance of targeted British amphibious raiding in the Chesapeake, where an important cannon foundry was destroyed.

Despite long term under-funding and limited resources, the American Navy performed well in the War of 1812, far better than the American Army. US warships were worthy opponents, in contrast to those of the European powers. In 1812, naval victories boosted national morale; they secured the northern frontier in 1813 and 1814. On the open ocean, privateering, rather than naval cruiser warfare, took a heavy toll of British merchant shipping in 1812, but the introduction of an effective convoy system quickly reduced those losses, and increased the number of American sailors held as prisoners of war. In late 1814 there were 12,000 sailors in American naval service, 7,000 of them on the Lakes. At the same time 20,000 naval ratings and privateersmen were British prisoners of war, a striking figure that highlights the Royal Navy’s