saged the surprise attack on Pearl Har-
bor in 1941. Similar prolonged efforts
by his successors through the Franklin
Delano Roosevelt presidency were for
naught and not surprising.

Editing chapters by different au-
thors involves creating an over-all sto-
ryline, threading each together and at
the same time blending each author’s
distinctive writing style into a cohesive
text. This was largely accomplished,
except perhaps for unavoidable re-
dundancies where topics overlapped
occurring during the same historic ep-
isode(s). At a gathering of the American
Historical Association, TR emphasized
the importance of using “vision and
imagination” in historical writings. “It
is good to hear the sound of trumpet and
horn … put flesh and blood on the dry
bones to make dead men living before
your eyes…. Great thoughts match and
inspire heroic deeds.” Hattendorf and
Leeman’s *Forging the Trident* succeeds
in organizing a fascinating glimpse
into how Theodore Roosevelt, by his
idiosyncratic intelligence and person-
ality, largely steered America’s “ship of
state” into the era of the modern navy.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

Matthew Heaslip. *Gunboats, Empire
and the China Station: The Royal Navy
in 1920s East Asia.* London: Blooms-
bury Academic, www.bloomsbury.com,
2021. ix+304 pp., illustrations, notes,
bibliography. US $115.00, cloth; ISBN
978-1-35017-618-8.

Matthew Heaslip is a lecturer at the
University of Portsmouth and this fine
monograph is based on his PhD disser-
tation. His study on the China Station in
the decade after the Great War fills a gap
in the historiography of the Royal Navy
and demonstrates convincingly both
the importance of the station as well as
the difficulties faced in overcoming the
many, many challenges endemic to the
region at that time.

The China Station was one of the
Royal Navy’s “areas” into which it di-
vided the world, appointed an admiral,
assigned a number of warships, and
thereby, kept the peace for mercantile
interests. The China Station grew out
of the two nineteenth century Opium
Wars that had resulted in the forceable
opening of the Chinese market to Brit-
ish commercial enterprise. In this en-
deavour it was followed by the French,
the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese,
and somewhat later the Americans, the
Germans, and the Japanese. This period
of Chinese history marks their “centu-
ry of humiliations” (roughly 1840s to
1940s), when its national sovereignty
was respected by no one. China was
not, unlike say India, ruled directly or
indirectly by the European powers; rather,
access to Chinese markets was
forced on a weak central administration
in then-called Peking. The physical re-
ality of this dominance was seen on the
Chinese littoral, most famously Hong
Kong and Shanghai, and deep into the
country by way of navigable rivers (es-
sentially the Yellow, the Yangtze, and
the Pearl Rivers). After the turn of the
twentieth century, marked by the Box-
er Rebellion, circumstances in China
grew increasingly difficult for the im-
perial powers. The collapse of the Chi-
inese imperial dynasty in 1911 and its
replacement by a republic of most un-
certain foundations increased the inse-
curity and tension in the country. Con-
sequently, maintaining some level of
peace conducive to commercial activity
was difficult and getting more so as the
Great War approached. The decade af-
fer that conflict witnessed a return of the
(victorious) imperial powers, but the
unrest and instability endemic to China
Heaslip well describes these difficulties that faced the often quite junior RN officers in command of the gunboats that patrolled the Chinese littoral and the inland water routes. Complicating matters further were the various warlords and their local campaigns designed to secure portions of the fracturing Chinese polity, which a hapless central government in Peking was utterly unable to influence. Life was no easier for the RN admirals headquartered at Hong Kong or Shanghai. The blessing of rapid and effective communication links provided by radio and cable meant that the days of a nervous Foreign Office providing rough guidelines and relying on the sound judgement of those on the spot were truly over. Now admirals were required to seek and receive direction from London. In turn, the admirals could direct the activities of ship captains in real time. This clipping of naval wings was the new reality, making a difficult situation worse for those on the station. Finally, as Heaslip analyses clearly, the power of Great Britain was both relatively and absolutely far less in 1925 than it had been in 1914. This placed a premium on firstly, not rocking the boat in Chinese waters, as well as needing to liaise and cooperate with the other imperial powers which all too often, from the British perspective, had their own contrary or unhelpful interests to consider. It was approaching impossible to fulfill the mandate of maintaining peaceful conditions in China for the benefit of British commercial enterprise.

Indeed, the geopolitical circumstances facing Great Britain in the interwar period were daunting and would have strained the capacities of any nation at that time. Britain, however, was of the view that it was the preeminent power, even if it no longer had the armed forces, the diplomatic clout, the economy or the financial resources that such a title rather implied. Maintaining its position and seeing off threats to the status quo was viewed as critical by London, but the resources provided as well as the narrow authority conceded to China Station admirals during this period made a problematic situation infeasible.

There is not the space in a short review to touch on the many tentacles of complexity troubling British authorities, but Heaslip nicely encapsulates them and engagingly lays out the troubles in a clear fashion that will enlighten anyone who is vague as to what the China Station actually was, why it existed, and the role it played. He also thoroughly discusses the importance of the 1927 Nanjing Incident (and other similar episodes around this date) that is almost unknown currently and yet resulted in the largest peacetime deployment of the RN in all the interwar period. It also represented the belated comprehension that the inherent bluff of gunboat diplomacy was increasingly ineffective as China embarked on its modernization, passed the turmoil of the previous eighty years, and started to assert its sovereignty more effectively. Finally, the role of China in British foreign policy, in particular the powerful strain of anti-communism, is well brought out in Heaslip’s account, with Britain’s determination to demonstrate its great power pretensions globally. The importance of Singapore, Hong Kong, and the growing rivalry and enmity with Japan are interwoven with accounts of how British naval officers of all ranks dealt with their immediate and difficult operational challenges on the station as they countered pirates, unrest, and the effects of China’s civil strife.

Finally, Heaslip considers and analyses RN officer training, culture, and
attitudes that affected their outlook as they conducted themselves on the China station. He notes the racism that was part of the intellectual assumption of many, but not all, personnel at the time and how this factor influenced behaviour. Heaslip also does not shy away from the inherent violence in which imperial policy was conducted, condoned, and expected in China and elsewhere. Wiser officers well understood the criticality of resorting to violence sparingly as a last resort and to the minimum possible degree. Not all were wise.

All in all, Heaslip has provided an important account of the interwar Royal Navy’s China Station. He has filled a significant gap in the historiography, while identifying areas that would benefit from additional research. It is hoped that he will seek to follow his own guidance in this regard. He has made excellent use of primary sources in various archives, principally in Britain, but also in China. Also of obvious value were the articles written by those on the spot and published in the Naval Review. The listing of secondary sources is extensive and will serve as an excellent introduction to any who wish to explore further. The book includes some photographs that illuminate the narrative, as well as a few useful maps and diagrams. Two short appendices provide lists of the senior RN officers on the station and the particulars of the typical warships assigned to Chinese waters. I happily recommend this book to all interested in the period. The only negative is the price. As is common with such monographs, the cost is over $100.00, which many will find beyond their purse.

Ian Yeates,
Regina, Saskatchewan


The Sonarman’s War is H.G. Jones’ personal journey through the Second World War. Although the cover touts his tale as “A Memoir of Submarine Chasing and Mine Sweeping,” his story focuses on the latter. Occasional teases of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are strewn throughout the book, but readers with an appetite for ASW will be left hungry.

H.G. Jones served aboard Submarine Chaser 525, which he affectionately named Cinq-Deux-Cinq. During his time aboard, he would serve in some of the most infamous military operations during the Second World War, including Anzio and Okinawa. He does not tell his story from the beaches or a foxhole, but from the sea, where he, along with his crew, earned their place in history.

The Sonar Man’s War recounts in detail the excitement and dreariness endured by those at sea in war. Despite his impressive credentials as a PhD and historian, Jones’ book captures his pride serving as a young, enlisted man during the formative years of his adult life. Instead of a monologue based on possibly faulty memory, Jones carefully details his experiences through diaries, archived records, personal photos, and letters from his time abroad. He occasionally sprinkles in his less-than-flattering opinion about officers, although he writes with reverence about the officers under whom he served.

The book objectively lays out his growth from a boy from a small farm to a seasoned veteran over the course of the war. He does not try to polish or sanitize any part of his story. For every