
Publishing a book that lives up to its secondary title “The Definitive History of Submarine Warfare” may have been a challenge, but with the exception of few perplexing omissions, Iain Ballantyne has achieved his goal. Although reflecting the author’s point of view from his British “literary periscope,” the author provides us with a global appraisal.

He begins with the earliest attempts by ancient Greek divers to design submersible vessels, the problems associated with them and the clever solutions that turned them into weapons. What started with the Revolutionary War’s *Turtle*, progressed through the Confederate Navy’s *Hunley* (which sank the USS *Housatonic*) and finally, led to John Philip Holland and Simon Lake and what turned into an extremely lethal weapon of the First World War. There were many imaginative variations along the way, but the resulting submarines employed by the Allies and Central Powers are the products of both scientific and mechanical evolution.

Waging war using and defending against a submarine force was difficult. Churchill stated the German “U-boat war is hard widespread and bitter, a war of grouping and drowning, a war of ambush and stratagem, a war of science and seamanship.” (260) Plans to combat these U-boats were variations on a theme—“to take aggressive, coordinated action and deny enemy submarines their advantages of surface speed (over slower escorts and merchant vessels) and cover of darkness. They would have to dive into an environment where they were slow and sonar could search them out.” (359) This resulted in a wartime disease the author calls “periscopeitis”, or paranoia producing false sightings of the enemy submersibles. This also produced two deception ploys, surface vessels in dazzle camouflage paint and Q-ships.

Ballantyne skillfully narrates intriguing stories about submarine commanders, sailors and their boats during their quasi-piratical wartime encounters; each is a fast-moving gem of a tale. He mentions officers on both sides of the conflict, including Captains Otto Weddigen, Georg von Trapp (later of *Sound of Music* fame), Fritz-Julius Lemp, Hans Rose, Max Horton, Admirals Karl Dönitz, John Jellicoe, Jackie Fisher, and US Admiral William Sims. There is also the trio of submarine aces, Otto Kretschmer, Günther Prien and...
Joachim Schepke, who compiled remarkable records before their demise (almost all at the same time, but at different places). The author introduces the reader to so many colourful submariners that it is difficult to decide whom to mention in a review.

Ballantyne graphically recounts the ferocious battles off the English Channel, Irish Coast, Scapa Flow, Baltic Mediterranean, Heligoland, Dardanelles, and particularly Jutland, and the frightening stories of large protected convoys overcoming submarines waiting to pounce on them. The Second World War submarine adventures are even more fascinating because they also involved the Australian, Japanese, Italian and Russian fleets and a wide variety of special-purpose submarines—miniatures to infiltrate fortified harbours to lay mines, and still others to land troops or carry critical supplies in secret. There are stories of convoys being attacked by wolf packs in which one U-boat finds a convoy and sends messages to perhaps a dozen more subs to join in an all-out attack. In time, clever listening devices, enigma code interception and depth charges were invented to counter them. The author vividly conveys the cruelty of a senseless war upon the innocent through the horrendous loss of civilian life when a U-boat under the command of Kapitänleutenant Walter Schweiger sunk the SS \textit{Lusitania} and Oberleutenant Lemp sunk the SS \textit{Athenia}.

A forgotten episode from the Second World War about midget sub captain Kazuo Sakamake portrays the human side of submarine warfare. On 8 December 1941 Sakamake ran his vessel aground on a coral reef while on his mission to attack Pearl Harbor. Washed up on Waimanlo Beach, the Japanese naval commander was captured before he was able to atone for his ineptitude. Dressed only in a loin cloth, he identified himself to patrolling American soldiers as a Japanese naval officer and requested to be allowed to kill himself in an honourable way. Instead, he became Japanese POW #1 of the war. Another example is American Admiral Charles Nimitz who came to the defense of his nemesis, Admiral Karl Dönitz, during the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. He stated that the German admiral’s conduct of war was similar to that of the American Navy in the Pacific, including not rescuing survivors of torpedoed enemy vessels and thereby saved the Nazi Admiral from being hanged.

The author chronicles other events; perhaps the most frightening being several that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. His accounts make the reader realize how luck played a huge role in preventing a nuclear war. A further series of detailed and enthralling events occurred during the Falklands War, especially the sinking of the \textit{Belgrano} by the \textit{Conqueror}.

Accompanying these human stories is the development of more weaponry; sophisticated deck guns, torpedoes, decoys, detection devices and their countermeasures, including submarine nets, acoustical and magnetic mines and, most important, depth charges or bomb carrying aircraft. All of these are framed within war-room strategies and ever-changing tactics, topics that could accommodate a book on its own.

As it evolved, the submarine went from a vessel barely worthy of protecting harbours from intruders into the tip of the spear in most naval commands’ arsenals; from miniature one- or two-man subs to the largest commissioned sub in the world, Russia’s \textit{Dmitriy Donskoy} (26,000 tons when dived). These weapons are extremely costly, theoretically intended never to be used, but necessarily designed to operate 365 days a
year to deter existential threats — the spectre of nuclear annihilation. It is estimated that there are roughly 16,000 nuclear weapons, enough to destroy the world many times over. Many, if not most, are submarine-based and could be launched by error or in anger. In theory, however, the ballistic missile submarine is a weapon of peace. It exists to persuade a potential aggressor that there is no point in using their weapons of mass destruction since there can be no winners in such a conflict. The danger is that not all political leaders may understand this.

The Deadly Deep is a triumph of a historical survey work but there are several puzzling flaws in Ballantyne’s excellent work. Although he briefly mentions the SSN Nautilus, it is puzzling that he omits the sometimes irascible but brilliant father of the nuclear navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover. A reference to the former submarine officer, past President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, would have been appropriate. There is also no mention of the loss of the USS Thresher and the subsequent location of the underwater graves of Thresher and USS Scorpion by Robert Ballard as part of his mission to locate the resting place of RMS Titanic.

In spite of these, and perhaps a few other omissions, Ballantyne’s writing is gripping and the multiple stories flow in a compelling sequence. This important, just over 700-page book is written in fast flowing prose informing the reader about how the submarine was conceived, later developed and how it has advanced. Ballantyne speculates about where it likely is going — with a sobering warning. I highly recommend this superb, engrossing book for all maritime and naval historians.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


The American Civil War ushered in a new era of naval conflict wherein armour, steam, screw propulsion, and shell guns eclipsed wood, wind, and carronades. This dramatic shift was starkly highlighted on 8 March 1862, when the ironclad ram, CSS Virginia, steamed into Hampton Roads and destroyed the USS Cumberland and Congress. Only the arrival of the USS Monitor that night evened the odds. After the following day’s epic contest between these newfangled warships the import was clear—the future belonged to iron and steam.

As the Virginia’s early foray demonstrates, the Confederacy aggressively pursued this challenging technology, despite disadvantages in every category that mattered—manpower, industrial facilities, and resources. Nonetheless, its ironclad construction program launched numerous formidable vessels during the course of the war, including the CSS Albemarle, Arkansas, Tennessee, and of course the Virginia, which subsequently earned their places in history. Theirs is an oft-told saga, evidenced by such now-classic titles as History of the Confederate States Navy from its Organization to the Surrender of its Last Vessel (1894) by J. Thomas Scharf, Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads (1971) by William N. Still Jr., and individual vessel biographies like Ironclad Down: The USS Merrimack - CSS Virginia from Construction to Destruction (2007) by
Carl D. Park. Despite this impressive scholarly attention, the ironclads’ most critical component, their power plants, has been little explored or understood.

Enter Saxon T. Bisbee, vessel manager and nautical archaeologist at Northwest Seaport Maritime Heritage Center in Seattle, Washington, whose new book *Engines of Rebellion: Confederate Ironclads and Steam Engineering in the American Civil War* admirably corrects the imbalance. The volume is part of the *Maritime Currents History and Archaeology Series*, inaugurated by the University Press of Florida, carried forward by the Naval Institute Press, and now under the aegis of the University of Alabama Press. Bisbee concentrates on the 27 Confederate ironclads that saw service or were on the verge of commissioning when the war ended, all of which had American-built machinery. He groups them into five different classes by hull type: conversions (like the *Virginia*), early nonstandard types (among these the *Arkansas*), standard hull designs (for example, the *Richmond, Tennessee, and Georgia*), diamond-hull designs (*Albemarle, Missouri, Tuscaloosa*), and late-war types (*Milledgeville, Wilmington*). The trend was toward steady improvement in cost, design, and battle worthiness, so much so, that by war’s end, the Confederate Navy had progressed very far indeed beyond its primitive beginnings.

Bisbee briefly outlines each vessel’s career before turning to what is known about its engines and performance. The Confederates variously used three types of steam engine to power their ironclads—horizontal, vertical inverted, and inclined (usually borrowed from riverboats). Bisbee explains how these engines worked, along with their boilers and auxiliary equipment like fan blowers, bilge pumps, and firefighting apparatus, in fairly detailed prose. Happily, he provides a glossary, essential to fathoming how cylinders, crossheads, pillow blocks, stuffing boxes, and wrist pins, among a hundred other things, contributed. Unfortunately, the many technical illustrations, including rare engineering diagrams, are too small on the page, rendering them practically useless.

While specialists will appreciate the engineering emphasis, general readers will cheer Bisbee’s human touch. He expertly limns the personalities in Confederate ironclad design and production, and graphically portrays the ghastly realities of nineteenth-century engine rooms underway. Three men were critical to the ironclad program. They included Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, a gifted administrator who understood that “inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability” (6); chief naval constructor John Luke Porter, “almost singlehandedly responsible for the design of virtually every type of Confederate ironclad” (44); and John Mercer Brooke, a bonafide scientific genius who was head of Ordnance and Hydrography. Far below them were the common sailors who made these engines go and fixed breakdowns or damage. Of these, none was more vital than a “special type of seaman, the naval engineer.” (25) Bisbee explains how these distinctive characters came on duty smartly attired and well-groomed, only to stumble away hours later greasy, gritty, sweaty, and exhausted. The rest of the engine room crew, typically about 20 men in total, had to endure the same or worse. Assistant engineers, firemen, and coal heavers nonetheless, proved themselves capable and brave. Bisbee includes gripping first-hand accounts that portray just what skill that took. Of the *Virginia* during her duel with the *Monitor*, one Confederate webfoot
declared, “The scene in the engine and boiler room … beggared all description. Dante’s Pandemonium alone approaches the weird and fiery sight here presented.” (50)

Among this book’s most intriguing revelations are the fates of these ironclads. A surprising number of them still lie where they were sunk (usually by the Confederates themselves to prevent capture) and have been identified by maritime archaeologists. Thus, the potential to learn more about these vessels and their power plants is very good. Until such endeavours bear fruit, the best single source for what made these iron monsters move will be Saxon T. Bisbee’s well-researched book.

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama


The US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, has conducted a naval history symposium on a regular basis since 1971, publishing more than a dozen volumes of which this is the latest. The objective of the symposium, as articulated by John B. Hattendorf in his introduction, is the presentation of “… scholarly and professional … ideas and interpretations in the field of naval history.” The symposium seeks a global coverage of this broad topic and goes well beyond the more parochial focus on the American experience that one might suppose for an event sponsored by the US Naval Academy. Indeed, Hattendorf notes that the symposium has evolved into the world’s largest routine meeting of historians who have specialised in naval and maritime history.

This volume, in common with its predecessors, has published a small selection of the papers presented within a wide range of topics. This volume comprises 22 papers out of an unspecified multiple of that figure (212 participants are noted on panels over the seven sessions during the two days of the symposium). Importantly, the fundamental requirement is that the papers deliver a new slant on a well-known subject, or introduce an entirely new topic to the naval historical community. It is, therefore, a very useful bellwether of where the academic frontiers are moving in the broadest of senses.

The papers are certainly diverse. They range from Jorit Wintjes’ paper on the navy of the late Roman Empire, to Richard Ruth’s interesting exploration of the Royal Navy’s education and training of a Siamese prince in the late nineteenth century, to Nathan Packard’s discussion on the US Marine Corps personnel difficulties in the aftermath of the defeat in Vietnam. Other papers examine the role of the young USN in the triumph at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 (by Gene Smith), a role that has normally been entirely overlooked, and on developments in international law at sea regarding private property in the decade prior to the Great War, noting the differences in view between Great Britain and the US (by Alan Anderson). One paper addresses Captain Vancouver’s survey of the Salish Sea as a ‘contact’ history with the indigenous population and thus, represents Canadian content (by Madeleine Peckham, MA University of Saskatchewan).

It can be safely concluded that the symposium accomplished its aim and
that there is certainly something for virtually anyone who describes themselves as a naval historian, no matter the period. Admittedly the papers are rather thin on ancient history, nor is there any on the medieval period, as well as none on the broader European, African, and Latin American portions of the globe. There are limits, however, to what might be included in a volume such as this. Inevitably, the focus is American, with the majority of papers covering subjects of direct interest to the American naval historical community (15 out of 22). These papers include the normal academic apparatus in terms of notes, albeit without separate bibliographies. There is no index and there are no illustrations. Neither is to be expected in a volume of this nature.

This collection of papers is well worth dipping into and will have useful material for those with specific interest in topics presented. The only negative is that the production of this volume has been anything but spritely, given the fact that the symposium was conducted in 2013 and only published in 2018. Presumably there are similar volumes in preparation for symposia conducted in 2015 and 2017. The value of determining up to date research interests is slightly undermined accordingly. That minor caveat aside, I can recommend this production for those with an academic focus in their interests.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan

Sometimes there are books you wonder if you should accept the invitation to review, and sometimes it seems obvious, as the title promises a book that is a perfect fit for your own research area and expertise. Magnetic North—Sea Voyage to Svalbard easily fell into the latter category, dealing as it does with the Svalbard archipelago and expedition tourism in this fascinating part of the Arctic. Once the book finally arrived, however, I thought I might have made a mistake. Why? Certainly not because the book deserves a negative review or criticism, but simply because it is not an historical analysis or critical take on tourism in the Svalbard region, but rather the product of a poetic or creative writing approach. Facing the option of either returning the book or reviewing a work of literature, I decided to proceed, with an up-front apology for being an historian reviewing a work of fiction, poetry and impressive creativity.

The number of expedition cruise ships going to Svalbard, the remote group of islands in the middle between the northern tip of Norway and the North Pole, has increased steadily over the last few decades, with the islands now being one of the “hot-spots” of international Arctic tourism. To distinguish themselves from each other due to increasing competition, individual tour operators often take aboard highly qualified, academically trained lecturers and experts, as well as writers and/or artists-in-residence, a practice that has become kind of a standard within the industry. Jenna Butler has been a writer-in-residence onboard a small sailing expedition cruise ship and Magnetic North is the ultimate result of this residency.

Dividing the book into more than 60 small sections, she chronicles the trip around the islands and provides the reader with a highly personal reflection
on the places visited and the natural features encountered during the trip. Anybody looking for a straightforward guide book or a traditional history of the region will not find it here. But if you are looking for an alternate view of the grandeur of Arctic nature, the paradox of Russian mining settlements in an area under Norwegian sovereignty, the critically endangered nature of the islands, how people respond to the extreme environment and living conditions in the Arctic, and a deep personal reflection on traveling to this part of the globe, this book will by no means disappoint.

Butler’s powerful language, often combined with a female and/or feminist perspective on an area that has often been understood as a male-only world helps the reader understand that these islands and their history do not only exist out of the heroic (male) stories that tend to dominate most of the literature on Svalbard, but that there are other aspects too, dimensions that will help to really understand Svalbard with all its complexities.

For someone simply looking for a short read on Svalbard’s history, this is not the book, although Butler never claims to be writing such a history. I would, however, definitely recommend Magnetic North to readers aware of this history or having been to Svalbard, and interested in a different take on the islands. Many people familiar with the high latitudes claim that they have a kind of magnetic quality. Once exposed to them, you will be drawn again and again to the ‘magnetic’ North or you will be repelled. Maybe it is the same with Jenna Butler’s story: you will be either be drawn to the short book again and again, discovering new ideas and thoughts each time you open it. You will enjoy reflecting on your own perspectives and experiences like the ever changing reflection of a glacier front on the water or you will put it away after the first couple of pages—having been repelled by its magnetic force.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


This work is an examination of ironclads constructed and commissioned during the short existence of the Confederate States of America. Given the Confederacy’s notorious lack of funding, resources, and manpower, the completion and commissioning of 25 armoured warships was a feat in and of itself. Most vessels were completed individually or in pairs, so each had its own unique story from, as the saying goes, “cradle to grave.” Utilizing surviving Confederate records, firsthand accounts from Confederate and Union servicemen, and other sources, author Campbell examines ship service lives in 14 independent chapters, tracing the vessels from the circumstances that led to their proposal through construction, deployment, and combative action, and their ultimate destruction. The chapters adhere to a chronological pattern, as each section covers successive major ironclad projects undertaken by the Confederates as the war progressed. The brief conclusion to the work comes in the form of a page and a half entitled “Some Final Thoughts,” and is followed by an appendix of surviving crew lists for six of the vessels, the endnotes, bibliography, and index.
Each chapter operates as a largely self-contained narrative, following the design, construction, launch and combat (if applicable), and destruction of individual ironclads. It is noted in the introduction that Chapters Eight and Nine are actually from Campbell’s earlier 1997 work Southern Fire: Exploits of the Confederate States Navy (1). These chapters are arranged in chronological order, and Chapters Two, Four, Six, and Nine are sub-divided into two parts for unknown reasons. Chapter Thirteen is an anomaly, as it consists of five images and six paragraphs which are “an extract from the Chattahoochee Heritage Project” written by Elizabeth Hance and Sarah Voreis (221). The original version of this section is an 11-paragraph blog post from April 2013 found on the organization’s website. On average, 15 pages are devoted to the discussion of each ship, with four (CSS Virginia, Arkansas, Albemarle, and Tennessee) being significantly longer and three (CSS Manassas, Missouri, and Jackson) being less than 10 pages. Following the text and concluding remarks is the aforementioned appendix, which has rosters for the Virginia, Arkansas, Albemarle, Neuse, North Carolina, and Raleigh. These crew lists include name, rank, branch of service, and the known birth states of officers assigned to the first four vessels. Campbell favours a narrative style, aiming to make the text engaging rather than just a reiteration of facts. Interesting anecdotes, such as Peter Smith’s invention of the extremely effective twist drill to speed up the cutting of rivet holes in the armour of the Albemarle, are interspersed with the chronology to help expand and humanize the story (102). Campbell’s tone occasionally slips into anti-Union territory, such as when discussing the 1863 attempt to break the blockade of Charleston by the Chicora and Palmetto State, but by and large, he presents a relatively even-keeled examination of his subject matter.

In terms of possible improvements, there are several that come to mind. Many images throughout the work appear to be of surprisingly low quality and resolution, being blurry or pixelated in nature (ex. 51, 89, 127, 203). This is often made more apparent when they are displayed on the same page as a crisp, high resolution image, and detracts from their effectiveness. Many of the images are available at higher resolution from the sources mentioned. Some image citations might also be misattributed, most notably the map on page 170, which is attributed to the “Naval Historical Center,” but is quite clearly marked as belonging to the Civil War Preservation Trust, and should be cited as such as per the organizations rules regarding the reproduction of their maps. An expansion on the CSS Jackson information would also be appreciated, to better match the coverage and first-hand accounts associated with the other vessels. Finally, with so many different designs produced by so many naval architects, including some designers not trained in ship design, the inclusion of a scaled silhouette comparison would be useful to help visualize the changing sizes and styles of ironclads as the war progressed.

Confederate Ironclads at War is a useful primer for those interested in the Confederacy’s brief foray into modern warship construction. Campbell makes excellent use of transcribed accounts for both ship construction and combat engagements, providing both “worm’s eye” view and overall logistical histories for each vessel, except CSS Jackson. There are improvements that can be made for future editions, but for those interested in specific Confederate warships or the armoured elements of
the CSN as a whole, this work serves as an excellent starting point.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


This is one of the most tragic stories of the sea: the wreck of the brigantine Queen on an island off the coast of Newfoundland in December 1867, as winter was closing in. Fishermen in coastal villages had already laid up their small boats, so it would be the following spring before anyone knew that a vessel had been wrecked on the far side of uninhabited Gull Island, just a few miles east of Cape St. John, the promontory that marks the western side of Notre Dame Bay. Gary Collins is a well-known Newfoundland author with at least ten books to his credit. He seems to be drawn to tales of disaster; stories of true events, like this one, in which he is remarkably able to draw the reader into the realisation of what it was like at the time and the place he describes.

On 24 September 1867, the brigantine Queen, owned and registered in Swansea, South Wales, and commanded by Captain John Owens, set out on a voyage across the Atlantic. She carried a small amount of cargo consigned to merchants in St. John’s, Newfoundland, but her real purpose was to load copper ore at a new mine at Tilt Cove on the northeast coast of the island. Swansea was known for its copper refineries and in the 1840s and 50s a fleet of strongly-built sailing ships traded regularly around Cape Horn to the copper exporting ports of Peru. They were known as the “Swansea copper-ore men” and were never mentioned without the comment that “the ships were made of wood but the men were made of iron!” The Queen, however, was not one of those. In the mid-nineteenth century, literally thousands of small wooden sailing ships—schooners, brigantines and brigs—were engaged in coastal trades on both sides of the Atlantic. Remarkably, many, including the Queen, were able to make a living from their world-wide ventures and routes. Collins doesn’t give her statistics but she would typically be about 100 feet long with a beam of 25 feet, measuring about 130 tons gross and could probably load nearly 200 tons of cargo. She seems to have been somewhat undermanned with a crew of eight: master, mate, ‘bosun’, four seamen and a cook.

The Queen had a long and difficult crossing to St. John’s, arriving 24 November. Here the crew discharged their cargo, loaded more for Tilt Cove and took on a coastal pilot and six passengers. Among the latter were two women and a doctor who were moving to the new mining community. The bare facts of what happened to the ship, its crew and passengers were recorded in the Captain’s log and in letters written by Dr. Dowsley, who continued to write on the island after the wreck, even as his health failed. But Collins’ book is a fictionalised account of real events. With only the names and ages of the crew and passengers to work with, the author has created or deduced realistic personalities and believable accounts of their interaction. His description of what it was like to be on a small vessel in dangerous weather with the crew fighting to save the ship puts the reader right in the scene: Gary Collins is good at this. The introduction, which describes his
first visit to the island, invites you to follow the tale.

With fifteen souls on board, the *Queen* left St. John's on 5 December, expecting at most a two-day coastal trip to Tilt Cove, but contrary gale force winds drove them out to sea. Eventually, on 12 December and nearly at their destination, yet another storm drove the *Queen* into a cleft in the rocks on the eastern side of Gull Island. Amazingly, all aboard got to shore, at probably the only spot where this was possible. Four men returned to the ship to salvage food, but the wreck was taken off the rocks by the sea and they perished. The fate of the others was more prolonged. With no food of any kind on the barren island, they slowly starved to death. When the bodies were found in the spring of the following year it was plain that before all had died there had been cannibalism, perhaps murder. It is a tale of tragedy and horror.

While Collins is very good at describing scenes at sea, he makes mistakes in nautical terminology of the type that causes reviewers for this journal to grind their teeth. For these I blame the publisher rather than the author. Surely a Newfoundland publisher like Flanker Press has editors that know the language of the sea? Are not Newfoundlanders born with nautical lore in their DNA, or at least imbued with it at their parent's knee? I will not enumerate these errors here. Enough to say that *Desperation* is a graphically told story of a grim and tragic event that reminds us of the perils our seafaring ancestors endured.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


On 9 February 1799, the United States Navy recorded its first victory over an enemy vessel when the USS *Constellation* defeated the 40-gun French frigate *Insurgente*. After the French vessel struck her colours, the *Constellation*’s captain, Thomas Truxtun, took possession of the vessel and sailed it to the American naval depot at St. Kitts. Once there, Truxtun replaced his U.S.-made 24-pounder cannons with the 18-pounder guns from his prize, reflecting his opinion that his victory came despite his guns, rather than because of them.

Truxtun’s dramatic action was a testament to the poor quality of American cannon manufacturing in the first years of the new country. Standardization was nonexistent, and many guns exploded when they were tested after delivery. What was needed was a means of manufacturing reliable cannon and shot to arm the warships the under construction. The person who made this possible was Henry Foxall, an English-born ironmonger and recent immigrant, who brought with him the latest iron manufacturing techniques. Building a boring mill at his Eagle Works foundry, Foxall sold the United States the dependable cannons their military needed, in the process becoming one of the country’s first defense contractors.

As Jane Donovan demonstrates in her lucid biography, Foxall’s role was a product of a series of setbacks born of financial turmoil and religious persecution. The son of a furnace man, Foxall followed his father into what was then the rapidly developing field of ironworking. Foxall’s first employer, Henry Cort, was a leading iron manu-
facturer who patented new processes for producing iron of better quality than was previously possible. Cort’s poor choice of business partners forced him into bankruptcy and Foxall emigrated to Ireland with his family, where they faced harassment from both Protestants and Catholics because of their Methodist faith. His role as superintendent of Aringa Iron Works made him a particularly visible target for United Irishmen desperate for weapons, leading Foxall to uproot his wife and children yet again, this time for the New World. Within weeks of his arrival in Philadelphia he became an employee of the preeminent businessman and Revolutionary War leader, Robert Morris, who was then establishing a foundry in Springetsbury, Pennsylvania. Though Morris himself was soon imprisoned for debt, this time Foxall benefited from his employer’s bankruptcy by taking over the business, which became the Eagle Works.

While Foxall’s knowledge of cutting-edge iron forging techniques established his firm as the foremost iron producer in the United States, it was the perilous international situation which made his fortune as a defense contractor. European wars continually threatened to involve the United States, and the need for weapons with which to arm the military provided Foxall with a steady stream of orders. So important was their business for Foxall, that he moved to Washington D.C. when the government relocated the capital there in 1800. Here he built a new operation, the Columbia Foundry, that supplied the military with a variety of iron products. By the War of 1812, Foxall was the sole supplier of cannon and shot to the United States Navy, and he prospered to such an extent that when the war ended, he sold his foundries to focus on his religious and civic activities and his other business concerns.

Donovan’s biography of Foxall reflects an impressive amount of research into both her subject’s life and the context of his times. She does an excellent job of reconstructing his business activities and exhibits an understanding of his faith and his role within the Methodist Church that reflects her background as a scholar of religious history. Yet readers interested naval history will find little in its pages to interest them, as her coverage of naval issues is tangential to the main focus of her book. Much of the relevant context she provides in her coverage of Foxall’s work with the military she draws from other works already familiar to the students of the period, with little new research addressing the technical aspects of cannon manufacturing or the details of federal contracting in the Jefferson administration. Because of this, while Donovan’s biography of Foxall is a fine work that will be read with interest by students of the history of Methodism or of business in the early republic, those in the naval history of the era will find their time better spent with other books.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona


An ace pilot is a term coined in the First World War meaning a pilot who shoots down five or more enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat. Unsurprisingly, the Second World War spawned the greatest number of ace pilots from many countries—both Allied and Axis. The United States Navy’s (USN) Aviation
Branch saw a great many pilots become aces, almost all against the Japanese in the Pacific theatre of war. One of those was Stanley (“Swede”) Vejtasa—who achieved immortality by scoring seven (7) aerial victories in one day during the Battle of Santa Cruz in 1942. Seven at Santa Cruz. The Life of Fighter Ace Stanley “Swede” Vejtasa is a biography of this ace, whose naval career spanned more than 30 years and saw the transition from biplanes to metal monoplanes to jet aircraft.

Stanley Vejtasa (pronounced VAY-tuh-suh) was born on 27 July 1914 in Paris, Montana. During the 1930s, barnstormers—pilots who flew exhibitions—came to Montana and Vejtasa saw them. Like so many others, he was fascinated by the still-novel concept of aviation and wanted to fly. He managed to go to college and at the University of Montana, he took the step that made his future. He heard about a recent graduate of the University of Montana, Hubert Zemke, who became a U.S. Army Air Force ace in the Second World War and had been accepted for U.S. Army Air Force pilot training. Shortly thereafter, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator visited the University of Montana and was available to meet with anyone who had an interest in naval aviation. Vejtasa met with him and subsequently applied for entrance into the Naval Aviation program, passed the necessary exams, and was accepted. He did flight training at Seattle, Washington, and Pensacola, Florida. At Pensacola, he flew F4B-4 biplanes—totally outmoded aircraft, but as he recalled, fun to fly.

By late 1939, Vejtasa was flying SBC-3 biplane dive bombers, again outmoded, but good for training. In 1941, he was assigned to a squadron on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Yorktown. At that time, America was in a twilight zone: while officially neutral in the European war, the USN and U.S. Coast Guard were conducting neutrality patrols in the Atlantic, frequently encountering German U-boats and indulging in combat. All ambiguity was resolved in December, 1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent American declarations of war against Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy.

It was in the Pacific theatre of war that the USN and Vejtasa saw the most combat. In a space of a few days, Vejtasa made his mark on history. During the Battle of the Coral Sea, on 7-8 May 1942, Vejtasa was flying SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers. His dive bombing skills were deadly accurate and his air-to-air gunnery was little short of incredible. In two days, flying SBD’s that were much slower than the Imperial Japanese Navy’s famous A6M Zero fighter, Vejtasa damaged one Zero and shot down three others. For his efforts, he was awarded the Navy Cross—the only USN pilot to be awarded same for his dive bombing and air-to-air combat skills.

Vejtasa’s most famous action came five months later, at the Battle of Santa Cruz. In that famous naval battle (see TNM/LMN XXII No. 4, October, 2013, for a review of Osprey’s Santa Cruz 1942, which book tells the story of that battle), the USN lost an aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Hornet. That left the USN with only one serviceable aircraft carrier—the U.S.S. Enterprise. On 26 October 1942, Vejtasa was flying F4F-4 fighter airplanes as a member of Squadron VF-10 on the Enterprise. On that day, Vejtasa shot down seven Japanese bombers that were attacking the Enterprise, most likely saving that carrier from destruction. While Vejtasa flew other missions after that and scored a partial air victory, his Second World War combat days were over. The Amer-
ican philosophy regarding experienced pilots, especially ace pilots was simple: after a combat tour, send the pilots home to the United States to be flight instructors. That philosophy enabled experienced pilots to teach new pilots the necessary skills to survive combat.

Vejtasa stayed in the USN after the war. He served in many roles, among them, working with test pilots, combat missions in the Korean War, commander of ship, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Constellation*, and helped start the USN’s famous “Top Gun” program at Naval Air Station in Miramar, California. The last naval aircraft he flew was the famous F-4B Phantom. He retired from the USN on 1 July 1970—having flown naval aircraft from biplanes to the most advanced jet aircraft of its time. The great pilot returned to his home state of Montana, and helped manage a ranch for another 21 years. He passed away on 23 January 2013, at the great age of 98.

This book is a tribute to a superb pilot who exemplified “The Greatest Generation.” It is based on interviews with Vejtasa, Vejtasa’s unpublished autobiographical essay, interviews with friends and contemporaries, U.S. Government archives, and many fine secondary sources. Edwards writes well and his accounts of the Battle of Santa Cruz make clear just HOW dangerous that battle was. The narrative never flags and the reader is left with an appreciation of the heroism of not just Vejtasa, but also the heroism of his shipmates at all levels. It is recommended for all interested in naval aviation, the Second World War, and aviation in general.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Bottom line, up front. Not a book for all tastes—historians will consider it ‘Pulp History’ while general readers of military history will have various opinions ranging from quite good to extremely average. For me, it was an interesting story of about 50 pages—padded out to 184. Read on.

Quentin Falk is a show business journalist who has written a number of biographies including those of Albert Finney, Anthony Hopkins and Alfred Hitchcock, to name a few. Having not read any of them, I cannot compare *Mr Midshipman VC* to his normal style. The book details the short life George Drewry (1894-1918) who, as a midshipman, won a Victoria Cross (VC) at Cape Helles during the landing of troops from the River Clyde on 25 April 1915. The title of the book stems from Drewry’s ability to survive near disasters during his short life—only to be accidently killed at age 25 when serving in command of the anti-submarine trawler *William Jackson*.

The book opens with a brief description of the landing at V Beach (Cape Helles) during which George Drewry performed the actions which earned him the VC. Falk then goes back in time to describe Drewry’s family situation and how he first went to sea as a 14-year-old apprentice in 1909. During his early sea service, he survived a fall from the rigging of the *Indian Empire* and was pulled from the water suffering only a few bruises and shock. Eventually, he qualified as a fourth officer in famous P&O line.
At the outbreak of war, Drewry was at Port Said serving in the P&O steamer *Isis* and was called up for duty as a Probationary Midshipman in the RN Reserve; being appointed to the torpedo gunboat HMS *Hussar*. In March 1915 Commander Edward Unwin took command of *Hussar* and when he was given command of *River Clyde* in April, Unwin took George Drewry with him as an officer of the watch.

The landing at V Beach proved to be abject slaughter, with reputedly the water being stained red for some distance by the blood of those killed. Under Unwin’s insistence, *River Clyde* had been modified to become a landing ship with exit doorways cut in her sides and narrow gangways supported on each side. Three lighters were also to be used to ‘fill the gap’ between the beach and where *River Clyde*’s bow hit after she had been run aground. The landing was delayed for various reasons and eventually took place in daylight; everything that could go wrong—did go wrong!

Unwin also won a VC for his actions that day, along with four other members of *River Clyde* ship’s company (one VC awarded posthumously). In my opinion, much of the blame for the high number of casualties among the landing force rests with Unwin. The pictures, used on the cover of book showing soldiers walking calmly down the narrow gangways, while shells burst lackadaisically nearby, hide the reality of using an untried landing capability, in daylight, against a well-entrenched and capable enemy. No wonder the United States Marine Corps studied the Gallipoli landing in depth between the wars to try and avoid its failures in the future.

Drewry suffered a head wound in the action but recovered in time to take part in the landings at Suvla Bay in August 1915, and his service there is described through several letters sent to his father. Drewry was given command of a motor landing craft known locally as ‘black beetles’ due to their shape and colour, or ‘K’ lighters; forerunners of the Second World War landing craft. He was again working for Commander Unwin, who had been appointed Beach Master at Suvla Bay. The landings at Suvla were a success, however, the penetration inland was not undertaken with enough urgency. The Turkish defenders soon exploited this failure and the advance ground to halt; as had the landings at ANZAC Cove and Cape Helles. The remainder of the book deals with Drewry’s less-than-exciting service in a battleship based at Scapa Flow in 1916-18 and his brief command of the trawler *William Jackson* before his untimely accidental death only a few months before the Armistice.

Falk has undertaken a significant amount of research, including contacting George’s descendants, but rather than judiciously using this information, he has attempted to inject all of it into the book, which makes it disjointed at times. Large sections of the book go into excessive detail or rambling anecdotes—hence my initial comment about a 50-page book padded out to 184. The fixation of starting and ending each chapter with a quote becomes quite annoying, as does the use of quotes from war fiction books which really add nothing to the story. Some of this could have been avoided by using chapter end notes rather than clogging the chapters with excessive detail. The several illustrations are effective and support the text.

It’s a quick read (three to four hours with a few cups of coffee in between) and I learned a few things about the Gallipoli campaign that I was unaware of; but it’s not a book I would read a second time.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia

Britain launched a major expedition against Denmark twice during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, in 1801 and 1807. They were the victors in both engagements, the Danes seemingly doomed to defeat from the outset. In the English-speaking world, the story has been told largely from the British perspective. Gareth Glover sets out to bring the Danish and British perspectives together, to explore the engagements more fully. He suggests that they were linked events, the British army’s siege, in 1807, ultimately completing the work begun in the naval assault of 1801.

The first Battle of Copenhagen, in 1801, was a naval engagement, with British forces under Horatio Nelson’s immediate direction. The story is fairly well known. The League of Armed Neutrality between Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, siding with the French to keep British ships out of the Baltic, drew the British government’s concern. Diplomatic efforts, which were pretty much doomed from the beginning, failed due to French troops on the Danish border ready to enforce the alliance. The British government sent Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, with Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson as his second-in-command, with a fleet of 19 ships-of-the-line, six frigates and 28 smaller vessels to Copenhagen, to beat the Danes into submission. Just under 1,000 soldiers and their officers were sent along in the ships-of-war. After silencing the Danes at Copenhagen, the British would then strike at the Russian fleet at Reval (now Tallinn, Estonia), before it could sail into the Baltic in the spring.

Glover describes Danish preparations for the defence of Copenhagen in great detail. Though victory was not expected, the idea of a stiff defence to inflict as much damage as possible on the British invader was clearly the goal. A fleet of mostly old and cut down ships-of-war, cavalry transports, an East Indiaman, and four gun platforms were arranged in a tight line along the Inner Channel, in front of the city. These were supported by 11 gunboats and numerous shore batteries. The island on which the 68-gun Trekroner Fort sat, protected the inner harbour and naval yard. The remaining Danish navy were held in reserve behind the fort or inside the dockyard. Additional men, raised from among sailors and civilians, formed a reserve held ashore, to replenish the various fighting platforms, as needed.

There is little new in the narrative of the overall unfolding of events. Personal narratives by the Danes who fought, however, provide a refreshing perspective, and are used to good effect in describing the Danish side of the battle. It was a bloody affair, brought to an end by Nelson’s letter to the Crown Prince, threatening to burn the captured Danish ships and gun platforms, without removing the wounded, if the Prince did not agree to a ceasefire. Glover addresses the controversy around this event, as to whether it was meant as a way to avoid further loss to an already badly mauled British squadron, or as an act of humanity, to stop further useless bloodshed. The author espouses the former, since the Danish defence had inflicted significant damage on the British, and Nelson knew continued battle would prevent the interdiction of the Russian and Swedish fleets, and thus, failure of the mission.
An uneasy ceasefire was maintained as negotiations for Denmark’s withdrawal from the Armed Neutrality, were conducted. In the end, the death of Tsar Paul, and the cooling of Russian and French ‘friendship,’ ended the alliance and solved the problem of British access to the Baltic Sea. Glover states that if the Tsar had not died, the armistice with Denmark would not have held, and that the mission would have collapsed, becoming a defeat, not the victory at Copenhagen that resides in Nelson biographies. Glover suggests that the British failed to really accomplish any of their goals in 1801. In contrast, the Danes were successful in keeping their surviving ships within their control. This left the Danish problem ultimately unresolved for the British, setting up the need for a second assault on Copenhagen.

A brief chapter, covering the period between the two engagements, ties them together. With the start of the Napoleonic Wars, Denmark assumed its previous neutral position. But Napoleon’s decision to wage an economic war against Britain by outlawing trade between Britain and European countries under his influence, put pressure on Denmark, to once again side with the continental dominator, rather than the one that commanded the oceans. As in 1801, the British government saw the possibility of Denmark’s fleet being used to either stop Britain from entering the Baltic, or worse, supporting the French to invade Britain. They responded to this threat with another expedition against the Danes.

The second half of the book addresses the 1807 attack on Copenhagen. It was clear to Britain that the Danish fleet had to be seized, or destroyed, to prevent the threat of a joint action with the French navy. Glover draws out the questionable preparedness of the Danish ships to go to sea, and be of any use to the French. He demonstrates that the British government over-exaggerated Danish readiness to give their fleet to the French in order to gain political and public acceptance of the campaign. Like the first expedition, the 1807 attack against Denmark had little public support; even King George III considered it a “very immoral act” (167).

The second British assault was significantly larger than that of 1801. Admiral James Gambier led 39 ships-of-war, 57 smaller vessels, and 377 transports, carrying 30,000 troops, under General William Cathcart. While negotiations continued until the British expedition arrived in Danish waters, a peaceful resolution was impossible, as the ultimate demand was for the Danes to hand over their fleet, something they could not do.

As Admiral Parker had been slow to advance, and then hesitant to stay with the decision to attack in 1801, so, too, Cathcart was indecisive in 1807, much to the annoyance of Gambier and some of Cathcart’s junior officers. Finally he decided to lay siege to the city. Again the Danes were not expected to win against such an invading force, but their defences were strengthened as much as possible, they attacked a British siege position, their artillery dueled with the British, but the militia lost at Kioge against British troops under General Arthur Wellesley.

The British artillery attack against the city included the first combat use of Congreve Rockets. After three days, the Danes requested an armistice and arranged a surrender. The British took the surviving Danish ships, gunboats, and all the naval stores they could find back to England. Denmark never fully recovered from the loss and suffered economic turmoil as a result. The reaction by Russia and Prussia to declare
on war on Britain lasted only until Napoleon turned his attention to Russia, in 1812.

Despite sanctioning the attacks, the British government was never comfortable with the two victories. Denmark was not the long-standing enemy that France had been. Neither the navy nor the army received the full accolades and medals that other victories rained down upon them.

One of the final chapters discusses the use of gunboats and brigs by the Danes, in 1808-1809, to wage a privateer-like war to some effect against the British merchant ships and smaller naval escorts. The British adapted to these methods and ultimately maintained control of entry into the Baltic, continuing their trade with Sweden, and their indirect access to European markets.

The defeat of Denmark, and its choice to stick with France until 1814, further weakened its position and led to the ultimate loss of its claim over Norway. The peace treaty, bringing Denmark to Britain’s side, saw Norway enter into a semi-autonomous relationship with Sweden.

Glover is unambiguous in his conclusion that the first Battle of Copenhagen was a strategic failure, and indeed could have turned into a defeat of the British squadron by a combined Danish, Swedish and Russian navy. Parker’s failure to destroy, or capture, the entire Danish fleet, resolved by the Tsar’s death, saved the British from this fate. In contrast, the second Battle of Copenhagen was a strategic victory for the British, as they effectively extinguished the naval threat from Denmark.

In discussing the connection between the two battles, Glover invokes the First Gulf War as an example of politicians interfering in the generals’ conduct of the war, preventing them from accomplishing their goals, and thus, requiring another war to finish the job. But the first Battle of Copenhagen was not ended by the politicians, it was stopped by the reality of combat. Even if British forces won a longer engagement, they would be in no shape to fight the rest of the ‘war’ that possibly lay ahead. Nor could they restart the battle, given the resources that were present and their condition after the initial engagement. This doesn’t quite match the Gulf War context.

As noted above, Glover treats the reader to more of the Danish perspective on these engagements than seen in previous English works. This is interesting, given that the only archival sources are from the British National Archives, and though he uses the best Danish authorities on the battle, there are only eight published sources that are clearly Danish focused, or published in Denmark. This small group carries the weight of the Danish side of the story. The book has 36 appendices covering 71 pages. They hold tables of opposing force strength, letters from various commanders and government officials that are mentioned within the text. Twenty-seven deal with British aspects and nine are about the Danish side of the engagements.

The use of contemporary maps (as well as maps created for the text) are helpful for locating the described action. Numerous images are used in the book, including a grouping of coloured images (between pp. 144-5), some of which come from Danish sources and represent fresh views of the events.

Gareth Glover’s work is a good addition to the existing shelf of books on the two Battles of Copenhagen. It may not be the definitive word on the subject, but it does ensure future authors balance their narratives on the engagements between British and Danish
sources, perhaps with more from Danish archives.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


The German invasion of Norway in 1940 was occasioned by Germany’s need to obtain badly-needed iron ore from Sweden. But Swedish ports were ice-bound, so Swedish iron ore had to be shipped by rail through then-neutral Norway and from there by ship to German ports. This situation did not escape the notice of the British Admiralty; then-First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, and the British Chiefs of Staff considered options to prevent this, finally concluding that mine-laying plus a troop landing in Norway was in order.

On 9 April 1940, the German navy (Kriegsmarine or KM), using destroyers as troop-carriers, landed forces in Narvik harbour and captured the town of Narvik.

The Royal Navy (RN) was not far behind. On 10 and 13 April, RN destroyers confronted ten German destroyers. On April 10, in Narvik harbour, the RN sank two KM destroyers, losing two RN destroyers in the action. Three days later, the RN trapped the remaining eight KM destroyers in Ofot Fjord and sank or caused them all to be scuttled at the cost of two RN destroyers suffering severe battle damage. Both battles were furious; both sides’ commanders—Captain Bernard Warburton-Lee of the RN and Kommodore Friedrich Bonte of the KM—were killed in the earlier battle.

It is this story, the Battle of Narvik, that authors David Greentree and David Campbell tell in *Duel # 88 British Destroyer vs. German Destroyer*, a recent addition to Osprey’s *Duel* series. This series pits one weapon of war against its enemy counterpart and examines their respective histories, equipment, armament, training of their users, and specifications. The result is as close to an “apples to apples” comparison as is possible when analyzed and viewed from history’s perspective.

The *Narvik 1940* duel follows this format. The introduction presents the background to the Norwegian campaign and the Narvik battles. A chronology starts in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles limiting the post-First-World-War German navy to 16 small destroyers and proceeds over time to trace the various naval agreements and treaties, the initial sorties of the KM, and finally, the sequence of events leading to the Narvik battles, as well as the battles themselves. Good side and top views in colour of two types of RN and KM destroyers help the reader to visualize the combatants, while the development and specifications of the RN and KM destroyers are fully set forth. Brief biographies of the chief officers are included. The book outlines crew training on both sides as well as each side’s command and control procedures. Very good drawings of each combatant’s armaments help the reader to see what each side faced in combat.

At the heart of the book are the sections on the strategic situation and the combat itself. Good photographs appear throughout the text and a photograph of Ofot Fjord shows how easily the KM destroyers were trapped. Maps accompanying the text outline the tracks of the combatants and the battles
themselves indicating the relevant ships and their positions. These visuals allow the reader to follow the narrative and see when and where each ship was damaged or sunk. While complete, the combat narrative can, at times, be a bit hard to follow—but that reflects the confusing nature of battle, particularly at sea in a far-northern venue in early April, when snow and fog are likely to be present. A chart showing the respective RN and KM ships damaged and lost would have been helpful. The authors write well and the narrative is spiced with first-person accounts of the battle. Many good secondary sources support the text. The courage and skill of crews on both sides is readily apparent.

The verdict on the Narvik battles is a mixed one: the RN did not prevent the Germans from landing troops in Narvik harbour, but it did manage to sink one-half of the KM’s destroyer fleet. It is possible that one factor in the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, the proposed German invasion of Great Britain in autumn, 1940, was the lack of destroyers available to provide cover for the KM. Clearly, Narvik was a severe blow to the KM; though it commissioned 22 destroyers over the next four years, the Narvik losses were irreplaceable at a time when combat ships were at a premium. Some 2,500 KM sailors from the destroyers made it ashore, however, and were armed with captured Norwegian army and navy weapons. Those sailors were formed into battalions and comprised 50% of the German’s northern Norway invasion force—a critical reinforcement that made the difference in the German conquest of northern Norway.

This reviewer learned much from British Destroyer vs. German Destroyer. Narvik 1940. It is recommended both as a quick reference and an in-depth study of a key naval action of the Second World War.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


When we think of the Second World War, certain dramatic events catch the imagination. The bombing of Pearl Harbor or the D-Day landings are perfect examples of these huge, dramatic moments. History tends to be drawn to such massive collective experiences that profoundly affected the lives of all involved. They are defined moments in time that capture the imagination, making them easier to process but sometimes difficult to assess. The evacuation of Dunkirk from 26 May through 4 June 1940 is one. Code-named Operation Dynamo, but dubbed the “Miracle of Dunkirk”, it involved rescuing the remnants of the British Army from Dunkirk, France, in the wake of the German invasion and represents an incredible example of seamanship and skill. Bringing most of the British army home was a godsend for the beleaguered British Isles. It meant that Britain was able to preserve the manpower needed to defend their island and, in the long run, return to participate in the liberation of Europe.

Yet Dunkirk, while certainly an essential aspect of the early war years and setting the stage for the fall of France, is less in the public consciousness than most people realize. Caught between Germany’s stunning invasion of France and the Battle of Britain, it is over-
shadowed by other momentous battles. Invariably it is mentioned in history classes, documentaries, and books but the actual events never seem to be brought out in any kind of detail beyond the dramatic, almost miraculous rescue of the army by a motley assortment of civilian ships and small naval vessels. This could also be partly due to the fact that despite the heroic rescue, Dunkirk is seen as part of the Allied failure to defend France. And failure is not always good copy.

This mentality is reflected within the greater media of entertainment with the recent release of the motion picture Dunkirk (2017). Captivating many, this movie does not tell the entire evacuation story, but rather interweaves three tales from the perspective of the participants. Although it definitely captures the feel of the moment and emotion of the soldiers, sailors, and airmen, it tells the tale as cinema, not history. This whets the appetite for more and it is into this space that John Grehan’s book about Dunkirk appears as a useful and valuable resource.

Grehan’s chronological account of the nine days of Dunkirk presents a fascinating study that breaks down the experience into well written and easy to follow assessments of each day’s events. Divided into 12 chapters, the first two examine the history of the British Expeditionary Force in France and the great invasion of France. The next nine chapters follow Operation Dynamo as a daily study. They present a compelling read of the challenges faced by men under fire and the difficult decisions that had to be made. Whether examining the threat posed by the eight German divisions facing the defenders on the eastern perimeter on the third day (Chapter 3), or the loss of the destroyer Grafton on 29 May with hundreds of men on board (Chapter 4), the compelling narrative creates an important and unique picture of Operation Dynamo.

The final chapter examines what the author calls the ‘Dunkirk Spirit’, a fascinating reassessment of Dunkirk in light of the material that preceded it. The text is also strongly supported by seven appendices which provide documentary support for the text; for example, by breaking down the British order of battle. Also important are the assessments of the material losses (Appendix IV) or the returns relating to disembarkation in the UK (Appendix V) which explain the long-term repercussions of Dunkirk. Assessments of the fighter patrols on a day-by-day basis and examples of the civilian boats and crews provided in Appendix VI and VII respectively reveal aspects of the battle for Dunkirk that are never really talked about.

The combination of the daily account and the significant appendices provide a very important study for the reader. They balance each other and serve as an important starting point for further research into the battle for Dunkirk. In some ways, the book provides an excellent counterpoint to the motion picture. While not intended to do so, it helps fill in the context for the reader, pulling together the overall story raised in the movie and making it more manageable for the non-historian.

As an academic, I find Grehan’s account of the evacuation of Dunkirk to be extremely convincing and valuable. It represents a unique understanding of the evacuation and, as such, strengthens any other narrative of 1940 by providing more detail and balance. The appendices strongly support the text and provide a very readable resource. For the layman, Grehan produces an incredibly enjoyable and informative read. This book is highly recommended to anyone interested in this period of the Second World War.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario

Susanne Fournais Grube is a Danish marine artist of distinction. Living is the Danish archipelago, she was exposed to ships, boats and port scenes which plainly fascinated her and she has been painting these subjects for more than thirty years. As she married a Danish diplomat, she lived for long periods in France, Belgium, the USA and Britain and it was while her husband was the Danish ambassador in London that John Scott-Morgan of the Pen and Sword publishing company suggested this book. The result is a representative collection of her paintings of ships, details like anchors and mooring lines, lighthouses and other port buildings and small craft.

The first chapter is devoted to Liberty ships, significant because of their important role in World War Two; the second to tugs, ferries and pilot boats that has also somehow acquired some Belgian and Finnish warships. Then we have ocean liners, followed by supertankers. Lighthouses, both Danish and American, come next and then a chapter on yachts and wooden boats, including some fishing vessels. Each chapter is preceded with the author’s remarks on the development and significance of the types depicted.

Ms. Fournais’ style is bold with dramatic use of colour. The draftsmanship is impeccable. Some works are like posters, rather reminiscent of the work of Kenneth Shoesmith (reviewed in NM Vol ??? No. ?*). Many could be ship portraits of the kind shipping companies like to have in their board rooms; others of details of shape and line that caught her eye. Everyone will have their favourites among these images. I was particularly taken with a close-up of the funnel of the Queen Mary 2, an aerial view of the fully loaded supertanker Picardie and a view of a red kite flying beside the Bovbjierg lighthouse. Ms Fournais is far too knowledgeable to use the tricks of many previous artists, particularly poster artists, of putting an impossibly small tug or yacht in the foreground to emphasise the size of the main subject, or so I would have thought, but oops! Immediately at the waterline of the QM2 on a visit to Newfoundland is what can only be a tiny model sail boat. At least there are no little people on board. I think this is a joke on her part. An intriguing picture in the tugboat chapter is of a rather dilapidated motor yacht. The picture is called “Out of Africa”. Does she belong to Isak Dinesen (Baroness Karen Blixen) or maybe to Baroness von Lawick (Jane Goodall)? There appears to be a chimpanzee peering through the railings.

This is a very attractive coffee table book; not in size – it is a manageable 26 x 24 cms. Every page presents an interesting, even dramatic image. It is a pleasure to pick up and imagine your favourite pictures on your own walls.

C. Douglas Maginley  
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Vice Admiral Niblack served in the USN from 1876 to 1923 and was an
Annapolis contemporary of, *inter alia*, Admiral William Sims. Niblack had a varied career involving survey work in Alaskan waters, as well as general service in the southwest Pacific, which included action in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1901 (a savage and brutally fought war almost exactly coinciding with Great Britain’s Second Boer War). He served in a variety of warships from battleship to gunboat and with appointments varying from watchkeeper to executive officer, achieving command of *USS Michigan* in 1913. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1917 while in command of a battleship squadron. Later that year, he was appointed to command the US Patrol Squadron out of Gibraltar, where he served with distinction, playing an important role in the establishment and escorting of the convoys to Great Britain during the summer of 1917. After the war, he held a series of additional appointments in European waters as well as in Washington and diplomatic posts in London, retiring as Commandant of the Sixth Naval District in Charleston, SC in July 1923. This book is his account of his wartime experiences at Gibraltar (*A biographical sketch of Admiral Niblack, xi-xvi*).

The book’s provenance was as a proposed article for the US Naval Institute’s journal *Proceedings*, written almost certainly in the early 1920s before Niblack’s retirement from the navy. The manuscript was some 57-pages long and was never published, owing, it is believed, to its length. It is not known if Niblack was ever asked to reduce it somewhat and thus, make its publication more probable. Indeed, as John Hattendorf, the editor of the manuscript, noted, all details as to dates and any correspondence between the author and *Proceedings* have been lost.

Niblack’s manuscript languished, initially, in the archives of *Proceedings* before proceeding by stages to the US Navy’s Office of Naval Records and Library and thence, to the US National Archives (*Introduction*, iv). It was here that John Hattendorf discovered the document, many decades later, and concluded that publishing it now would contribute usefully to the historiography of the USN’s participation in the Great War. In particular, knowledge of the activities of the USN in European waters is inevitably focused on the battleship squadron under Admiral Sims serving with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. The role of a small, heterogenous squadron of minor warships operating out of Gibraltar has disappeared from the collective consciousness of most historians.

The tale Niblack tells is an interesting one of making do with inadequate resources, the challenges of co-ordinating action with various foreign fleets, and dealing with the near-chaotic command situation in the Mediterranean that lacked an overall allied commander. Each national force had to laboriously organize its efforts in concert with forces immediately at hand in order to accomplish, inevitably limited and tactical, objectives. Indeed, Niblack observed that even the British commanders at Malta and Gibraltar were at odds, which complicated matters considerably without taking into account (from the British perspective) the near-random manoeuvres of the French and Italian fleets. Nevertheless, despite this less than ideal situation, the naval forces involved did muddle through and were successful in implementing the convoy system in their region, as well as maintaining control of the Mediterranean Sea more broadly. How accurate and fair Niblack’s assessment is might be contested, but his views are certainly contemporaneous and, as such, a useful
and important contribution to the primary sources for this period and geographical area of the war at sea.

Hattendorf has edited Niblack’s manuscript with a light touch, essentially restricted to correcting typographical or spelling errors that almost certainly would have been identified by the contemporaneous editor of Proceedings. He provides an introduction of some 38 pages that covers Admiral Niblack’s background and a brief sketch of USN activities in the Gibraltar area while Niblack was there. He also includes some photographs to illustrate the types of warships involved, as well as of Niblack and some of his officers and men. The footnotes accompanying the manuscript have been provided by Hattendorf at the end of each short chapter in the book (25 in number) and are sequentially numbered from the beginning. It might have been wiser to place them at the foot of the page and number by chapter.

This short book will be of immense interest to any scholar of the period and Hattendorf has provided a real service in plucking Niblack’s long lost manuscript out of the dusty gloom of the archives and into the broad sunlight of the day. There is no diagram or illustration of any of the operations involved in the Gibraltar area, or of the theatre more generally. These were not part of the manuscript, but it might have been a helpful addition. That said, scholars will be familiar enough with the scene and so, perhaps, their inclusion here was assessed as unnecessary. Recommended.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


This work is the latest addition to publisher’s “Detailed in the Original Builders’ Plans” series of works, analyzing the Royal Navy Aircraft Carrier HMS Victorious. Given that this vessel underwent an extensive post-war reconstruction in order to become a modern jet carrier, author David Hobbs essentially examines two carriers’ worth of plans and modifications: HMS Victorious of 1941, and HMS Victorious 1958. Both of these sections have associated introductory texts detailing the design process and very brief service histories prior to the focus on annotated full-colour ship schematics. A final section on the later 1960s refits also operates as a conclusion in its final paragraph. As this work is primarily an examination of construction plans and drawings, Hobbs has drawn heavily from the archival collection of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England, which is associated with the publication of the book and maintains the surviving Admiralty plans for the Victorious and other warships in its collection.

The first 69 pages of the work cover the design history and 1941/1943 configuration of the HMS Victorious, with over 85 percent of this space being devoted to the builders’ plans. Within the text section, Hobbs begins with the origins of the armoured carrier concept from the mind of Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, who foresaw the need for a carrier capable of operating with little or no support and while damaged (6-7). The design, aircraft compliment, wartime loan to the United States Navy, and 1943 modifications are all briefly covered, including an aircraft data chart.
and 1941 carrier characteristics chart. This brief analytical text is followed by reproductions of the original colour plans. Following the 1936 rig sketch, this section first contains all the as-fitted deck plans, from bridge structure on down to the hold. It is hard to read the original builders’ notes on these images, but they give a good sense of placement, and important points are noted in annotations with relevant page numbers. The remaining 47 pages act as an annotated CAT scan of the ship, with larger foldouts and profiles demarcated into decks and stations. Groups of ship stations are presented in both profile and cross-sectional views on two side-by-side pages, while decks are presented with a top-down view of the deck spread across four pages, with the relevant section of the ship’s profile depicted across the top of the page at the same scale. A central gateway fold-out acts as a transition point, showing a three-page rendition of the 1941 Profile before shifting to a four-page 1958 Profile. Additionally, a three-page general arrangement view of the 1958 flight deck and night flying light system is also included in the gateway foldouts.

The latter 85 pages deal with the modernizing of Victorious into “arguably the most advanced aircraft carrier in the world” in 1958, along with the later 1966 deck refits (86). The builders’ plans are laid out in the same pattern as the pre-modernization section, to include some additional 1950 Proposed Modernization and 1963 As-Fitted plans, plus hangar and flight deck plans from the 1966 refit. Unlike the earlier section, there is text bookending the Cold War era plans. The initial text covers the selection of the Victorious for modernization in 1950 due to her comparatively better condition to the original selection of HMS Formidable and the period of continuous modification following various advancements in aircraft, radar, and other aspects (82). Another data chart of operated aircraft is included in this section as well, and the final paragraph details the 1967 dockyard fire that was used as an excuse to prematurely scrap the Victorious and downsize the remaining Royal Navy ships for being “too small a force to be viable” (93). The final text covers why the long modernization process resulted in several refits, due mainly to eight years of aircraft and radar innovation which resulted in the aircraft of 1958 possessing very different requirements than those planned for in 1950, necessitating modifications to accommodate things such as new armaments and increased fuel supplies (158). The last paragraph highlights some of the firsts achieved by the modernized Victorious, and points out that over 90 percent of the ship was only a decade old when she met her untimely end at the hands of force reduction.

In terms of possible improvements for future editions, there are several that come to mind. While it is true that this work focuses on the construction and design of HMS Victorious, the sections covering its service history, especially during the Second World War, are disappointingly brief. The ship’s British 1944-1945 war service is lightly covered in a paragraph, followed by two longer paragraphs on her 1943 loan to the U.S. Navy. An expanded chronological discussion of these topics would be appreciated, especially regarding her aircraft wings’ evolution throughout service. Mention is also made of increasing the number and type of airframes contained during service, but there is no place within the text where this is well illustrated. The inclusion of period photographs would help put this into context, showing how the hanger bay and flight deck would be loaded at
various points in the *Victorious*’ service life. A more fleshed out bibliography or end note section might also be beneficial to scholars interested in information on specific subjects or equipment annotated on the various plans. Finally, the inclusion of some form of separate afterword by the author offering his thoughts on the *Victorious* in detail would be greatly appreciated, especially given his service aboard her in 1966 as a midshipman.

All in all, *Aircraft Carrier Victorious* is an excellent resource for those interested in British armoured carrier and early jet carrier design, offering access to schematics and plans that would otherwise be difficult to access. The addition of Hobb’s annotations to the builders’ plans highlight unique, important, mundane, or modified areas of the ship design that might otherwise have gone unnoticed, offering explanations for design choices or highlighting why initial constructions had to be changed following real-world usage. For naval architects, modelers, and scholars for whom accessing archives in the United Kingdom is difficult due to time or distance, the reproduced drawings within offer a rare detailed glimpse into key Royal Navy carrier designs.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The title of the book notwithstanding, this ably told tale won’t be new to many readers. In fact, very good, but arguably more summary accounts predate Hoff's and at least one was in print October 1848, just months after the unspeakably tragic burning of American shipping magnate Enoch Train’s packet, *Ocean Monarch* on 24 August of that same year. Another mention, from 1996, drew heavily on the 1848 retelling. The earliest account is not listed in Hoff’s bibliography, nor is a modern-day biography of one of the crewmembers.

Hoff has written a social history of a tragic event which happened to occur in a maritime setting, and despite positive reviews, most sound like the reviewer essentially skimmed the story.

One has to be seriously interested in the tragic details to persist in reading the whole work; or perhaps, a descendant, or social scientist of human behaviour in time of tragedy. Yet one need only spend time with Google to locate images of the event painted by prominent artists of the day; a quite laughable YouTube video showing Captain Murdoch in Naval Officer uniform; and several posts by descendants of those aboard the barque, seeking more information. Or one could read *The Famine Ships* by Edward Laxton (listed in Hoff’s bibliography). The *Ocean Monarch* tragedy is by no means a “lost story”, just one that was told in earnest and urgent detail decades ago and is now resurrected with more attention to the lives of the individuals involved. And in the end, we still don’t really know how the fire started, or who might have been to blame.

The briefly introduced context of conditions during the reign of Queen Victoria encourages us toward singular empathy with the plight of the British underclasses in general, who were forced to leave everything familiar to seek a new life in America. In response to that need came the building of ever-larger sailing vessels (packets).
Among them were two from the same East Boston shipyard of Nova Scotia-born Donald McKay: *New World* of 1407 tons burthen, and *Ocean Monarch* at 1301 tons. Both would be present at the death of the newer vessel. Much like Juan Trippe of PanAm and William Allen of Boeing developing the 747, Train and McKay partnered to launch this large, transoceanic passenger liner. We will learn little more about *Ocean Monarch* herself, but an amazing amount about her human cargo. And this is where Ms. Hoffs’ focus makes the difference.

The warp of this rich tapestry is chronology, while the weft is the multicoloured characters so sadly lost, yet who she brings so vividly to life, literally resurrecting them in all their humanity, courage, bravery, cowardice, and greed. Sexual stereotypes of the day are belied by the unexpected exceptional strength, courage, and endurance of many of the women on board. Black men and women—whether cook, steward or stewardess—were summarily disregarded, as were those in steerage, by those in better, or even cabin class accommodations. Livestock had greater care and provender than humans. Some children were let go, as parents saved themselves.

The transition from happiness and optimism at being finally outbound—to absolute terror, bewilderment, and panic upon learning their beautiful conveyance was on fire—is described at the same accelerating pace experienced by everyone aboard. The scene is portrayed as the hell it must have been; whether aboard, or after leaping into the ocean. The options of death by fire or drowning are starkly juxtaposed in vignettes of the actions, hesitations and outcomes resulting from the behavior of each passenger, family, sailor, officer and her Master, Captain James Murdoch. Each begs the very personal question: “What would I do?”

The author’s research into primary, contemporaneous accounts is prodigious. The result is a great gift to the descendants, and a reminder of the truth of that time: “those in peril on the sea.”

How did the vessel catch fire, who might have been responsible, and why was the outcome so devastating? Although never confirmed—I found the answers to the first two questions plausible, but not satisfying, and somewhat conjectural. The explanation provided certainly would have led to the eventual, and rapid consumption of the entire hull above her coppered bottom, masts, sails and rigging, by fire. The inability of the crew, even aided by passengers, to prevent the nascent flames from growing is explained by the few, poorly outfitted boats that proved difficult to launch; only 12 wooden “fire” buckets, and rudimentary “fire pump.” There was no “fire engine” or ability to bring seawater aboard as from a deck pump. Yet when passenger James Fellows returned safely to Boston and told Enoch Train about the disaster, Train claimed: “…no ship was better provided for appliances for saving life.” [156].

The inquests seem to only have been held in England, with Train having no accountability. Captain Murdoch, being first accused of dereliction of
duty and cowardice was subsequently acquitted by testimony of other officers, crew and many passengers.

The time-honoured expectation that one vessel must always come to the aid of another in distress was challenged briefly when two near, but not closely, steamers continued on their course. Both were heavily laden, and the controversy remains as to whether they might have been able to render aid in time. We learn of the truly selfless aid by members of the French royal family, a British Admiral, the Captain of a Brazilian frigate, a private yacht, and a Dee pilot boat. The crew of the pilot boat were first accused of murdering a rescued passenger. Luckily, he turned up alive, and the charge was reduced to pilferage of belongings of another man brought aboard.

Maritime historians would probably appreciate a list and particulars of the several vessels mentioned for future reference. The bibliography is short of references or standard histories of these packets. Occasionally, one is brought up by “lubberly language”, rather than proper use or spelling of nautical terms. A glossary of but a dozen or more examples would have sufficed to assist the general reader. A track chart of the various vessel positions would be welcome also. There is little of a technical nature about Ocean Monarch beyond what can be gleaned from the dustjacket illustration. There were several paintings by different artists, depicting the event as it evolved, in an impressive and impassioned manner. Far more has survived to describe William Webb’s 1856 Western Ocean packet of the same name, than of McKay’s handsome barque. Ironically, in October 1848, McKay’s New World, herself cheated tragedy when her crew expeditiously extinguished a fire in her galley; the vessel proceeding shortly to her “new world” destination, a grateful 675 aboard.

Hoffs suggests that among other items salvaged (mostly crockery) was the head of the imposing “Neptune and his Trident” that graced her bow. I found a report that the entire figurehead had been removed and was for a long time, viewable in a prominent restaurant nearby. My enquiry to that house, still serving the public, has not been answered.

Both Hoffs and the author of the near-contemporaneous account, clearly drew from the same sources, their chronologies parallel each other. The latter is truly remarkable in the author’s ability to collect so much data—later validated by Ms. Hoffs’ book—in such a short period of time. The 1848 Poetic Narrative, with an Original and Authentic Account, in Prose, Of The Loss of This Ill-Fated Vessel by James Henry Legg is truly “poetic” and well worth reading for comparison. But for a deeply sympathetic, near ethnographic investigation into the behavior of inhabitants of an island afloat, in time of extreme crisis, read Hoffs.

Randle McLean Biddle
Star, Idaho


The only major naval battle of the First World War, The Battle of Jutland was a clash between the powerful navies of Great Britain and Imperial Germany that took place in 1916 in the North Sea off the coast of Denmark’s Jutland Peninsula. Seaforth Publishing has done a service to maritime history with its paperback printing of Jutland: The Unfinished Battle. The original hardback
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

edition was released in 2016 for the centenary of The Battle of Jutland, and the updated paperback edition is sure to result in greater distribution and wider readership. Interestingly, the author of the volume is Nicholas Jellicoe, grandson of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who commanded the British Grand Fleet at Jutland.

Nicholas Jellicoe has written a fair and balanced account of the battle and its aftermath, notwithstanding his close family connection to the naval battle. This reviewer will not pass judgment on the author’s account of the actual battle, about which enough pages have been written to fill a library, but instead comment on the strengths of the volume, which is much more than a straightforward history of the battle itself.

The opening chapters of The Unfinished Battle lay the cultural foundation for Jutland, with a full discussion of the Anglo-German naval race. This portion of the book competently explains the rampant “New Navalism” in both nations, and the relative ship strengths of both the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet.

Jellicoe recounts the two-day battle (May 31–June 1) in great detail, accompanied by excellent maps that show the engagement movement, and comments on the design, structure, signaling, and gunnery of both countries’ ships. Compared with Admiral Lord Nelson’s glorious victory in The Battle of Trafalgar in 1805—during which the French and Spanish lost 22 ships and the British lost none—the result of The Battle of Jutland was much less definitive, with both Great Britain and Germany claiming victory. Thus, the title’s description of the battle as “unfinished”: the battle ended literally after a furious two-day engagement, but its outcome has continued to be hotly debated for more than 100 years. Jutland was a sharp disappointment for the British Royal Navy, which suffered the greater loss of ships and sailors, but Germany’s losses at Jutland prevented it from engaging in more than skirmishes for the remainder of the war.

Jutland is a story of missed opportunities for the Royal Navy, confused or absent signaling, and two Royal Navy admirals performing in very different ways. Admiral John Jellicoe is portrayed as cautious and careful, while Admiral David Beatty is described as aggressive and a risk-taker. Nicholas Jellicoe treats readers to captivating asides, such as the fact the captain of H.M.S. New Zealand, Sir Lionel Halsey, wore a traditional Maori pendant and a grass skirt called a piupiu over his uniform for good luck. The garb worked as intended for captain, crew, and ship; the crew suffered no casualties during the entire war. Both the British and the German admirals had real concerns about safeguarding the huge and expensive fleets in an age of deadly mines, more accurate guns, and torpedoes. Yet their concerns did not deter either side from engaging with the enemy, and the result was the loss of a considerable number of ships and tonnage—and thousands of lives.

The book’s strength is its post-battle chapters, which discuss the displeasure of the British public and press at the indecisive outcome. The chapter comparing British admirals Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty and German admirals Reinhard Sheer and Franz Hipper are also done well. While people today expect the result of any contest to be “spun” by partisan advocates, Britain moved too slowly to promote its version of Jutland events. Germany won the first round of the public relations aspect of the battle, claiming an early victory and using its media tools to an effective end.

The author disputes the myth that the German fleet entirely disappeared post-Jutland. He notes that the two navies engaged in additional skirmishes,
but because of Germany’s losses at Jutland, the two massive fleets never came face-to-face again. In fact, determined not to be stymied by its failure to wrest dominance of the seas from Britain on the surface of the North Sea, Germany turned to a newer “weapon of total war”—the submarine. In 1917, Germany had 130 U-boats and proceeded strategically to use unrestricted submarine warfare to sink both merchant and civilian ships as a means of starving the British people.

Concluding paragraphs of the book describe the internment and scuttling of the German High Seas Fleet in the forbidding waters of the British naval base at Scapa Flow, off the coast of Scotland. Jellicoe’s discussion of the First World War’s British Admiral John Arbuthnot Fisher and German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz as the “godfathers” of their respective navies is useful. Those two senior and pioneering naval officers laid the groundwork for the clash of the dreadnoughts at Jutland, and both admirals lived to witness their fleets in action there.

This well-written book contains much information about the period, personalities, and facts relating to the Battle of Jutland. The author provides an exhaustive bibliography and an abundance of notes for each chapter, plus text blocks and sidebars. Based on the calibre of this book, Nicholas Jellicoe’s new volume about the Scapa Flow scuttling (expected to be published in June 2019) is likely to be another major contribution to our understanding of First World War naval history.

Meantime, perhaps with this excellent book, “the unfinished Battle of Jutland” will finally be finished, and no longer a source of historical argument and contention.

W. Mark Hamilton
Alexandria, Virginia


Life in New France moved on the waters, from France to Canada, on the St. Lawrence River into the continent and on the Great Lakes in its heart. *The Misunderstood Mission of Jean Nicolet* focuses on one of those journeys but tells a much larger saga.

Jean Nicolet is often presented as an explorer in search of the Northwest Passage to China who ends up in Wisconsin, becoming the discoverer of Green Bay instead. Author Patrick J. Jung introduces the evidence supporting his theory that Nicolet was a diplomat who knew that he was going to First Nations with a view to improve relations between them and French traders, rather than an explorer in search of new lands.

Jung begins with the tale of the search for the Northwest Passage and the support of that quest by French kings. The meeting of Francois I and Jacques Cartier in 1532 forged the partnership that would lead to explorations of Newfoundland in 1534, the Gaspe, the shore of Labrador and up the St. Lawrence, which Cartier named. It was Cartier whose contacts with the Stadaconans fired his imagination for riches to be discovered. The first French settlement established by Cartier and continued by Roberval would founder on the rocks of reality and was abandoned in 1543. The 1547 ascension of Henri II, who had no interest in Canada, crippled French settlement for decades.

In 1603, Samuel de Champlain, under the patronage of King Henri IV, established the first permanent settle-
ment at Quebec that grew into the commercial nexus of a fur trading empire stretching into the interior. A student of prior navigational accounts, Champlain explored up the St. Lawrence to the Lachine Rapids where he received a description of Lakes Ontario, Erie and Huron.

It was to this nascent colony that Nicolet arrived in 1619. Although Champlain returned to France, Nicolet remained in Quebec during the conquest and rule by the English Kirke family from 1629-32. With Champlain’s return in 1633 the stage was set for Nicolet’s journey to the west. But why was he going? Was his a voyage of discovery in search of the path to the Orient? Did he greet the First Nations in a Chinese robe, blissfully ignorant that he was not in China? That is the conventional history written and taught, but challenged by Jung. Through detailed examinations of journals and reports he concludes that, by 1634, Champlain and others knew that the St. Lawrence did not join the western sea. Jung posits that Nicolet went as an ambassador to solidify relationships with the First Nations along Lake Michigan and Green Bay. With a display of French firepower, an exchange of gifts and a robe “strewn with flowers and birds of many colors” Nicolet and his company of travelers won new allies and established trading relationships with Puans and Menominees who lived on the shores of a “fresh-water sea” and whose names grace modern maps.

As the author readily acknowledges, Nicolet’s voyages are shrouded in the mists of time. Jung meticulously combs the writings, charts and draws inferences to decipher where Nicolet and early Frenchmen on the Great Lakes steered their canoes, who they met and what they accomplished. Modern and period maps, drawings and photographs of contemporary markers facilitate understanding of the text.

Though the subtitle is *Uncovering the Story of the 1634 Journey* the scope of this work is much broader. Many of its pages examine the history of early New France, its relationships to the Old World and the forces that drove men like Nicolet into the heart of the continent. Although I have read much about French America, by the end of this book I appreciated much more about it and the western travels that it spawned.

Although the actual narrative fills only 179 pages, I would not categorize it as a fast read. The reader is challenged to think in order to process the message and to understand the relationships between the French and Indian dramatis personae. I mention this not as a criticism. I found the text so interesting that I wanted to devote the time to absorb its points and its history. Whether your interests include early Canadian colonial era, Wisconsin history or just a good story I think you will enjoy the saga of this man behind the monuments.

James A. Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


In his epochal *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* (1890), Alfred Thayer Mahan maintained that geographical factors—position, physical conformation, and extent of territory—largely determined “the sea power of nations.” Those states with ready
access to the sea, in particular principal trade routes, along with well-situated ports providing access to markets in the interior, plus security from landward assault, were/are best positioned to become maritime powers, focused on sea-borne commerce. Mahan also pointed toward several ancillary factors affecting the disposition of a state toward maritime or terrestrial power: the number of people “following the sea,” the “national character,” chiefly the “aptitude for commercial pursuits,” and, certainly not least of all, the “character of the government,” specifically the degree to which it fosters and protects maritime activity.

In this volume Professor Lambert stands the last of these arguments on its head, maintaining that the ongoing costs of defending maritime trade from pirates and rival powers “obliged sea states to develop more inclusive forms of government, forms that gave merchants, traders and shipowners a share of political power, in exchange for services or financial contributions.”(17) A similar claim is made by Peter Padfield in *Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind* (2000), but Lambert’s argument ranges much further than does Padfield’s, in the process drawing clear distinctions between “sea states,” “seapowers,” “maritime empires,” and “naval powers.”

The first of these archetypes (addressed in chap. 6)—Lambert’s historical examples are Rhodes, Tyre, Sidon, Samos, and Genoa—are economically dependent on seaborne commerce but lack the financial resources, geographic security, and/or favourable geostrategic environment requisite for the true seapowers on which most of his study focuses: Athens (chap. 2), Carthage (chap. 3), Venice (chap. 4), the Dutch Republic (chap. 5), and England/Great Britain (chap. 8). At the other end of the continuum are states that lack the maritime/commercial economic underpinning requisite for seapower but which, owing to fortuitous circumstances or just plain luck, are nonetheless able to amass substantial overseas empires, states such as Early Modern Portugal and Spain (chap. 6). Finally, “naval powers” are states that possess powerful fleets for military purposes—power-projection and decisive battle—rather than for the traditional aim of maritime powers—safeguarding trade in peace and war. These states, such as Achaemenid Persia, Republican Rome, Bourbon and Napoleonic France, and the modern United States, are addressed throughout the text in their appropriate chronological contexts.

Indeed, Lambert points out that Mahan deliberately split his translation of the Greek word *thalassocracy*—seapower—into two words—sea power—in his propagandistic and ultimately successful quest to convince his countrymen to emulate Republican Rome and Bourbon France (albeit without the latter’s strategic miscalculations) in the acquisition and utilization of sea (i.e., naval) power. As a consequence, Mahan maintained that “command of the sea,” as exercised by a *guerre d'escadre* battlefleet, was the critical factor in the outcome of the conflicts that constituted the “Second Hundred Years’ War”—the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-48), the Seven Years’ War (1754-63), the American Revolution (1775-83), and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1802-1803-15). Ergo, the fleet amassed by the United States was designed to exercise naval dominance in wartime, without serious consideration of the multifarious roles played by the navies of *bona fide* seapowers: “US
cruisers were built to fight in fleet battles; Britain relied on them to control sea lanes.” (305)

Again contra Mahan, Lambert argues forcefully that genuine seapower states, such as Carthage and Great Britain, “are not powerful; they focus on the sea because they are weak.” (8) And because they are weak their strategic choices are limited: “[w]eakness obliged them to wage limited wars, seek allies, and negotiate settlements; they were unable to do any more.” (11) The same was true at the operational strategic level: “[l]and powers could secure victory through ‘decisive battle’ and the occupation of core territory, sea power [sic] was restricted to limited outcomes, achieved by economic exhaustion [of the enemy]. Sea power strategy focused on controlling the sea for security and economic advantage, not the empty glory of naval battle.” (18)

The disagreement with Mahan is in service of a larger argument: that seapower is a conscious cultural choice, rather than the result of geographic determinism, and that it continues to inform the western world. As to the former contention, Lambert bluntly states that “seapower identity is wholly artificial.” (8) “Britain,” he adds, “like Athens, Carthage, Venice and the Dutch Republic, became a seapower by actively constructing a cultural identity focused on the sea.” (5) The process of construction involved much more than economy, or state-building. Lambert stresses factors such as art, architecture, and literature. In service of this argument, critics and historians such as John Ruskin and Jacob Burckhardt supplant Mahan. Of the former he remarks that although “Mahan may be a better guide to students of strategy, Ruskin’s approach to seapower was at once more sophisticated, and more significant.” (3) More critically for his purposes, both Ruskin and Burckhardt appreciated “the critical role of [human] choice in the evolution of the state…identities were fluid, not fixed.” (2)

What of seapower today, given that the subtitle of Lambert’s chapter on England is “The Last Seapower”? Again, he minces no words. “As a group… [seapowers] did more to advance trade, knowledge and political inclusion than their landed peers: they shaped the global economy and the liberal values that define the contemporary Western world.” (6) Indeed, in concluding he stresses that “the seapower state legacy of inclusive politics, open, outward-looking societies, the rule of law, personal liberty and economic opportunity,” when set against the autocratic, authoritarian, illiberal political systems associated with most continental states, has generated a “tension, between stasis and progress, closed minds and open seas [which] is the single greatest dynamic in human history.” (329)

As suggested by that claim, Lambert paints with broad brushstrokes, hardly surprising given the chronological sweep of his survey, which begins with the ancient Mediterranean (chap. 1) and winds up with the contemporary world. (chap. 9) In addition, an introduction and conclusion set forth and reiterate his principal arguments, and a chapter focused chiefly on Russia (7) charts the failure of intermittent efforts—starting with Peter the Great—to impose seapower culture on a continental state. Equally unsurprising, it is also, as Lambert admits at the outset, a work of synthesis rather than of archival research. (xii)

This a provocative book, quite deliberately so. Lambert’s stated intention is “generate debate” rather than to settle it. (xii) Readers may disagree with some of his arguments, but they almost certainly will be intellectually stimulated as well.

This first volume in a two-part series is the latest reissue of a large-format book that first appeared in 1990 and was last reprinted by Conway Maritime Press in 2002. The content deals with the small boats employed by coastal forces in the Royal Navy and United States Navy during the Second World War, in particular the many variations of the Fairmile motor launch and similar American multi-purpose wooden boats based on a First World War design. John Lambert and Al Ross, one British and the other American, produced the definitive reference book on these larger coastal craft. Each author possessed experience serving in his respective navy, shared an interest in drawing views and details of small warships, and in pursuit of accurate information, conducted exhaustive research in archives and by talking to coastal forces veterans. This reviewer remembers how active the Coastal Forces Veterans Association was in the 1990s, with public outreach and water model ships outside the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich on weekends. As veterans of the Second World War aged, recording of coastal forces stories in the narrow seas and elsewhere was an important project for them. Lambert passed away in 2015, though his enthusiasm and work in the books still lives on, as the multi-volume series has become a favourite amongst ship modellers and naval historians interested in coastal forces.

This new volume preserves the original content and pagination of the previous printings, with some new additional features. Lambert and Ross set a very high standard with the first volume, by incorporating well-written text, impressive numbers of line and perspective drawings of the boats, armaments, and engines, photographs of the same, data text boxes, detailed lists, and informative appendices. It was clearly a labour of love for Lambert, who had a background as an industrial draughtsman. The drawings alone are worth a closer look, as one marvels every time one picks up the book. The Fairmiles and sub-chasers were intended to be mass-produced by manufacturers and small boatyards that previously had little or no experience in naval work. Based on improvements on First World War designs, the wooden boats were employed in various roles and functions well beyond anti-submarine warfare, in general purpose ways. They laid mines and tended minefields, delivered agents and supplies, patrolled against enemy forces, supported amphibious landings, and served as gunboats with higher calibre armament. Coastal forces were generally organized into flotillas operating from an advanced base, since habitability on the small ships and operational range was limited without resupply and logistics. The boats covered by the book served in the English Channel, off the Scandinavian countries, the Mediterranean, around the coasts of India and Burma, in the Pacific, and on the North American coasts. The Canadian Fairmile B type gets mentioned in a section that follows the format of description, class data, detailed side drawings, and a construction list. The Seaforth reprint has an eight-page unnumbered insert after page 64 that gives paint and
camouflage schemes in colour, with a lengthy note for ship modellers. The jacket cover of the new book also uses a striking reproduction of a painting from John Lambert’s own private collection, different from the coloured painting by Peter Hogan on the jacket cover of the Conway Maritime edition. Sadly, the Seaforth edition still does not include an index, which might have been a useful addition for a reference book and not requiring the original author.

Even with the additions, the suggested retail price for the Seaforth reprint is the same as that for the Conway Maritime reprint in 2002, sixteen years on. The newer book is printed in China, instead of the United Kingdom. Comparing the two editions, the text, drawings, and photographs benefit from glossier paper and more pronounced black ink. As mentioned, colour has also been added in parts. Those features are clearer in the digital editions. The new Seaforth reissue makes more widely available a set of books that might be out of print and otherwise hard to come by. This volume is the type of reference work that ship modellers and persons interested in the history of navies and small boat actions will likely want to own themselves, for ease of access and consultation. It is still among the best books on the Fairmile, a very useful and under-appreciated wartime coastal craft.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia

At the outbreak of the Second World War the British Navy sent its Home Fleet to Scapa Flow, as it had in 1914. From there, they could interdict German warships as they entered the North Atlantic. With submarine nets across the main channels, and several ships sunk to block the minor ones, the British felt fairly safe within the anchorage. In early October 1939, two German surveillance flyovers spooked the British into sending their capital ships to sea, in fear of an air raid. On the night of 13 October 1939, and into the early hours of the next day, U-47 entered through a gap in the defences and sunk the First World War veteran HMS Royal Oak. It then slipped back out the way it had entered. The attack caused consternation in London, celebration in Berlin, created controversy almost immediately, and has generated much debate since. Martindale has waded into the discussion, providing a thorough exploration of the event, and the analysis to date. He uses the perspective of the German commanding officer, Günther Prien, and U-47 to tell the story and conduct his study.

The book is divided into five sections. The first is an extremely brief overview of the Battle of the Atlantic, introducing Admiral Karl Dönitz, the Wolfpack concept, and discussing the ultimate failure of the German U-boat strategy. The author states that Hitler’s failure to build enough submarines before the war, and the Allied ability to build more merchant ships than were lost, plus new surface radar and altered tactics, allowed the Allies to triumph over the U-boats. Martindale, however, is clear that the Wolfpacks pushed Britain almost to the ropes.

The second section reviews the ten patrols of U-47 under Prien’s command. It is laid out chronologically, detailing each patrol by day, with notations,
much like they may have appeared in the ship's log. To fill out the story, Martindale adds information about each patrol that would not have been known by the submariners. Ships are sighted and sunk or damaged, enemy vessels are avoided, crash dives occur. The frustration and monotony that ebb and flow on a submarine hunting for victims, is palpable. One or more maps illustrate the course of each patrol, followed by a summary table of activity, and an assessment of the exercise. The second patrol was the mission to Scapa Flow, which is dealt with here in the same manner as all the others. U-47 did not return from its tenth patrol, most likely sunk by a depth charge. This section reveals the failure of German torpedoes in the early years of the war, which ran deeper than they were set to, often gliding harmlessly under their target. These failures were a constant source of irritation to Günther Prien (and other U-boat officers), though it did save countless Allied lives and cargoes. The other element that is striking in these patrol reports is the misidentification of the targets and their tonnage. Seldom are any of the officers correct in their identifications. German overestimation of the tonnage they sunk is remarkable, although the reality was still devastating. Prien was known to prefer running on the surface among the convoy he was targeting. Only a few of the Wolfpack commanders operated this way; most stayed outside the convoy and preferred a submerged attack. Also of note is the change in attitude towards submarine attacks. At first, the rules of war were followed, with submariners giving crews time to abandon ship before sinking them, or once sunk, offering assistance to the survivors. As the war progressed, this humanity slipped away and nothing was done to warn or save torpedoed mariners.

Sections three and four constitute the bulk of the book, dealing with the raid on Scapa Flow by U-47, and the myriad questions and theories concerning the incursion. Gunther Prien's skill and daring was essential for guiding the U-boat through Kirk Sound, around sunken block ships, and into the vast deep-water anchorage. At the time of the raid, apart from destroyers, Britain's only capital ships in the area were HMS Royal Oak, HMS Vanguard and HMS Iron Duke. The Kirk Sound route placed U-47 closer to the Royal Oak, which it found and began to torpedo early on 14 October 1939. Three torpedoes missed but four found their target. The first struck just before 1 a.m., the other three, one right after the other, 15 minutes later. The great ship rolled over and sank within 20 minutes of the fourth hit, taking 836 men to their deaths, while 425 managed to survive the nightmare. Prien thought he had also struck HMS Repulse which he and his first officer 'saw' north of the Royal Oak but Repulse was not in the anchorage at the time. The ship behind the Royal Oak was an old float plane launcher, HMS Pegasus, which was not hit. Prien then returned to the open ocean via the Kirk Sound, totally undetected by the British.

The response to the disaster was quick. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, promptly acknowledged the ship was sunk by a U-boat, an inquiry was held, the commanding officer of the anchorage (Vice Admiral Sir Wilfred French) was relieved of command, and improvements to the defences were initiated. In Germany, celebrations and a vigorous propaganda campaign were launched; Günther Prien received the Knight's Cross from Hitler, after which they had a private conversation. Though Prien met the Nazi elite twice, Martindale found little evidence that he embraced Nazi ideology.

The attack was widely seen by Ger-
mans as avenging the humiliation of the German Fleet in Scapa Flow after the First World War. In this section, the author reviews accounts and films produced about the Scapa Flow raid. He dismisses the earlier books and all the films, but does recommend the later books, although written without the archival documents to which Martindale had access. He lists 41 questions, or controversies, that arose out of the sinking of the *Royal Oak*, and evaluates them one at a time, in immense detail, to ferret out a possible answer. In each case, he presents the ideas of others, and then his own, based on his research. For some he provides the answer, for others, he gives the probable likelihood of what may have occurred. One of the mysteries was Prien’s misidentification of the ship to the north of the *Royal Oak* as being HMS *Repulse* instead of the much smaller *Pegasus*. Martindale shifts the alleged position of the two British ships, and the firing position of U-47, adds in the dark night, the effect of northern lights, and the fact that Prien had seen a photograph of Scapa Flow, from the beginning of October, showing *Repulse* north of *Royal Oak*. In poor conditions, at a great distance, with a preconceived notion in his mind, the *Pegasus* became the *Repulse*. The details and various scenarios Martindale creates to examine each of these questions leave no stone unturned. If he is unable to arrive at an answer, it seems doubtful anyone else will.

The final section contains biographical information for Prien and the German officers and crew members mentioned in the text. Interestingly, they are mostly brief, as little information exists for these individuals. The longest biography is Prien’s, which recaps his naval career, family life, his hard-edged but humane character and his superficial involvement with the Nazi party. Like Prien, several individuals met their end in the U-boat service, others survived the war and rebuilt their lives.

The format of a U-boat log, with date headings and summary tables, stops after the second section, but the remainder of the book contains many headings and sub-headings. Some readers may find them disruptive to the flow of the narrative, while those interested in detail will appreciate the compartmentalizing of information that they facilitate. The maps in this book are critical to understanding the action, and are clear, well labelled, and easy to read. Tables throughout the book summarize parts of the detailed text, helping the reader to grasp the point the author is constructing. The index refers only to people and ships mentioned within the text, which leaves much valuable information difficult to locate.

Martindale used military records from Britain and Germany, some of which had not been available to earlier writers. He also makes extensive use of web-based sources, some being transcriptions of crew lists and log books. He cites the URL, but nothing else for most of these, leaving other researchers to search through all of them to find what they might be interested in. Certainly there is more evidence here than in any previous book on the subject.

Günther Prien skillfully guided his U-boat into the enemy’s anchorage and torpedoed a British warship. In the grand sweep of the war, it was more of a propaganda victory than any form of crippling blow to the British Navy. The story and the controversies that swirled around it are an important chapter in the early U-boat warfare of the Second World War. Anyone who is interested in submarines, daring raids, or the effect of contemporary propagandists’ spin on the longer historic record, and is willing to work through the details,
will certainly benefit from reading Dougie Martindale’s latest book.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


This important and elegantly written book is, as Christopher McKee observes, the result of an attempt to understand the lives and careers of American naval sailors in the first half of the nineteenth century, part of a wider project that generated his last book, *Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945*. In contrast to his work on the careers of American naval officers, *A Gentlemanly and Honourable Profession*, the surviving records make it impossible to gain an overview of lower deck careers in this period. McKee dismisses the obvious substitute, published memoir literature as flawed, the texts are strikingly literate, deceptively astute, and generally driven by reformist agendas dating to the period on which they were published, not those of the careers they record. Some were essentially fictitious. British sailor memoirs of this period pose the same problems, the sailor’s voice largely lost amongst contemporary concerns. There was an exception to this lacunae; the archives of the United States’ Naval Asylum, latterly the Naval Home. Down to the end of 1865, 541 men entered the system, having served for long periods as sailors and/or marines. The book examines how these men lived out their lives, inside and often outside the accommodation, and serves as a micro-study of the long-lost lower deck experience.

Initial ideas for an Asylum, inspired by Greenwich Hospital, were aired in 1810, with a design by favoured architect Benjamin Latrobe. The War of 1812 diverted the funds, and it was not until the late 1820s that work began on a large classically inspired structure in Philadelphia, close by the River Shuylkill, and only two miles from the town centre. For obvious reasons, the Asylum was co-located with the Naval Hospital, which later outgrew the accommodation, acquiring a separate building. While the Asylum followed Greenwich in making an overt display of learning and culture, it faced inland, ignoring the river. The Asylum made no attempt to engage with the elite foreign audiences that regularly entered Greenwich to see the Painted Hall. By the time the Asylum opened, Greenwich housed a fabulous collection of naval and marine art, much of which now hangs in the adjacent National Maritime Museum.

Among the critical issues McKee addresses is the nationality of ‘American’ seafarers. Beneath some obvious disguises lurked a strikingly large number of Irish, English, German and other foreign sailors. After twenty years in American naval service, and more on American merchant ships, men with thick Germanic accents Anglicised their names and claimed to hail from German-settled Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, to secure entry. Many foreign-born men had not bothered to acquire citizenship: a striking observation given the highly charged issue of British impressments of ‘American’ seafarers between 1803 and 1812.

Admission required institutional or
political support, but the Navy’s poor record keeping, which blocked McKee’s larger project, enabled men who did not qualify to enter. A forceful Congressman was more useful than a spotless record of service. Serious injuries needed no time limit, including the loss of limbs or serious cranial trauma.

Once inside, life was ordered, and comfortable, but lacked much positive stimulation. After the failure of the original leadership, a harsh authoritarian regime that alienated the inmates, the Asylum was run with an understanding of the nature of the inmates. Many of the men who emerge for the records were serial offenders against rules and restrictions, dismissed and re-admitted on three of four occasions, some spending time in less agreeable quarters in the Poor House across the River after drunken outbursts. Captain, later Admiral, Joseph Smith, long-serving head of the Bureau of Yards and Docks from 1846 and Andrew Hull Foote provided considerate and engaged leadership of the facility. While African American sailors were disadvantaged by successive Southern Navy Secretaries, who reduced their number and moved them into support roles, they were accommodated at the Asylum with little evidence of racial tension.

Ultimately McKee concludes the Navy cared about old and disabled sailors, officers like Joseph Smith indulged their minor infractions, and often forgave their sins. Perhaps they recognised the lack of positive stimulation, which led them to indulge bad habits, often connected with alcoholism. Greenwich veterans, on the other hand, were distracted by a steady stream of visitors. It was a decent place to wait for the inevitable, but a surprising number decided they preferred an out-pension: with their days essentially free others found work, including in the local Navy Yard.

In the absence of a similar study of the occupants of Britain’s Greenwich Hospital it is hard to draw wider conclusions about sailors’ lives in retirement, let alone compare them with those of veteran and disabled soldiers. Were the disciplinary infractions of these men a product of their seafaring background, or merely a predictable outlet for boredom and a response to restraint?

McKee remains an exemplar of the discipline, posing original questions, delighting in the human element that constantly undermines the idea that reality is anything more than compound of chaos and mass. His old salts, and their disabled peers, will be recognized by everyone who has studied the lives of seafaring men, men of action often bored by rules and routine, and strikingly self-propelled, for good or ill, and often both. His judgements are as compelling as the lives of his subjects.

Andrew Lambert
London, UK


This work is a reprint of Moran’s 1992 examination of United States Marine Corps (USMC) equipment produced for and used during the Second World War. Combining period black and white photography and 1990s-era colour images, Moran examines the material culture of the USMC in six distinct chapters, divided by time periods, special units, and relevant miscellanea. There is no bibliography, footnotes, index, or any other end material. The foreword and introduction explain the book’s cre-
All six chapters stand on their own following a standardized layout. Two to four paragraphs introduce the topic, followed by informational text on uniform components, equipment, and markings germane to the chapter. Archival black and white photographs are interspersed throughout the first part of each chapter, with descriptive captions noting image context and visible uniforms, equipment, or insignia. The remainder of each chapter is illustrated with colour images of original clothing and equipment, some shown individually and some modeled as a complete uniform. The fifth chapter on insignia and miscellanea lacks informational text separate from captions and the period and modern photos are more freely interspersed with each other.

The first two chapters cover the standard Marne uniforms and equipment, with Chapter One focusing on early 1941 and Chapter Two looking at the combat uniforms and equipment issued from mid-1942 through the Battle of Okinawa. This second chapter is by far the longest of the book, accounting for a little over a quarter of 192 informational pages. The third chapter examines not only the specialized equipment favoured by the Marine Raiders, but the advent of camouflage uniforms, the latter of which characterizes most of the modern imagery. Chapter Four is less equipment-heavy, focusing on the Paramarines and on jump smocks and a few key pieces of jump-related equipment. The ‘miscellaneous’ fifth chapter is roughly divided in two; firstly examining Marine Corps insignia and patches, and then equipment not relevant to other chapters, such as grooming kits, rations, and medical supplies. The final 20 pages detail clothing and headgear used by the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve, which is described in the Foreword as being a “forward-thinking chapter” (7). [Moran’s companion piece, devoted solely to the Women’s Reserve is reviewed in this issue.] As a whole, the book appears to have changed little from its original 1992 edition, with the increase in page count from 144 to 208 attributed to the new, smaller format.

In terms of possible improvements, several come to mind. The black and white period photos are useful for recording the uniforms and equipment in use, but colour photographs of Marines, taken both stateside and in the Pacific, are available in the collections of the Library of Congress, US National Archives, and Naval Historical Center. In its current format, only the dust jacket makes use of two original colour photographs. Including more early colour images would clarify the look and use of gear in the field, as well as improve the visibility of distant or hard-to-see objects. Since a number of the reference images seem slightly out of focus or desaturated, re-photographing them with a clearer focus, similar to the new modeling image used on the dust jacket, would improve the clarity and increase the usefulness of the work for more specific identifications. A possible inclusion in the fifth chapter would be a chart of the small arms wielded by the Marine Corps. They are mentioned in captions, but given that firearms are an integral part of a Marine’s equipment and that the Corps fielded some unique weapons, devoting a page or two covering the types and their issuance might be useful. Finally, a guide to the Unit Numeral Identification System (UNIS) markings on Marine gear would greatly increase the work’s value to the scholarly community. The numeric-symbolic codes often marked on Marine equipment to denote units are occasionally
mentioned in this work when an example is shown on a piece of gear. A reference chart of the symbols and coding could greatly aid researchers trying to identify not only a piece of clothing or equipment, but the unit to which it was issued.

_U.S. Marine Corps Uniforms and Equipment in World War II_ is a valuable guide for identifying both standard and specialized Marine uniforms and equipment in photographs, museum collections, and for private interests. Moran’s work, while not necessarily in-depth in terms of as manufacturers, production numbers, and other statistical points, offers a solid snapshot of Marines in training and combat during the Second World War. While some of the photographs do show their age, the work is well deserving of the respect it has from the National Museum of the Marine Corps, and will continue to be a useful reference tool for the foreseeable future.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


After providing a brief introduction to the creation and early stages of the U.S. Marine Corps Women’s Reserve, the majority of Moran’s book is focused on providing high quality pictures of every female Marine uniform, available headwear and accessory option. The book is a complete visual resource in all respects of the physical appearance of the U.S. Marine Corps Women’s Reserve. While Moran’s text offers a concise, thoroughly researched and written history as the title suggests, it is not the main focus of the book, reducing its use for primary research regarding the non-visual aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps Women’s Reserve.

The author includes primary documents which generally pertain to uniform-code updates. Compared to the written section of the book, the author deals much more fully with pictorial aspects related to the female Marine’s physical appearance. Beyond the images of uniforms and accessories, primary documents include advertisement posters, photos of early groups of female Marines, letters sent to the recruits with required materials, among other notices. Although not presented in the original letter format, the author also covers interesting announcements, such as the general prohibitions of the Uniform Regulations in 1943, forbidding women to wear non-military pins, earrings or flowers while in uniform. A few of the other announcements involve special regulations for uniforms, articles of the officers’ uniforms, and insignia, ornaments, etc. for commissioned officers. The author keeps readers engaged and incorporates information early on that clarifies the decisions behind what equipment and uniforms were selected for the reservists.

Moran explains why the Marines operated differently than other branches of the military. While they were the last branch of the military to set up a women’s section in the Second World War, they did not want to differentiate between male and female members, as the other branches did. The Army referred to their female members as WACs—Women’s Army Corps; the Navy had WAVES—Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service, and the Coast Guard their SPARS, named by their first director.

From the beginning, 7 November
1942, female reservists in the Marines did not have an official or unofficial nickname. This was very important to Marine Corps Commandant Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb. He did not want the Marines to be divided by gender; he wanted all his service members to be treated as Marines. The media, however, eventually began referring to them as ‘BAMs’- Beautiful American Marines.

In order to keep the new reserve section closely aligned to the Marines, and as the last branch of the military to set up a female reserve, their leaders were able to borrow from the Army, Navy and Coast Guard female reserves, and differentiate their program based on three factors. The first factor: to encourage unity, female Marines were not given a nickname. Even naming female Marines in the media or other publications was frowned upon by Marine leaders; they were simply referred to as Marines. Secondly, female Marines were not an auxiliary service. They were fully qualified Marines. Thirdly, only minimal changes were allowed to feminize the traditional green Marine uniform.

The logic for recruiting women for the Marine Corps was it would free urgently needed male personnel for combat, relieving those preoccupied with non-military tasks, that could be fulfilled by women. The first step in allowing women to join the Marines was to calculate how many jobs within different Marine units could be filled by women. In November, 1942, a memo was sent to commanding officers requesting this information. Coinciding with the information retrieval, General Holcomb began to review potential recruiting methods. For this task, he turned to Dean Virginia C. Gildersleeve of Barnard College, Columbia University. She had previously assisted the Navy in this area and along with other committee members, Gildersleeve initially recommended 12 women to be interviewed for the position.

Originally, Female Marine Reservists were accepted based on the same protocol as the WAVES and SPARS. Later the requirements were changed. To be considered for the interview process applicants had to be 5 feet tall, weigh more than 95 pounds, and preferably unmarried. Initially, a candidate could not be married to a fellow Marine, and could have no children under the age of 18. Further entrance requirements for the reserves included a letter of physical status from their own physician, an aptitude test, and a one-on-one interview. Once accepted into the female Marine reserves, candidates received training based on existing naval programs. The U.S. Navy had already established some female-specific training via their WAVES program, and as the Marines and Coast Guard were closely linked with the Navy, it was determined that the best path for initial training of female recruits was to use a very similar protocol. Moran is careful to show that, though closely aligned with the training of WAVES and SPARS, there was a clear differentiation between Marine trainees and their counterparts. This book is a helpful and colourful addition to the field of research concerning female Marines in the Second World War.

Jane Plummer
Pensacola, Florida

From Robert Albion’s seminal work, *The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860*, to the more recent Mannahatta Project to the place Russell Shorto dubbed “The Island at the Center of the World,” New York City’s premier borough—Manhattan—has captivated the historical imagination of countless observers. Now, in Kurt Schlichting’s *Waterfront Manhattan: From Henry Hudson to the High Line*, we have a distinctive re-siting of Manhattan’s history. Taking a place-based approach to the island’s waterfront, Schlichting shows how such geographic focus liberates maritime history from some of the traditional perceptions that engulf it, and, instead, reveals it to be a transformative agent whose impact is equally manifest in the waterborne and terrestrial worlds.

Hardly surprising to anyone familiar with the challenges posed by liminal environments (locations where land and water meet), Schlichting begins by chronicling a legacy shared by maritime cities around the globe—the reclamation of waterfront space. Up until the middle of the nineteenth century, private water lot grants provided the incentive for investment in wharves and other infrastructure necessary to fuel the city’s commercial growth. Schlichting reveals the sweeping scope of waterfront infill around southern Manhattan and the degree to which it altered the original contours of the island. Manhattan’s natural endowments were enticing enough, but America’s “culture of improvement” drove the artificial measures that catapulted New York City to the forefront of the nation’s port cities.

Maritime historians need little assistance appreciating New York City’s role as an entrepot, but the materiality of Manhattan’s waterfront development provides tangible insight into how these economic ambitions were implemented. Schlichting’s integrated discussion of the mutual role of packet lines and the cotton trade vividly illuminates how a maritime landscape served as the crucible for trade patterns that shaped modern America’s industrial economy and the broader Atlantic economy. Completing the picture were barges and steamboats bringing grain stuffs (second in value only to cotton as an export) from the Midwest, via the Erie Canal and, for those benefitting from these economic patterns, passenger traffic to resorts north and east of the city, such as Newport, Rhode Island. Schlichting is not content portraying a waterfront devoid of people, and, instead, provides an experience-centered approach to Manhattan’s waterfront, whether it concerns crew on vessels clearing or arriving in port, newly arrived immigrants, or tourists en route to vacation destinations.

*Waterfront Manhattan* capitalizes on the distinctive social dynamics of port life, taking readers from the always familiar “shape up”—where longshoremen gathered in hopes of obtaining work—to the conditions they endured in neighbourhoods adjacent to the city’s busiest shoreline. Detailing the development of neighbourhoods on the Lower East Side, Greenwich Village, and Chelsea, Schlichting describes a waterfront world awash in some of the most pressing social concerns to emerge during urban America’s rapid transformation in the nineteenth century. Transient mariners struggling for food and lodging joined the ranks of permanent residents who weathered occupational accidents, inadequate housing, and mounting sanitation problems. Most notable were the scores of Irish immigrants who gave the waterfront districts their unique cultural milieu—a pattern
earning them the moniker “the Irish waterfront”—and fostering a political climate rife with corruption among waterfront unions and shipping interests; this legacy became internationally visible through Malcolm Johnson’s path-breaking investigative journalism and the 1954 film *On the Waterfront*.

Given its role as a national and international entrepot—to say nothing of its unmatched natural features—Manhattan’s waterfront was bound to engender a host of competing claims and emerging problems as it was consumed by the juggernaut of American enterprise following the Civil War. For example, the advent of intermodal transport as railroad lines descended on Manhattan’s metropolitan orbit, further incentivizing the flow of commodities and people into, and out of, the port. Unlike the confines of the East River, the more expansive Hudson River became the epicentre of these developments as the New York Central Railroad, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Central Railroad of New Jersey and other lines scrambled for space amidst Manhattan’s aging waterfront infrastructure. While railroads displaced traditional users of the waterfront, the “steamship revolution” necessitated piers and wharves capable of accommodating larger vessels. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would not allow piers to be extended further into the Hudson River to service these vessels, Manhattan’s shoreline had to be pulled back—a reversal of earlier infill practice. In short order, rising economic stakes outpaced private investment’s capacity and willingness to invest in the shoreline and, in 1870, New York City established the Department of Docks; a shift from private to public control of Manhattan’s waterfront where a municipal authority would re-acquire waterfront property, manage it, and provide sweeping improvements to its infrastructure. Schlichting describes a nascent progressive sentiment that led to uniform bulkheading around southern Manhattan, the construction of City Beautiful Movement-inspired Chelsea Piers, and the ultimate establishment of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

*Waterfront Manhattan* concludes with the decline and rejuvenation of the island’s waterfront in the latter twentieth century. While longstanding corruption had taken its toll on confidence in the waterfront’s future, decline in Manhattan’s manufacturing sector factored more prominently. But of greatest significance was the introduction of container shipping by Malcom McLean in the late 1950s. Trucks receiving containers from docked vessels required infrastructure that could not be accommodated within the cramped confines of Manhattan. Needing space for cranes, storage, and wharves capable of mooring supersized container ships, Manhattan shipping activity moved to ports in Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey, and Staten Island—more spacious locations with the added advantage of providing manageable access to the interstate highway system.

Schlichting leaves us with compelling thoughts on how waterfront redevelopment changes societal views on what constitutes the maritime landscape—in essence, New York City’s place amidst global port transformation saw working landscapes become residential/recreational landscapes. Emblematic of the push toward multi-use waterfront space have been Manhattan’s Battery Park City, Hudson River Park, and the newly re-purposed High Line Park. Such initiatives are part of gentrification’s grip on the waterfront and it can be challenging for residents or tourists to envision the visceral rhythms of the “Irish waterfront” that once defined these venues.
Leaving readers with a description of the effects of Hurricane Sandy on Manhattan’s waterfront, as well as those of climate change and rising sea levels, Schlichting offers us an immutable insight—that it is the sublime biological and physical power of water that draws us to it, and, at the same time, makes humanity’s aspirational visions co-exist with its uncontrollable force.

Michael J. Chiarappa
Haddonfield, New Jersey


William Still has now completed his trilogy on the U.S. Navy in Europe from the American Civil War through 1924. He began in 1980 with *American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917* which was followed in 2006 with *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War.* This third volume traces the Navy’s activities in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War.

Still begins with a discussion of the U.S. Navy’s deep involvement in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Sailors and officers advised on naval issues, handled communications, and served on allied commissions. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Benson, participated in the conference for a period of time. Still describes the navy’s command structure, especially with regard to European operations. He argues that the navy was committed to playing its part in postwar obligations emerging from the 1918 armistice and the 1919 peace conference. At the same time, however, the USN also faced the challenge of demobilizing.

Benson, and the American public, wanted the navy to demobilize rapidly. Unfortunately, the tasks of bringing home the American Expeditionary Force from France and carrying out residual naval responsibilities in Europe undermined this desire for speed. The end of hostilities in November 1918 caught the navy off guard, having done little planning for the administrative burden of demobilizing. One of the navy’s principal tasks was to return the army from Europe which involved temporarily converting over 20 battleships and cruisers into troops transports. At the same time, the navy was reducing its size from 530,000 in November 1918 to under 130,000 within a year. Demobilization raised challenging issues such as how to handle naval property and equipment stationed in Europe but no longer needed, and how to close down European bases.

While demobilization challenged the navy administratively, minesweeping proved to be a considerable operational challenge. The U.S. Navy was responsible for clearing the thousands of mines laid in the North Sea as part of the Northern Mine Barrage. Sweeping these mines involved setting them off using electrical signals from a passing ship. Exploding mines repeatedly damaged sweeping ships, delaying progress, as did the poor weather so common in the North Sea. Eventually, the navy swept over 20,000 mines, killing thousands of fish to the benefit of Scottish fishermen.

In Paris the debate over how to handle the German fleet proved contentious. Benson believed the British wanted to retain German capital ships to bolster their own fleet.
armistice called for dividing the German fleet between the victorious powers, the Germans scuttled their ships in Scapa Flow in June 1919, making this a largely moot point. The U.S. Navy inspected German naval installations to ensure compliance with the terms of the armistice.

Further south, the navy also sought to curb Italian ambitions in the Adriatic Sea. Italy wanted the Dalmatian coast on the east side of the Adriatic as the price for joining the allied side. After the peace conference, repeated Italian incursions into the area threatened war with the newly formed state of Yugoslavia. Benson insisted that the navy play its part in carrying out the armistice terms in the Adriatic and prevent the Italians and Yugoslavs from kicking off a war. Italy’s nationalistic behaviour soured U.S. naval opinions on the Italians, although a small American naval force did help prevent war from breaking out and calmed tensions.

Subsequent chapters examine the navy’s role in the Allied intervention in Russia and the operations of the American naval squadron in the Black Sea area. This squadron sought to promote American business interests while assisting humanitarian efforts. Robert Shenk has also recently examined these efforts in America’s Black Sea Fleet: The U.S. Navy Amidst War and Revolution, 1919-1923 (2012).

Still conducted extensive research for this book which builds upon his two previous works. There are more than 70 pages of notes and the list of archival sources is impressive. In conclusion, he notes that “the peacetime Navy is rarely at peace” (245). The demands of the armistice, as well as American humanitarianism, created considerable demands on the U.S. Navy’s resources and personnel. Still argues that the navy’s operations in Europe after the war were unheralded at the time and have remained so since. With the publication of Victory Without Peace, this state of affairs will no longer hold.

Corbin Williamson
Montgomery, Alabama


Since the end of the Cold War there has been an unprecedented investment in maritime power by nations of the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. While the relentless growth in the numerical strength and capabilities of China’s navy has been the most spectacular, Japan, Korea, India and Australia have been steadily expanding their maritime forces. Over the same almost-thirty years, European countries, and Canada, have been shrinking their naval forces. The Decline of European Naval Forces is a timely look at how eleven west European navies have been evolving since 1990.

Jeremy Stöhs is an academic educated in both Austria and the United States who has been with the Centre for Maritime Strategy and Security at Kiel University in Germany since 2016. The Decline of European Naval Forces is apparently based on his Master’s Thesis of 2015. It starts by explaining sea power and how geopolitical changes are ending the era of western predominance and replacing it with multipolar power distribution. The narrative underlines how the dominance of US naval power has protected international seaborne trade for the past seventy years. Stöhs
argues that because the geostrategic centre of gravity is shifting from the Atlantic and Europe to Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, it is possible that the United States will no longer be able or willing to act as the global guardian of the seas. Europe should be anticipating this possibility and acting, something many of its countries have not been doing for the past 25 years (5).

The narrative then moves on to “case studies” that examine how the navies of Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden have changed over a 25-year period since the end of the Cold War. The case studies are ambitious because they aim to explain the rationale behind defence and naval programs country by country. They also aim to shine light on individual maritime defence technology sectors. Each case study includes two graphs: one shows the number of major warships in 1990, 2000 and 2015. A second graph traces Defence Spending as a percentage of GDP from 1990 to 2015. An informative appendix provides the same graphs for the United States, China, India and Russia. The Defence Spending to GDP graphs are telling, but only a crude overview at best, because they show overall military rather than naval spending. The platform diagrams do not include maritime patrol or other aircraft. In fact, maritime patrol aircraft are not systematically tackled in this study. The narrative, however, mentions that both the UK and the Netherlands gave up these capabilities, creating a gap given renewed interest in Russian naval activities. Fortunately, the RAF will receive new Poseidon Maritime Patrol aircraft starting in 2020.

The general conclusions are that European navies have shifted emphasis from general warfighting to expedi-
the future impact of the two new Queen Elizabeth carriers. Another interesting verdict on the same page, based on "some naval analysts," is that the Japanese navy was the second-most effective conventional naval power after the United States.

There are jarring assertions that undermine the narrative's credibility. On page 5, a list of countries that have significant stakes in seaborne trade oddly ignores the Netherlands, location of Rotterdam, Europe's largest port. Readers are told that France withdrew from NATO in 1966 (58). In fact, France withdrew from the Alliance integrated military structures in 1966 but continued as part of its political structure. France contributed to various NATO military missions after 1990 and rejoined the military structure in 2009 (68). Each case study includes a useful summary of a nation's naval past. The summary on Germany on page 127 is based on verdicts by two other commentators whose qualifications are not given at this point. Because these verdicts appear to be summaries themselves lifted out of longer discussions, they present an unnuanced and puerile picture: Germany lacks the naval history and culture of a blue-water navy capable of the full ranges of naval warfare because its naval ambitions "were squandered in both World Wars." Moreover, "German sea power in both World Wars was never imbued with that determination to close with and destroy the enemy which was the tradition in Britain's Royal Navy." Such sweeping statements really require supporting rationale. They reinforce an impression that the narrative covers many areas but lacks depth.

The introduction explains that this book is intended for a broad readership, a commendable goal. A list of acronyms and abbreviations is at the front of the book. In fact, the detailed and acronym-sprinkled discussions of various warships classes and their weapons and sensor systems are not accessible for a general reader. Photographs of warship classes or diagrams would have helped. Readers of defence technology journals and websites will be comfortable with the advantages of "a tri-national PAAMS system instead of choosing the American Aegis combat system and SPY-1D radar …" (82) but a general reader will struggle. Aegis is an automated system that uses a phased array radar to detect and track multiple targets and to guide weapons to destroy enemy targets. It crops up in several discussions but is never defined and is not in the acronyms and abbreviations list. Some descriptions of warships will appeal to naval technology insiders, but their significance may be missed by the general reader: a discussion about the innovative Danish Absalon class support ship includes the following: "Even more flexibility is provided by the weapons modules installed amidships. Four quad Harpoon SSM launchers and 3 12-cell Mk 56 VLS find space between the main mast and funnels; they are able to deploy a total of 36 ESSMs, in addition to the 16 Harpoon SSMs. A single127mm/62 caliber Mk 45 gun is mounted in the A position on the bow, which is overlooked by an Oerlikon 35mm CIWS (B position)." (145-46).

Stöhs sets his discussion of individual navies in a wide context. It covers a broad span of topics—from contemporary sea power to geopolitical changes to post-Cold War multinational operations and the evolution of weapons technology. It’s noteworthy that Stöhs digresses in various place to touch on topics such as aircraft carrier developments in India and China. These excursions enhance and help broaden the narrative. The endnotes
are comprehensive, and the index is exemplary because it provides detailed page references. The entry for Norway for example is more than just a list of pages but an itemized list of topics. The book’s production standards are a credit to the US Naval Institute Press. They feature its characteristic sturdy binding, clear typeface and clearly presented diagrams. Having said this, photographs or annotated line drawings of ships would have helped a general reader to sort through the differences between the several warship classes and weapons systems covered.

*The Decline of European Naval Forces* is an ambitious project based on open sources. Its coverage reaches far wider than simply a discussion of 11 navies, setting it apart from annual warship development publications that cater to a niche market. It also spans a longer time period. Although intended for general readers, a grasp of current naval weapons systems is required to follow the narrative which in places is jargon-filled. In an interview about his book on YouTube, Stöhs says that he hopes that this study can be updated in future. A follow-on version better crafted to be accessible for general readers could help inform publics about maritime defence issues. Including more navies from countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, whose democratic governments face the same budget challenges as those of Europe, could widen its appeal and add interesting parallels.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


It is a brave historian who attempts to summarize the naval history of the Second World War within the confines of a single book. Samuel Eliot Morison famously took 15 volumes just to detail U.S. naval operations during the conflict; in this light, Stephen Roskill’s four volumes in the official history of the Royal Navy during the war stand as a model of concision. Yet with this book, Craig L. Symonds, a longtime scholar and author of several excellent studies of the naval efforts of both the American Civil War and the Second World War, has undertaken such an effort. The result reflects the challenges inherent in such an endeavour, as well as the compromises necessary to achieve it.

The first challenge involves comprehensiveness. Any survey of the naval aspects of the Second World War must necessarily be a globe-spanning enterprise, and Symonds’ book indeed encompasses operations on all of the world’s oceans. Yet the trade-off here is embodied in the title. This is a very much a history of the war at sea, with the battles on the rivers of Europe and Asia left unaddressed. His scope is narrowed further by his concentration on the key theatres of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea, with the engagements in the Baltic and Black Seas in particular referenced only in passing. This confines Symonds’s coverage to the naval war waged between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Axis powers on the other, as Soviet maritime operations are barely mentioned. Finally, in the balance between narrative and analysis the scale is tipped towards the former, as Symonds devotes more pages to describing battles than engaging in a detailed breakdown of all of the
factors of the naval war. What emerges from these choices is a book that is a superb introduction to its subject, one that provides an excellent starting point for readers new to the conflict, yet still contains insights that reward the time of readers well versed in the battle.

Symonds begins his book, not as one might expect with the bombardment of Polish positions in Danzig by the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein in September of 1939, but with the London Naval Conference nine years earlier. This allows him to set the stage with a deft summary of the major navies in the war that followed while highlighting some of the issues that contributed to the conflict. Symonds then moves straight into the war itself, summarizing the major operations and detailing the key battles. Germany’s war on Britain’s trade looms large in these chapters, as does the fall of France in June 1940 and the dramatic shift in the naval balance that resulted. From the start he demonstrates the balance of the strategic, operational, and personal details that is a hallmark of the book as a whole, showing how the decisions made in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the struggle in the Mediterranean affected not just the war in that region, but the broader global struggle as well. Here, the United States is key as Symonds traces the gradual expansion of America’s involvement in the effort to provide the British with the resources necessary to continue the war.

This required a careful management of American naval assets, particularly given ongoing U.S. tensions with Japan. It is at this point when the global focus of Symonds’ book truly comes into play, as his approach illuminates how both Britain and the United States had to factor Japan’s expansionist impulses into their deployment of naval assets. As his narrative expands to include the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the U.S. and Britain take centre stage in his narrative as the only major combatants waging a truly worldwide war. Symonds repeatedly underscores the juggling act this entailed, most notably with the ships themselves. At the start of the war, the pressure was greatest on the smaller warships, particularly the versatile destroyers that served so many functions. But with the development of smaller escorts and the gradual suppression of the U-boats, it was the Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs) which proved indispensable to the war effort. Symonds highlights these unromantic workhorses in a way few other historians of the war have, not just for their immediate use in the invasions taking place in both Europe and the Pacific, but their ongoing employment as roll-on/roll-off supply vessels to sustain them until port facilities became available. So vital were the LSTs and so thinly were they spread, Symonds argues, that the destruction of three of them by German E-boats in the Exercise Tiger disaster nearly forced the postponement of the entire Normandy invasion, with only a hasty redeployment saving the day.

It is details such as this which make Symonds’s book such a rewarding read. Epic in its scope and perceptive in its analysis, it manages the difficult feat of providing a fresh perspective on a well-worn subject. It will likely remain as the standard overview of naval aspects of the Second World War for years to come, and the measure by which future works on the subject are judged.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona

With _The Trawlermen_ Clarence Vautier provides a book that is, on the one hand, a short and easy read, but on the other, a major challenge for a reviewer. Divided into 25 chapters, each focusing on a particular ship of the Newfoundland fishing fleet of the post-Second World War era, he tells 25 remarkable stories that involved these ships. From a strictly academic point of view, Vautier does not provide any information on the selection criteria used for choosing these particular stories nor does he provide any information on the sources used in recounting the different events. Thus, from this perspective, one must conclude that the book is neither written for a scholarly audience nor is it likely to be used as a primary or secondary source.

While such a judgement can easily be justified, it would be an unfair take on the Vautier’s work. One cannot criticize a book for being something that it is not and does not claim to be.

_The Trawlermen_ simply presents a collection of sea stories, sometimes with a heroic touch, that describes living and working conditions onboard the Newfoundland trawler fleet. As such, the book can easily be recommended to any reader interested in a casual, yet interesting read.

Nevertheless, given Vautier’s background as a professional mariner having actually worked on a good number of fishing voyages off the east coast of Canada, the book might also be relevant for the professional maritime historian, even if only on a meta-level.

Although the author does not provide any information about his sources or his selection criteria, it is possible to extract the information from between the lines. What seems to surface is a strong emphasis on heroic and dangerous actions ascribed to various named crewmembers of the respective vessels. In other words, the book is intended to tell the stories of unknown or forgotten heroes and to bring their names to public attention. On the meta-level, this should indicate to the maritime and/or social historian something about the self-perception of trawlermen. Clearly, some of them are self-conscious or at least aware of a certain lack of public recognition of their work.

Any maritime historian who has worked with fishermen in oral history projects will know the self-perceived ‘underdog feeling’ of some fishermen in relation to merchant mariners or navy sailors and the concept of publicly telling the heroic story of the fishermen to overcome this ‘underdog feeling’.

This may be the origin for Vautier’s book, but it might also be a case of an over-analytical approach to a review of a book that simply wants to tell stories of the men working the trawlers off the coast of Newfoundland during the second half of the twentieth century.

Would I recommend the book to a fellow maritime historian? Yes and no.

I would recommend it to the very small group of fisheries historians interested in meta-level analysis and extraction of hidden motifs in the context of oral history projects. They would find the book a relevant source for work on the meta-level. I also would recommend the book to any historian who is beginning to work in the field of fisheries history and has absolutely no clue about how the fisheries work. Vautier offers an easy-to-grasp insight into the understanding of the inner dynamics of crews onboard fishing vessels and the fisheries at large. For the majority of maritime and/or fisheries historians, _The Trawlermen_ might be of somewhat limited relevance outside of some entertaining sea-tales.
Since the book does not pretend to do anything other than telling the trawlermen’s stories, it easily delivers on this goal.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


World Naval Review is an annual that describes the fleets and technologies of the world’s navies in an established format: a world overview (first section) followed in the second section by reviews of the four principal regions; these are all by author/editor Conrad Waters, although the regional reviews include articles about particular navies by other writers. The third section describes significant ships, and the fourth is devoted to technical reviews, one of which is always about naval aviation. There are many photographs and comparative tables.

In this year’s overview, the editor comments on the revival of Cold War-like tensions between the USA/NATO and Russia. He points out that the only two nations with “real terms” decreases in defence spending over the last decade are the United States and the United Kingdom, while Asian nations—chiefly China, but also South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Indonesia—are showing a larger proportion of defence, especially naval, expenditures.

The review of the Americas is largely concerned with the United States Navy, by far the largest. As well as a new fleet carrier, units of several categories (submarines, littoral combat ships and amphibious types) are joining the fleet and a new frigate design is being considered. The detailed articles in the section, however, are about the Royal Canadian Navy (by Theodore Hughes-Riley,) and the Peruvian Navy (by Guy Toremans). The former gives a short historical background and mentions the interim supply ship MV Astérix, the Harry DeWolf Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and the future frigates. Toreman’s article (subtitled “Making Great Strides”) is about a small navy in the process of modernisation.

After considerable comment on the Chinese Navy (PLAN) in last year’s edition, this year’s remarks on that subject are fairly short, although the comparative tables show that China now is indeed a major naval power. There are also several effective medium-sized navies in the Asia/Pacific region: South Korea, Japan, Indonesia and Australia, all of which are engaged in programs of construction and modernisation. In this section, the Navy chosen for a detailed description is that of the Republic of Singapore. This is by Mrityunjoy Muzumdar, who dealt with the South Korean Navy last year. Singapore is essentially a city-state, but it can operate an effective navy that includes submarines and a variety of surface warships. It is situated right beside the narrowest chokepoint in the strategic Straits of Malacca, which it plainly wants to have some ability to control.

The Indian Ocean and Africa region includes areas where piracy and drug smuggling are persistent problems. Add the wars and tensions in the Arabian Peninsula and we find that those waters are full of warships of many nations from all over the world, mostly co-operating but also pursuing their national interests. The Indian Navy is the largest in the region and has been obtaining Russian help while pursuing its own construction programs, but building times are very long. In the
The European Region the most significant development is the return of the British Royal Navy to operating large fleet aircraft carriers with the completion of the Queen Elizabeth, which will be followed by the Prince of Wales. These ships are only surpassed in size by the eleven 100,000-ton super carriers of the United States Navy.

The Significant Ships section features the two new “first of class” fleet carriers: the Gerald R. Ford of the USN and the Queen Elizabeth of the RN. The Ford has a new design of nuclear reactor and is fitted with electromagnetic catapults, a new arrestor system, and other innovations like new ammunition elevators, some of which have given trouble as new systems often do. While the hull is much the same, she differs in appearance from the preceding Nimitz class in having a taller island considerably further aft. The Queen Elizabeth also differs in appearance from her predecessors or, indeed, any previous aircraft carrier, by having two island superstructures, one for ship control and the other for air operations, though either can fill in for the other in case of damage. The mainstay of the Air Wing of both ships will be the F-35 fighter. In the Queen Elizabeth’s case, that will be the STOL or “B” version while the Ford will have both “B” and “C” variants. There will also be other types of aircraft and helicopters essential to a fleet carrier. The description of the Gerald R. Ford is by Scott Traver, that of the Queen Elizabeth by the editor. The photographs and diagrams in this section are exceptionally good and images of the two ships share the cover.

The last section, “World Naval Aviation” by David Hobbs, is a perennial feature and discusses the mix of aircraft employed by the US Navy and those of other nations, including the large-deck amphibious or helicopter-carrying ships that may also be capable of handling STOL jets. The technological review of modern naval communications, by distinguished historian Norman Friedman, starts with an historical background (and some vintage photographs). Satellite communications have provided naval staffs and on-scene commanders with new control abilities and data links between units are now so important that updated electronics tend to be the most important modifications when ships receive mid-life refits. Tied into this is the growing use of autonomous systems, which are covered by Richard Scott. In addition to the aerial drones with which we have become familiar, there are mine countermeasures craft and, in the near future, autonomous submarines that could deploy missiles, mines or torpedoes. The USA and Russia are both intensely pursuing research in this field.

It should be remembered that World Naval Review 2019 describes the naval situation as of mid-2018.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Battleship U.S.S. Nevada was a tough, though vulnerable, old bird. Beginning active life in 1916, she was, in author Stephen Younger’s phrase, the world’s “first super-dreadnought” (5) because of her advanced oil-driven power plant and her “all or nothing” armour arrangement concentrated on the vessel’s most critical areas. Her fore- and aft-mounted main 14 inch gun battery, while not unique, nonetheless reflected the most advanced thinking in naval ordnance
with its emphasis on bringing all main batteries to bear during broadsides.

Sent to Ireland with her sister battlewagons *Oklahoma* and *Utah* near the end of the Great War, *Nevada* and her colleagues saw no action though they did make a sweep out into the North Atlantic upon the unfounded rumour that German Admiral Hipper was coming out to attack troop convoys with his fast battlecruisers. Thereafter, *Nevada* spent the next twenty-three years in peacetime pursuits. The author wisely does not gloss over this period; critical developments were taking place which not only shaped the battleship’s future but also the impending Second World War.

First, the inter-war United States Navy was a very hard working outfit. Daily in-port routine focused on keeping ships clean and efficient, which took time. Despite often severe budgetary restrictions, ships were often at sea on either training-and-good-will voyages or the annual fleet exercises which were rigorously, if unimaginatively, pursued (invariably culminating in a Jutland-style slugging match between American and enemy battle lines).

Second, as the years passed, *Nevada* and her sisters slipped into obsolescence as the restrictive Washington Naval Treaty and later agreements kept the U.S. and the other great naval powers from replenishing their capital ships. Because of their intrinsic superiority in both speed and reach together with (for most) lesser tonnage, aircraft carriers inexorably moved to the fore as World War Two approached, then broke out.

Third, as early as the late twenties, *Nevada* and many (though not all) of her sisters began to suffer minor but chronic materiel breakdowns; their ponderous speeds slowed down the battle line; their power plants became questionable; and their main 14 inch batteries were inferior to newer 15- and 16-inch guns deployed on more recent American and foreign battleships. The brutal but undeniable point has frequently been made over the past 75 years that Pearl Harbor was a blessing in disguise for it destroyed a still-unreplenished American battle fleet that was slow and worn out. *Nevada* was a near-perfect exemplar.

The bulk of *Silver State Dreadnought* is devoted to *Nevada*’s very active wartime service from the gallant, if futile attempt to get the big ship clear of harbour on 7 December 1941 to her final days on the gunline at Okinawa three and a half years later. Resurrected from near scrapping by wise heads who saw the need for heavy gunfire support ships as the U.S. moved to the offensive in 1943, *Nevada* plied her trade with deadly accuracy from Normandy to Southern France and back into the Pacific at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The battleship endured many adventures and not a few hair-raising escapes during this most dramatic part of its career. Author Younger knows how to tell a story from dry documents. Without either forcing or stretching the evidence the author left this reader fairly close to the edge of his seat on several occasions.

We now have three accounts of America’s inter-war battlefleet and its fate—several books on *Arizona*; Jeff Phister and his colleagues on *Oklahoma* and now *Nevada*. Each of these ships and their sisters were products of a time of constant transition and transformation and their rapid obsolescence proved fatal to two of them. But Younger concludes with his usual sagacity that *Nevada* “was always the best ship her design allowed her to be” (260). She also had the good luck—and the good wartime officers and men—to be able to prove the point.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington
BACKLIST


Much has been written about the Battle of the Atlantic, either as an overall campaign or individual conflicts between U-boat and a surface warship (destroyer, frigate, or corvette), but almost always from the perspective of the warship. Rarely do we have accounts from the merchant ship’s officers and crew. This book is an exception, and a worthy one to relate the experiences of at least 40 merchant marine officers and sailors. Author Pearce also used archival material from the British National Archives [at Kew] and local libraries.

Pearce served as a Royal Naval gunner on merchant ships in convoys crossing the Atlantic before joining HMS *Trinidad* in October 1941 as Commander’s Writer. He was serving on her when she was torpedoed by one of her own errant torpedoes and then dive-bombed and sunk (actually scuttled) during convoy PQ13 (May 1941). That self-torpedoing incident is told in his book *The Ship that Torpedoed Herself*. A prolific writer, he has authored 10 books, most of them about naval actions.

*Heroes* has 10 chapters, each dealing with separate incidents. The first recounts the October 1940 attack of the *Admiral Scheer* on convoy HX84 which was being shepherded by the armoured cruiser HMS *Jervis Bay*. The story is about one ship in that convoy, *San Demetrio*, an 8000-ton tanker with 12,000 tons of fuel on board. Shells from the *Scheer* wrecked the superstructure and started fires but, fortunately, the cargo did not ignite. The crew beat a hasty exit and watched the ship burn but it did not sink. The *Scheer* moved on to other targets. The two lifeboats had separated during the next two days, when one of them came across the still-burning ship. The 16 crew members in the lifeboat, headed by the second officer, reboarded the ship, extinguished the fires, and got the engines going again. Without charts or compass to aid in navigation, they managed to get the ship 1500 miles to the coast of Ireland, and then to the Clyde estuary.

Another chapter deals with the fate of a number of the ships in PQ17 after being ordered to ‘scatter’ north of North Cape and how they managed to find their way to Murmansk. The longest chapter is about Operation PEDESTAL, in particular, the delivery of the oil tanker *Ohio* to the heavily besieged island of Malta in August 1942. The importance of the material in the five freighters and single tanker that succeeded getting there is well documented by Pearce. This is a compelling story told from the perspective of the merchant ship, as opposed to the normal recitation of facts from a naval report. The Merchant Marine’s motto must surely have been “Never turn back”.

Pearce is an excellent writer who tells a very gripping story. He may have a few facts wrong (e.g., the continuing existence of the *Graf Spee* in October 1940 (22) or the improbable situation of a third officer still in his bunk well after Action Stations had been sounded), but such things can be easily set aside by the good telling of a good tale.

David H. Gray
Ottawa, Ontario