
Each of the eleven authors in this work has his own style and every chapter offers a unique perspective on the subject of strategy. This approach offers many advantages, as it provides a very rounded critique of the world view that is being stressed. The lack of naval strategy is a bit strange, in a book produced by the Naval Institute Press, but there is so much strategic content within the work that it would probably have required a second volume to encapsulate naval strategy in equivalent detail. This book focuses mainly on strategy as applied to conflicts on land or in the air. The approach is as professional as the stylish black and orange cover, depicting the image of interlocking cogs, which provide a striking, representation of the contents.

The chapters vary: for example, chapter 4 is written in a Socratic style, sacrificing some content and argument to preserve the style. This can be a very good method of instruction, and certainly in parts, this chapter achieves that spectacularly, but in others it feels a little laboured. In contrast, the more conventionally written sections seem perhaps slightly less dramatic, but a lot more consistent, and would probably be easier for new student of strategy to digest. Chapter 3, *The Realist as Strategist* (James Wood Forsyth Jr.; 61-74), is a good example, providing an informed and flowing argument that guides the reader through its subject matter in an effortless wave. Readers will find the conclusion thought-provoking as it offers a different perspective, for example: “Rather, what strategists need to ascertain is, “What kind of interests do statesmen have in mind when they act?” Survival is but one, honour another. No doubt there are more” (71). In fact, that theme runs through the conclusions.

In Chapter 9, *Four Dimensions of the Digital Debate*, Richard J. Bailey Jr., proposes “The recognition that power is a social commodity leads to the conclusion that societal tensions must be confronted, as a basis for understanding strategy more fully” (204). If the axiom ‘knowledge is power’ is true, it must also be concluded that knowledge is also a social commodity, which raises the interesting possibility that this work, by passing on knowledge of strategy, increases individual power. In

Chapter 7, *Beyond the Horizon*, Jeffrey F. Smith promulgates the future of airpower debate that “As with all organizational change, some will find every reason not to take the future context into account if it means changing what they understand and cherish about today’s airpower strategy (mainly manned flight)” (154). This whole chapter is an in-depth analysis of the future of airpower, on the role of air forces and how the world might change — it is definitely a must-read. In fact, the book’s extensive notes, index and bibliography make this essential for any student of strategy, military history or international relations. Careful reading will provide readers with an excellent guide to valuable and relevant sources.

As Mark O. Yeisley states candidly in the conclusion “Lest the reader be unduly disappointed, this book does not clearly answer the question of what strategy is; instead, it focuses more on how strategy should be sought and outlines multiple approaches for doing so.” (253) These different approaches create an insightful whole. While the title might be misleading for readers looking for a book about air power strategy, a more thorough reading will reveal its real value. This book is a framing work, creating a structure for thinking about strategy. Although the casually interested might find it difficult, *Strategy; Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower* is an excellent book for serious students and academics.

Alex Clarke
Epsom, Surrey


*Lincoln’s Trident* chronicles the history of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron of the United States Navy from its establishment in the spring of 1862 through the end of the Civil War. From the taking of New Orleans and the mighty Mississippi River, to the invasion of Mobile Bay, Browning neatly weaves the glories of battle into a well-curated series of contexts that illustrate the logistical, strategic, and personal challenges faced by the individuals involved.

Almost immediately after the secession of Southern states and the bombardment of Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861, the country erupted into Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln directed the Union Navy to blockade the 3,549-mile Gulf of Mexico coast, preventing the Confederacy from engaging in commerce. Charged with guarding 189 approaches of variable, but undeniably shallow, depths (hostile fortresses guarding the most prominent of these) and fitted with only 42 deep water vessels in commission, “in 1861, the navy would be hard-pressed to blockade a single major port in the South” (6). Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles would be immediately challenged in his task, not only by the loss of a most valuable Navy yard in Norfolk,
meaning resupply of a Southern blockade must happen from New York, but also in buying, fitting out, and provisioning vessels of appropriate size, propulsion, and draft.

As the author explains, most of the Union Navy’s vessels at the start of the war were large sailing ships, and the officers appointed to them were, by and large, forged in the War of 1812. These vessels and the tactics employed by their officers were well fitted to the Western portion of the blockade around Texas and Louisiana, where the deep, wide waters of the Gulf provided ample room to manoeuvre these large warships into offensive positions and provisioning coal was exceedingly difficult. Fresh water and victuals, however, proved another story. By contrast, in the Eastern portion of the blockade around Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi, steam vessels had the advantage where coal could be more easily had; when the seas were calm, they were still fit for the chase and had access to the approaches, making these shallower draft vessels much more suited to the task. When coal ran out, however, as it inevitably did, the steam vessels were just as problematic.

Onto this backdrop of too few vessels, of the wrong draft and type, with insufficient reprovisioning in place, the author presents several other layers of challenges for our hero squadron. First, unrealistic expectations coupled with the Union Government’s lack of unified strategic objectives plagued the Navy. Second, personal egos and infantile machismos of the commanding officers complicated otherwise straightforward missions. Finally, the inability of the Army to cooperate sufficiently left the fleet’s efforts (and sacrifices) almost moot. By July, 1862, the Mississippi fleet met the Gulf fleet, having collectively taken the entire Mississippi River in preparation for the arrival of the Army to hold it. Instead, “with little or no coordination between the service branches and no cooperative continuing strategy that could use the gathered naval assets, [the fleet’s] role on the river became largely unnecessary and [its] orders to cooperate with the army obsolete” (172). Rather than continue suffering the yellow fever that was raging through the ranks, or getting stuck in the river for the remainder of the year as the water levels continued to fall below the deep draft of the sailing warships, the fleet left the river and returned to the blockade, but not before failing on multiple occasions to take the ironclad Arkansas, principally at Vicksburg. The author’s description of the series of battles comprising the effort to destroy her is both compelling and agonizing.

Although both accounts are well written, the continued blockade and failure to take Mobile was as agonizing to read as the actual battle for Mobile Bay was enthralling. “By 1864, Mobile’s value to the Confederacy had increased, because it was the only major deepwater port remaining on the Gulf Coast east of the Mississippi [and] the two railroads that served the city gave the port added importance” (423). Moreover, the waterways reaching into the South from Mobile served as important communications networks. Had the Navy and Army worked together to secure and hold the city, suggests the author, the Confederacy may have
fallen far earlier than it did. It was not until 3 August 1864, however, that the campaign for Mobile finally commenced (441) with four ironclads “forming a line” to take the bay early the next morning (444) and the inveterate now-Rear Admiral Farragut positioned in the tops of the flag vessel. With the heart-wrenching loss of “our best monitor” Tecumseh, and along with her all but 21 of her 114 men, and amid “the carnage of battle... the bloodstained deck... and the body fragments” (461), Farragut gives his most famous order, “Go ahead sir, d – n the torpedoes” (451). Eventually the Bay is in Union hands, along with the forts defending it. By 15 August, the Army and Navy were again quarrelling over who would, in fact, take the city itself. By this point, now Vice-Admiral Farragut leaves the squadron for a promotion as commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Within months, the blockade was ended by Congress, and with surrender after surrender, the war was over.

This work is of sufficient length for the author to have introduced some extremely interesting historic characters, including the first Commander of the Squadron, the unfortunate William Mervine; the industrious officer who spearheaded much of the strategic confusion, Gustavus Fox; and the quintessentially dishonest David Porter. Despite not being able to hide his disgust and distain for the ego-maniacal Mr. Porter, the author manages to present all of the major characters objectively enough to do them justice and to allow the reader to comprehend personal quirks and intentions—both good and ill—quite clearly. This reader found the work to be obviously well researched and filled with rich, relevant detail. The battle descriptions were particularly well-rendered and contrasted nicely with the discussions detailing political intrigue, especially that of Porter toward his superior officer and foster brother, David Glasgow Farragut. Make no mistake: Lincoln’s Trident represents serious scholarship, but feels more like a compelling novel; in truth, this reader was hard-pressed to put it down.

Brandi Carrier
Alexandria, Virginia


For over a quarter century, Bernard D. Cole, a retired Navy captain, Auburn University Ph.D and former faculty member at the U.S. Naval War College, has been one of the most distinguished and meticulous observers of China’s ever-growing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). His latest work is a more than satisfactory culmination of years of scholarship. A comparatively short but tightly written book, it covers a broad field fully and gracefully.

Cole’s argument is cogent and compelling. Following thirty-odd years of “miracle” growth, China has become the world’s second-largest
economy, but one desperately reliant on imports of energy and other resources. While itself a substantial oil producer, China has grown so spectacularly that it now imports “at least half its oil,” (136) mostly by sea from the Middle East. Moreover, Beijing is ambitious to continue its expansion into African, Middle Eastern, and especially European markets. To accomplish and maintain these objectives, China must ensure the sea lines of communications (SLOC) between the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the China coast through such maritime chokepoints as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca and the South and East China Seas. Hence, the need for a substantial navy.

Beyond that objective lies a tantalizing dream: that by centenary of the People’s Republic in 2049, its fleet will be sufficiently large and efficient to make its presence felt throughout the world ocean. Cole emphasizes that “the PLAN will not be curtailed by lines of Western defensive concepts in defending Chinese maritime interests. Its doctrine has been described as a ‘strategically defensive and active self-defense counterattack’ triggered” as soon as the “enemy splits and invades China’s territory, severely harming China’s interests . . . equivalent to firing the first shot at China at the strategic level.’” The PLAN’s mission is “‘do all we can to dominate the enemy by striking first. . . as far away as possible.” (91). Shades of Pearl Harbor!

The “enemy” is, of course, the American navy whose continued presence in force in Far Eastern waters both alarms and infuriates the PLAN. “China’s maritime strategic thought assumes the United States is determined to contain and encircle China. One analyst at the influential PLA Academy of Military Science recently describes the PLAN as ‘relatively weak,’ with “China’s maritime security at the mercy of . . . the United States Navy.” (109)

Nonetheless, the latest PRC defense white paper issued in May 2015 ordered the PLAN to transition from its present “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection” of China’s maritime interests. (97). How realistic is this objective? At one point, Professor Cole suggests it is quite feasible. Citing the conclusions of a 2015 maritime conference at the U.S. Naval War College, he writes that “At current pace, the PLAN will become the world’s second-largest navy by 2020 and equal to the U.S. Navy in quality and quantity by 2030.” (71) This seems quite a stretch for an unbalanced navy largely comprised of destroyers, frigates and both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines. In fact, in his admirably balanced account, the author adduces an abundance of evidence to the contrary. Present day China is plagued by a number of potentially crippling problems that argue against the creation and deployment of a global navy in any conceivable future. The overriding objective of the PRC is the maintenance of power which depends absolutely upon continuation of a robust economy. Yet that economy is increasingly burdened by domestic and foreign demands. “The country’s total debt. . . at the end of 2014 equaled 282 percent” of China’s GDP. . .” (119) According to a leading Chinese official, both public and
private investment is weak; domestic consumption is “sluggish”, (117) the international market place is stagnant, industrial production is falling while costs and prices rise. Corruption is rampant. “According to several sources,” the entire Chinese military establishment is dominated by a notion utterly foreign to effective and efficient modern sea services: “if it is worth something it is for sale’ particularly promotions and certain duty assignments.” (120).

The greatest impediment to the creation and maintenance of a global Chinese battle fleet, however, is the lack of innovation throughout China’s industrial economy, a fact often remarked upon by foreign observers and decried at the highest domestic level. The Party dislikes and fears free-thinkers in any area of national life. Largely cut off from access to Western and especially American high tech advances, save where it can purloin information and processes or obtain them from third-parties, the PLA in general and the PLA-N in particular is largely forced to rely on the uneven fruits of Russian and even Soviet-era production and products (i.e. the old Soviet aircraft carrier Liaoning).

The author might have devoted greater space to the problem of professional training and development of both officers and enlisted personnel. Like the economy it is designed to protect, the PLA-N is brand new. In the utter absence of combat experience, how effectively do its sailors handle the advanced technologies that the PRC has been forced to develop to implement its current “area denial, anti-access” (“AD/A2) strategy. How well do fleet units manoeuvre together? How efficient are air operations from the single, Soviet era aircraft carrier, Liaoning? Admittedly these and a host of related questions are hard to answer in the absence of PLAN transparency. Thanks to Dr. Cole and other observers we do know that the PLAN is often at sea and willing to partner operations with other navies, notably those of the Russian Federation and the United States (i.e. the annual “Rimpac” manoeuvres off Hawaii).

Finally, in a situation reflecting that of Japan in the 1930s, the PLAN is engaged in ongoing competition for attention, resources and respect between an army oriented toward continental security and strategy and the PLA-N seeking global maritime status. As Cole wisely concludes, despite earlier suggestions to the contrary “If China succeeds in deploying an effective global navy while remaining a strong continental power, it truly will have beaten the historical odds and established a new paradigm of national power.” (113).

I have but one significant criticism. While the Naval Institute Press is an admirable organization turning out distinguished products, its audience is understandably limited largely to professional military and naval people many of whom are familiar with at least the outlines of Professor Cole’s argument. His well-written work deserves a much broader readership among a public that badly needs informed discussion of a subject of growing national importance in a time of frequent media sensationalism.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington

There are not many comprehensive surveys of Central American maritime history and/or archaeology, and even fewer that contextualize the past as a function of landscape development. Panama is unique in the Western Hemisphere, if not the world, in that it is in its entirety, the only transcontinental isthmus directly linking two oceans and two longitudinally continuous coasts.

The thesis of *The Maritime Landscape of the Isthmus of Panama* is that Panama is “inherently a maritime landscape, both in its geography and culture and from prehistoric times until the present (xiii)”, and that its importance lies in both coastal migration and transportation and its access to harvestable marine resources. The goal of the authors is to “explain” Panama and its development as a maritime cultural landscape from its earliest prehistoric inhabitants more than 10,000 years ago to the present through the lens of world systems and maritime cultural landscape theories.

The book is organized in an easy to follow format of chapters that cover recognizable periods of prehistory / history in which some socio-political activity, geographic discovery, and/or technological innovation irrevocably transformed Panama’s maritime cultural landscape. Each chapter consists of a history of the period, a discussion of the built environment and important socially imposed landscape identifiers (such as place names), and related archaeological sites and their associated scientific investigations. All of prehistory is contained within a single chapter, while the Spanish colonial and later French and American commercial periods comprise the rest. The majority of the book is devoted to the Spanish colonial period, especially that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is a function, I believe, of three factors: the relative dearth of prehistoric archaeology programs in Panama compared with historic archaeology (though what is presented appears to be well done), the specific areas of expertise of the authors, and the archaeological sites within Panama that have received the most comprehensive scientific investigation and subsequent conservation and protection. The description of the history of this time period, its events and resulting archaeological sites, and resultant effects on the maritime cultural landscape are the most comprehensive and vibrant in the book, and are the chapters in which individual people, for example Henry Morgan, and local communities play a significant role in the discussion of the landscape.

Unlike many other long-form characterizations of maritime archaeological landscapes elsewhere in the world, shipwrecks play only a small role and an overall minor component in the evolution of Panama’s maritime cultural landscape as defined in this book. The authors explicitly define contributing shipwrecks as those engaged in trade, colonial or other-
wise, with or through Panama and that wrecked within its coastal waters, and those built or modified specifically for the Panama route, including those that wrecked thousands of miles from Panama, but excludes those that transited through the Panama Canal. While the latter may not be contributing elements to Panama’s maritime cultural landscape, their presence and design evolution most definitely played, and continues to do so, an important role in the evolution of the canal as a contributing component itself.

The authors do show the importance and results of dissonance in attempts at patterning new socio-cultural and technical systems onto at first, indigenous physical geographical landscapes and later, the machined and terraformed environment in the evolution of the maritime cultural and physical landscape. This is illustrated through an excellent use of historic cartographic and archaeological evidence for why towns and ports thrived or failed and were abandoned or relocated throughout history and the persistence or loss of recognized geographic place names. This is, however, often treated as ancillary information at the end of a discussion rather than evidence for the continuing evolution and persistence of Panama as a coherent maritime landscape throughout its history.

The weakest chapters of the book are those that discuss the development and role of the trans-isthmus canal, both the interrupted French efforts and the American completion of the Panama Canal, the demarcation of the Canal Zone, and its fortification during the First and Second World Wars. The discussion of this approximately 150-year period is essentially a listing of the components of the built environment associated with the construction, operation, and protection of the canal and the historical impetus for their construction. While comprehensive, detailed, and fascinating in their own right, there is little attempt to incorporate the canal and its material components into the greater maritime cultural landscape of Panama, including local motivation of patterning and placement or its effects on local society. While the canal obviously dominates the maritime landscape of Panama both physically and socially, one might think that it is the only important contributing component to the maritime landscape in the twentieth century.

The other major critique of the information as presented is the relegation of the indigenous Guna and their agency in both shaping and using the maritime cultural landscape in the perpetuation of their livelihoods and culture to the conclusion chapter of the book. They do not occupy a separate landscape from their colonial occupiers, though access to or knowledge of internally recognized social signifiers on the landscape may have been restricted to only them and to those with whom they chose to share it. This discussion warrants either its own chapter or a section of each chronological chapter.

The data and information presented in this book are so rich that questions one could pose to the maritime cultural landscape arise as one progresses through the book. For example, Panama was ostensibly a colony of some sort, whether in a
historical or modern form, until 1999 when the Canal Zone was officially handed over to Panamanian authorities. As a colony, therefore, Panama is intrinsically a part of a larger socio-political and geographical system and peripheral diaspora. What then is the interplay between Panama as a component of this greater international landscape and as a local maritime landscape in and of itself?

The Maritime Landscape of the Isthmus of Panama is a valuable resource for historians and archaeologists with an academic and/or heritage conservation interest in the maritime history, archaeology, and the comprehensive landscape of Panama and the role the isthmus played and continues to play in global maritime transportation, security, and commerce. Any shortcomings identified are due, not to what is included as important components of Panama’s maritime cultural landscape, but to the desire for more; the understanding the investigation of landscape of the time periods discussed in each chapter could fill an entire volume. This illustrates the authors’ success as proving why the maritime cultural landscape of Panama is so robust and an important subject of study.

Alicia Caporaso
New Orleans, Louisiana


The concept of the ‘fiscal-military’ state, or as N.A.M. Rodger describes England, the ‘fiscal-naval’ state, is one of the most significant advances in the study of state development in the last thirty years. It has been particularly important to the study of naval history, starting with John Brewer’s Sinews of Power, continuing through the work of Jan Glete, N.A.M. Rodger, Roger Morriss and others. The British Fiscal-Military States 1660-c.1783 and War, Capital and the Dutch State are two important studies that demonstrate the recent broad applications of the concept. These two books are linked; former is the proceedings from a 2013 conference held at Jesus College, Oxford. Pepijn Brandon was originally scheduled to be part of that conference, but was, unfortunately, forced to withdraw. The paper that he was going to present was drawn from his Ph.D. thesis which forms the basis for this book.

The British Fiscal-Military States is a good, but not excellent, example of the results of academic collaboration. The individual papers are uniformly very good, beginning with John Brewer revisiting and discussing The Sinews of Power. The nine papers that follow demonstrate the study of the fiscal-military state far beyond the metropolis, with multiple chapters on both Ireland and Scotland, and

another studying the Atlantic World. In particular, the final paper in which Steve Pincus and James Robinson argue that the English, and later British, states were in fact not ‘Fiscal-Military’ states and questions the way that the study of ‘Fiscal-military’ states focus on revenues and expenditures and so do not incorporate substantial facets of state activity hints at their later publications where they argue more for the concept of an interventionist state. This is a fairly standard type of collection, covering a large period of time with topics as diverse as paper money in Ireland and the British silk industry. Roger Morriss reliably provides the Royal Navy perspective to the discussion. The bookends provided by Brewer, Pincus and Robinson provide an excellent and necessary methodological component. Finally, Steven Conway’s afterword rightly identifies future avenues of investigation.

There is, however, one significant problem: not one of the ten essays included was written by a woman. Dr D’Maris Coffman, Dr Anne Murphy, and Dr Laura Stewart all presented papers at the conference. In addition, Dr Elaine Murphy was listed on the provisional programme. Their absence from the book is glaring and unnecessary flaw in an otherwise very good collection.

Brandon’s book serves as an excellent companion to the collected papers. On the one hand, it is a more united topic since it addresses a single nation. The comparison to British Fiscal-Military States highlights the United Republic’s federal and decentralized structure. Brandon examines what he describes as a ‘Federal-Brokerage’ state, from its genesis in the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish in the 1560s through to the Batavian Revolution in 1795.

After a lengthy introduction, the author discusses the origins of the ‘Federal-Brokerage’ state. This is followed by a chapter on Merchant Companies, the Navy and Trade, and then a chapter entitled ‘Production Supply, and Labour Relations at the Naval Shipyards’. The fourth chapter covers ‘Troop Payments, Military Soliciting, and the World of Finance’, while the final chapter examines ‘The Structural Crisis of the Federal-Brokerage State’. It is a thorough study, and Brandon argues that the Brokerage aspect both existed before, and survived the end of the ‘Federal-Brokerage’ state at the Batavian Revolution. Directly challenging the standard narratives regarding the importance of war in the formation of early-modern states, he makes a compelling argument that brokerage was an important aspect of many early-modern European states, and that the different forms in different nations should be seen as ‘variants on a continuum between market-oriented and state-oriented, localised and nationalised solutions’. Indeed, he views the Dutch Republic as noteworthy not for taking a distinct path, but because it had more thoroughly integrated capitalist brokerage into its state infrastructure than other nations.

The book is well structured, the arguments well supported, and Brandon clearly has a firm grip on sociological and political theory of state-development, as well as good command of the sources. Never-
theless, it is a tough read. This is not because of language issues but rather a somewhat unrelenting use of academic vocabulary, verging on jargon in some places. The argument isn’t obfuscated, but it could be more efficiently communicated. On another matter, the use of footnotes rather than endnotes is wonderful, given the wide variety of sources referenced and quoted. The review copy I received was in PDF form rather a physical copy, so I cannot comment on its physical qualities. While the creation of academic e-books is certainly to be applauded, conversion of the file from PDF to e-book formats did not work with the fixed line lengths, and the result was unpleasant to read.

Over all, I would recommend both *The British Fiscal Military States 1660-c.1783* and *War, Capital and the Dutch State* to anybody who is studying or interested in state-development, maritime or military history in early-modern Europe. Both are an acceptable representation of the current state of the field.

Sam McLean
Toronto, Ontario


An overview of British submarine operations during the First World War, *British Submarines at War* harkens back to a time of chivalry and ‘daring-do’ in its vivid description of a young service, with a new and untried weapon of war, determined to uphold the finest traditions of the British Royal Navy. Originally published in 1971, this book offers the reader a rare glimpse of a time when the *Dreadnought*-class battleship was the manifestation of a ‘proper navy’ and submarines were seen to be a “weapon of a maritime power on the defensive” and deemed a “dammed un-English Weapon”.

The author, a well-published historian and former civil servant, starts the narrative with a short explanation of the rocky reception submarines encountered during their introduction into the Royal Navy at the very beginning of the twentieth century. He then recounts the history of British submarine operations during the First World War, through the exploits of some notable actions of the period, broken down by the three geographical theatres where British submarines principally operated. Chronicling events in the Baltic, the eastern Mediterranean (in support of the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign) and the North Sea — the latter highlights the disasters of new submarine designs — Gray offers a fulsome overview of some exciting naval actions that are now all but lost to time. The book is interspersed with detailed maps that are appropriately placed with the narrative, which are essential if the reader is to follow along, as many places have changed their names over the last century. In addition to photographs, there are detailed appendices and at 261 pages long, I found it to be a very easy read.

Clearly this is but a précis of British submarine operations and is
not a detailed history, rather, it is a fascinating account of a different time, before unrestricted submarine warfare, when prize rules were scrupulously obeyed and submarine captains ensured the safety of the merchant crews before sinking their ships. It is also a time of almost unlimited innovation when submarine crews not only learned how to use this new weapon of war as they went along, but also how to survive in a new and unforgiving underwater environment. Moreover, the ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, while operating a vessel still in its technological infancy, shows the most amazing leadership resident in these small crews. For example, one submarine suffered a complete engine breakdown deep inside enemy waters and being unable to charge its batteries, could not return to base under its own power. Instead of scuttling the submarine and surrendering, the crew waited until a German fishing vessel came near and then surfaced and captured it. They then used their German ‘prize of war’ to tow their submarine 300 miles back to base through enemy waters (59-61)!

The First World War was also a time of ‘firsts’, where many activities later associated with the Second World War were, in fact, developed. It may come as a surprise to readers to learn that submarines were used to rescue downed aviators in 1914 and one even surfaced and towed a British seaplane, in enemy waters, to avoid its capture (51). In fairness, it was also a time before anti-submarine weapons such as active sonars and depth charges had been invented and once dived, other than being rammed, the submarine was relatively immune from attack from surface ships—the greatest threat being anti-submarine minefields, which unfortunately accounted for a large number of submarine losses.

Conversely, it was also a time of great hardship for these crews, required to conduct long patrols, some over 40 days in duration, with prolonged periods submerged (as much as 48 hours without surfacing) in areas where Allied submarine losses were quite high. During the Gallipoli campaign alone these submariners willingly took their submarines into complex and ever-changing oceanographic conditions (then completely unknown), relying on the most basic of navigation techniques, while navigating enemy minefields and literally punching through anti-submarine nets. It is a testament to the courage and fortitude of these pioneers that operations continued even though at one point only one of five submarines returned from patrol in the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara (118), an attrition rate completely inconceivable today.

The book also illustrates the continued inability of the Admiralty and senior naval leadership to fully grasp how to best employ submarines, with their persistent desire (complete with catastrophic consequences) to design submarines that could keep up with the dreadnought battle fleet—the disastrous K-class steam powered submarines. Furthermore, the author accurately foreshadows the future problems of torpedoes and communications that would continue to plague submarine operations for decades to come — showing how today’s chall-
Engages in submarine operations have a long history indeed.

History will forever paint the First World War as a great stalemate in the trenches of Western Europe, interspersed with the occasional clashes of battle cruiser fleets in the North Sea; so it is important to capture the lesser-known exploits of naval warfare to maintain an appropriate balance. I recommend this book to anyone with an interest in First World War naval history, particularly actions involving submarines, as it portrays, sometimes almost romantically, a different time and shows how far naval warfare has moved in the last century. There is a reason why Pen and Sword republished this book—it is a great read for the layperson and a handy reference for historians to commence follow-on research.

Norman Jolin
Appleton, Ontario


This book is the result of international discussions and research regarding global security over more than a decade. It is part of the Australian Navy’s Sea Power Series published by the Sea Power Centre explaining and supporting not only existing maritime/naval operations, but also future global networking challenges. Despite the use of ‘Global’ in the title, the emphasis is on ‘AUSCAN-NZUKUS Nations’ or as other authors might have referred to it the ‘Anglosphere’. This by no means detracts from the authors’ efforts to provide a fulsome and inclusive account of the difficulties and opportunities of navies networking, and by default, communicating, in a world where dropping hull numbers are being compensated for by the concept of ‘network centric warfare’ — a recent interpretation of the theory that the strength of a fleet is based on more than just the value of its component parts.

The complexity of this issue makes the abbreviations section at the beginning of the book as important as the contents. For example, readers should know that ‘Tactical Data Information Exchange System’ is referred to as ‘TADIXS’, one of many essential but space-saving acronyms used by the authors. Fortunately, the book is so well written that the reader quickly becomes accustomed to them.

The book is structured logically, from the ground up, starting with an examination of the basics such as Coalitions at Sea, the reason why networking/communication is necessary and difficult on more than just technical levels. This brief introduction could do with more expansion, especially on the earlier coalitions which, if elaborated, might have offered some useful historic examples. Nevertheless, this chapter serves the purpose and supports the authors’ case. Building the argument for collaborative sea power, the book offers ‘A Brief History of Naval Communications’, which actually
provides a very useful starting point for anyone interested in that topic. What is most interesting is how it shows the steady evolution of naval communication technology alongside the events on which it had an impact. One example is Rear Admiral Popham’s numerical flag system used by the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic wars to assist with their blockade operations. This was how Nelson was able to ‘see over the hill’ and intercept the combined French fleet at Trafalgar (22).

The third chapter, ‘Communication Evolves into Networking’ is the second longest chapter in the book. It is less about technology than the way the technology is used, with all its nuances and subtext. Unfortunately, it is the one part of the book where the lack of illustration is almost a problem. It leaves a lot to the readers’ imaginations, a problem if different readers go away with very different perspectives on what has been said. It is also the chapter where the emphasis begins to move from analysis to perception and from history to the future, even when its subject is the present. The authors then address ‘Networking Technology and Coalition Naval Forces Effectiveness’, placing the concept of network centric warfare clearly within the framework they have been developing, resulting in a fully developed argument, structure and encompassing overview of the various factors involved.

Chapters 5 and 6 are respectively, the longest and shortest of the chapters. Chapter 5 is where all the strings of argument made earlier are brought together to examine the complex world that is the modern maritime environment for navies, whether at peace or war. Despite its solid content, the authors present the information by means of headings and subheadings that render it accessible and understandable. It is in chapter 6 where the authors make the case for future the Royal Australian Navy, and by extension the Royal Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy, to work together with the US Navy on developing the next generation of communication and networking systems – to enable the AUSCANNZUKUS navies to truly get the most out of working together.

While this work may not appeal to the casual reader, it is well worth seeking out. It is certainly recommended to academics and practitioners seeking to further their understanding of global security and this complex maritime operational challenge.

Alex Clark
Epsom, Surrey


Robert Jackson’s *Sea Combat. From World War 1 to the Present Day* is a beautifully illustrated overview of the evolution of naval sea power and its advancement to today’s modern combat environment. The author highlights historically significant naval conflicts in the context of ever-
evolving technological and strategic change from a highly technical perspective. The levels of specificity are astounding and elements of the book are reminiscent of the Jane’s manuals. I would recommend this book for the model builder as a lovely coffee table book but unfortunately not for the naval historian or the marine archaeologist.

The narrative is clear and filled with fascinating detail and information, however, it has the tendency to wander from geographic region to region with rapid succession then suddenly focus on a single event. If this book were simply divided into a series of historical events that demonstrate how sea combat and technology evolved it would be more successful. The book also tends to focus on United States and European navies with the exception of Russian and Japanese fleets. The illustrations are generously placed throughout the book and beautifully rendered. This is surprising, given the retail price of $39.95 USD. Books twice this price are often less well illustrated.

The fatal flaw lies in the frequent mistakes in the captioning of the imagery. On page 180, for example, the caption states that the sinking ship is the Japanese carrier Hiryu during the Battle of Midway. This famous photo is actually of the Shōhō sinking in the Coral Sea (US Navy Photograph 80-G-17026, U.S. National Archives). Another error is on page 259; the image is captioned as the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper but is, rather, the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer. The Admiral Hipper class of heavy cruisers only had two barrels on their forward gun decks but the photo clearly shows three barrels. The stern of the ship has an entirely different configuration than what was found on those ships at that time. There are, unfortunately, many more examples of issues with the captions that need correcting.

Portions of the text are simply fascinating and contain vast amounts of information so obscure that many professional historians may not be aware of it. The text is elegant and clear. Often times the reader is left craving even more information than what could be reasonably be expected to be included in such a broadly themed book. Unfortunately, the author does not cite a single source, insert any footnotes, nor provide even a single bibliographic entry. No indication is provided of the education or training of the author other than that he was a former pilot and navigational instructor.

The “Present Day” portion of the book ends in approximately the early 1990s if not technologically in the 1980s. This was disappointing as part of the book’s appeal for this reviewer was to get some perspectives on advancements on the Russian and Chinese navies in the twenty-first century. Entirely missing are the new U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships, new Gerald R. Ford Class carriers, stealth incorporations into modern sea warfare, sea drone minesweepers, or even the new Virginia Class Nuclear Submarines.

All of these deficiencies make one question everything stated in the book. It is a shame, because the author’s passion for the subject is quite clear and his writing thoughtful. It is evident that much time and research went into the development of this book, yet
it is left unsupported by citations or detailed footnotes.

Taken as a whole this book would make for a great gift for anyone with even a minor interest in naval history from 1900-1990. The price is certainly fair and the binding and print is of a very high quality. Both colour and black and white maps and figures invite detailed study. Just be aware of the books limitations as more entertainment than reference material.

Scott R. Sorset
New Orleans, Louisiana


Canada’s Admirals and Commodores is an updated documentation of the 298 flag rank offices to have served in the various formats of the Canadian Naval forces since their inception in 1910. This work begins with a colour table containing rows for each of the various services and the years of their existence on the left, their cap badges on the right and columns showing uniform insignias for each of the ranks. The narrative sections are presented side by side in English and French. In the forward, Retired Admiral John Rogers Anderson explains the history of the series, now in its third edition, and the generalized background of flag officers during his service from 1960 to the present. After paying tribute to the Canadians who, though not included in this volume, served in the French and British navies before the creation of an independent Canadian Navy, Rogers notes that the leaders of the 1960s and 70s, veterans of the Second World War and Korea (who often had experience in the Royal Navy), were succeeded in the 1980s and 90s by those who had learned their trade in the Cold War. Contemporary flag officers draw on their experience in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan conflicts. Rogers raises the point that as a result of the amalgamation of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, many officers who began their careers in the navy, ended them in the army and air force.

The introduction prepares the reader for the format of the book, providing a history of the evolution of ranks, beginning in the Royal Navy of the 1600s and continuing through the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces that resulted in some blending of ranks through to the present. It also includes statistics relating to the number of flag officers, definitions and lists of shore establishments, as well as a brief history of the position of Commander of the Navy.

The bulk of the book consists of entries for each of the 298 Canadian naval flag officers, including name, any decorations, place and date of birth followed by each assignment in the officer’s naval career. But for the fact that each assignment does not have its own line, they could be bullet points.
I am disappointed in this book. I had hoped that the biographies would include details of engagements and campaigns in which each officer served from which one could get some sense of the history of the Royal Canadian Navy. I recommend this for readers already familiar with Canadian naval history for whom it could be a valuable reference about the careers of officers they may already know.

James Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


There is an interesting parallel in the career of Daniel Killman with that of his contemporary, the Cape Bretoner Alex Maclean—who is said to be the model for Wolf Larsen in Jack London’s novel, *The Sea Wolf*. MacLean was two years older, but they both went to sea as mere boys in the late nineteenth century and rose to command at an early age. Likely they never met, even if they were operating in the North Pacific at the same time. MacLean was a sealer; Killman did one brief season as a whaler. Killman’s book does not mention MacLean and MacLean’s biographer (CNRS member Dan MacGillivray) does not refer to Killman. The commonality is that they were hard-nosed, hard-driving shipmasters who ran tight ships and were as tough as nails. By today’s standards, they could be viewed as brutal, but shipboard life could be, during their lifetimes, a fairly brutal existence.

Daniel Killman was born in Maine in June 1860, the son of a retired shipmaster turned farmer, although the wider family had long standing connections with seafaring. It was these family connections that he used to gain a berth as an ordinary seaman in a bark commanded by his uncle. Killman was one month and four days short of his eighteenth birthday. For the next fifty plus years, most of his life was spent at sea—in the early days, in sailing ships, later transitioning into steamships — predominantly in the Pacific Ocean. He obviously was good as a seaman, rising quickly through the ranks to First Mate and ultimately Master in sailing ships while still in his mid-twenties. He passed the examinations for Master in steamships and commanded his first steamer when he was barely twenty-four years of age. Truly, a remarkable achievement.

This autobiography was originally written sometime after Captain Killman retired in 1929. He died in 1936 with the manuscript unpublished. The manuscript was retained by his younger daughter Sydney and she steadfastly refused requests from noted maritime historians to publish and annotate the work out of concern that they may not be fair to her father’s legacy in their treatment of the story. Such permission was eventually granted by the living descendants of Sydney so that the memoir has finally been published in an edited and annotated form some eighty years after Captain Killman died. The result is a fascinating glimpse into an age
and a way of life long since forgotten, where time and distance had a totally different impact on the lives of seamen than they do today. The term ‘fast passage’ in the context of Daniel Killman’s voyages would be mind-boggling to the modern mariner!

Killman tells his story in a straightforward chronological sequence of events. The story is told in a very matter-of-fact tone throughout, which tends to disguise some truly major events and incidents with a cloak of diminished importance—for the most part, they are made to seem as though it’s no big deal but just an event worth noting. For example, Chapter 15 details a voyage in February 1913 from Bellingham, Washington, to the islands of Fiji with a cargo of lumber including deck cargo. About two days out from the islands, the weather deteriorated and rapidly turned into a full blown hurricane. Killman’s ship was dismasted but she did not founder. He and his crew survived and spent twenty-two days on the drifting hulk until they managed to reach a nearby island from which they eventually were returned home. Adding insult to injury however, was the ensuing legal hassle over the wreck of his ship which did not sink. Nevertheless, this was truly an epic story of ingenuity and survival but it is told in a very plain manner without embellishment.

Rarely is there any introspection or analysis, or even much emotion in the story—it can occasionally sound as if he is simply writing up the Deck Log. The reader never really discovers what sort of a man Daniel Killman was; only what he said he did, which is in itself something of an indication of his true character. In the West Coast ports he was known as “Crazy Killman”, but the real origins of this epithet are obscure. Captain Killman does reflect on the circumstances of the harrowing experience of the hurricane and ponders some “what if” matters. In the last chapter he allows some emotion to creep in as he lays up his last sailing ship command and prepares to go ashore into retirement. He ponders the fate of sailing ships and marvels at their beauty, while wondering whether such ships will ever be seen again.

This is a fascinating and absorbing book. It is greatly enhanced by the extensive and comprehensive end notes. The author, at times, is a little casual with dates and some other key statistical information. The notes provide this data as well as a context to most of the incidents described. They represent an incredible research effort to fill in the blanks in the record. The editors are to be congratulated for their perseverance in getting such an important story published and for making such an excellent contribution to the maritime history of the era.

Michael Young
Nepean, Ontario

This is a book worth reading, if not adding to your collection.

Lynch’s introduction notes that American maritime history primarily focuses on the East Coast and Great Lakes region meaning that there is a paucity of books about the maritime history of California. Is this because historians have concentrated on other regions, or does it seem that way because of the lack of books about California’s maritime history? No matter which, Lynch’s book is a very welcome addition to the body of contemporary literature addressing American maritime history.

As Lynch points out, California has always looked to the sea. In a sense, this is the underlying theme of his comprehensive, extremely detailed study, beginning with the plentiful natural environment, which supported a large population of indigenous inhabitants. He then addresses European voyages during the Age of Exploration, in search of riches on what they believed to be an island.

Lynch’s scholarship is evident: he uses a broad range of references, many of which are somewhat obscure but useful, nonetheless; and he synthesizes information throughout the book to present and explain the interaction of the political, economic, and social factors that contributed to California’s complex maritime history of California.

The first chapter, entitled “The Natural Setting,” is packed with information about California’s early history, creating a far richer context for the facts that follow. This enables the reader to more accurately analyze what others have written about the California coast, beginning with the observations of Cabrillo and other early European explorers and moving on to assessments of California’s economic value by foreign imperialistic powers competing to acquire Alta California in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Lynch skillfully interweaves the social and economic trends which influenced and contributed to the development of the state, the industrial and military importance of California’s coastline, the allure of California’s recreational resources, and their influence on urban growth and migration, both regional and international.

His book emphasizes the ways in which the California coast contributed to the relationship between the state’s commercial history and urbanization, including stimuli that brought waves of domestic and foreign migrants, and the enactment of discriminatory laws that discouraged them. He discusses the development of service industries that catered to the state’s rapid commercial development, beginning with the fur trade and the Gold Rush. They stimulated the development of bay and inland maritime services, and such post-Gold Rush activities as agriculture, fishing and whaling. Coastal operations such as the oil industry and deep water operations involving foreign trade gave rise to services such as ship building necessary to support industrialization and the rapidly growing population it attracted. In response to the growing need for labour, passenger traffic increased, via ship and railroad. Finally, successful marketing of California’s recreational resources drew both tourists and residents to the state.
Lynch also discusses the social trends that accompanied economic growth. For instance, he notes that modernization within the industry occurred as a result of mechanization, creating a new social hierarchy in the maritime industry. The influx of a large population of foreign immigrants willing to undertake this dangerous work for lower pay resulted in labour activism, and in the formation of seamen’s labour unions, especially along the West Coast.

Although the book includes several photographs, it would have been helpful if maps were included, especially for those readers who are not familiar with California.

In summary, this book is an excellent resource for both maritime and California historians, economists, and other social scientists studying these issues. The bibliography is a treasure trove of primary sources for scholars. It is also an interesting read for those who are simply interested in the history of California and/or of maritime industries.

Marti Klein
Laguna Niguel, California


Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Britain’s Royal Navy grew to unparalleled size and power to support itself throughout a series of significant, widespread campaigns, including the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) and the War of 1812 with the United States (1812-1815). The expansion of the Royal Navy during this time prompted attempts by the Admiralty to strengthen its control by issuing orders and directives to vessel commanders and officers regarding the conduct of the navy’s crewmembers. *Order and Disorder in the British Navy, 1793-1815* offers extensive discussions on the concepts of order and disorder aboard Royal Navy ships by the early nineteenth century and how Admiralty responses to establish or restore authority among these vessels, through disciplinary actions, was based on a complex reciprocity of behaviour among officers and crewmembers.

The book’s title and general summary leave the reader to infer that Malcomson will be providing an assessment of conduct among Royal Navy officers and crew members between 1793 and 1815. Malcomson explains that by 1812 the Royal Navy, in addition to engaging war with the United States, was engrossed with blockading continental Europe, exerting a British presence in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, convoying troops and supplies to Portugal and Spain, protecting trade from French privateers, and safeguarding interests in the Eastern Hemisphere. Despite the widespread geographic distribution of the Royal Navy’s operations during this time, the book does not present an encompassing analysis of how conduct among naval personnel may have varied from the late eighteenth to the
nineteenth century, nor does it discuss possible comparisons of order and disorder among those individuals stationed around the aforementioned locations. Instead, the majority of Malcomson’s work exclusively involves the analysis of behaviour of Royal Navy personnel serving among the North American and West Indies Stations during the War of 1812 (June 1812 to February 1815).

Malcomson views the War of 1812 as a self-contained conflict at a time when the Royal Navy was at its mightiest during the Napoleonic War era, so it would be a prime campaign to analyze how naval authority established order among personnel and the behaviours that resulted to undermine established directives. While he openly acknowledges that the discussions of behavioural conduct dynamics and authority in the book are his own, there appears to be an assumption that the reader is already be familiar with previously published historical analyses of the Royal Navy during this time period so they may fully apply the author’s conclusions within the context of the entire period from 1793-1815. As a result, individuals with an academic background in maritime history of the period, or a robust interest in Royal Navy history and operations will get the most enjoyment out of this book.

Despite the restricted geographic and temporal sampling that the book offers while discussing the Royal Navy as a whole, the book’s greatest strengths lay with the meticulous research and statistical analyses that the author undertook to support his arguments and conclusions. Malcomson presents a sample of 36 Royal Navy ships that served on the North American and West Indies Stations throughout the War of 1812 for his analysis. These vessels were chosen, in part, due to the availability of primary sources discussing shipboard conduct among their crews and the methods of punishment utilized to discipline insubordinate personnel.

The book is separated into distinct sections that discuss how officers maintained order and how individuals attempted to undermine authority, and which methods were undertaken to restore order. Every subject discussed in the book that relates to these corresponding topics is extensively researched, again predominately through the use of primary sources, and many of the included footnotes provide further historical contexts to support Malcomson’s arguments. Several statistical analyses are also utilized to further explain whether certain social demographics engaged more frequently in specific types of behaviours and whether types of disciplinary actions, as well as their frequency, varied over time. Most of the technical specifics for these statistical analyses are highlighted in corresponding footnotes, so general readers do not need to be concerned with needing background familiarity with these types of analyses to fully understand how Malcomson obtained his results.

Order and Disorder in the British Navy, 1793-1815 is exceptionally well written and well researched. The presented analyses of order, disorder, and subsequent punishments among Royal Navy personnel, however, are primarily based from those individuals stationed along North America and the West Indies during the War of 1812. The author concludes that order and
disorder in the Royal Navy during this period was based on a complex reciprocity between officers and crew members and that Admiralty rules were alternately observed or relaxed. While readers who have an interest in British naval history are likely to find this book enjoyable, those who have a more extensive knowledge of other historical works regarding naval campaigns throughout this period will better understand how Malcomson’s conclusions may apply to the broader timescale of 1793-1815.

James D. Moore III
Sterling, Virginia


In this academic analysis of Canadian-American relations from 1961 to 1963, Asa McKercher emphasizes the surprising amount of common political ground that existed between John G. Diefenbaker and John F. Kennedy. This fresh interpretation challenges the Canadian historiography which has relied too heavily upon biased partisan sources and inaccurate political memoirs. While not overlooking Kennedy’s and Diefenbaker’s personality flaws and specific disagreements, McKercher paints a more balanced and authoritative portrait of the two leaders and their relationship than any historian to date.

Less dramatic than John Boyko’s recent popular history, Cold Fire Chronicles, which covers the same ground, McKercher carefully weighs every piece of evidence before drawing nuanced conclusions. While McKercher’s work moves the scholarship ahead, it lacks a comprehensive overview of the international and wider historiography, and especially criticisms of American policy, such as post-colonial studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, European and world wide trade negotiations, and American relations with other North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) partners during this period. Some will no doubt regard his interpretation with regard to Kennedy as too soft; while his evidence about Kennedy’s patience and willingness to compromise on matters of importance of Canada is convincing, he understates the strategic urgency for Canada to develop non-American trading partners and ignores the chaotic planning environment which resulted from Kennedy-led strategic initiatives.

Kennedy and his defence secretary, Robert McNamara, caught NATO allies off guard with alarming and contradictory statements about flexible response, while pressuring them to accept American nuclear arms for their weapons systems. For most, this situation was emotionally charged, fraught with challenges to prestige and sovereignty as well as concerns about the arms race itself and disagreements over arms control agreements. McKercher touches upon the complexities of these issues with appropriate circumspection, but does not delve into how Kennedy’s and
McNamara’s flamboyance exacerbated alliance-wide tensions.

McKercher condemns Diefenbaker and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, for poor diplomatic tactics. That judgement is well supported, although other works on Green offer alternative evaluations of his contributions to the important nuclear testing cessation agreement which was signed by the new Liberal administration shortly after it took over in 1963. *Camelot and Canada* is thus a part of an ongoing re-evaluation of the era, rather than a work of synthesis.

As one of the new generation of millennial historians, McKercher has followed an unusual academic path, working for several years as an archival assistant at Library and Archives Canada while pursuing a Masters in History at the University of Ottawa. He then completed a doctorate at Cambridge, writing numerous academic articles on Diefenbaker, Cuba, and Canadian-American relations, before producing this work. With an impressive publishing record, he does not quite exemplify the new slow scholarship movement which some feminists have proposed to counter the extreme ‘publish or perish’ professorial path. Nonetheless, McKercher’s approach seems more methodical, deliberate, and ruminate than the usual academic fast track to the top. The result, a well-written, well-researched monograph, is clearly not the last word on Diefenbaker and his administration.

American and Canadian naval and maritime historians should read this work as an essential first step in correcting a badly skewed historiography, but it does not go quite far enough and, at times, relies too heavily upon partisan political memoirs. The chapter on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concluding portions of his book are weaker than they might be. More declassification of sources would help. As well, gender analysis, post-colonial analysis, and less traditional methodologies might help us better understand the underlying tensions of the Cold War and the extent to which powerful masculine players dismissed minor partners and marginalized alternative policies.

Canadian concerns with American dominance and with the impact of American-led policies on the world remain ever relevant. Kennedy’s proposals created an unpredictable planning environment, exacerbating fears of a nuclear holocaust—something evident at the time, but not sufficiently appreciated by McKercher. Another question not yet fully explored is how much (if anything) Canada accomplished by not agreeing with the United States, its larger, influential ally. Could Canadian diplomacy and trade with communist nations help counter Soviet and American Cold War brinkmanship? Was it worth the cost of being perceived to be less trust-worthy and reliable? To be accused of not being a team player? These emotionally-laid terms were rightly used against Diefenbaker, but have resulted in over-looking the unpredictability he faced and consideration of possible Canadian contributions to the eventual development of détente.

Isabel Campbell
Ottawa, Ontario

In Austro-Hungarian Cruisers and Destroyers 1914-18, Noppen both complements his earlier volume on Austro-Hungarian (A-H) battleships of the First World War and also furthers his studies on lesser-known aspects of the Great War at sea.

It is necessary to understand the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to understand the A-H military. The empire was actually two separate nations — Austria and Hungary, each with its own government but ruled by a common monarch (the Emperor of Austria who also the King of Hungary) and possessing an Imperial Army and Navy. Both Austria and Hungary had to fund the common military establishments and both nations possessed portions of the Dalmatian coastline.

For a number of years, Austria had extensive overseas trade while Hungary traded little overseas; the Hungarian government often did not fund the Imperial Navy at all. But by the late 1800s, a significant amount of A-H overseas trade was being conducted through the Hungarian port of Rijeka. At that point, the Hungarian government could no longer avoid contributing to an Imperial Navy.

At the start of the First World War, the A-H Imperial Navy had 16 battleships which constituted a fleet in being. Although the battleships saw little action, they were enough of a threat to cause the British, French, and Italian navies to keep ships on alert in case the A-H battleships would sortie. (See the review on Noppen’s Austro-Hungarian Battleships 1914-18) in Vol. XXII, No. 1, the January 2013 issue of TNM/LMN.) Combat duties then fell upon the A-H cruisers and destroyers—and those units saw a lot of action.

Noppen begins his narrative with background information as to the naval strategies that the A-H Navy followed: Jeune École, Mahanian, and Dreadnought strategies modified to meet the needs of A-H strategy. At various times, the A-H Navy followed all of these strategies. He then moves on to discuss each class of the A-H cruisers and destroyers: torpedo-rammkreuzern (torpedo ram cruisers); Zenta class protected cruisers, Huszár class destroyers, light cruisers, and Tatra and Ersatz Triglav class destroyers. The various classes are set out in separate subsections, each containing descriptions of the ships of each class, the history of each ship in the class, a chart outlining each ship class’s pertinent specifications: dimensions, full displacement, ship’s complement and armament, machinery and protection. Generally, each subsection is accompanied by a photograph of one or more ships of that subsection’s class. This is valuable reference material, although the intermixture of cruisers and destroyer classes can be a bit confusing. It might have been clearer if he had delineated the various cruiser classes first and then dealt with the various destroyer classes.
The second section of the narrative describes the combat operations of the A-H cruisers and destroyers and it is here that the narrative shines. It is clear that the A-H cruisers and destroyers, no matter how outmoded some of them were, rendered valuable service to the A-H Navy. They participated in many types of action — offshore bombardment, ship-to-ship combat, and support for hit and run actions. The narrative describes the major actions of the A-H cruisers & destroyers: combating the initial Allied advance in the Adriatic in 1914, securing the northern and central sections of the Adriatic in 1915 and securing the southern Adriatic later that year; the battle of Cape Rodoni/Gargano in late December, 1915; and the struggle over the Otranto Straits, culminating in the Battle of the Otranto Straits in May, 1917. Earlier in the book, the section dealing with the cruiser, Kaiserin Elisabeth, notes that it was based at Tsingtau, China and helped defend the German colony there against the Japanese in August, 1914. The descriptions of these conflicts are clear and hold the reader’s attention. After 1917, the A-H Navy had few operations and a mutiny even occurred on several A-H vessels. It is a tribute to the spirit of the A-H cruiser and destroyer crews that these ships and crews put down the mutiny.

The A-H cruisers and destroyers were sought-after war prizes after the cessation of hostilities. The A-H cruisers and destroyers were parceled out among the French, Greek, and Italian Navies. Those awarded to the French navy were quickly scrapped; the A-H cruisers and destroyers awarded to the Greek and Italian Navies lasted longer, but all had been scrapped by 1939. None survived to see service in the Second World War.

The narrative is supported by many pertinent photographs and reproductions of contemporary colour prints. Colour sideviews of the ship classes and colour prints of significant A-H actions support the narrative and add to the overall effect of the book. The centre section carries an excellent cutaway view of SMS Novara. Some of the photographs include the major leaders of the A-H Navy. The only omission is that of a map of the Adriatic showing the A-H Navy ports and locations of actions — which would have been helpful.

The participants in the First World War have passed on; the war itself is consigned to history. The Austro-Hungarian Navy is a distant memory but Noppen’s books have brought that navy back from obscurity. Austro-Hungarian Cruisers and Destroyers 1914-18 is a valuable book from which the reader can learn much about this little-known aspect of the Great War at sea and is highly recommended. It is hoped that Noppen will complete the story of Austro-Hungarian combat vessels by writing a book on First World War Austro-Hungarian submarines and torpedo boats.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Robert Parsons collects and narrates sea stories, particularly those taking place at or near Newfoundland. His passion for sharing moving tales in this collection is taken from local records, saved correspondence and newspaper reports of the incidents as substantiation for each story. In spite of the book’s title, not all of Parsons’ salty narratives involve heroics. Frustration, tragedy and occasionally lawlessness creep into this anthology. The collection is divided into nine sections of roughly equal length that include “Unusual, Wreck, Danger, Anxiety, Survival, Abandonment, Court, People,” and “Conflict.” Each segment’s title is a clue to the author’s focus, but most tell of danger to people and their anxiety due to many maritime catastrophes and conflicts.

The coast of Newfoundland and the names of many geographic landmarks become a colourful background for the seaborne dramas. There are Isle aux Morts, Mistaken Point, Wreck Rock, Blowhard Rock, Chain Rock, Man O’ War Shoal, and Deadman’s Bay. Then there are Seldom-Come-By, Heart’s Content, Mud Cove, Tilt Cove, plus in adjacent Labrador there are Cutthroat, Splitting Knife and Smokey Tickle. The author skillfully describes raging storms, intense fear, bold valour, shocking calamity, and unspeakable hardships; all dispensed by the cruel North Atlantic. The following is a typical example: “[The captain and his crew] had an unbroken fight with bad weather. That battle on the 100-ton Lunenburg-built schooner reached a peak in the latter part of April. The [ship’s] sails were ripped from the booms and gaffs, and it was beaten to submission by a mountainous sea that swept the schooner from end to end. It carried away everything movable, and much thought to be, from the deck and over the side. Navigation, standing on the exposed deck and lashed to the wheel, became life-threatening.” (107)

Heroes of the Sea can at times be a repetitious recitation of catastrophic tales with only minor variations distressingly similar in their themes. A few accounts, however, are quite captivating, such as the wreck of the brig Dispatch and how the Harvey family and a Newfoundland dog helped save perhaps 140 men and women from a rock off shore during a raging storm. The ledge was three miles off the Isle aux Morts, a well-named village mentioned above. Others are several sordid stories concerning barratry or “casting away,” that is the intentional abandoning of a vessel, setting it adrift to be wrecked for the purpose of insurance fraud. Because the cataclysms often left little trace, the crimes were difficult to detect, but when the evidence was found, the offenders were usually severely punished.

An appealing part of Parsons’ book for this reviewer is the sea disaster poetry written in sad rhyme and sorrowful folksong-like verses. Some recollect “Newfie speak,” the charming and often amusing dialect of the ruggedly beautiful island province. The tales usually start with a variation of the exhortation “Attention all ye fishermen (or seamen) and listen unto me,” (110) and end with a heart-breaking refrain similar to “not one
soul on board is left to tell the tale.” (28) The poems and tales easily lend themselves to be set to music and are perhaps why Newfoundland is the source of so much wonderful Canadian maritime folk music. One poem in the publication may be the source of the classic “Old Polina” and its hero, Captain Guy. Many of these sagas take place near Twillingate, Fogo and Moreton’s Harbor, a repeated line in the chorus of “I’se the B’y that Builds the Boat,” but the song (a personal favourite) is absent; perhaps because the lyrics do not recount a calamity and the charming tune is too buoyant for inclusion.

*Heroes of the Sea* falls short of being a classic anthology of salty stories, but does successfully capture the difficult lives of those who went “down to the sea in ships” off the treacherous Newfoundland and Eastern Canadian coasts. Parsons has put together a good collection of sea stories, perhaps best read next to a roaring fire during a blustery stormy winter’s night.

Louis Arthur Norton  
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Since Graham Allison published *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* in the early 1970s, scholars have studied the American presidential decision-making processes relating to crises. In *Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents*, Douglas Carl Peifer applies historical analysis to three naval incidents that affected America: the sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana harbour in 1898; the sinking of RMS *Lusitania* in 1915; and the sinking of the USS *Panay* in 1937.

Each of these incidents imposed critical decisions for the American President in office at that time: the loss of Maine in 1898 was a direct *casus belli* for the brief Spanish-American War later that year; the loss of RMS *Lusitania* was a stepping stone to American involvement in the First World War; while the sinking of the USS *Panay* in December 1937, was a crisis quickly resolved which did not lead to war (although almost exactly four years after the *Panay’s* loss, that incident was quickly remembered with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.) The loss of *Lusitania* is probably familiar to most readers of *The Northern Mariner/le Marin du Nord* but the *Maine* and *Panay* incidents are likely less well known.

The USS *Maine* sank as a result of the Cuban Revolution of the late 1800s. In 1898, Cuba was still a Spanish colony although the Cubans had attempted at various times throughout the years to free themselves from Spanish dominance. The revolution that occurred in the 1890s attracted much American support. Sympathy was definitely on the side of the revolutionaries and against “Imperialist” Spain. The United States sent the *Maine* to Havana in early 1898 — ostensibly on a friendly visit to a Spanish naval port. Another
reason for the Maine’s presence in Havana was to protect American lives in Cuba. On the evening of 15 February 1898, Maine exploded, killing 258 seamen and injuring others. The immediate cause was determined to be a mine placed on the outside of the ship’s hull. (Research in the 1970s attributed the cause of the explosion to spontaneous combustion in a coal bunker, although a more recent investigation has averred the explosion was caused by an external mine.)

The cry, “Remember the Maine! Down with Spain!” was a direct cause of the 1898 Spanish-American War. Although the record shows that American President William McKinley tried to avoid war, public pressure plus failed diplomacy ultimately led the American Congress to declare war.

Of the Lusitania’s sinking, little needs to be said. It suffices to relate that the ship was carrying munitions as well as civilian passengers when a German U-Boat sank it off the Irish coast in 1915.

The Panay’s loss is probably the least-known of the three incidents. Panay was a gunboat belonging to the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Fleet stationed in China. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, hostilities gradually approached the Chinese capital of Nanking. By December of that year, Panay and its crew had evacuated several civilians from Nanking and moved up the Yangtze River. The gunboat was clearly marked with American flags. On the afternoon of 12 December 1937, Japanese aircraft attacked Panay, sinking it, ultimately killing one crewman and one civilian. While there was great concern in the United States over Panay’s loss, the outcome was unlike the sinkings of Maine or Lusitania. The Japanese government paid America compensation of over $2 million. The incident was closed — but eerily, almost exactly four years later, Panay’s loss was recalled when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

Peifer’s analysis of these three incidents is well-structured. After an introduction relating naval incidents and the decision for war, he separates the narrative into three parts, each containing the same structure. He starts out with a narrative of the particular incident, then places each incident in its historical context, relates the immediate reaction by the public, press, appropriate government entities, and the business world. He then analyzes each president’s decision and any results from that decision. The last section of each part looks at the aftermath, consequences, and any reflections on that incident. A final part deals with lessons learned. The parallel structure Peifer uses to analyze each incident facilitates comparison of the three incidents — the Maine incident led to a war; the Lusitania incident was a stepping stone to entry into a war, while the Panay incident was resolved without hostilities between America and Japan.

Peifer’s conclusions and interpretations are defensible and supported by extensive documentation. His analyses are clear and comprehensible. Each major part contains a selection of pertinent photographs which add to the narrative. He writes well and the narrative does not falter. The notes
Book Reviews

and bibliography supply many sources for further study of each incident. The cover carries a vivid (if somewhat inaccurate) print of the Maine explosion and photographs of the Presidents involved in the respective decision-makings — William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

This is a valuable work. The academic will find much of interest in Choosing War while the non-academic reader will learn a great deal. Whether one agrees with Peifer’s analysis or not, Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents is worth a place on the reader’s list and is highly recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


In the greater tapestry of military history, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is just not seen in the same light as carrier operations or daring landings on foreign shores. Compared to the exciting story of the battle of Midway or the night actions around Guadalcanal, the battle of the Atlantic and convoy escorts are perceived as having far less wow factor. Thus, any book dealing with anti-submarine warfare faces a daunting, uphill battle. Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman have risen to this challenge in their second volume on ASW history, Hunters and Killers, Vol. 2: Anti-Submarine Warfare from 1943. Focusing on ASW warfare beginning with the turn of the tide in the Second World War and tracing key developments throughout the Cold War, they present an enjoyable study of technological innovation, personalities and events to capture the imagination.

The text of Hunters and Killers is broken down into thirteen chronological chapters. Picking up the tale of the struggle against the U-boats in 1943, the authors do an admirable job of weaving a narrative that combines details of the technological war with accounts and biographies of many of the key participants. The first four chapters of the book are aimed at the Second World War, mostly focused on the struggle to control the Atlantic sea lanes. The authors, however, do not confine their discussion solely to the Atlantic since Arctic and Mediterranean operations are also brought out in three of the chapters. The fourth chapter deals specifically with the American/Japanese struggle for the control of the Pacific and the ASW operations tied to that. The inclusion of this subject provides an interesting counterpoint to the Atlantic discussion and helps to balance the text. Unfortunately, it is limited to only one chapter. The inclusion of the Pacific operations also provides a strong backdrop for post-war American ASW efforts. The last nine chapters primarily deal with the Cold War period and the changes in ASW operations within the confines of the bi-polar
world. This includes discussions of submarine progression and development, including programs like GUPPY, which extended the life of American diesel/electric boats prior to the deployment of nuclear submarines; the scale of the Soviet threat as it evolved over time and the challenges faced in dealing with it. The last two chapters even begin to question the value and future of ASW operations and raise some important questions for the reader.

While this is a fascinating text on the subject of ASW warfare, it is not without a few issues. The brevity of the text is a problem; its scope and the inclusion of a great many illustrations create the feeling that the book is too short for the subject. This is potentially a huge topic and expanded detail and analysis would have been greatly appreciated. The overriding emphasis on the Atlantic is to be expected, but it does present a skewed understanding of the history. While the inclusion of Cold War operations in the Pacific helps to balance the text, the truth is, the scale of these operations did not counterbalance the need to preserve the sea lanes to Europe, which was essential for NATO in the event of a war in Europe. Nevertheless, American deterrence patrols and operations in the Pacific are significant and more information there would have been interesting.

At the same time, the authors seem somewhat reluctant to include the role of other nations, like Canada, within their narrative. Canada played a huge role in the Battle of the Atlantic, as many top authors have detailed, yet it seems to be short-changed in the discussion. None of the major works on the subject are even mentioned, which certainly presents a biased assessment. Similarly, important research and discussion of the Pacific war are strangely absent. Author Mark Parillo’s fascinating discussion of the slaughter of Japanese shipping highlights many aspects of Japanese ASW efforts. The submarine war in the Pacific also raises another issue. Several times Polmar and Whitman refer to the amount of tonnage sunk by the American submarine fleet, yet they never mention the fact that two sets of numbers exist in this regard. The initial numbers put out at the end of the war were not one hundred percent accurate. Revisions have been made, most notably by John Alden in his detailed analysis of US submarine attacks in the Second World War, which reduced the estimate of total tonnage sunk by the US submarine fleet. The authors fail to specify which numbers they are using, which severely limits aspects of the book. This being a survey history, however, such problems are to be expected.

Over all, this book is a good addition to the library of anyone interested in the field of ASW. I would strongly recommend that it be paired with Polmar and Whitman’s first volume to provide a more comprehensive account of Hunters and Killers.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario

Peder Roberts, Lize-Marie van der Watt and Adrian Howkins (eds.). Antarctica and the Humanities.

There’s no doubt that Antarctica is not the first place on the globe most people think of when it comes to research in the humanities. Antarctica, however, is not only a place to study science, the last pristine wilderness, an icy desert or whatever other stereotype comes to mind, it also has a history as a site of human activities, a space contested between nations, an imaginary landscape and a sphere for projections of all kinds of ideologies — in short, a continent that has been overlooked by researchers in the humanities.

_Antarctica and the Humanities_ edited by Peder Roberts, Lize-Marie van der Watt and Adrian Howkins is, foremost, a welcome contribution to placing the humanities on the map of Antarctic research, both present and future. Organized under four major themes (The Heroic and the Mundane, Alternative Antarcticas, Whose Antarctic, Valuing Antarctic Science), the 13 contributing authors provide not only an impressive overview of humanities and social science approaches toward the study of Antarctica, but also clearly demonstrate that Antarctic research is relevant to more than the natural sciences.

In a review for _The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord_, the most important question is whether the book holds any value for maritime historians, as the chapters all deal more or less exclusively with continental Antarctica rather than the waters surrounding it. Despite this land-based approach, I would argue that the book is of great importance for any maritime historian who is interested in the history of maritime technology, naval warfare or maritime trade, as well as the wider interaction of humans and the sea. Like Antarctica, the oceans are not often considered as a space of real importance for the social scientist. By showcasing the application of social science research to a place like Antarctica, the authors are promoting a better understanding of the opportunities for the social sciences in the maritime realm as well.

Peder Roberts’ chapter on Antarctica and the fantasies of Nazi survival and the chapter on race and South African Antarctic history are probably the two best examples to illustrate the book’s relevance to the maritime historian. Each chapter uses a very different approach to applying humanities research techniques to the subject of Antarctica and the meaningful analysis that results serves as a template for comparable research in the context of the oceans.

The whole section on “Whose Antarctic” is another example of a template for maritime research. ‘Who owns the oceans?’ is a common question and there is a rich body of research available on the topic. Articles like Elena Glasberg’s ‘Proto Territory’, Alessandro Antonello’s ‘Finding Place’ and Dag Avango’s ‘Meaning of Material Culture’ clearly demonstrate that the question of who owns Antarctica and/or the oceans provides many more research opportunities beyond the basic historical analysis of the role of international law or the development of sovereignty over a certain territory.

Two maps and a good number of
black and white illustrations throughout the book help the reader to visualize the various arguments. While the index provides a most valuable research tool, this reader would have appreciated a bibliography at the end of the book to supplement the endnotes after each individual chapter. Since this book has the quality to become the standard for future humanities research on Antarctica, a full bibliography would have offered a welcome overview of the existing body of research available. Although it is larger than many would expect, it is spread across an extremely broad range of journals and books.

Antarctica and the Humanities is recommended for any historian interested in Antarctica, but it would also appeal to a maritime historian interested in more than just ships and maritime technology or trade. The book’s comparatively high price will, unfortunately, somewhat limit its distribution and availability. Even the e-book is not cheap at 66.99 €. It is hoped that a paperback version or less expensive e-book will be published in the near future.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


This book contains the papers presented at All Souls College, Oxford, in April 2014, in honour of the exceptional career of Professor John B. Hattendorf, as he prepared to retire from the United States’ Naval War College. The central focus of the collection is on the linkage between larger political/national strategy and the development and use of the country’s navy to support those ends. The 21 chapters, ultimately, can be broken into three sections (though the editors do not do this physically), pre-1830, the First and Second World Wars, and the educational development of a navy’s officers. There is much to ponder in many of these papers, a good deal of which ought to produce further reflection and discussion. This collection is a fitting tribute to the dynamic professional life of John Hattendorf.

N.A.M. Rodger begins and ends the book with a tribute to Hattendorf. Rodger’s biography of the honouree covers his professional and personal life, with not only the firm grip of an academic colleague but, with the warm familiarity of a friend. At sea, in service to his country, in the lecture hall, the conference room and as a museum director, Hattendorf’s contributions to the field of naval history, are rooted in experience, deep study, and dialogue. His catalog of past work is listed in an appendix covering 29 pages. While the previous publications are remarkable, the reviewer was drawn to the 14 forthcoming and future projects listed, which demonstrate his continuing contribution to our discipline.

Each of the editors has written a chapter in the book. As noted, Rodger
provided the tribute to Hattendorf’s career. Benjamin Darnell addressed naval downsizing, in relation to Louis XIV’s financial problems forcing France to shift their focus to the army and continental Europe. J. Ross Dancy explored the manning of the lower decks of the British Navy, in the eighteenth century, especially the focus of press gangs on acquiring hard-to-get able seamen. Evan Wilson focused on the development of commissioned officers and the shortage of masters, during the same period as Dancy’s study. These two papers fit very well together with all three papers providing thoughtful insights, although Wilson’s seems to have more connection to the book’s overarching theme of strategy.

Carla Rahn Phillips provides a very interesting piece on the Spanish government’s difficulty in recruiting and keeping officers to command its galleys in the mid- to late-sixteenth century. It appears that money and prestige became the necessary incentives, particularly the latter. Roger Knight and Agustin Guimera provide papers on the strategic role of the British and Spanish navies (respectively) from the late 1700s through the Napoleonic Wars. The connection between offence and defence is stressed in both, providing an interesting, fresh perspective on the naval activities of the two fleets.

Paul Kennedy’s paper examines the difference in strategic focus between the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the First World War and the Second World War. All the other entries are 10 to 13 pages in length, whereas Kennedy’s comes in at 29. This sweeping, yet preliminary, examination of the topic discusses the influence of technology, geography, imperialism, and economic development on strategy and the use of the navy in times of political and martial conflict. He maps out a transition from fleet blockades and battles, to the goal of protecting one’s trade, and attacking that of the enemy. Exerting control over the seaway allowed the supplying of allies and the landing of forces in enemy-held territory. The next two articles, by Matthew S. Seligmann (on development in warship type prior to 1914) and George C. Peden (the British Navy’s place in the grand strategy between 1937 and 1941), complement Kennedy’s piece, adding another layer of detail to the analysis. Werner Rahn’s paper on the German Navy’s place in Hitler’s Atlantic strategy (1939-1944) underlines Kennedy’s perspective, but from a different vantage point, making these four articles a superbly integrated group.

Andrew Lambert’s chapter on Sir Julian Corbett provides an overarching connection between the work just discussed and the final section of the book, which focuses on the education of naval officers. Corbett’s emphasis on protection of trade/supply routes, rather than massive battle fleet engagements, as the strategic key came from his study of history. Corbett’s ideas shaped the navy’s education of its officers, and influenced those who crafted national strategy, in the years ahead of the First World War. Subsequent chapters serve to illustrate the necessity of developing a broader historical understanding, to formulate grand strategy and the navy’s place within it. Paul Ramsey’s paper on the mutual influences of Spenser Wilkinson and
William Sims on each other, and the teaching of sea power and strategy at the University of Oxford and the U.S. Naval war College (respectively), in the first third of the twentieth century, is a wonderful description of how this took place in Britain and America. A more general connection between developing naval strategy and knowing one’s broader history (military, economic and political) is the focus in the last two papers, by James Goldbrick and Geoffrey Till. This group (and several others not mentioned in this review) emphasizes that naval strategy must be connected with the political goals of the nation and that naval leaders (read all commissioned officers) must be aware of these larger goals.

While all chapters in the collection touch on topics addressed within Hattendorf’s own body of work, it is this final section on education that, for this reviewer at least, holds the strongest connection to Hattendorf’s most significant and enduring contribution to naval history and the study of strategy; his role in, and insights on, the education of naval officers, specifically, and naval and maritime historians, more broadly.

Each chapter has thorough footnotes. The index is extensive and quite workable. The only image appearing in the book is that of the honouree (serendipitously taken by a J. Corbett). The cover illustration is of an American battleship in the Firth of Forth, Scotland. The nine figures and four tables appear within four of the chapters, are appropriately placed and discussed.

This collection of papers will appeal to people interested in the connection between naval development and deployment, and the determination and playing out of grand strategy. It will prove a valuable source of instruction to those entering academia with the assignment of teaching naval history, the development of strategy and, most certainly, the interaction of the two.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


With the centennial of the First World War well underway, it is expected that numerous works on the topic would be appearing, especially when it comes to the ‘exciting’ stories to be retold. The naval war from 1914-1918 provided a rich supply of such narratives, especially the story of Germany’s guerre de course and attack on Allied sea lanes of communication.

Chris Sams has refreshed the dramatic story of German surface raiders. Following on the heels of Nick Hewitt’s Kaiser’s Pirates (2013) and Gary Staff’s German Cruisers (2011), Sams offers a familiar narrative of the various raiders with some interesting comments about what it all means. Interestingly, he begins not with the cruisers stationed in Imperial Germany’s far-flung colonies, but with the Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean Sea. The author
admits that neither cruiser was ever a commerce raider, but includes them because of the knock-on effect they caused the Royal Navy (21). While his is generally correct, Sams does not explore their role further within the work. This is disappointing, especially since forcing the Royal Navy to scatter across the reaches of the British Empire was key to a short, successful war raiding campaign.

The stories of the individual cruisers and their theatres of operation are well covered. This includes some areas that are often glossed over, such as the auxiliary cruisers SMS Cormoran and SMS Prinz Eitel Friedrich’s cruises in the Pacific — searching for weeks on end for targets to no avail. The latter finally ventured into the Atlantic to enjoy a successful but brief raiding career while the former sought internment in Guam due to lack of supplies. This fate, that befell almost all the German liners that became auxiliary cruisers, is very important as it highlights the problems of supply, especially coal, but it is only superficially addressed. Considering the amount of research that has been conducted on the creation of German supply or Etappen stations and the intricate system of procuring coal for raiders from neutral countries in times of war, this is weak area within the work.

The lack of footnotes can be forgiven as the work is geared toward a popular audience, but there are a few other foibles. Names are misspelled in several instances and the wrong prefix is used for ships. The author also invents some conversation in the first chapter between Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge and his flag captain, a conversation that likely did happen, but since details, such as the exact words spoken, are not known, it is not really appropriate in a history.

There are occasional research lapses or perhaps, too ready acceptance of a source’s face value. For example, the author claims that when Karlsruhe armed the liner Kronprinz Wilhelm, two 4.1” guns were transferred when in reality they were two much smaller 8.8cm (3.8”) guns. A photo described as the cruiser Gneisenau is actually that of a dreadnought battleship. Another point is on the escape of the Dresden and her finding refuge in the vast area of Tierra del Fuego. The author gives lots of credit to a local German settler, Albert Pagels, for hiding the ship from the Royal Navy (161-163), but recent research shows that the escape was due to Dresden’s navigating officer, Weiblitz, and some recent German surveys conducted in the region. Lastly there is mention of Emden firing ‘dud’ shells during her action with HMAS Sydney, something that is still debated heavily today. The question remains whether they were indeed duds, or the wrong shell type (base fused rather than nose fused) which, if so, would explain why they would have acted like duds.

The above is a bit unfortunate, as there are many places the author demonstrates some fine research. The interpersonal conflict between Admirals Jackie Fisher and Doveton Sturdee is well described and it clearly illustrates what was happening within the Admiralty and the conflicting views on how to deal with the German naval threat. Those interested in Canadian naval history will be happy to read several pages about the episode of the near miss between SMS Leipzig...
and HMCS *Rainbow*. Canada’s feverish preparation for war and Captain Walter Hose’s departure to defend Canada is discussed in detail as he set off with black powder shells on board the hopelessly outdated HMCS *Rainbow* to cover the withdrawal of the British sloops HMS *Algerine* and HMS *Shearwater*. Sams notes that *Leipzig*, although not taking any prizes for the first month of the war, managed to tie up shipping all along the Pacific Coast for several weeks.

Perhaps most interesting is that after relating all this, the author claims that German raiders achieved very little and were not really worth the effort. Their only big victory had been Coronel and that was quickly countered by the Falklands. This is surprising, given the way the author emphasizes the impact *Goeben* had on Turkey and by extension, on the war itself, or how *Leipzig* stopped trade. His argument is that submarines would prove better raiders and have a much more significant impact. This reviewer would not object with that point at all, but would say that cruisers have been sold short and there remains more to say on the topic.

Overall, *German Raiders* is an easy read that will surely entertain anyone interested in the naval history of the First World War. It is designed for a popular audience and relies heavily on secondary sources through which it conveys what happened reasonably well. It is fast-paced and enjoyable. A treatise on German raiders it is not, but as a refresher, well worth reading.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


With the 100th anniversary of the battle of Jutland approaching, our distinguished late member, William (Bill) Schliehauf, decided it was time to re-examine the very controversial Naval Staff Appreciation of that great clash of the dreadnoughts that had occurred from 31 May to 1 June 1916. Unfortunately, Bill was unable to see the project to completion as he was stricken by a very serious illness and died in 2009. His friend and colleague, Stephen McLaughlin, took up the project published this book in 2016.

The Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland was actually the second analysis of the battle prepared for the Admiralty in the immediate post-war period. In early 1919, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, ordered Captain J. E. T. Harper to prepare a *Record* showing what had actually occurred. It was to be based solely on the reports of the flag officers and commanding officers held at the Admiralty. Harper, a navigation specialist, had the wreck of the battlecruiser *Invincible* accurately located. That ship had exploded at 6:32 p.m. on 31 May. From this datum, working backwards and forwards in time, he was able to
reconstruct more accurately the position and movement of all the ships involved. (All had been navigating by dead reckoning since leaving their bases and their assumed positions varied quite widely). Harper finished his Record by October 1919 but publication was delayed until 1 November, when the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Earl Beatty, took up his appointment. Beatty demanded changes in several sections dealing with the battlecruisers which he had commanded. Harper objected and when the publishers of the Committee of Imperial Defence's Official History, Naval Operations, intervened for legal reasons, the Record was shelved. It was not published until 1927.

Meanwhile, in November 1920, the Naval Staff College had directed Captain Alfred C. Dewar and his brother Kenneth G. Dewar to prepare an appreciation of the battle. In the immediate aftermath of Jutland, two schools of thought emerged within the Service: one held that Admiral Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, had been too cautious while another thought that then-Vice-Admiral Beatty had been too rash. It should be stated that neither of these distinguished Admirals, both of whom had been Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and subsequently First Sea Lord, ever engaged personally in the controversy, but their protagonists kept it up through the 1920s and 30s and even after the Second World War. Numerous books and articles were written on the subject including one, The Truth about Jutland, (pro-Jellicoe) by Harper himself.

The Dewar brothers took quite a different tack. They used Harper’s diagrams but while the Record was confined to facts, the Dewars’ Appreciation discussed not only the decisions and actions taken during the battle by Jellicoe and other flag officers but the standing orders issued to the Fleet by the Commander-in-Chief. This was within their mandate, but their work carries a very distinct anti-Jellicoe and pro-Beatty tone rather than being an impartial assessment. They completed their Appreciation in January 1922 and a print-run of 100 copies was ordered, but influential authorities quickly counselled that it should not be published. These included Sir Julian Corbett, who had authored the Imperial Defence Committee’s Naval Operations, and Beatty himself, while Admirals Chatfield and Keyes (who were Beatty supporters) warned that if issued to the fleet “it would rend the Service to its foundations”. The Admiralty then ordered all copies to be returned and destroyed.

It is not clear how many had actually been issued, but several survived and that has allowed Schliehauf and McLaughlin to produce their appreciation of the Appreciation. The surviving copies discovered by Bill Schliehauf were found at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, among the Beatty Papers; two at the British Library, London, one each in the Keyes and Jellicoe papers, and one at the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. In addition, a microfilm of the first mentioned copy is held at the University of California, Irvine.

In the volume under review, the editors in their own introduction (written by Schliehauf) first explain the sequence of events described above, along with necessary notes
describing how positions and courses were expressed in 1916 and how orders were promulgated by signal. Then the Dewars’ Appreciation is reproduced in full, complete with diagrams, footnotes and appendices. This part is not a facsimile of the original: the pages have been adjusted to the book’s format but the content is unchanged. Where the editors have added their own notes and comments in several places, the additions can readily be distinguished from the original authors’ notes. The diagrams have been redrawn by John Jordan (like Stephen McLaughlin, a very well-known nautical historian) but, apart from one very minor correction, they are the same as those produced for Harper and used by the Dewars. This fascinating narrative forms the bulk of the present volume: 242 out of 316 pages.

The Dewars’ account of the battle is very clear and indeed, dramatic. Starting with the situation in 1916 and the preliminary activities of both sides from 28-30 May, it describes the movements of the fleets from their bases to the moment of contact and then details the manoeuvres of the ships in action and of all those in the vicinity. From the first contact, the account is divided into discrete time blocs, some only a matter of minutes. Each is illustrated by track charts and the reader can follow the action closely, knowing who was firing at whom and what hits were obtained. This applies not only to the account of the battlecruiser actions and the two encounters of the main battle fleets but, as far as possible, to the confusing night actions in the early hours of 1June. The Dewars, apparently, did not have access to German accounts which resulted in some errors.

Following the reproduction of the Naval Staff Appreciation is the Editors’ Afterword, written principally by Stephen McLaughlin but following Schliehauf’s intentions. It plainly shows that the Dewars were very critical of Jellicoe while repeatedly praising Beatty. Some of the policies they disliked were true enough but whether they were wrong is a matter of opinion. For instance, Jellicoe expected to win the battle by the overwhelming gunfire of his battle fleet in line-ahead formation. He wanted the battlecruisers and cruisers to engage their opposite numbers and the chief duty assigned to the destroyers was to prevent any attack on the battle fleet by their German equivalents. Attacks by destroyers on the enemy battle fleet would only be sanctioned if the prime task was accomplished and a favourable opportunity occurred. The Germans saw what they still called torpedo-bootes as primarily offensive, but their attacks on the British line were made by few boats and were ineffective. Jellicoe was under a misapprehension regarding the German torpedobootes. He thought they could all carry mines and that if the German fleet turned away, they would lay mines in their wake and lure the British over them. He expressed this view to the Admiralty which did not demur. This was faulty intelligence: no German torpedoboote could lay mines. Then there is the matter of the deployment of the battle fleet: the Dewars did not like a line-ahead contest on parallel tracks, claiming that in the days of sail it had always been inconclusive.
Stephen McLaughlin has addressed the whole question of deployment, including alternatives to what Jellicoe actually did, in his article ‘Equal Speed Charlie London – Jellicoe’s deployment at Jutland’ in the Conway annual Warship 2010). The Dewars were also critical of decisions made (or not made) by some squadron commanders and the Admiralty Intelligence Section, the latter for not passing on some vital information.

It is appropriate on this hundredth anniversary to remember Jutland and in republishing this controversial volume with their commentaries, the editors have allowed us to take an impartial view of the great drama that unfolded in the mists of the North Sea a century ago, when more than 8,500 British and German sailors lost their lives in the space of ten hours. At the entrance to an excellent temporary exhibition in the Royal Navy’s complex of museums in Portsmouth Dockyard is the slogan: “Jutland: the battle that won the war”. That is not so—rather, it was the battle that did not lose the war. It was said that Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could have lost the war in an afternoon – and he didn’t!

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This popular history describes the loss through grounding of various warships from 1691 to 2002, with each account roughly 15 pages long. Peter C. Smith is the prolific author of 76 books about naval, military and aeronautical history. Most chapters describe a single shipwreck, but two set in the early eighteenth century deal with multiple losses in related circumstances (a devastating storm which caused the loss of many ships around the British Isles in late 1703 and the destruction of Sir Cloudesley Shovell’s fleet off SW England in 1707). Each narrative constitutes a compact history of the warship lost, starting with its construction, and in many cases, its design. These summaries are dense with details of armament and the opening sections read like entries in Wikipedia. The author has included the full name of the commanding officer of every warship and merchant ship mentioned in the text; for example, “...the First Sea Lord, Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Pound, GCB OM GCVO...” (232) Where available, the full names of all persons lost are also listed, meaning that in the case of HMS Birkenhead, wrecked off South Africa in 1852 while transporting soldiers and some dependents, these details occupy eight pages of text.

Several of the incidents described happened in adverse weather with most involving tragic losses of life. The author adds welcome immediacy to the stories by means of passages from contemporary accounts but occasionally, he adds details official and other sources that are not explained to the reader. For example, in the story of the unfortunate ground-
ing of HMS *Nottingham* off Australia in 2002, the reader is told:” .... the marine engineering officer advised that the ship was not in danger of sinking or plunging. C,D,E,F and G sections of 4 and 5 decks were free flooded, and there was seven feet (2.136m) of water in the Sea Dart Quarters, Sea Dart Hydraulic and Power Rooms and 3D messdeck, with five feet (1.524 m) in the FER and rising.” Unless the reader is familiar with type 42 destroyers, these facts have an authoritative ring but do not help one grasp the situation. One major deficiency is a lack of maps, especially since the text is often not helpful in situating events. In describing how two small destroyers attempted to return to Scapa Flow in January 1918 in atrocious weather, the senior ship “....reported that her position at 1830 was 58°55′N, 1°46′W, steering N88W....” Adding how far and on what bearing this position was from the point of grounding around 2120 would have been helpful.

The most interesting accounts are arguably about two losses in 1940 early in the Second World War: that of HMS cruiser *Effingham* off Norway in May and of the elderly destroyer *Sturdy* off Scotland in heavy weather in October. *Effingham* grounded during a bold attempt to transport troops to Bodo, roughly halfway up the Norwegian coast on 17 May. By holding Bodo, the Allies hoped to block the German advance up the coast. *Effingham*’s captain had a large scale Norwegian chart which indicated that Bodo could be reached by a short cut channel thought to be too narrow for U-boats. The Admiral in charge of *Effingham* and three other warships agreed to the daring plan. *Effingham* was leading the formation at high speed in daylight when she grounded and tore out her bottom. Two other warships also touched bottom but got away. Smith offers several theories about what happened. The first suggests that the fatal shoal was marked on the chart by a “+”, a Norwegian chart symbol for an obstruction which was not familiar to those on the bridge of the cruiser. A second theory is that in laying out a planned track someone had obscured the shoal on the chart by a pencil line. What happened may have been a combination of both. A third theory is that *Effingham*’s navigating officer had earlier misidentified one of his lead marks. The ship was lost in a narrow rock-strewn channel (the book includes an excellent aerial photo) where “local knowledge” would have been helpful. The author states “It is, however, on record that *Effingham*’s captain was vehemently opposed to embarking any (sic) Norwegian whatsoever, either as a pilot or even as a liaison officer, for fear that they would be unreliable and have pro-German sympathies” (215). This is an extraordinary assertion, particularly so long after the event, but the author does not say what the source of this suggestion is or how he evaluates it.

HMS *Sturdy* was lost on 30 October 1940. She was apparently not fitted with radar, operating under radio silence and hence, not able to request a radio bearing from a shore station, and had been unable to obtain any celestial fixes in heavy weather for at least twenty-four hours. *Sturdy* was making for Londonderry after failing to locate an incoming convoy.
north of Ireland when she went aground in darkness on one of the Inner Hebrides. The author does not analyse how off track the ship was beyond saying “This was far to the north of her intended landfall” (225). In fact, 

_The author does not analyse how off track the ship was beyond saying “This was far to the north of her intended landfall” (225). In fact, Sturdy was lost more than 60 nautical miles to the north of Inish Hutch, the planned landfall to the north of Londonderry, which suggests how difficult navigation could be in a small destroyer enduring heavy weather for a prolonged period. Five sailors drowned trying to get lines ashore in the dark from their wrecked ship which had broken in two and was being washed by heavy seas."

_When Sturdy went aground and broke in two on Tiree Island in the Inner Hebrides, two of her crew managed to get ashore through heavy surf alive and set out to look for help. The remaining survivors, huddled in the dark in the forward section, saw a message sent by flashlight from the rocks ahead: ‘On no account attempt to leave the ship—tide is going down’ (229). The two survivors who had made it ashore had found the home of a local, who in turn, alerted a merchant navy captain who fortuitously happened to be home on leave on this remote island. Thanks to his warning, the men on the wreck made no further attempts to get ashore in darkness and reached safety in daylight. Sadly, the captain, whose night time message prevented further loss of life, was killed 11 months later when his ship was torpedoed. Following the subsequent enquiry, First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound seems to have “immersed himself in the case” (232). At a time when the submarine war on trade was highlighting the critical shortage of escorts, the Admiral regretted the loss of “this fine destroyer” and minuted that “….it is important to make everyone realise that incidents such as these will not be treated lightly” (232-33). Pound ruled that the Sturdy’s commanding officer’s next appointment should not be back to a destroyer. The former C.O. was accordingly appointed to the cruiser HMS Exeter and after she was sunk in 1942 would spend three and a half years as a Japanese prisoner of war. On the one hand, the First Sea Lord’s close attention to the loss of Sturdy and how her captain should be treated reflects how closely records of losses were being studied at the highest level, even in wartime, to discover what had gone wrong. On the other hand, it reinforces Admiral Pound’s reputation as an excessive centraliser,"

_After sighting, land fog was encountered. The order to reduce speed from 12 to 8 knots was given just when breakers were sighted ahead, but the ship struck rocks shortly afterwards. The author quotes the midshipman’s account: “Skipper, from starboard side, ‘Put the helm over’. Lambe [Officer of the Watch] ‘Hard a-starboard’. From the Skipper again, ‘Good God, Bott [navigating officer], where are we?’ He suddenly looked ninety, and old Nuts [Bott] looked_
cold and blue.” (181) Unfortunately, this new cruiser was a total loss.

Peter Smith works facts into his narratives which are interesting, if not directly related to the accounts of losses. On page 175, a footnote explains that the Kisbee Ring (often now described as a Kisby Ring)—a circular or horse collar-shaped life-saving buoy designed to be thrown to someone in the water—was invented by a Captain Thomas Kisbee, Royal Navy, (1792-1877) who also invented the Breeches Buoy. On page 219 we learn that the Royal Navy scrapped 24 Great War era destroyers in 1936, which would have been most useful in 1940 when the RN and RCN received obsolete destroyers from the USA. The author remarks that the small destroyers scrapped were reaching the end of their expected “lives”, but it is sobering to be reminded of this decision.

Sailors on the Rocks is a popular re-telling of how several British warships were shipwrecked over the centuries. It is nicely produced with photographs reproduced on glossy stock, a brief and general bibliography titled “Further Selected Reading on Royal Navy Shipwrecks” and a good index. Footnotes identify sources used where appropriate, but a lack of maps leaves the reader unable to situate the incidents. A generation ago, two authors with first-hand subject expertise produced rewarding books which analysed selected maritime disasters: Some Ship Disasters and their Causes (1968) by K.C. Barnaby, a naval architect, and An Agony of Collisions (1966) about radar-assisted collisions by Peter Padfield, the merchant navy officer then embarking on his writing career. Sailors on the Rocks is not written in a similar analytic framework. Instead, it presents dramatic stories whose purpose is to tell good yarns about notable naval shipwrecks.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Gary Staff is the author of numerous books about the Imperial German Navy, its ships and battles. This book describes the battle of Jutland (Skagerrak, in German) making use of official documents but much enlivened by the letters and individual descriptions of officers and crew members who were actually there. Like the Dewar brothers’ Jutland: The Staff Appreciation (with commentaries by Schliehauf and McLaughlin) reviewed above, it provides a detailed account of all phases of the battle but gives a much more vivid impression of what it was like to be there from the deck of the Derfflinger.

The first chapter describes the operations carried out by the German High Seas Fleet from January 1916 when Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer assumed command until the middle of May. During this time there were two sorties by the Germans and one by the British which might have resulted in
engagements between the fleets. The first was in February by a large number of torpedobootes (equivalent to British destroyers) that encountered nothing more than a few minesweepers. The other was the bombardment of Lowestoft and Yarmouth by the panzercruisers (battleships) on 24 April. This was an elaborate operation supported by submarines and zeppelins. The weather was severe and there was no encounter between heavy units. Then, on 4 May, the Grand Fleet under Admiral Jellicoe with the battleship fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Beatty attempted to entice the High Seas Fleet over mines and submarines to a gunnery action, while at the same time, mounting an air raid on the zeppelin base at Tondern. Neither thrust was successful, but Jellicoe’s fleet had penetrated even closer to the Jutland peninsula and Horns Reef than they would at the end of the month.

The next chapters describe the battle of 31 May-1 June in much the same way as the Dewars have done, dividing it into time periods of variable length during which significant actions or manoeuvres took place. Excellent diagrams support each section and the personal reminiscences of participants vividly recreate the scene. Most readers will already be familiar with the general trend of the battle. 1. Beatty and Hipper (the panzercruiser commander) sight each other: 2. Hipper leads Beatty towards Scheer’s High Seas Fleet: 3. Beatty leads Hipper and Scheer towards Jellicoe’s battleships: 4. Jellicoe deploys to the southeast and Scheer finds he is heading into an arc of firing battleships and turns away. The weather is misty: 4. Scheer turns back to the eastward but finds himself in the same position and turns away again: 5. Darkness falls and Jellicoe steers south hoping to cut the Germans off from Horns Reef but Scheer passes behind him. There are chance engagements in the dark: 6. Early on 1 June, Jellicoe is informed by Admiralty intelligence that the Germans have gained their bases and returns home.

Gary Staff is an enthusiast for the German panzercruisers and they are analysed and illustrated in several of his books. Vizeadmiral Hipper’s engagement with Beatty’s forces show how effective and tough these ships were. During the run south Beatty lost two ships, Indefatigable and Queen Mary, by magazine explosion and a third British battlecruiser, Invincible, is later lost for the same reason. With his five panzercruisers, Hipper was facing ten ships, four of them of the Queen Elizabeth class, the most powerful battleships in the world. The Germans were terribly battered with most of their armament out of action, but they did not explode and they could keep up their speed even partially flooded. Eventually, Hipper’s flagship, Lutzow, (he had transferred to Moltke) was reduced to slow speed and succumbed. The only other German capital ship lost was the pre-dreadnought Pommern, torpedoed during the night. The High Seas Fleet battleships were hit many times but appeared virtually unsinkable. Neither Staff nor the Dewars raise the issue of defective British fuses that exploded on impact, thereby preventing penetration of armour, nor of the British practice of accumulating charges in and below the turrets and
leaving doors in the supply chain open in the interests of rapid fire that contributed to the magazine explosions.

The last chapter, 'the outcome', is a good summary of the effects of the battle. Scheer declared a victory on return to port (it really wasn’t) and the first Admiralty announcement seemed to the British public much like a defeat, soon mitigated by Jellicoe’s despatch. Much has been made of the fact that the Grand Fleet was ready for battle a few days after returning to port while the High Seas Fleet was supposedly immobile for the rest of the war, but this was not so. Scheer reported to the Kaiser that the fleet would be fully ready for action by August and Sunderland was bombarded in that month. In 1917, the German fleet was active in Baltic operations and was instrumental in liberating Finland from the Bolsheviks. The last major sortie was in April 1918 and was on the scale of the 1916 Skagerrak operation but the British were unaware of it. For the rest of the war, however, Germany’s main hope was submarine warfare which was very nearly successful in 1917, while the Allies concentrated on mining the North Sea. The culmination of the naval conflict was the surrender of the High Seas Fleet and its internment in Scapa Flow and eventual scuttling.

Many years ago, probably when I first learned of the Battle of Jutland, I said to my father that it was unfortunate that poor visibility had robbed Jellicoe of his victory. He said that it was a very good thing—that if the weather had been clear, many thousands more British and German sailors would have died horrible deaths and, whatever the outcome, the end result would have been the same. He was right.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This narrative of the 1850 McClure Expedition into the Canadian Arctic details its efforts to locate the lost Franklin Expedition, discover the North-West Passage, and survive amid the harsh threats of the frozen environment that claimed Franklin’s ship. The author, Glenn M. Stein, uses primary sources from museum, archives, and material from descend-ants of McClure’s crew members scattered throughout the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. Chapters are arranged chronologically, beginning with the related histories of the participants and explorations prior to the 1845 launch-ing of Franklin’s expedition. The bulk of the work focuses on the years 1850 and 1851, and ends with a brief epilogue regarding the recent discovery of the HMS Investigator’s surprisingly intact wreckage.
The work opens with a brief *en medias re* description of the *Investigator’s* tenuous situation as of April 1853, before examining the life and experiences of Robert McClure which shaped who he was, not only as a naval officer, but also as an explorer. From his interactions with famed explorer James Clark Ross, McClure acquired a distrust of steam engines and their proponents which would have repercussions for the unfortunate Lieutenant Haswell throughout the expedition (28-29). The vast majority of the work deals with the years 1850 and 1851, focusing on the beginning of the voyage and the first full year in the Canadian Arctic.

The expedition had a mix of good and bad attributes. Two ships were assigned to be prepped for Arctic conditions and deployed at the same time: HMS *Investigator* and HMS *Enterprise*. A German Moravian Missionary, Johann Miertsching, was attached to the mission as a translator due to the knowledge of Inuit languages he had acquired in Labrador. More than half of the expedition members had served as shipmates on previous assignments, resulting in familiarity prior to the arduous task ahead of them. On the negative side, the winterization of the *Investigator* made her somewhat unsightly, with the massive added weight of copper sheeting and heating apparatuses slowing the vessel’s speed and hampering manoeuvrability. Seams leaked, space was an issue, and worst of all, the shoddy contract work by food distributor Stephen Goldner meant much of the canned meat rations were rotten. Later, an unfortunate accident caused over 3,000 pound of good rations to be lost overboard, further straining resources (44-45, 82). Once McClure pushed on alone into the Canadian Arctic with the *Investigator*, he lost the safety offered by having a support vessel in what comes off as a rather poorly justified race for glory. Nevertheless, the expedition succeeded in some regard, with McClure and his crew contacting several indigenous groups, offering trade items and leaving messages in an effort to ascertain the whereabouts of Franklin’s expedition. The ship’s doctor helped further the natural sciences by gathering botanical samples. Finally, a sortie by McClure’s sled party recorded the discovery of the fabled North-West Passage on 31 October 1850 (119-120). From that point on, however, conditions worsened, and the *Investigator* became hopelessly ice bound at its wintering location of Mercy Bay. The next four winters were marked by bitter cold, deteriorating conditions, dwindling supplies, and eventual crew deaths. The arrival of Lieutenant Bedford Pim in HMS *Resolute* on 6 April 1853 marked the expedition’s salvation as the malnourished survivors abandoned the *Investigator*’s trapped hull and marched out across the ice to safety with their supply-laden sleds (214-215, 224-225). The final pages cover the aftermath of the expedition, from the voyage back to England and distribution of medals, to the hearings to establish if McClure had truly been the one to find the North-West Passage and the passing of the final expedition members from old age. There follows a brief epilogue detailing the discovery of the *Investigator*’s intact wreck on 25 July 2010, seven appendices on a variety of subjects,
chapter notes, the bibliography, and index information.

Throughout the text, an assortment of accompanying images and maps aid in reader comprehension. Modern photographs of artifacts and late-nineteenth century portraits of crewmen complement black and white renditions of period paintings and sketches from the expedition or related findings. Large block quotes from the reports and diaries of various crew members are sprinkled throughout the work allowing the men’s own words to describe their situation. Selections of primary sources from the Admiralty’s orders, sled party records, crew biographies, and other data found in the seven appendices further illuminate the background and experiences of the McClure Expedition comprising notes, crew lists, report extracts, and a detailed account of the Arctic Medal’s design and construction.

The work does have its flaws. Stein has a tendency to write biographical descriptions of crew members after introducing them for the first time. While this information is interesting, the sections are sometimes overly long and interrupt the flow of the text. Occasionally, the same information is repeated, such as with a near identical repetition of caulker James Evans’ background and his tattoos (36, 137). This insertion of seemingly tangential information is present throughout the text. The tendency to call the expedition members “Investigators” and to sometimes have non-italicized ship names within quotes is also a little pace-breaking, as the proliferation of “Investigator,” Investigator, and “Investigators” does begin to run together. These are not crippling issues, however, but rather things that could be smoothed out and streamlined should Stein craft a revised edition in the future.

Given the recent discoveries of the wrecks of Investigator, Erebus, and Terror in the frigid waters of the Canadian Arctic, such a work is quite timely. The nineteenth century preoccupation with finding the North-West Passage is often overlooked in the public eye save for in Canada and the United Kingdom. This work serves as a valuable primer for both scholars of the subject and lay people interested in learning more about polar exploration in the waning days of the Age of Sail. The heavy use of personal data on individual crew members gives the odyssey a human touch, and despite any flaws, this work is still an enjoyable and informative story of the Royal Navy’s mid-nineteenth century Arctic explorations.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Tamara Thornton surveys the life of Nathaniel Bowditch, one of early America’s foremost mathematicians
and astronomers and a complex man of extraordinary intellect and work ethic. The author does a masterful job of describing the cultural life of post-colonial Salem, Massachusetts, in which Bowditch was nurtured. Born in 1773, Bowditch was the son of a working-class father, but his family was well connected in the local society. Where one stood in relation to political conflicts between the federalists and the anti-federalists and to which of the three local Christian dominations one belonged — Unitarians, Congregationalists and Anglicans — determined one’s social station and mobility in a judgmental society. Salem was a prominent seaport in pre-revolutionary America and young Bowditch went to sea as a supercargo (business manager of a ship’s cargo). This is the first blending of an informative account of the historical times that affected Bowditch through well-chosen anecdotes. Of particular interest to maritime historians, the first third of the biography focuses on his unusual upbringing, years at sea, and how he came to publish the work on navigation that prompted his initial fame.

Bowditch was largely self-taught, but was soon recognized as a mathematical sage in his community thanks to his constantly undertaking calculating challenges, including book-keeping problems. His life at sea exposed him to John Hamilton Moore’s *New Practical Navigator*, a guidebook for determining one’s position on the oceans of the world. While using this guide, Bowditch observed that many of the book’s tables were incorrect, thus endangering vessels that were not where they determined their position to be by depending on Moore. He, therefore, undertook the task of recalculating the book’s tables. This was the basis of his *New American Practical Navigator* that became indispensable, a book carried by ships of many nations. It was not, however, a work of creativity, but a result of painstaking mathematical rectification lacking enduring significance.

Bowditch, although a savant in math, was not considered a cultured man by many of his peers. In much of Massachusetts’ society, attaining credentials as a scholar of repute and prominence as a businessman did not necessarily mean one was socially polished. Status was determined by having a college education, thus becoming knowledgeable in the classics, natural philosophy and having some facility in English, Latin, Greek, and perhaps, French. At the time, mathematics was not considered a topic for a seriously educated man, unless accompanied by a Harvard degree. Although Bowditch never formally enrolled at Harvard, he was awarded an honorary master’s degree and doctor of laws.

Bowditch was intrigued by the ingenuity and complexity of the Pierre-Simon Laplace equations that mathematically described the regularity of the solar system. He struggled to teach himself technical French, then, he laboriously recalculated and annotated much of *Mécanique Céleste* in five extensive volumes. This brought him international fame as a Laplacean scholar. Once again, Bowditch did not create the original work, but through his mathematical brilliance, made it more accurate, understandable and useful. Much of the fame that came from this effort resulted in his election to many pres-
tigious academic societies both in the United States and Europe, the best known being American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Philosophical Society, and the Royal Astronomical Society of London.

As a young man, Bowditch worked as a clerk in a ship chandlery, leading to a life-long preoccupation with orderliness, record keeping and persistence in every endeavour he undertook. He used double-entry ledgers for all business transactions and modified the common notion of commercial credit of the day. He insisted that company borrowers fill out printed forms for bank transactions, introduced filing systems, cataloging, data collection, entry systems, paginated records and agreement records on acquired goods, etc. He looked upon corporations as best working like what he described as “a clockwork mechanism,” reflecting his love for mathematical order and his belief that strict regulation carried over into all human affairs. It also reflected his fascination with the astrological order of planetary systems.

Bowditch’s interest in fastidious organization led to his next vocations as a banking and insurance executive. “His enthrallment with precision and certainty of numbers shaped his impulse to systematize the institutions under his control.” (5) In the insurance business, he was an early actuary, a bonus from his Laplace work that led to the new science of probability and statistical inference. He was a founder of Essex Fire and Marine Insurance, the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company, and Essex Bank and active in the East India Marine Society. He declined a faculty appointment as Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy at Harvard, but went on to be a Harvard overseer. During that time, he persistently shook up the administration, making several enemies in the process. His feuds make especially fascinating reading. He also made a lasting contribution in helping organize Harvard’s library collection. Indeed, his contribution of creating impersonal systems in commerce persists today beyond his contribution to science.

Bowditch was compulsive in his interpersonal dealings in science, business matters and academic relations. Imbued with self-imposed morality, he could be charming at times, but often displayed what appeared to be a social inferiority complex. In addition to his self-assurance, he displayed little patience with what he perceived as ineptitude, corrupt practices or dishonesty. Perhaps because of this, some described him as being “petty, self-righteous, inflexible, relentless, and tactless.” (196) Still, he almost always achieved his goals, even at the expense of occasionally creating hard feelings. Although he made many significant contributions to eighteenth century navigational and astronomical science, his works have become a scientific footnote, largely because they lacked creativity and originality. Thornton’s biography of Bowditch is remarkably fluid and her rich narrative profiles the social, economic and cultural issues that surrounded this extremely complicated man. Thoroughly researched, this book is provocative in its objective examination of Bowditch’s multifaceted
career, thus giving the reader a probing, thoughtful, descriptive work about an unorthodox, quasi-genius Yankee. This biography puts Boweditch’s contributions within the perspective of a unique era, the early evolution of American navigational science and the American maritime industry.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut.


Letters of Seamen in the Wars with France 1793 to 1815 contains 255 letters written by seamen enlisted in the Royal Navy and Marines. Presented in chronological order, three-quarters of the letters are included in Part 1, which comprises nearly the entire date span of the wars. From the sailing of the first detachments of ships sent to the Mediterranean to transporting Bonaparte into exile on St. Helena, this general cross-section of the material has been included to explore what the letters and other sources may reveal about these men’s lives at sea and the war itself. The remaining one-quarter of the letters comprises Part 2, a selection of letters detailing eye-witness accounts of those present on board the ships involved in the Nore mutinies, dating from April through July 1797.

With respect to sources, much of the material appears preoccupied with gently countering historical classism. For example, the authors review various sources that attempted to discern the rates of literacy among seamen (20-28). Multiple sources had determined this rate based on a binary system, failing to realize that most individuals fall somewhere on a continuum of literacy. For example, in several sources, whether a seaman signed his name or simply made an ‘X’ instead was a determining factor between “literate” or “not literate,” respectively. Such a method fails to comprehend that signing one’s name is not commensurate with being able to read and write fluently. The authors indicate awareness of this when they state, “A very wide range of levels of skill of expression is found in the letters of seamen, from the very proficient to the barely literate” (26) and “…writers from different social strata appear to have had difficulties with various aspects of writing” (27). Based on the delicate manner in which the authors treat these sources for some twenty pages, it was difficult to discern whether they supported or were seeking to refute the classist tenor of their predecessors. The same is true of a second example, a discussion of the seamen’s interest in current affairs, wherein the authors state, “The letters suggest that these men were not as simple as is generally thought” (69). Finally, in the conclusion, “…we might well regard some of them as…literate rather than illiterate, inquiring rather than simple and more careful with money than profligate.”
If countering historical classism was of key interest to the authors, a stronger, separate chapter and indication of the import of the topic or its central place in the book’s purpose would have been welcome. As it is presented, however, the authors’ efforts to champion the seamen against prejudice are admirable, but appeared to this reader as wholly irrelevant. Having an argument with an historical perspective that is not presently shared by most historians seems an unnecessary tangent to an otherwise well-researched book.

With respect to organization, the discussion introducing Part 1 would have been better presented after the letters themselves. Firstly, the letters are well-interpreted through extensive footnotes while the introductory discussion are not. One example is references to “pressed men and Quota men” (44). For readers unfamiliar with these terms, suitable definitions are not provided there, but rather in the footnotes of the letters themselves. Secondly, a reader would have been able to understand the authors’ discussion better having read the letters first. The introductory material directly references many of the letters and seems to expect the reader to be familiar with how these letters fit into the overall narrative analysis. Examples are evident (49 and 51) where the authors assume that the readers’ familiarity with the letter-writers — not yet introduced — is as strong as their own. Finally, nowhere in the book is a suitable historical context for the ongoing wars with France presented. If the introductory material was to have served as this context, it failed by assuming that all readers will have a high level of familiarity with this conflict, time period, and life at sea in general. The analytical introduction to Part 1 is not of poor quality, but it cannot substitute for a suitable historical context and would have been more useful after the presentation of the letters themselves.

By contrast, the material introducing Part 2 is more useful for understanding the context of the mutinies, particularly sections beginning on pages 381 and 386. Additionally, the book is thoroughly indexed and possesses valuable appendices. Appendix I consists of biographies of the various letter writers and Appendix II presents summary discussions of the ships mentioned. Both offer the reader a richer understanding of the primary source documents.

With respect to the purpose of the book, the reader does, indeed, learn what the letters reveal about these men’s lives at sea during this period. One may deduce that the seamen in this sample were primarily concerned with ensuring that their loved ones received long-overdue pay, that they themselves received ‘necessaries’ (e.g., clothing), and with finding means of keeping social connections with those at home. They wanted their families to receive correct accounts of naval engagements, but not the horrific and gory details that must have been an inexorable part of the experience. Finally, after extensive periods away from home, their focus was on returning, with or without the blessing of the Crown. This collection of primary source documents is a welcome contribution to our historical
understanding of the lives of British seamen during the Napoleonic Wars.

Brandi Carrier
Alexandria, Virginia


I was unsure as to what to expect when I started to read another account of one the early twentieth-century’s many submarine disasters that all seem, in some ways, to have been lost to time. While I was superficially aware of the USS S-4 disaster, I was pleasantly surprised to find a superbly researched account of the tragic loss of a submarine and the colossal rescue and salvage operation it generated. *Seventeen Fathoms Deep* is not so much a submarine story, although the submarine USS S-4 is the focal point of the narrative, rather it is an accurate recounting of the Herculean efforts put forward by a small team of officers and divers to do their utmost to rescue the trapped submariners, in the most appalling of weather conditions, and what lessons the US Navy subsequently learned from the disaster.

The author, a published librarian and maritime researcher, was conducting research for another book when he stumbled upon long forgotten archival material about an incident which he recognized had not been adequately chronicled. His extensive research, which included first-hand reports and access to private papers, allowed him to piece together the entire incident from the initial collision with USCGC *Paulding*, through to the subsequent salvage of USS S-4 three months later. Williams sets the scene with a short summary of contemporary events in 1927, considered to be the “quintessential year of the Roaring Twenties”. He then goes to great lengths to describe all the key characters in the story and their unique backgrounds. At times he seems to be stretching the narrative—but that would be unfair, as he wants the reader to understand the passion these men had for their profession. The narrative is interspersed with appropriately-placed photographs, many from private archives. At 292 pages long, I found this to be an exciting and, at times, gripping read.

The story recounts how a former US Navy destroyer (ex-USS *Paulding*), on loan to the US Coast Guard for prohibition patrols, collides with a dived submarine (USS S-4) off the New England coast which immediately sinks in 102 feet of water; hence the title *Seventeen Fathoms Deep*. By the standards of the day, the response to the collision although *ad hoc*, was immediate as all available resources were quickly assembled to try to rescue any survivors. The US Navy quickly recalled many of the team that had salvaged the submarine USS S-51, sunk two years earlier with a large loss of life. One notable team member at both incidents was the irascible Captain Ernest King, who would later become the Commander-in-Chief Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy during the Second World War. At this point the reader will
have to pay close attention to the narrative (70-79), as it can be a bit confusing as to which incident the author is describing in his zeal to explain the personal experiences the key players gained in the earlier USS S-51 disaster.

I found the intense description of the perils of hardhat diving around sharp jagged metal—pushing the limits of 1920s diving technology—to be riveting, and the reader will appreciate the excellent use of footnotes to describe specific technical issues. In fact, the detail on diving (54) is superb and underscores how dangerous and difficult this operation was as the divers tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to provide fresh air to a group of trapped submariners who were slowly suffocating. As the USN raced to amass the necessary equipment and stores to support the rescue operation, they found that in the midst of Prohibition, they could not obtain hard spirits to revive the frozen while decompressing. Luckily, the local Coast Guard base was loaded with spirits confiscated from rum-runners. How ironic that the Coast Guard was supplying the Navy with rum to help them salvage a submarine accidentally sunk by a Coast Guard vessel (146).

Among the lessons the USN had to learn was that such a disaster would generate an incredible media firestorm and that naval leadership was unable to understand the public had a right to know what was happening. In short, the handling of the USS S-4 incident became a PR disaster for the US Navy. This was exacerbated when the principal rescue ship (USS Falcon) had to return to Boston in the midst of the rescue operation to land a seriously injured diver as the sea conditions precluded transfer to another vessel (164). Clearly it was the right decision, as no diving could be conducted because of the foul weather. The optics, however, were disastrous and there remained great animosity between the Navy and the media who were clambering around the rescue operation in rented fishing boats trying to get a story. Finally, although no one survived from USS S-4, the disaster raised awareness of the dangers of submarine operations and resulted in a number of innovations put in place that laid the foundations for modern submarine rescue. Twelve years later, when the submarine USS Squalus sank on peacetime diving trials, survivors would be rescued.

It is impossible to know exactly what happened on board USS S-4 that day, but this book offers vivid insight into how it most likely transpired and the multitude of problems rescuers faced as they carried on despite immense frustration when their every effort seemed to be stymied by either the extreme weather or the limits of technology of the time. I recommend this book to anyone with an interest in naval history, particularly those involving submarines and diving, as it graphically portrays how out of a disaster lessons can be learned and progressive change can happen.

Norman Jolin
Appleton, Ontario

Water was the dominant means of transporting freight between North American communities during the early nineteenth century, and when existing watercourses did not make the desired connections, engineers were engaged by business and political interests to manipulate nature in the pursuit of development. The Morris Canal was a result of such collaboration, connecting the Delaware and Hudson rivers through lift locks, inclined planes, dams, and other works across the highlands of northern New Jersey. Kevin Wright, who became fascinated with the waterway while working as tour director at the restored canal village of Waterloo, has written a detailed account of the Morris Canal that uses contemporary publications to explore links between speculative finance, technological innovation, and changing approaches to transporting freight.

Wright begins by placing the Morris Canal in the context of the fuel shortage that beset the north-east United States as forests receded in the wake of settlement, and affordable cordwood was no longer readily available to families and manufacturers. Anthracite coal in eastern Pennsylvania offered a solution, if delivered at a reasonable price. The Erie Canal demonstrated the benefits of building waterways to haul bulk cargo, and plans began in 1816 to connect the Lehigh Valley with the eastern seaboard using the waters of New Jersey’s Lake Hopatcong. The Morris Canal and Banking Company was chartered in 1824, and construction began the following year. The canal’s design featured a series of inclined planes first used in England in 1787. The planes required considerable adaptation, and contractors struggled to balance efficiency and economy. By 1831, the canal was completed as far as Newark at a cost that was three times the initial estimate, due to experimentation and various setbacks. Shipments of coal, wood, iron ore and farm produce were soon traversing the canal and generating revenue, but construction did not reach Jersey City on the Hudson River until 1837.

Competition from other canals and the increasing demand for coal soon led to efforts to increase traffic through rebuilding planes, lengthening locks, deepening the canal, and installing Scottish turbines to improve water flow. The capacity of canal boats rose from 10 to 70 tons between 1832 and 1860, but debt management proved more troublesome than engineering. After defaulting on payments to foreign and domestic creditors, the company was reorganized in 1844 without banking privileges. The canal’s prospects benefited from the leadership of an experienced engineer, and from the growth of railroads that revived the iron trade in northern New Jersey. Substantial increases in coal and iron ore shipments resulted in profits from 1852 to 1876. By the 1870s, however, railroads aggressively sought to eliminate canals as competitors. The Lehigh Valley Railroad leased the Morris Canal in 1871, and commerce on the waterway began an irreversible decline. Local communities still depended on the canal for
deliveries of coal and other commodities, but it never met operating expenses after 1877. Boats carrying 70 tons took five days to travel between the Delaware and Hudson rivers; a locomotive could pull 2,000 tons over the same distance in five hours. The Morris Canal operated on an occasional basis into the twentieth century, but as Wright notes, the innovative design—initially regarded as an engineering marvel—had become “a discarded anachronism” (168). Remnants of the canal were turned over to canoeists, hikers, photographers, and artists, with other sections drained and buildings destroyed in the 1920s to make way for more productive uses.

Wright bases his account on a wide range of newspapers, magazines, trade journals, and government documents published concurrently with the events he chronicles. These sources provide insights into the actions of company directors, engineers, and politicians that range from the optimism of the age to criticism of “This miserable little ditch” (91). The publications also yielded the many etchings and photographs that are generously distributed throughout the book and reproduced with impressive clarity. A few historical maps are included, but a modern map showing the canal’s route and towns featured in the text would be helpful for readers not familiar with the area. Wright’s prose is clear and very descriptive, especially when discussing technical issues and working conditions on the canal. He offers the reader copious facts in a chronological sequence, but as the text moves between financing, design, labour relations, natural calamities, economic conditions and back again, a more thematic approach would have given the text more cohesion. Many of the details would have been more effective in tables listing revenue, expenditures, number of boats operated, and tonnage carried so that trends could be discerned regarding the canal’s operations over almost a century.

Kevin Wright’s history of the Morris Canal is a useful addition to the literature on civil engineering during the nineteenth century, the transition from mechanics with manual skill but little technical knowledge, to a more centralized approach led by competent engineers, and the relationship between major infrastructure projects and the United States’ volatile financial sector. It also provides valuable perspectives on the impact of inland waterways on local and regional development before railroads evolved from being a catalyst of the Morris Canal’s prosperity to agents of obsolescence for its inclined planes.

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