Book Reviews


Although it tends to be lost in the shuffle of the First World War centenary, 2017 is the 350th anniversary of the end of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, which was fought from 1665-1667. The interdisciplinary and more nuanced approaches of the last several decades are actively working to reshape conceptions of not only the Second Anglo-Dutch War, but also of the global context of seventeenth century conflicts. Both books under discussion examine Dutch shipbuilding and ships, and provide details which, until recently, have been unknown or hard to acquire in English language texts.

Wendy van Duivenvoorde’s *Dutch East India Company Shipbuilding: The Archaeological Study of Batavia and Other Seventeenth Century Ships* provides a detailed, technical discussion of one particular ship, while setting it in within the context of seventeenth-century Dutch, and especially, Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), shipbuilding. It is a meticulous and definitive cataloging of the material recovered from the *Batavia*, wrecked off the west coast of Australia in 1628, as well as a discussion of the context of the disaster. The various chapters detail the study of the wreck, the disciplinary context of other VOC ships, and the archaeological findings. The author’s objective was to “create a better understanding of Dutch shipbuilding practices in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century, in particular for ships designed and constructed to sail long distances over the world’s oceans.” It is important that she states that the understanding of the *Batavia* in this book is not a final reconstruction, but a working hypothesis and educated guess. The sheer wealth of documentation about the study and recovery of the *Batavia*, information known about other contemporary ships, and archival documents ensured her success.

For those who are interested in the early-modern aspects of the age of sail, *Dutch East India Company Shipbuilding* is a must-buy, and an excellent example of the interdisciplinary work that is driving modern understandings of the early-modern maritime world. For example, included in the book are transcribed and translated documents from Dutch archives that define the dimensions of

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various different types of wooden ships. These are absolutely invaluable, and provide important context for the technical discussion and 'educated guesses'. Further, the book is beautifully printed and presented. There are numerous detailed and well laid-out images, including archival documents, screen-shots of computer programs used to reconstruct the *Batavia*, and explanatory diagrams. Van Duivenvoorde's efforts on this book continue the original accomplishments of the *Batavia* team led by Western Australia’s Jeremy Green, who provided the foreword.

James Bender’s *Dutch Warships in the Age of Sail 1600-1714: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* is a much more straightforward historical effort, and makes an equally important contribution as a reference work for historical research on the early-modern maritime world. Although *Dutch Warships in the Age of Sail* does not quite do for the Dutch navy what Rif Winfield's fantastic *British Warships in the Age of Sail* did for the British navy, it is, nevertheless, a detailed, and definitive cataloguing of Dutch warships during the described period.

The book begins with the author’s brief explanation of the text’s structure, followed by a key to abbreviations, a glossary and bibliography. Despite its rather unorthodox placement of information, this layout works really well to provide context for the reader. There is a 24-page introduction from the excellent and authoritative English historian of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, J.D. Davies, in which he provides needed background on the Dutch state, and the Dutch methods for the creation, maintenance and use of maritime military forces. Next comes two sections of fleet lists; the former simply listing ships that took part in each campaign, and the latter, providing much more detail for each ship. Unfortunately, unlike the Winfield volumes, Bender does not supply a complete set of characteristics for each ship. Dimensions for some ships are provided intermittently, although most ships do have crew, armament and commanders detailed. Bender cannot be criticized for being unable to match Winfield’s wealth of technical details since his Royal Navy records remain largely intact, while most of Bender’s comparable Dutch records were lost in a fire in 1844. The details are accompanied by a large number of excellent (although all black and white) reproductions of contemporary drawings, paintings and other images.

Both *Dutch East India Company Shipbuilding* and *Dutch Warships in the Age of Sail* are highly recommended. They should certainly be purchased for university libraries and would make valued additions to the personal libraries of academic scholars and history buffs.

Samuel McLean
Toronto, Ontario


This is a big book, physically and historiographically. Andrew Boyd, a former Royal Navy (RN) submariner and Foreign Office civil servant, challenges a considerable field of literature regarding the efficiency of the interwar Royal Navy, the circum-
stances surrounding loss of the battle-
ship *Prince of Wales* and the battle-
cruiser *Repulse* (Force Z) to Japanese
air attack in December 1941, and
British strategy for defense of South-
east Asia and the Indian Ocean. In
particular, Boyd rejects those such as
Correlli Barnett, who describe British
Eastern defense policy as “strategic
illusion, weakness, and then irrele-
vance” in the late 1930s and early
1940s. Boyd’s work supports and
extends David Edgerton’s challenge
to Barnett’s and Paul Kennedy’s view
of twentieth-century Britain as a na-
ation in decline. In contrast, Edgerton
and Boyd highlight Britain’s
strengths, enduring prowess, and
effectiveness, especially compared
with nations other than the United
States. Boyd’s principal innovation
is to recast our frame of reference
when considering British Eastern
defense strategy. Instead of focusing
on the defense of the Singapore base
and Southeast Asia, Boyd argues that
in the late 1930s, planners in London
began to conceive of an eastern em-
pire stretching from the South China
Sea and Singapore in the east all the
way to the eastern Mediterranean in
the west. Within this area lay the
critical Middle Eastern oil fields, the
resources of India-Australia, and the
sea lines of communication connect-
ing these resources with the rest of
the empire. While modern historians
have separated the Mediterranean,
Indian Ocean, and Pacific Oceans in
their accounts of the Second World
War, Boyd recasts British defense
policy by highlighting the linkages,
both physical and mental, between
these regions.

The author begins by examining
the Navy’s rearmament program of
the 1930s, setting himself in opposi-
tion to what he describes as “the stan-
dard narrative” of the Navy’s inter-
war decline. Barnett is the chief
culprit in Boyd’s account, especially
the view that the interwar Royal
Navy was intellectually conservative
and consumed with refighting the
1916 Battle of Jutland. In contrast,
Boyd wants to show that in the 1930s
the Navy was both stronger and more
innovative than has been suggested,
even by fellow revisionists such as
John Ferris and Jon Sumida. He
describes British interwar warships as
broadly comparable to their foreign
counterparts and draws upon recent
works by Sumida, Geoffrey Till,
Norman Friedman, Thomas Hones,
Mark Mandeles, and D.K. Brown to
argue for the interwar Royal Navy.
Boyd makes a strong case, though in
at least one technical area he goes too
far in suggesting that the carrier HMS
*Eagle* was “comparable” to USS
*Lexington* in both size and capabili-
ties (16). Boyd’s synthesis of recent
revisionist works raises a larger inter-
pretive question. To what degree
should internal consistency and ‘ap-
propriate for the information known
at the time’ be the standard of histori-
cal evaluation of military organiza-
tions? For example, Boyd accepts
and expands on Till’s 1979 argument
(in *Air Power and the Royal Navy,
1914–1945: A Historical Survey*) that
the RN’s interwar Fleet Air Arm
(FAA) reflected a uniquely British
context and was in large measure
appropriate for the tasks envisioned
and undertaken, despite serious limi-
tations. In contrast, Williamson
Murray accepts Till’s position, but
concludes that the RN still “got it
wrong” on naval aviation by making
comparisons with American and Jap-
anese naval aviation. (See William-
son and A. Reed Millet’s 1996 *Mili-
tary Innovation in the Interwar Pe-
riod*). Both perspectives appear to
have merit and the question requires
further investigation.

Boyd then examines the develop-
ment of British strategy to defend its
eastern empire. He highlights a key
1937 meeting where British officials decided that in the eastern empire three areas took priority: the Suez Canal, the oilfields of the Persian Gulf, and the northern approaches to India. To defend these locations (and access to them) required control of Iraq, Egypt, Iran, a neutral or friendly Turkey, open sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean from India to Australia, and at the eastern edge of this region, Singapore. To defend this region, the RN would have to be flexible, shifting forces between the eastern Mediterranean and Far East as the strategic threats changed. After the start of the Second World War, Britain adopted a forward defensive posture in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East which consumed much of the nation’s military resource in 1940-1941, and in the Far East, relied upon a limited defensive screen. Britain’s early wartime commitment to hold the eastern Mediterranean “meant the forces available to meet potential Japanese intervention were . . . reduced in crucial ways” (131). Boyd argues that this commitment discouraged Germany from undertaking a major offensive into the Middle East.

Turning to Southeast Asia, Boyd demonstrates that in 1940, Admiralty staff clung to the view that a purely naval fleet (as opposed to a mixed sea-air force) was the foundation of eastern defense. As a result, in 1941, the Admiralty sought to persuade the Americans to move their fleet to Singapore to replace the ships the Admiralty could no longer send east. By 1941 the defense of Singapore and the surrounding area required British air and sea forces only available at the expense of its defense of the eastern Mediterranean. Faced with this choice of conducting a forward defense of the eastern empire in the eastern Mediterranean or in Southeast Asia, London gave the Mediterranean priority.

Boyd also demonstrates the critical role played by the United States in shaping Britain’s eastern defense strategy in 1941. Early that year, RN plans proposed that the bulk of British naval forces in the Far East would protect Indian Ocean convoys in the event of war with Japan while the Americans and Dutch guarded the Dutch East Indies and the South China Sea. In response to American criticism of these plans (if the British valued Singapore as highly as they claimed, why were so few British naval forces assigned to defend Singapore?), the Admiralty began to consider deploying the limited covering forces available to the South China Sea rather than the Indian Ocean. This is an important point that has not previously been recognized. The Admiralty also sought to play its part in supporting the growing Anglo-American deterrence posture in the western Pacific. The Americans were sending troops and planes, including heavy bombers, to the Philippines in an effort to dissuade Japan from striking south and agreed to provide destroyers to support a British capital ship squadron based at Singapore. Boyd’s argument successfully and creatively incorporates the deployment of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* with elements of late 1941 allied planning such as the American reinforcement of the Philippines. He concludes that this deterrence strategy “had the potential to check Japan. Failure [of the strategy] laying in timing and execution.” (272)

Boyd then challenges the traditional understanding of Force Z’s deployment to Singapore by arguing that the Admiralty’s shift to an offensive forward strategy, not Churchill’s posturing, that played the critical role in the decision to send Force Z east.
He also disputes the notion that the carrier Indomitable was to be assigned to Force Z, suggesting that later accounts are “post facto attempts by key participants to suggest they were more proactive in addressing the Japanese air threat than they actually were.” (302) Finally, contrary to those who view the 1942 Japanese raid into the Indian Ocean as a sign of the RN’s helplessness, Boyd insists that Somerville came within a hair of achieving a major victory over the Japanese. The key to this argument is a counterfactual night torpedo air strike on two Japanese carriers detached from Nagumo’s retiring force late on 5 April. This would have been one of the more challenging naval air operations of the Second World War.

A number of maps help the reader navigate the text, including several maps detailing the relative positions of Somerville and Nagumo during the 1942 Ceylon raid—an indispensable element for the type of detailed operational argument Boyd makes. An appendix lays out interwar major power naval construction while the 75 pages of notes demonstrate the author’s prodigious research, principally among British archival records.

Boyd’s characterization of an eastern empire defended from the eastern Mediterranean to the South China Sea is an innovative approach to understanding British policy and strategy in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The extensive evidence marshalled is compelling and future scholars will have to take note of this reconceptualization. This book is recommended for specialist naval historians as well as general readers interested in the Second World War at sea.

(The views expressed in this review are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or Air University.)

Corbin Williamson
Prattville, Alabama


The 1917 Halifax explosion has inspired numerous books, but Kingston, Ontario, journalist, author and editor, Ken Cuthbertson, offers a fresh take on it this year, the 100th anniversary of the tragedy. Cuthbertson has written several highly acclaimed biographies of well-known journalists, most recently, famed war correspondent William L. Shirer (A Complex Fate, 2015). His instincts and interest in the human aspects of the title event drive and sustain this carefully researched new look at the cataclysmic morning of December 6, 1917.

The book, rather prosaically titled, uses 31 chapters plus an introduction, a valuable bibliography and endnotes to retell this tragic story to a new generation in chronological order, focused tightly from 30 November 1917 to April 1918. One by one, Cuthbertson provides considerable background and backstory on the many players in an organic and integrated way that effectively builds insight into their motives and actions. His foreshadowing, though occasionally a little heavy-handed, brings the reader breathlessly to the point of impact, fire, explosion and death. I found the book hard to put down.

Cuthbertson observes the characters clearly and (mostly) sympatheti-
cally, from the principals—Captains Haakon From, of the Belgian Relief freighter SS *Imo*, who did not survive, and Aimé Le Médec of the munitions ship SS *Mont Blanc*, who did—to harbour pilots, Naval Chief Examining Officer Wyatt, sailors like Bert Griffin, and ordinary people such as Mary Jean Hinch, who were victims of and survived the almost indescribable “Thing” that had happened to them.

The author sympathizes with Le Médec, portraying him as something of a heroic victim, starting from the New York moment when he must stoically accept wartime orders from his government to transport the 3,000-ton cargo of TNT, gun cotton, picric acid (an explosive nitrate compound) and benzol that transforms his ship—slow, worn out and entirely unsuited to the job —into a floating bomb. Captain Le Médec reluctantly abandoned *Mont Blanc*, hopelessly ablaze in the middle of Halifax harbour, after the collision, thereby saving himself and his crew (and possibly a Mi’kmaq toddler and mother), but by then readers will only wince and agree that by then there was really nothing else to do. The rudimentary systems and directions that were intended to prevent human error, which he had apparently followed more or less to the letter, were absent or had failed catastrophically. Sadly, it would not be the last time for such dreadful occurrences.

Cuthbertson seems less sympathetic to *Imo*’s reputedly irascible and impatient Captain From, who was, indeed, in a hurry to get out of the harbour and was decapitated when *Mont Blanc* exploded.

Of the three trials and investigations following the event, one exonerated From, one exonerated Le Médec, and the third, adjudicated by the Privy Council in London, held the officers equally responsible for the collision. This inability to reach a unanimous conclusion does not seem unusual for such huge disasters at the time. When the *Empress of Ireland* sank after a collision in the St. Lawrence only three years earlier, Norway’s inquiry found the Norwegian vessel blameless, while the Canadian inquiry headed by Lord Mersey (who had investigated *Titanic*’s sinking) found that the *Empress* was not the cause of the collision. Two sets of irreconcilable (might one say “alternative?”) facts. Humans failed. A thousand died. The controversy continues.

Cuthbertson is—rightly, I think —unsympathetic about the systemic flaws he found, lackadaisical enforcement of maritime rules, simple incompetence, carelessness of government and military officials, and all-too-human institutional infighting between the Harbour Pilots’ Association, the Royal Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, the civilian Harbour Master authorities and others involved in the Halifax tragedy, never mind the ugly, inevitable and ever-so-familiar buck-passing, cover-up and scapegoat-seeking by authorities after the event. He points out that the media played its own unsavoury role in the investigative part of the saga.

This era, of course, was supposedly when hubris was being bled out of the human race in the War to End All Wars. The unsinkable *Titanic* had gone down just five years before. Some things don’t seem to change.

The recent (2013) railway tragedy at Lac Mégantic, Quebec, showed similar issues of lax regulatory oversight and enforcement by Transport Canada, no doubt influenced heavily by industry lobbyists pressuring big government to keep business operating costs low. Having worked in laboratory medicine and as a safety officer, I nodded in agreement with Cuthbertson. “To Err is
Human,” a landmark 2000 report, similarly stated the problem with medical errors—not so much about bad people in health care, but about good people working in bad systems that need to be made safer. It’s not that we don’t know what to do (safer harbour rules did exist in 1917) and many approaches do reduce failures in complex systems. But it’s rare that robust operation controls are fully implemented or maintained for long, since safety is so expensive! Explain that to the survivors of the Lac Mégantic disaster or the devastated Haligonians before them.

Cuthbertson’s criticism of the “system” and those in charge of it in Halifax and elsewhere in 1917 is clear and fair. Harbour authorities subsequently improved procedure to deal more sensibly with munitions ships, showing there was at least some recognition at the time that simply blaming the people involved was not a solution for the future. Cuthbertson softens his judgement with the caveat that “Western society was still transitioning from being rural and agrarian to being urban and industrialized.” A century later, we still are, it seems. That may be one of the lessons to be drawn from this fine book.

David More
Kingston, Ontario


Apart from its slightly smaller dimensions, cover illustration, and modified title that substitutes the word “Warfare” for “Organisation,” this is the paperback edition of the superb original that appeared in 2008 as a joint publication between Seaforth Publishing and the Naval Institute Press. The innumerable strengths of the first version are found here, from the comprehensive and detailed examination of all aspects of the English Restoration navy to the lavish collection of both colour and black and white illustrations that appear throughout the book. While it cannot be considered a “new” or fresh contribution, Davies’ splendid work remains an essential source for students and scholars of the Royal Navy.

The principal focus of Davies’ book is the 40-year period between 1649 and 1689, when under the administration of Samuel Pepys, the English navy underwent the fundamental changes that enabled it to transition into the world’s most powerful navy over the following century and a half. Davies convincingly argues that it was during the ‘extended’ Restoration Period, under the monarchs Charles II and his brother James II, when England continued to duel with the Dutch for maritime economic supremacy, that the English navy became a permanent national institution. The period witnessed the construction and operation of larger and heavier warships, employing innovative and more effective fighting tactics, and commanded by an increasingly professional officer corps, while being overseen by a competent and committed administration.

Every aspect of England’s Restoration Navy is examined over 55 chapters contained within thirteen main sections. Davies modeled his study on Brian Lavery’s Nelson’s Navy (1989), and was determined to do for the navy of the seventeenth century what Lavery had so effectively achieved for that of the later period. In this book, Davies devotes
concise chapters to ship types, shipbuilding, officers and crews, methods of naval recruitment, and life and work aboard ship. Other chapters provide the necessary context for understanding developments in the navy during periods of war and peace, such as changes relating to dockyards, naval bases and victualling, and the state and influence of England’s Dutch and French naval counterparts. He addresses fighting tactics through the analysis of three separate battles — Scheveningen, Lowestoft, and Texel; the case studies providing welcome attention to these largely neglected battles.

Davies, a widely recognized scholar of the Royal Navy and Restoration Period, is clearly at home here. His expertise on the topic is unparalleled, having spent much of the past four decades researching and writing either academic monographs or historical fiction novels set in the period. His first major study, Gentleman and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy (1991), which examined the reactions of naval personnel to the demands imposed by Pepys and the structure of the service and the role of the Navy in the life of the country, certainly informs this much broader treatment. Davies’ use of the best available evidence allows readers to reap the benefits of his notes. Though he makes thorough use of Pepys’s famous diary and the naval administrator’s other published and unpublished works, Davies is very careful in weighing that testimony with that found in additional original manuscript sources such as the Admiralty Records, as well as published primary materials including those volumes produced by the Navy Records Society. Of further value and enjoyment to readers are its wonderful illustrations. Davies’s use of images and photographs is extensive and rarely experienced for an economically-priced book, for he has gathered a truly impressive array from repositories ranging from the National Maritime Museum, British Library, British Museum, and U.S. Naval Academy, to private collections, as well as the author’s own photograph collection.

The strengths of Davies’s book also reside in its prose. For the past decade, he has produced no fewer than seven works of historical fiction novels set within the context of the seventeenth-century English navy. Writing with flair and purpose, Davies engages academic and popular audiences alike. Whether describing the intricacies of working the ship, the supply chain of ships’ masts, sails, rigging and armaments, or the victualling system in this book, or relating the latest exploits of his fictional “gentleman” Captain Matthew Quinton in his engrossing novels, Davies makes the world of the seventeenth century Restoration Navy accessible to all his readers.

Though the stellar work stands on its own in every regard, this reviewer feels that the author may have missed an opportunity to include a guest preface to expand the audience. Another relatively simple enhancement would have been to update the suggestions for further reading. These nitpicks aside, Davies’s outstanding study of the seventeenth-century English navy should continue to be the go-to book on the subject. The readable text and affordable price of this edition will further increase its accessibility to scholars and non-scholars alike, who will eagerly sign on for the passage.

Michael Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario

George S. Burkhardt’s *Sailing with Farragut: The Civil War Recollections of Bartholomew Diggins* depicts the American Civil War through the eyes of an ordinary sailor who fought against the Confederacy under Admiral David Farragut for Union control of the Mississippi and Gulf Coast ports between 1862 and 1864. Part of the Voices of the Civil War series, Burkhardt’s edition of *Diggins* helps fill a void, the serious lack of naval primary accounts by common sailors, marines and others, from either side, engaged in the conflict between the States. Burkhardt credits this dearth of personal narratives to the high rate of illiteracy among the naval rank and file, both Union and Confederate. He tells us that 45 percent of the U.S. Navy’s strength in 1863 was foreign-born while another 8 to 23 percent of the enlistees were African-Americans, mostly illiterate. USS *Hartford*, Diggins’ ship, carried a crew of 324, of which 216 were foreign-born, representing 25 different nationalities. Many of Diggins’s crewmates, he says, understood only basic commands.

A young Irish immigrant in 1862, Diggins never gave his reasons for enlisting in the navy. Burkhardt doubts it was due to patriotic fervor, suggesting instead Diggins’s need for employment, the lure of prize money, and his personal desire for regular meals and better sleeping conditions than were offered by the army’s traditional muddy ground. USS *Hartford*, Farragut’s flagship, was tasked with taking rebel-held New Orleans under the Union’s Anaconda policy, designed to shut down Southern ports and split the Confederacy at the Mississippi. Diggins describes the large fire rafts “filled with pine knots and other combustible matter…all in flames 30 to 50 feet high,” used by the Confederates to defend New Orleans (10), and the “terrible roar and nois” of the guns during the siege of the city (17). New Orleans having fallen, he details firsthand the continued defiance of local rebels and the dramatic response of Union General Benjamin F. Butler, the infamous “Beast Butler.”

After the reduction of New Orleans, Diggins takes us up the Mississippi to Vicksburg, where he criticizes Farragut for his dangerous passage of the well-fortified city whose batteries commanded the steep, overhanging banks of the river. He enumerates the hazards of “brown water warfare,” such as currents, tides, storms, groundings, and gunfire from enemy ships and forts, as well as random shots from shore, by which he was seriously wounded. An added problem for the “brown water navy,” he says, was runaway slaves, desperate for safe passage, and seeking to serve with the fleet to earn their freedom.

When Farragut’s vessels attacked rebel-held Port Hudson, Diggins recounts his mission ashore to disrupt telegraph communications behind enemy lines, and his stint at blockade duty at the mouth of the Red River to inhibit the flow of Confederate traffic across the Mississippi. Diggins found blockade duty especially irksome due to heavy weather and rations infested with worms and “weevils.” The surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, however, raised Yankee spirits, and *Hartford* turned north with the rest of the Union flotilla for repairs and refitting.
ending Diggins’ first voyage with Farragut.

His second voyage with the admiral began in 1864, and focused on rebel-held Mobile. He gives us an eyewitness account of the Battle of Mobile Bay, listing the Union vessels involved, their fleet formation, and Farragut’s heroics. Diggins greatly admired him for storming through Confederate defenses, even quoting the Admiral’s famous “Damn the Torpedoes” line in reference to his ships entering the heavily-mined harbour.

In an interesting sidelight to the struggle for Mobile, Diggins describes previously unrecorded skirmishes in which he and his crewmates on Hartford participated, what Burkhardt terms the Ivanhoe Saga. On the dark night of 30 July 1864, blockade runner Ivanhoe, a fast English iron-hulled paddle-wheel steamer, carrying medicines, shoes, blankets, and provisions sorely needed by the beleaguered city, grounded in Mobile harbour. Over a week-long series of actions, the Union fleet tried to destroy the steamer, while the Confederates tried as hard to save her and salvage her cargo. On two separate nights, Diggins became part of a boarding party of 100 men seeking to sack Ivanhoe, each man armed with a revolver, cutlass, and carbine. Hand-to-hand combat with desperate defenders ensued, but in the end, the rebels prevailed in making off with Ivanhoe’s cargo.

Naval aspects of the Civil War largely ended with the fall of Mobile, and USS Hartford sailed north with Farragut and Diggins, each to receive recognition for their services—Farragut becoming America’s first full admiral, and Diggins being awarded the Medal of Honor for his gallantry at Mobile. Surprisingly, Burkhardt tells us, USS Hartford survived, though much deteriorated, until 1956.

Throughout his Recollections, Diggins details information on gunboats, ironclads, supply ships, monitors, submarines, and Confederate mines and torpedoes, and explains contemporary weaponry, tactics, and strategy. His personal contact with, and comments on, a selection of Union leaders including Farragut, Admiral David Porter, generals Butler, Nathaniel Banks, and U. S. Grant enlivens his narrative. Burkhardt has done a fine job editing Diggins’ Recollections. He introduces each chapter with useful background information, supplementing Diggins’ original manuscript with period maps and photographs. He, likewise, displays a mastery of a rich array of primary and secondary sources. Overall, Burkhardt’s Sailing with Farragut: The Civil War Recollections of Bartholomew Diggins is a sterling addition to the library of literature on America’s Civil War.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


Laura Sook Duncombe’s new book on pirate women covers a lot of ground geographically and chronologically. She has chosen a varied selection of female sea rovers, some notorious while others are obscure; they inhabited different eras, from the ancient world to the modern period. Their stories are often a blend of history and myth. In some cases,
they exist only in novels or Hollywood films. Duncombe argues that what these women had in common, despite their diverse backstories, is that their need for freedom drove them to the sea. Certainly, the shipboard world offered danger and opportunity as well as escape from their lives ashore.

Many of Duncombe’s subjects are historical figures. She includes the best known women pirates such as Anne Bonny and Mary Read. One of her underlying arguments, however, is that most such women languish in anonymity. This is true of even the most successful pirates. An apt example is Cheng I Sao: despite her massive fleet and her many successes at sea in the nineteenth century, Cheng I Sao is not well known in the western world. And even in her own country, her true name is uncertain: Cheng I Sao simply means “wife of Cheng I.” Yet, Duncombe argues that Cheng I Sao is the most prosperous pirate of all time of either gender. (174) In the majority of cases, the lives of these women are so poorly documented, it is almost impossible to know what aspects are fact and which ones are fiction. The author attempts to sift through the often conflicting accounts of their feats and legacies.

In order to do this, Duncombe has consulted some of the relevant secondary sources and a few primary sources in print. Her research included some of the “must read” texts for anyone tackling female piracy, such as John C. Appleby’s Women and English Piracy, 1540-1720: Partners and Victims of Crime and David Cordingly’s Seafaring Women: Adventures of Pirate Queens, Female Stowaways, and Sailors’ Wives. She also draws on popular culture—everything from Treasure Island to the “Pirates of the Caribbean” films. She even includes juicy gossip that Bartholomew Roberts, one of most infamous pirates of the Golden Age, may have been a woman! Although she has used diverse sources for her research, Duncombe’s bibliography is not extensive. Her analysis would have benefitted from some of the recent works on gender and seafaring.

Duncombe isn’t an historian nor is her intended audience professional academics. General readers won’t be troubled by the absence of references in the text. Academic readers, however, will wish the author had backed up some of her bolder claims with more evidence and specifics. Statements such as “Without American pirates, there might not have been an America as it exists today” (146) raise a number of unanswered questions.

The author tries to contextualize her subjects in their various national, cultural and time periods, even in cases where the female pirate is a work of fiction. She includes, for example, the story of Gunpowder Gert, a completely fabricated character whose story, it seems, was convincing enough to fool the Canadian Broadcasting Company. Historical realities or speculation regarding these female pirates are only part of the author’s focus. She is also intrigued by how accounts of these women were recorded and passed down through history. Duncombe’s book is a fascinating exploration of pirate tropes, myths and histories.

The material is entertaining and the author writes in an engaging manner. Duncombe colloquially refers to some of her subjects’ “stone-cold sass” (127) and “gaining excellent street cred” (186). It must also be said that the author has a serious agenda beneath the swashbuckling fun. She wishes to explore these women’s lives and legacies from a feminist perspective. Without question, female pirates represent a mas-
sive rejection of the gender norms of their respective societies: “Pirates live outside the laws of man, but women pirates live outside the laws of nature.” (xi) Her approach is timely and may hopefully lead to a “rethinking” of some of the conventional wisdom about female piracy. She is right to point out the biased portrayal or lack of knowledge about these women. Her examination extends to how women are discriminated against in Hollywood. Although this is certainly true, a book focusing on female pirates is not the best place for that discussion.

Overall, Duncombe does provide an enjoyable romp through history via the lives of several women pirates. This is a useful book in terms of raising questions about how pirates, and women pirates in particular, are portrayed in history and in fiction. There are a number of other authors who have published works on female pirates so the book jacket’s claim that it is “the most comprehensive overview of women pirates” is arguable. Nevertheless, it definitely fulfills its second claim that it is “chock-full of swashbuckling adventures that pull these unique women from the shadows…” While it may leave a more academic reader longing for references and more evidence, Pirate Women is a fun and informative read aimed at a general audience.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


The title of this delightful work—which we might render as The adventuresome travels of a sea-captain’s wife—hints at the tradition of the picaresque novel once popular in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Germany. These were lively romances of voyage and discovery, danger and intrigue, featuring such memorable characters as Simplicius, Springinsfeld and Courasche. Somewhere along the way, these fictional types would discover long-hidden secrets, and encounter exotic worlds; somewhere they might even find a bundle of letters that provided a key to a network of unexpected human relationships. The real-life letters and diaries of Helmine Schröder née Arppe, (1857-1940) led to the present volume. Their discovery, after much dogged sleuthing, proved much more than a family treasure and a cause for a grand family reunion. They offer the general reader a unique historical perspective on the last days of commercial sail, and of a woman’s attempts to break into it. The book’s subtitle—Shipboard letters from sailing freighters around Cape Horn—captures both the imagination and the reality.

It was not uncommon in the nineteenth century for wives to accompany their skipper-husbands on the relatively short voyages in the Baltic trade. But that was rarely the case with deep-sea sailing freighters, whose voyages could take many months, and sometimes years. That was because they often engaged in the tramp trade and had to pick up whatever cargoes and destinations they could. As the editors explain, ship owners did not want to deal with the ethical and moral issues of having a woman on board for lengthy voy-
ages. And besides, social proprieties of the day required the captain’s wife be isolated from the rest of the crew.

In the event, Helmine Schröder was unusual for the time by overcoming such obstacles. The eldest of eleven children, Helmine finished her schooling at the age of sixteen, and became a teacher. At the age of 24, she married her uncle, Captain Robert Schröder. Fourteen years her senior, he had, by that time, sailed around Cape Horn 22 times. He worked out of Antwerp with the Belgian shipping firm of T.C. Engels, that had been dealing in the saltpeter trade with Chile. At the time of their marriage, Captain Schröder skippered the three-masted wooden bark *Marnix de St. Aldegonde*. The increasing competition by steamships in world trade had been making it more difficult for companies to find experienced and qualified crew for tallship freighters. In fact, few such ships had been built since the 1870s. These facts likely played a role in Helmine’s obtaining permission to accompany her husband. Together they undertook their first voyage to Chile in 1881-1882. Robert then left her at home in Rostock, in the northern seaboard state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, as she was pregnant. In November 1883, he set sail with the steel bark *Theodore Engel*, not returning to Antwerp until October 1886, when his son was just over two years old. That November, the young family went to sea on the Chile route aboard the *Theodore Engel*, finally coming ashore for good a year later in order to run a family factory in Rostock. Though the editors offer few technical details on these ships, the book’s cover reproduces an anonymous painting of the bow of the *Marnix* with all sails set.

The Afterword by co-editor Ursula Feldkamp sheds particularly helpful light on issues faced by captain’s wives at sea: pregnancy, isolation in the ‘golden cage’ of her cabin, the ‘appropriate’ clothing,’ and meals. Sea-going wives, it turns out, caused the crew additional work; for example, crew had to douse and reset the mizzen sail whenever she laundered, and lamented her use of freshwater. Feldkamp explains how happily Helmine adapted to shipboard life, standing watch with her husband, and even learning to calculate the ship’s position with sextant and chronometer. Yet, despite her capability, being a woman, she could never have been accepted as crew.

Helmine was sensitive to all this in letters addressed to her family at home. Both in letters and diary she wrote of the domestic concerns of life aboard, of the business of operating a commercial vessel, of the exciting places she visited, and of her admiration of her husband’s nautical talents; she wrote of the brave crewmen who handled sails under the most frightening conditions, and of her wonder at the raw ocean’s power and majesty. Her deep Christian faith permeates her letters and diaries, as does her love for her husband—the “my Robert” of so many entries—and for her distant family. She herself was a spunky, yet gentle, observer of a nautical world she was exploring with open and unfeigned pleasure. “If you want to be a competent seafaring wife,” she had written in her very first letter, “you mustn’t be afraid of a bit of wind.” To this, her husband added a postscript: “I always thought that my Helmine would experience some fear, but no, nothing startles her.” Even at the prospect of her husband’s skippering a steamship with its regular runs and reliable schedules, she looked back to high seas sailing. Especially aboard her honeymoon ship “the Marnix.” Though not quite as quixotic as the literary formula of the picaresque
novel, the adventures of this particular captain’s wife form a refreshing counterpoint to the usual narratives of macho sailors battling the Horn. They make a very significant contribution to maritime history.

Michael Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia


Part of the *Luftwaffe at War* photographic reference series published by Pen and Sword Books, this volume focuses on German air operations over the Atlantic Ocean, most notably the Focke-Wulf Fw-200 Condor airframes. A four-page introduction offers an overview of German aviation in the Atlantic from 1938 to 1945, followed by eight full-size colour pictures depicting Fw-200 crews and aircraft. The remainder of the work is a 56-page collection of captioned black and white photographs, usually one or two images per page.

The introductory text is a compact piece. It is sometimes a little choppy, both textually and chronologically, but it serves largely as an operational history of Kampfgeschwader (KG) 40, the most notable German unit of the Atlantic air war. The introduction hits its stride during this section, examining the unit’s aircraft, tactics, officers, and operations over the course of roughly two full double-columned pages.

The photographs are arranged so that the full-colour images appear first, then the black and white ones, clustered by date and aircraft type. The initial photos appear to date from when the KG 40 unit was stationed in France and were most likely taken for propaganda purposes. After these there are 28 pages of captioned photographs focusing on the Fw-200 from initial acceptance through operational use, featuring armaments and aircrews mixed in with overall views of the aircrafts. This section is followed by ten images of the Heinkel He-177 long-range bomber. Thirteen photographs of Junkers Ju-88 bombers and their operation, five pictures of the enormous Blohm and Voss Bv-222 and Bv-238 flying boats, and nine images of the Ju-290 long range patrol aircraft appear on the remaining pages. There is a final mix of 13 images involving previously visited airframes, lesser-used aircraft, experimental designs, anti-shipping armaments, and two views of He-115 floatplane attack training.

The publication data states that this is the 2016 edition of a work first crafted in 2003. An examination of the earlier version shows that the two editions are identical save for variations of their cover and publisher, making this more of a re-release rather than a revision. As it stands, it would be beneficial to carry out some level of alteration. The introductory text could be streamlined, possibly with the text divided into subsections by discussed subject or unit rather than as an unbroken stream. There are also some odd lines mixed in where the wording is not as clear as it could be, and aircraft are introduced by their model designations well before any sort of minimal description of them is given (5). Some form of citation in this section is also needed, as there are no footnotes, endnotes, or bibliography to be found. Some captions are a little odd, such as a joke about patrolling soldiers protecting cows on the frontispiece, while others contain information unrelated to the image, such as
the discussion of changing exterior camouflage patterns on a detail image of a cockpit interior (53). The introductory caption for the He-177 might need some restructuring as well, as lay readers might not realize that there are two engines powering each propeller, making them think the reference to four engines is a typo (45). More photographs would also be appreciated. The He-115, despite being the cover image, is heavily underrepresented in the work, although there are many good profile and operational shots of the airframe in existence. Other maritime airframes that are not included could be added in an expansion, most notably the tri-motor Bv-138 “Sea Dragon” flying boat, which was an important airframe for German long-range reconnaissance and patrol operations. Additionally, a concluding section on the results of the Luftwaffe’s wartime Atlantic operations with regard to post-war operations and aviation design would be useful. Given the rarity of surviving maritime-use airframes from the Second World War, a section detailing surviving aircraft would help as well. For example, there is a single Fw-200 under restoration in Berlin, the remains of one Bv-138 in Denmark, and two recovered He-115 wrecks awaiting restoration. For those interested in the Atlantic air war, information on these surviving traces of the conflict could be a helpful research tool.

Despite its flaws, this work is a decent visual primer on some of the Luftwaffe’s airframes and actions over the Atlantic Ocean during the Second World War. Above all, it is specifically helpful for those interested in KG 40 and the wartime use of the Fw-200 Condor. Since works on this subject are not nearly as prevalent as those on other aspects of the Luftwaffe in the Second World War, an improved second edition would prove useful to both lay and scholarly communities.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


This work is a 2017 English translation of Poul Grooss’ 2014 study of the Baltic naval war, originally released in Danish as Krigen i Østersøen 1939-1945. While the title belies the author’s intent to write a naval history, Grooss admits in the introduction that due to the nature of combat in the Baltic region, the text can be seen more as a “joint-operation” piece which covers the interwoven actions on both land and sea (xiii). The work is arranged chronologically, with the actions of each participating nation discussed in turn. After the introduction, Grooss offers a brief history of the Baltic region, followed by examinations of the interwar political and military maneuverings that placed the Baltic States in their assorted positions just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. Wartime actions make up the core of the text, with primary emphasis placed on the early and late war time periods, when naval activity was at its peak. The final sections cover the post-war aftermath and ramifications, followed by appendices and indices.

The foreword and introductory pages detail the overall importance of the Baltic campaigns to the narrative of the Second World War, and why these actions had a greater significance than previously thought.
Grooss points out that since casualty numbers are heavily disputed, the death toll may have actually equaled or surpassed that of the war in the Atlantic (xiv). The existing historiography of the subject is shallow, and Grooss explains that the uncharted nature of his study had led him to work largely with primary sources, several of which conflict depending on the national bias of the original authors. Most importantly, he makes it clear that he in no way intends for his coverage of Sweden’s actions during the war to be seen as an “attack” on the country, he merely discovered a great deal of new information during his research not previously found by other historians (xv). One could argue that the two first chapters serve as additional introductory material, focusing on the region and interwar lead-up to hostilities. The 11-page first chapter offers a physical description of the Baltic region, including natural geography and man-made modifications such as canals, along with a brief coverage of the area’s power struggles from the age of the Vikings through the First World War. The shorter second chapter consists of four pages of text and two pages of photographs, succinctly covering the political jockeying of the primary countries during the interwar period, and how each arrived at their own starting point when hostilities finally broke out.

The heart of The Naval War in the Baltic consists of six chapters that cover the war from 1939 to 1945. While Grooss discusses the early and final years of the war in a more day-to-day or month-to-month approach, the years 1943 and 1944 are detailed in much broader terms, due to the comparative lack of historically-significant naval actions. Political and military maneuverings are discussed in terms of their symbiotic relationships, and the broader terms of the war are often discussed prior to specific naval actions, putting them fully into context and improving reader understanding of why the actions were carried out as they were. Of great interest are the actions of Sweden, Finland, and the occupied countries during the wartime years, along with the late war Operation RESCUE/HANNIBAL to evacuate civilians in the face of the coming Soviet forces. A wide assortment of photographs, maps, and diagrams are worked into the text, enabling readers to visualize the people, ships, equipment, and locations described by Grooss. To highlight technological information or other details outside the narrative, Grooss uses grey informational text boxes outside the main text. Footnotes cover the more common notes and points of clarification, such as details of surviving wartime vessels and their present locations. Notable post-war aspects and events, such as remaining minefields and shipwrecks, British testing of German air warning systems, and the late/post war execution of German personnel by Germans for wartime actions, is covered in its own chapter. This is followed by a Postscript analysis of the participating countries, in which Grooss concludes that in the final outcome of the Baltic fighting, Sweden is the one nation that emerged relatively “untouched by the devastation,” and therefore could be deemed “a kind of winner” compared to the occupied, weakened, and impoverished lands surrounding it (360). Of special note amongst the appendixes is Grooss’ “Cross-reference List of Place Names in Various Languages,” which is an extremely useful tool not only for this work, but for general research into wartime documents originating from the Baltic area and relating to inhabitants or belligerents (375-384).
Two things would improve this work; firstly, the grey informational text boxes, while interesting in their content, tend to break up the narrative, as well as noticeably diverging from the overall story. Collecting these sections into appendices of technical data or battle plans might help to smooth the book’s overall flow. The primary problem area is the lack of direct citation. While there is no reason to doubt Grooss’ scholarship, and there is some reference to where he obtained his information within the main text and footnotes, there are no real direct citations for interested scholars to follow beyond the bibliography at the end. Including such citations, even as endnotes, would greatly improve the work’s functionality as a research tool for current and future students of the war in the Baltic.

Overall, *The Naval War in the Baltic* is not only a guide to important naval actions that took place within the Baltic region, but also offers a great deal in terms of the geopolitical relationships and combined arms actions in the area as well. The translation of this work from its author’s native Danish into English is a boon for American scholars, providing access to Grooss’ research into untapped archival sources and offering his professional perspective as a Danish military officer. For those interested in lesser-known Second World War naval actions, or even Sweden’s wartime acts undertaken during their “neutrality,” this is an excellent source of background information and analysis.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The polar region has captured our imaginations for centuries, fuelling a seemingly insatiable appetite for tales of exploration, discovery and often tragedy. While numerous scholarly monographs and popular treatments dedicated to the history, ethnology and ecology of the Arctic have appeared in that time, it is within the past decade that work on the ‘roof of the world’ has drawn widespread public attention. Among the chief reasons are the promises and perils of an increasingly ice-free navigable northwest passage and the competing claims of polar nations over their Arctic sovereignty. This has spurred several high-profile military manoeuvres as expressions of respective national ambitions in the region. The most recent contribution to the boom in awareness and literature pertaining to the Arctic arose with the fascinating discoveries of the two ships of the fabled 1845 Franklin Expedition, beginning with a Parks Canada team locating the *Erebus* in 2014. Though the book under review appeared prior to the finding of *Terror* in 2016, it uses the re-ignition of public interest generated by the *Erebus* discovery amid the jockeying of polar nations to offer readers a fairly comprehensive record of human exploration and habitation in this vast, unforgiving and beautiful landscape.

The book’s author, Curator of Canadian and Caribbean Studies at the British Library, was a lead curator of a 2014 exhibition of the same name at the British Library, and the book is an expanded treatment of the exhibition, published in North America by McGill-Queen’s University Press. Oversized and lavishly illustrated, this is by all appearances, a
traditional coffee-table book. Based exclusively on secondary research, this history of the Arctic is engagingly presented through some 84 mini essays, none of which are more than two pages in length. The approach is very effective, allowing readers to gain a nuanced understanding of a remarkably diverse and complex environment and its past at a comfortable pace.

The essays themselves are organized within three main sections. “The Draw of the Arctic” seeks to explain the allure of the region to both indigenous and non-Arctic peoples. Resident Inuit communities of course long pre-dated European interest and presence in the north, though it may surprise many readers that the Arctic became part of the European imagination as far back as the days of Herodotus in the fourth century BC. For Europeans, these mysterious lands and seascapes gradually moved from the realm of imagination to reality as attempts to locate trade routes increased between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Greater contact with the North, however, ushered in an era of destructive change for the region’s inhabitants.

Section Two: “Seeking an Arctic Passage” chronicles the series of polar missions conducted by the United States and Europe in the nineteenth century, particularly when Britain emerged from the post-Napoleonic era as the foremost Arctic exploring nation. The highly publicized Franklin Expedition, and later search for survivors, receives special focus, though there is also ample attention devoted to other explorers including Buchan, Ross, Parry, Rae, McClure, McClintock, Nares, and Amundsen. The rigours and accomplishments of these missions are recalled, but so too is the erosion of the Inuit way of life and the physical landscape that accompanied this more extensive and sustained encroachment, leaving a legacy of pollution that motivated zoologists and conservationists to take action. These expeditions also had a dramatic cultural impact on Europeans and North Americans through the work of artists, writers, and photographers. Essays on Mary Shelley’s iconic tale of Frankenstein and American cartoonist Thomas Nast’s relocation of Santa’s home from northern Europe to the North Pole in the late nineteenth century, serve to deepen our understanding of how the Arctic became part of the popular imagination.

These discussions set the stage for the third section: “The Arctic and the Modern World,” in which the pressures of trade, oil and mineral exploration, military defense, mass tourism, and climate change have continued through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to remould and distress the landscape and its inhabitants. The “lines in the ice” refer to those human marks on the region, from mapping sea routes and Inuit overland trails, to the Soviet construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the establishment of the Distant Early Warning System (DEW Line), to growing infrastructure associated with resource extraction and the result of daily human activities. Though the forecast appears bleak, Hatfield is also mindful of how the Arctic has inspired art, literature, science and cartography over time and how this may act to rally us in support.

The commonly-held perception of the Arctic, by those living far to the south of it, has been a vast, desolate and uninhabited region. Specialists and generalists will benefit from the book’s wonderful achievement in presenting the history of exploring, working and living in the Arctic as a multi-layered relationship. Readers of this journal will certainly appreci-
ate the author’s coverage of early modern mapmaking and the numerous voyages made in search a northerly passage around North America. A remarkable collection of illustrations, from an indigenous carved map to a twenty-first century NASA visualization of changing ice levels over the past four decades, all combine to enhance the ways we see and understand the high north. Hatfield must be applauded for examining both the ingenuity and creativity arising from human activity in the region, as well as giving equal time to the remarkable destruction and devastation of it.

Michael Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario


The German Maritime Museum in Bremerhaven has been producing its handsome “German Nautical Archive” for forty years. Published annually since 1978, this “Scientific Yearbook of the German Maritime Museum,” as it is formally known, began appearing as a refereed journal in 2004. The present two volumes continue the rich scholarly tradition of examining, celebrating, preserving and re-assessing the great maritime history of Germany, and indeed of Central Europe. The resources of the Museum itself embrace not only archives and technical laboratories, but floating exhibits (including coastal, riverine and deep-sea vessels), and graphic artifacts as diverse as the mediaeval “Bremen Cog” (1380) and the control panel of Germany’s first nuclear-powered vessel Otto Hahn (1968). The value which Germany places on its cultural traditions can be seen by the fact that the Museum was designed by architect Hans Scharoun (1893-1972), famous, among other achievements, for his design of the Berlin Philharmonic concert hall. He was a proponent of the so-called ‘organic philosophy’ of architecture which sought to blend the human and technical needs of site, space and structure, in order to form an organic whole. The visitor to both concert hall and museum feels the effect of that blend. The German Maritime Museum, in short, is harmonic. The museum is a national treasure, and its Annual reflects that.

These Annuals embody the highest scholarly standards while documenting an uncommonly eclectic range of themes and issues: everything from marine archaeology and engineering, ship construction, art, literature, and social and political history. What unifies these contributions is their focus on the seas and seafaring. As an aid to further dialogue and international research, each article includes the full postal address of the contributor, and a brief—occasionally very brief—summary in English. Many articles are supported by obviously very expensive colour photographs and technical drawings.

The first volume under review—for the years 2013/2014—embraces the typically wide range of themes. These run from an examination of tides as understood in the literature of
antiquity, to the development of high seas fishing vessels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the southern Baltic coast, to the restoration of Baltic seaside resorts and marinas in the 1990s, and a study of the MAN high-speed diesel engines once installed in the torpedo boats of Germany’s Second World War Kriegsmarine. The value of the latter study lay in possible applications to the modern Federal German Navy.

Clear and graphic communication has been central to the success of these volumes. Occasionally, however, good communication has seemed to be overridden by an overweening sense of scholarly style. This first volume, for example, is not a casual read. It is a book for deeply-dyed specialists. For example, the volume opens with a 100-page disquisition on “Types and Contents of Tidal Analyses in the Literature of Antiquity.” With its closely-argued text—and 651 footnotes—it is not for the faint-hearted. It is written in what social critic Rudolf Walter Leonhardt had described in the 1960s as ‘professor German’ (Professorendeutsch): convoluted and opaque. The summary in English gives some of the flavour: “the concepts and conceptions of the tides could moreover serve as an instrument of the — at least latently negative — cultural-anthropological assessment of the groups of the population confronted with the phenomenon of the tides.” The author himself summarizes a half-dozen characteristics of how one viewed tides in antiquity. He notes in antiquity the beginnings of a scientific way of viewing tidal phenomena; observers of the period saw single causes of what were in fact multicausal synergies; their explanations, he points out, were couched in both pagan and Christian mind-sets; what satisfied their ‘scientific’ understanding seems not to have caused any problems for ‘religious’ views; but in the final analysis, these nascent ideas about tides sometimes disconcerted the indigenous populations in antiquity whenever they confronted new realities.

Author Torst Capelle’s “A golden boat and its context”—an examination of a golden charm bracelet discovered in 1797 in what is now Romania—treats his readers to an 89-page abridged version of the book which he had published on the subject in 1994. Whereas his book could provide only black-and-white photos of the ‘golden chain of miniatures,’ the article can now include colour photographs—all of them for the first time. Twenty-eight impressive colour plates, many of them full-page, here grace a text that has been updated by the inclusion of the most recent research. The chain, which is now held in the Antiquities Department of the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, contains some 14 medallions from the Roman era, as well as four ‘charms’ of Germanic/Teutonic origin from the period of the “Migration of Peoples” (Völkerwanderung) which occurred between the fourth century and the sixth century A.D. Taking pride of place in the chain (and in the article) is the largest item in the collection, a manned boat in gold. As the author observes, the golden chain is an important objet d’art that reflects the complex cultural interrelationships throughout the early Teutonic world.

The second volume under review—for the year 2015—is an altogether different work. It is a consistently well-written and more congenial collection of papers that appeal to specialist and non-specialist alike. It runs from the arcane (timber rafting in antiquity as seen by Roman legal specialists), to a ‘who-dunnit’ examination of a nineteenth-century crime, to the stranding of the passenger
vessel *Hohenzollern* in Sardinia in 1908, to an 83-page reflection on late-mediaeval ship construction and trade in the Baltic (with 311 footnotes). The volume continues its rich fare with Part I of “Traditional Sailmaking from the 17th to 20th centuries” (Part II to be continued in the volume for 2017), and a study of two ‘forgotten’ types of boat unique to the Southern Baltic (*Quatzen und Polten*).

As if this were not rich enough, the volume ends with an article on the painting *Der Mönch am Meer* (The Monk by the Sea) by German Romantic landscape painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840). It, too, is a detective story, for prior to its latest restoration, Friedrich’s painting had been neglected, abused, retouched and overpainted such that it no longer reflected the painter’s original intentions. Infrared examination and restoration led to what author Sabina Cibura describes as ‘particularly spectacular insights’ into the painting, and its relationships with other paintings and drawings by Friedrich. In short, viewers who saw the reconditioned ‘Monk by the Sea’ in Berlin’s *Alte Nationalgalerie* in January 2016 discovered for the first time in the painting not only the existence of a long-hidden ship, but a fresh way of interpreting a unique moment in Friedrich’s philosophy of nature. Sumptuous, detailed illustrations and diagrams, both in colour and black-and-white, accompany each of the articles.

Over the years, editor Eric Hoops has rendered sterling professional service to the international nautical research community. The volumes that have appeared under his hand, as every editor can understand, are the result of the interplay of many varieties of talent, teamwork and travail. May his leadership continue.

Michael Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia


British Columbia’s Pacific coast features a robust maritime history, and stories recalling vessels that were shipwrecked throughout the region and local seafaring traditions have thrilled and entertained the public since the nineteenth century. In *West Coast Wrecks and Other Maritime Tales*, author Rick James presents a compilation of shipwrecks that occurred along the BC coast over the past 140 years while offering a local’s insight into the area’s unique maritime history. Although James claims that the book is not intended to be an all-inclusive source when discussing BC’s shipwrecks, the reader will find that the ships he mentions and their associated histories provide an excellent and encompassing summary of the province’s maritime past.

From nineteenth-century wooden sailing vessels to mid-twentieth-century steel packet steamers, James chronologically presents the histories of almost every conceivable type of shipping that traveled Canada’s western coast. Considering that each vessel’s story occupies only a few pages, the book provides a concise overview of British Columbia’s maritime past through which readers can understand the economic and wartime conditions that resulted in the development of specific vessel types. In some cases, such as Canada’s involvement in the First World War,
these conditions actually resulted in the overproduction of ships, which is why so many vessels were ultimately abandoned along the region’s shorelines. The remains of some shipwrecks discussed in the book still remain undiscovered, adding a layer of mystery to their respective stories.

The author has an obvious passion for BC’s maritime history along with extensive experience with both the subject matter and the people who share his interest. James writes well with a lively style, but while he does provide a list of selected sources and names of various individuals who were consulted, there are no footnotes or citations throughout the narrative. This would indicate that his book is intended for the general public rather than academic researchers.

In addition to recounting the histories of various ships that have been lost along the BC coast, James also focuses on the contributions of diver Fred Rogers, who has not only authored books on BC shipwrecks but has discovered and explored several of these vessels. While readers who live outside the province may be unfamiliar with these explorations, James attributes much of the modern knowledge about the area’s shipwrecks to Rogers’ accomplishments. He suggests that Rogers’ work was driven by a desire for historical knowledge, highlighting the importance of leaving underwater artifacts undisturbed. Wreck sites are non-renewable resources that can be used as a means to educate the public, if they are not damaged.

West Coast Wrecks also includes a brief history of the development and use of the Easthope marine engine, the first gasoline engine produced in British Columbia. These types of engines were primarily used on fishing boats throughout the early twentieth century, but few have been preserved. James suggests that this engine was a distinct part of BC’s maritime cultural identity but does not compare their construction and efficiency with similar engines used elsewhere during the same time period to allow the reader to appreciate its uniqueness.

West Coast Wrecks and Other Maritime Tales provides an excellent overview of British Columbia’s maritime past since the 1860s and should appeal to readers who not only have an interest in shipwrecks but also history in general. By means of a series of concise narratives, James allows the reader to situate specific vessels within the province’s broader maritime history. The book also serves as a great introduction to the maritime traditions of this region and may serve as a platform for readers to perform further research that is more focused to their own particular interests.

James D. Moore III
Sterling, Virginia


What makes Warship 2016 different from previous issues is the hard cover format with the designs and notes printed directly on it, rather than a cloth binding with paper dustcover. Otherwise, it continues to provide a wide variety of both historic and current information, a formula its readers expect. As stated on the back cover, Warship is devoted to the design, development and service history of the world’s combat ships.
The first three items in this edition describe in detail three classes of 1930s warships: the French colonial sloops of the Bouganville class, by John Jordan, the similarly-purposed Italian sloop Eritrea, by Michele Cosentino, and the Japanese Asashio class of powerful destroyers, by Hans Lengerer. All three studies include elevations, plans and excellent photographs. The operational histories of the eight Bouganvilles that were completed and the Eritrea are recounted; the latter serving in both Italian and, later, French service (as Francis Garnier). The article on the Asashio class discusses how Japanese destroyer design was influenced by the capsizing of the torpedo boat Tomozuru while running trials in 1934 and the “Fourth Fleet Incident” of 1935 which respectively revealed deficiencies in stability and strength in Japanese warships (see Warship 2011 and 2013). The Asashio class is meticulously described with plans and photographs. All ten units were lost in action during the war in the Pacific. Later in the book, there is an article by Vladimir Yakubov and Richard Worth about another class of the same period, the Soviet Fugas class of useful and versatile small minesweepers.

The major article on modern ship types describes the U. S. Navy’s revolutionary Freedom and Independence classes. These are designated Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and are a totally new type of naval vessel. Author Conrad Waters includes in this category the modern corvettes used by several European navies which would be useful in coastal waters. Also of technical interest, Peter Marland describes the development of Action Information Organisation in the post-Second World War Royal Navy. This follows up on his article in the previous issue on Royal Navy weapons and fire control during the same period.

Turning to historic events, Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara conclude a two-part account of naval war in the Adriatic in the First World War. In 1917-18, the Austro-Hungarian fleet was pretty well boxed in and, in spite of good performance by individual units, was not able to do much. Then Stephen Dent investigates the use of the old French battleship Courbet as a target for “bouncing bombs”, such as those used to breach the Ruhr Dam. These never reached a satisfactory conclusion. On the lighter side, Richard Wright has researched the involvement, or rather non-involvement of the Chinese Navy’s flagship Hai Chi in the revolution of 1911 which saw the end of the Chinese Empire. After attending King George V’s coronation review, the ship was kept cruising between England and North America until events at home settled down. Perhaps this was because the loyalty of the crew was uncertain.

No Warship annual would be complete without examining some unusual nineteenth-century design. The French and Russian navies have provided the most interesting examples and this year it is the French coast defence ship Tempête, a small, slow, monitor launched in 1876. A sister ship Vengeur is mentioned but not the similar Tonnerre and Fulminant. This article by Philippe Caresse could easily apply to the whole group. Stephen McLaughlin has not continued his accounts of early Russian ironclads in this issue, choosing, instead, to amplify some of the discussions he and William Schleihaufl developed in their analysis of the Dewar brothers’ Jutland, The Naval Staff Appreciation. (See review in The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, Vol. XXVII No.1). He gives examples of divisional tactics that
might have been employed at three critical stages of the battle. This is what Vice Admiral Sturdee advocated, but the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Jellicoe, firmly rejected it. Conclusion? It would have been risky.

Reviews of the year’s nautical books wind up this volume along with Warship Gallery, actually a short article on the First World War battleship HMS *Colossus*.

C. Douglas Maginley, Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


The German Maritime Museum produces a steady flow of excellent publications, three of which, on photography, ports and shipping, are reviewed here.

The German photographer Konrad Nonnast (1919–1992) took up professional photography when he was well into his twenties after serving in the German Navy during the Second World War. Once the guns fell silent, with his country in ruins, Nonnast found employment at a shipyard in the port of Cuxhaven on the eastern shores of the North Sea. A couple of years later he switched to radio electronics. It is not quite clear when he made his career change and turned to newspaper photography, but by the mid-1950s, Konrad Nonnast had become a well known reporter who toured the Cuxhaven area on his motorbike.

Until well in to the 1960s, he stuck with large format cameras using 6 x 9 centimetre negatives. When he thought the time was right, he switched to standard-sized film, that is, 24 x 36 millimetre. But that was more than enough of that modern stuff for Nonnast. He continued shooting in black and white, since it would take quite some time before press photography entered the realm of colour.

In the 1950s and 60s, Nonnast documented the development of maritime affairs in Cuxhaven, including the mass emigration to Canada (1948-1950) and Australia (1954-1962) that characterized post-war shipping. In the second half of the 60s, mass transport took to the air, leaving the stately liners to people with time to waste. Nonnast focused on maritime activities in the port of Cuxhaven, capturing ocean liners, ferries, tugs, cargo steamers, tankers, maintenance and repair at ship yards and wharfs, quayside storage houses, tankers, and the handling of crates, boxes, barrels
and all sorts of cargo in the pre-container era. The majority of the photographs offer a fascinating portrayal of maritime life of the period.

Walter Lüden (1914-1996), a contemporary of Nonnast, was a self-taught photographer. He took up photography while still in his teens, starting with a so called “Box” camera. After the Second World War, he turned professional and worked for a newspaper magazine using Leica and Hasselblad cameras in the port city of Hamburg, at the river Elbe. During the war, the city was nearly bombed out of existence but Lüden managed to keep himself afloat in the early stage of Allied occupation by taking portrait pictures of English and American officers. While documenting the damaged cities in the north of Germany, he witnessed the reconstruction of Hamburg and the economic miracle of West Germany. Within a couple of years working in the area, Lüden became a part of port life. His iconic photographs mirror a photographer's eye. His dynamic images illustrate the hustle and bustle of ship's and quayside activities.

Aware of the dangers of moving cranes, trains and trucks, Lüden kept an open eye for interesting shots, not only ships, cargoes and quays, but also the denizens of this port environment: sailors, dock workers, ship-builders, truck drivers, agents and of course the spectators; the Hamburger—the people, not the food. By the time Lüden left Hamburg in 1965 to live on an island in the North of Germany, the Container Revolution was in full swing. Ro-ro (roll-on/roll-off cargo loading) had been introduced and on the docks, as elsewhere, the times, they were a-changing. Full marks to Klaus-Peter Kiedel for publishing the outstanding work of photographer Walter Lüden.

To get to the port of Hamburg, ships must pass Cuxhaven, and on occasion ships call at both ports. Konrad Nonnast in Cuxhaven and Walter Lüden in Hamburg sometimes photographed the same ships in their respective ports. Among them were the liners *Italia* (Nonnast p. 15, Lüden p. 80; an almost identical photograph) and *Hanseatic* en route from Hamburg to New York.

The third book contains a variety of photographs of shipping in the Nord-Ostsee-Kanal between the Baltic port of Kiel and the port of Brunsbüttel near Cuxhaven during the same time-frame as the previous books. The images, taken over the years by amateur photographers, illustrate in both black and white and colour, the wide range of ship types passing through this canal. Although the pictures lack the photographic quality of those by Nonnast and Lüden, they still offer a good insight into the busy shipping history of this narrow stretch of water during the 1950s and 60s.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands


This work is an examination of the interwar era war games carried out by the United States Naval War College, designed to act as an “inquiry into the behavior of a military organization” and address the college’s place in the formation of naval leaders and tactics before the Second World War (3). Following an introduction describing the book’s purpose and related
historiographies, the text examines the students, instructors, facilities, and gaming process. Once this background information is covered, the three phases of interwar war gaming are examined in their own chapters. The remainder of the work consists of the conclusion, three appendixes, chapter notes, and a bibliography.

The introduction underlines the absence of a proper examination of the Naval War College’s interwar war games through a detailed survey of related historiographies and data regarding War College graduates in the Second World War. Lillard feels that the tangential and slightly dismissive way other historians have viewed the interwar activities of the Naval War College in the context of the Second World War as undeserved. He follows a rather detailed historiographical analysis with an outline of his work, describing the purpose of the various chapters and the logic behind their creation. The first two focus on the student players, instructors, and general war game process. Within these chapters, Lillard notes the current overemphasis on the Admirals in charge of the College, but holds that the Captains leading each section and the students who would become future instructors were the most influential in terms of molding the classes and advocating new ideas (30-33). The overview of the games themselves is well laid out, with blueprints, photographs, and charts supplied to help one visualize the experience of the roughly dozen war games carried out by each senior class.

The here main chapters examine the War College within Lillard’s three phases of the interwar period: the Early Phase of 1919-1927, the Middle Phase of 1928-1934, and the Late Phase of 1935-1941. He describes the first phase as a period of growth, where the War College’s influence expanded. Mahanian theories and tactics are still quite evident in the battleship-heavy war games, but a clear and gradual acceptance of newer ideas, most notably regarding the use of aircraft, was beginning to take hold. The middle years saw the most innovative leaps forward, with the casting off of Mahanian ideals in favour of experiments with new tactics, technologies, and concepts. War game data was collected and analyzed against data provided by previous games and real-life fleet problems to help with examining facets in the long term. Finally, insightful critiques from the referees helped further shape the advancement of both games and theoretical thinking. In the late pre-war years, the War College entered a period of “increasing maturity and relevance,” evolving their games to deal with long-term, total war scenarios with allied powers and political considerations, an aspect that would be strikingly similar to the reality of the looming war (112, 121, 126). While Lillard does note that the applicability of the war games to real life was questionable, the environment helped offer a quantitative approach which fleet problems lacked, and built a tight community of leaders with shared experiences (133-137).

In terms of possible improvements for future editions, the occasional use of more obscure words such as “lacuna” and “fulminated” tend to throw off a reader’s pace, and could easily be replaced with their more well-known synonyms to improve the flow of the text. An appendix regarding wartime and post-war games by the Naval War College and how they compared to their interwar predecessors would also be interesting, especially given the use of a 1950s era photo within the main text (111).
All in all, this work is an interesting study into an often overlooked part of interwar naval history. It helps shed light on some of the more unusual training received by future naval leaders of the Second World War, and into the testing bed for many of the ideas, tactics, and technologies that would come to the fore in the 1940s. Playing War successfully bridges an interwar gap in naval historiography, and would be a useful research tool for those interested in the academic side of US naval officer preparations for the Second World War.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The stories of prisoners of war (POWs) escaping from captivity in the Second World War are legion; for example, “The Great Escape” from Stalag Luft 3 in March, 1944 has been the subject of several books and a famous movie. Lost to time are the chronicles of First World War POW escapees, which makes Dwight R. Messimer’s Eleven Months to Freedom. A German POW’s Unlikely Escape from Siberia in 1915 one of the rarest stories in escape history.

Erich Killinger was an Imperial German Navy midshipman at the outbreak of World War One. He was known for his risk-taking ability and often pushed the edge of the rulebook. At the beginning of the war, Killinger joined the fledgling German Naval Air Arm, and after training, assigned to the Baltic Front as an aircraft observer. On 6 April 1915, after a combat mission over the Imperial Russian city of Libau, Killinger’s engine malfunctioned, forcing him and his pilot to crash at sea. The Russians rescued them and the two Germans immediately became prisoners of war.

Killinger’s time as a Russian POW and his subsequent successful escape is the heart of the narrative. He was first held in various prisons and then, along with other Germans and Austrians captured by the Russians, was transported to Siberia via train. Killinger and three fellow prisoners jumped from the train and despite bitterly cold weather, he managed to make his way to Manchuria and then-neutral China. He contacted German consulates and after convincing the local German authorities of his story, Killinger was put aboard a liner destined for the then-neutral USA. On the journey, he made friends (and possibly enjoyed a shipboard romance with a married woman who was a fellow passenger). From San Francisco, he took a trans-continental train to New York. These were the safest parts of his escape; the most difficult part came next. The British Royal Navy had imposed a very effective blockade of the European coast and all ships approaching Europe were stopped and the passengers and crewmembers searched and questioned. Killinger managed to disguise himself as a deckhand on a ship bound for also-neutral Norway, passing the British blockade, arriving in Norway, then travelling to pro-German Sweden, and finally returned to Germany. He returned to German Naval Aviation, wrote a book about his exploits, and served to the end of the First World War.

Killinger’s post-World War One career was typical of many Germans; he served as a sales representative
and traveled throughout the world. His book on his escape was reprinted in 1934. Then, in 1938, he joined the German Luftwaffe (Air Force) reserve. This was the only career path for a former aviator; Hermann Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, declared that he had sole control of ALL military air assets. The German Navy had no air force of its own, although Luftwaffe units were attached to the German Navy. Killinger had no choice—if he wanted to be part of aviation—it was the Luftwaffe or nothing.

Ultimately, Killinger became Commandant of a POW camp—a natural choice for a man who had been interrogated by the enemy and managed to escape. After the Second World War, Killinger was tried for war crimes based on abuse of prisoners. He was found guilty of the crimes charged, served a short prison sentence and was released in 1948. He again rejoined the business world from 1950 until his retirement in 1963 and died in May, 1977.

Messimer’s narrative is fascinating. His primary sources are Killinger’s two books as well as contemporary military reports. He fully describes Killinger’s career and the escape. Especially noteworthy is the description of the international German “pipeline” established for escapees. The narrative provides much colour—the network of forgers for passports, Mexican dollars for the escapees, Killinger’s attempts to disguise himself as a merchant seaman, the precise efforts by German consular officers to get Germans back to their country—all are the stuff of great drama.

Messimer’s writing is clear and concise. The narrative does not flag and holds the reader’s attention. Very good photographs from the author’s collection bolster the narrative and the maps provided make clear the various locations involved. The author’s use of primary sources is sound. Further, the narrative illustrates early Russo-German conflict in the First World War—a subject not always dealt with by Western writers on the Great War.

In many ways, Killinger’s escape can be compared to Franz von Werra’s escape from British captivity in the Second World War. Killinger escaped from a train in Siberia in freezing weather, made his way through several neutral nations and returned to Germany. Von Werra was transported to Canada, jumped from a train in the dead of winter, found a boat and crossed the ice-strewn St. Lawrence River and slipped into the then-neutral USA. From there, he found his way to South America and ultimately Germany. (Von Werra’s story was recounted in the book and the movie *The One That Got Away.*)

Eleven Months to Freedom. A German POW’s Unlikely Escape from Siberia in 1915 is a very entertaining read and is highly recommended. It would make a great movie or TV-miniseries.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Robert E. Mullins (John Beeler, ed.)

This work began in 2000 as the King’s College London doctoral dissertation of Robert E. Mullins. Three years later, Professor John Beeler of the University of Alabama ap-
approached Mullins to produce “a vastly transformed scholarly contribution to the fields of political science, naval history, and strategic studies” (xvii). Mullins and Beeler (identified as both a ‘co-author’ and an editor), are both absolutely correct that the policy-process leading to the Naval Defence Act of 1889 on the British side, and the move towards a Blue Water battlefleet navy by the United States around the same time, was complex, involving a host of domestic and foreign, internal and external factors. The civil-military causal chain is highlighted; neither political nor naval leaders called the shots exclusively of the others’ influence. Few military historians today can get away with simplistic nuts-and-bolts, armchair-general analyses which John Keegan famously addressed as ‘the deficiencies of military history’ in *The Face of Battle* (1976). This included “the history of strategic doctrine…[which] suffers markedly from that weakness endemic to the study of ideas, the failure to demonstrate connection between thought and action” (29).

This is the crux of the matter in *The Transformation of British and American Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era*. After much wringing of sources, including a sharp attack on Arthur Marder, and references to political science, cultural studies, strategic and security studies, international relations and the like, the author insists that British naval policy, during the 1880s in particular, was based on “strategic ideas which were *inspired* by [select] examples drawn from naval history and which were later *institutionalised* and *implemented* through the lobbying efforts of naval officers” (32, original *emphasis*). For this, we can thank professors of naval history —namely Professor John Laughton at King’s College London—for laying the foundations of [correct] British and American naval (and presumably also foreign) policies.

Both the book and Mullins’ original dissertation tend to rely heavily upon the work — sometimes the assumptions — of others. On the one hand, he argues that there was never really a foreign threat emanating from France and Russia (virtually throughout the nineteenth-century); their navies, singly or combined, were second-rate at best and could have been defeated at any time by the Royal Navy—the margin of qualitative and quantitative superiority over all rivals was that great. On the other hand, it was foolish and irresponsible for mere economy-minded British politicians to dictate the force levels of British naval and imperial power throughout the Victorian era. There could never be enough ironclads or battleships, particularly of the largest class possible. Yet many other historians have concluded that succeeding British ministries rarely cut naval spending when convinced the threat was real; and the nature of that naval ‘threat’ was far more complicated than simply who had the largest battlefleet of first-rates. Would British seapower be able to operate against an enemy’s fortified coastline effectively or not? What about the defence of imperial trade and colonies worldwide? As even Oscar Parkes noted in 1970, the Northbrook Admiralty, for example, had to consider attacks by swarms of torpedo boats, not just the calibre of guns and armour thicknesses of rival powers’ ironclads. Mullins quotes from Parkes a letter by Admiral Sir Cooper Key (First Naval Lord) to Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, dated December 1884, emphasising “*I should have no fear whatever with France and Russia now, so far as our Navy is concerned*” (dissertation 47; Parkes, *British Battleships*, 328). But
in that same letter Key also stated, “I have always deprecated asking for a very large lump sum for shipbuilding purposes—it will only induce other Nations to make another start.” In other words, naval power was always relative, and foreign navies carefully calculated Britain’s ability to harm without fear of injury as well. It was such ‘defensive supremacy’ that dominated Gladstone’s and Salisbury’s thinking — as well as that of Russia, for example. Anything else tended towards interventionist foreign policies, arms races and finally, wars. What’s remarkable is that this sophisticated and perceptive logic was also shared by British naval professionals such as Key.

Citing Andrew Lambert, Professor of Naval History at King’s College London, the authors maintain that “the exploitation of British naval supremacy [was] the logical outgrowth of a forward offensive naval strategy.” This went beyond a close blockade of enemy naval bases (and port cities) to actually bombarding them to rubble, suggesting that a battleship could go anywhere and do anything — something few in the Admiralty or in America seem to have believed. Thus, Mullins in his dissertation was baffled that “Mahan was curiously silent on the offensive potential that followed from command of the sea, examples for which appeared throughout British experiences with global warfare between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries” (203; *Transformation*, p. 284, reduces this to “the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”).

Perhaps this was because it was not so clear cut how effective command of the sea was in winning wars against land powers—the American Civil War being a large, fresh example closer to home. The Union blockade and amphibious operations could only accomplish so much; assaults on fortified ports could backfire, as with Charleston in April 1863. Although the authors refer to the Civil War experience as contemporary proof of the primacy of an offensive policy, Vice-Admiral and naval historian Philip Colomb was actually very careful about when and how attacks on territory from the sea might be conducted, even after attaining full command of the sea. “In all attacks made over sea against territory, we shall note one almost universal rule,” he noted in 1899. “No attacks of magnitude are ever known direct from a distant base…,” the best illustration of that being the operations of the Union Navy during the American Civil War (*Naval Warfare*, 1899, p. 225). Colomb then went on to observe that during the Franco-Prussian War it was “well understood by the French Government in 1870 as ever it had been in former days, that the navy alone was practically powerless to make territorial attacks, and that whether ships were steam ‘battleships’ or sailing ‘line-of-battle ships’ they did not in themselves represent the proper force for conducting territorial attacks” (427). Finally, when analysing the Spanish-American War, Colomb concluded “Attacks on territory by the fleet alone, except by way of set bombardment for merely punitive or destructive purposes, are not now, any more than they were two hundred years ago, the proper objects for a navy alone to carry out” (*Appendix, xxii*). It should be added here that the Royal Navy was distinctly unable to force the defences of the main Russian naval base at Cronstadt, guarding St. Petersburg, throughout the Crimean War. The main, decisive theatre of war remained the costly Siege of Sevastopol.

This book is asking readers to buy into quite a bit. Indeed, as Keegan warned long ago, military (and naval) historians tend to “accept
the conventions within which they are working”. Notions such as ‘British naval supremacy’ or ‘Pax Britannica’ become axiomatic, even tautologically so. Thus, “what has been called the ‘rhetoric of the past’—that inventory of assumptions, and usages through which the [military and naval] historian makes his professional approach to the past—is not only...much more strong and inflexible than the rhetoric of almost all other sorts of history, but it is so strong, so inflexible and above all so time-hallowed that it exerts virtual powers of dictatorship over the military [and naval] historian’s mind” (*Face of Battle*, 36).

This reviewer recommends that potential readers consider alternative explanations of at least British naval policy during this period, such as C. I. Hamilton’s *The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making, 1805-1927* (Cambridge University Press, 2011). It offers more insightful analysis (without the need to beat up poor Arthur Marder). Naval historians, Hamilton warns, must be careful with “the myths of coherence and doctrine...one must not try to simplify the inconsistency of the past, and falsely attribute the kind of rational planning now seen as fundamental to good governance” (1). Hence the Naval Defence Act of 1889 in his view was blindsided by ‘matériel factors’ and even these technological discussions could be “dangerously focused”. This included Laughton’s article of 1884 on the state of the navy which “dealt largely with the question of ship numbers.” Perhaps the ‘historical school’ was decisive in influencing naval policy, perhaps not. Conservative MP John Colomb (the Vice-Admiral’s younger brother) received “a chilly reception in the Chamber”, notes Hamilton, “when he rose to urge the formulation of the strategic principles underlying national defence” (211, 209). Meanwhile it was largely business as usual in the Admiralty. As such, the real strength of both the original dissertation by Mullins and this published version lies not in the various assumptions and agendas themselves, not entirely convincing in their interpretation of historical evidence, but in its new and useful history of ‘organisational culture’ to support—not necessarily supplant—‘policy-and-operations’ narratives.

Howard J. Fuller
Wolverhampton, England


For most people, the first image that pops into the mind at the mention of the First World War is an endless slaughter in the trenches, linked to names like the Somme or Passchendaele. The war at sea is a different story. The naval version of the First World War is usually presented in a rather limited form. Invariably the history is laid out either as a discussion of German submarine operations and their attempt to strangle Great Britain, leading into the 1917 political ramifications of submarine operations and the entrance of the United States into the war; or, alternately, the naval history of the First World War focuses rather myopically on the great surface battle of Jutland on 31 May to 1 June 1916. This ignores the other 143 wartime surface battles that spanned the globe. While none were necessarily as large as Jutland, col-
lectively these battles played an important role in shaping the war.

The vastness of this surface war has virtually never been discussed by historians, until now. Vincent O’Hara, an independent scholar and the 2015 Naval Institute Press Author of the Year for his book *Torch: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory*, and Leonard Heinz, retired attorney and naval enthusiast, have teamed up to produce an impressive study of all the First World War battles. *Clash of Fleets: Naval Battles of the Great War, 1914-1918* represents a major step forward in understanding the complexities of surface combat during the period. Organized into seven chapters, the book presents a generally chronological story of the war. While the first chapter deals with the nature of the fleets involved and the last assesses the war experiences, the remaining five each focus on a single year of the war, breaking it down chronologically by geographic area.

Each chapter presents the reader with all the naval engagements of the year in a concise but effective manner. The authors first provide details concerning weather conditions, the men and ships involved, reason for the engagement, and casualties, then follow up with a discussion of each battle and its consequences. From the smallest bumping of light forces through to the mighty clashes of the main battle fleets, every theatre of operations and every navy, save the United States, is brought into the general pattern of the naval war. Each entry includes a wealth of detail about the engagement that is useful for both academics and historical enthusiasts. Of particular value, however, is the final chapter where the authors compare the First World War with both the earlier Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the Second World War. Examining a variety of factors, the authors examine the tempo and lethality of operations producing some surprising results.

The inclusion of more than just the North Sea experiences is important here. Battles waged in places like the Aegean, the Black Sea, and the Indian Ocean reveal the enormous scope of the war. Just as the fixation on the trench system across France excludes a massive aspect of the land warfare experience in places like the Eastern front, or the Middle East, the emphasis on the North Sea denies a clear understanding of the scope of the war at sea. This is brought home by the vast variety of experiences and engagements and the number of nations involved. It adds a huge richness to our understanding and opens our eyes to the need for more research. Probably the greatest weakness of the text lies with the need to limit the scale of the discussion of each battle. Each of these events was a pivotal moment in the lives of those involved, making the scale of detail afforded seem a bit short at times. With such a large number of engagements to cover, however, the authors had to compromise although they manage to find a balance between detail and scope.

On the whole, this book is an excellent addition to any naval enthusiast’s collection. Anyone who does extensive work in the First World War or naval history in general, should really add this to their collection. It provides a wealth of information in an easily readable format. An enjoyable, well written book, it should also be considered by anyone with just a simple interest in naval affairs.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario

Containing New England’s largest estuary, Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island, was once called “Rogue’s Island” and “the Sewer of New England” by Puritan minister Cotton Mather. This bay receives the Taunton, Providence, and Sakonnet Rivers extending northward from the Atlantic for 28 miles, roughly cleaving the state in two. The bay was an abundant source of seafood and was the site of many safe harbours. The Narragansett colony, founded upon religious independence and freedom, was settled by sundry disreputable entrepreneurs, and reprobates engaged in the so-called “slave trade triangle.”

This triangular trafficking commerce started with the importation of vast quantities of molasses from the Caribbean to be processed in the colony’s many distilleries to produce a high-demand commodity, rum. Vast numbers of barrels containing spirits were shipped to West Africa in exchange for slaves to be traded in the Caribbean or mainland America. Theoretically, Rhode Island was an enlightened colony banning the importation of slaves in 1652. Although slaving was illegal, the law was largely ignored. During the mid-1700s, the city of Newport had 22 distilleries from which rum was exported and traded for slaves. Many Rhode Island residents grew rich on the “prohibited” business of its day. When anchored in Newport, the decks of slave ships were scrubbed with vinegar to mask the odour of sweat, blood and excrement in an attempt to pass inspection by the authorities.

British coffers were low after the recent Seven Years War. One way to partly replenish the king’s treasury was to police Narragansett Bay, catch smugglers and both fine and tax them. One vessel tasked with this assignment was His Majesty’s Schooner *Gaspee*, a sloop that was converted to a two-masted schooner in 1767 or 1768. In a schooner rig, the sail area was larger, making it potentially faster, a needed attribute for a revenue vessel. *Gaspee* was a diminutive warship only 49 feet long carrying eight small cannon. She was authorized to carry a crew of 30 men, but rarely had this many due to a high rate of desertions in North American waters and the difficulty with impressment in the colonies. The schooner patrolled the bay with one or two other vessels as a team. On 17 February 1772, *Gaspee* seized a cargo of rum, other spirits and sugar from the sloop *Fortune*, owned by Jacob Greene, a member of a prominent Rhode Island family and caused consternation among the local population. Five months later, *Gaspee* ran aground off Namquid Point in the afternoon of 9 June while in pursuit of the packet *Hannah* for tax evasion.

In darkness on 10 June, a raiding party attempted to board the schooner. When within shouting distance of the schooner, Abraham Whipple identified himself as sheriff of Kent County. A scuffle ensued and the ship’s captain, William Dudingston, who carried both naval and revenue service commissions, was wounded. The 30 or 40 men in the American raiding party overwhelmed the British ship’s crew. Purposely or accidentally, *Gaspee* was set afire. Subsequently the vessel’s powder maga-
zine exploded leaving little of the king’s vessel to salvage.

The dark night made it difficult to definitively identify the raiders dressed in non-descript dark clothing. The only witness who allegedly recognized some of the men was Aaron Biggs, variously described as “a free negro, mulatto lad and indentured servant.” (22) He claimed to have been rowing a boat nearby when the raid took place. (During a subsequent trial, however, Biggs’s testimony was discredited because of an accusation that he was bribed, tried to avoid a flogging or was using this deposition as a means of flight from his master.)

Steven Park’s small book is tightly focused upon a singular event, its legal implications and ponderings about its historical significance. The historic background information and the detailing of the Gaspee incident occupies the first third of Park’s book. The remainder is an in-depth examination of the history and application of Admiralty and British Law as it might relate to bringing to justice the culprits who had burned His Majesty’s property. The legal problems were many, but the most controversial was that those responsible might be sent across the Atlantic to stand trial three thousand miles away in England. If not, there was a question of who had jurisdiction, the North American Vice-Admiralty Courts or the local colonial courts? This complex legal question of vicinage agitated the independent-minded people of Rhode Island and especially proto-revolutionary firebrands such as Sam Adams of Massachusetts and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia. Park presents the opposing but subtle arguments in a clear manner. Courts of oyer and terminer, commissioners of assizes and the court of Nisi Prius emerge from British legal obscurity.

There is an examination of historical evidence for the burning of the Gaspee as a significant spark of the Revolutionary War. Where does a muddled raid fit in relation to the Boston Massacre (5 March 1770), the Boston Tea party (16 December 1773), the Battle of Machias, Maine (11 June 1775) during which HMS Margaretta was captured by rebels, and the Battle of Lexington and Concord (19 April 19, 1775)? Four of these events took place in what was then Massachusetts, with only one in nearby Rhode Island. It is reminiscent of Luigi Pirandello’s play, in this case six events in search of the primary catalyst for the American Revolution.

Park investigates many issues, but two comprise a large portion of the book. Was this incident merely the result of a few disgruntled Rhode Island merchants who attempted to teach some annoying policemen a lesson that ended with unintended consequences? Was this event purposely blown out of proportion as an excuse for the Patriot movement to subvert the Royal government and start a rebellion? Reasonable arguments can be made for both cases.

In summary, Steven Park has written a scholarly 114-page text with 566 notes and 15 pages of primary and secondary source references, possibly an edited PhD thesis. It is surprising that Abraham Whipple, who was as a central figure in the Gaspee event and later a distinguished captain the Continental Navy, is only mentioned in passing (10 and 16-18). This reviewer suggests two companion books to put the Gaspee affair into historical perspective: Sheldon S. Cohen’s Commodore Abraham Whipple of the Continental Navy: Privateer, Patriot, Pioneer (University of Florida Press, 2010) and Christopher L. Pastore’s Between Land and Sea. The Atlantic Coast and the Transformation of New England. (Harvard University Press,
2014), neither of which appears in the author’s secondary resource list. In summary, this work is a challenging read for those with a limited interest in sixteenth- through eighteenth-century British legal history and its application. Still, Dr. Park presents his arguments in a cogent, erudite manner, making his book worthy of a place in the libraries of scholars of the maritime history of the American Revolution.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


This work is a one-to-one scale reproduction of the second volume from Richard Perkins’ singularly unique collection of Royal Navy ship profiles. Produced between 1927 and 1946, with the vast majority of work occurring prior to 1939, Perkin’s work was the undertaking of a dedicated enthusiast, seeking to document all ships of the British fleet for roughly the eight decades between the years 1860 and 1940. This volume focuses specifically on the armoured ships of 1860-1895, monitors, and aviation ships of the Royal Navy, with the original work largely unmodified, save for slight page reorganizations, an introduction by Andrew Choong, NMM Curator of Historic Photographs and Ships’ Plans, and a ship index at the end for quick reference.

The introduction appears to be for the Perkins Collection as a whole, rather than specifically for Volume II, and offers what little background is available on the man behind the work before discussing the albums. The National Maritime Museum originally received the pages unbound, but staff eventually bound the loose leaves at a later date (6). Since Perkins had a set order for the pages, any pages inserted out of this order have been returned to their intended place in this reproduction. It is also noted that the museum viewed the albums as a “working collection” rather than “museum objects,” so there is a small number of pencil notes scattered throughout the various volumes added by museum staffers over the years, supplying additional information not available to Perkins during his initial crafting of the works (7).

Regarding the main body of this volume, each page of Perkins’ folio has been removed from its museum binding, scanned in high definition and reproduced at full scale, perfectly capturing the appearance of the original images. His loose notes have been inserted and transcribed at the beginning of the work, followed by the scanned pages arranged in his original order. Perkins created a two-page listing of ships divided by type and demarcated into class as an initial guide to his second volume of work. The ordering of ship classes within each ship type seems to a degree random, as many seem to be following reverse chronological order only to be followed by a more recent ship class. (20-21) The ship data and profiles themselves are arranged with a high degree of uniformity using Perkins’ template system, so each vessel entry ideally contains all variants of the ship’s name, a colour profile drawing, notes regarding weapons and history, funnel or other key...
details, and a service timeline. Perkins’ profile drawings appear to have been produced separately from his main templates and then affixed afterwards, as seen from the edges and different colorations visible in the scans. The drawings are all in colour, depicting the period paint schemes of the vessels. Additional data is included in the form of red and green coloured details, which illustrate minor removals and additions to the ship, respectively. In the event of a ship having major alterations during its service life, Perkins includes additional drawings of the vessel at different key points in time, so as to fully illustrate all possible iterations of the same vessel’s visual appearance. The other data included with each ship’s entry varies based on the vessel as well. Some vessels naturally have more information than others, depending on their service length, the variety of changes undergone while in service, the information available to Perkins at the time, and a number of other factors.

In terms of possible improvements to this work and the future editions of remaining volumes, there are two that come to mind. A more tightly focused Introduction highlighting the specific volume in hand would be appreciated, as would an explanation of why certain types of vessels, like the pre-1895 armour-ed ships, monitors, and aviation ships found in Volume II are grouped together. A general summary of warship evolution involving the specific vessel types would complement the drawings that highlight vessel modifications and improvements during their service life. The other major suggestion would be to include more photographic profiles of the covered vessels in an appendix or another separate section. Three such images from the Perkins image collection are at the very beginning on the frontis-piece. The images’ description states that their inclusion is meant to illustrate the variety of warships contained within this particular volume, but utilizing more of the collection’s 11,000 photographic negatives in a larger capacity would help to further underline the accuracy of Perkins’ illustrations and provide examples of their usefulness in terms of rapid ship identification. Such a section could feature certain notable vessels such as HMS Warrior, or Monitor M33, that still survive, or more well-known vessels like HMS Ark Royal, or ill-fated HMS Victoria. These are, of course, minor cavils, merely suggested as a means to enhancing the book’s overall effectiveness.

As a whole, this work represents an opening up to the scholarly community of an invaluable archive for British warship recognition. Perkins’ painstakingly accurate depictions of naval vessel profiles, his documentation of their service history, and annotations of their modifications throughout their career make for an incredibly concise resource for identifying vessels in photographs and other visual media, both in terms of ship name and rough time period of the image. An underutilized gem long trapped in the repositories of the National Maritime Museum, the publication of this volume and other will be of great import to those with an interest in the Royal Navy during the eight decades prior to the Second World War.

Charles Ross Patterson II  
Yorktown, Virginia

While the main focus of Rath’s work is the maritime conflict between 1854 and 1856 in what became known as the Crimean War, he explores the maritime aspect of the war in much greater detail. Arguing that this struggle for imperial dominance has been much misrepresented, thinly referenced, and underscored by historians and researchers, he criticizes the publication of biased or slanted treatments throughout the twentieth century. He feels that these works do not represent a full appreciation and understanding of the war’s far-flung naval campaigns and their contribution to the overall outcome of the war. First, there were more than three empires fighting and vying for land, power, and military and naval supremacy as sovereign states. The Ottoman Empire, various Italian kingdoms, Norway-Sweden, and Denmark became major players in the outcome of the war. Second, many of the events, for example, the signing of diplomatic agreements that opened an isolated Japan to the western world and pushed Japan to create a modern navy that could challenge European powers, occurred far from Crimea and the siege of Sebastopol.

The book is clearly organized and provides for an easy, but comprehensive, read. It starts with an introduction that delivers the background circumstances which characterized the reigning imperial powers of Europe in the 1850s and their ambitions beyond their realms. Rath also uses this chapter to explain the format of the book and points out the major features, events, details and rationale for each one of the succeeding ten chapters and conclusion. For example, in chapter one, Rath addresses the collusion and strategic planning between Great Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire against growing Russian aggression against the Turks, which includes a feint offensive in the Crimean Peninsula. Due to circumstances, however, the intended side raid or assault scheduled for Sebastopol became the news-drawing siege from which the war received its name. While the campaign in the Crimea, and the siege of Sebastopol have been the focus of many researchers and authors, Rath uses this chapter to point out that the naval strategists of France and Britain saw the Baltic Sea as the future area of action where they could stifle any Russian transcontinental ambitions.

Within this format, Rath expertly provides expanded views and text on the events and outcomes of each chapter, along with any associated naval campaign, not only in the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula, but around the world. Each chapter has a regional focus so that the reader has no problem understanding not only the campaign, but its significance to the greater scheme of the war. He also pays attention to the fact that this conflict occurred in the mid-nineteenth century in the midst of an evolving world, and that each campaign provided something to this period; namely, new maritime steam and weapon technologies along with a greater appreciation for international maritime law and advances in medicine and understanding disease under wartime conditions.

This work is well researched and written with a much appreciated completeness. A review of the end notes reveals a wide variety of both primary and secondary sources including newspaper articles, official commanding officers’ reports, personal correspondence in the form of letters and diaries, and secondary sources from both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Also, the sources are not just of British or French origin,
but from all nations, kingdoms, and navies and militaries involved. By being so inclusive with his sources, Rath was successful in providing a well-rounded and complete overview of specific wartime campaigns and their contributions to the nature of maritime warfare within a changing mid-nineteenth-century world. Rath’s biography indicates that he attended the London School of Economic and Political Science and Georgetown University before receiving his Doctorate from McGill University.

This work includes both primary and secondary sources. It makes an excellent contribution to understanding maritime history during the Crimean conflict but might be better appreciated by those readers interested in maritime warfare, maritime law, and maritime history in the mid-nineteenth century rather than a general audience. It should definitely be part of the library of any historian or researcher intent on conducting future research in this area.

Wayne Abrahamson
Pensacola, Florida.


The cover art of this volume is an illustration of the landing of British troops in Egypt, in 1801. A shell is exploding in a boat carrying troops to shore; men are flung from the boat, others turn away in a vain effort at self-protection. From the title and this image, the prospective reader might think they were going to learn about the military campaigns, the battles, the triumphs and losses in which army and navy collaborated, in the effort to defeat Napoleon. They would be mistaken. This book is ultimately about the British Transport Board whose herculean, and under appreciated task, was to get thousands of troops, their equipment, supplies, horses and food from one place to another (often very far apart) while at the same time victualling the British fleet on all its stations, and supporting troops and allies previously carried to foreign soil. It is a story that has been largely ignored. Robert Sutcliffe’s book is a significant contribution to the study of this topic.

The Transport Board was resurrected in 1794 as a result of the British experience during the American War of Independence. Its tasks included supplying the British Navy while on station, moving troops, their weapons and ammunition, camp accoutrements, food and other supplies. Having disembarked the army at a destination, the Transport Board then worked to supply them, move them around the local theatre by water, and, if necessary, extract them from threat of defeat. The Transport Board was also responsible for prisoners-of-war and providing hospital ships for foreign service. The movement of troops and their supplies is the major focus of this book. The Board’s early history was one of slow incremental improvement in its ability to perform its role. At the beginning and the end of this book, Sutcliffe is clear that the success of the Transport Board, in shipping the troops and material to distant places, was in large part due to the British domination of the oceans, especially after the Battle of Trafalgar (1805).

Convoys of transport ships ranged in size from two to more than
125 ships. During the years 1794 to 1815 thousands of convoys were dis-
patched. It was the British Navy es-
cort ships’ responsibility to keep
them organized, moving at a good
speed, and safe. This proved at times
to be a nightmare for the naval offi-
cers, one of frustration, tainted with
the stress of pending ruin if the con-
voy collapsed into individual ships
headed for their destination at all
possible speed, attack by enemy ves-
sels, or wrecked due to storm. As
Sutcliffe indicates, the overwhelming
majority of convoys were delivered
as a unit, unscathed, and on time;
losses were minimal.

The majority of the Transport
Board’s carriers were merchant ships,
hired for specific periods of time
(most often for three months), sup-
ported by the occasional use of Brit-
ish naval ships converted to carry
troops, horses, or material. Coal col-
livers were seen as ideal for service as
horse carriers. The use of the ships of
the East India Company, though large
and good, was limited as the Govern-
ment feared paying the penalties
applied if the vessels were not avail-
able for the convoys headed for the
Far East. Sutcliffe notes the Trans-
port Board’s request to use more
ships-of-the-line as troop ships was
rejected by the Admiralty, which
forever fretted over the need to block-
ade the remnant navies of the French
and their allies. The size of the naval
vessels would have allowed the trans-
portation of larger proportions of the
various battalions, depositing them in
more complete segments, thus mak-
ing it easier to organize them after
landing. The failure to use the large
ships, no longer needed for blockade
duty or fleet actions, stands as a
missed opportunity.

The text is heavy with statistics;
cargo weight, ship tonnage, numbers
of troops, officers, and horses, etc.,
compared one year to another, even
month to month. It produces a de-
tailed exacting account of the Trans-
port Board’s activities and ultimately
their achievements. This makes for
chapters rich in hoards of data from
which Sutcliffe draws clear conclu-
sions. One of the clearest is the im-
pact of the Government’s use of a
large number of the merchant ships,
in the convoying of troops and mate-
rial, reducing the available tonnage
for shipping trade. For example, the
use of colliers for carrying horses to
Northern Europe, resulted in fewer
collectors being available for carrying
coal to market and thus a rise in its
price. In a similar vein, the sending of
food to Wellington’s troops resulted
in shortages and higher prices in
England. Merchant ship owners stood
to make money from the govern-
ment’s need for tonnage, as long as
damage to the ship and its cargo was
minimal, and ships were readied and
loaded promptly, avoiding financial
penalties. Sutcliffe’s analysis reveals
the significant economic impact of
shipping men, animals, armaments,
material and food to places around
the globe (though largely Europe and
North America), in terms of both the
cost to the government and the infu-
sion of money into the British econ-
omy.

Though it is clear that the trans-
port board improved in its capabili-
ties as the period unfolded, it never
could predict their long term future
needs. This resulted, more than once,
in the release of shipping to save
money, then a mere three weeks or so
later the need to assemble a host of
vessels for a new mission. The prob-
lem being that ship owners had more
than likely found new employment
for their released ships, thus creating
a shortage and subsequent delay in
assembling the needed tonnage.

Two campaigns receive repeated
mention in the book, the Walcheren
expedition (1809) and Wellington’s
Peninsular campaign (1809 to 1814). The Walcheren expedition, though a military disaster, was probably the Transport Board’s most efficient preparation, being ready to move troops and supplies only ten weeks after the request was given to them, an astonishing accomplishment in light of the other requirements the board was fulfilling. Wellington’s success in Portugal and Spain was built, in part, on the shoulders of the Transport Board which not only delivered his troops to the theatre, but consistently supplied the food, fodder and replacements of both men and horses. The use of larger naval vessels as transports would have been most advantageous in both campaigns, according to Sutcliffe, but again was not approved by the Admiralty.

Other examples appearing in the book include the landing of troops in Aboukir Bay, in 1801 to defeat the French in Egypt; the expeditions to the West Indies that led to the capture of French and Spanish colonies; the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807; and the Castine expedition by the British into Maine, United States, in 1814. Though convoys were delayed at times, by ship shortages and problems in gathering and loading troops and supplies, the Transport Board ultimately played a positive role as each of these events unfolded.

There are four illustrations in the book, two which show troops embarking, one of the burning of the President’s mansion in Washington (1814) and the other of the bombardment of Copenhagen (1807). Seven maps support the narrative. Thirty charts and tables display the statistical record and analysis of the Transport Board’s activities. All tables and charts are referred to in the surrounding text and help to visualize the issue being discussed. Footnotes are helpful, with some containing details contextualizing the point made in the text. There are three appendices, each a table of figures, the first, for the number of ships and tonnage belonging to a variety of British ports, 1799-1820; the second, showing the number of ships built in several English ports, 1786-1814; the third, showing military force strength at home and away, 1808-1816. The bibliography is thorough and will assist others doing research in this area.

Resplendent in detail, this work provides a seemingly definitive statement on the Transport Board’s troop movement and support activity during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Robert Sutcliffe’s book will appeal to naval and maritime historians interested in this period, but also those focused on the logistics behind seaborne military expeditions, and anyone exploring the organization and growth of British government bureaucracy during this era.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


Numerous books and articles have been written discussing, and at often times speculating on, the reasons behind the disappearance of the 1845 Franklin Expedition, which involved the loss of expedition leader John Franklin, all officers and crew-members, and the vessels HMS Erebus and HMS Terror. The late Garth Walpole presents a comprehen-
sive account of how historical artifacts from the expedition, primarily those now held at the National Maritime Museum in London, England, were recovered and how these items, in the absence of written records, collectively offer biographical accounts of the participants in Franklin's expedition. Since Walpole unfortunately passed away before completing his manuscript, so Russel Potter finished the final compilation of research notes and inserted the corresponding images. The book is still presented from Walpole's point of view, however, as Potter states, "I didn’t want Garth’s voice or personality to be diminished in any way" (2).

Walpole immediately states his intent to distinguish his research from other material culture analyses by maintaining that the items recovered from the Franklin Expedition are more appropriately designated as relics rather than artifacts. The term relic may be viewed as antiquated or unscientific by some individuals, but Walpole argues persuasively that relics can be viewed as the material embodiment of an individual, or a physical means by which the deceased may be remembered. Aside from the recently-found sunken wrecks of the Erebus and Terror, the only remaining physical evidence of the Franklin Expedition consists of the assemblage of items recovered following the crewmembers’ disappearance. Considering that these items reflect personal life histories in the absence of other historical information, the reference to them as relics is quite fitting.

Walpole offers a chronological account of search and recovery expeditions that were organized following the disappearance of Franklin and his ships, and he acknowledges that there are some discrepancies in the historical record as to where specific individuals were located at a given time and when specific material items were recovered. The accounts of the first recovery expeditions, which occurred between 1850 and 1852, are somewhat confusing. Understandably, there were several vessels and expedition leaders from Great Britain and America involved in searching for Franklin and his crew during this time period, and they were all transiting around different geographic areas. Walpole’s accounts of the searches at this time shifts between years and locations of specific areas with no clear indication as to why the accounts are structured in that specific way. This may cause further confusion for the reader attempting to keep track of who was involved in a specific expedition and where their vessel was located in relation to the others. Chronological accounts of subsequent expeditions after 1852, however, and the related discussions of participants and recovered material items, become much more straightforward. This clarity is likely due to the reduced number of recovery efforts that were supported throughout the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the greater attention to historical record-keeping by this time.

Walpole went to great effort to ensure that all historic accounts and the contexts in which specific relics were recovered were as accurate as possible, a feat that is especially impressive given the conflicting information offered by some personal accounts. The book is extremely well researched, and all historical accounts are thoroughly cited. All relics described also include their catalogue number designation from the National Maritime Museum. In fact, the book includes a full list of the museum’s Franklin collection, including reference to the specific expedition from which items were
recovered. Academic researchers who are interested in learning more about the contexts in which specific items from the Franklin Expedition were recovered will find this book to be a valuable resource.

The book does contain a few factual and editorial errors, and while it is unclear how these were not revised before publication, they are infrequent and do not detract from the book’s central discussions. For example, the grave of expedition member William Braine was located on Beechey Island; an illustration of his gravestone is provided, but on the same page he is referred in the text as William “Baines” (36). It is further suggested that the gravestones found on Beechey Island should be viewed in the context of “eighteenth century Victorian values” (36), the wrong century. Compared with the meticulous details given as to when and where specific relics were collected, the book does not necessarily expand on why certain items were left behind and not conserved. Nevertheless, Walpole lists those items that were not retrieved, letting the reader appreciate their value in terms of the overall collection.

Walpole is completely successful in explaining that as an assemblage, the relics recovered from the Franklin Expedition not only convey the life histories of the lost crewmembers, but also their role in fostering exploration and interactions among subsequent British and American search teams and Inuit communities. Due to the meticulous historical detail offered, the book may be most appreciated by academic researchers and those with a focused interest in the Franklin Expedition. General readers should understand that the book primarily concerns how and where specific relics were located rather than their historic context or how they were functionally used.

James D. Moore III
Sterling, Virginia


Anthony R. Wells is distinguished as the only man to have served in intelligence roles in the Royal Navy as a British citizen, and in the U.S. Navy as an American citizen. Because he has participated in this work on either side of the Atlantic, he has a unique perspective on the connection between the two navies and the way that shaped events. A Tale of Two Navies covers that special relationship and the shared challenges since 1960. The book is not an exhaustive review of the entire Cold War, but instead presents selected topics the author expects will be relevant for future discussion. The author’s intent is to provoke thought and discussion as much as it is to inform. He, therefore, presents a way to think about maritime affairs, rather than a simple history. Wells acknowledges that his analysis is occasionally hampered by a lack of information, as some of the key documents remain classified and, therefore, unavailable to scholars. He nevertheless points to practical ways to learn from the past to prepare for the future, based on the information available and his own experience.

This book consists of a series of interlocking yet independent thematic chapters that are organized mostly chronologically. The first half of the volume covers a range of Cold War topics, including warfare in the nuclear era, intelligence, and technology. One chapter recounts the de-
mise of the Soviet Union, the paradigm shift it provoked, and the challenges that faced both navies, especially budget cuts and their effects. An analysis of the post-Cold War challenges follows, including the loss of clear purpose for NATO, and the cancellation of Cold War-era projects. The last chapters of the book deal with current and ongoing issues such as ISIS and other extremism, the rise of Chinese hegemony, and Russia’s resurgence. As the First Sea Lord and the Chief of Naval Operations have issued a joint paper discussing their vision for the future, the author considers the stated views as well as history to analyse the future of their combined strategy. As Wells demonstrates, the special relationship between British and American naval forces has been illustrated by a consistent linkage of the two navies’ respective strategic plans based on the desire to defend shared values.

With his unique perspective and breadth of experience, the author makes thought-provoking arguments for historians, policymakers, and national security scholars to reflect on. He demonstrates throughout the importance of naval affairs as a cost-effective tool for diplomacy and the achievement of national goals. The Royal and U.S. Navies must therefore continue to learn from their relationship, including reviewing each other’s mistakes, to succeed in meeting future challenges.

Wells regularly speaks of his own experience, adding force to his arguments by noting when he was involved in a specific event or was part of an analysis team studying various aspects of an issue. Occasionally, this participation comes off as boastful. Nevertheless, he has conducted a massive amount of scholarly and professional research on his chosen topics, and is thoroughly familiar with the information and the available sources. This is especially helpful for prospective researchers, offering source notes and a bibliography as a jumping-off point.

One obstacle to a wider readership is Wells’ assumption of a fair amount of historical, geopolitical, and technological knowledge among his readers. There is more information on a few of the less-well-known topics, such as the Soviet Black Sea Fleet’s movements into the Mediterranean during the Six-Day War, but for the most part, the author expects the reader to have a solid grasp of twentieth-century maritime history. Lack of that knowledge does not negate the benefits of reading the book, since the author does explain the outline of the events he references, but it may require the reader to conduct some additional research to fully understand where Wells is coming from. Otherwise, the main points will still be understood, but the nuances may be lost.

While the editing throughout the book is excellent, with almost no typographical errors, there is a glaring error in Chapter 9 where, while discussing the Gulf War, the author refers to Iranian forces, when he clearly means Iraqi forces. (174) It is the only instance your reviewer could find, but it does introduce a doubt that some other such mistakes could have slipped into the text.

*A Tale of Two Navies* is written for academics and professionals, although a general audience would also benefit from the author’s insight, and come out with a much deeper understanding of how to think about naval affairs. Whether one is a policy expert or a rank amateur, Wells’ work is an excellent acquisition for those who want to expand their thinking on modern maritime affairs.

Frédérik Genest
Kingston, Ontario

Michael Lewis’s “A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815,” published in 1960, quickly became the primary source on the background and career path of the officers that commanded the British Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It earned the status of a classic. Concerns over Lewis’ use of the autobiographical entries, in the dictionaries edited by John Marshall (1820s) and William O’Byrne (1849), as the data for his profile did not severely diminish Lewis’s place in the naval historiography. Evan Wilson aims to change this. The question is, is he successful?

It is the presence of Marshall and O’Byrne as Lewis’s source that provides Wilson with his starting point. The first problem with the naval biographical dictionaries, compiled in 1820s and 1849 (as Wilson clearly explains), is that only men still alive at the time of the call for their biography could write one. Of those still alive, some may not have been inclined, or able to produce a short biography. Among those who did, the temptation to colour the narrative a more admiral, self-promoting shade casts a dark shadow over the reliability of both compilations. Wilson sets out to avoid this dilemma by randomly sampling lieutenants from “Bruno Pappalardo’s index of lieutenants’ passing certificates” (229). He then adds as much information as possible, about the officers’ background and careers, from official sources, starting with the information contained on their passing certificates.

Wilson acknowledges the shortcomings of his sources, such as the propensity to lie about one’s age to qualify for writing the lieutenant’s exam, thereby distorting the age data. He avoids the use of the questionable biographical dictionaries, drawing instead on the entries in other sources, such as the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB). Some of these entries, however, depend on Marshall and/or O’Byrne. For example Wilson cites the ODNB regarding Sir Christopher Cole (121), but in the ODNB entry, Marshall is the first reference (Supplement, vol. 2, p. 41). The problematic biographical dictionaries appear to have spread widely throughout other literature on naval officers.

A second problem with the two biographical dictionaries is that many of the personal accounts are from officers who entered the navy during the time period under study, many of whom did not become lieutenants until late in the wars and never held command in the era. To counter this, Wilson sampled from 1775 and 1805. This captures those officers in command at the beginning of the wars and those who passed the lieutenants’ exam in the midst of the war. In his sampling approach, Wilson avoids two of the major problems plaguing the sources used by Lewis. All this careful and improved data collection serves as a solid foundation for the picture of the naval officers that Wilson builds.

Wilson found that commissioned officers were overwhelmingly from England, followed distantly by Scotland, Ireland, other countries or colonies, and Wales. The majority entered as midshipmen, captain’s servants or volunteer boys between the ages of 10 and 16 (18). Their early education was primarily at sea, with
some time served as able seamen. A few men came with merchant ship experience and a handful came via the Royal Naval Academy. Training was at the hands of the commissioned officers and, if present, the school-master aboard ship. After they had learned every aspect of the ship and sailing, came the opportunity to take the lieutenants’ exam. The next challenge was to obtain a position as a lieutenant and then to keep it long enough to become a commander and then post-captain. Most lieutenants finished their careers without such opportunities.

Where Lewis found a significant number of members of the upper class entering the navy, Wilson establishes that the greatest supplier of commissioned officers to the navy was the professional or middling class, with few coming from the upper classes. The navy offered the professional and middling groups a place for their sons to rise in station, if they managed to achieve the rank of post-captain, live long enough to be promoted to flag officer, and/or either collect a king’s ransom in prize money, or be granted a government pension for great deeds done, or wounds suffered. But Wilson is clear that for most who entered as midshipmen or captain’s servant, and even among those who made it to lieutenant, the chances of rising above that station were slight. Success was limited by the number of openings, the mediocrity of performance, death, disability, lack of a patron early in one’s career, the coming of peace, or some combination of these factors. Wilson identifies commissioned officers as men well trained, examined, and dedicated to a career in the navy.

Wilson, like Lewis, examines the background and careers of warrant officers, but his is the first study of this group using a randomly created database. He focuses only on the surgeon, purser, chaplain, and master; those who shared the wardroom with commissioned officers. Here, too, he alters Lewis’ conclusions. Wilson found that warrant officers “straddled the civilian and military worlds” (81). Many had relevant land experience with their profession before shipping out. And many spent only part of their lives at sea, leaving at some point to return to a shore-based enterprise. Some were quite well educated.

A separate chapter addresses patronage and promotion. According to Wilson, while patronage was still critical to an officer’s career, at the start, as well as when trying to achieve notice by more powerful patrons, ultimately talent (merit) was the key to advancement. This is a rather positive perspective on patronage, with no exploration of the growing tension between the Admiralty and the local commanders over the appointment of officers, that grew during the period.

Separate chapters explore the issues of pay and prize money, and the commissioned officers claim to gentleman status. Post-captains of first- and second-rate ships were definitely well off and could even survive on half-pay. The latter was not really true for lieutenants or warrant officers, nor commanders of the navy’s smaller vessels. The bounty of a large prize payout could enrich a lieutenant, a commander or the warrant officers, but captains benefited most from prize money (at least prior to 1808 changes in prize distribution). Wilson notes that few lieutenants and warrant officers earned the kind of prize money that could set them up for the rest of their life. The status as gentleman was important, even critical, in a naval officer’s career. Upper class officers and others with a classical education previous to their entry into the navy were more
easily seen as gentleman. Those from the professional, or middle class, who went to sea early and did not have a classical education, had a harder time fully conforming to the expectations of a gentleman. Wilson demonstrates that the air of gentility was a persona sought by officers. Self-education, wealth, martial experience, and medals all played a role creating the effect. The problem commissioned officers faced was the time they spent in skill development (an activity perceived as suited to tradesmen, not gentleman).

Comparison between British officers and those of the British military and other nations is captured in a very interesting chapter. It is more of a beginning in this area of research than a final statement. Unlike British military officers, naval officers could not purchase their rank and were required to have a more extensive practical skill-training period. Wilson found many variations in the way different European nations created their naval officers. Some focused on raising them to gentleman status, while providing a trained cadre to run the ship, others trained men to be sailors and gentlemen.

A minor issue is that in studying those who passed their lieutenant’s exam, Wilson does not explore those who never rose above the level of midshipman. His assessment of the midshipman or captains’ servants is based on those who were successful in moving forward. Lewis did sketch an overview of the sailor (chapter 8) but Wilson avoids this, focusing only on the commissioned and select warrant officers. Given the scale of his project, this choice was for the best.

An appendix offers a thorough explanation of his reasons for, and method of sampling officers for the study. Drawing on men from 1775 and 1805 provides enough data to address his questions. An argument could be made for sampling from those who passed their lieutenant’s exam in 1795 (shortly after the start of the French Revolutionary War), as they could potentially have their career throughout the period. Wilson includes a list of the names of the warrant and commissioned officers in the study.

Ten images are placed throughout the book. Three reflect aspects of the commissioned officer’s career (unemployment, social space on board ship, and patronage), there are five examples of officers being painted in a manner to solidify their claim to be members of the socially elite, and two on Nelson. Set throughout the text, 17 figures and 11 tables illustrate Wilson’s discussion of his statistical analysis. They are clear and easy to read. The book’s index is quite usable, the bibliography is complete. The archival sources will prove helpful to future researchers.

As noted above, Wilson’s goal was to replace Lewis’ picture of the commissioned and warrant officer with a more accurate one. He has presented a strong case for adjusting our idea of the background, the career path, prospects and social standing of warrant and commissioned officers between 1775 and 1815. This book will appeal to people studying the Royal Navy of the long eighteenth century, the development of naval officers, and the ideas of “nobility” and “gentleman”. The question now arises, will Wilson become the new Lewis?

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario

As the author points out in his foreword, while much has been written about the Arctic, no one has specifically addressed Arctic transportation and trade. Who has used marine and river transportation? What were the routes followed? Over the last four hundred years, what were the cargoes taken in and out? After a career as an analyst and economist specialising in marine issues and retiring as the principal analyst of a major consulting group, Christopher Wright set out to fill that gap with this volume.

The first two chapters provide the background and a preview. Until about 1950, Inuit society was largely nomadic, following the game on land and sea or under the ice. Gradually, however, permanent settlements grew up around Hudson Bay Company posts and other trading endeavours, religious missions and government established centres. Today, the traditional nomadic life is not likely to reemerge unless we in the south totally destroy our civilisation. With Chapter 3, Wright describes the entry into the Arctic of the whalers, the fur companies, the missionaries and government expeditions that were intended to reinforce the sovereignty of Canada. Chapter 7 discusses the various routes, from the East, the West and via the Mackenzie River, followed by a chapter detailing the complex story of the establishment of Churchill as a grain exporting port. For a long time, the clearly inferior, indeed impossible, location of Nelson, British Columbia, was favoured by some bureaucrats. In fact, the last section of the railway being constructed was heading towards Nelson until it was diverted to Churchill. Wright states that Churchill never lived up to its promise as a grain port. It opened in 1931 but high insurance premiums and other factors cancelled out the advantage of a somewhat shorter distance to European discharge ports.

The story of Arctic resource extraction appears in chapter 9, beginning inauspiciously with Martin Frobisher bringing 1300 tons of useless rock to England during the years 1576-1578. Originally searching for the Northwest Passage, Frobisher was stricken by gold fever when he found some heavy rock that he mistakenly thought contained gold. Wright documents the subsequent attempts to establish mines in the North. In the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries various modest mining activities had some success, but large-scale mineral extraction had to wait until recent years. Many different mineral ores can be found in the Arctic. When working for a consulting company in the 1970s, Wright personally developed the plans for mining and shipping a high grade of asbestos to Europe from the Ungava area. This activity is now terminated; however, metal ores, such as nickel, zinc and lead, often mixed, were found in large quantities in Rankin Inlet, at Nanisivik on Baffin Island, and in the Polaris mine at Little Cornwallis Island. There is certainly a lot more waiting to be discovered.

The other Arctic resource was oil. From 1972 to 1980, oil companies financed innovative attempts to discover the possibility of underwater wells, like those now common in more southern latitudes. This activity in the Beaufort Sea peaked in the early 1980s but was eventually thwarted by the problem of ice and these projects were put on hold. Canadian Arctic oil may be considered a reserve resource, although a small amount has been shipped from Bent Horn. Although the trial voyage of the American supertanker Manhattan in 1969 was considered
The next chapter looks at defence and military endeavours. In the Second World War, the United States built weather stations in the Arctic to support the air delivery of warplanes to Britain and provide weather data to assist Atlantic convoys. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Canada built the early warning radar lines which required a large amount of shipping, mostly American. This prompted Canada to increase its Department of Transport fleet, especially icebreakers, and led to the formation of the Coast Guard in 1962.

A long Chapter 11 is devoted to the annual sealift of food and other supplies to the various settlements throughout the Arctic. Wright reaches back to the earliest days (supplies for the first Hudson Bay Company’s posts) through to the nineteenth century. One or two ships a year sufficed in the 1920s and 1930s, but these tasks greatly increased after the war in 1945. During the 1950s and early sixties, the Department of Transport’s Canadian Marine Service and then the Coast Guard provided much of the lift capability. From 1950 to 1970 the Eastern Arctic Patrol ship CCGS C. D. Howe visited as many settlements as possible each year delivering cargo as well as providing medical and dental care. Icebreakers also brought supplies and a number of former landing ships were purchased, proving most useful in the ports with great tidal variation. After 1970, Canadian commercial ships provided most of the cargo lift capability.

It would be natural to ask: how can all this diverse information possibly be presented to the reader? The answer lies in the author’s background as an analyst and the solution is in tables—lots and lots of tables comparing everything conceivable: ports, populations, companies, ships, itineraries, goods shipped in and shipped out, catalogued by place, by purpose and by year. In the appendices—more tables! This is not a criticism. It is what makes the book unique and was really the only way to fulfil the author’s intentions. Arctic Cargoes is not light reading, but a valuable reference book that should be on the shelves of professional and academic libraries.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Broadly speaking the books on academic’s shelf will split into three categories, the highly academic, the good general work and the specialist reference. This book certainly fits it the latter, but it does it so well that even though it could have come across as disjointed or terribly sectional, instead it actually is nice to read. This is a book which whilst should be on every academic who studies navies in WWII book shelf, it should also be on anyone who is just interested in that period’s shelves as well. This is leaving aside its utility to modellers and war gamers, who would find this work indispensable in their pursuit of realism. This work though is strange in a way, for an academic review, as its purpose is not so much its words, as its illustrations, and so that’s where this review will start.
From first glance at the ‘C’ class cruiser on the front cover, HMS *Caledon*, beautifully illustrated in full painted colour, clouds, smoke, camouflage, water, all done in impeccable detail, and in the bottom right corner, the faintest Mal Wright, the impression given is one of not just competency but pride in the work and the presentation of it. It speaks great things of the partnership between the author and the editing/publishing team, as this is a lot of colour ink used. The quality of the presentations lives up to the standard set by this cover, in fact several possibly exceed it in terms of scalability from image. What is certain, is that if presented with a photograph from WWII, a reader would be able to narrow down date range considerably simply by using this book. Furthermore next to each image there is a little history, an explanation of the ship, its service, and why it’s the colour it is at that time.

HMS *Rawlapindi* (p.191) is a fine example of this, the image provided is clear, and it’s pure rendition somehow emotive; especially when placed next to its history. A history that describes how even though she was terribly outclassed, she engaged the German battlecruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, actually managing to score a hit before she was sunk, taking 266 men to the bottom with her. Including, although Wright doesn’t mention this, Ludovic Kennedy’s father (*Sub-Lieutenant; a Personal Record of the War at Sea, 1942*) who was the Captain of *Rawlapindi*.

For ships though with longer wartime careers, their records can span many pages, for example HMS *London* starts off with her 1932 scheme on p.79, and finished with her 1949 scheme on p.82 – there 14 images of her in total over these pages, each showing her and how she looked at the different stages through her life, often providing both port and starboard views. These illustrations are further brought to life by descriptions that are alongside them, for example on p.81 “*Around August 1942, London had her scheme simplified and changed to 507c and 507b for easier crew maintenance. Note that the patter of the 507b is similar to the areas of MS1 previously carried, with B5 eliminated. There were a few changes to the shape of the patterns, but they generally followed the same lines. The decks remained grey. The number of light AA guns had not changed, but those by the front of the bridge were raised up higher for better coverage...*” and it goes on. These are incredibly detailed descriptions that provide context that can both further illuminate image, but also help the researcher to again refine down what they might be looking at.

The award for possibly the most striking image in the book, goes to one of its most unassuming, the stark black and white (Dec 41-Dec 42) of HMS *Manxman*, an *Abdiel* class minelayer, on p.179. The edges are so precise, the detail so delicate, even the portholes are clearly defined. That this was the camouflage chosen for a ship which would operate independently in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, might seem strange but dazzle camouflage like this was supposed to break up a ships outline; it was like this that *Manxman* would carry out a solo supply run to Malta when no other ship had got through in three months (p.179). The award for most delicate must go to HMS *Suffolk* (May 41), a *Kent* class heavy cruiser, on p.67. The blend and placements on green, especially the port-side view must have required a very delicate brush. This picture encapsulates what must have been this works motto, ‘if it’s worth doing, it’s worth
doing perfectly’. The camouflage of course was the Admiralty designed disruptive camouflage scheme, a scheme the intention of which “was not to hide the ship, but to make it difficult for the viewer to tell what is was, as well as the details of its course and distance” (p.67) – put another way, this was camouflage designed for anti-raider, whether surface or subsurface, duties. Something which in 1941, the year of Bismarck’s cruise (Suffolk playing an important part in the chase) was of critical importance.

Overall, this review has managed to touch on just five of the one hundred and twenty one ships featured, so therefore hasn’t even scraped the surface of this very inclusive, and exhaustive reference; a reference which as has already been said is a very good read, and therefore a must buy.

Alex Clarke
Epsom, Surrey