to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, in 2017. The celebrations had more public salience and higher political acknowledgement for the Dutch than the British, the latter having little success to celebrate and no hero on which to focus. Prioritizing of entertainment over historical fact guided the preparation of activities along the Medway.

Each of the four groupings of chapters begins with a half-page illustration relevant to that section’s topic. There are 41 illustrations within several of the chapters, 20 alone in Coats’ and Lemmers’ study of dockyards and coastal defences. There are seven easy-to-read statistical tables. Four maps are grouped together to orient the reader to the Dutch and English colonies discussed within the text. Unfortunately, only the first is properly labelled, while the captions for the other three are placed with the wrong map.

This book is for those with a background knowledge of Anglo-Dutch relationships in the seventeenth century, the details of the three wars, as well as some command of European political dynamics. It contributes a rich layer of new scholarly analysis of the contextual landscape of the Anglo-Dutch aggression between 1652 and 1689. As noted above, the final two contributions explore how history is told in light of political and cultural forces.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


France and the United Kingdom have been partners and allies on the defence side since the Entente Cordiale in 1904. These former enemies and competitors put aside differences to build a close relationship that stood up to the Second World War. The nadir came after France’s capitulation and the Royal Navy’s attacks on warships of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar in 1940. Its military power restored and expanded for a nuclear age, France was a contributing member to NATO during the Cold War, although French President Charles De Gaulle withdrew from the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. After France formally returned to the fold 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, French and British political leaders met in 2010 to sign the landmark Lancaster House agreements that set out the scope of a renewed bilateral relationship between the two countries in certain military and defence fields. Alice Pannier, a political scientist and assistant professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, has revised a prize-winning doctoral dissertation completed jointly through King’s College University of London and Panthéon-Sorbonne University in Paris, into a book that examines the nature of the evolving Anglo-French relationship since 2010 in the context of the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the European Union, popularly known as Brexit. She was a postdoctoral fellow at the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire (IRSEM) within France’s Ministry of Defence and secretary-general of the Association pour les Études sur la Guerre et la Stratégie (AEGES).

Pannier argues that France and the United Kingdom have a special rela-
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

tionship of a bilateral nature that has stood the test of time and become closer than ever as the latter leaves the European Union. The book, largely based on her field research of over a hundred interviews of French and British individuals in the defence and diplomatic fields, is divided into six chapters. The first two chapters provide a theoretical basis for understanding bilateral relationships pertaining to security and defence in the European context, as opposed to much more studied multilateral relationships on which much IR theory focuses. Bilateral relationships are common and come in many varieties, and occasionally can be characterized as special, if relations are particularly cordial and mutually beneficial. The next three chapters comprise case studies on the deployment of military forces during the Libyan campaign in 2011 in which France and the United Kingdom took on a leading role together, the aspiration and creation of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) drawing on forces from the two countries and available for high intensity operations, and integration of national defence industries with a focus on a joint program for development of an anti-ship missile, the Sea Venom/Anti-Navire Léger (ANL). The last chapter and conclusion assess the strength of the bilateral relationship and the ability to adapt and learn in the face of change and the impact of Brexit on an enduring special relationship. The defence relationship between France and the United Kingdom largely works on the basis of constant negotiation, trade-offs, and interest agents sharing a common narrative that suits political purposes. France enjoys equally close relations with Germany, both still primary members in the European Union, and the drift of the United Kingdom away into the most likely greater military influence of the United States, opens the possibility of a shift in emphasis and priorities. The French and British bilateral relationship has gone through ups and downs, and no doubt shall continue in some form, as one country sticks with Europe and the other absconds.

In terms of navies, the slightly larger Marine nationale has significant capabilities and growing qualitative advantage compared to the Royal Navy. Both France and the United Kingdom, as former colonial and imperial powers, still maintain robust expeditionary forces for regional and global deployment and count as the two European nuclear powers within NATO with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and helicopter carriers during the Libyan operations presented a significant show of force and facilitated air strikes on land targets. The French and British navies provide nuclear deterrence for their respective countries, in the form of nuclear ballistic missile submarines kept on station at sea. Collaboration in the nuclear field, one of the Lancaster House agreements, has met some measure of success, and according to Pannier, is easier done than the conventional military because the communities are smaller and closer in views. Nuclear propulsion and classified information sharing are still areas where France and the United Kingdom could cooperate better. France has its own system of strategic surveillance satellites, while the United Kingdom relies on the Five Eyes and the Americans. Both navies are replacing SSNs, and France has marketed a conventional version of its Barracuda nuclear attack submarine for export, besides the proven and affordable Scorpene diesel-electric design. The Marine nationale and Royal Navy are each limited by budgetary concerns and the escalat-
ing cost of new technology, which has meant reductions in actual force levels and readiness.

Having a publisher that could work in both English and French no doubt factored into Pannier’s choice of Canada’s McGill-Queen’s University Press. *Rivals in Arms* fits nicely into its Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies series, which focuses on contemporary topics. Pannier has also co-authored *French Defence Policy Since the End of the Cold War* published by Routledge in December 2020. Many of the same themes are covered in more detail on the French side. *Rivals in Arms* is recommended for a primarily academic audience with an interest in IR theory, contemporary military affairs, and European politics and diplomacy.

Chris Madsen
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The subtitle of this book is *Continuity and Innovation in a Key Technology*, which leads one (reasonably) to expect that the book will be largely concerned with the tension between change and inertia over the indicated two-century period and have something significant to say in conclusion.

In the introduction, the author implies that this key technology has remained peripheral in British Atlantic history: “Archaeologists have worked on it, as have a few ship historians concerned with technical matters, but a scholarly appreciation of this central technology has not yet taken its place upon the shelf.” While this would seem (to this reviewer) to do a disservice to the works of Greenhill and McGregor (to cite only two authors who have written on the subject), in attempting to be scholarly, the author falls short of his (assumed) objective of saying something new and interesting.

Reid starts well, mapping his argument through the structure of nine recognizably suitable chapter headings: Introduction; The Ship: A Primer and Field Guide; From the Stocks to the Ways: Building a Ship from Contract to Launch; The Mysterious Art of the Shipwright: Deciphering the Merchant Ship Design; Merchant Venturers and Merchant Ships; Sailing and Surviving: People and Labour Abroad; Working the Ship: the Technology of Operation; Conclusion: The Merchant Ship in the British Atlantic, 1600-1800; and Epilogue: *Ann & Hope* in Canton—Beyond the British Atlantic.

Through these chapters he makes a number of points which relate to what an engineer might characterize as recognition of a system, with the inescapable corollary that all design is a compromise. Thus, in various places we hear the arguments that relate the evolution of merchant ship design to the wider milieu of geo-political risks (wars, privateering, the requirement for self-defence versus convoying), of economic risks (cargo capacity, economies of scale either via ship-size or distribution of risk via fleet-size, etc.), and of operational costs (manning and evolution of rigs in terms of numbers and sizes of sails and masts, and of configurations of fore-and-aft and square sails). There are many tantalizing mentions of the research possibilities of “experimental archaeology,” the build-