

the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, sent a telegram to the British on 2 January 1915 requesting a military demonstration to relieve the pressure on Russian forces in the Caucasus region. Here Lambert launches into a meticulous reconstruction of the debates throughout January and into February over the available options. While Churchill's advocacy of a naval operation to force the Dardanelles was part of this, it was only one of several proposals considered, each of which had their advocates within the cabinet. As the various options foundered because of political obstacles, Churchill's proposal of a "low-risk, high-reward" operation became more tantalizing, especially as the "wheat problem" stoked the cabinet's anxiety. Churchill's communiqué on 20 February announcing the Admiralty's intention to force the Dardanelles helped to reverse the market's direction, bringing prices down in expectation of renewed access to Russian wheat. Yet this decline also exposed the government's effort to manipulate wheat prices through third-party purchases. The infeasibility of price controls or other options meant that the only way left to continue lowering prices was through reopening the Dardanelles. With the failure of the naval effort on 18 March, Britain had no other choice but to use land troops.

By the summer, efforts to regain access to Russian wheat became unnecessary, as the reports in May of bumper crops by farmers in both the United States and Canada collapsed prices and ended the wheat crisis. In that respect Lambert's book adds another layer of tragedy to the already lamentable tale of disaster on the Gallipoli peninsula. It is a remarkable piece of historical scholarship, one that finds an important new perspective about a subject seemingly explored to exhaustion. Do-

ing so required a formidable amount of research in over two dozen archives on three continents, from which Lambert uncovered the scattered details that he then pieced together patiently in order to make his case. Thanks to his efforts, we have a better understanding of one of the defining events of the First World War, one that enhances our appreciation of the myriad factors behind it. Though some scholars may take issue with Lambert's interpretations, it is a book that nobody concerned with the Dardanelles campaign, the First World War more generally, or the complex history of globalization can afford to ignore.

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Mark Lardas. *Spanish Galleon vs English Galleon 1550-1605*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, 2020. 80 pp., illustrations, bibliography, index. UK £13.99, US \$22.00, CDN \$30.00, paper; ISBN 978-1-4728-3990-9.

The mystique of the Spanish Main, treasure fleets, and galleons has long held appeal for students of maritime history. The era of the late-sixteenth century has been, and continues to be, covered in depth by academic historians. But in an age when reading in general, and history in particular, faces shrinking cultural appeal, an easily digested introductory volume on the age of galleons is of particular worth.

With the release of *Spanish Galleon vs English Galleon*, author and historian Mark Lardas has capably filled that niche. The latest installment in Osprey Publishing's *Duel* series of books, this modestly-sized volume serves equally well as a primer for those with casual interest in the topic, or as a refresher volume for those more knowledgeable

on the era.

Like other Osprey books in this series, Lardas' work takes an in-depth look at vessels and combatants. Both Spanish and English galleons are described in detail: their design, capabilities, and tactical efficacy for their respective nations.

The very mention of a galleon generally conjures up the vessel's association with Spain, and for good reason. At one time possessing the largest merchant fleet in the world, Spain and her kings would rely on the galleon in the crucial trans-Atlantic trade that funneled the riches of the New World into the coffers of the empire.

For that reason, Spanish galleons tended to be large, relatively ungainly vessels, designed more for cargo capacity than maneuverability. Those converted to naval use, however, could be tactically imposing. Large Spanish galleons were designed for close-quarters action and consequently carried large contingents of heavily armed boarding parties. Moreover, Spanish vessels were designed with towering sterncastles, affording naval commanders the tactically vital advantage of "high ground" during close engagements.

England, the expanding economic upstart of the Elizabethan age, responded with galleons which were designed to exploit Spanish maritime vulnerabilities. English galleons were built for speed and were much smaller compared to their Spanish counterparts. Possessing sleeker hulls and greatly shortened sterncastles, the vessels were fast and highly maneuverable. These nimble English galleons, including the technologically advanced "race built galleons," were considered state-of-the-art naval technology during their heyday.

Perhaps more importantly, the rapidly expanding Protestant economy of England had made great strides in

artillery development during the sixteenth century. English gun founders had grown skilled in the art of cast brass (actually bronze) gun tubes, as well as perfecting the design of the culverin, the most fearsome ordnance available at the time. Although generally smaller in calibre than Spanish guns, the culverin's greater range ensured that English captains could keep their ships at a safe distance while hammering the enemy.

England's decided superiority in technology, gunnery, and basic seamanship would play to the island kingdom's advantage. While England's naval and merchant fleet pursued a policy of innovation and original thinking, Spain stubbornly maintained an outdated naval tool chest. With better guns, better ships, and highly professional mariners, England was well positioned for the high-stakes game of naval dominance.

In detailed looks at three crucial naval engagements, the author explores that basic theme. Lardas initially describes Francis Drake's legendary capture of the Spanish treasure ship *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*. At the helm of *Golden Hind*, Drake famously made use of skilled seamanship, sheer audacity, and outright deception to capture the Spanish vessel. By a brazen use of the English galleon's capabilities, Drake succeeded in negating the advantages of a much larger enemy ship.

In his brief description of the Battle of Gravelines, Lardas explores the last fight of the Spanish ship *San Mateo*. One of the crown jewels of the Spanish Armada, *San Mateo* made a bold effort to defend Spanish transports but was assailed by a swarm of smaller, faster English galleons. During a day-long exchange of artillery fire, *San Mateo* was battered by superior English gunnery, run aground, and finally forced to strike her colours.

Lardas likewise describes the last

fight of the English galleon *Revenge* off the Azores in 1591. The vessel's commander, Richard Grenville, made a bold move to evade a greatly superior Spanish force, but was quickly beset by unexpectedly swift enemy ships, which ultimately forced his surrender. Far from sticking with inferior technology, Spain finally began copying English ship designs, an unexpected development in the Elizabethan naval arms race which led to the demise of *Revenge*.

Part of the appeal of Osprey books is lavish illustration, and this volume is no exception. Thanks to a heavy dose of period wood cuts, cutaway diagrams of galleon cross-sections, detailed paintings of naval arms and armaments, and portraits of the era's most legendary players, this volume offers a rich visual feast of Elizabethan naval history.

Spanish Galleon vs. English Galleon promises to be a pleasant volume for maritime history enthusiasts and will find appeal to a broad cross-section of readers. It is well suited for young naval history enthusiasts but is also appropriate for seasoned academics who might enjoy a refreshing read on a familiar topic.

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Eric Leon and John Asmussen. *German Naval Camouflage Volume II: 1942-1945*. [Re-Release] Barnsley, S. Yorks: Seaforth Publishing, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2020. 168 pp., illustrations, appendix, bibliography. UK £35.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-84832-223-3.

This work is the third reprinting of Eric Leon and John Asmussen's 2014 examination of the camouflage patterns employed by the Kriegsmarine for their surface fleet during the more chaotic

and tumultuous second half of the Second World War. Utilizing an extensive collection of photographic evidence, firsthand accounts, secondary sources, and modern computer programs, the authors have created profile and top-down illustrations with as accurate as possible renderings of ship camouflages at various key points in the service lives of German battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats. The markings and paint schemes of shipboard aircraft are also covered in an appendix, along with corrections and additional information for Volume I of the series.

The introductory text offers a good examination of the authors' sources and methodology. While the visual sources are mainly discussed rather than shown due to the sheer volume of reference photographs, the methodology is extremely well documented, covering digital techniques and showcasing the analytical and rendering process. The scope of the work and concessions are also covered here. The former notes the decision to omit pre-dreadnoughts, most First World War-era ships, and vessels below torpedo boat size "in the interest of timely completion," while the latter includes concessions made for the sake of visibility, such as the omission of rigging from top-down views and the scaling up of wood decking to prevent data loss in rendering (13, 16). All of the processes and choices laid out provide a good background for the main body of the work.

Following the introduction, the work is subdivided into five sections: battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats, moving from the largest tonnage ships on down. The larger capital ships often have more variant of camouflage rendered due to the nature of their size and service lives, and ships of cruiser or battleship size each have an intro-