

children were looked after and in some cases lifted them out of the abject poverty that would otherwise have ensued. Money was still being paid out in 1959 to the last of the widows—just before they turned 70 and the British old age pension took effect.

The little known strike by the engine room crew of RMS *Olympic*, that occurred less than a fortnight after *Titanic*'s loss, is also briefly mentioned. The men refused to steam the ship until sufficient and serviceable lifeboats were installed. While the men were arrested for 'mutiny', the lifeboats were fitted before the ship sailed. The advent of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requirements which flowed from the tragedy is also examined.

The book is not without its faults and at times it becomes glaringly repetitive—that children had their school shoes pawned by families so food could be provided starts to lose its effect after the tenth mention. As does the dampness of Southampton dwellings and the constant lack of 'nourishing food'. While these are important to the story, they lose their effect by the unnecessary repeating of the hardships suffered by the working class families. The photos used are mainly effective but those of documents are virtually unreadable without a magnifying glass.

Overall Julie Cook has done a pretty good job of providing an insight into working class Britain in the early twentieth century; through the lens of the effect the *Titanic* sinking had on Southampton and its working class families. Well worth the read, even if a little bit 'heavy going' at times. It also proves the 1912 tragedy can still raise interest over 100 years after the ship plunged to its icy grave.

Greg Swinden  
Canberra, Australia

Jeffery M. Dorwart. *Dorwart's History of the Office Naval Intelligence, 1865-1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2020. xiv+400 pages, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. US \$62.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-68247-391-7.

This work is actually an single-volume reprint of a two-volume history that was first published in 1979 and 1983 respectively. In this omnibus edition, the story of the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is presented in three parts. The first part encompasses the complete first volume which traced the history of this office from its conception in 1865 to 1918. The second book, however, is split into two separate sections in this release, with Part II covering the years 1919 to 1938, while Part 3 covers the years 1939 to 1945. Overall, this breakdown is very logical and conventional.

It is based on a plethora of sources, including archival records, oral histories, memoirs, interviews and the works of other published authors. Despite the recent appearance of a semi-official history of the ONI, it still holds its own. Essentially, this is because Dorwart's study is an academic study based on a wide range of published and unpublished sources. His central theme is that the ONI and its predecessors suffered from a split-personality. In general, it was torn between two often divergent missions—collecting data on foreign navy's warships and weapons versus identifying internal and international threats to the United States. This central theme dominates this work, and combined with the usual "budget issues", helps to tie everything together. Complicating this dual role is the fact that becoming the Director of the ONI was not typically a goal in itself for most naval officers who occupied this position.

Given that the ONI had its roots in the post-civil war US Navy's quest for technical information on the warships of its contemporary's national fleets, its evolution was remarkable. The office employed a range of naval officers and civilian experts throughout its existence. In the early period, it was manned most often by officers who were no longer able to assume sea-going duties. Recruiting officers with strong bureaucratic skills was especially difficult. Its first successes came with the establishment of naval attachés who were assigned to the various US diplomatic missions around the world. This allowed them to collect information on the naval construction of the nations to which they were attached, and led—indirectly—to ferreting out details concerning the naval ambitions of their host nations. Gradually, these missions drew the ONI into the realm of military intelligence and espionage.

The ONI rose to prominence during the Spanish-American war and its activities in this conflict fleshed out its mission within the US military establishment. An increased emphasis on domestic security was added during the First World War with mixed results as some "home security assignments" were given to less than savory characters. As the twentieth century progressed, naval attachés gradually lost their access to their traditional sources of information on naval construction and policy-makers as nations increased their security. Consequently, the ONI "engaged" many civilians whose positions within international corporations allowed them to travel throughout certain nations as agents. As for the "naval career" issue, in Dorwart's opinion, only one officer who attained the position of Director of ONI actually saw the position as a career goal. Unfortunately, although he may have been the most

gifted officer to hold the post, his reign was short-lived.

These themes with their highs and lows form the most interesting elements of this unique study. Also pertinent is what Dorwart calls, "The Failure of Intelligence Doctrine" i.e. inability to predict or detect the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This came about for a number of reasons. Despite trying to recruit more officers throughout 1941, particularly those with knowledge of other languages, i.e. Japanese, the ONI's efforts were just beginning to bear fruit by the end of 1941. Like most American agencies, the ONI was focused on the Atlantic rather than the Pacific, and at the time, the office was just emerging from a bitter inter-office rivalry which only served to distract it further. Nonetheless, it did advise of the possibility of a Japanese attack on the USN's Pacific fleet base. Dorwart maintains the ONI was the one office that should have detected and alerted the US administration to this impending attack. Having done, in his words, "two-thirds" of the task", he unfortunately left it to other offices to complete. At this point, the threat was down-played and all US intelligence services received a black eye for this epic fail.

Given that it is, perhaps, harder to write a biography of a person, than an entity or an institution, one can say that Dorwart has accomplished this task very well. It is a very readable work that flows well. This well-written and researched tome should serve as the standard reference on its subject for the foreseeable future. The decision to publish it in this omnibus edition was indeed a very good one and it should be read by anyone with a strong interest in US naval history between 1865 and 1945.

Peter K H Mispelkamp  
Pointe Claire, Quebec