

lost to the waters of time. This book is a testament to those who did not tell their stories but performed their duty faithfully.

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Nicholas A. Lambert. *The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster: How Globalized Trade Led Britain to Its Worst Defeat of the First World War*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, www.global.oup.org, 2021. xvii+337pp., notes, bibliography, index. UK £32.99, US \$49.95, cloth; ISBN 9780197545201. (E-book available.)

For over a century, the debate over the 1915-16 Dardanelles offensive has been shaped by a series of assumptions that took hold even before it had ended. The first is that the campaign was launched because Winston Churchill, the ebullient First Lord of the Admiralty, singlehandedly persuaded HH Asquith's Liberal government to launch an attack on Turkish positions guarding the mouth of the Dardanelles Straits. The second is that this offensive was inspired by purely military considerations and sought mainly military goals: specifically, to force the Ottoman government to surrender and to open a route to Russia's Black Sea ports in order to facilitate arms shipments for their under-equipped armies. In this book, Lambert challenges both of these premises by developing arguments made in his previous book on British economic warfare during the First World War, *Planning Armageddon*. To that end, he re-examines the debates within the government in the months leading up to the campaign and draws from them the broader political, financial, and economic motivations that led them to support it.

To Lambert, what is missing from the traditional narrative of the origins of the Dardanelles offensive is the role played in the cabinet's deliberations by concerns over food security. This was a novel problem for British policymakers in wartime, as during the last global war waged a century before, the United Kingdom was able on its own to produce enough wheat to feed its populace. This changed over the course of the nineteenth century thanks to the accelerating globalization of trade. Within forty years of Napoleon's defeat, Britain imported approximately one quarter of the grains consumed by their populace; by the end of the century, that number rose to 80%. While this global trade made possible the cheaper foodstuffs enjoyed by British workers, it left their economy dependent on the ability of the new international grain market to supply them. Cognizant of this problem, the government took steps to control the food supply virtually from the moment they entered the conflict in August 1914, by prohibiting the export of foodstuffs and monitoring agricultural production and supply. While sugar was the most immediate concern, wheat was the more important commodity, and in the months that followed, rising global wheat prices became a source of anxiety at the highest levels.

The most important factor driving up wheat prices in the futures markets in the last months of 1914 was the loss of access to Russian wheat once Ottoman Turkey closed the Dardanelles at the end of September. Not only did this cut off the global market from an important producer of wheat exports, it also denied the cash-strapped Russians a critical means of earning much-needed foreign currency for munitions purchases abroad. With Russia's offensive capacity crippled in part by the lack of munitions, the supreme commander of

the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, sent a telegram to the British on 2 January 1915 requesting a military demonstration to relieve the pressure on Russian forces in the Caucasus region. Here Lambert launches into a meticulous reconstruction of the debates throughout January and into February over the available options. While Churchill's advocacy of a naval operation to force the Dardanelles was part of this, it was only one of several proposals considered, each of which had their advocates within the cabinet. As the various options foundered because of political obstacles, Churchill's proposal of a "low-risk, high-reward" operation became more tantalizing, especially as the "wheat problem" stoked the cabinet's anxiety. Churchill's communiqué on 20 February announcing the Admiralty's intention to force the Dardanelles helped to reverse the market's direction, bringing prices down in expectation of renewed access to Russian wheat. Yet this decline also exposed the government's effort to manipulate wheat prices through third-party purchases. The infeasibility of price controls or other options meant that the only way left to continue lowering prices was through reopening the Dardanelles. With the failure of the naval effort on 18 March, Britain had no other choice but to use land troops.

By the summer, efforts to regain access to Russian wheat became unnecessary, as the reports in May of bumper crops by farmers in both the United States and Canada collapsed prices and ended the wheat crisis. In that respect Lambert's book adds another layer of tragedy to the already lamentable tale of disaster on the Gallipoli peninsula. It is a remarkable piece of historical scholarship, one that finds an important new perspective about a subject seemingly explored to exhaustion. Do-

ing so required a formidable amount of research in over two dozen archives on three continents, from which Lambert uncovered the scattered details that he then pieced together patiently in order to make his case. Thanks to his efforts, we have a better understanding of one of the defining events of the First World War, one that enhances our appreciation of the myriad factors behind it. Though some scholars may take issue with Lambert's interpretations, it is a book that nobody concerned with the Dardanelles campaign, the First World War more generally, or the complex history of globalization can afford to ignore.

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Mark Lardas. *Spanish Galleon vs English Galleon 1550-1605*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, 2020. 80 pp., illustrations, bibliography, index. UK £13.99, US \$22.00, CDN \$30.00, paper; ISBN 978-1-4728-3990-9.

The mystique of the Spanish Main, treasure fleets, and galleons has long held appeal for students of maritime history. The era of the late-sixteenth century has been, and continues to be, covered in depth by academic historians. But in an age when reading in general, and history in particular, faces shrinking cultural appeal, an easily digested introductory volume on the age of galleons is of particular worth.

With the release of *Spanish Galleon vs English Galleon*, author and historian Mark Lardas has capably filled that niche. The latest installment in Osprey Publishing's *Duel* series of books, this modestly-sized volume serves equally well as a primer for those with casual interest in the topic, or as a refresher volume for those more knowledgeable