
The early American Navy, through the mid-nineteenth century, was not an effective blue water force. Most of the 50 or so Revolutionary-era vessels were taken by the British or burned to prevent capture. The few that survived the war were sold out or returned to the French. The War of 1812 produced a few signal victories, but by the time the British finally paid attention to North America, after Napoleon’s exile to Elba, the American Navy was bottled up in port or worse. Early Republic finance was not attuned to support expenditures for a navy with fleets commensurate to the maritime nation that the United States, in fact, was. During this era, the Jeffersonian gunboat navy and embargo in no way enhanced American naval prowess. The structural deficit of ships-of-the-line had a distinct influence upon the strategy and tactics of the young nation’s maritime military arm well into the nineteenth century.

Under these conditions Benjamin Armstrong examines the early American Navy and foregrounds his analysis on the third tip of the maritime strategic trident, tactics of guerre de razzia, war of raiding. The Navy did not have the ability or materiel to undertake a guerre de d’escadre, fleet-to-fleet battle. The Revolutionary era Battle of Block Island Sound (1776), where a single British vessel eluded an entire American squadron, and the destruction of the Penobscot Expedition (1779) are prime examples of the structural and operational issues. Guerre de course, commerce raiding, was a well known technique that American civilians took up with aplomb, seizing thousands of vessels during both wars with Britain and the Quasi-War with France. With rare exception, the United States had no access to battle fleets to project national power and commerce raiding could effectively be accomplished by privateers. It is not surprising that the composition of the marine military force would evolve strategies that were appropriate to the conditions at hand. Armstrong’s monograph explores the
under-appreciated tactics of irregular maritime warfare in coastal waters.

Using chronological examples of asymmetrical warfare from the Revolution and Quasi-War through to America’s early nineteenth-century deployments in the Mediterranean, Great Lakes, Caribbean and Indo-Pacific regions, Armstrong puts forward numerous examples. Names of famous American captains—Jones, Talbot, Hull, Porter, Preble, Chauncey and Decatur—and their exploits, illuminate the courage and audacity of these men. Inventors and inventions that contributed to the advancement of naval warfare during a time of rapid material and industrial growth are also presented. Finally, the idea of naval officers as on-site diplomats is introduced while focusing on interactions in the Indo-Pacific during the 1830s.

Armstrong posits numerous themes that he believes are extant in and connect to each of the selected irregular warfare operations analyzed. The ideas explored range from local partnerships and intelligence, to the utility of nation-state partnerships, whether formerly recognized or not. He casts a wide net indeed, finding several other factors that link the actions under consideration through the early decades of the American Navy. Is this deep thinking too much, as the structure of the forces may not have been able to accomplish other strategic objectives? One could suggest that pragmatism may have had as much influence under the circumstances. It might have been instructive to expose a glaring failure of irregular warfare during this era to test the theories promoted. As JFK reportedly said after the Bay of Pigs, “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” Either way, Armstrong makes well-reasoned and evidence-based arguments that should get readers thinking about the origins of early naval tactics.

As a resident of Rhode Island, this reviewer was pleased to read of the Gaspee Affair (1772), which some might consider the first shots of the American Revolution. Highlighted as the book’s opening vignette, a British naval officer was shot and his vessel burned. Unfortunately, this action is reported as taking place at Pawtucket, which is where a falls demarcates the Blackstone River above from the Seekonk River below. The event actually occurred at Pawtuxet, several miles further south. This initial geographic misidentification of two similarly named areas is a minor flaw and appears to be an editorial aberration, in no way detracting from the attention to detail that obviously went into the book. The volume is well researched and fully footnoted, with bibliography and index for the serious researcher.

Small Boats and Daring Men is a niche market monograph for the maritime trade. Those with a military mindset should enjoy the analysis of the strategic theory of guerre de zaza. Historians of the navy, technology and early American diplomacy should also find something in the book to pique their interest. Maritime historians, in general, should find the topic enlightening. Academically, the book might be appealing as a text for an upper level or graduate course. Readers who like true adventure, and many of the raiding expeditions are, to say the least, adventurous, will be fascinated by the audaciousness of the mariners of yore in small boats. It would be nice if a book of this quality of scholarship obtained an audience beyond a naval/maritime readership.

Michael Tuttle
Cranston, Rhode Island

“Row like you want to feed your families!” (4) With that exhortation ringing in their ears, members of a remote Indonesian tribe pull hard after sperm whales in the Savu Sea, harpooning them from rickety bamboo platforms. The story of these resilient people, known as Lamalerans, and their struggle to hold onto their ancient lifeways is beautifully told in this absorbing new book by journalist Doug Bock Clark. Clark lived intermittently with the Lamalerans over a period of three years and learned their language, took reams of notes, conducted numerous interviews, and snapped 20,000 photographs in his quest to understand them as deeply as possible.

The Lamalerans live on the remote island of Lembata at the southeastern tip of Indonesia. Not for nothing do other Indonesians call it “The Land Left Behind,” for it is 2,000 miles from mainland Asia and 600 northwest of Australia. The tribe’s 1500 members live clustered by the water’s edge where they can easily spot sperm whales migrating close offshore. Perhaps 300 Lamalerans regularly participate in these whale hunts, but their take is so modest—at best 20 leviathans a year—that there is no significant impact on this still robust species. In any case, as Clark makes clear, Indonesia has not signed the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and even if it does, the Lamalerans’ hunts would still be legal “under a clause protecting aboriginal subsistence hunts.” (12) The tribe has had its run-ins with Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, but contemporary Western environmental perspectives are alien to them. They consider the sperm whales rewards from the Ancestors for faithfully keeping to the old ways. This does not blind them to the beauty or complexities of the natural world. They respect these things and approach all of their hunts with a deep spiritual connection to their prey and the interrelated life web that we moderns can only envy. After a successful kill, nothing is wasted, and the hunters portion out the meat so that everyone in the tribe gets a share. According to Clark, this practice makes the Lamalerans one of the most generous societies in the world.

Clark’s focus on four families gives his narrative emotional resonance. Among the more memorable characters are Jon Hariona, an aspiring harpooner; his younger sister Ika, a lighthearted girl hungry for an education; and Frans Bediona, an elder struggling to strike an intelligent balance between tradition and encroaching modernity. Perhaps the most consequential character featured outside the four families is Salés Bataona, a former town mayor and energetic entrepreneur determined to wed his tribe to the global economy by building an ice house and a fish factory. Jon’s odyssey to become a lamafa, the Lamalera word for harpooner, pits his youthful impatience against the years-long realities of responsible apprenticeship. Eager to prove himself, he practices spearing devil rays and dolphins. But sperm whales are the prized prey, requiring close cooperation among hunters. Clark excels at describing these bloody encounters—leaping harpooners, thrashing flukes, roiling seas, and ravening sharks. The skill and bravery of the lamafa almost beggar belief. Perched at the prow of a wooden téna, or local whaling ship, which is
itself considered “a living being, with its soul linked to the bloodline’s Ancestors.” (28) the lamafa carefully chooses his moment before launching both his harpoon and his person at the massive mammal surging alongside. A successful strike means the Asian equivalent of a Nantucket sleighride, complete with smoking ropes, rocketing boats, and denouements hours and miles later. In order to finish the whale, multiple lamafa clamber onto its back, driving their harpoons deep, working through several feet of blubber to hit vital organs.

Despite the effectiveness of these ancient methods, they are increasingly being eroded by modern conveniences like outboard engines—immensely popular with the tribe’s youth—and ruinous large-scale fishing practices like drift netting and long-line fishing, the latter pursued by foreign trawlers illegally plundering the Savu Sea. On land, smart phones, television, motorbikes, and the exotic lure of distant cities like Jakarta have further loosened the bonds between tribal elders and their offspring. Clark’s admiration for traditional cultures’ advantages—stronger families, closer connection to the natural world, and better mental health—is evident, but this does not diminish his appreciation for modernity’s gifts. Women have especially benefited from labour-saving improvements like electricity and running water. Ika, for example, values her culture as much as Frans, but she is also keenly aware that the Ways of the Ancestors have privileged “men and the elderly at her expense.” (173)

It is an open question whether the Lamalerans can preserve their culture going forward. Bright lights and social media entice the young, cash economies subsume barter, overfishing threatens delicate natural balances, and international pressure increases on the Indonesian government to ban whale hunting and push the Lamalerans into ecotourism. For the present, Clark writes, the Lamalerans “still choose to follow the Ways of the Ancestors, and every day that choice is getting harder.” (316) Whatever the future holds, Clark has done an inestimable service in telling their remarkable story.

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama


Wartime aerial reconnaissance has been in existence since balloons were first used in the 1700s. Throughout the 1800s, balloons were the only means of aerial reconnaissance, but the development of the airplane in the 1900s offered a new technology for aerial reconnaissance. In the First and Second World Wars, light aircraft were often used to spot enemy forces, direct artillery fire, and many other tasks. The development of the jet aircraft for combat use, often capable of carrying a large ordnance load, gave aerial reconnaissance a new task: the requirement to spot and direct attack aircraft to drop bombs and launch rockets accurately against enemy forces and positions.

The Vietnam War saw major uses of what was called “Tactical Aerial Controllers, Airborne” (TACA.) These pilots often flew light aircraft, exposed to enemy fire and flying at low altitudes, while directing jet aircraft. Catkiller 3-2. An Army Pilot Flying for the Marines in the Vietnam War is a memoir
of one of those pilots and his year in Vietnam.

Raymond G. Caryl enlisted in the U.S. Army in the mid-1960s and earned a commission. After completing airborne (paratrooper) school, he then went through Army flight school and was sent to Vietnam. Here he became part of an historic and, for its time, unique assignment: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) units were heavily engaged in the Vietnam conflict and quite often required air support. Hence, the need for a TACA to properly direct the aircraft supporting the USMC units on the ground. The problem was, the USMC simply did not have suitable aircraft to support its own forces via tactical air control. The solution was to assign an Army aircraft company, the 220th Reconnaissance Aircraft Company (RAC) to support the USMC units. The aircraft and pilots were Army; due to USMC insistence that the 220th RAC control the direction of air support, the aerial observer was a U.S. Marine. This was an uncommon (for its time) occurrence—Army and Marine personnel working together. The 220th RAC and a few pilots of another Army company, the 21st RAC, were the only Army pilots to combine with Marines. Equally unheard of at the time, was the operational control of the 220th Company, an Army unit, by the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.

Caryl spent the period 1967-68 as a member of the 220th RAC and this memoir is a vivid recounting of his time in that unit. It makes a valuable addition to the Vietnam War literature by illustrating a first-person view of combat from a perspective not often documented. Although the U.S. Army and the USMC have had a historic rivalry, Cat-killer 3-2 shows how warriors from different services, with different approaches to combat, overcame that rivalry and developed close working relationships.

Caryl flew the Cessna O-1 light aircraft, named “Birddog.” (The Canadian Army flew the same aircraft in the 1950s and 1960s with the designation L-19.) The company call sign, “Cat-killers,” derived from the fact that dogs kill cats and since the aircraft the pilots flew were named Birddogs, the call sign was obvious. The O-1 was a single-engine, high-wing, unarmed light aircraft—perfect for tactical air control. Although some O-1s were armed with machine guns, the normal armament for a pilot was a carbine and a pistol—which had to be fired by the pilot out a window with one hand on the firearm and the other hand on the control stick. Canadian-built aircraft are given a brief mention—American military use of the DHC-2 Beaver, DHC-3 Otter and C-7 Caribou are mentioned in the text—a reminder that DeHavilland Canada built rugged aircraft suitable for short landing strips in all climates.

Caryl’s book brings the human dimension of wartime to the reader. He writes easily and the narrative does not flag. It is full of combat, crashes, mishaps, victories, leave, the climate, and the dangers of his missions, of humorous incidents so common at bases in wartime when men have to find whatever lightness is available to them. He also does not hesitate to take a light tone when such is appropriate. One comment—the book is unavoidably rampant with military acronyms which can put a general reader off. Despite Caryl’s thoughtful placement of a list of the acronyms at the beginning of the book, this reviewer spent much time flipping back to that list for the meaning of an acronym. The illustrations support the text. The cover is a colour photograph of the author standing next to O-1, holding a carbine and wearing a flak jacket—his only protection against enemy fire.
It is reassuring to know that Caryl went through his year in Vietnam without injury and returned to the USA safe and sound. He finished his active duty service in 1970 but stayed in various U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units, this time flying helicopters. He further served the U.S. government as a pilot with first the U.S. Forest Service and then the U.S. Customs Service, retiring from reserve military duty in 1997 and U.S. government civilian flying the following year. Not yet ready to quit flying, Caryl flew helicopters for another six years, first for an Arizona television station and as a contract pilot flying on forest fires. He finally ended his flying career in 2004 after nearly 38 years in aviation. Caryl served his country in many capacities well.

This book is one for the aviation enthusiast and student of the Vietnam War, not for the maritime enthusiast, but it is a rewarding read and is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


This work is the latest addition to the Navy’s longstanding project to compile records of the American Revolution’s naval aspects into a chronological compendium, the first volume of which was originally published in 1964. This, the thirteenth volume, covers records related to the American and European theatres of operation from June 1 through August 15, 1778. It should be noted that the designation of these theatres does not specifically refer to combat arenas, but rather to the locations where the source documents were produced. Regarding the naval operations of France and England, Crawford emphasizes in his Editor’s Preface that such engagements of the larger global war were only covered when “directly related to the role of sea power in the winning of American independence” (xiv). The arrival of French Vice Admiral Comte d’Estaing and his fleet in American waters along with the resulting interactions naturally dominates most of the American Theatre documents, while crew troubles, political wrangling, and administrative problems pervade the later European documents. Two appendices offer an interesting assortment of documents as well, with the first chronicling the outcome of New Jersey Maritime Court decisions from December 1777 through March 1778, and the second offering a detailed account of HMS Rainbow’s capture of the ship Marquis de La Fayette. Finally, an extensive index concludes the work.

As Crawford states, annotations and analysis are largely absent from this work. The source materials are preceded by brief summaries, however, consisting of approximately two-and-a-half pages for the American theatre and two pages for its European counterpart. These sections constitute the majority of historical interpretation for the text, and offer quick and concise overviews of the major background events in the war, such as the British withdrawal from Philadelphia and diplomatic manoeuvering in Europe, then neatly summarize the naval occurrences discussed in the transcribed documents. All entries follow the same format, with a bolded day and date preceding all entries from said date. Each document is titled, usually with the names of correspondents, such as “Lord North
to Earl of Sandwich,” or with information regarding the log, diary, report, or news outlet that produced the text. In the event that the text is an extract, it is noted above the transcription, and in the event of a translation, the original non-English text is presented first. Any notes associated with the text are located at the end of the entry. These usually are short notes as to the names of people or vessels alluded to by the authors, but there can be exceptions, such as the lengthy transcribed account of the capture of the Loyalist ship Providence (260-261).

The American section takes up the vast majority of the main text, consisting of 864 pages, or just over three-quarters of the primary documentation. Texts range from small annotations taken from letters and journals to multi-page entries, such as lists of vessels captured by the Royal Navy over set periods and an August 6, 1778 recording of Vice Admiral Viscount Howe’s fleet off Sandy Hook (173-176, 715-717). The intermingled documents offer a good view of the building presence of the French Navy’s arrival off North American shores, both in terms of physical ships and in the more far-reaching waves sent through American logistical networks and British tactical planning. In comparison, the European theatre documents take up 275 pages, and are primarily concerned with Franco-British actions and discontent among the American crews operation in European waters. One of the more interesting pairs of documents in this section actually refers to the American theatre, being a back and forth between ambassador Conrad-Alexandre Gérard and Vice Admiral Comte d’Estaing on the situation regarding Philadelphia, New York, and Halifax, along with issues of American cooperation and supply (929-930, 953-973). D’Estaing’s ending neatly summarizes the rapid and somewhat unprepared nature of early French assistance, saying “We also need… what was forgotten or refused at Toulon [France], for powder without balls does not kill even quails” (972).

As an aside, the index to this tome is impressive in its own right for its thoroughness and meticulous nature. The 145 pages of double-columned entries begin with an introductory paragraph, explaining choices in terms of spelling, abbreviation, and ship data. Entries of individuals and vessels often have detailed sub-entries, such as the two full columns of index information provided for Lord Richard Howe alone (1221-1222). Such an exhaustive and well executed undertaking further speaks to the dedication of those researchers involved, and is a magnificently helpful asset to those searching for a particular topic.

In terms of possible improvements to consider for Volume Fourteen, few come to mind. Annotation is largely up to the chief editor in cases like this, and the preference for or against varies from scholar to scholar. One suggestion is somewhat beyond the scope and function of the document compendium, but might be useful as an appendix: the visual representation of commonly referenced vessels. The inclusion of scaled profiles of ships, akin to the profiles presented on pages 162-165 of Aidan Dodson’s 2018 work Before the Battlecruiser, would help researchers not only visualize the size and profiles of vessels, but give a sense of scale to combative actions by allowing for quick visual comparison of the size and armaments of opponents. Another is the numbering of documents, akin to what is done by the United Kingdom’s Naval Records Society within their record compilations. Such numbering could be correlated to a quick reference
index in the back of the work, allowing for faster identification of relevant records and aiding in citation by scholars referencing specific documents in their research.

All in all, this volume is a fine addition to the *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* project. The long gaps between volumes are well justified by the meticulous and in-depth archival work which is visible throughout the transcribed and translated documents which otherwise could take lone scholars untold days of searching through repositories on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to locate. The inclusion of French-language documents in their original form also increases the usefulness for those who understand the language, and the time period covered makes this an invaluable primary source compilation for those interested in early French-American military interactions.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


On 23 January 1968, a U.S. Navy (USN) intelligence ship, the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, was attacked by units of the North Korean Navy—two subchasers, four torpedo boats, with support from two North Korean MiG fighter jets. *Pueblo*’s skipper, Commander Lloyd Bucher, quickly saw the futility of resisting the North Koreans. *Pueblo* was armed only with two .50 machine guns plus some small arms available to the ship’s crew. Moreover, Bucher had been told by his superior officer, Rear Admiral Frank Johnson, to keep the machine guns covered or even stowed below decks. Practically speaking, *Pueblo* and its crew were sent on a potentially hazardous mission unarmed.

The North Korean Navy fired on *Pueblo*, killing one American sailor. To save the lives of his crew, Bucher surrendered *Pueblo* and the ship was boarded by armed North Korean sailors. Bucher and his crew had to sail the ship into Wonsan Harbour, North Korea. *Pueblo*’s crew was imprisoned for eleven months, frequently undergoing torture. After many negotiations, *Pueblo*’s crew (including the body of the killed sailor) was released in late December, 1968.

The story of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* has remained controversial for the 51-plus years since its capture. James Duermeyer, a retired USN Commander, relates this tragic story with the advantage of perspective as well as access to contemporary accounts and reactions. He relates the background to *Pueblo*’s sailing; the United States government was short of sea-going intelligence assets and, therefore, converted several Second World War-vintage cargo ships to intelligence ships. Equipped with electronics, the ships’ duties were to gather intelligence on Communist countries—including North Korea. The ships were lightly armed, prone to mechanical malfunctions, and not properly equipped with destruct equipment in case of capture. The ships’ missions were guided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), as well as the U.S. Department of Defense and the USN. This multiplicity of government agencies, all involved in the ships’ missions, was a recipe for disaster. Moreover, while *Pueblo* itself was captured in international waters, away from North Korean shores, authorities had apparently for-
gotten that the 1950-1953 Korean War had ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty, so legally, the Korean War was still going on. Moreover, the period 1966-1969 saw so many small-scale military actions on the Korean peninsula that that period has been termed “The Second Korean War.” On board a lightly armed, poorly equipped, breakdown-prone ship, Commander Bucher and his crew sailed into a potential combat zone against an aggressive enemy.

*Pueblo*’s capture was a boon to the Soviets. Lacking enough destruction equipment in case of capture, *Pueblo*’s crew could not destroy all the documents they had obtained nor their intelligence-gathering equipment. The captured material was quickly sent from North Korea to the Soviet Union.

The reaction of the American government was confused. *Pueblo*’s capture came at a terrible time; the American involvement in the Vietnam War was reaching its apex, while domestic troubles dominated the news. The U.S. military was stretched to the breaking point with its commitment in Vietnam, and troops stationed elsewhere. President Lyndon Johnson’s administration decided to not pursue military action against North Korea in favour of negotiations—which lasted almost a full year.

Duermeyer also examines North Korea’s motive for seizing *Pueblo* and its crew, which appears to have been the North Korean concept of *juche*—translated as self-reliance. Far from being a small part of an overall Soviet-inspired plan of military and world domination, North Korea’s capture of *Pueblo* was an independent action by North Korea, which was determined to show its independent military prowess.

After *Pueblo*’s crew was released, the USN set up a court of inquiry into its capture and quickly seemed to be determined to make Bucher (and his officers) the scapegoat. The USN operates on the principle that a ship’s captain is responsible for what happens on and to his ship. This is normally a good principle, but not in the case of *Pueblo*. The junior officers all testified that Bucher had not the ability to resist the North Koreans; public opinion, as the facts of the capture were related by the news media, gradually swung towards Commander Bucher and his crew. The court of inquiry found that Bucher had the ability to resist the North Koreans but failed to do so; he, along with his intelligence officer were to be given letters of reprimand and the executive officer was to be given a letter of admonition. As well, Admiral Johnson and the head of the Naval Security Group Pacific were to be given letters of reprimand—a move that would have killed the careers of all those officers.

Fortunately for them, a new Presidential Administration took over on 20 January 1969, and with it, a new Secretary of the Navy. John Chafee, a Second World War U.S. Marine Corps veteran, who had recently served six years as the Republican Governor of the heavily-Democratic state of Rhode Island, knew how important public opinion could be and as well, what the real situation was for Bucher and his men. Chafee dismissed the charges against Bucher and the officers recommended for discipline and stated that the failure started from all levels, not just Bucher and his men.

Duermeyer’s book is well-written and researched. He writes easily and the narrative flows smoothly. He deals deftly with the various issues involved, from the actual capture scene, to the history behind the intelligence ships, the reasons for North Korea’s actions, the U.S government’s reaction to *Pueblo*’s capture, the aftermath, the mistreatment
of the ship’s crew, and the court of inquiry. It is clear from this book that Bucher and his crew were sent into harm’s way without proper armament or equipment. The bibliography lists the many works on Pueblo’s capture and related sources, including books, articles, government documents, and websites, but Duermeyer’s book suffices as a definitive work on its subject. It is highly recommended.

What of the main characters of this tragedy, the U.S.S. Pueblo and Commander Lloyd Bucher and his crew? Pueblo remains in North Korea as a war prize. It is now berthed on the Taedong River at North Korea’s capital, Pyongyang, as a museum piece and is visited by many North Koreans. Most of Pueblo’s crew left the USN over time. Commander Bucher attended the Naval Postgraduate School, earned a graduate degree, held two shore assignments, and retired from the USN in 1973. He died on 28 January 2004—exactly 36 years and 5 days after he and his crew were sent into harm’s way ill-equipped and unsupported.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


The Chinese proverb “A picture is worth a thousand words” is now a cliché, but Michael Dyer’s book, filled with a magnificent collection of drawings, scrimshaw pieces and photographs, is an entire library about Yankee whaling from its earliest days to the present.

These were the times when some whale-men went to sea with paper, watercolour paints, brushes, pen and ink, and sharp scrimshander’s scribers. The artworks that these sailors created were vividly coloured contemporaneous drawings found in ship log books, crewmen’s personal journals and a few diaries. The images date from the early part of the nineteenth century. A few others are from books, maritime broadsheets and intricately engraved scrimshawed souvenir pieces on whale teeth or bone. The paintings and drawings are largely from the collections of the New Bedford Whaling Museum, the Old Dartmouth Historical Society, the Kendall Whaling Museum and the Mystic Seaport Museum.

Dyer uses various art forms to examine the details of the vocation of whaling, accompanied by texts about shipboard life at sea and the tedious and treacherous job of whale hunting which was sometimes thrilling, commonly boring, and often disappointing. Even after locating their prey, there was no guarantee of a successful capture. Some whales fought back, perilous weather could capsize small boats, lines tangled, and whaling gear occasionally broke under the strain of landing these gigantic creatures. Injuries occurred during the routine voyage and especially the hunt. These contributed to a host of potential variables that interfered with a successful voyage. Between sighting whales and lowering whaleboats, a whale-man’s life was a repetitive daily routine of shipboard maintenance and sometimes cruel discipline. The most welcome break was the sighting of another ship on the horizon, the possibility of exchanging news and potential camaraderie. When all these shipboard complexities worked well, and the desired number of whales was found, killed, and processed, the reward
was a full vessel—homeward bound. Aboard every whaler was a logbook, usually a journal, diary, and likely pieces of scrimshaw that told a whaler’s story.

“O’er the Wide and Trackless Sea” features a series of scholarly treatises. Chapters include whaling as an American culture, a comparative overview of log books and journals, recognizing landfalls, a gallery of ship portraits, another of whaling scenes, and finally, an epilogue describing the waning years of Yankee whaling supplemented with informative captions that accompany each image or group of images. Exquisitely intricate scrimshaw pieces provided remarkable details of the hunt on their recto and verso sides. These engraved images reveal the type of oar locks used on some whaleboats, their hull construction such as lapstrake verses carvel planking and the dates of their usage, when and how sails were used on these work vessels, and even the racial mixture of the whaling crews. Some whaler’s jargon is also explained; for example, to “gam” is speaking with others from a whale ship at sea, or an alternate name for a whale pod, while a gall-eyed whale is an animal that is scared off or alarmed.

The artwork contains all sorts of macro-details such as whaling ship design, sail plans and their evolution, drawings of landfalls, recognition aids used for determining one’s location, even the natural history of global places and the science of cetology are illustrated. As Dyer notes, the mostly-amateur artists were fastidious in their whale drawings. In fact, “One hundred years before, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the general public little knew what a sperm whale actually looked like. Natural history books of the period presented pictures of sperm whales that were often based on desiccated stranded specimens to which artist had easy access.” (331) Other illustrations show what one might call a waterline view of anatomic characteristics of the right, bowhead, fin, and humpback species.

Dyer’s book ends with a Clifford Ashley allegorical quote concerning the twilight of the whaling industry (118 (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin, 1926). He describes whale-men as “wrinkly-eyed old men pacing the wharves gazing seaward, his seaweed blown away unheeded, his hoops rusted, his staves dried out, and is oil trickled and seeped down into the earth of the wharf unheeded.” (335)

“O’er the Wide and Trackless Sea” is an oddly shaped 11X10-inch volume perhaps best read on a table, but it is magnificent on several levels. It is a collection of whaling related artworks, a scholarly reference book concerning a now defunct maritime industry and an enjoyable read that graphically narrates many whale hunt adventures—and a few misadventures. Michael P. Dyer’s book is likely destined to become classic about whaling and an excellent addition to the libraries of all maritime historians.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Governments change, people change, even religions change, but macro-geography rarely changes (and when it does it’s a long drawn out affair). Why is this
important? Because the Pacific Ocean we know today is very much the same as it was in 1941 with its various land masses, coral atolls, huge expanses of open ocean and a reliance on sea borne trade and movement for the nations that border it. Many of the naval and military planning problems of 1921, 1941 and 2021 in this respect are also unchanged.

This latest book from the eminent strategist Norman Friedman examines the role that war gaming, at the United States Naval War College during in the inter-war period (1919-1941), played in preparing the US Navy for the war in the Pacific during 1941-45. The US Navy ended the First World War as very much a battleship-centric force; but it had seen the effect that airpower, submarines, and effective logistics could have on a future conflict. War gaming at the college had begun in earnest in 1911, but it was Rear Admiral William Sims, who had commanded US naval forces in the European campaign in 1917-18, and was President of the War College during 1919-1922, who took it to a new level of importance. As a result, war gaming became a central part of the curriculum and its outcomes keenly examined by the higher echelons of the US Navy.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the War College examined the various US war plans with War Plan Orange (a potential war with Japan) as the major consideration. War Plan Red, with Great Britain, as the adversary was also examined, but mainly as the British were a near peer force. Many US naval officers even recommended a formal alliance with Britain was needed, in the face of an increasingly belligerent Japan, but Congress was unsympathetic, with many still seeing the British as a potential enemy; or at least concerned about being drawn into another European war.

It was the frequent war gaming of War Plan Orange that enabled the US Navy to accurately predict Japanese actions, test alternative and tactics and, most importantly, adjust its force structure to meet the coming conflict. As a result, both the US Navy and Army realised that in a coming war, the Philippines could not be held against a Japanese invasion and that it would mean a long ‘island hopping’ campaign to recover it and other lost territories. Additionally, the games revealed that Japan could ultimately be defeated by cutting its sea lines of communication (starving it of the raw materials it needed to wage war). To do this, the US Navy required fewer battleships and more aircraft carriers, more aircraft and the pilots to fly them, more logistics support vessels to keep the fleet at sea across significant distances, more submarines to interdict Japanese SLOCs and a US Marine Corps capable of capturing (or recapturing) forward operating bases in the Pacific.

By the mid 1930s, the War College’s ability to influence higher level strategy was waning, but the major decisions on US Navy force structure had, by this time, been made and building and training programs put in place. Although the attack on Pearl Harbor was not predicted, much of the war gaming predictions proved ominously correct and the US Navy focus on air power, logistics (the bullets, beans and black oil to keep the fleet at sea far from their home ports) and investment in the US Marine Corps amphibious capability were major factors in winning the future war.

*Winning a Future War* has much to offer the current-day reader, as the eyes of the world turn once again to the Pacific Ocean and the potential for yet another ‘future war’.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia

James Goldrick’s survey of naval combat in northern Europe during the latter half of the First World War serves as a follow-up to his 1984 book, *The King’s Ships Were at Sea*. In that work, Goldrick, who was, at the time, a lieutenant in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), published an Anglo-centric operational history of the first six months of combat in the waters between Britain and Germany. In his new book, following a long career in the RAN culminating in his retirement as a two-star admiral, he picks up his narrative in the aftermath of Jutland and expands the scope of his coverage to include operations in the Baltic as well as the North Sea.

This latter decision is especially laudable, as it highlights the interaction between the two theatres. This was most true for the Germans, who, positioned as they were between the seas, were ideally situated to transfer their forces from one sea to another in support of their operations. That the British also maintained a submarine flotilla in the region, despite the growing challenges they faced in reinforcing it, was a testament to the importance the Admiralty placed upon operations there. Yet these were constrained by the Russians, whose growing political problems exacerbated ongoing morale issues and hampered their ability to confront the Germans as effectively as they might have under different circumstances. Goldrick is particularly critical of the Russians’ management of their sailors’ time during the slack winter months, when the ice-enforced inactivity and poor relations between the officers and the lower decks combined to turn the larger warships into hotbeds of revolutionary sentiment.

The Russians were not unique in this respect, as the Germans faced similar problems with the squadrons of the High Sea Fleet. Contrary to popular impressions of a port-bound fleet, this was not the result of inactivity, as Goldrick describes a succession of sorties mounted by Admiral Reinhard Scheer in a continuing effort to create some opportunity that might reduce the growing imbalance between their forces and the Grand Fleet. Instead, the problem lay with the social distance between the officers and men, the inequalities between whom were enhanced by the increasing hardships caused by the war. This problem of resource deprivation affected the ships as well as the men, as Goldrick points to the declining fitness of the ships as more of a constraint on operations than was any caution on Germany’s part. Faced with limited opportunities and deteriorating conditions, the Germans turned increasingly to new technologies and tactics in an effort to win an advantage. Emphasis on the use of such weapons as mines, zeppelins, torpedoes, and airplanes is one of the great strengths of this book, as the author effectively demonstrates how efforts to employ them influenced operational planning on both sides and foreshadowed the nature of naval combat in the war that would follow.

Perhaps foremost among these new tools was signals intelligence. Goldrick gives due attention to the efforts of the Admiralty’s famed Room 40 in decoding German messages, aided by the Germans’ excessive reliance upon radio for inter-ship communication even in port. As commander of Britain’s Grand Fleet, David Beatty is singled out for
his appreciation of the value of signals intelligence, even though its employment was hampered by issues with timing and other factors. This points to another recurring theme of this book: the gap between plans and actions. For all of the careful planning and new technologies, weather remained the deciding factor in the outcome of battles, as wind, fog, and storms intervened to turn carefully staged operations into inconclusive muddles. This helped make the war at sea as attritional as the one on land, with victory in the northern European waters in the end won by the side that could best mobilize the manpower and matériel necessary to sustain operations over the long term. Here the British proved their greatest capability over the Germans, aided by the increasing support provided by the United States Navy from the summer of 1917 onward. While the Royal Navy’s standing suffered from the inability to thwart German raids or stop the U-boat threat, the raid on Zeebrugge and Ostend provided a fillip to morale and presaged other imaginative operations that were in the preparation stages when the war came to an end in November 1918.

Overall Goldrick’s book is a worthy sequel to his earlier history of the naval war in the North Sea. By expanding the scope of his coverage and integrating technological innovations and intelligence efforts, he provides a well-rounded operational history that incorporates factors often excluded from previous accounts. Yet this book also suffers from many of the same flaws as his earlier work. Despite his expanded scope, his coverage remains frustratingly narrow as he minimizes the role of the French navy and mentions the reactions of the neutral Scandinavian countries only incidentally. This is, in part, a reflection of his sources, which while including most of the standard secondary works (albeit with a couple of surprising omissions) contain material only from English-language archives. This constrains the scope of his achievement. While deepening our understanding of the factors shaping the naval war in northern Europe in 1916 to 1918, Goldrick points to how much we still have to learn about the complicated nature of the war on that front.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona


Wars have been won largely by lethal weapons, but an unsung mode of transportation, a seaborne “eighteen-wheeler” called the Liberty Ship, performed an equally critical mission. During the Second World War, it carried crucial supplies across the North Atlantic to besieged Britain ensuring that nation’s survival. John Henshaw meticulously traces the origins and evolution of this legendary vessel in Liberty’s Provenance.

A metaphorical Atlantic bridge of twentieth-century ships was established, first to combat the U-boat fleet of the Central Powers, and later, to foil the Nazis who occupied the western European coastline, both of which isolated the island nation of Great Britain. German submarines of both wars had met with limited success in starving out the British thanks to the convoy system and the efforts of a stalwart merchant marine. Towards the end of the First
World War, the British Admiralty and Merchant Shipbuilding Advisory Committee developed a prototype of a merchant ship that was relatively inexpensive to build and operate. These vessels became the workhorses of “The Battle of the Atlantic” that lasted from the first day of the Second World War to its conclusion, therefore, arguably, the longest and most important battle of the war. Winston Churchill said “the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril . . . the dominating factor all through the war. Never for one moment did we forget that everything happened elsewhere, on the land, at sea, in the air, depended automatically on its outcome.” (29)

Although German U-boats successfully sunk many merchant ships, the Allies’ industrial capability and technology were able to replace them. During the Second World War, the American and British dockyard workers produced cost-effective vessels commonly known as Liberty Ships, a name credited to Admiral Emory Scott Land, the head of the United States Maritime Commission. (73) They were easy to repair, yet expected to last no more than five years in service. Eighteen shipyards along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts built 2,710 of these vessels, the backbone of a massive sealift of troops, armament, ordnance and raw materials to both Atlantic and Pacific theatres of war.

A decade after the First World War, a relatively young English ship designer, Cyril Thompson at Joseph L. Thompson & Son Limited shipyard at Sunderland’s North Sands, came up with a hull plan that would be fabricated many times on both sides of “the pond.” Liberty Ships were about 441 feet 6 inches long, with a 57-foot beam and a 37-foot 4-inch draft. Their flexible designs were the epitome of versatility. They could be configured as a freighter for dry or bulk cargo, tanker, collier, troopship, hospital ship, maintenance vessel, rudimentary aircraft carrier, aircraft box carrier and an aircraft maintenance ship. Highly skilled American and British shipwrights built the ship using the same plans, but in their own distinct way. American yards required detailed drawings and specifications because the workforce was relatively untrained, its worker pool having been drafted for other defense industries or the military. The British, by contrast, had a long history of apprenticeships. Their highly experienced shipwrights did their jobs almost intuitively. Hulls were mass-produced on an assembly line from prefabricated steel ready-to-run modules. The Americans welded the sections together, while the British commonly used rivets for longitudinal overlapping plates. Also, the units of measurement were slightly different. Therefore, care had to be taken so that everything fit properly. The propulsion systems initially varied from single-screw double-reduction geared steam turbines to the simple so-called Scotch boilers. For standardization, the relatively simple VTE reciprocating engine was adopted for the vessels. They were mostly oil powered, but because the British Isles were rich in coal, some ships ran on the alternate fuel. Liberty Ships were seaworthy, but slow, with a maximum speed of about 11 knots. A crew constantly sailing into harm’s way needed some one-on-one protection—at least psychologically, so the ships were armed with bow and stern guns and port and starboard machine guns on each side of the bridge. Fortunately, their bodyguard ships, largely destroyers and destroyer escorts, had an array of more potent defensive weapons.

Henshaw meticulously traces the provenance of the Liberty Ship, from SS Embassage in 1935, to SS Dor-
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

ington Court of 1939, through the Empire Wind and Empire Liberty series and the “Ocean” Class. The final iterations were the Liberty, Fort, Park and Victory classes that ended roughly with the war’s conclusion. He has made numerous detailed scale drawings of the ships and supplements them with many archival photographs. Henshaw also discusses the contribution of the American firm of Gibbs & Cox and the remarkable ship builder Henry J. Kaiser. The Kaiser shipyard is credited with producing the Robert E. Peary in four days and 15 ½ hours. However, the author questions its probable unrecorded defects and “how it would be possible to get three coats of enamel paint, sprayed, rolled or brushed on and dry in that time.” (69) Henshaw praises the American “can do” spirit and accomplishments, but presents strong evidence that the credit for devising the so often replicated hull plans for the Liberty Ship should go to his fellow countryman, Sir Cyril Thompson. President Franklin Roosevelt was unimpressed with the original plans of the emergency cargo ships and called them dreadful looking objects. TIME magazine subsequently called the vessels “ugly ducklings.” (73) Henshaw, however, feels that this mundane vessel was the vital implement that secured the Allies’ victory. The SS John Brown and SS Jeremiah O’Brien are the only two surviving Liberty Ships and they serve as mobile museums on the east and west coasts of the United States, respectively.

Liberty’s Provenance is a relatively brief scholarly work. It is a captivating read about a class of ships that perhaps lacked romance, but excelled in grit. They were the unrecognized behind-the-scenes toilers in history’s most-costly war in lives and treasure. John Henshaw’s highly informative book is a seminal contribution to the maritime historiography of the Second World War.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Helen Hollick successfully brings to life the assorted adventures of smuggling, while presenting a historic narrative of an illegal trade over several centuries. Smugglers thrived along the English coastline as a need for goods pushed demand for highly taxed items such as salt, tin, and leather. This later evolved into an organized enterprise for smuggling tobacco, brandy, and other popular commodities. The book combines Hollick’s passion for storytelling (she has published several novels) and transforms her vision into an in-depth examination of this historic illegal process. The reader may easily envision tricks of the trade as smugglers perfected their craft of outwitting the revenue collector. Gradually, this turned into a lucrative business run by unsavory gangs. Finally, Hollick brings this story full circle to its significant role in sparking the American War of Independence.

Hollick writes in a reader-friendly fashion, exploring popular pirate slang and dispensing enticing facts which prompt readers to delve deeper into the book. Highlights include a playful composite of pirate tales and smuggling folklore passed down through the generations by witnesses and local historians. Often, smuggling activities involved local taverns, which, when in-
interest in smuggling lore spiked, inspired tavern owners to rename their establishments to capitalize on these sentiments, i.e. The Smuggler’s Inn. For example, Hollick connects historical fact to fiction by exploring the Jamaica Inn, made famous by author Daphne du Maurier in her 1936 novel *Jamaica Inn*. Using popular fiction as an anchor to introduce factual elements, Hollick brings smuggling history to life.

The author presents a synchronized examination of the typical smuggler, who they were, the morality behind this trade, and how smuggling evolved over time. She explains that during the 1600s, smuggling became a means of survival in small towns along the English coast. Fishermen and many townsfolk participated in acquiring certain goods while avoiding the King’s tax. Participants viewed these as essential items which fishermen bought from a supplier directly and distributed to neighbours at a small profit. The exchange benefitted the community, and therefore, necessitated the cooperation of people within the community. Smugglers operated at night in secluded locations, entrusting members of the community with storage assistance or as lookouts, and on many occasions bribed the revenue men to overlook questionable activity.

Later, organized gangs became involved in smuggling. This could include larger groups of 40-50 men, and occasionally, hundreds of men. Some of these gang members used violence to circumvent the law, while the law, in turn hanged men caught smuggling. Once the morality of individuals involved became tainted, members of the community cooperated, but did not outwardly promote smuggling as they had in previous generations.

Hollick makes use of interesting details to illustrate the smuggler’s tactics. For example, she explains how women used hooped skirts to hide contraband and explores women who dressed as men and joined the Royal Navy. Smugglers redesigned water barrels to allow them to hide contraband inside, without fear of a disastrous inspection. Hollick makes great use of her coastal knowledge to describe secluded points of entry along the English coast which became benchmarks for evading Customs authority. She also explains how attitudes to and among smugglers changed over time. Though inspired, the book lacks detailed references to justify the author’s conclusions. A more intense use of sources would have allowed the reader to understand better the depth of the author’s arguments.

Finally, the author examines the American War for Independence, once more embracing smuggling as a virtuous venture. She details events in Rhode Island which involved the molasses trade, the Sugar Act, and how this type of smuggling activity bruised relations between the King of England and the colonies. Tax resistance ignited events such as the Boston Tea Party and led to the formation of the Continental Congress. Hollick explores how individuals like Samuel Adams, the Sons of Liberty and others became American patriots rather than common smugglers or rebels and how smuggling evolved in both structure and morality.

The *Life of a Smuggler* is a comfortable and informative instrument for all readers. It entertains and educates through the lives of those who participated as smugglers. From an historical perspective, the book captures the essence of smuggling using vivid detail while expanding our geographical knowledge by tying this trade directly to life on the English coast and elsewhere. The author successfully illustrates how smuggling shaped the history of coastal
life, first in England and then into Jamaica and the American colonies, celebrating history through the smuggling trade.

Diana Ritzie
Highlands Ranch, Colorado


Here at last, and very welcome, is a volume in this distinguished and imaginative series that is devoted to women and the Senior Service, mainly in the age of fighting sail. Not that women have not been studied elsewhere in the naval context before, ashore or afloat, but this collection brings so many of the constituent parts together—and opens new vistas. As such, it forms more than the sum of the parts. And as such, too, it will form a basis for much further thinking on the subject—and will lead other writers to do more in this important aspect of naval affairs. It has often been said that if there had been more Emmas there would have been more Nelsons! I leave it to the reader to comment on this. But it is certain that whereas the Naval Service was a world inhabited, and in large measure controlled, by males the influence of females was considerable, though not in proportion to their numbers.

Some readers will not be familiar with *The Trafalgar Chronicle*, so a word is in order here about this publication and its proprietors. The publication has always been a prime source of information on the Georgian navy, that is to say, the Royal Navy in the ages of the Hanoverian or Georgian kings. In this era, the Navy rose to greatness as the preeminent navy, with vast global reach significant in the expansion of the British Empire and in the protection of trade, bases and colonies. That navy has often been called “Nelson’s Navy.” For that reason the year 1805 is of signal importance, and the Battle of Trafalgar, the preeminent event, the climax of the age of fighting sail. Inspired students of the naval epoch, realizing this 25 years ago, established The 1805 Club. Its objects were to conserve the graves, monuments and artifacts of people associated with the Royal Navy and the merchant navy during the era of the Georgian sailing navy. No other organization is dedicated to the preservation of these memorials and relics, which are vital parts of British and Imperial naval heritage. Since 1990 the Club has conserved sixty-five graves and memorials in Britain and overseas, created three new memorials, arranged events, and furthered publications in cooperation with the leading Seaforth Publishing, including *Nelson’s Band of Brothers*, one of my favorite books. The annual *Trafalgar Chronicle* is its flagship, its leading edge of research and communication. To be invited to write for its pages is a tribute to one’s scholarship and to be a member of the Club indicates a companionship that covers the seven seas and unites all continents. (For membership: www.1805club.org)

Captain Peter Hore, energetic champion of naval history, turned his attention to the matter of females and the Navy. Here is his opening line: “Women have for various reasons left a light footprint in the sands of history, and historians, established—mainly male historians—have unfairly overlooked women and their importance in the tides of history.” Years ago he decided to set the record straight, to correct the imbalance. He called on Margarete Lincoln, late Director of
Research, National Maritime Museum, to present the overall case and to evaluate the growing literature on the subject of women’s myriad connections with the seas. Years ago she had written, “women’s contribution to British naval supremacy in the long eighteenth century tends to be neglected or sensationalized.” Captain Hore set out to redress the imbalance, and he has done so with discretion and distinction, bringing in many authors and subjects.

Lincoln herself opens the whole with a broad and insightful “Women and the Sea.” Then follows Peter James Bowman’s study of Jane Austen’s naval hero, the answer to be found in Persuasion (1817). Jo Stanley describes Nelson’s Afro-Caribbean, nurse Cuba Cornwallis. Kevin Brown, distinguished historian of naval medicine, writes on sexual health in Nelson’s Navy. Other chapters provide insights into the naval world, and the one that caught my attention was the riveting “Sea Surgeons and the Barbers’ Company of London,” by Peter Willoughby. Because I had studied closely this subject under the tutelage of my late friend Vice Admiral Sir James Watt, I was particularly pleased to note that this subject continues to attract the best of historians, and also that the documentary material available to them is indeed rich and extensive.

But the allure of this book is naturally and understandably Emma Lady Hamilton, and one is naturally led to ask the question: “What’s new to say about Lady Hamilton?” A great deal, as it turns out, even a created “Television Interview with Emma, Lady Hamilton,” by that imaginative historian Joe Callo, made possible by paranormal communications. When The Host uses the term mistress in reference to Emma, she naturally takes exception, pointing out she was really Nelson’s paramour. I will leave it to the reader to follow her most persuasive arguments and tight reasoning. And speaking of Emma, one also must include Fanny Lady Nelson. We know of That Hamilton Woman, Alexander Korda’s film of 1941. But who knew that an utterly charming and adorable Fanny had been the subject of the silver screen in Nelson (1918)? One of the latter’s screen-stills reads: “Like most men of genius, Nelson craved for warm-hearted appreciative response. Unfortunately his wife lacked the power to supply this, so despite his apparently happy peaceful home life, he welcomed the opportunity for action.” This “jarring dismissal” is to be found in the BFI National Archives along with the rest that make up this hitherto-forgotten piece. Having authored my own work on allied subjects, That Hamilton Woman: Emma and Nelson (Seafort, 2016), to coincide with the National Maritime Museum’s Emma exhibition, I can attest to the enduring fascination with the topic. But the exhibition never met the expectations of the managers and patrons, and it gradually disappeared from view and into the cabinets of curiosities of the Museum.

I close this review of this wonderful contribution to The Trafalgar Chronicles with two quotes. The first, from Susan Sontag’s Volcano Lover: “People will be very sorry they spoke so cruelly of me. One day they will see that they were abusing a tragic figure.” The second comes from W. Clark Russell, the great describer of Nelson: “It is strange to observe how the unfortunate Emma mingles herself with the life of Nelson. The student cannot get away from her. She is as a strand in the rope of his career, and makes herself as much a portion of his later life as if she had been a ship or a battle.”

Barry Gough, Victoria, British Columbia

It has been approximately 44 years since the most divisive war in American history came to an end. To this day, for a vast number of people, Vietnam remains an often-painful enigma. While historians are now delving into the complex history of the conflict, too often the information available is sketchy or heavily politically biased due to the rawness of the events. It is in this environment that Edward Marolda’s edited work *Combat at Close Quarters* enters the historiography of Vietnam.

Marolda brings a wealth of skill and experience to this effort. Having served as the Acting Director of Naval History and Senior Historian for the United States Navy (USN), he was the 2017 recipient of the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award. His experience with the Vietnam War is equally impressive. With nine works under his belt on the USN’s role in the conflict, and a supporter and participant in the creation of Oral Histories, Marolda has a great deal of first-hand experience with the material. Ironically, he served in Vietnam as an Army Officer, not as part of the USN.

In *Combat at Close Quarters*, Marolda acts as both author and editor, contributing to three of the four chapters along with some outstanding scholars. Overall, the text is broken down into four chapters supported with the usual forward and preface as well as a list of suggested readings. The text is also heavily illustrated and utilizes, within the text, information side bars to highlight key issues, concepts and technology. The first chapter, written by Marolda and Norman Polmar, focuses specifically on the role of the USN in the air war, especially the Rolling Thunder Campaign (1965-1968). It examines the status of the USN aircraft technology and the operational realities of working carriers into Rolling Thunder. Of particular importance are two aspects of the chapter. The first is the discussion of the changing technology when it came to the fleet air arm and its impact on performance. The second revolved around where carriers operated as part of the operation and the role of the supporting fleet. This included Operation Sea Dragon (1966) which brought the gun line to bear on North Vietnamese lines of communication and coastal defenses.

Chapter two picks up the same basic approach. In “Green Hell: Warfare on the Rivers and Canals of Vietnam,” Marolda and R. Blake Dunnavent examine the role of the brown water navy in the conflict. This will be more familiar to readers who have at least watched films like *Apocalypse Now*, which placed a huge emphasis on patrol boats navigating Vietnam’s countryside which is interlaced with rivers and canals. This natural waterway system was extensively used by all sides and the USN needed to maintain a presence here to intercept supplies and the movement of forces as well as to support American ground operations. Again, the account is a fascinating read that provides a great deal of depth to the operations.

The third chapter, “Nixon’s Trident: Naval Power in South East Asia, 1968-1972” by Johan Darrel Sherwood, returns to a discussion of the USN’s role in the Nixon years. An accomplished author with four books on the USN and naval aviation during the Vietnam
War, Sherwood provides an interesting appraisal of the fleet. Starting with the Tet Offensive of 1968 and the election of Nixon, the chapter examines the peculiar air operations during the Vietnamization of the war. While the US officially avoided bombing the North, “protective reactionary” strikes were conducted attacking northern air defenses and related materials. Ironically, it is also the period when American air operations were expanded to include Laos, in an effort to interdict the movement of men and material into South Vietnam. In the process, the US made Laos the third most bombed nation in the world, being outstripped by only Germany and Japan in the Second World War. This reached a pinnacle during the 1972 Easter Offensive when the USN, with only limited Army and Airforce support, were able to blunt and stop the offensive.

The final chapter by Marolda and Richard A. Mobley, “Knowing the enemy: Naval Intelligence in South East Asia,” examine the extensive intelligence operations that were an essential hallmark of the Vietnam War. Any kind of insurgency/revolutionary war places a great deal of emphasis on both finding the combatants in a sea of civilians but also in identifying the key political issues and forces at work within the country. Once identified, in theory, they can then be utilized to the advantage of the government. Of course, the story of Vietnam is resplendent with examples of intelligence operations run amok. Stories of drug smuggling and other illegal activities tend to draw most readers’ attention. This chapter helps balance that by outlining the scale of the operations.

Overall, the text of *Combat at Close Quarters* provides a fascinating read and presents a great deal of incredible material to the consumer. The scale of naval operations is in itself surprising. Most telling, however, is the complexity of changing technology and adapting military power. It presents a very different and important alternative discussion for the Vietnam war that is often missing. Yet there are a couple of issues that stand out with the text. As many might expect, it is a history of the USN in the war and, as such, focuses almost exclusively on that aspect. A secondary impact is it comes across to the reader as a bit too pro-navy and thus, biased. Being a very focused study, some bias may be inevitable, but even if it is occasionally a bit irksome, it is not a reason to avoid the book. The second issue is more about lay-out. The separate sections focusing on specific aspects of the war like technology and aircraft design are included for very specific reasons, but somehow seem to detract from the text. They make the book feel more like a high school text or a coffee table book and less like a valuable study. This, of course, is a personal perspective which should not deter anyone from the text. Despite these two minor issues, the text is a solid and enlightening read. Its dense detail makes it an excellent addition to a reader’s library.

Robert Dienesch
Truro, Nova Scotia

---


This book is a detailed account of British and British-built Confederate blockade runners in the American Civil War of 1861-1865. It describes the econom-
ic basis of the trade and the cargoes in and out, along with exciting accounts of the runners dashing through the blockading squadrons (and sometimes getting caught). As for the ships themselves, the records of the prize courts provide detailed information about those ships that had been captured by the U.S. Navy, as well as their cargoes, while shipbuilders’ archives, newspapers and correspondence both official and personal contributed a rich lode of information. It was not that the builders and owners were broadcasting details of their activities in what was, supposedly, a clandestine activity, but the scale of construction was such that it was impossible to hide it from the press and the Illustrated London News.

While the North was an industrialized society, the South was agrarian. To wage a war, it would need armament and many other items that could only come from Europe. They would be paid for with cotton and tobacco. On 19 April 1861, President Lincoln issued a proclamation of a blockade. This had the unintended effect of defining the Confederate States as a separate country, which was then promptly recognized by Britain and France.

After describing the legal and diplomatic events at the instigation of the blockade, McKenna turns to its immediate effects. The chief Confederate naval agent in England throughout the conflict was James D. Bulloch, who was tasked with purchasing or constructing suitable ships, to be fitted out as commerce raiders (like the famous Alabama) or as blockade runners. Bulloch acquired comparatively large vessels, expecting them to run from Britain directly to Southern ports. They wore the Confederate ensign and the captains were in the Confederate Navy, although most were ex-U. S. Navy, while the crews were mainly British. At first, they were successful as the Union had nowhere near enough warships to mount an effective blockade. By mid-1862, however, the blockade was becoming more effective and a change of tactics was required.

It was quickly perceived that the best type of blockade runner was exemplified by the paddle steamers that connected Glasgow with the numerous settlements on the Clyde estuary. They were small and fast with a shallow draft that could get over sandbars where the Union gunboats could not follow. They were bought by British entrepreneurs and registered as both British merchant ships as well as Confederates vessels. Cargoes were carried by larger ships to Bermuda, Nassau and Havana and there transferred to the runners that took them through the blockade to Confederate ports: Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah and St. Augustine on the East Coast and Mobile, New Orleans, Galveston and the Mexican port of Brazos in the Gulf of Mexico. A typical cargo could include thousands of rifles, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, perhaps cannon, uniforms, cloth, and medicines as well as luxuries and fine wines. The outward cargo was chiefly bales of cotton plus tobacco and resins. Due to the high prices being paid by the British mills for cotton, this traffic was immensely profitable: two successful voyages could more than pay for the ship. The crews were well paid and the personal danger was not great. If intercepted, the ship and cargo would be seized and any Americans in the crew would become prisoners of war, but neutrals (British, for the most part) would be released after a few weeks. Some of the captured ships were taken into the United States Navy; others would be sold at a prize auction. After passing through a few owners, they often returned to blockade running, as did
the crew. Some of the British-owned ships were commanded by Royal Navy officers who had temporarily relinquished their commissions and sailed under assumed names. The Admiralty does not seem to have objected to this.

McKenna next surveys the shipbuilding centres around Britain. At most British shipyards “Clyde Type” vessels were being built as blockade runners. These ships were long and narrow, about 200 ft long, 23 ft wide and had a draft of 10 ft or less and were registered at about 350 tons. An excellent illustration of their simple, efficient design is found on p.94. By the end of the war, these ships were attaining speeds of 18 knots, faster than any existing warship. They were built of iron, with a few of steel (an early use of this material). Those that had screw propellers instead of paddles were twin screw (to keep the draft small). This section is illustrated with contemporary prints and photographs.

The next chapter lists the known ships alphabetically, with the number of runs by each through the blockade and describes some of the exciting escapes and captures. Blockade runners were not armed: to fire on a Union warship would have been considered piracy. If intercepted, they surrendered. While some were caught on their first or second trip, others accomplished 20 and reputedly 30 runs. Overall, about 75% of their voyages were successful.

The last part of the narrative describes what happened as the Confederate military situation declined. By 1865, the blockade had become very effective as Union forces were capturing the destination ports or the forts that guarded their entrance. Confederate money was no longer being accepted in Europe and payments were made in “cotton bonds”—a promise to supply so many bales of cotton. Then came the surrender. Blockade running crews, who had made good money while it lasted, went back to regular merchant service, the Royal Navy officers reclaimed their commissions and the ships were sold. Several ended up in Bedford Basin in Halifax, including the Druid (nine successful runs) which was bought by the Government of Nova Scotia and in 1867 and turned over to the Canadian Department of Marine and Fisheries. She served until 1901.

This is a very good account of an important aspect of the War between the States. The Confederacy could not have lasted six months without the arms and other supplies brought in by the blockade runners. Even if you already have Lifeline of the Confederacy by Stephen R. Wise, (University of South Carolina Press, 1988), it should not deter you from getting this book. They cover the same events but with different emphases. Positive accounts of anything Confederate are much criticized these days, but we must not let political correctness prevent us from recounting what actually happened.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Whenever assigning a book review in one of my classes on maritime history, I recommend that students avoid an autobiography or a memoir. This is because a review should be a discourse on the (scholarly) argument put forward in the book under review and a discussion of its contribution to the field. For
obvious reasons, most autobiographic works do neither a scholarly argument nor do they contribute to the existing body of knowledge, except as primary source material.

When agreeing to review *Recollections of an Unsuccessful Seaman* I had this issue in mind, but must say that I was pleasantly surprised. This is not just another set of recollections and sea-stories, but a carefully selected collection of autobiographical experiences compiled by Leonard Noake. The result is a coherent argument, and thus, a book definitely well suited to be reviewed.

Noake wrote the manuscript in retrospect and, in fact, while in hospital after receiving a terminally ill diagnosis at age 42. Writing the manuscript and creating the drawings accompanying the book was a way to occupy himself while in hospital and knowing that he had an incurable disease.

Born in 1887, Noake joined the maritime industries in 1903 and started serving as an officer in 1908. Aside from a few short stints on land, he served on a wide variety of British merchant vessels of all sizes right up to the point when he was hospitalized.

Organized chronologically, Noake’s book provides easily readable insights into the British merchant fleet without the slightest hint of drama. More importantly, he seems to be one of the very few merchant sailors whose autobiography does not try to make himself a kind of hero. This might be explained by the fact that the manuscript was not originally intended for publication, but written for his family in the certain knowledge he was dying. It seems particularly relevant in the chapters dealing with the First World War and his service on merchant vessels supplying the Allies with all kinds of goods from the Americas, including substantial numbers of horses. Noake’s description of one crew as being truly multinational (12) with at least nine nations represented illustrates one of his main goals, which is to present a critical account of the living and working conditions within the British merchant marine. His analysis continues throughout the book, culminating in a fictional radio interview written by the author himself as the last chapter of the book.

*Except for the very pick of positions in the Merchant Service, (and even these are very ill paid) the profession of an officer in the British Mercantile Marine is an extremely poor one, in every possible way.* (159) Noake’s summarizing comment might not come as a real surprise for many maritime historians, but is definitely a counterpoint to the way the merchant marine is way too often portrayed in popular history publications. The same applies to his comments on local stevedores and foreign crews temporarily joining the ships while working the African coast. He not only notes the living conditions of these men (4) but also observes that officers gained personal profit by offering passage to native passengers and charging ‘excessive luggage fees’ (6).

A small collection of photos and watercolours painted while he was hospitalized and working on the manuscript completes the book and provides a good insight into the author’s special type of humour. Fortunately, his great nephew, David Creamer, recognized the manuscript’s potential and preserved the original tone of the text while transcribing and editing it for publication.

When assigning a review to my students, I always ask them to conclude with a recommendation. While I fortunately ignored my own advice not to review an autobiographical work, I’ll obey this second suggestion. *Recollections of an Unsuccessful Seaman* is definitely to be commended: to the ca-
sual reader interested in maritime history, because it provides a counterpoint to most other comparable accounts; to the maritime historian, because it is a primary source allowing one to take a good look at the history of the British merchant marine and, in particular, the social and labour history of the trade; and finally, to a general audience longing for the ‘good old days,’ as it clearly shows that they might not have been that good, but that all kind of issues related to international labour markets, wage differentials between developed and less developed parts of the globe, living and working conditions for (international) crews on merchant marine vessels that existed a century ago. While *Recollections of an Unsuccessful Seaman* can be an entertaining evening read, it deserves to be read as a serious and critical account.

Ingo Heidbrink  
Norfolk, Virginia


Osprey Publishing, familiar to many, is renowned for its high-quality short monographs on military and naval subjects from all time periods. This particular one examines the French navy’s experience with battleships in their heyday—from prior to the Great War to the end of the Second World War.

In the case of France, the *Marine Nationale* was late to the dreadnought game as unleashed by Great Britain’s Royal Navy with the rapid construction and commissioning of *HMS Dreadnought* in 1906. France was a reluctant and hesitant responder to the Royal Navy’s innovation, which revolutionized battleship configuration and design and was copied by other great powers, notably Germany, with alacrity and commitment. While the naval race between Great Britain and Germany dominated the decade and a half before the Great War, the shift to the dreadnought-type was adopted by all who wished to describe themselves as serious maritime powers. Why did France hang back?

As recounted by Noppen, there were several reasons for French reluctance. Foremost was finance. France was fully committed to the land defence of the country from the very real threat posed by Germany, a threat that was fully realised in 1914. Funds available for the *Marine Nationale* were consequently limited. This difficulty was compounded by a shipbuilding infrastructure that was ineffective, inefficient and obsolete. Indeed, French investment in its navy had languished for decades, notably encouraged by the navy’s seeming irrelevance in the catastrophic defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The years thereafter were dominated by the thinking of the *Jeune École*, which conceded that matching the power of the Royal Navy, then considered France’s most probable enemy, given the many points of friction in the troubled relationship with Great Britain, was infeasible. To inflict any check at all on Great Britain would be a stretch, but the best method to do so was a *guerre de course* against British merchant shipping with speedy armoured cruisers. Battleships had little to offer in this assessment.

The immediate pre-war years witnessed the establishment of the *Entente Cordiale* with Great Britain in 1904, once the remaining issues, mainly colonial, had been resolved. France essentially assumed that the Royal Navy
would look after the security of the French Atlantic and Channel coasts, while it could concentrate on the Mediterranean threats posed by Austria-Hungary and Italy. The battleships that were built in the years prior to the First World War were designed with these threats in mind. The first modern dreadnoughts, of the Bretagne class, were not completed until 1916. The battleships of the preceding Danton and Courbet classes were hybrids, and were dated on completion in comparison with other navies, including those of France’s Mediterranean rivals. Neither class was a match for contemporary dreadnoughts of the British, German or American navies of this period. Noppen clearly describes this circumstance, thus providing good context for French decisions and its relatively small battleship investment during this period.

Noppen’s narrative includes a brief operational history of the battleships during the Great War, the interwar period thereafter, and concluding with the Second World War. As the locus of the naval war during the First World War was in the North Sea, and since the threats from Austria-Hungary and Italy were nugatory, transient or translated to an ally, that history was largely uneventful. Indeed, the crews experienced significant boredom which led to a number of postwar mutinies. The inter-war period did not alleviate the former problem, and French finances and shipbuilding capacity remained problematic. The Washington Treaty and its follow-on negotiations meant almost no new battleships were built and these in the mid- to late 1930s. The ships of the Dunkerque and Richelieu classes were, like their contemporaneous King George V class battleships of the Royal Navy, built in accordance with treaty limitations. They were alone in this regard. The four ships of the two classes had an ‘interesting’ career during the Second World War in a political sense, but rather less so as fighting warships. This complicated history is skilfully sketched out by Noppen.

The Osprey oeuvre is noted for its strength in photographs, line drawings and illustrations. This example is no exception to these well-established standards. French Battleships 1914-1945 is well served in all these areas, particularly with the photographs that illuminate the text. The drawings are superb. As history, the book is entirely derivative from secondary sources but that is not a criticism as there is no pretence that it is expected to uncover new ground in a very brief account. What it does do is provide a quick summary of its topic and is accompanied by the full panoply of illustrations that combine to form a very attractive package. On that basis, this book is recommended.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


China’s ‘century of humiliation’ began after the country lost a war on drugs (1839-1842) against the United Kingdom, a conflict known as the First Opium War. Opium was grown in India and sold in China under British supervision. When the Qing government resisted against the import, Britain resorted to gunboat diplomacy, which led to another Opium War from 1856 to 1860. The defeat of China made way for other foreign powers such as France, Rus-
sia, the United States and Japan to also invade and conquer parts of China to expand their trade and empires. For China, the humiliation finally ended in 1997 when, after 156 years, Britain returned rule over Hong Kong to China and the term “unequal treaties” was archived in the realm of history.

The Qing dynasty (1644-1912), with its 14500 kilometres of coastline, had been integrated into Asia’s nineteenth century maritime world through its maritime militarization and seaborne shipping. Like its predecessor, the Ming dynasty, the Qing developed a maritime consciousness. Among its defining factors were ecology and the geography of the coast and the scale and type of activities the state employed in using the channels and resources of its waters and economic linkages. To regulate, monitor and oversee expanding markets, as well as to administer their maritime area, navy and customs office in a proper manner, the Qing devised a system of rules and regulations. Their navy was organized and funded to deal with known enemies. The naval forces sent by Britain were of an entirely different order of magnitude.

The Qing considered their coastal waters as an inner sea. The outer sea was beyond the purview of administrative governance and economic extraction. A frontier was middle ground or an in-between space that facilitated the flow of people, ideas and commodities. The border between the inner and outer sea fluctuated with shifting geographic political and cultural factors.

The government focused mainly on expanding their empire to the west since China had no external threats on its eastern and southern shores. Compared to the Ming navy which was focused on naval defence, the Qing navy had a more professional structure that supported the national interest in expansion and the annexation of offshore islands, shoals and sandbars. (Present day China seems to have adopted similar policies). Apart from rampant piracy, things remained relatively quiet for a long time. This peace at sea was a major cause of the decline in the Qing’s naval development. With no stimulus for innovation and naval reform, and no need to adopt foreign military techniques, the empire missed out on many opportunities to strengthen and reinforce itself as a maritime power.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Qing dynasty faced a host of challenges: corruption, nepotism, factional struggles, administrative disarray, fiscal weakness, explosive population growth, inflation and a low rice production. On top of that, the government was confronted with popular unrest; rebellions like the Miao Revolt (1797-1806), the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804) and the Lin Shuangwen rebellion (1787-1788) proved that the government was incapable of organizing an army that could swiftly put an end to negative sentiment. In these conflicts more than 100,000 people died. Even worse, the myth of an almighty government died with them.

The Opium Wars and the Sino-Japanese war (1894-5) dealt heavy blows to the Great Qing by draining its treasury and exposing its ineptitude in battles at sea. The war against Japan was the climax of China’s ‘century of humiliation’. It was a disastrous defeat for China, both politically and economically. Unlike the European powers of the time, the Qing navy was not designed to pursue territorial expansion on the high seas. Its aim was to assist the state in safeguarding maritime trade. The Qing navy played a significant role in monitoring and policing its maritime frontier, which included suppressing marauding pirates. Against invading foreign na-
val powers, however, it was no match, lacking funding, organization, ships and equipment. Failure to compete left China to endure defeat, plunder, occupation and unequal treaties as ultimate consequences.

The author is successful in shedding light on the maritime policies of the Qing navy and the theories behind it. At first glance, this book is aimed at maritime historians, as an attempt to right historic wrongs. One could also consider it as an apology, or perhaps an explanation, for China’s in-your-face maritime policies of today.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands


This work is a chronology of the recorded large scale naval engagements of the ancient Greek world, from the Battle of Lade in 494 BC through the Battle of Cnidus in 394 BC. Author Owen Rees initially undertook this as a chapter in his work about ancient Greek land battles, but at the suggestion of his editor, agreed “to bring the multitude of naval engagements... into a broader modern awareness” (ix). This has always been somewhat problematic for scholars, for while naval warfare was intrinsic to the Greek method of war, ancient sources seem to assume that their readers already knew a great deal, and did not need to explain everything. Rees, therefore, focuses on those engagements importance enough to demand some elaboration, albeit sometimes in propagandistic terms, most notably in the case of the ubiquitous Battle of Salamis against the Persians. Combining modern scholarly research, archaeological evidence, and the primary source writings of key ancient authors, Rees selects battles from four main documented conflicts and examines them in a standardized format. Each conflict studied opens with a contextualizing introduction, then each subsequent battle begins with a listing of the primary sources, followed by sections on the background, forces, battle, and aftermath. The work is bookended by an introduction into Greek naval technologies and tactics along with a glossary of common terms. The conclusion describes the evolution of late Archaic and Classical naval warfare. Detailed endnotes, a selected bibliography, and a short index are also included.

The four conflicts analyzed are the Persian conflicts, the Archidamian War, Ionian War, and the warfare of the early fourth century; all are largely self-contained, as are their internal chapters. Introductory texts provide the framework for each of the engagements, just as the primary introduction establishes the basic framework of Greek naval equipment and doctrine. Rees presents both sides of the engagements as equally as possible, given surviving sources, and does an admirable job with some of the less well-documented engagements. While the first section on the Persian Conflict recounts the earliest chronicled and best known Greek naval battles at Lade and Salamis, the three engagements of the Archidamian War “show the range of fighting systems available to Greek fleets,” albeit largely from the perspective of Athenian writers and commanders (39). The Ionian War receives the most analysis, as this later stage of the Peloponnesian War saw extensive documentation survive regard-
ing the warring leagues of the Classical superpowers. While less widely known than Salamis, Rees covers the critical Battle of Aegospotami and resulting destruction of the Athenian navy within this section, marking the beginning of the end for Greek naval supremacy. The final chapter examines the major naval engagements of the Greco-Punic War and Corinthian War, showcasing the creation of the quinquereme amidst the rise of Carthage, and the dissolution of Panhellenic sentiment against the backdrop of another Greco-Persian conflict (143-144).

In addition to the main text, Rees’ endnotes are quite helpful and informative. While some are simple citations of specific sources, others are more detailed analyses containing information that would have otherwise broken the flow of the main text, but are nevertheless of interest to scholarly work. This includes details like calculations of naval expenditures based on pay scales provided in the writings of Thucydides, examinations and explanations of choices in regard to more contested pieces of the primary source narratives, and citations for alternative scholarly interpretations for those interested (193, 201). For those seeking further research and viewpoints on any of the selected engagements, these endnotes add a great deal to potential research of the topic, as well as providing a better understanding of several of the larger contentions in the modern scholarly historiography of Ancient Greek naval warfare.

In terms of possible improvements, the primary suggestion would be more maps. Understanding land and sea engagements is always easier with an illustration, although when they are simplified down to a single graphic for a multi-stage engagement, some details can be lost. Naturally the less detailed engagements are harder to map, but the addition of two or possibly three more detailed depictions of the battles would greatly help the lay reader to visualize the battle.

Great Naval Battles of the Ancient Greek World is a fine introductory text to the study of the late Archaic and Classical periods. Rees’ style of writing is excellent, with a good flow and scholarly air without any signs of coming across as wooden or clinical in its dissertation of facts. Given the relative scarcity of ancient naval warfare analyses among recent publications, this text is a worthwhile addition to the historiography of pre-Hellenistic Greek naval engagements and tactics.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


This powerful progressive text demands that we accord the ocean its history, free from the romantic, anthropomorphic and gendered language of the past, and accept the reality that the human role in the story is one of destruction: without humans the oceans would recover from all the their current problems, reversing centuries of exploitation, pollution and folly. All of those who go down to the sea in ships, books or other media will profit from reading Helen Rozwadowski’s timely, concise and compelling book. As a historian of the seas, focusing on ocean science, environmental issues and public history, Rozwadowski’s text has obvious resonance with the Maritime Studies programme she
has founded at the University of Connecticut. It is both an overview of current thinking and a programme for future development. As humanity slowly comes to accept that the sea is essential to its future on this planet, we will need such sound guidance. This book will reach audiences around the world, as maritime studies proliferate, and a wider public becomes increasingly aware of the issues that face their oceans going forward.

While mankind was shaped by the sea, the sea only acquired a written history as ocean-facing communities began to interact. It was no accident that the Phoenicians developed a simple writing system to support commerce, or that the Greeks adapted it. The societies used the sea to escape the limits of their terrestrial context, for trade, war and culture. The *Iliad* is, at heart, about trading relationships, and oceanic power projection in the Aegean. Trade promoted ocean science, from astral navigation to submarine telegraph cables, industrial development and a new form of imperialism, the sea empires of Athens and Carthage.

In the twentieth century human exploitation of the oceans accelerated, while new, more invidious pollutants began to challenge the ability of the seas to regenerate. Today the ocean is primarily viewed as a playground for the fortunate, and a workplace for a strikingly low percentage of the world’s population. Massive ships, economies of scale, container shipping and automation have stripped the seas of their workers, at a time when the global population is expanding rapidly, concentrating on the coast, and becoming ever more dependent on oceanic resources. The rise of the sea-based wind turbine has provided a new way to exploit the seas, without increasing the sustainable workforce. Wind turbines, like modern lighthouses, do not need a crew.

The absence of humans has obvious implications for writing about the oceans. As Jonathan Raban noted, sea literature is rarely concerned with the sea since most of us run out of ideas when confronted with such an alien space, while the purpose of seafaring has always been to journey from one piece of land to another, or to bring back an ocean harvest to the land. It is not a place to live, and few who spend much time on it have the luxury of time to reflect. In rare cases, Melville and Conrad for instance, men of the sea found an oceanic voice back on shore, and mined the deeper resonances of the oceans as a place of work and wonder. Elsewhere mariners’ words have been adopted and repeated by landlubbers, who, like Shakespeare in *The Tempest*, locate their drama ashore.

While the resources that first drew men onto the oceans are more attractive than ever, rising demand for protein, hydrocarbons and metals has sparked a critical legal and intellectual shift from open seas to EEZs: what was once free is now subject to legal regimes that seek to continentalize ocean space. The legal structures of UNCLOS II of 1982 provide a basis for international jurisdiction on these offshore claims. The People’s Republic of China, however, recently refused to accept an adverse judgement concerning its claims in the Western Pacific Basin, leaving the whole system of regulation in crisis. Carving up the oceans into offshore provinces on the basis of national power, which is at the core of the current dispute, is a truly terrifying prospect. Large continental empires have consistently treated the ocean with contempt, as an inconvenient, alien, barrier to the extension of Imperium, the locus of disasters and a space that had to be dominated. Owned seas just might be treated
with more concern, policed against pol-
lution, over-fishing, and other abuses, 
and the political will of landed popula-
tions might be mobilized to serve their 
own interests. While environmental 
altruism may shape the debate, some 
countries are culturally attuned to see 
the sea, but most are not. Vast Expanses 
has the capacity to advance under-
standing, extend engagement and promote a 
more sophisticated view of our respon-
sibility for the future of oceans. This is 
a work of the first importance for stu-
dents of the sea.

Andrew Lambert  
London, United Kingdom

B.B. Schofield. With the Royal Navy in 
War and Peace—O’er the Dark Blue 
Sea. Barnsley, S. Yorks: Pen and Sword 
Books, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 
2018. xviii+270pp., illustrations, maps, 
notes, index; UK £25.00, US $49.95; 

Vice Admiral Brian Schofield is known 
as a naval historian who wrote a num-
ber of books in the 1950s and 1960s on 
the subject of the Royal Navy’s Sec-
ond World War. His service, howev-
er, stretched from his years at Osborne 
and Dartmouth Colleges as a pre-war 
midshipman starting in 1908. He re-
tired as a Rear Admiral, appointed Vice 
Admiral at that point, in 1950. His ca-
reer spanned the first half of the twen-
tieth century and the Royal Navy’s last 
years as a global force. Not for him the 
dispiriting descent into the second or 
even third rank of naval powers of the 
1950s and beyond.

It may seem a rather late publication 
of his memoirs that were written in the 
mid-1950s. The book has been com-
piled by his daughter, Victoria Schof-
field, from his drafts, which were in the 
family’s possession. The sources for 
his reminiscences involved an exten-
sive file of his letters to his family that 
has since been discarded. These letters 
provided a framework for Schofield and 
were certainly not quoted to any great 
extent at all. Indeed, references to his 
family life are almost non-existent. 
Truly, his first commitment was to the 
Royal Navy at a cost to his personal life 
that contemporaneous society would 
likely find inconceivable and unaccept-
able. At his time such devotion to the 
Service was quite normal. That there 
was a cost is evident in that his first 
marriage ended in divorce in 1941, af-
ter some nineteen years, at a time when 
divorce was quite unusual.

Schofield’s career of some 42 years 
was extensive and varied. His sea-go-
ing experiences started in HMS Indom-
tible and a Mediterranean cruise in 
1913-14. He clearly enjoyed his life as 
a midshipman, the port visits and the 
excitement of service in the Royal Navy 
at its heyday. Schofield’s Great War in-
volved service in little ships, primarily 
with the Harwich Force under Commo-
dore Reginald Tyrwhitt. He was pro-
moted to Lieutenant at this time, serv-
ing ultimately as Executive Officer in 
HMS Torrid. Schofield’s war service 
is an important reminder of the efforts 
made to control the Channel and south-
ern portion of the North Sea from both 
the German High Seas Fleet as well as 
from submarines and light surface forc-
es. It was a constant struggle that has 
been almost completely overshadowed 
by the drama of the great battlefleets.

Life in the interwar years saw 
Schofield serve in HMS Renown for 
the Prince of Wales’ visit to Canada in 
1919, training as a navigator and serv-
ing in a variety of warships in home and 
Mediterranean waters. Schofield was a 
linguist and also served as an interpreter 
and translator in both French and Italian 
for whichever fleet he found himself.
After qualifying as navigator for ‘big ships’, he served in a number of battle-ships, as well as assuming staff posts both ashore and afloat. In 1938 he was promoted captain and was sent to Paris and Brussels as assistant naval attaché. The outbreak of the Second World War saw him relinquish this function on the defeat of France and take command of the light cruiser *HMS Galatea* in 1940. In early 1941, he assumed his most important post as Director of Trade Division at the Admiralty and so was centrally involved in fighting the U-boat war. This task saw him interact directly with the highest levels of command—naval and civil—in both Great Britain and the United States. He witnessed important meetings such as that at Argentia, Newfoundland, in late December 1941, between Churchill and Roosevelt, the Casablanca Conference in 1943, and numerous sessions in Washington and London. Schofield’s recollection of various discussions with the formidable Admiral E.J. King, USN is of considerable interest. He took command of *HMS Duke of York* in the months before its engagement with the *Scharnhorst*, leaving in November 1943 to take on *HMS Dryad*, the navigation school. While there he was directly responsible for converting the school into the headquarters for General Eisenhower and Admiral Ramsay ahead of the Normandy invasion. Schofield finished the war in command of *HMS King George V* in the closing months of the Pacific War. In the five years after the war, prior to his retirement in 1950, Schofield was, *inter alia*, posted to Washington where he served with the liaison staff there as Rear Admiral and directly witnessed the unambiguous passing of the torch of naval supremacy to the United States.

Schofield’s memoirs are of considerable interest as they detail the life in the Royal Navy over a period of four decades that witnessed its waxing and waning. Schofield the man comes across as a personable and thoroughly competent individual who served his country well and enjoyed considerable success in his profession. He had the good fortune to be at the centre of many critical events during the Second World War, particularly when with the Trade Division, and was an astute observer as to the reality of things vis-à-vis the relative position of Great Britain and the United States. He never expressed resentment over this circumstance, accepting it as inevitable and with good grace. Schofield, indeed, was one of those officers responsible for ensuring the good working relationship between two very unequal partners and, in concert with his peers and superiors, was certainly successful.

We are, therefore, quite fortunate that Schofield’s family saw fit to publish this memoir. As editor, Victoria Schofield lets her father speak for himself, but has added short notes at appropriate points to provide context for certain episodes that will be unfamiliar to many today. These are never intrusive and will be of value to some. The collection of photographs included is well done, as are the footnotes (which overwhelmingly involve providing details of individuals identified in the narrative, who are largely unknown today), and the maps. Indeed, the latter are quite helpful and artfully executed. There is no bibliography outside the footnotes.

This is a useful and well-done memoir. I can recommend it unhesitatingly to anyone interested in this period of the Royal Navy, as well as anyone who would like to learn a little more about the author of *British Sea Power, The Russian Convoys* and *The Arctic Convoys*.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan

This is not an academic book, but a guidebook for both commercial and recreational uses of maritime spaces. It is one of an extensive series of handbooks that covers topics from the use and maintenance of small diesel engines to a general overview for those skippering yachts. Reeds is well known as the publisher of professional maritime engineering books, as well as other manuals. That they publish these handbooks for recreational boaters and racers is a result of their close relationship with Adlard Coles Nautical (via Bloomsbury Publishing). This relationship also works because Adlard Coles is largely responsible for publishing the Royal Yachting Association’s instructional material. As a result, material from RYA publications can be published under Reed’s brand and brought to a new audience and market.

This small book is designed for those who know little about weather, but can also serve as a handy reference for those who are more experienced. Divided into sections, the book deals with Air Masses, Fronts and Depressions, Sea and Land Effects, Waves and Swell, Weather Forecasting (the background), Using Forecasts, Sources of Weather Information, Getting Forecasts, Observing (Learning by Experience) and then the Appendices.

This book is well written, concise, and the images help to illustrate the points. It is lovely to see it updated to include modern ways of finding weather data via the internet, radio communications and other sources. The only drawback with this book is that, because it is produce by Reeds/Adlard Coles, effectively all of the illustrations and examples provided are mostly UK-specific, providing French and Dutch weather and forecasting examples as well as domestic. The appendices, however, are extremely good, and provide both free and paid examples of services for weather information.

I have absolutely no hesitation recommending this book for anybody who is learning more about weather from a yachting perspective.

Samuel McLean
Toronto, Ontario


The strange-looking ironclads of the Civil War were unmistakable. They were hardly beautiful with their hulking nondescript shapes and strange silhouettes, and certainly alarming to those who had to face them in combat. The officers assigned to operate these ugly, armour-plated vessels with big guns, rotating turrets and unique mechanical machinery that generated intense heat and noise were a new breed of men, sailors who could adapt to novel technology and naval tactics that would arise from these innovations. Rifled guns could shoot further and, with better aiming equipment, they were far more accurate making ship-to-ship bombardments more devastating. Historically, inter-ship communication was accomplished with flags by day or lantern lights by night, usually with coloured lenses in various numbers, hung from masts. Since most ironclads
had no masts, they operated with others somewhat blindly, sometimes used as lone wolves to ram and sink their opponents. The commanding officers assigned to ironclad duty were an obvious group worthy of documenting and study.

Myron Smith, a well-known and knowledgeable Civil War, brown-water historian, has created a formulistic biographical directory of ironclad captains (A-Z). Each entry begins with the captain’s name, date of birth, and death (if known), and his naval affiliation—USN or CSN, followed by a biographic profile in which appears the name of the Northern or Southern ironclad vessel in bold type. In brief narratives, the author relates the battles in which the ship took part. Smith’s clearly written accounts are succinct and include an abundance of facts in a style reminiscent of encyclopedia or Wikipedia entries. He has included approximately 200 photographic images or drawings of almost every captain and many photos of the ironclads in which they served. Although the photographs are from the early days of printing, the quality of these illustrations is excellent.

Several entries are more in-depth, such as those for Captains Daniel Ammen, John Payne “J.P.” Bankhead, Isaac Newton Brown, Franklin “Old Buck” Buchanan, Greenleaf Cilley, James Augustin Greer, Thomas Oliver Selfridge, and Henry Walke—officers who fought gallantly on both sides of the conflict. Almost all of these pieces end with information about whether one or more US naval vessels were subsequently named after these captains. Forty-one Union officers were so honoured and two Confederate Officers, Captain Josiah Tattnall of the CSS Virginia and Admiral Franklin Buchanan also of CSS Virginia and CSS Tennessee. (Although not the focus of this book, this reviewer notes that several other USN vessels were named after Confederate Officers: CSN officers H.L. Hunley, George Dixon, Raphael Semmes, James Iredell Waddell and Richard Page; CSA officers Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. Sailors traditionally take great pride being associated in some way with the ship’s namesake.)

The biographical summaries of each naval officer are followed by an abbreviated list of sources. These books, periodicals, newspaper articles, Internet references and scholarly papers are more expansively covered in the comprehensive bibliography. An appendix lists all of the Union and Confederate ironclads followed by their captains.

Ironclad Captains of the Civil War is purposely not replete with sophisticated prose or descriptions and analyses of historical events. The excellent forward by Mark F. Jenkins, along with Professor Smith’s scholarly introduction, however, provides a perspective concerning these unorthodox vessels and their deployment in combat or defense during the Civil War. As mentioned above, a well-written directory is a useful ingress for those who are drawn to the history of Civil War ironclads and their officers. Myron Smith has made an excellent contribution by organizing data for scholars of that groundbreaking (or perchance wave-breaking) naval war about its often-intriguing captains and their innovative armoured vessels.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

When it comes to the First World War German Navy post-Jutland, aside from the U-boats, the massive Hochseeflotte the Kaiser had built is largely forgotten. Most would think that it sat idle until the large mutinies and the eventual steam into British captivity in November 1918. Gary Staff sets out to tell an entirely different story, one that shows that not only was the German fleet an active force after Jutland but it was still, in fact, a very powerful force to be reckoned with.

The author focuses on the Battle for the Baltic Islands in late 1917. This poorly-known operation was, arguably, the first, successful, large-scale combined arms amphibious landing. As a very basic summary, German troops landed and successfully captured the islands of the West Estonian Archipelago from 12-20 October 1917 under the codename ‘Operation Albion.’ The invasion was covered and supported by a large naval force, a special detached squadron (Sonderverband) of the High Seas Fleet under Vizeadmiral Erhardt Schmidt. The bulk of the fleet was comprised of no less than ten dreadnought battleships and their supporting cruisers and torpedo-boat flotillas.

The just over a week-long operation resulted in the loss of a Russian pre-dreadnought battleship (Slava), a destroyer (Grom), and a British submarine HMS C32 along with more than 20,000 troops captured in return for the loss of a few hundred German troops and a number of small craft. This outcome, as the author quotes a Russian Navy Commander, “had enormous significance for the further course of the war...the result of being forced from Moon Sound was our further retreat and possible abandonment of Riga.” (148)

Staff does a delightful job of delivering the narrative of this very interesting campaign. One of the book’s strong-points is the lengths the author went to locating sources to ensure a balanced narrative. He uses several Russian primary and secondary sources along with their German counterparts, bringing to light a number of interesting points throughout. What stands out most is that, by this time, the revolutionary elements had seeped through and largely shattered the Russian Imperial Army, although their intelligence system was almost unaffected. In fact, the only arm of the Russian forces that was functioning well during the operation was their intelligence, which remained good and accurate (16). Although Russian soldiers were still willing to fight, with decent morale, they were continually hampered by soldier’s councils and the ability of officers and commanders to veto decisions.

On the German side, not everything went well either. Surprisingly, German naval gunnery appears to have been quite poor, and the navy was generally unaggressive and unwilling to take much risk. Staff also highlights the time-consuming nature of naval mine warfare and the significant effect of well laid barrages. If mine-sweeping forces were unsuccessful or driven off, a mine could render a dreadnought battle ineffective. For example, Bayern was struck on the first day while approaching her firing position and significantly damaged, forcing her to detach from the operation.

While very good, the narrative itself is the sum total of the book. Even though the author does state, right in the introduction: “In writing this book I did not seek to make any great analysis of the fighting, but rather wanted to present a balanced and accurate narrative (xii),” one is still left with the question
‘so what?’ A little analysis, even if just to guide the reader along the narrative path would have been a great asset to the work.

The combined arms assault by the Germans, using naval forces, aerial recon with airplanes and Zeppelins, and the assault by ground forces was highly successful, but exactly what was learned from it? What was its impact on future operations? How did the improvisation of small craft actually shape future thinking and planning? Perhaps most importantly, how heavily did this shape the Eastern Front from then on, and are the conclusions drawn by some of the primary sources indeed accurate? These are just a few questions that will have to be left for another work.

The text is nicely complemented by a good collection of photos from the events. Naval historians will be quick to realize that infantry landings in the Baltic in 1917 were just like something out of the Nelsonian Era—longboats going ashore packed with troops. Happily, the author included 15 maps that allow the interested reader to not only follow along with the narrative, but also understand the strategic implications of the battle area and the terrain involved.

A fast and easy read, both the historian and the interested reader will enjoy churning through the narrative. For a quick, linear overview of the Baltic islands campaign, this is certainly a book worth looking at.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Rusagonis, New Brunswick


Two stories separated by 143 years but united by a ship are compacted into The Ship, The Saint And The Sailor. One story is the history of Russian Alaska represented in the Kad’yak. The other is an account of its discovery and recovery of its artifacts that provides an insight into the practices and challenges, both natural and human, of marine archeology.

The ship is the Kad’yak, the three-masted barque built in Lubbock, Germany in 1851 and purchased by the Russian-American Company in 1852. In the spring of 1861, it sailed from its home port of Kodiak bound for San Francisco with a cargo of ice on a voyage that it would not complete.

The saint is Father Herman, the Russian Orthodox priest who arrived at Kodiak in 1794 as part of a mission ordered by Empress Catherine the Great. While providing religious support to Russian settlers, he also saw the need to bring salvation and education to the natives. His years of dedicated service spawned a reputation reflected in his recognition as St. Herman of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The sailor is Captain Illarion Arkhimandritov, a native Alaskan, the son of a Russian father and a native mother. A mariner trained in St. Petersburg, he was well known and experienced in Alaskan waters who, after failing to keep his promise to hold a Te Deum (a religious service) for Fr. Herman during his visit to Kodiak, ran Kad’yak onto a rock in front of Fr. Herman’s grave, leaving the topgallant spar horizontal slightly tilted, forming the shape of a Russian Orthodox cross.

This narrative places the saga of Kad’yak and its captain in context nar-
rative by introducing the reader to the history of the settlement and economy of Russian Alaska in an era when the territory was managed by the Russian American Company and its main export was, no joke, ice. Like some other areas of North America, its industries were worked by colonials and based on fur trading and the sea. I found the explanation of the ice trade to be fascinating. How did Russian ships begin transporting ice from Alaska to San Francisco? In the days before refrigeration, the ice that formed in Tanignak Lake in the woods of Kodiak Island was high quality, suitable for a city by the bay growing in size and sophistication. Ice from Kodiak was cheaper than from its major competitor—Boston!

There would have been no book without the second story; Stevens’ account of the archaeological discovery and exploration of Kad’yak and the recovery of its artifacts. In some detail, he describes the process of deciphering the location of the wreck from Captain Arkhimandritov’s journal and other records, a task that has the makings of a mystery or a puzzle. Here Stevens introduces the reader to the equipment and methods used in marine archaeology. The difficulties of seeing in the dark, even at relatively shallow depths, maintaining orientation among unfamiliar landmarks, and blowing off nitrogen to prevent crippling “bends” after dives demonstrate the difficulty of such explorations. Unlike higher profile explorations, the Kad’yak opened a link to Russian Alaskan history but was not a path to riches. Because of its non-commercial nature, it attracted a different type of researcher: professionals working with volunteers, donated vessels, requests for historical grants, and dives squeezed in between paying jobs. The interplay of state and federal laws and competition between researchers eventually led to legal battles and broken trust and friendships. The temptation to profit from evading the rights of the State of Alaska under the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act reveals the pervasive influence of human nature and the gave the courtroom proceedings an importance comparable to those occurring underwater.

Although I found the exploration to be fascinating, I was more interested in the history reflected in Kad’yak’s tale and artifacts, yet the writing held my attention even when the topic was less personally interesting. The photographs and contemporary and historic maps are helpful supplements to the text. There is a happy ending to the tale in the sense that the recovered relics are on display in local museums on Kodiak Island and the maritime history of Russian Alaska is better known. Stevens packs a lot of information into a short book. I recommend it for anyone with an interest in Alaskan history or marine archeology.

James M. Gallen

St. Louis, Missouri


It was with some interest that I read Stewart’s *The War With Hitler’s Navy*—a surprisingly slender volume, considering the comprehensiveness of its title and the thousands upon thousands of pages previously written about the topic. British publisher, Pen & Sword, lists at least 24 directly related books in its current catalogue, including one with a very similar title, *Hitler’s Navy*!
The appetite for this subject seems inexhaustible. So why read Stewart’s version?

As a postwar baby boomer, I eventually developed a deep sense of that dreadful struggle against Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism that was the Second World War. Three uncles served in the Royal Canadian Air Force; one was shot down and killed in 1944. As part of an early 1960s grade school project, a fellow nerdy, history-enthused buddy and I gave a rousing performance of Johnny Horton’s great hit, Sink the Bismarck. While this did not make me an expert on the Kriegsmarine, Nazi Germany’s successor to the First World War Imperial German Navy, as a young man I read voraciously about Bismarck, Scharnhorst, the armed merchant raider Atlantis and German U-boat ‘Aces’ such as Jost Metzler, with La Vache Qui Rit (The Laughing Cow) painted on the conning tower of U-69. Whenever I buy cheese I am still reminded of the horrific Battle of the Atlantic and 12 doughty little corvettes built in my hometown, Kingston, Ontario, which went to war in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Two would not return.

This is not a book for historians who are already experts on the topic since there is little new research. Its nine chapters are organized chronologically, beginning with a brief discussion of the limitations on German Naval power by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the various violations of it that allowed the Kriegsmarine to begin to build up a new fleet. Grand Admiral Raeder had planned sufficient naval construction, including aircraft carriers, to allow Germany to challenge Britain in 1944, but this was not to be. Stewart describes well the resulting piecemeal, sometimes tentative deployment and destruction of Germany’s small but still formidable surface fleet, battle by battle, beginning with Admiral Graf Spee in 1939. The U-boat war, the only thing “that ever really frightened” Churchill, has two chapters to itself.

Stewart writes smoothly and professionally, befitting an author with more than a half-dozen war-related books to his credit on an eclectic variety of subjects. In this case, he has the good sense not to reinvent the wheel, judiciously deploying quotes from other well-known texts rather than redoing them. It is a measure of his ability that in such a slim volume he combines overall strategic views and sharp political perceptions with specific battle descriptions, technical discussions and personal (sometimes amusing) anecdotes that tie everything together in a neat package. Direct quotes are end-noted in each chapter.

There is a decent selection of photographs, including both ships and individuals, and their captions generally add value, though there are a couple of errors misidentifying ships. Gratifying to me in a more parochial way was Stewart’s reasonably even-handed description of the RCN’s important, if initially somewhat ham-fisted contributions to winning the Battle of the Atlantic. I do quibble with his statement that Canadians “tended to allow themselves to be diverted from their main duty of sticking close to the merchantmen … instead embarking on vain hunts for submarines that had been reported in their vicinity.”(130) In one of the more notorious incidents of that sort, U-69 torpedoed a Newfoundland ferry, SS Caribou, in 1942, and the commander of escorting Bangor-class minesweeper, HMCS Grandmère, was criticized for attempting to ram the surfaced U-boat and then spending two hours hunting it instead of stopping to pick up survivors. Indeed, the Flag Officer of the Newfoundland Force noted that attacking
U-boats in such situations was normal operational doctrine. Stewart levels rather more reasonable criticism (he is not alone) at the inexperienced RCN corvette commander who notoriously abandoned convoy SC 42 to save a precious torpedoed tanker by towing it to Iceland.

In spite of these being well-ploughed historical waters, some of the anecdotes were intriguingly new to me, such as the Royal Air Force considering battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the “Ugly Sisters” of the Kriegsmarine. (108) My own view is that many of the modern German warships were rather elegantly designed, particularly compared to British battle-ships such as HMS Rodney, oddly truncated due to the Washington Treaty. The final chapter on Baltic actions near the end of the war was also relatively new and interesting.

One thing unfortunately absent was an epilogue stating the author’s overall conclusions about how the Kriegsmarine had been deployed, though such observations are to some extent, woven through the book’s fabric. Overall, I think Stewart’s book well worth reading; the drama, horror and heroism of the times are evoked in an understated way, as are the effects of Hitler’s personal direction of his war, which helped to sink his vainglorious dream of a Thousand Year Reich in just six catastrophically bloody years.

David More
Kingston, Ontario

Barbara Tomblin has written an excellent overview of life in the Navy of the Confederate States (CSN) during the American Civil War. Employing official records, private correspondence, and memoirs she provides an in-depth look at their day-to-day life aboard ship and ashore, their response to the war, and their involvement in specific engagements.

At the start of the Civil War, the breakaway Southern states did not have a navy. The initial effort consisted of individual states pulling together ships, officers and men. Quickly, this became a Confederate effort with the appointment of a Secretary of the Navy and the establishment of a formal navy department. States then simply turned over their vessels and men to the government in Richmond, Virginia. Most Southern officers in the Union Navy resigned their commissions and headed to their home states to offer their services. Ships were assembled from what was at hand, and construction begun on others, either in the form of converting vessels to naval use, or building from the keel up. From nothing quickly rose a small, largely limited in range, but impressive-ly effective fleet.

A key problem which plagued the CSN throughout the conflict was the recruitment of men. There never seems to have been enough trained or seasoned seamen, necessitating the use of landmen, often recruited from among the army. Tomblin does note that some seamen at the outbreak of war enlisted in the army, with the desire to get into the thick of what was thought would be a short war. For many, the thought of the North’s naval resources made the probability of the South having an effective naval presence remote. Tomblin’s research reveals a widely-held patriotism aligning officers and seamen to the Southern cause.
Like other navies around the world, recruitment was driven by officers drawing on local social links to get men to join, recruitment drives among the larger population and specifically within army regiments, and the offering of bounties. Not only whites, but a limited number of blacks, enslaved and free, were taken into the naval service. The total numbers in the Confederate navy never surpassed 5,000, about a tenth of the Union navy’s enlisted men.

For those used to serving in a naval vessel, adapting to life in the CSN was not difficult, but most recruits were not accustomed to shipboard life and the adjustment was taxing. From sleeping in a hammock, to the watch rotation schedule for work and rest, through the repetitive drills at the guns, and the work of operating a steam-powered vessel seemed for many, daunting. But Tomblin’s evidence is clear that most recruits settled in, found their sea stride and made good sailors.

Morale was of keen interest to the Southern officers. They took pains to provide opportunities for their sailors to relax and recreate, including cards, song, alcohol, tobacco and visits ashore (often to see relatives or friends. Officers appear to have enjoyed theatre and formal social gatherings while ashore, in keeping with the middle and upper class values associated with their rank. Shore leave did see its share of drunkenness and fighting among the sailors, but they were never the main activities. Officers made concerted efforts to tend to the religious needs of their crews, providing divine service, or at least trips ashore to church on Sunday, when possible.

But the seamen were not always a contented lot, desertion and other disorder occurred. The desertion seems to have increased as the war dragged on, especially towards the end. When sailors began to fear for their family’s safety, as the Northern forces moved into the South, men simply left the navy when opportunity presented itself. Some deserted as their ships were taken out of service, or they were stuck in what they must of thought was an endless round of inaction. These men often deserted from the navy to the army, in order to get closer to the fighting; not the usual type of desertion engaged in by sailors.

Discipline was a priority aboard Southern ships of war. The master at arms often served as the detector of transgressions reporting them to senior officers. The usual range of inappropriate behaviour included, fighting, drunkenness, insolence, disobedience, theft and gambling. Punishments were handed out according to the captain’s sense of seriousness of the crime. They could include being placed in irons, being tied up by the elbows into the rigging, loss of prize money, or grog allowance. More serious offences, such as desertion or mutinous activity, were handled by a court martial, resulting in more severe penalties. Other than noting examples of corporal punishments, the courts martial demoting officers, and the mentioning of one death sentence (commuted by Jefferson Davis), Tomblin does not provide any statistical evidence, or advanced analysis, about the relationship between disordering behaviour and punishment. In part, this is due to a dearth of documents on the subject. She does suggest that, at times, harsh corporal punishment was a cause of desertion.

The fighting experience of the Confederate sailor is brought out in four chapters. One deals with warfare along the southern coast, another on the high seas, a third on combat on southern rivers and the fourth on the South’s use of ‘torpedoes’ and experimental underwater craft. The high seas chapter address-
es the Confederate raiders. Southern commerce raiders took the war to the Northern whalers and merchantmen as their vessels plied their business around the world. Few in number, they were effective in raising insurance costs for Union ship owners. When faced with manpower shortages, the captains of the raiders often enticed crew from captured ships to join them in their pursuit of prize and glory. Their demise was not only due to the effective Union blockade, but the gradual shift of sympathy among countries originally supportive of the Southern cause, and their eventual denial of safe harbour.

Most of the CSN’s activity was within the confines of the Confederacy. Their ships predominantly resisted Union efforts to blockade and attack southern ports. The most common form of aggressive move by the Confederate coastal navy was cruising in the space between the defences of a Southern harbour and the blockading Union navy in search of lone Union craft to take. The attack on Union ships off Charleston by the CSS Chicora and Palmetto State is an example of such an encounter, producing a tighter blockade by Northern forces, and a propaganda win for the South (135-9). Naval engagements along rivers were just as critical as the coastal campaigns, for example, the destruction of the USS Underwriter by a Confederate naval raiding party (197-202).

Tomblin amasses a number of examples that indicate a ferocious naval resistance to Union invasion. Perhaps the best known example is the Battle of Mobile Bay (140-50). The reader is left with the impression that Southern officers and seamen prosecuted their orders to the best of the ability, often against overwhelming odds, with the best results to be expected, even if that was ultimate defeat. There never seemed to be an easy win for a Union ship. Throughout these chapters Tomblin never fails to highlight the rough living and hard working conditions aboard the ironclad ships, the continuing difficulty of raising enough men, and the frustration experienced during the long periods when men were idle.

The author explores new territory in the chapter on the naval shore gunnery crews, Confederate use of ‘torpedoes,’ and underwater craft. Though underwater craft have been mentioned before, the development of ‘torpedoes’ is new. The Confederate navy made wide use of torpedoes, which were either used as underwater mines or were attached to a long boom, at a ship’s bow, that would be dropped as the vessel approached the enemy. In the case of the mine-like use, the torpedo would be placed underwater in an area thought to be passed by enemy shipping. As an enemy ship sailed over top, a person ashore would complete an electrical circuit and the mine would explode. Another use was on a ship which delivered the explosive to the side of the enemy vessel, lowering the boom (so to speak) and detonating the charge as it hit the target. The deployment of naval forces ashore to man gun batteries occurred more often as Confederate naval assets were destroyed, captured, or so closely blockaded that manning them was no longer good use of personnel. They served effectively in the defence of Southern cities as Union forces closed in.

A chapter on prisoners and prison camps examines life in captivity for the Confederate sailor. Captivity was easier in the early years in most camps, but as the war went on they became overcrowded, disease spread, food rations were cut, and in mid-1864 the prisoner exchange system all but ended. Men occupied themselves with activities ranging from gambling to furniture making.
Some received visits from family and friends, but that too was curtailed as the war progressed. For many prisoners of war (soldiers and sailors) the way out of the intolerable conditions was to take the Union oath and join the Northern army. Tomblin makes the most out of the few memoirs and personal records relating to the prisons. The reader’s understanding of the experience of entering a prison, existence in it, and the various ways out (death, escape, exchange, enlistment with the North, and end of the war) is amplified by the personal narratives. The use of Black troops as guards created great tension among the Southerners.

In the final months of the war, sailors were brought ashore more often to assist in the South’s defence. As the Union closed in on Richmond, desertion rose substantially among the army and the navy. Seeing defeat coming, few wished to stay till the very end, preferring to return to their family as soon as possible. At the war’s end all Confederate troops and sailors were prisoners. Their choice was to take the oath of allegiance to the Federal Government, or stay confined. Those who swore the oath could return home.

Tomblin includes two maps, one of the Atlantic voyages of CSS Florida, and the other of the location of prison camps. A set of 14 black and white images are found between pp. 184-5. They depict Confederate ships, officers, and engagements, and a picture of Jefferson Davis and Secretary of the Confederate Navy, Stephen R. Mallory. The endnotes are numerous and thorough, making good use of archival and secondary source material. The index is workable. There is one problem causing confusion, though relatively minor. At the outset, the author gives the number of men in the Confederate navy as “never exceeded 4,966” (22), but at the end of the book states that there were 8,000 sailors in the Confederate navy at the time of the South’s defeat (234). She does not explain this discrepancy.

Tomblin has performed a great service in exploring the conditions faced by the Confederate officer and sailor. Her work on the daily life in Jefferson’s navy will serve as an important jumping off point for future research into this subject. In the end, she leaves us with the appreciation that the Confederate naval officer and seaman were like most others (certainly those in the Union Navy). Most worked hard to learn the tasks at hand, fought to win, enjoyed their free time, played and prayed. They shaped their world as best they could, sometimes parting ways with the navy, but mainly they sought to support the Southern cause, afloat or ashore.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


A sequel to Vego’s *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice* (2016), this volume addresses maritime warfare theory from the perspective of smaller, and weaker, navies (e.g. Canada). Building upon the premise that the maritime theory of stronger maritime powers may suffer from a false reading of historical precedent, Vego remarks that it is possible for small navies to also fall victim to this error. In this instance, smaller/weaker navies use maritime strategies based upon a lim-
ited interpretation of classic defensive maritime strategies. In effect, he calls for a re-reading of naval operational history vis-à-vis small navies. His fundamental argument is that medium and small navies can use the traditionally defensive maritime strategy of sea denial offensively. Sea denial strategies are also important for large naval powers, particularly when they are forced on the defensive, but Vego argues that attempting to prosecute strategies strictly of sea control is an unsound doctrine. Strategies of sea denial are best established in peacetime, for implementation in time of war. By Vego’s definition, maritime strategy is a component of a nation’s grand-strategic plans which must manifest in both peacetime and time of war in order to be effective. Gauging the success of a maritime strategy is contingent upon its strategic role within a grand strategy, and whether a nation’s maritime forces met the sine qua non for “success” placed before it.

The scope of the book is broad, ranging from defending against Mahanian decisive-battle strategies, to the Jeune École of both France and the Soviet Union, and engaging firmly with the theories of Julian Corbett, and Samuel P. Huntington. Vego critiques Mahanian doctrine particularly, and insists that small navies use their connection to land masses in order to advance warfare. He pursues his argument by dipping into joint maritime warfare practices in both offensive and defensive situations. The book opens by examining variations on the theme of success from various perspectives; from the tangible (materiel comparisons), to intangible (i.e., morale, training, and unpredictable events), and concludes that the only constant in predicting the outcome of a war is the chaotic component of the metric of success introduced by humans, and human technology. Unlike Trevor Dupuy (Numbers, Prediction, and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles [Revised Edition], [Hero Books, 1985]) who was positive that everything in battle could be qualified, Vego argues that no metric apart from the most general (e.g., a larger fleet is more likely to defeat a smaller one; or a highly trained fleet will likely do well against a fleet with poor leadership) can be ascribed to guaranteed success. Rather, he argues that a navy ought to be designed to fill a specific role, and its success measured based on its ability to fulfill the role assigned to it.

Much of Vego’s modern historical discussion, at least until 1919, can be supplemented by Vincent P. O’Hara, W. David Dickson, Richard Worth, eds. To Crown the Waves: The Great Navies of the First World War, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013). Many of Vego’s case studies, however, are pulled from the Second World War at the earliest. He does occasionally dip into the ancient past, scraping up examples from such periods as the First Punic War (264-241 BCE) to illustrate a point. In some cases, he places an ancient and a recent example side-by-side, creating an interesting comparative narrative through temporal juxtaposition, although this occasionally introduces a discontinuity into his analysis. Vego tends to examine concepts thematically rather than a strictly chronologically, leading the unwary reader toward a state of mild confusion as his narrative skips from period to period. Readers expecting an argument that conforms to a time line will be confused, and may have to re-read the section. If, however, they anticipate that Vego will define a concept, and then choose isolated cases from history’s broad scope, they will fare better. Had Vego stuck to a strictly
chronological examination and inserted thematic notes as appropriate, he would have produced a highly disjointed, and inflated, book. Instead, by matching an illustrative event with the theme at hand, he ensures his point is made concisely.

Researched, constructed, and fully cited, Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial provides researchers with a textbook application of the 2017 edition of the Chicago Manual of Style, including the phasing-out of “ibidem.” The author draws upon both English and German sources, as well as translated Russian resources. While providing readers with a broader range of scholarship beyond Anglo-American-based maritime theory and historiography, Vego still conforms to a certain degree of homogenization within the field of study. Despite the rapid rise of maritime activity by Russia and Asia-Pacific nations, there is a distinct lack of discussion of Asiatic maritime theory. Drawing upon the occasional sample from the Russo-Japanese War or the Second World War is insufficient to provide a truly wholistic assessment of maritime warfare theory; thus, does he perpetuate Eurocentric analyses.

Milan Vego has created a book on small maritime-power which, combined with supplementary texts of equal virtue, can form a solid core of modern maritime warfare theory primers: Ian Speller’s Understanding Naval Warfare (Routledge, 2014) comes to mind. If one can afford the price tag characteristic of Routledge books, it is a highly recommended addition to navalists’ libraries.

Ambjörn L. Adomeit
London, Ontario


Global Piracy: A Documentary History of Seaborne Banditry is an undergraduate-level textbook on the history of piracy from the classical world to the modern day. It argues that pirates have always been standard features of seafaring life—and historically were viewed as such—and cannot simply be reduced to criminalized outsiders. The text builds a global history of piracy through contextualizing primary sources and uses the conceptual trio of episodic, intrinsic and parasitic piracy to understand and categorize piracy throughout the chapters. Each chapter is about a different region and era that is relevant to the history of piracy, and includes a contextual introduction, discussion questions and a selection of primary sources.

The text seeks to fill two very real voids in the study of pirate history: the need for high-quality academic textbooks to accompany the growing number of piracy-focused history classes, and the need for a more diverse and critical approach to the increasingly popular field. The introduction promises to address many of the most pressing and relevant issues in pirate studies today, such as its Western-centric approach and the oversimplification of the definition of piracy.

The work correctly names problems and challenges in the history of piracy, but does not make much real progress in counteracting them. It promises to diversify our understanding of piracy by bringing in different perspectives and questions on topics like race, gen-
der and class, but it is difficult to take that claim seriously when only one woman is mentioned, Cheng I Sao, and a minimal discussion of gender is simply tacked onto her. Even if one were to decide that only one female pirate is worthy of being included in a global history, the presence of women is not the only time gender is a relevant topic; isolated, all-male communities present more than enough for discussion.

For a documentary history there are surprisingly few documents. As this is intended to be assigned as class readings, one would expect the primary sources to be the centrepiece of the chapters—yet, some chapters only have two or three examples, and it is not always clear where that primary source came from or who wrote it. It is stated overtly that the text intends to move away from the sources that dominate the field in favour of a fresh approach, but does not provide a satisfactory alternative. I appreciate the intent to deconstruct some of the flawed and dogmatic notions in the study of piracy, yet the text does little to educate the reader on those notions in order to more effectively challenge them. One does not have to rely entirely on sources like A General History of the Pyrates and Grotius, but it is hard to imagine ignoring them entirely, if only to address the impact they have had on the study of piracy itself.

The choice to approach piracy from a global perspective, however, is a good one and provides opportunities to pinpoint where ideas about piracy come from and to compare piracy between eras and regions. It can highlight universalities as well as how regional and temporal context affect piracy and how it was perceived. The main appeal of a global approach is to create precisely these sorts of connections, and while the potential for the reader to form those connections is there, the text could have done more to stimulate it. Of course, as a teaching tool, the text would be paired with lectures in which those themes could be teased out in more detail.

In addition, the chapters could be assigned out of order or not in their totality, so it makes sense to make them capable of standing on their own. The episodic, intrinsic and parasitic categorization was clearly meant to be the connecting thread throughout the entire text, as it is mentioned in at least one discussion question in almost every chapter; however, the categorization is too confusing and not reiterated enough to make a real impact. The discussion questions that are provided are in some instances good prompts to train students in primary source analysis, but would have benefited from calling upon broader themes and there were sometimes so many questions as to be overwhelming.

The introductory sections for the chapters are often too long and loaded with detail that does not seem necessary. As a result, the bigger ideas and concepts get lost in the weeds—not just regarding piracy, but of the era and region more generally. In those introductory sections there are a number of instances where the author relies too heavily on too few historians and consequently, the introductions do not provide the reader with a thorough understanding of the topic. Additionally, the writing style is inconsistent; it was evidently intended to be accessible to students, but alternates between simple and dense.

In essence, the concept of a global history of piracy textbook that challenges and diversifies the field is promising and prescient. This text does not quite fill the voids that were promised, but hopefully it will help to highlight those needs and push the study of pirate history in the direction it needs to go: less Western-centric, less rigid in its
definition of a pirate and less reliant on
dated and dogmatic ideas.

Sarah Toye
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Kennard R. Wiggins, Jr. America’s An-
chor: A Naval History of the Delaware
Publishing, 2019. 288 pp., illustrations,
notes, bibliography, index. US $45.00,

In America’s Anchor, Kennard R. Wiggins, Jr., the author of several other
volumes of Delaware history, offers an
account of the Delaware estuary from the 1600s through the end of the Sec-
ond World War. He focuses specifical-
ly on the role this region played in the
development of the U.S. Navy. Indeed,
the men and women, not to mention
the resources, of the Delaware estuary
“built a navy manned by trained and
disciplined sailors led by dedicated and
visionary officers” (4). Although many
residents of this region might pay the
waterway little heed today, Wiggins
argues that the Delaware has always
played a significant role in North Amer-
ican history—whether as the cradle of
the U.S. Navy or as “the area’s only
link to the outside world, a vital artery
of transport, trade, and communication”
(5).

The first permanent settlement
was in 1638 in Wilmington by a group
of Swedes. This means, Wiggins ob-
erves, that Wilmington predates Phil-
delphia by half a century and Balti-
more by a full century. He explores,
as one would expect, the interactions
between various European powers and
the contest over what would eventual-
ly become the state of Delaware. The
Delaware coast suffered from depreda-
tions by Spanish and French pirates and
brigands who repeatedly raided coastal
settlements. Brigandage and lawless-
ness aside, the Delaware estuary was,
in the author’s estimation, one of the
three most important maritime systems
in colonial America. Problematically,
however, it was devilishly difficult
to navigate, so people had to develop
navigational aids. In sum, this was a
region marked by the “vagaries of war
and piracy, weather, and the uncertain-
ty of water and wind” but, at the same
time, “by steady forward progress in
improving ships, ship-building skills,
trade, and the safe navigation of sea-
borne vessels” (19). This curious du-
ality reminds scholars that the tendency
to ignore Delaware in favour of other
colonies is a mistake; there are many
reasons to study Delaware history.

As the narrative moves into and
beyond the American Revolution, Wig-
gins pays particular attention to com-
batt, the construction of the navy, and
the role the Delaware estuary played
in both topics. He argues that the “wa-
ters of the Delaware estuary were con-
tested during almost the entirety of the
War of Independence” (21). One of the
strengths of the volume is the author’s
attention to the ships and personalities
that sailed these waters. Once the rev-
olution ended, the new nation faced a
pressing question: did it need a navy?
Despite opposition, it quickly became
apparent that doing without a navy was
a terrible idea which left the U.S. ex-
posed to attack by sea. Thus, the fed-
eral government invested time and money
in a navy that quickly proved its worth.
Indeed, the new navy “turned the cor-
ner for America in freeing itself from
the tribute paid to piracy and then gave
a good account of itself in the face of far
superior forces during the War of 1812
(79). In the years between the War of
1812 and the Civil War, the Delaware
The Delaware estuary contributed to the maintenance and development of this navy.

As most people know, the size of the U.S. Navy ballooned during the American Civil War. The North needed vessels to transport soldiers and supplies, to conduct joint operations with the army, to shell fortified positions on rivers and coasts, to protect U.S. shipping from commerce raiders, and to blockade southern coasts. Not surprisingly, once the rebels surrendered, the federal government reduced the size of the navy and slashed naval appropriations. Nobody, in other words, wanted to pay to maintain a huge navy. The period between the Civil War and the First World War, especially after the Spanish-Cuban-American War, was one of experimentation and evolution in naval design and featured competition among the powers to build the biggest and best-armed vessels. Wiggins devotes a chapter each to the First and Second World Wars. His analysis in both cases covers combat as well as shipbuilding. The number of ships U.S. yards cranked out during these conflicts was staggering. The author contends that the Delaware estuary reached its apogee of strength and became the arsenal of democracy in the period from 1914-1945. The book ends somewhat abruptly after the Second World War, when the infrastructure and many of the shipyards disappeared. Still, as Wiggins notes, “the Delaware estuary remains an important strategic maritime resource” (220).

One of the strengths of this volume is the author’s attention to individual personalities. Many readers will appreciate his detailed capsule biographies of some of the famous residents of the Delaware estuary. That said, he sometimes spends too much time on the individual biographies and the result is that the narrative becomes somewhat choppy. In addition, given his impressive attention to detail, a chapter on the period after the Second World War and a more detailed account of the decline of “America’s anchor” would have strengthened the book. These points aside, this book will appeal to anyone interested in the subject matter.

Evan Rothera
Fort Smith, Arkansas


Painting War: George Plante’s Combat Art in World War II is a rare type of publication about the Second World War. Contrary to what the reader might expect from its title, the book is not a chronological account of the war centered and focused on the actions and activities of the professional artist and illustrator George Plante. Nor is it an analysis of Plante’s art in the context of early-twentieth-century artistic movements intersected with the war. It is also not the biography of the man as an artist and sailor. This book is a thoughtful analysis of Plante’s wartime experience elicited primarily through his frequent letters home to his wife, his memoirs, and the memories and stories told to Williams, Plante’s stepdaughter.

George Plante was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1914. As a young student, Plante developed an early interest in art. He attended art school, first in Edinburgh, where he met his first wife Evelyn, recipient of his wartime letters. He then finished his education in Berlin. While studying in Berlin, he witnessed Hitler’s rise to power. Plante returned to Britain and
began his professional career as a commercial artist and illustrator.

By spring 1940, Plante had not yet been called up to war service. Keen to avoid potential infantry duty, Plante presented himself, but the RAF and Royal Navy both told him to wait for official service orders. A naval official told Plante about the great need for radio operators in the British merchant navy. Plante returned to Edinburgh for training in radiotelegraphy, and upon completion, was assigned to his first vessel, the coastal steamer Amelia, to learn the fundamentals of life at sea in wartime. His next post was the converted whale factory ship oil tanker SS Sourabaya, which sailed the North Atlantic in the dangerous merchant convoys between England and New York.

While at sea, Plante used his free time to sketch and paint life aboard the vessel, the convoy underway, combat action with German U-boat wolfpacks, and sailors rescued by Sourabaya from combat casualties. Plante was then assigned to the SS Southern Princess. The vessel was torpedoed and sunk in 1943; Plante and all but four persons aboard the vessel were rescued.

Plante used his shore leaves in New York to successfully pursue professional contacts in art and advertising; he clearly never suspended his identity as a professional artist during his merchant marine service as a radio operator. He was commissioned to produce paintings of the North Atlantic campaign to promote American support for the war. Plante’s artistic endeavours and commercial skill caught the interest of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), and he was recruited to its Cairo office to produce illustrated propaganda booklets and leaflets, which were distributed throughout southern and eastern Europe. As much of this work was clandestine and/or secret, Plante produced few written personal documents illustrating this period, though he did keep several examples of his work. It was in this capacity that Plante completed his wartime service.

What sets Painting War apart from nearly all histories of the Second World War is the fortuitous combination of archival, historical, memorial, and anecdotal material from which Williams drew to create the narrative description and analysis of Plante’s wartime experience. Instead of relying solely on archival and previously published materials, this work draws from five very different, uniquely important lines of inquiry and evidence: what is known historically; what Plante contemporaneously wrote in his letters; what Plante wrote retrospectively in his memoirs; what Plante illustrated and painted both contemporaneously and retrospectively; and what Plante told Williams directly, from her childhood until his death in 1995. (She states that Plante died before she began this book project). This allows Williams to evaluate consistency, variation, and change present in her sources.

There is a marked difference in the narrative style and material presented between Plante’s merchant marine and clandestine propaganda services. The former is much more personal and introspective, and is presented in a focused, direct perspective. Since Plante could not write contemporaneously about his clandestine service, this section of the book primarily places Plante’s activities in context of the overall PWE operations from a mostly remote, third-person perspective. While this renders the second half of the book somewhat less compelling than the first half, it is highly illustrative of the historical- analytical process, and the type of narrative historians can produce from available material.

In historical analysis of modern
Book Reviews 103

wars, for which there is more source material than could ever be used to produce a cohesive study of an individual theatre, operation, or service, such as the North Atlantic merchant marine convoys or the clandestine propaganda programs of the PWE, it is easy to focus on the programs themselves, the chronological events and activities, and the statistics of their outcomes. When people are introduced into the historical narrative, it is often those in charge, the decision makers who are discussed. It is easy, and perhaps even necessary, to gloss over the lived experiences of the people who carried out the orders and activities. This is especially true for maritime history where we are often presented with the movements, activities, and ultimate disposition of ships as monolithic entities (e.g. ‘the ship sailed from Liverpool to New York’ or ‘the ship fired on the enemy vessel’).

*Painting War* gives us an analysis of an intimate, first-person account of the war and life at sea in the North Atlantic, as well as of the clandestine services, as experienced by a single individual striving to navigate and control his own participation on the international stage. This is why Williams’s study and presentation of Plante’s wartime experience and this volume is so important.

Alicia Caporaso
New Orleans, Louisiana

**BACKLIST by David H. Gray**


Many organizations within the Canadian government undertook to publish their history as part of Canada’s centennial celebrations in 1967 including the Canadian Coast Guard. This many years later, it is worth reviewing Thomas Appleton’s history of the Canadian Coast Guard and its antecedents, from the beginning of European settlement of Canada to 1967. It is also important to revisit what was considered important 50 years ago and what the author and his agency saw as the future.

Thomas Appleton began his career, on deck, as an apprentice in the marine service, eventually becoming a professional engineer. He spent the war years as a Royal Canadian Volunteer Reserve officer (RCVR), in command of minesweepers and escort ships, and later served for six years on the active list of the RCNR. Born in Scotland, he was an avid sailor (later owning a Dragon class sailboat, and being Commodore of the Britannia Yacht Club in Ottawa). In 1960, he joined the Department of Transport as a marine historian and continued a life-long interest in marine history.

Marine history is coloured by the peculiar nature of the shipping industry, conservative thought, an uncompromising sea, and advancements in technology. Appleton’s history begins with John Cabot’s discovery of Newfoundland, its rich fishing grounds, and European’s desire for lots of fish for their diet. The arrival of French settlement in Quebec around the Gulf of St. Lawrence brought the first semblance of management to marine affairs; for example, the lighthouse at Louisburg. The formation
of individual provinces brought in the individual management of fisheries, administration of law and order and the supplying of aids to navigation (lights and buoys). The author describes the complexity of amalgamating all these separate entities after Confederation in the chapters on Confederation and the Years of Growth. The navigability of the channel upstream to Montreal, and the canals to, and through, the Great Lakes were continuing enterprises throughout the reporting period of the book.

The federal government’s Marine Services (administered by various departments over the years) have struggled to have the right ships to fulfill the various duties—lightships, supply ships for aids to navigation (floating or ashore), search and rescue, law enforcement (often fisheries), icebreaking, etc. These ships are much better described than in *The Ships of the Canada’s Marine Services* (2001) by Charles Maginley and Bernard Collins, because Appleton explains why the ships were designed and what technical developments were used in their construction. Indeed, there is a whole chapter dealing with ships and shipbuilding.

Appleton also explains the development of the lighting apparatus in lighthouses and in floating aids better than most of the dozen books which the reviewer has on lighthouses. What is lacking is the acknowledgement of the effort in building the earliest light stations. There is only a single reference to W.P. Anderson, the General Superintendent of Lights (later the first Chief Engineer of the Department). This reviewer considers him Canada’s nearest equivalent of Scotland’s famed lighthouse builder, Robert Stevenson (1772-1850). Appendix 4 lists the light-stations (and light-ships) in service in 1867, with their year of establishment.

There is a chapter on search and rescue which includes the lifesaving stations on Sable Island and other shore-based lifeboats. Would you believe that messenger pigeons were tried? Another chapter recounts the development of marine regulations in steamboat (particularly boiler) inspection, deck loads and shifting of grain and other loose cargoes, freeboard, load-lines, ship-subdivision and fire. The last significant chapter of the book mentions the Civil Service and how obtaining a job was so very different from the more modern Public Service. After Confederation, people were hired for their ability to write with a good hand, spell and write grammatically, and be conversant in arithmetic. Applicants needed a medical certificate and a letter of recommendation—anything from less than a cabinet minister was insufficient. And at the next change of government, one might be out of a job. We have come a long way, baby!

*Usque Ad Mare* not only contains good insights into what was important half a century ago, but it is still relevant today. There are references to what we now call ‘climate change’ and the destruction of the environment. And that is several years before the creation of the Department of the Environment.


It may seem strange to review of a 60-year old book, but its relevance continues in newspaper headlines on a weekly basis. It is a description of the Royal Canadian Navy’s icebreaker, HMCS Labrador’s first season in the Arctic, where it became the first deep-draught ship to transit the Northwest Passage.
The relevance strikes home in the Foreword, written Labrador’s captain: “The rich resources that lie within the Canadian Arctic will remain there until such time as we have need of them. It behoves [sic] us, however, to carry out the research that is necessary to exploit these raw resources now, before we need them. They are in our storeroom and will remain there as long as we protect this storeroom.”

Tom Irvine served during the Second World War in Royal Navy cruisers, destroyers and corvettes, and following the war, he transferred to the Hydrographic Department of the Royal Navy. He immigrated to Canada in 1950, joined the Canadian Hydrographic Service, then enlisted in the RCN as a hydrographer. He was the hydrographer in charge on the Labrador on this momentous trip. He died in Ottawa in October 2008. The title is taken from The Rime of the Ancient Mariner by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834).

The book describes the circumnavigation of North America, from the shipyard at Sorel, Quebec, the frightening trip downriver where no one, including the river pilot, knew the characteristics of handling a deep-draught icebreaker. There were two major equipment failures during the transit that could have wrecked the ship were it not for some excellent ship-handling. The ship went to Halifax to complete her provisioning for the trip and take on about 20 scientific staff. From there, she traveled to Resolute, and then moved a RCMP special constable from Craig Harbour (south side of Devon Island) to Alexandra Fiord (midway up the east side of Ellesmere Island) encountering massive icebergs en route. Back at Resolute, Irvine and his seamen did conducted a harbour survey. They visited Beechey Island, the site of Sir John Franklin’s last known winter anchorage, and then did a search and rescue of a trawler from Boston, MA, which needed ice-breaking assistance to get out of the uncharted Baring Channel (between Russell and Prince of Wales Islands). The ship next met the USS Burton Island and USCG Northwind, both having come from west-coast American bases, and then the three ships sounded parallel lines as they crossed the Beaufort Sea and rounded Point Barrow, Alaska. From there it was all haste to Esquimalt with a very sick crewman. The Labrador completed the circumnavigation at more leisurely pace via the Panama Canal with stops at San Francisco and Granada, Nicaragua.

I remember meeting Tom Irvine on several occasions at Canadian Hydrographic Service and Canadian Hydrographers’ Association functions in Ottawa and recognized that here was someone with a great deal of experience. It is only after reading this book that I realize that I had missed a great opportunity to tap that resource. Irvine’s book is light reading filled with interesting dialogue and a good amount of humour. One of the best is the signal-light message from a passing tramp steamer in the Caribbean: “I’m in the Caribbean; where are you?” I highly recommend the book as a description of Arctic navigation for those who have not had that opportunity.