ed by today’s expedition cruise ships on the charts. Whether you are reading the book in your study, in an armchair in your living room, or in the lounge of an expedition cruise ship, it will not disappoint. In fact, it will provide a deep inside look at how and why the quest for terra australis incognita began to take shape. With a moderate retail price for a hardcover book (also available as an e-book and to be released in a paperback edition within the near future), this book is a welcome addition to every library with a section on Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, whether it is a library for professional purposes or a private collection.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


*Forging the Trident* is a biography focused on Theodore Roosevelt (TR), and the United States Navy; its readiness, training, armament, ship design, evolving materiel, administration, budget, public relations, and policies. The book’s eleven separately authored scholarly essays/chapters plus John Hattendorf’s erudite introduction cover Roosevelt’s career as a maritime historian, New York City police commissioner, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Army Rough Rider, Vice President, and President of the United States. Finally, it explores his influence on his successors – particularly TR’s fifth cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). The book’s authors, in general, are a quasi “Newport Chowder and Marching Soci- ety,” most of whom have a relationship with Newport, Rhode Island’s Naval War College or Salve Regina University. This seems appropriate since TR visited the lovely Rhode Island seaport in 1888, 1897, 1908, and 1913. The title, *Forging the Trident*, is prophetic in that Poseidon’s trident is a potent symbol, a robust weapon, and tool that also represents power and authority – Roosevelt’s metaphorical persona. One chapter’s title, “Checking the Wake While Looking Beyond the Horizon,” perhaps best describes the book’s overall thrust.

Several areas in *Forging the Tri- dent* are unusual focal points in this TR biography. The first is Roosevelt’s southern roots as a decedent of Confederate Naval officers, Bulloch uncles (James and Irvine), and this branch of his family’s relationship with the Republican and Democratic politics of the reconstructionist south. Next, as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, TR saw the potential of naval aviation from an interest in Samuel P. Langley’s early, but unsuccessful, attempts at controlled flight in the late 1890s. President William McKinley gave Langley $50,000 from the War Department (roughly $1,600,000 today) to continue his aeronautical work, a fact not mentioned in the book. The inventor’s ideas were pioneering, but at the time unsuccessful, and later eclipsed by the Wright brothers’ successful powered flight in 1903. Still, the first aircraft carrier, completed in early 1922, was the USS *Langley* designated CV-1. *Langley* became the primary test platform for the USN’s nascent naval aviation program and its quest for air superiority over a battle fleet.

In another far-reaching innovation, Roosevelt encouraged his presidential successor, William Howard Taft, to switch from coal to oil as fuel for navy
ships, thus eliminating the need for coaling stations either owned by America or provided by friendly foreign countries. In 1910, the navy converted from coal- to oil-burning ships and Taft established three Naval Petroleum Reserves to assure an oil supply in the event of war or national emergency as provided for in the Pickett Act of 1910. It authorized the president to draw upon potential oil-bearing lands as sources of fuel for the Navy. It also made refueling navy vessels while underway at sea a reality. Finally, in 1905, Roosevelt’s interest in John Holland’s submarine torpedo boat led him to undertake a dive in the submarine Plunger. Afterwards, the president emerged like a child who had enjoyed an amusement park ride, but the press admonished him for taking this risk in then-precarious novel technology.

Perceiving the United States as a potential world power, Roosevelt orchestrated several political public relations maneuvers. The first was the recasting of a highly successful Revolutionary War officer into a hero. John Paul Jones had died many years before and was buried in an obscure, unmarked Parisian grave. Once his body was discovered and identified in 1905, the president ordered that it should be returned to the United States.

Aspiring national powers elevate military heroes to emulate desired military virtues, but some are more fable than fact. Most early-nineteenth-century depictions of John Paul Jones produced an image of a rumbustious Revolutionary War man of action. Unfortunately, his often-prickly personality was coupled with a violent temper. He was sexually promiscuous and some under his command saw him as more of a naval adventurer than as the prototypical professional officer. The author of the chapter about Roosevelt’s elevation of Jones as a much-needed national naval hero to be re-entombed under the chapel at the naval academy at Annapolis pointed out comparisons between Horatio Nelson and Jones noting that “both men were small in stature, assertive, vain, insecure, in love with military trappings, and brave to the point of recklessness” (96). Roosevelt reimagined the life and legacy of John Paul Jones, purposely creating what he thought the country needed. He gave the nation a reconstituted hero of the American naval service, elevated by way of military pomp and ceremony to finally rest in grandeur at the Naval Academy’s maritime campus – a clever scheme to reshape and add support for American naval power.

The second public relations move of major importance was assembling and dispatching the Great White Fleet for its round-the-world voyage in 1907-1909. Maritime historian Roosevelt, having written the now-classic The Naval War of 1812 as a Harvard undergraduate, romanticized the gallantry of its nineteenth-century officers, sailors, and ships. This voyage was his attempt to demonstrate America’s naval prowess to the world at the dawn of the twentieth century. The colourful pageantry during the departure and return of the Great White Fleet amply illustrates Roosevelt’s propensity for public spectacle – to be “the bride at every wedding, the corpse at every funeral, the baby at every christening … the admiral at every naval review or the lieutenant at every boarding party” (249). Speculation regarding its real justification and impact is the subject of several chapters, but basically this was Roosevelt’s blatant display of military mobility and might; his manifest “big stick diplomacy.” It was also his attempt to keep Japan, the winner of the Russo-Japanese war, at bay. While effective, it certainly pre-
saged the surprise attack on Pearl Har-
bor in 1941. Similar prolonged efforts
by his successors through the Franklin
Delano Roosevelt presidency were for
naught and not surprising.

Editing chapters by different au-
thors involves creating an over-all sto-
ryline, threading each together and at
the same time blending each author’s
distinctive writing style into a cohesive
text. This was largely accomplished,
except perhaps for unavoidable re-
dundancies where topics overlapped
occurring during the same historic ep-
isode(s). At a gathering of the American
Historical Association, TR emphasized
the importance of using “vision and
imagination” in historical writings. “It
is good to hear the sound of trumpet and
horn … put flesh and blood on the dry
bones to make dead men living before
your eyes…. Great thoughts match and
inspire heroic deeds.” Hattendorf and
Leeman’s Forging the Trident succeeds
in organizing a fascinating glimpse
into how Theodore Roosevelt, by his
idiosyncratic intelligence and person-
ality, largely steered America’s “ship of
state” into the era of the modern navy.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

Matthew Heaslip. Gunboats, Empire
and the China Station: The Royal Navy
in 1920s East Asia. London: Blooms-
bury Academic, www.bloomsbury.com,
2021. ix+304 pp., illustrations, notes,
bibliography. US $115.00, cloth; ISBN
978-1-35017-618-8.

Matthew Heaslip is a lecturer at the
University of Portsmouth and this fine
monograph is based on his PhD disser-
tation. His study on the China Station in
the decade after the Great War fills a gap
in the historiography of the Royal Navy
and demonstrates convincingly both
the importance of the station as well as
the difficulties faced in overcoming the
many, many challenges endemic to the
region at that time.

The China Station was one of the
Royal Navy’s “areas” into which it di-
vided the world, appointed an admiral,
assigned a number of warships, and
thereby, kept the peace for mercantile
interests. The China Station grew out
of the two nineteenth century Opium
Wars that had resulted in the forceable
opening of the Chinese market to Brit-
ish commercial enterprise. In this en-
deavour it was followed by the French,
the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese,
and somewhat later the Americans, the
Germans, and the Japanese. This period
of Chinese history marks their “centu-
ry of humiliations” (roughly 1840s to
1940s), when its national sovereignty
was respected by no one. China was
not, unlike say India, ruled directly or
indirectly by the European powers;
rather, access to Chinese markets was
forced on a weak central administration
in then-called Peking. The physical re-
ality of this dominance was seen on the
Chinese littoral, most famously Hong
Kong and Shanghai, and deep into the
country by way of navigable rivers (es-
sentially the Yellow, the Yangtze, and
the Pearl Rivers). After the turn of the
twentieth century, marked by the Box-
er Rebellion, circumstances in China
grew increasingly difficult for the im-
perial powers. The collapse of the Chi-
nese imperial dynasty in 1911 and its
replacement by a republic of most un-
certain foundations increased the inse-
curity and tension in the country. Con-
sequently, maintaining some level of
peace conducive to commercial activity
was difficult and getting more so as the
Great War approached. The decade af-
ther that conflict witnessed a return of the
(victorious) imperial powers, but the
unrest and instability endemic to China