opportunity to visit Tokyo many times and discover many aspects of Japanese culture that are well documented in this book.

Although he does not report on any wartime operations, Lyman records two interesting and dangerous encounters he shared with his comrades. The first was the explosion of a land mine as a convoy of cars he was in was travelling south on dusty Highway One. The lead truck passed over a mine, and Lyman’s driver quickly swerved his jeep off the road. As the author reports, the explosion killed two young marines, who were found in a rice field. The second dramatic event occurred during a rescue operation to recover a lost squad in the Tra Bong River, using a special floating tank. Lyman’s group was soon under fire, but after the Americans fought back, the enemy ceased shooting.

Other significant passages describe local villages, where groups of children used to surround the soldiers and try to sell them something. The US forces in Vietnam understood that to reduce the local population’s distrust, they had to give them a hand through Civic Action projects, such as building schools, churches, and orphanages or providing villagers with health care. Many soldiers were involved in these projects, but one figure who stands out is John Murphy, a former construction company owner, who spent most of his time in Vietnam helping the Vietnamese rebuild what the war had destroyed.

Unlike other war diaries, Lyman’s memoirs do not express any negative judgement towards the enemy or the local population. The common thread of this book is the sense of friendship among many young soldiers, sent to a previously unknown part of the world, to fight a war no one wanted, and the curiosity and sorrow for the Vietnamese people involved in what is now considered a Cold War era proxy-war. In Lyman’s words: “I felt we could do more for these people, or less – if we’d just give them the money the military was spending on this war effort and let the Vietnamese sort their differences themselves” (167).

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The Anglo-Dutch conflict of 1652 through 1682 was the high-water mark of Dutch naval power and global influence. For the English, it was an era of great internal political upheaval from Cromwell to the arrival of William III of Orange. For the English navy, it was a period of slow awakening as the result of Dutch victories. David Ormrod and Gijs Rommelse edited and contributed to this collection of papers that explore in depth the financial, naval, political, and diplomatic developments during this period. This book is the result of two conferences in 2017, held in Amsterdam and Chatham, to mark the 350th anniversary of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665-67, and the Dutch raid on the Medway, 1667. It provides a deeper understanding of the changing context during the period and the impact of the wars on England and the Netherlands.

There were three Anglo-Dutch wars, 1652-54, 1665-67 and 1673-74. The first war began largely over English ambitions to destroy Dutch superiority
in trade and ended with both countries financially exhausted. The second war was centred on trade and the attempt by the recently returned King Charles II to place his nephew, William III of Orange, in charge of the Dutch. It ended with the successful Dutch raid of the Medway. Admiral De Ruyter, employing a plan by Johan and Cornelis de Witt attacked the English anchorage at Chatham and made off with the flagship Royal Charles, a humiliating defeat for the King whose control over England was still precarious. The third war saw an allied France and England attack the Dutch. It ended after four naval victories by the Dutch under Admiral De Ruyter persuaded the English Parliament to force Charles II to seek peace. The end to Anglo-Dutch conflict in the seventeenth century came with the Dutch invasion that served to place William of Orange and his wife Mary on the English throne in 1688.

The book is divided into four sections. The first is a single chapter by Ormrod and Rommelse, who position the period under review as being one where the conception of the nation as being (at least in good part) a “fiscal-naval state” comes to the fore, producing changes in governance of the navy, fiscal policies for the government to finance the navy, and the establishment of distant colonies and trade. Helping to shape this new sense of state was the growing mercantile powers within England and the Netherlands, who provided the finances and encouraged the empire building. Broader European inter-relationships with England and the Dutch also influenced the existence of war or peace between the two states. A comparison of the two “fiscal-naval states” is performed in another paper by Richard Blakemore and Pepijn Brandon appearing in the next section of the book.

The second section contains six articles focusing on the war in the North Sea. Rommelse and Roger Downing set the stage with a view of the European context in which the three Anglo-Dutch conflicts occurred. While the wars began with English desires to counter the financial and trade advantages of the Dutch and the Dutch to challenge the English claim over the North Sea, others saw it as either a financial war only, or a series of unfortunate conflicts between two Protestant states. As for the other European countries, they either jumped in whenever an advantage to their own national political or financial interests arose, or kept a safe, circumspect distance.

John Hattendorf describes the impact of the naval rivalry between the English and Dutch. The three naval wars and the intervening years of competitive trade and colonization are portrayed as an ongoing “naval arms race.” The conflicts helped to establish permanent naval forces in major European nations and altered the tactical aspects of sea battles, leading to navies adopting a line of battle approach rather than swarming a single enemy ship with several ships. It also affected ship design, creating the line of battle, convoy escort, and coastal defence ships. The Dutch mastered the ability to quickly assemble and deploy an invading force both in 1667, and for the transporting of William III to England in 1688. The English came to understand the need to secure ongoing, adequate financial support for the navy.

Ann Coats and Alan Lemmers write about the dockyards and coastal defences of the two belligerents. With a heavy use of images, the authors explore the differences between English and Dutch ability “to support their navies.” At mid-century the Dutch held the upper hand, in both financial and
organizational areas, but by 1700, the English had reversed the situation. The Dutch created a fleet, professionalized their naval officers, and employed taxes to support the effort. This served to bring about social changes beyond their intentions and weakened the traditional five regional Dutch admiralties. England had faced humiliating defeat in the second war largely due to a failure to complete planned defences, and properly pay dock workers and sailors, caused in part by financial problems. Fiscal reform under Charles II brought order to tax collection and distribution of funds, while the appearance of a strong, stable Bank of England, capable of backing loans, led to completion of shore defences and improved funding of the navy.

The English and Dutch colonial empires in North America and Asia are dealt with in the third section. Nuala Zahedieh reviews the Anglo-Dutch struggles around the Atlantic rim. The Second Anglo-Dutch war was the most critical, leaving England with the east coast of North America, and the Dutch in charge of English slave trading posts in Africa and with access to Spanish markets through the slave trade. As for the West Indies, the treaty returned conquests to pre-war owners. Overseas possessions and their defence, and the capture of the other country’s distant colonies proved an expensive endeavour, in both coin and lives.

In Asia, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) had developed into a near independent state power, staking claims and waging war to support them. Erik Odegard explains the interaction between the VOC and the English East India Company (EIC) during the periods of war and peace in the seventeenth century. With its extensive resources and government support, the VOC was able to exert its trade control over areas of Asia the Dutch had colonized and influence surrounding nations. The EIC just managed to survive the period, learning the lesson that “company-state” status was the only road to flourishing in the east.

Jaap Jacobs examines the use of treaties, land claims, and diplomacy in the rivalry between the English and Dutch in North America, while Martine van Ittersum does the same for the contest over the Banda Islands in Indonesia. In both cases we see each side using nuanced interpretations and application of treaties and international law to upload their own claims over desired areas and trade. State and mercantile interests overlapped throughout the era, with either party calling the other to support their positions and enforce trade and land possession claims. Treaties with Indigenous people were an important part of the exertion of rights by the European states. Government charter and “just war” claims to Dutch areas of North America were used by the English to justify territorial possession.

The fourth section has two chapters which examine the historical remembrance of the wars and the multiple portrayals of Dutch hero Admiral Michiel De Ruyter. Remmelt Daalder examines De Ruyter’s afterlife as a national hero in the “collective imagination,” representing the nation’s naval prowess, as symbol of political reform, a spark for the heroic deeds of a later generation’s naval officers, military recruitment icon, and the stable face on Dutch currency. Admiral De Ruyter was perfect for the role – intelligent, daring, loyal, and a reminder of an age when the Dutch were more powerful and influential. His biography could be easily massaged to fit the contemporary national conditions, to suit the purposes of the group employing his image. David Ormrod reports on the British and Dutch efforts
to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, in 2017. The celebrations had more public salience and higher political acknowledgment for the Dutch than the British, the latter having little success to celebrate and no hero on which to focus. Prioritizing of entertainment over historical fact guided the preparation of activities along the Medway.

Each of the four groupings of chapters begins with a half-page illustration relevant to that section’s topic. There are 41 illustrations within several of the chapters, 20 alone in Coats’ and Lemmers’ study of dockyards and coastal defences. There are seven easy-to-read statistical tables. Four maps are grouped together to orient the reader to the Dutch and English colonies discussed within the text. Unfortunately, only the first is properly labelled, while the captions for the other three are placed with the wrong map.

This book is for those with a background knowledge of Anglo-Dutch relationships in the seventeenth century, the details of the three wars, as well as some command of European political dynamics. It contributes a rich layer of new scholarly analysis of the contextual landscape of the Anglo-Dutch aggression between 1652 and 1689. As noted above, the final two contributions explore how history is told in light of political and cultural forces.

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France and the United Kingdom have been partners and allies on the defence side since the Entente Cordiale in 1904. These former enemies and competitors put aside differences to build a close relationship that stood up to the Second World War. The nadir came after France’s capitulation and the Royal Navy’s attacks on warships of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar in 1940. Its military power restored and expanded for a nuclear age, France was a contributing member to NATO during the Cold War, although French President Charles De Gaulle withdrew from the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. After France formally returned to the fold 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, French and British political leaders met in 2010 to sign the landmark Lancaster House agreements that set out the scope of a renewed bilateral relationship between the two countries in certain military and defence fields. Alice Pannier, a political scientist and assistant professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, has revised a prize-winning doctoral dissertation completed jointly through King’s College University of London and Panthéon-Sorbonne University in Paris, into a book that examines the nature of the evolving Anglo-French relationship since 2010 in the context of the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the European Union, popularly known as Brexit. She was a postdoctoral fellow at the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire (IRSEM) within France’s Ministry of Defence and secretary-general of the Association pour les Études sur la Guerre et la Stratégie (AEGES).

Pannier argues that France and the United Kingdom have a special rela-