
Vice-Admiral Tim Barrett, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) since 2014, has written a short (77 pages of text) book in which he positions the RAN within its historical context, its work with other navies, how the RAN fits in with Australia as a whole, and what the future holds.

Barrett states his basic thesis in the very first paragraph: the RAN is a national enterprise, part and parcel of Australian society, which supports, and must be supported by, the nation as a whole. He breaks the book into ten chapters: the shape of things to come; the RAN’s heritage; naval power, maritime power, and strategic reach; the nature of contemporary maritime power; the strategic contest; alliances and coalitions; the Navy as a system; the Navy as a national enterprise; the Navy and the community; the Navy and the nation.

He states that clear direction and guidance are critical leadership qualities and that leaders at all RAN levels must be on the same page. He then moves on to describe the RAN’s background as it developed from the British Royal Navy (RN). There are brief accounts of twentieth-century naval conflicts — Jutland, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Coral Sea — and convincingly relates their importance to Australian naval power. The lessons he draws from these battles and other issues are that the RAN must focus on protecting Australia through application of military force at the enemy. This encompasses five major points: projecting force at a distance (the Coral Sea battle); imposing great and unacceptable costs on the adversary (Jutland); targeted and decisive lethal force (the RN in the 1982 Falklands War and the US Navy [USN] in the first Persian Gulf war); agility through quick decision-making (the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944); and the use of sea control (the Battle of the Atlantic). He further notes the rising influence and power of the People’s Republic of China. His chapter on the RAN’s past and current work with the USN, the RN, and the Royal New Zealand Navy is especially apt for countries entering into strategic alliances with other nations.

Barrett expands on his thesis in two chapters. First, a navy must be viewed as a system, not a closed system but a synergistic system of personnel, technology, and organization. All three of those components must...
work together to create an effective navy. Given the changes in the times, it is no longer possible to view a navy as just a collection of ships and men. He emphasizes that the human dimension will always be needed in combat; it is too easy for a machine to mistake something harmless for a target and thus, the human element in instant decision-making will always be needed, as well as in prioritizing targets. In the end, morality is required in combat—so human discernment is essential.

Finally—the RAN is an Australian national enterprise—an integral part of Australian society. It is necessary to protect the island nation/continent. Involved in that enterprise are five basic questions: where does the nation, through its government, want the RAN to operate?; how long does the nation want the RAN’s submarine force to be stationed?; and how many stations does the nation want to RAN’s submarine force to have in order to effectively operate?; how can the submarine force be maintained?; and how can continuous training be implemented? Those are questions that, when slightly modified, can be posed to any navy and indeed, any military service.

It is a short book, indeed; but that is also its virtue. Barrett makes his points concisely with the result that this book can be read in one sitting. While the author focuses on Australia and the RAN, the concepts expressed therein are must-reading for military officers and policy-makers of whatever force, wherever situated. To broadly restate Barrett’s main points: ANY military force must be seen as a system of manpower, equipment and technology, and organization; and that operational capability with other nations’ forces is critical. The questions he poses can be applied to any military service. While the book is intended for an Australian audience, military leaders and decision-makers can learn much from the broader points it makes. It is superfluous to recommend this work; I need only state that The Navy and the Nation deserves a world-wide readership.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


This intimidating volume represents the second in a set of four, following on The Sea in History - The Ancient World, and preceding two more books on the early modern and modern eras. The book’s editor, Michel Balard, wastes no time in invoking Braudel in his introduction, which serves as a clear enough signpost to what follows. And what follows is interesting, diverse, and often exciting. Even 75 papers in French and English and over a thousand pages, however, can hardly do justice to a subject that spans a millennium and—more ambitiously—the entire
world. The book embraces “Universal History,” as the editor puts it, seeking to identify how the sea was a “differentiating factor in world history.” It is a tall order, and one cannot envy the editor his job of herding so many scholars, themselves distributed across 40 countries, including the Caribbean, Mali, Korea, the Mongol Empire, Indonesia and elsewhere. Despite that geographical spread, the total regional distribution of the chapters does not stray that far from the traditional haunts of medieval studies. Of the 75 entries, 31 deal with some aspect of the Mediterranean (including the Black Sea), with 10 focussing on Venice and Genoa alone. Another 14 cover the North Atlantic, North Sea and Scandinavia. This leaves little room for the Americas, where we have two papers on the Mayans and one on the Andean coast of South America. The Indian Ocean is better served with seven papers, and the Far East with six. The remaining chapters are broader studies, which tend to focus on European examples, such as Nikolas Jaspert’s look at the link between piracy and state power, while a handful of authors travel even further afield, to Senegal, or to the Philippines.

A book like this faces a challenge: to cover the bases implied in its title, or to provide new offerings and fresh scholarship. *The Sea in History* attempts to satisfy both requirements, with mixed results. Some contributors offer new insights, such as Gertwagen’s insightful reflections on the sheer incompetence of the Venetian navy, and Gregor Rohmann on the Vitalian Brethen in the Baltic. Two engaging chapters, by Gerassimos Pagratis and Nevra Necipoğlu, contest the traditional view of Byzantines as antipathetic to the sea. Other contributors, however, provide straightforward surveys of their subjects, as in Sachin Pendse’s paper on shipbuilding in India and Jorge Ortiz-Sotelo’s overview of “Central Andean Peoples and their Relationship to the Sea.” Some of these feel more necessary than others: with a surfeit of books on the Vikings available, do we need a new 14-page overview of the Viking ship, no matter how well written? One senses the intention to cover all the bases, but of course there are omissions. The absence of Polynesia is surprising; likewise, except for a section on Spain, the Islamic Mediterranean during its so-called “Golden Age” before the crusades is entirely absent. And while Angela Schottenhammer provides a useful overview of “Maritime Relations between the Indian Ocean and China in the Middle Ages,” the intervening territory of mainland South-East Asia doesn’t merit a single article.

Meanwhile, for the ever popular city of Venice, we learn about the culture and conditions of sailors in Doris Stöckly’s paper, Jean-Claude Hocquet explains the vital role of salt in the commune’s economy, Bernard Doumerc outlines different logistical approaches to Venetian seafaring, Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan describes the expansion of the arsenal over the centuries, while John E. Dotson addresses the shipbuilders and Ruthy Gertwagen offers an admirable overview of the “Naval Power of Venice in the Eastern Mediterranean.” At the other end of the world, of six sections dealing with the Far East,
two full papers and part of another focus on the few decades of the early-fifteenth century in which the treasure ships sailed under Zheng He.

In short, coverage is uneven and sometimes arbitrary. Guided by the ghost of Braudel (and Horden and Purcell), most of the authors make an attempt at the *longe durée*. The papers mostly eschew historical personages in favour of durations, which are usually measured in centuries. But the comparative project suggested by the editor of the sea as a “differentiating factor in world history” is not made explicit, as each paper by necessity confines itself within one region or subject area (already big enough in most cases). Drawing out the comparisons is left to the reader, a task that is eased by the predominance of certain themes. Chief among them is shipbuilding. Individual articles cover the topic in the Adriatic, Venice, Portugal, Byzantine Constantinople, Viking Scandinavia, India, and the Philippines, while others address it more lightly in Al-Andalus, the Kingdom of Jerusalem, knightly Rhodes, Lusignan Cyprus, Crete, England, Yuan China, and Korea. Any specialist in naval technology will be well served by this book. A second key theme is naval organization and state sponsorship of fleets and maritime expansion, and here too the offerings span the globe.

This book is, quite simply, too big. There is a nice volume here on Venice and Genoa, another on the medieval Baltic and North Sea, a third and slighter one on China and the Indian Ocean. Taken together, they are difficult to deal with. It is not clear for whom this book is intended. Its diversity makes it a fun read; this reader had never before considered the navigational problems faced by the early Maya, or the balsa rafts of the Peruvian coast. But nobody buys a book at this price for its entertainment value. Specialists in the history of shipbuilding, nautical technology, or naval organization will have reason to consult it, and those pursuing cross-cultural approaches to these subjects may find it very valuable indeed. A comparative approach to the various maritime histories of the world is a desirable outcome, which this book fosters, and it may be recommended on that basis.

I would certainly hope to find it in any library or collection devoted to naval or maritime studies.

Romney David Smith  
London, Ontario


Despite the collective fixation on large surface combatants in most of the historical naval literature, the real working fleet has always been the vast number of smaller vessels, particularly destroyers. Having evolved out of the need to protect major combatants from torpedo boats, the destroyer has become a highly versatile ship capable of defending against not just surface, but sub-surface and airborne threats. With such versatility, it is no surprise that the destroyer has
played a central role in every naval action since its creation. For a smaller navy like the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the destroyer has also represented a significant element of our naval power. Therefore, an understanding of the development of Canadian destroyers is an essential aspect of understanding the Royal Canadian Navy.

To facilitate this process, Sean Campbell, a RCN reservist and ardent navalist and author, who has written for the Canadian Naval Review, has provided Canadian naval enthusiasts with a concise history of Canadian destroyers in his recent book Tin-Can Canucks: A Century of Canadian Destroyers (2017). In presenting a history of an entire class of warship, Campbell has provided a chronological understanding of the evolution of Canadian destroyers throughout the 1900s and into the present day, all within 336 pages. He sets up the context of the rise of the destroyer in his introduction by tracing the joint development of both the torpedo and torpedo boat destroyer. Inextricably linked, the torpedo gave purpose to the creation of the small torpedo boat destroyer. Acting as both a delivery system for torpedo attacks and a means of keeping similar vessels at bay, the destroyer took its place in a supporting role for the main combat fleet in every navy prior to the First World War. With the addition of the sub-surface threat shortly before war began in 1914, it was inevitable that the destroyer would be thrust into a defensive role here as well. Campbell’s prologue, “HMCS Grilse,” discusses early escort procurement during the First World War, starting with the acquisition of the steam yacht SY Winchester and her subsequent conversion into the first Canadian escort, HMCS Grilse, and the later acquisition of similar ships into the RCN.

In the eight separate chapters that follow is the history of every class of destroyer incorporated into the RCN from HMCS Patriot and Patrician, gifts from the Royal Navy in 1921, to HMCS Athabaskan until her decommissioning in March 2017. Each chapter presents a brief discussion of the adoption of a specific design of destroyer before going into brief histories of the ships in the class. For example, in the chapter “Tribes of all Types,” the author discusses the decision to adopt British Tribal class destroyers into the fleet, followed by a history of the individual ships. This is concise and focused history at its best, as obviously, each of these ships could be the subject of one or more books in its own right. The final chapter and afterword offer a brief examination of the decisions that have been made regarding the future of the RCN and their impact. Encapsulating a vastly complicated process, the author manages to give a short synopsis of the key papers and studies relating to the decision-making process and provides an excellent basis for further research.

Collectively, this book is an excellent place to begin an examination the Canadian Navy’s growth and development in the critical area of destroyers. Considering their central role in the battle for the Atlantic and Canada’s strong reputation for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), this study provides an excellent foundation. Backed up by a solid bibliography and a good sense of the historical role
of these ships, the author produces an interesting text that is both enjoyable and useful for naval enthusiasts and students of history. Unfortunately, the brevity of the text is its major limitation. Covering a century of destroyer acquisition and development in a scant 336 pages, it inevitably gives the reader a sense of being rushed. This is not necessarily a negative, however, since it serves as an incentive for further research and study. In that regard, the author has provided an excellent entry point for those interested in the field and, in some important ways, a guide book for future students of the Canadian Navy. An excellent read, this book should be a strong contender for inclusion in the collection of most naval enthusiasts.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


Marian M. Desrosiers’ John Banister of Newport: The Life and Accounts of a Colonial Merchant depicts the career of a successful entrepreneur and businessman in eighteenth-century Rhode Island. A man of many talents, an exporter and importer, wholesaler and retailer, creditor and insurer, as well as owning and outfitting vessels, Banister was also involved in Rhode Island’s notorious slave trade. He played a key role in transforming trade in the English colonies, and contributed to economic growth in pre-revolutionary America. In turn, Banister blended his business skills with a keen knowledge of law and an understanding of the period’s emerging technologies. His maritime activities and his real estate ventures ashore afforded opportunities for working-class Rhode Islanders, thereby leveling the economic playing field in Newport.

Desrosiers begins her study of Banister by posing a series of questions which she answers in her following chapters. She asks, how did Banister become a leading capitalist in eighteenth-century Newport? Did his role as a loyal citizen of the British Empire help or hinder Rhode Island’s economy? How was Banister pivotal to the success of numerous tradesmen and other merchants in colonial America and beyond? How deeply was he involved in the slave trade? How did his commercial decisions provide wealth for his family? How did he use his wealth for the benefit of the Rhode Island community? And, can we integrate Banister’s local successes within the broader perspective of Atlantic history?

Born in Boston, in nearby Massachusetts, John Banister (1707-1767) arrived in Newport in 1734, Desrosiers tells us, “to establish business in a port with potentially profitable consumer markets, less competition, and more opportunities for success” than he could enjoy in his hometown (16). In short order, he married well, built a wharf and warehouses, became a real estate developer of lands he inherited or purchased, and was
outfitting vessels for the American coastal trade, the overseas trade, and the West Indies. His exports included fish from New England and Newfoundland, agricultural surpluses and livestock from Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and lumber and naval stores from New Hampshire, New Jersey, and the Carolinas, consequently providing an economic boost for American producers. “Banister was not unique in any particular item he exported,” says Desrosiers, “but he knew how to get the most value out of the diversity of his cargoes” (8).

Among his imports were textiles from France, Italy, Ireland, China and Japan in a variety of colours, textures, weights and patterns, which he sold to consumers at affordable prices. Even his luxury items, gloves, hosiery, and shoes, he marketed on easy credit terms.

The amount and extent of Banister’s imported goods were conducted through “many triangles of trade,” Desrosiers says. European semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, pig iron, wrought brass and copper, tools, tableware, ceramics, glassware, paper, paint, and household furnishings, came from French and Spanish ports along the Bay of Biscay, and Amsterdam. Other “triangles” linked Newport with Central and South America, and the Caribbean islands of France, Spain, and the Netherlands. Banister’s ships sailed the Atlantic to trade for foods that Rhode Islanders craved, such as tea, cocoa, coffee, and nuts, in addition to salt, spices, and tropical fruits. His mahogany imports from Central America were sold to Rhode Island furniture makers, who created a distinctive Newport style.

Banister also met the demands of Rhode Island consumers for imported processed foods, such as molasses, sugar, West Indies rum, and Madeira wine. He exported rum to Africa in exchange for slaves and was owner and employer of slave labour, and builder and outfitter of ships for the slave trade. English slave-trading merchants approached him to build ships for them, recognizing his talent for discovering the latest technological advancements in shipbuilding at reasonable cost.

According to Desrosiers, Banister assumed risks in funding privateering ventures in support of the Royal Navy in wartime. He paid the fees and taxes required, adhering religiously to the legalities of insurance, and the regulations of the admiralty courts. Thus, he complemented his income from the importation and selling of consumer goods with building and outfitting privateers and letter of marque vessels, further providing employment for Rhode Island mariners. He formed privateering partnerships as well with other merchants to protect his colony and enhance its prosperity.

Banister worked directly with his captains and concerned himself with his crews regarding wages and supplies to promote business in Rhode Island and the Empire, always complying with imperial navigation laws.

In an interesting chapter, Desrosiers deals with the personal expenses of the Banister family in the matter of heating, lighting and food and clothing costs, and the money laid out for property improvements and household furnishings. She com-
pares Banister’s expenses with his income, and that of other Newport families, to explain living standards among the town’s mercantile elite.

Banister’s account books reveal a world of trade and real estate development. From his activities in providing goods, services, and jobs to the local economy we see Banister as a “rainmaker” generating prosperity for other businessmen, artisans, widows, and even slaves.

The importance of Banister’s role as a merchant is reflected in the details of his records. He assembled his cargoes with an eye to “price, quality, and demand” and was flexible enough not to trade in only one or two commodities or at one location. He diversified his ownership of vessels with other merchants, as well as staggering the destinations of his ships to minimize the risk of loss. He affected the livelihood of Newport and its trading partners in North America, Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa, and his business decisions had an impact on the well-being of Newport’s workers and consumers. Merchants like Banister played a decisive role in furthering the consumer revolution and the expansion of colonial trade in eighteenth-century America.

Desrosiers has mined an impressive list of sources, including Banister’s personal journal and account book (1746-1749), his memorandum book (1749-1767), his receipt books (1748-1768), and his letter books, ledgers, cash, and day books. She has consulted Newport town meeting and colonial court records, probate and church records, customs records, and colonial governors’ correspondence to corroborate Banister’s own accounts, adding as well colonial office audit records, admiralty court records, clearances for Banister’s ships, and newspaper advertisements of goods he offered for sale. Her book contains prints, maps, and contemporary paintings of Banister’s world, statistical tables, and listings of vessels he outfitted, built, or owned from 1739-1749. John Banister of Newport: The Life and Accounts of a Colonial Merchant sets the standard for what the writing of the economic and social history of early America should be.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


Just another new book on Operation Tabarin, the secretive British Antarctic operation during the Second World War, might be the first reaction when opening Anthony Dickinson’s new book. While it is true that the book deals mainly with what is now a well-known British undertaking in Antarctica, it is also true that Dickinson provides much more than one more version of an already well-known story. Furthermore, it is first time someone has looked at the operation from a maritime history perspective.
Dickinson describes the story of the Newfoundland ships *Eagle* and *Trepassey* during their Antarctic service and more importantly, he discusses why two Newfoundland sealing vessels became the backbone of maritime logistics for British wartime activities in Antarctica. In addition to the story of these two ships, Dickinson provides a plethora of information on the participation of Newfoundland ships in all kinds of Polar expeditions ranging from attempts by Peary and Cook to reach the North Pole, via Shackleton’s expeditions south, to Operation Tabarin and the beginnings of the British Antarctic Survey. Nor does he limit himself to the operational history of the ships. He provides the story of their crews and analyses why Newfoundland mariners were particular well equipped for navigation in these often uncharted regions, whether the Arctic or Antarctic.

One of Dickinson’s most relevant points is the simple fact that these vessels were often chosen not because they were an ideal choice, but that they were simply the best material available during the Second World War. This means the maritime history of Operation Tabarin was characterized by ships that were neither ideally suited for the task nor in prime condition. Dickinson’s carefully researched material on the crews of these vessels is easily as important as her research on the vessels themselves. It reinforces the idea that Newfoundland, with its long history of sealing operations, was perfectly suited to provide the crews for the maritime arm of wartime British operations. Clearly, for operations under extreme conditions, experience with those conditions was at least as equally relevant as youth and physical ability.

The chapter about the requisition of dogs for the Antarctic sledging operations seems at first to be a little off topic, but on closer reading, it fits nicely into the larger argument that without all kinds of support from Newfoundland and Labrador, Britain would have had difficulty establishing its sovereignty claims in Antarctica.

This book is a welcome addition to the literature about the history of Antarctic expeditions, in particular as it does not focus on the well known names of expedition leaders, but places the emphasis on the men and ships (and dogs) without which the expedition leaders would never had been able to achieve their goals and objectives. To a certain degree, it might be stated that Dickinson has written one of the first histories of Antarctic exploration that is neither bound to the ‘great men’ tradition nor to a strict history of science approach. It embodies the concept of history from below, or maybe even a revisionist approach linking regional with global history.

For those neither interested in Antarctic nor Newfoundland history, it might be read as a curiosity with a good deal of regional pride, but such a take on the book would definitely undervalue the meticulous research on which it is based. For the professional Antarctic and/ or Newfoundland maritime historian, it is a well written book bringing an important story to light and opening the paths to future research on the history of Antarctic maritime history and in particu-
lar the related logistics on which Antarctic exploration depends.

Unfortunately, praise for the book must come with a grain of salt. Although the book is without any doubt carefully researched, the respective references are not provided as traditional foot- or endnotes or in text citations, but as notes in an appendix. These do not refer directly to specific sections of the text, but just to the chapters, thus somewhat limiting the potential to use the book for future research. Despite this caveat, which might be the responsibility of the publisher or the author, the book needs to be recommended to those interested in the subject in one way or another way, regardless of whether the ice lies North or South.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


The *Anne* was a third rate, and one of the 30 ships built for the Royal Navy and paid for by an act of Parliament in 1677. It served until 1690, when it was burned following the battle of Beachy Head. The wreck settled effectively at the low water mark near Hastings, Sussex. As such, the remains are an incredibly important artifact of English naval history, particularly of the period immediately following the Restoration. *Anne* is also a ship of some importance to Richard Endsor, who is one of those individuals who, despite not being a formally trained naval historian, has made very important contributions to the study of the early modern Royal Navy. His previous book, *The Restoration Warship*, focused on the *Lenox* (built as part of the same programme as the *Anne*). As such, I had very high hopes for this book. These hopes were met in some measure, but this also makes the flaws so much more disappointing.

The structure and contents of the book are straightforward. First, a chapter discussing the Thirty Ships building programme and the general historical context. The second and third chapters cover the *Anne*’s construction and the immediately subsequent period that it spent “in ordinary” at Chatham. The fourth and fifth chapters examine the ship’s operational experiences in the Mediterranean Sea and the Battle of Beachy Head. Chapter six focuses on the ordinance of Royal Navy warships in this period, and the final chapter considers the *Anne*’s current state. From an information point of view, this book is generally fine. The structure works very well, and the writing itself is quite clear. It provides a good breadth of information, and clearly should be a high quality, inexpensive book that would support the Shipwreck Museum. It is also visually impressive. There are very good colour illustrations on every single page, and the paper and the binding do not feel cheap. The references alone are a fantastic thing for any undergraduate or graduate student to have. At first consideration, the book does seem like a slick production, something that any naval historian would like to have on their shelf, and a book that would increase
knowledge of both Restoration naval history and the *Anne* itself.

A closer inspection raises questions about the financial corners that were cut during production. Many of the images and illustrations are credited to the author or his collection. This is not a problem, as illustrations and images are notoriously expensive and Endsor has an extensive collection of prints and photographs. He also creates rather remarkable drawings and paintings that fit well within this book. There is, however, inconsistency in how the illustrations are accredited. In addition, there are numerous typos and other errors in the text. For example, the title of the third chapter in the table of contents is different from the title of the chapter on page 41. Among the numerous typos spread throughout the book are misspelling of people’s names and several sentences which are either missing a word or have an extra word inserted. Effectively, it feels as if this book is about 98% complete.

It is my profound hope that the publisher will take the time to go through and correct the errors. If they do so, then this will truly be a very good book that should be on every maritime historian’s shelf. Until then, this remains a very good book *in potentia*.

Sam McLean
Toronto, Ontario


After the War of 1812, the United States increased its importance as an Industrial Revolution competitor. The Atlantic became the storm-tossed thoroughfare over which people, merchandise, mail, money and materials were transported. Increasingly efficient factories on both sides of the ocean produced a vast range of goods for mass consumption. Sail-powered ships carried passengers and cargoes at a reasonable cost, but were subject to the vagaries of weather. They were slow and undependable for meeting a schedule in a timely fashion. A sailing vessel could manage roughly three crossings per year, while a steamship might complete up to twelve. The invention of the steamship and the building of rail links at deep-water seaport centres changed the transportation industry forever. Early seaport hubs were developed at Liverpool in Britain and at the competing American cities of New York and Boston, with a Canadian port in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The various levels of conflict and sources of enmity arising from this commercial development form this riveting maritime story.

Many diverse problems had to be addressed and *Steam Titans* chronicles their sometimes tenuous solutions. What was the best hull design, deep or shallow, for a transoceanic steamer? Should the vessels be made of timber or iron? How could steam engines become more efficient and their designs made smaller and lighter to take up less space? Should they be powered by paddle wheels or by screw propellers? For the issue of
fuel, wood was abundant and cheap in North America, but increasingly plentiful coal was becoming the fuel of choice. (The British General Mining Association (GMA) became highly influential in this choice.) Should the accommodations be luxurious to attract affluent passengers or more functional to quarter a greater number of customers?

Harbours were modified to accommodate stream ships. Ports now needed large quays and supporting shore-side infrastructure. Channels and harbours had to be dredged. Packet shipping was an attempt at providing and maintaining a predictable schedule, but weather, availability of fuel and mechanical breakdowns at sea became major problems. New routes were devised to accommodate the higher speeds, but this presented increased dangers of collision with seasonal North Atlantic ice flows and Grand Banks fog that jeopardized ship and passenger safety.

Finally, Fowler focuses on several thorny levels of financial conflict. Was funding of the steamships and steamship lines going to be private, public through the offering of shares, or by way of government subsidy? Because of the vessels’ speed, they could accept contracts to carry intercontinental mail and other confidential cargoes, but how were the international laws and politics to be resolved?

The British Empire was approaching its economic peak while the Americans were the upstarts, but both were vital trading partners. Fowler narrates the international history of the times as a skillfully written backdrop to how all these problems were confronted. They were largely the work of two fascinating main characters; Cape Cod/New Yorker Edward Knight Collins and Nova Scotia Haligonian, Samuel Cunard. Their competitive dealings and sometimes arcane interactions encompass the substance of book.

Collins had put together a fleet of sail-powered packet ships that plied the waters between New Orleans and New York. In 1836 he launched the large Shakespeare, the first of the theatrically named vessels in his “Dramatic Line.” The ship steamed the New York to Liverpool route carrying passengers and cargo, well timed to meet the growing demand for international travel and American cotton to energize the English textile industry. Sensing an opportunity, Cunard obtained a profitable contract to carry Britain’s royal mail in 1839 and simultaneously provide regular passenger and cargo service between Liverpool, Halifax and Boston. By 1842, Cunard had launched a fleet of four steamers that halved the time of sailing ships over the same route. There was now a lively competition between New York and Boston to be recognized as America’s foremost commercial port city.

Sail power from the wind was free, but steam offered many advantages. Thus, Collins quickly tried to match and surpass his rival with steamships. It turned out that ocean-going steam vessels required extremely large, heavy engines, men to continually heave coal to fuel a boiler’s fire while underway and machinists to fix breakdowns—a frequent occurrence, especially in the early years. It was a business prospect that proved to be a financial challenge.
Eventually both Cunard and Collins directly competed, operating New York to Liverpool ocean services. Hard-fought contests involving the fastest speed and most lavish service were inevitable. Collins’s commodious and luxurious steamships outpaced Cunard’s, but the British vessels provided services at a lower cost. The Collins Line was losing money and needed subsidies from Congress. Then tragedy struck one of Collins’s premier ships, the Arctic. Fowler’s description of the steamer’s sinking following a two-ship collision off Newfoundland is a masterful literary warp and weft, a tapestry woven from the threads of witness and survivor statements.

Out of the fog, two points to starboard, suddenly appeared the menacing shape of a vessel heading straight for Arctic, a vessel with all sails set and a stack belching smoke. Having no means of communication other than his panicked voice, the lookout ran aft toward the bridge calling “stop her, stop her—steamer ahead.” . . . passengers [then] felt “a slight jar to [the] ship accompanied by a crashing noise against the starboard bow.” (215-216)

On deck, passengers and crew watched the water lapping up toward them as they cornered themselves on the port quarter, struggling to keep their footing on a wet deck sloping down toward a steadily rising sea. (220) Convinced “that the ship must go down in a very short time” [Captain] Luce, with the help of passengers and third mate Francis Dorian, broke out axes and saws and began to hack away at every floatable they could find, putting over side spars, sails, “and such other materials as we could collect . . . to form a raft . . . [suddenly] an alarm was given that the ship was sinking.” To avoid being sucked down by the rapidly sinking steamer, Dorian shoved off with four male passengers, 26 crewmen, and several empty seats. (222)

In summary, Steam Titans is an intriguing and absorbing tale superbly told; a piece that reinforces the premise that maritime history is the pillar upon which America’s economy was built. Dr. William Fowler Jr. is among the best author/historians to tell this engrossing chronicle.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


This is the companion volume for Cheryl Fury’s edited collection entitled, The Social History of English Seamen, 1485-1649 (Boydell Press, 2011). It continues the exploration of English seamen, from the time of Cromwell through to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This volume tackles the same topics, government support and admiralty organization, manning, health and food, relationships ashore and afloat in the navy, and the careers of merchant seamen, the development of a seafaring workforce, and piracy.

Jeremy Black and Cheryl Fury start the volume off with a thorough
overview of the development of English sea power during the era. They trace the influence of the various wars in the long eighteenth century, on Britain’s structuring of the administration, government support for and use of the navy, as the country developed its foreign policy for Europe, and expanded and protected global trade and its colonies. This was not a smooth evolution but ended with Britain becoming the dominant, European maritime power, with a global reach.

Bernard Capp examines the naval seaman and officer from 1650 to 1700. Capp describes the seamen as complaining (about food, access to alcohol, discipline and pay), drinking to excess, seeking the comfort of prostitutes when ashore, and yet under the influence of a good officer becoming content and committed to the service. Among officers the tensions were about personal background. The Puritan officers of the Cromwell era, those of the aristocracy, and the men who rose from the ranks (the tarpaulins) held little respect for each other. While the Commonwealth period saw a sharp rise in religious affiliation aboard ship, the Restoration returned religious belief to a more minor role, with ability and patronage being more important for determining an officer’s employment. Capp, however, warns the reader not to dismiss the place of religion in the navy’s history. By the start of the eighteenth century, the professional turn in the officer corps widened the gap between seamen and those in command.

The next three chapters are based largely on books written by the authors. They are useful, concise summaries of their work, but contain little that is new. N.A.M. Rodger, based largely on The Command of the Ocean (London: Penguin, 2004), lays out the perspective that the British Tar was a loyal, hard working person, especially for officers he liked. Even with a revolutionary influence at the end of the period, they remained loyal to the Crown and the service. During the eighteenth century, officers, commissioned and warranted, became valued more for what they accomplished than their social origins. Margaret Lincoln’s contribution is in line with her book, Naval Wives and Mistresses (London: National Maritime Museum, 2011). She describes the supportive role played by the wives of sailors, of both the quarter and lower decks. Women provided everything from moral encouragement, the celebration of patriotism, a home and family to which the sailor could return, to a moral conscious for the nation over the nature and pursuit of war. Burg’s exploration of the prevalence and nature of homosexual activity aboard ships is based on his book Boys at Sea: Sodomy, Indecency, and Courts Martial in Nelson’s Navy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). He holds that men in superior positions aboard ship (commissioned and warrant officers mainly) used their power to dominate and sexually abuse young men and boys. The evidence is quite clear and convincing, but the issue of frequency across the navy is still open to debate.

The collection shifts to the study of merchant seamen. Peter Earle’s chapter looks at the origins and career of seamen between 1650 and 1730 and it too originates from his
earlier work, *Sailors: English Merchant Seamen 1650-1775* (London: Methuen, 1998). Many were drawn to work afloat, not simply those whose families had gone to sea before them. Money could be made, if the sailor was lucky, a saver and careful. Some kept to the sea into their seventies as there was nothing ashore for them but poverty. Many came and went, spending more of their working life ashore than afloat, a ship providing employment only during a downturn in their trade.

David Starkey’s piece examines the effect of the interaction between private enterprise and public policy on the seafaring workforce from 1650 to 1815. In this statistics-heavy chapter, Starkey lays out how the government and ship owners shaped the nature and size of the workforce employed at sea. The government reacted to, more than they anticipated manpower needs, as did the merchant ship owners, but the necessities of war and profit made both groups very attentive to changing diplomatic and market contexts. While manpower did not increase in a straight line, by 1815 there were far more men sailing in war and merchant ships than in 1650. This reflects the need for an ever larger fleet to exert Britain’s political influence globally, and the county’s increased economic reach. Apart from the new information, Starkey’s work provides an incredible example of how to sample evidence to build a numerical profile of a maritime workforce (149-156).

James D. Alsop reviews the content of three well known biographical memoirs by seamen. They include Matthew Bishop, George Marshall and William Spavens. Alsop considers only Spavens as a factually correct (mainly) account of his time at sea, the other two are left looking more like works of fiction. But Alsop is mainly interested in how the three talked about food. Seamen’s claim to proper food (what was served, the portions and quality) and how they described themselves obtaining it, Alsop suggests, reveals how they portrayed their masculinity. A proper man had access to good traditional food on voyages, or knew how to get it, if a captain or purser were not forthcoming with the right victuals. It is an interesting analysis, though I must admit, I was more impressed by his fact-checking on Bishop and Marshall.

John C. Appleby explores the rise and fall of piracy during the period of the book. At its height during the early part of the eighteenth century, illegal piracy and legitimate privateering were often confused, one for the other. Piracy, in its rejection of social order and governmental restrictions, offered opportunities, when regular trade was at a low point, or when England was at war with Spain, for sailors and ship owners to make money. But pirates were not a cohesive group and their loner mentality lead to their demise, when governments, or colonies, organized themselves against the “‘Brutes and Beast of Prey’” (229).

Fury’s final chapter draws together the continuity of the two collections, comparing the general findings in this volume with those of the first. It is brief, to the point and most valuable to those who have read both books. Across the past 350 years, the issues confronting the navy remain relatively the same—manning, health
and feeding, and the ability to pull the navy into war standing at the outbreak of hostilities. Seamen, whether naval or merchant, had similar backgrounds, increased in overall number across the period and tried to use the context they found themselves in to their own benefit. English pirates swerved in and out of legitimacy depending on the nation’s need; finally fading from the seas (replaced by others).

Each chapter has its own footnotes with a single reference list at the end of the book for all the chapters. The references and bibliography are great resources in and of themselves. Starkey’s chapter holds all three figures and six of the eight tables. They will be very useful for those examining the British maritime workforce. The index is brief, just two and half pages.

This collection, together with the first installment, would make an excellent set of readings for a course on British sailors in the years between the founding of the English navy through its climb toward the height of power as the British Navy. The second volume alone provides excellent summaries of the previous work of Rodger, Lincoln, Burg and Earl. Black and Fury’s introductory overview, Starkey’s workforce analysis, and Appleby’s contribution to piracy in this volume are compelling, and informative pieces, reason enough to have a copy.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


*Spindrift* is an engaging anthology of well-chosen writings about the sea in various Canadian contexts. This notable collection of largely contemporary selections is the first such with a national focus. It contains 170 extracts chosen for their literary merit from writings by 130 creators of fiction, non-fiction and poetry. *Spindrift*’s compilers worked on this project for five years and their attention to detail shows. One of the collection’s outstanding strengths is the selection of the writings: each one is self-contained and long enough to convey a short vignette, mood, or event. Another great virtue is the breadth of the chosen themes and how evenly they are balanced. The compilers, Michael and Anita Hadley, provide deft introductions for each selection to explain its context and the of the author. The extracts are set in the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Arctic; the Great Lakes have been bypassed. *Spindrift*’s selections have a refreshingly contemporary tone because more than a quarter of them were published in the last twenty years and almost two-thirds of them have appeared since 1975. Mostly about one-and-a-half pages to two pages long, they are grouped in ten thematic chapters covering how the writers experienced coastal locations, individual vessels, large and sail, the joys of being on the water, particular mariners and marine workers, wargames at sea, hazardous occasions, specific voyages, and the like.
And what about the 130 contributors? They too are a varied lot. Historical insights are provided through selections like those of Marc Lascarbot writing in the sixteenth century through Captain George Vancouver in the eighteenth, to noted modern historians such as Barry Gough, Peter C. Newman, Pierre Berton, James Prichard and Robert Turner. There are cult figures like Stan Rogers and poets including Bliss Carmen and E.J. Pratt. There is a strong representation of “Can Lit” names including Sally Armstrong, Neil Bissoondath, Lawrence Hill, Wayne Johnston, L.M. Montgomery, Alice Munro, Nino Ricci, Jane Urquhart and Yann Martel. Annie Proulx, the contemporary American writer whose fiction has focused on Atlantic Canada is not forgotten.

Anita and Michael Hadley are a husband and wife team who were both post-secondary educators. Their experiences together include decades of saltwater cruising on the British Columbia coast in sailboats, as well as community service in Africa. Michael committed years to service in the naval reserve, made noteworthy contributions in several academic fields, and based significant books on Canadian naval and B.C. coastal history on groundbreaking research. In compiling their anthology, the Hadleys have thus drawn on rich life experiences and associations with the sea.

*Spindrift* has been attractively produced by Douglas & McIntyre with an evocative etching by David Blackwood as the frontispiece and cover. Small drawings by Matthew Wolfesstan appear at the start of each chapter. Publication has been happily timed to coincide with Canada’s 150th anniversary. A list of permissions to publish the extracts is at the back of the volume in lieu of an index. This serves as a bibliography but has no page references, so that a reader wishing to look up a particular extract has to work through the 16-page table of contents. This eclectic collection is perhaps best enjoyed by dipping into one or several selections at a time. They are all rewarding. Given its wide breadth and the richness of the extracts, all relating to the oceans and Canada, and the diversity of its contributors *Spindrift* is an outstanding achievement.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Whenever I come across a book like Nate Jones’ *Able Archer 83*, I hate *The New York Times Book Review* even more. Every Sunday the reader is treated to vapid fiction, boring memoirs adventure tales in marginally interesting lands or yet another biography or collected edition of the letters of a Victorian author, while books like *Able Archer 83* that illuminate our very dangerous time are ignored. Not that I am usually enamored of the work of the National Security Archives on which the Jones study is based. Too often the release of documents hinders needed diplo-
matic and security measures best left alone for a time.

But this book is different, setting forth a series of chilling developments, miscalculations and blunders that nearly pitched Soviet Russia and the West into world-shattering nuclear war a third of a century ago. Following an introduction and four short chapters that illuminate the context, Jones presents a collection of documents which clearly set forth why and how a NATO exercise whose sponsors thought routine, led Soviet authorities to conclude that it was a mask and launching pad for a pre-emptive all-out Western nuclear strike against their homeland.

Jones argues plausibly that “The world was so dangerous in 1983 because the leaders of both superpowers allowed it to be so.” For some time, both the Reagan White House and Andropov’s Kremlin had engaged in bluster, and as CIA Director William Casey told his president after the event, “The point of blustering is to do something that makes the opponent pay high costs while the blusterer pays none or little. The military behaviors we have observed” from the Pentagon before, during and immediately following Able Archer “involve high military costs. . . adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.” (57)

The Reagan Administration came into office convinced that the Soviets had achieved rough parity in both nuclear weapons and conventional forces. They had recently invaded Afghanistan and in early 1983, a Soviet MiG had shot down a Korean civilian airliner that had inadvertently stumbled into Russian air space. The new president not only continued the modest military and especially naval buildup of his immediate predecessor, he ramped it up dramatically. In the midst of these activities, Reagan told an audience of religious evangelicals that the Soviet Union was an “evil empire” and as such the “focus of evil in the world.” At the same time, he planned to introduce short-range Pershing missiles into Western Europe and approved a “PSYOP” campaign that was, according to a later internal, highly classified CIA study, designed to secretly attack the Soviets “on economic, geostrategic and psychological fronts” in order to roll back and weaken” Kremlin power. A disturbing emphasis was placed “on what the White House perceived as a Soviet image of the President as a ‘cowboy’ and reckless practitioner of nuclear politics. [The] US purpose was not to signal intentions so much as keep the Soviets guessing what might happen next.” Rather than intimidating the Soviets, the effort alarmed them to such a degree that they went on more or less permanent “hair-trigger” alert, interpreting every Western move and gesture in the most sinister terms and reacting accordingly. (Quotes are in Benjamin Fisher, “The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations,” undated (ca. 1996), CIA Studies in Intelligence, reprinted on p. 185)

According to a reprinted CIA study, “The Navy played an even bigger role” in PSYOP than did the Strategic Air Command’s historic daily thrusts toward a provocative fail-safe line in Arctic and sub-Arctic air spaces. Just a month into his presidency, Reagan “authorized” the U.S.
Navy “to operate and exercise” in areas where the fleet had rarely—or never—gone before. Major exercises in 1981 and 1983 in the Soviet far northern and far-eastern maritime approaches demonstrated US ability to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups close to sensitive military and industrial areas without being detected or challenged. Using sophisticated and carefully rehearsed deception and denial techniques, the Navy eluded the USSR’s massive ocean reconnaissance system and early warning systems. Some naval exercises included ‘classified’ operations in which carrier-launched aircraft managed to penetrate Soviet shore-based radar and air-defense systems and simulate ‘attacks’ on Soviet targets. Summing up a 1983 Pacific Fleet exercise, the US chief of naval operations noted that the Soviets “are as naked as a jaybird there (on the Kamchatka Peninsula), and they know it.” His remark applied equally to the Kola Peninsula in the far north.” (Fisher, quoted on p. 187)

The final element in creating a Soviet hair-trigger response to any suspicious U.S. and/or NATO exercise or operation was Reagan’s announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) designed to make the United States invulnerable to nuclear missile attack through a computer-based hyper-response mechanism. It is now clear to all what seemed obvious to some of us then, that this scenario would ultimately doom the USSR to permanent military inferiority. Neither side possessed the computer power during the Reagan years to remotely bring “Star Wars” into sight, but the Americans might eventually pull it off; the Russians, never. Soviet first Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Ogarkov, openly admitted the fact to a sympathetic Western journalist. “We cannot equal the quality of United States arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based on technology and technology is based on computers. In the United States, small children . . . play with computers . . . Here we don’t even have computers in every office of the Defense Ministry.” (ibid) All of these developments added up to ever-increasing Kremlin alarm over both the capabilities and intentions of the U.S. to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike that would destroy the Soviet Union. The issue was further inflamed by the poor health of the Kremlin leadership. Andropov died shortly after the Able Archer exercise concluded following months of physical decline and hospitalization. His successor, Chernenko, suffered from various serious illnesses. Throughout the first half of the 1980s, the Andropov and Chernenko regimes expended vast sums and energies to tease out American intentions. Yet according to a comprehensive report by a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board established by Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush in 1990 to study the “war scare” provoked by Able Archer 83, Washington repeatedly dismissed all warnings of escalating Soviet concern over the NATO exercise and was oblivious to the implications. Not until December 1983 when “rumors of imminent war were circulating at all levels of Soviet society” did the Reagan Administration awaken to the crisis it had created. When later told that Able Archer 83 had sent Soviet forces to possible
first strike readiness status Reagan expressed profound surprise bordering on shock. (Advisory Board report, “The Soviet War Scare,” February 15, 1990, reprinted pp 69-177. The quote on Soviet society is on p. 159.) The Board report included a somber conclusion: “In this era of increasing instability in the USSR, we cannot know who may long retain or quickly assume the mantle of Soviet leadership. Will he understand that US leaders are not going to start World War III and behave as if he understands? . . . The world will stay a chancy and changeable place and the only rule is perhaps that there is an inevitability of uncertainty which we ignore at our peril. Information at best will always be in some part fragmentary, obsolete and ambiguous.” (112) Ronald Reagan clearly did not absorb the message; at least not immediately. The following August (1984), with none of the tensions underlying Able Archer 83 resolved, “the Great Communicator” “intoned” into his microphone as it was being adjusted for voice level, “My fellow Americans, I am pleased to tell you that I have signed legislation to outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.” Although never broadcast, the “joke” went viral. Fortunately, the old men in the Kremlin and the Soviet General Staff held off from a spasm response and the incident passed down the corridor of history to be revived and recalled with a collective shudder thirty years later. (Harold Jackson, “From the Archives; 14 August 1984: ‘Storm as Reagan Bombing Joke Misfires’.” The [Manchester, England] Guardian, August 14, 2014 online at https://theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/ronald-reagan-bombing-russia-joke-archives 1984)

The connection between Able Archer 83 and the Great Korean War Scare of 2017 is too obvious to miss. Unfortunately, the great mass of the North American and European publics will remain ignorant of the earlier incident and its illustration of the always fragile nature of international affairs in our nuclear age.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


Outside of the development and existence of the atomic bomb, the most closely guarded secret of the Second World War was the fact that British Intelligence had cracked the German military codes. Postwar it became popularly known as the “Ultra Secret” and even today, is surrounded in myth, fabrication and a hint of mystery. The German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe used similar methods for encoding operational messages. The Navy, or Kriegsmarine, had a much more complex methodology albeit based on the same basic system as the other two. As a result, solving the naval codes, especially those used for communications with U-boats operating against Allied convoys,
was very difficult at the outset. In fact, the methods used by the Kriegsmarine convinced the leadership that their codes were never compromised. There is only one known incident where Allied actions could have revealed they had been broken. Fortunately for the Allies, the connection was never made. How the British got to the stage where German messages were being deciphered, translated and distributed in time to be operationally valuable is the subject of this intriguing book.

The author is a distinguished historian who has become an authority on the history of cryptology. He tells the story with an engaging style and explains the concepts behind complex technology in a clear and understandable way and he provides key insights into many of the key personalities involved.

The vital component in encoding or decoding messages was an electromechanical machine known as the Enigma—thus, the title of the book. It comprised multiple rotary discs wired in a specific order which, in response to input from a typewriter keyboard, substituted another letter or symbol for that input. This way a message would be encoded and dispatched to a recipient. The recipient needed an Enigma machine whose settings matched those of the encoding machine in order to decode the message. The base settings or starting points could be changed daily, weekly or less often but all units had to know the new settings and the times for changing.

The origins of the Enigma can be traced back to a German electrical engineer who applied for a patent for a cipher machine and in 1918 wrote to the Imperial German Navy seeking their interest. Rejected, the inventor’s company turned to the commercial market and in 1923 a cipher machine was available on the open market. How the Enigma was developed from then to the point in 1939 where it had become the common cryptographic system in the German Armed Forces is a fascinating story well told.

The author cleverly relates the point and counterpoint of intrigue as various players, especially Polish Intelligence, sought to crack the German codes prior to the onset of the Second World War. How the British initially acquired an Enigma machine is almost an entire story in itself. The work of the cryptanalysts and mathematicians, including the noted Alan Turing, at the so-called Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park is especially well described. It is astonishing to learn of all the activity ongoing behind the scenes in the covert world of codebreaking. It is also fascinating to learn the stories of how various machines and cipher documents were captured from German ships and U-boats during the war itself.

The point is well made that, for Germany, the Achilles heel of the U-boat war was the method of operational control exercised by Admiral Dönitz, commander of the U-boat arm in the period in question. Dönitz took strict control over its operations by using encoded radio messages to direct the actions of individual U-boats, based on estimates of where the Allied convoys were routed. That the Germans had penetrated the British codes for convoy messages made these estimates fairly good! As the author describes, once the British had
started to break the codes, signals
analysis coupled with the High Fre-
quency radio direction finding system
added to the intelligence picture
which enabled the application of
counter tactics.

The final chapter of the book is
entitled The Reckoning. In it, David
Kahn puts into context the place of
what became known as ULTRA and
the decrypted messages it produced.
Several key questions are raised and
the author responds to each. One
question, of course, is whether or not
ULTRA won the war. The author
contends that it did not. He believes,
and the evidence is supportive, that
without ULTRA the war would have
been prolonged but not lost. Although
for a while in 1941 the Germans
came close to cutting the Atlantic
lifeline, by 1943 the tide had turned
in the Allies favour. As Kahn points
out, while codebreaking was a signif-
icant factor, what eventually defeated
the U-boats was a combination of
superior technology, adaptive tactics
by the Allied naval forces and the
introduction of long-range aircraft
capable of patrolling the Atlantic.
Also, with the entry of the United
States into the war, the American
shipyards produced ships at a faster
rate than the U-boats could sink
them.

This is a remarkable book full of
fascinating information about lesser
known aspects of a critical part of the
Battle of the Atlantic. Highly recom-
manded.

Michael Young
Nepean, Ontario

Mark Lardas. USS Lawrence vs HMS
Detroit: The War of 1812 on the
Great Lakes. Oxford, UK: Osprey
.com, 2017. 80 pp., illustrations,
maps, tables, bibliography, index.
UK £12.99, US $20.00, CDN $27.00,

This work is the 79th installment of
Osprey’s “Duel” series of books, offer-
ing comparative studies of two
specific adversarial vehicles of war,
often naval vessels, tanks, or aircraft.
USS Lawrence vs HMS Detroit marks
author Mark Lardas’ fifth entry into
the series, with his previously pub-
lished works focusing on naval ship
duels of the American Revolution,
War of 1812, and Civil War. This
book offers an examination of the
decisive 10 September 1813 Battle of
Lake Erie, which saw the surrender
of an entire British squadron, “the
only instance in naval history so
 crushing a victory was achieved over
the Royal Navy,” and ensured Ameri-
can control of the Northwest Terri-
tory and northern Ohio for the rest of
the war (5, 7). Following the stan-
dard format of the Duel series, Lardas
offers a chronology of major events,
followed by examinations of relevant
ship designs, strategic situations, and
technical specifications before cover-
age and analysis of the battle and its
aftermath. A small Further Reading
section is provided at the end, fol-
lowed by an index. While this work
is focused on the battle between USS
Lawrence and HMS Detroit specifi-
cally, there is also heavy coverage of
the USS Niagara versus HMS Queen
Charlotte as well.

Lardas’ introduction states that
“The Battle of Lake Erie had greater
strategic consequences than all other single-ship duels fought during the War of 1812 put together.” (7) To explain how such a momentous event occurred, he begins with a two-page chronology of major events from the birth of the naval commanders to the final disposition of the main combatant vessels. Following this primer, ship development is covered in a multi-stage chapter, looking at the evolution of the ocean going sloop-of-war design, the variants on this ship construction that arose from the unique nature of the Great Lakes, and the respective design and construction histories of the Americans and British on the Great Lakes. One-page technical and historical summary sheets with colour side profiles are presented for both the Lawrence and Detroit so as to familiarize the reader with the work’s primary subjects. The analysis of the strategic situation is largely a summary for the start of the War of 1812, American desires for Upper Canada, and the actions surrounding the Great Lakes. An accompanying map of the strategic points and key engagements in the Great Lakes area is included in this section as well. The Technical Specifications section is essentially an expanded form of the Design and Development chapter’s information on Great Lakes sloop-of-war hull, gun, and rigging patterns. Accompanying cross-sectional hull drawings of ocean versus lake hulls and cannons versus cannonades greatly aid in reader understanding, and close-up pictures of scale models are used for showcasing gun mounts and rigging as well. Regarding the combatants, Lardas examines the sailors, officers, and marines involved, with separate one-page biographies for both Oliver Hazard Perry and Robert Heriot Barclay. Lardas notes that “Despite the Lakes’ strategic importance, naval forces on their waters were an afterthought,” with discussions of how difficult it was to man ships with experienced crews, the selection and roles of officers, and the need to supplement Marine contingents with Army troops to maintain numbers (39). The battle itself is examined in three stages, divided into the lead-up to engagement, the actions of Lawrence against Detroit, and concluding with the final firefight between Niagara and Detroit’s. Maps, full-page illustrations, and quarterdeck views are interspersed throughout this section to aid in understanding. In the analysis section, Lardas mentions the two competing fields of thought regarding Lake Erie, that Barclay “was doomed from the start” versus that it was “a close-run thing” only won by Perry’s presence, before delving into statistics regarding engagement forces to strengthen his own argument that “both sides are right and talking past each other” (69). A brief chapter follows covering the post-battle situation on Lake Erie and the post-war interactions of America and Great Britain, and a select bibliography is present within the final two-page Further Reading chapter.

In terms of possible improvements, there are two that stand out. The first point of note is that there appears to be a large number of paintings that have been rendered in black and white. For example, in the black and white rendering of Howard Pyle’s 1911 painting “Carrying Powder to Perry at Lake Erie,” much of the picture’s detail is lost in close
shades of grey to the point where one cannot read the large markings on the wagon or distinguish military troops from civilians in the works mid-ground and background (30). Including more original colour images would increase the amount of visual information accessible to the reader. The other critique is the lack of citations. This not so much specific to this work as it is endemic to all Osprey publications, given their non-academic target audience. While this is not likely something that can be changed due to the longstanding parameters of Osprey books, the lack of direct citations does hamper scholars who wish to trace Lardas’ sources.

_USS Lawrence vs HMS Detroit_ is a solid primer on the 1813 Battle of Lake Erie, offering a neutral analysis of an often subtly biased subject to popular history readers. The information presented regarding Great Lakes warship design, crewing, and gunnery all offer interesting comparative information regarding the more traditional ocean-going warships of the early nineteenth century, and help highlight the unique aspects of this important naval battle.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia

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On 4 August 1914, the Dominion of Canada went to war with Imperial Germany and pledged unqualified loyalty to the British Crown despite years of rising colonial nationalism and Canada’s vast geographic distance from Europe.

Author John Mitcham contends that just 30 years later, following the Second World War, Canadian scholarship began moving away from imperial history and in favour of a more multi-ethnic Canadian history. He further asserts that historians have considered the study of Great Britain’s interactions with its Dominions as anachronistic. With great acuity, the author explores the cultural, social, and political dimensions of the military and naval cooperation between the British Empire and its Dominions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with an emphasis on the role of Canada and the naval relationship between the two nations.

Sea power and the Royal Navy were vital to the national existence of Canada. The decades leading up to 1914 gave rise to the “New Navalism” as the great European powers and the United States expended vast sums of money to increase and expand their naval power. Canada could not escape the struggles for global naval supremacy. At the 1897 Colonial Conference, Britain urged Canada to assist with Royal Navy subsidies, but Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier replied that Canada preferred its financial resources be spent on local protection as opposed to global and imperial goals. The tension between British imperial needs and Canada’s domestic needs was constant. London’s dialogue with Canada was continual as the Royal Navy served as the imperial shield of
Great Britain and its empire. Though sea power was central to the cultural definition of “Britishness,” Navalism was meant for the white colonial empire, and strict racial boundaries were in force. The Royal Navy did not warmly welcome contributions of manpower from India or the non-white populations of South Africa or New Zealand. Canada struggled to find the balance between Navalism, nationalism, and imperial patriotism. By the end of the nineteenth century, British imperial defence became increasingly insecure as its naval power and industrial might was challenged on the global stage. In response, the British Admiralty took aim at maintaining naval supremacy, and in a nod to imperial unity, named three new ships: HMS Dominion (1903), HMS Commonwealth (1903), and HMS Canada (1913). The British Navy League, founded in 1895, opened branch chapters in Canadian cities, though membership in the League’s colonial chapters was for white members only. In 1902, the British Navy League sent arch-Navalist H.F. Wyatt to tour the chapters. Wyatt told Canadians that the Royal Navy was the engine that was responsible for the well-being of the British race. Starting in 1907, the League published proposals for colonial navies, including one submitted by prominent Canadian Navalist H.J. Wickham.

A fascinating part of Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870–1914 is its discussion of the 1909 “Dreadnought Panic,” and in particular, the role Canada played. The year 1909 saw increased public agitation for more British dreadnoughts as the Anglo-German naval race reached a fever pitch. Many in Canada did want to assist the British Admiralty—but on Canadian terms—while French-speaking Canada tended not to be supportive. London welcomed possible assistance from Canada, which the British press lovingly termed, “The Sea-King’s Daughter.”

In 1912, Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden had the intention of providing London with a gift of three dreadnoughts, at a cost of more than $35,000,000, but the Canadian Senate ultimately rejected Borden’s plan. In London, a disappointed First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was to have more success with Australia and New Zealand.

Mitcham’s Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870–1914 addresses defence issues across the late-Victorian and Edwardian British Empire, with Canada and the naval component as one important part. In many respects, this period includes Great Britain’s last major and successful effort to strengthen the bonds of its empire in the face of rising colonial nationalism, slowly changing racial/class attitudes, and the impending world war, which many believed was coming. Mitcham goes to great lengths to detail this successful forging of British identity and strong imperial unity.

The book makes a significant contribution to defence studies of the period and to the thinking and actions of the imperial British world, now vanished from the global stage. Mitcham explores the meaning of British identity in all its various forms, including the themes of race, physical fitness, and imperial federation. Even the formation and the foundation of the Boy Scout movement is
examined for what it reveals about the value British culture put on traditional values of masculinity —including encouraging its males to become disciplined and physically fit in time for an impending war.

The book is well-produced, with marvelous political cartoons and some interesting illustrations. The scholarship is solid, with a wide use of source material from across the globe, as reflected in the extensive bibliography. A serious book for serious students of Canadian and imperial defence history.

W. Mark Hamilton
Alexandria, Virginia


The United States military conflict in aiding South Vietnam during most of the 1960’s and early 70’s is certainly an ever-growing quarry of historical investigation and scholarship. One such a history, Knowing the Enemy: Naval Intelligence in Southeast Asia by Richard A. Mobley and Edward J. Marolda, indeed chronicles the efforts of US military intelligence organizations and their struggles within the Vietnamese theatre of war to successfully retrieve tactical and strategic information.

As part of an historical series titled The US Navy and The Vietnam War, which is published by the Naval History and Heritage Command, both Mobley and Marolda demonstrate their extensive knowledge of the subject matter in Knowing the Enemy. Mobley, a retired US Navy commander, dedicated part of his career as a navy intelligence officer operating alongside many of the organizations in Vietnam that are detailed throughout the book. Marolda, who is no stranger to US Naval history, holds many different hats at Naval History and Heritage Command from Director and Senior Historian to accomplished scholar.

Knowing the Enemy begins like any well rounded history does highlighting much of the contextual history leading up to key events - namely the Gulf of Tonkin incident - igniting the powder keg in Southeast Asia. The authors waste no time delving into the integral question of US national security agencies attempting to gain a better understanding as to the developments of North Vietnam’s Communist inclinations and military actions towards the South Vietnamese Republic. In addition to understanding the amount of aid stemming from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union to the North Vietnamese, the question really posited by US Intel that the authors address is how exactly Communist elements traversed the landscape to both attack South Vietnam and supply the Viet Cong (VC).

Initially US Intelligence efforts centered around frontline personnel scoping out beachheads and assessing the terrain, much like the US “advisors” sent in the 50’s and 60’s. Seaborne lanes provided an easy access for enemy infiltration into South Vietnam bringing aide to the Viet
Cong: between 1963 and 1964, North Vietnamese trawlers—sometimes under the guise of PRC flags—sailed back and forth bringing arms and ammunition to the VC. Additionally, the authors point out how North Vietnamese infiltration of neutral Laos not only prompted further US pressure on Hanoi but also really brought intelligence gathering under joint military operations.

On 18 May, 1964 Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief in the Pacific, commenced the joint Navy-Air Force Operation Yankee Team, which consisted of USN Carrier Kitty Hawk and her task force of RF-8A Crusader and RA-3B Skywarrior reconnaissance planes. Their mission was aerial reconnaissance over Laos, which proved to be no easy feat. On 6 June, North Vietnamese antiaircraft unit shot down an RF-8A commanded by Lieutenant Charles F. Klusmann and was taken prisoner. Albeit Klusmann’s successful escape after 3 grueling months in a jungle prison camp, the reality of collecting intelligence during the war, as the authors emphasize, was indeed hazardous work.

When it came to seaborne intelligence collecting, US sailors certainly endured the hazardous work on a personal level given their close proximity to enemy lines. Early in 1964, President Johnson ordered the use of Desoto Patrols all along the coasts of belligerent countries in the Gulf of Tonkin. Destroyers like USS Maddox embarked for enemy coast lines, originally being allowed only 20 miles distance but later cut down to 12, with Direct Support Units (DSUs) aboard. These DSUs consisted of naval communications technicians employed to decipher Morse and voice transmissions, detect radar transmissions, and thusly create maps and charts for future personnel engaged in the war. By July 1964, General Westmoreland expressed his doubts in the effectiveness of the Desoto patrols, yet top naval brass such as Commander, Seventh Fleet Vice Admiral Thomas H. Moorer praised the patrols for their close training and the potential information collected from enemy positions.

In the wake of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident involving USS Maddox, the reality of intelligence collecting during active combat situations encompasses the remainder of Mobley and Marolda’s book. Naturally as the war ensued, navy Admirals called on naval intelligence personnel to scope out the North Vietnamese terrain but also keep an eye on China’s involvement in supplying Vietnamese and Laotian Communist elements. Notwithstanding some of the delays of 1960’s technology – namely developing photographs and deciphering audio transcriptions – between ’64-’65 special aerial reconnaissance squadrons from the Seventh Fleet photographed potential targets at low, steady altitudes. This resulted in considerable casualties; twelve RA-5C Vigilantes and twenty RF-8 Crusaders were shot down over enemy territory. However, the 3-12 inch cameras and the later panoramic cameras operated well enough to deliver photographic evidence of North Vietnamese movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

As the war continued into the late 1960’s and early 1970’s much of the aerial reconnaissance flights and patrolling of sea lanes continued and
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Certainly developed as the war kept changing. By 1967 there arose another element as far as intelligence gathering to which the authors largely attribute the efforts of Navy SEALs such as US attempts to secure the Mekong Delta. Indeed the Navy SEALs bore some gruesome encounters collecting intelligence at the tactical level; but towards the end of the war the authors also attribute many of the Naval Intelligence Officers (NILOs) at the operational level, who worked with respective combat units, the local populace, and captured enemies for information.

Overall Mobley and Marold put forth a really well researched and written history of naval intelligence gathering in the Vietnam War. The authors certainly do not skimp on detail from specific organizations and personnel to much of the equipment used in these pursuits. Knowing the Enemy is a perfect addition for both the enthusiast and scholar.

Christopher Pearcy
Virginia Beach, Virginia


Ken Otter’s memoir of HMS Gloucester is multi-layered. It is the combat history of a Second World War British cruiser that took place mostly in the eastern Mediterranean. This is also a tale of the evolution of naval combat during the early years of that war. More poignantly, it is a chronicle of its crew: captains, petty officers, seamen, bandsmen, boys, and marines—combatants, casualties, survivors, prisoners of war, and repatriated heroes.

Gloucester was a 591-foot Southampton class cruiser that displaced 9,600 tons and was armed with 12 six-inch guns, 8 four-inch guns, 16 pom-poms, two triple torpedo tubes and a number of .5-inch machine guns. Capable of 32.3 knots, she was launched 19 October 1937, with a crew of roughly 810 officers and men. After the war, the survivors nicknamed the vessel “The Fighting G.”

The cruiser initially sailed in South African and Indian waters, but later took part in battles fighting the Italians and Germans in a seldom-written about theatre: Sicily, the Adriatic Coast and the Greek Coast. The first British warship to suffer damage from German aircraft, Gloucester’s most memorable engagements were at Bardia, Matapan and Crete. It was off Kapsali Bay, near the shores of Kythira, Greece, where the Luftwaffe sank Gloucester. A convoy that she was serving in was ordered split and she had few accompanying ships to offer protection. Critically, the cruiser had been insufficiently re-armed after several battles and lacked adequate anti-aircraft ammunition to fight off attacks from dive-bombers. After receiving several direct hits, Gloucester was set afire and reduced to an uncontrollable hulk. The ship was ordered abandoned and shortly thereafter, sank. Tragically, the British naval command failed to send ships to rescue survivors in a timely manner. It is
not known exactly how many men were lost, trapped in the ship, or sub-
sequently died in the confluence of the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.

Otter is the son of Fred Otter, Chief Yeoman on board Gloucester, who was killed when the vessel sank in 1941. The book is a quasi-memo-
rial to his father, but really an inti-
mate look at the lives of the men who served king and country on this Brit-
ish warship. The author supplies the reader with a rich collection of pri-
mary source material, letters and dis-
patches that described life on board the vessel. A reader soon feels like a shipmate to an assemblage of ordi-
nary, likeable “chaps.” The book be-
comes extraordinary when Otter shares the first-person stories of the men as they survived being ship-
wrecked and later the harrowing tales of endurance as prisoners of war cap-
tured by the Germans. Many of the accounts at sea are reminiscent of those in Nicholas Monsarrat’s classic novel The Cruel Sea. Otter’s many excerpts from letters and diary entries bring together the thoughts of men under aerial bombardment, preparing to abandon ship, and seeing their for-
mer floating home sink into a watery grave. Most moving were the de-
scriptions of how they watched comrades die nearby and their feel-
ings of utter helplessness. “As the ship tilted over, I slid from the pom-
pom deck, over the side into the sea. I had my Mae West on and swam to a trough that was used by the baker for making dough and was now filling with water. I was quickly joined by others and soon there was no room, so I swam away and reached a carley float where I held onto the rope around the side. When Gloucester went down it was a terrible feeling. The crew really loved that ship.” (112)

The last section of the book fo-
cuses on the survivors, prisoners of an often-vindictive enemy, men who shared a great deal of pain and priva-
tion. For example, “The place was crawling with bugs and the food was meagre and hardly fit for human con-
sumption. It was several days before I became hungry enough to eat any-
thing. We had biscuits that were green with mould, black peas crawling with weevils and ersatz tea. In time, we all got used to it somehow.” (142) “The Commandant, . . . a middle aged officer with greying hair, cold eyes and a Himmler chin, delighted in the misery which he caused and was always baffled and enraged that he could not break the spirit of the British prisoners. The sergeant major shared this feeling and used to revenge himself by beating and kicking his charges.” (146)

As the survivors’ memories were waning, their bond of brotherhood strengthened. Letters, documents and personal tales were told and col-
lected. Therefore “The Untold Story” is a compilation and skillfully con-
structed narrative, but most im-
portant, a memorial to the 810 men from the far reach of the British Commonwealth who served on HMS Gloucester. Ken Otter’s book is like a fine documentary film, at times sen-
sitive, graphic, compelling, and (for this reviewer) with unforeseen im-
pact. The author succeeded in writ-
ning a short but powerful memoir about a ship that was tragically, and arguably, needlessly lost and her crew of mostly ordinary men who at times acted heroically during trying
A Viktor Frankl quote effectively summarizes the book’s message: “To live is to suffer. To survive is to find meaning in suffering.”

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Captain Parani suggests to the reader that he is one of those rare individuals “bred to the sea”. At the age of sixteen he and some school friends in the Andaman Islands (an archipelago in the Bay of Bengal) put a rowboat aground in “a mangrove jungle among wild animals and pesky insects”. A professional boat handler rescued them, and the experience was evidently a major influence in subsequent years. “As life went on”, writes Parani, “my friends each carved out paths of their own. I eventually became a ship captain, commanding ships several thousand times heavier than the rowboat, but I would never forget the lessons I learned that day.”

In fact, with suitable modesty, and citations from a very wide selection of literature, Parani explains that it took many years of sea time and, it would seem, many hours of reading, to understand fully what seamen need to know. He quotes sources that range from the bible and William Shakespeare, to philosophy, psychology, business publications, memoirs (Churchill and Napoleon Bonaparte, for instance) and, here and there, advice from sailors themselves, among whom are several American admirals. A website, www.parani.org., leads the reader to still more information about the author, and “Advance Praise for *Golden Stripes*” by 28 seamen, academics, and business professionals who provide recommendations published on the pages preceding the title page of the main text, suggesting, as does Glen Blackwood of Memorial University, Newfoundland, that the book “addresses a huge gap in maritime education”. It is not too much to say that this book is apparently highly recommended!

Having acknowledged all this, and as a one-time navigating officer in the RCN, it is difficult for this reviewer to find fault with the plethora of advice in this book, coming from a seasoned seagoing professional. He cites various horrible examples to emphasise his points. *Titanic, Torrey Canyon, Concordia, Royal Majesty* for example “expose the myth of competency.” He proposes a “Porthole Model of Experience” in which only deliberate practice and intentional knowledge, allied to experience and “focussed feedback,” (the latter two of which have to be acquired), lead to “competency.” He advises the reader to find role models. He cites occasions when supposedly competent seafarers relied too much on their own experience, leading to overconfidence, complacency, and fatal navigational errors. Canadian and American examples, some of them very recent, which do not find their way into this book, are worth remembering.
The Halifax explosion of 1918, which Canadians remember very well, is a prime example of sins committed in seamanship. A number of events in the Second World War led to the unfortunate term Royal Collision Navy. Recent collisions at sea, in the Mediterranean and Pacific Oceans, are equally worth noting.

Read, learn and inwardly digest this book!

W.A.B. Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario


This work is the 2017 edition of John Roberts’ 2000 primer on designs of British warships that saw service in the Second World War. Utilizing his original general arrangement and “as fitted” drawings, Roberts covers the design and evolution of the primary warship types fielded by the Royal Navy during the war years, from their pre-war origins through wartime alterations. Declaring it “impractical to cover even major warships on a class by class basis,” the author instead opted to choose vessels that offered a more broad coverage of ship types, with an admitted bias towards the post-1920s designed fighting ships of escort size or larger (6). Following the introductory sections, Roberts examines 14 different types of ship designs through the key chosen examples, offering a chronological view of the evolution undertaken by British warships from treaty-based inter-war reconstruction to technology-based wartime refitting.

The four-page introduction to British Warships of the Second World War outlines the standard British ship design process from the original Staff Requirements to final fittings, along with an explanation regarding the refits and modernizations carried out on various vessels. The second chapter offers a more in-depth introduction to the Royal Navy’s position at the end of the First World War, the limitations imposed by the various naval treaties of the interwar period, and the gradual rearmament and modernization as nations moved towards the start of Second World War hostilities. The remaining chapters are divided between ship types and arranged largely according to descending tonnage, with capital ships being covered first, followed by the carriers which would supersede them in importance, then cruisers, and on down to motor torpedo boats and auxiliary anti-aircraft ships. While the chapters are largely self-contained, a set of blueprints related to the ship type discussed in the next chapter is often present at the end of the current analysis. The work concludes with a brief bibliography and index.

The page distribution of the core chapters highlights Roberts’ stated bias towards a primary coverage of larger fighting vessels. The discussion of battleship designs accounts for 47 pages of the work, almost twice the average analysis given to cruisers, destroyers, and escorts. In comparison, the smaller auxiliary vessels types, such as minesweepers and minelayers, often receive a mere
two pages of study paired with single “as fitted” drawings (154-157). The text of each chapter begins with the relevant start point for the history of each vessel type’s use in the Second World War. For example, the capital ship section effectively begins with the 1927 construction of HMS Rodney and Nelson, the coverage of aircraft carriers opens with a discussion of the 1919 to 1930 experimental designs, and the initial analysis of submarines begins with the 1921 design of the X1 (19, 66, 141-142). Each section quickly moves to discussing the reasoning behind ship design changes, and, in the more detailed chapters, specific information regarding certain key vessels or classes such as the HMS Ark Royal and Southampton class cruisers (66-67, 94-95). Significant post-war designs or project cancellations tied to the relevant discussions also receive mention within chapters. The ship drawings chosen for each section are either inserted with their captions within the main text, or on an overleaf with the caption on the page immediately afterwards. The captions of these images discuss the notable features of the vessel design, sometimes in comparison to other vessels of the Royal Navy, and often make mention of the drawings composition itself, citing the presence or lack of detail and the scenarios that led to that drafting choice. Along with captions for the selected drawings, the illustrated ships also have a standardized data block, listing the vessel’s displacement, dimensions, armament, machinery, crew complement, and armour, if applicable. As this is effectively a compendium, there is no traditional conclusion to the work.

In terms of possible improvements for future editions, standardizing the style and design used throughout the work for labeling drawings and for ship data blocks would be beneficial. Some of the drawing labels feature a grey bar and dark grey ship name, while others have a blue bar and bright red ship name. Some ship data blocks have a similar issue, with most in black text on a grey background, while others have a blue background, with no reasoning for the differentiation given. Additionally, some of the blueprints appear to have been copied in grey-scale, rather than in colour like a majority of the images. Having a consistent pattern throughout the work would help with the overall visual impact of the work. An expansion of the more cursory chapters on the smaller ship types would also be appreciated to increase the work’s value to historians wishing for the same level of analysis offered for the heavier fighting ships. Finally, the inclusion of citations and possibly an expansion of the somewhat scant appearance of the bibliography would be beneficial to scholars interested in examining the specific sources used for exact sections of the text themselves.

British Warships of the Second World War is a rare opportunity for scholars to examine detailed construction drawings of numerous British vessels housed in the collection of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich. For those interested in capital ships, carriers, and larger tonnage fighting vessels, this work offers a solid examination of vessel design and evolution in response to interwar treaties and wartime lessons. For smaller craft, it offers a glimpse into
the construction of support and auxiliary craft, and their use by the Royal Navy in the interwar and wartime periods. For a draftsman, naval engineer, model builder, or historian, the reproduced drawings and accompanying text offer insight into British warship construction on a level not easily reached outside of the United Kingdom, making this a good introductory resource.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Popular images of the Great War generally involve trenches, gas and dogfights between romantic aviators trailing their beloveds’ scarves in the breeze. America’s Sailors In The Great War tells the story of the men and ships that guarded supplies and troops as they traversed the Atlantic between North America and Europe, chased U-boats, laid mines, and made the Old Salts’ first, cautions forays into naval aviation.

During its neutrality, America was introduced to German potential in 1916 when the monster “merchant” U-boat, Deutschland, made two visits to the United States and Lieutenant Hans Rose surfaced U-53 in Narragansett Bay near the U.S. Naval War College.

Unlike armies that can be rapidly expanded by recruitment and armed with small arms, navies depend on investments in ships that must, to a considerable extent, be ready when Mars’ siren calls. The navy was America’s best prepared force and the first to extend its power into the war zone. Less than six weeks after the declaration of war, Division 8 consisting of five destroyers arrived at Queenstown, Ireland, “ready now… except for refueling.”

Every war shapes its warriors to meet its own challenges. During the First World War Britannia ruled the waves, but all Germany needed to starve Britain out was to cut its supplies of food and materiel. Surface raiders played their role, but most of the work of interdiction was carried out by the U-boats lurking beneath the surface. The stage was set by the time America entered the war so it molded its expanding navy to play its assigned parts. The primary German threat was U-boats, so American shipbuilding concentrated on destroyers and mine layers to counter it.

Before the Doughboys could halt the Hun, they had to navigate the U-boat-infested Atlantic. The task of transporting a huge American army overseas was unprecedented. One solution was escorted convoys in which destroyers would hunt, and if possible, sink any harassing U-boats. While Canadian convoys generally left Halifax for British ports, most American troops left New York and Hampton Roads for Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux. Crucial to the American build-up was the safe delivery of troop transports of which only three were lost, and
those on lightly-escorted return trips when empty of their human cargos.

This work examines both the ‘big picture’ of the wartime role of the U.S. Navy as well as the lives of the individual sailors. It commences with the “State of Play,” an analysis of the state of the American Navy and the status of Neptune’s Theatres at the time of the declaration of war, the relationships between the American, British and German navies and the Unrestricted Submarine Warfare that finally compelled a reluctant President Wilson to lead his country into belligerency. Its next topic is the “Call To Quarters” as the Americans are quickly incorporated into the Maritime combat.

Author Lisle A. Rose then addresses the variety of America’s vessels. While we might think of naval aviation as requiring the advent of aircraft carriers, in fact, planes were merely new tools adopted by all forces with sea planes being a major part of the navy’s contribution to the air war. One of the most interesting chapters deals with the development of the convoy system that became essential when success on the battlefield overseas relied on the transportation of men and supplies from Canada and the United States.

Next Rose focuses on the types of ships employed: the destroyers that protected the convoys and hunted the menacing U-boats; the battleships that, although little suited to the action of the war, did, on occasion, provide artillery support to land forces; the submarines that hunted other submarines; the minesweepers that made channels impassable; and, perhaps unique to this war, the sub chasers, essentially yachts, that were produced in large numbers to be sent out in search of U-boats.

Although the title mentions the sailors, most of the book deals with the ships, boats and planes that were part of America’s contribution to the Great War, some of the most entertaining anecdotes are drawn from the lives of the sailors. Division 8 sailors who arrived in the United Kingdom looking forward to encounters with Irish colleens were disappointed to find “not a one had any teeth, their hair looked like rope and they had no shape.” (58) Later arrivals, however, aroused jealousy among the Irish lads. Quick backpedaling was required by the drunken swabbie who shouted “To hell with King George” below his portrait in a Liverpool bar. When a husky Anzac replied with “To hell with President Wilson”, the Yank offered a hand and cried, “That’s what I say! I’m a Republican.” (183)

I find America’s Sailors In The Great War an excellent introduction to the men and machines that so heroically completed the missions assigned to them. Names of ships and men who would achieve fame in a later war, Texas, Arizona, Nimitz, Kimmel and Halsey are distributed throughout this tome. It is well researched and skillfully crafted so as to retain the reader’s attention. By the time I closed this work I had a much firmer grasp on the contributions of America’s sailors to the Great War.

James M. Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


Heligoland, referred to as Helgoland in German, is a rocky island with red sandstone cliffs in the lower North Sea off the coast of Germany, the main island being less than two kilometres in total space, at its highest elevation sixty metres above sea level and a smaller sister island named Düne nearby. Local inhabitants are outnumbered by birds and the vacationers and day trippers who come to the island and its seaside resorts in the summer months. Blessed with natural attractions and other entertainments, Heligoland’s geography at the eastern part of the Frisian chain on the doorstep of the large commercial port of Hamburg on the Elbe River, Wilhelmshaven naval base, and the entrance to the strategic Kiel Canal connecting the Baltic with the North Sea was significant. This small, secluded island was once a potent symbol of nationalism, militarism, and geopolitical ambitions. Jan Rüger, a professor of history at the University of London known for his scholarship on the rivalry between Great Britain in its heyday and Imperial Germany, turns his attention to the role that Heligoland played in this contest.

Heligoland was taken from the Danish by the British and then handed over to the Germans, in return for consideration in other colonial possessions. Imperial Germany, under Kaiser Wilhelm, militarized the island before and during the First World War, the victor powers disarmed and demolished fortifications in the decade afterwards, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, who showed special sentiment for the island, ordered its refortification and stationed large numbers of troops there, and the British after the Second World War barred access by first undertaking the largest non-atomic explosion in history to level the place and then using it as an aerial bombing range. Heligoland only returned to the control of West Germany after considerable political and diplomatic pressure, then residents were allowed back to a rebuilt showcase of modernity and peaceful intentions. Rüger expertly documents Heligoland’s rise and return from obscurity in the context of European warfare and competition in the twentieth century.

The book, however, goes further by focusing on the people who called the island home, its consideration in culture and art, and public discourse around Heligoland both in Germany and Great Britain. The discussion is solidly based in archival research in a range of locations and sources pertinent to the subject listed in the references and bibliography. The narrative is multi-dimensional in scope and objective, rather than a simple dry recounting of the main events that determined the island’s destiny.

The maritime aspects of Heligoland, as presented by Rüger, are woven into the broader tapestry of the island’s history and contacts with the external world. Fishing was a mainstay industry, and smuggling was a lucrative enterprise encouraged by the British during the Napoleonic period but declined precipitously afterwards. Artists painted maritime scenes, waterfowl brought bird
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watchers, and “mainlanders” enjoyed the beaches and relative tranquility.

The German navy used fortified Heligoland as a forward operating base for submarines, destroyers, and coastal craft. In keeping with Alfred Mahan’s classic phrase, “a ship is a fool to fight a fort”, the extensive fixed defensive positions and big guns on the island provided a potent obstacle to offensive action by enemy naval forces at the approaches to the Elbe estuary. Thousands of troops, involuntary tourists, were garrisoned there to man defences warding off seaward and aerial attack. The Royal Navy’s interest in disarmament efforts after the two world wars was primarily to ensure that the German navy and Heligoland did not pose a threat again. The big explosion was as much a psychological demonstration as an attempt to demolish and neutralize the physical war infrastructure on the island. Coastal fortifications, made out of concrete and reinforced steel, are incredibly costly and hard to remove. It might have just been better to leave them as a museum piece or testimony to another era.

Though an academic book, Oxford University Press has included a number of attractive features in terms of marketing and layout. The simple cover incorporates a striking colorized and enhanced photograph, illustrations conveniently located near related text feature older black-and-white photographs and artwork, and a nautical soundings map graces the front and inside covers. The book was printed in Great Britain, when so many other publishers have gone overseas citing price and quality. Heligoland is recommended for readers of maritime history with an interest in the two world wars.

Chris Madsen
Toronto, Ontario


The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is not known as a giant in the world of submarine operations, but it has a long, if intermittent, tradition of operating submarines. Salty Dips, Volume 10, “An All Around Look-100 years of Submarines in the RCN” contains a delightful collection of first-person accounts of submarine operations dating back to the inception of RCN submarine operations in 1914.

In August 1914, in Seattle, Washington, the RCN located two small submarines originally meant for the Chilean Navy. Three days of negotiating with the shipyard and a $1.2 million cheque meant that the submarines would not reach their intended original buyer. The Canadian navy took over the two submarines and they entered (and have gone down in history) as HMCS/M CC1 and CC2. The RCN’s submarines stayed in British Columbia waters until the two craft were ordered to Halifax in 1917. These two subs have a further historical distinction: CC1 and CC2 were the first ships carrying the White Ensign to transit the Panama Canal.
They remained in Halifax until they were sold for scrap in 1920.

The RCN operated two other submarines briefly after the First World War: HMCS/M Ch14 and Ch15. They were reluctantly accepted under pressure from the British Admiralty, but post-war demands to reduce the Canadian military and cut defence costs forced the RCN to lay up both submarines in 1922. (The story of the survival of the RCN in the interwar years has been told by Tony German in his classic work, *The Sea is at Our Gates.*

With the exception of two ex-Kriegsmarine U-boats that the RCN operated briefly after the Second World War, the RCN had no submarines of its own between 1922 and 1961. Many RCN personnel served in British Royal Navy (RN) subs during the Second World War. In the immediate post-war period, the RN stationed submarines at Halifax while the RCN provided personnel and training. This arrangement lasted until 1965, when the RCN stationed the new, British-built HMCS *Ojibwa* at Halifax. Prior to that, however, the RCN commissioned an ex-U.S. Navy submarine into its own fleet in 1961 and renamed it HMCS *Grilse*. Whichever date the reader chooses—the commission of HMCS *Grilse* or the stationing of HMCS *Ojibwa*, the RCN has continuously maintained a small fleet of submarines since that time.

"An All Around Look," tells the story of RCN submarine operations in the words of those who actually served in them. Arranged chronologically, the stories begin with the memories of a sailor who served on *CC2* and a long chapter on Barney Johnson, one of the RCN’s first submariners. There follows a section on RCN personnel serving in Royal Navy submarines during the Second World War.

The vast majority of this book is devoted to recollections of RCN submarine operations in the modern era. The accounts in the three sections provide an invaluable perspective—the human one—on RCN submarine operations. One common thread: the pervasive smell of diesel fumes that cling to any submariner, something submarine veterans remember throughout their lives. The accounts include Cold War experiences, training and operations, simulated attacks, cooperation with aviation, the proposed acquisition of nuclear submarines, the effort to preserve *Ojibwa* as a museum, and even the recollections of a Canadian Army Special Forces officer, relating his positive experiences on joint exercises with HMCS *Onandaga*.

Instead of a centre block of illustrations, the book is well illustrated throughout, with photographs appearing in appropriate places alongside the text relating to the submarines, pertinent personnel, and other relevant items. This was a wise decision, as the photographs are closely integrated with the text and make reading easier. Maps also appear in appropriate places and do not detract from the reading. The cover carries photos of HMCS *CC2*, HMCS *Grilse*, HMCS *Victoria*, and HMCS *Rainbow*. These images grab the reader’s attention and tie the various years of RCN submarine operations together. An unusual and very nice feature is a pull-out inset in the back cover showing scale drawings of
CC1, CC2, CC14, the two former U-boats, *Grilse*, *Onondaga*, *Rainbow*, and *Victoria*. This feature shows the evolution of Canada’s submarines over the last 100 years.

Being a collection of stories from various sources, this is not a straight-line narrative with a consistent style of writing. The contributors’ narratives are all different in style but this does not detract from the book. A very useful appendix contains mini-biographies of those whose narratives appear in *Salty Dips*.

Those looking for a comprehensive history of RCN submarine operations will not find in this book, but it was never intended to be a comprehensive history of RCN submarines. Yes, it includes a brief history of RCN submarine operations, but this book would be more profitably read in conjunction with a comprehensive RCN submarine history. This volume of *Salty Dips* presents the human perspective and makes submarine operations come alive. All who have ever served in a submarine will recognize the many issues raised by this book. It is recommended as a very enjoyable read.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


This book adds to Professor Sanger’s considerable oeuvre regarding Scottish whaling, and promises much. In the preface, he notes that his approach is “to provide an intricate account of Scottish Arctic whaling within which I have layered more personal insights obtained from newspapers. I have also let the whale men speak for themselves whenever possible through their log books, journals and diaries to help bring dry facts and complex concepts to life.” (xii) He also waxes lyrical about his use of newspapers from the period, as “It enabled me, so to speak, to mingle with the general public, purchase papers from corner news boys and rub shoulders with friends and family at dockside upon departure and return of each vessel.” (xii)

There is, however, a note of caution in his statement that the book “draws together under one cover information contained in two graduate theses and more than twenty journal papers and chapters dating from 1973 to 2012,” and “in order to make Arctic Bowhead whaling and it’s contribution to Scotland’s history better known and more easily available to a broader audience.” (xv)

The 120 pages of text is organized into a preface followed by ten chapters, the first of which is a somewhat academic discussion entitled “The Context,” while chapter ten consists of a summary and conclusions. The other chapters cover the period from pre-1750 to 1801. Each chapter contains a short introductory paragraph followed by a good outline of the period, terminating with an (untitled) summary. The chapters are quite readable, with good statistical material covering the Scottish and English fleets, and explanations regarding the impact of wars and the
payment of bounties (a government subsidy). In this respect, the reader should note that Professor Sanger is of the opinion that any voyage revenue, other than that coming from the whale itself, constitutes a subsidy. Thus, seal fishing, trading, etc. are considered subsidies.

Chapter seven rightfully acknowledges the achievement of the Larkins (Leith) and the Elizabeth (Aberdeen) in finding a way into the North Water (a seasonal area of unfrozen sea within an ice field, or polynya) in 1817, and radically changing the nature of the fishery. Without their exploration, there would, arguably, have been no Golden Age to discuss. Given Sanger’s interest in local newspaper reports, it would have been interesting to see what the Aberdeen Journal or the Dundee Courier had to say about their achievement.

The next chapter, The Golden Era of Scottish Arctic Whaling 1802-1840, does not provide British fleet information as in the earlier chapters, depriving the reader of comparable data about English whalers. Such data would have helped explain some of the confusing fleet references in the text. Despite this omission, the chapter does cover the period quite well.

The ninth chapter, The Final Decline: Subsidised Bowhead Whaling - The Transition to Harp Sealing and Other Arctic Activities: 1841 to World War I, lacks any comparable data regarding the English, although in this period, New England whalers, driven by economic necessity, were more of a competitor than the English. This is the only chapter to contain any consistent information on oil and bone pricing (1841-1861), a sore omission from the other chapters. Price information is noted as being available from newspaper references, and occasional pricing is provided in the text.

So much is missing regarding the activities of the Scots and competition from the Americans after 1850, that it might have been better to have terminated the book at 1860. By this point, Captain William Penney had successfully demonstrated the benefits of over-wintering, and Scottish Arctic whaling entered an entirely new period. Also, Dundee’s jute merchants and spinners became much more involved following the loss of flax supplies after the Crimean War and the rise of jute spinning and weaving.

Bartering and trade receive two brief mentions, but no detail. As an example of the importance of such revenue, the American whaler George Comer realized over $100,000 in whaling and trading returns from 1900-1903 at Fullerton Harbour on the northwest coast of Hudson’s Bay. Of this, trading provided $70,000.

Readers should be aware that the ice charts on page six of The Context, at least for Davis Strait, represent 9/10ths ice, not 4/10ths. It might also have been helpful to caution the reader that these charts may not represent conditions existing 250 years ago. For example, if Sir John Franklin had experienced the ice normals referenced in the book, his expedition would probably have been successful. Also, the text and log extracts about ice conditions do not always align with the evidence in the charts. A short discussion about the
Middle Pack, or Middle Ice, in Davis Strait would also have been helpful.

In summary, and apart from the regrettable number of typographical errors and the urgent need of a good editor, the book will be of great value to the academic, given the extensive endnotes (49 pages) and the newspaper references they contain. The book can actually be read without reference to the endnotes, which become intrusive. They can be treated almost as a second book, and read after the main text, referring back as needed.

Christopher Wright
Digby, Nova Scotia


Of the many new weapons deployed during the First World War, none of them came as close to determining the outcome of the conflict as the submarine. Though all of the major navies deployed submarines during the war, it was only the Germans who used them as one of their primary means of defeating their enemies, particularly Great Britain. In this book, Laurence Sondhaus—a professor of history at the University of Indianapolis and the author of several previous studies of naval policy and naval warfare during the era—provides an account of Germany’s use of submarines during the First World War, one that details its operation and its overall impact on the war.

Sondhaus begins by explaining the role envisioned for submarines in prewar naval thinking, showing how it fit neatly within the Jeune École’s vision of a naval strategy focused upon commerce raiding. That submarines were not developed for this prior to the war is attributable to the supersession of battleship technology at the end of the nineteenth century over that of the smaller vessels around which the Jeune École was developed in the 1870s and 1880s. With advocates of the battleship-based fleet in the ascendancy, submarines were envisioned as serving primarily as harbour-defense vessels, and were designed and constructed with that in mind.

These attitudes changed quickly in the first months of the war. The initial success of Germany’s U-boats provided their navy with one of their few bright spots in their early war record, and the naval high command quickly embraced submarines as a cost-effective weapon to deploy while their High Seas Fleet remained harbour-bound. While these attacks were conducted under the confining rules of commerce warfare drawn up in the nineteenth century, as early as November 1914 Germany’s naval secretary, Alfred von Tirpitz, gave an interview to a German-American journalist designed to test the American reaction to a broader campaign of unrestricted warfare on merchant shipping, one that pushed the German leadership into launching their first attempt at unrestricted U-
boat warfare three months later. With only a limited number of U-boats, however, this initial effort proved premature, and the growing backlash in the United States against the loss of American lives led to the suspension of the campaign after just seven months.

As Sondhaus demonstrates, Germany’s return to traditional cruiser rules did not end the threat they posed to Allied shipping. Instead, the Germans employed their U-boats in increasingly versatile ways by transferring several boats to the Mediterranean and using some of the ones that remained to lay mines around British and French ports, allowing them to continue to sink shipping in a diplomatically less controversial way. In response, the Entente powers put an increasing amount of effort into antisubmarine operations, though much of this was wasted in largely futile “barrages” designed to obstruct passage through various transit points and Q-ships which rarely delivered on their promised ability to lure unwary U-boat commanders into traps. For all of their growing effectiveness as the war wore on, however, the promise of U-boats as a means of destroying the Entente economies proved elusive. Faced with debilitating deadlock in the trenches, several members of the German high command grew convinced that with the increased numbers of U-boats now available and the improved capabilities of the newer types, a renewed employment of unrestricted warfare would be successful enough to achieve a German victory against their enemies on the Western Front. With his advisors calculating that the loss of tonnage would inhibit the deployment of U.S. forces abroad and thus, blunt the impact of an American entry into the war, the German emperor, William II, issued orders on 9 January 1917 to resume the campaign. Sondhaus accords considerable initial success to this effort, noting that in its first five months the U-boats exceeded their targets of tonnage sunk. Yet the Germans underestimated the total shipping capacity available to the Allies, while increasingly effective countermeasures—most notably, the convoy system that was implemented only in late 1917—deprived the U-boats of easy targets and placed them at greater risk, a combination that, in the end, doomed their campaign to failure.

Cogently written and backed by a good command of the published material on the subject, Sondhaus’ book is an extremely useful work on submarine warfare in the First World War. By detailing the military, political, and economic aspects of the German campaign, he offers several interesting insights both into the development of submarines as a weapon and their overall impact on the course of the war. The result leaves readers with a clearer understanding of the capabilities of the U-boat arm, the constraints on its deployment, and how these two factors shaped the role that the U-boats played in the conflict. It is a book that anyone interested in submarine warfare or the naval history of the First World War can profit from reading, and will likely serve as a standard text on the subject for years to come.
Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona


Unfortunately, when it comes to medieval military history, the popular concept of warfare is almost exclusively ground-based. After all, the romanticized view of the Middle Ages which has come to dominate public perception rests squarely with the heroic knight, the living embodiment of chivalry and honour, charging bravely on his trusty steed. Intermeshed with the idea of agape love, the damsel in distress, and often co-opted into literature and movies, the concept of fighting in the Middle Ages has been popularly understood as men in heavy armour fighting on horseback. While incredibly popular, it is an incredibly myopic view of the era.

In the face of this, Charles Stanton’s *Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean* (2016, 2011) represents an absolutely fascinating and ground-breaking look into an aspect of medieval warfare that is mostly forgotten, naval history. In the process, Stanton demonstrates the role of naval power in shaping the history of Sicily, Italy and the Mediterranean in general. Examining naval power during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the central Mediterranean area, Stanton impressively links the decisive role sea power played in not only the liberation of Sicily and southern Italy from Islamic dominance but in the shaping and expansion of shipping within the Mediterranean. This, in turn, played an important role in the Crusades and the cultural dominance of the west into the Mediterranean basin. This was something that no other power was able to achieve and, inevitably, it rests on the work of Roger de Hauteville and his son Roger II. Stanton’s background as a former U.S. naval officer can certainly be seen in his compelling and clear understanding of the influence of naval power during the period.

Starting with an introduction that clearly illustrates the strategic significance of Sicily, Stanton proceeds to lay out his history in a clear chronological structure. The text is broken down into four main sections. Starting with “the Conquest” (827-1101) and followed by “the Apogee” (1101-1154), and “the Eclipse” (1154 – 1194), the author elegantly traces the rise, decline, and impact of the Norman presence on the western Mediterranean. In the process, he introduces the reader to the key personalities and the important roles they played. The final section, “the Impact,” assess the changes brought about because of all these efforts. The rise of Norman naval strength in the central Mediterranean in the twelfth century had monumental repercussions that have lasted for centuries. The wide ranging political, economic, and military changes shaped all the nations and cultures
that bordered the Mediterranean. Inevitably, Stanton includes a discussion of how the western Italian trading states expanded eastwards, the dramatic return of commerce in the western Mediterranean and of course its impact on Muslim commerce patterns in the area. Backed up with a conclusion and impressive appendices, this book turns our understanding of medieval warfare on its head.

The appendices are a particularly important and valuable addition to the text. As Stanton accurately points out, contemporary authors lacked maritime expertise, making them difficult sources to work with. Likewise, any attempt to understand the naval infrastructure is extremely problematic. Lacking any systematic documentation regarding Norman naval matters, and similarly without physical examples of naval vessels of the period, Stanton was forced to build up this knowledge. Describing the Normans as masters of accommodation and adaption, he reconstructed the Norman fleets of the period through often indirect methods, studying the sources on Muslim and Byzantine naval practices backed up with the latest in maritime archaeology. This gives the reader a solid understanding of the ships, sailors, and support systems of the period. Appendix A “the Fleet (ships, sailors, shipyards, and strategies)” is the result and it serves as an incredible source in its own right. It is a must-read for anyone pursuing naval research in the period. When matched with Appendix B “Sources,” the two appendices provide a wealth of material for any scholar (whether professional or amateur) and are as important as the text itself.

Well written and documented, Stanton’s book is an incredibly fascinating and valuable resource that should be an important addition for scholars and laymen. It represents a significant addition not just to naval historians, but also to anyone interested in the history of the Mediterranean and its development. Naval history is, after all, a history of national power and society on the sea. Thus, by examining the history of Norman naval power, the author enriches our understanding of not just the role of Norman presence in the area but of the entire region that borders this critical body of water. The Mediterranean really represents in a lot of ways what the ocean or ‘the great common’ really is. It was the place where three great cultures met. It is in these waters that the European, Greco/Byzantine, and Muslim societies interacted, and in the process, created a unique and distinctively Mediterranean culture. Dr. Stanton’s work represents a very important addition to understanding that development. As such, it is a highly recommended text for anyone interested not just in early naval history but in Mediterranean history as well.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario

Anthony Sullivan has undertaken the first serious study of Saumarez in nearly two hundred years. Surprisingly so, notes Sullivan, since Saumarez was a key player in Royal Navy victories in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Captains like Pellew, Cochrane, and Moore have their chroniclers, and a “god-like” Nelson dominates the period, but Saumarez, he says, has largely been ignored. His aim is to “finally reveal Saumarez as a husband and father, and a God-fearing warrior diplomat, in his full worth” (239).

Saumarez was born on Guernsey in the English Channel in 1757 into one of the oldest and most distinguished island families. Naturally drawn to the Navy, through family influence he won a midshipman’s berth in 1770 to learn the rudiments of naval life. Midshipmen of the time were responsible for the “good order and discipline” of a ship, and during battle, for supervising gun crews. They practiced taking the ship’s position with a sextant, measured soundings, oversaw signaling, and were in charge of the ship’s boats. In their spare time, they studied navigation, gunnery, and seamanship, and practised the social graces required of young gentlemen-officers.

Over many chapters Sullivan details Saumarez’s career. He served in America against the revolutionaries from 1776 to 1778, seeing action at Charleston and Newport, having already made lieutenant. Returned to Europe, he commanded his own vessel and had been promoted to a post-captaincy by 1782. His actions with the fleet in the 1780s included an engagement at Dogger Bank with the Dutch, who had allied themselves with the Americans, and he served with Rodney at the battle of the Saintes, defending Britain’s valuable West Indies possessions. Peace, however, interrupted his Royal Navy service, and Saumarez found himself “on the beach.”

The French Revolution and a declaration of war between England and France in 1793 returned him to active duty. Assigned to the Channel Fleet, in successive command of brig HMS Crescent and ship of the line Orion, Saumarez’s days were consumed in convoying and blockade duty, troop transport, and the occasional single-ship engagement, as in his defeat of the French frigate Reunion off Cherbourg in 1793.

The transfer of Orion to the Mediterranean saw Saumarez engaged in a series of fleet actions, along with Nelson, against France and Spain at the battles of Cape St. Vincent (1797) and the Nile (1798); and, in 1801 in 80-gun Caesar at the battle of Algeciras. Meanwhile, he became rear admiral of the blue in recognition of his gallantry and achievements. The Peace of Amiens in 1801, however, again interrupted Saumarez’s naval service.

After war with France resumed in 1803, Saumarez was made Commander-in-Chief, Channel Islands, and with Napoleon threatening an invasion of England, his squadron was busy defending home waters. In 1806, he became vice admiral of the blue, and two
years later was put in charge of England’s Baltic Fleet “one of the largest and most important fleets in the Royal Navy” aimed at destroying the Russian fleet and “affording protection to his majesty’s firm and faithful ally, Sweden” (149).

As Commander in the Baltic, Saumarez became what Sullivan calls “Britain’s Diplomat Afloat” (169). England’s Baltic policy reflected Saumarez’s reports from the front, and he sometimes chose not to implement London’s orders, feeling they might be detrimental to British interests. As a result, he was able to continue the flow of trade in the Baltic, and more importantly, maintain peaceful relations with Sweden and Russia, fracturing Napoleon’s Continental System, designed to secure French hegemony in Europe. Says Sullivan, “Saumarez can claim credit for Napoleon’s fateful decision to invade Russia.” Because of Sau-marez’s diplomatic manoeuvering, Russia broke her alliance with France joining Britain and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in response proved to be a disaster for the Emperor (235).

In 1819, Saumarez was made rear admiral of the UK, retiring from active service in 1827. In 1831, he was promoted to Admiral of the Red, and finally received his long-sought peerage, becoming Baron de Saumarez. He died in 1836 and was buried on his native Guernsey.

Sullivan calls Saumarez “one of the navy’s best fighting captains” during the Age of Sail (234). Despite his fighting reputation, however, contact with his wife and family was his life’s foundation, and when family was beyond reach, Saumarez turned to his Anglican faith, trusting always in divine providence. He ensured that bibles and religious tracts were available to his crews, and his interest in religion was not limited to his own ship, but extended throughout his squadrons. He understood the important role religion played aboard a naval vessel, as moral support and an aid to discipline. He observed, “religious sailors in particular were the most courageous in battle.” (237)

Still, Sullivan’s admiration for Saumarez in not unmixxed. He credits the admiral’s successful career to “fortuitous timing.” Saumarez made lieutenant early in the American war, he says, giving him ample opportunity to display his abilities, and by the time he became post-captain, a long war with France had begun. The generation following his was less fortunate. With Europe at peace, an equal chance to demonstrate its skills failed to materialize. And, in comparing Saumarez with Nelson, Sullivan says, that while Saumarez showed “initiative in battle,” he lacked Nelson’s “killer instinct.” At Cape St. Vincent he nearly captured the Spanish flagship, but broke off to support the British line. Similarly, at the Nile, Saumarez disagreed with Nelson over tactics. Where Nelson would double his line, Saumarez thought this would recklessly endanger British lives. “Throughout his career Saumarez displayed a lack of enthusiasm for any attack that would lead to unacceptable losses among his men.” (233-34)

Sullivan’s study of Saumarez is detailed and well-written, and he has a keen understanding of naval
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

Taylor prepared the first version of the manuscript more or less immediately after his return from Antarctica, but due to a variety of circumstances, several attempts to publish this Antarctic memoir failed, making the manuscript finally available only 70 years later. As a result, Taylor’s book needs to be understood today as a published, autobiographical historic resource rather than an analytical history of Operation Tabarin. Consequently, its relevance to those interested in Antarctic history during the Second World War period has changed from a contemporary description of historic events to a personal perspective of a participant in those activities. Taylor, a Captain with the Royal Canadian Engineers during the war, joined the British expedition because of his pre-war experience as a surveyor and was the only Canadian member of Operation Tabarin. After the original leader of the expedition resigned due to mental stress in 1944, Taylor took charge of the whole operation. Under his leadership, Station D at Hope Bay was established, making him not just the only Canadian to lead an Antarctic expedition, but the expedition leader responsible for establishing the first permanent research station on the Antarctic continent itself and not an island.

Taylor’s extremely detailed descriptions of the construction of Station D at Hope Bay and, more importantly, the sledge journeys after the completion of the base make the book a most relevant source for a period of Antarctic history characterized by the transformation of Antarctic research from pure

minutiae. To help the reader he presents naval matters against the historical background of Saumarez’s time. His sources are impressive inclusive of Saumarez’s personal papers, Navy Records at the National Archives, Kew, records in the Admiralty archives, and contemporary newspaper accounts from the British Newspaper Archive. His maps, battle plans, and descriptions of ship manoeuvres complement the text. *Man of War* is a fine contribution to the library of naval biography.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


Operation Tabarin, the secret British military Antarctic operation during the Second World War, has recently gained substantial interest among Antarctic historians and enthusiasts. Andrew Taylor’s account of his participation in Operation Tabarin, carefully edited by Daniel Heidt and Whitney Lackenbauer, provides most welcome new insights into the history of this wartime Antarctic endeavour. This is particularly relevant for the light they shed on this small, but important, facet of the Second World War Antarctic history, from a British, but mainly Canadian perspective.
exploration to scientific research, or in other words, the shift from the “Heroic Age” of Antarctic exploration to the age of scientific Antarctic research. Taylor’s first-hand account repeatedly illustrates that the tools available to the men of Operation Tabarin were likely the same for Amundsen, Scott, Shackleton or any other explorer of the Heroic Age, but that the goals of the expedition had shifted towards a more scientific approach. Some of the book’s more lengthy passages, which may even be repetitive, are definitely suggestive of the dullness or monotony the members of the expedition had to face.

After the war, Operation Tabarin became the Falkland Island Dependencies Survey (FIDS), then later, the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). Taylor’s book now constitutes part of the early history of modern British Antarctic research, making it a relevant resource for anyone interested in the development of today’s international Antarctic research under the regime of the Antarctic Treaty System. In fact, the birth of modern international research on a continent without national sovereignty originated in such Second World War era attempts to either establish national sovereignty or at least prohibit other nations from doing so.

An impressive set of maps and illustrations help the reader to understand the complex geography of a region with which only very few will be familiar. The editors have provided a detailed foreword and, more importantly, an afterword, that could be considered an academic publication in its own right. They place Taylor’s achievements in context and document the contribution of an often-overlooked explorer to the understanding of Antarctica. As a Canadian, Taylor represents the fact that Antarctic history was also written by people who were not part of the main Antarctic nations.

When it comes to maritime history, Taylor’s memoir treats traditional maritime topics peripherally, at best. Yet many maritime historians would be interested in the concepts of establishing political sovereignty, coping with everyday life in extreme environments, or leading prolonged expeditions. There are certainly comparisons to be made between the challenges of nature facing human activities at sea and in Antarctica.

I can recommend the book to anyone who is even slightly interested in the history of Antarctica. Taylor’s autobiographical approach makes the book both personal and enjoyable to read.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


Although dated 2017, this World Naval Review really deals with the maritime situation as it was last year in 2016, when it was published. In fact, the introductory chapter is dated
June 2016, but it is unlikely that any unheralded innovations would have been manifested between then and now. The author/editor, Conrad Waters, has for some years been responsible for the section in the annual Warship that deals with new ships. The rest of that publication, which is reviewed annually in The Northern Mariner, is devoted to historical naval events and ship designs of the past. World Naval Review 2017, on the other hand, is totally concerned with the present worldwide balance of naval power and geopolitical considerations.

The book is divided into four sections. The first is a general overview by the editor containing a table showing that the United States continues to be the overwhelmingly superior naval power. It is, in fact, the only nation capable of exerting naval dominance in any ocean it chooses, but in the second rank, the navies of China, Russia and India are growing in importance, each with the objective of controlling their adjacent ocean basins. The former naval powers of Western Europe, long in decline, can now exert meaningful influence only in conjunction with each other or the United States.

Section Two contains the regional reviews: North and South America, Asia and the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and Africa, Europe and Russia. Here, Waters discusses the development of the principal navies in each region. In the part on the Americas, Canada is the first nation mentioned and our navy’s efforts to find an interim solution to the lack of supply ships are noted along with the Arctic sovereignty issues that resulted in the Harry DeWolf class offshore patrol vessel. The USN is shown as shifting from littoral warfare strategies back to the oceanic control of the past; this is further discussed in the article on the “land-attack destroyer” Zumwalt, in Section Three. In the Asia Pacific subsection, the Chinese determination to control the South China Sea and its islets and reefs is the most important factor. (The most serious of the present troubles with North Korea have developed since the book went to print). Within some of the regional sections, specific navies have been selected for a deeper examination and analysis (Fleet Reviews) by authors of undoubted expertise. In 2017 these are the Malaysian navy in the Asia Pacific Section 2.2 and the Danish and Dutch navies in the Europe and Russia Section 2.4. The authors are Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, Søren Nørby and Theodore Hughes-Riley respectively.

Section Three contains descriptions of specific ships or classes that are presumed to be trendsetters or revolutionary designs. These are the Japanese Akizuki class of large, capable, general-purpose destroyers (by Tomohiko Tada), the South Korean Dokdo class assault ships which should be suitable for export to other navies (by Guy Tormans) and the Zumwalt, the USN’s revolutionary land-attack destroyer (by Edward Feege and Scott Truver). The last is the most original warship conceived in many years. Its futuristic appearance is dramatically demonstrated by excellent photographs of the vessel in and out of the water. The USN has reduced the planned number of these ships to
only three, while resuming construction of more conventional Arleigh Burke type destroyers. This is because of more emphasis being given to readiness for oceanic as opposed to littoral combat.

The last section consists of technological reviews. The review of world naval aviation by David Hobbs is an annual feature that deals with naval aircraft as well as the ships that carry them. While the USN’s fleet of ten large carriers is the embodiment of sea power, there are a lot of flight decks on somewhat smaller carriers: e.g. the French Charles de Gaulle, helicopter carriers like the Japanese Hyuga class (described for some political reason as destroyers) and amphibious assault ships such as the South Korean Dokdo featured in the previous section. The chapter on shipborne anti-ship missiles is by distinguished author Norman Friedman. He observes that if a missile is approaching a mixed group of ships, it is very likely to lock on to a large radar target like a big container ship or tanker rather than an escorting warship that may well be of stealth design. This is not a happy thought for the crew of a big merchant ship. The final chapter, by Jan Ziolo, is on the interesting subject of submarine escape equipment and procedures.

The photographs throughout the book are outstanding, especially those of USS Zumwalt. Her striking profile provides the frontispiece and is on the back cover and those of her in drydock show her to be just as remarkable underwater as above. The tables in Sections One and Two provide essential information in clear, concise form. This book offers an excellent summary of the world’s current naval situation. It is recommended for any library or personal collection dealing with modern navies.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Greg H. Williams brings impressive credentials to the table as both a mariner and a writer in his latest volume. A U.S. Navy veteran, he also has sailed on Second World War-era Liberty ships such as the SS Jeremiah O’Brien, and is the author of a large number of reference books on American maritime history. He is a tireless compiler of maritime data, including a fascinating volume that lists U.S. Navy vessels sold into private hands after the Second World War, and a book on French depredations against American shipping in the 1790s. These are all very valuable and informative books that assist maritime scholars of all stripes; he cannot be praised enough for his grueling labour. He brings a truly impressive level of knowledge to bear.

The United States Merchant Marine in World War I once again demonstrates William’s strengths as a compiler of data. The heart of this work is the listing of American shipbuilders and operators from
roughly 1914 to 1920. Separate sections address ship operators and shipbuilders, with an entry commensurate with the importance of the entity. A rather fun aspect of this is that Williams includes the street address for each business; one suspects the editors at McFarland had to restrain him from including the phone number as well. These entries quickly and effectively sketch out the activities of shipping and shipyards during the war years, and are nicely complemented by a separate section that details ship construction by shipyard, and a chapter on the Naval Overseas Transportation Service (NOTS). He wraps up the book with a highly detailed chapter on American shipping losses, including the names of seamen lost and often including first-person accounts of the sinking, and a short chapter that provides a brief statistical analysis of the Great War on American shipping. William’s approach is essentially encyclopedic. He provides numerous entries regarding different events of the war at sea, but this is not a traditional monograph or work of non-fiction. The entries tend toward the episodic. Covering individual topics such as the Lusitania sinking, the financial losses suffered by different parties, or the British North Sea blockade, Williams on the whole avoids a narrative arc. Illustrations are few, but useful, and come from the author’s personal collection.

Genealogists and ship buffs will be pleased with the high level of detail in this work. Chapter 16, “American Ship Losses,” is especially good in this regard. Williams details the loss of all American ships due to enemy action, and carefully records the casualties, generally listing their names, often with the seaman’s address and ethnicity or race. For example, the American freighter A.A. Raven, sunk by the German submarine UB-55 off Cornwall on March 14, 1918 (397): Dirk Stimis (aka D.P. Stines), chief engineer, American, 25 South St., NY.

James Alfred Stiles, 1st engineer, British, wife Catherine, 46 Stacey Rd., Cardiff, Wales
Louis Collins, oiler, Belgian, 432 W. 19th St., New York
John Maseneck, fireman, Russian, 25 South St., New York
Charles Sousis, coal passer, Russian, father David, Riga, Russia
Bida Shosaburo, British (naturalized), steward, wife Ada, 30 Court Rd., Grange, Cardiff, Wales
Jesse George Guy, unk., English, 47 Grange Gardens, Cardiff, Wales
Joseph Martin, unk., Cuban, father Joseph, 33 Teniente Rey, Havana

Academics may be less pleased with Williams’ narrative efforts, which span the first 100 or so pages. He does not footnote his sources, and his bibliography relies heavily on sources produced during or immediately after the First World War I. This is a great shame, because there have been some very influential monographs on U.S. shipping in the Great War era, such as Jeff Safford’s Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, and Rodney Carlisle’s Sovereignty at Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry into World War I. A sprinkling of current monographs would have made his own narratives far more compelling.

Purely academic concerns aside, it is difficult to not be impressed with
the amount of data and the amount of research that goes into a work such as this. One of the reviewer’s takeaways is that he should immediately purchase the author’s other books. He has done highly valuable service to everyone with an interest in the history of the American merchant marine, and his latest labour underscores his talent for compilation. *The United States Merchant Marine in World War I* is one of those highly useful books that should find its way to the bookshelves of anyone with an interest in the First World War or the history of American shipping.

Joshua M. Smith
King’s Point, New York