
This work is the second volume of documents from the career of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Alexander Milne during the early years of his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the North American and West Indies Stations. Despite covering the period at the beginning of the American Civil War, the primary focus of this tome is Milne’s career, used as a microcosm of the mid-nineteenth-century Royal Navy. The author focuses on what the British Navy “did” with its ships and men rather than merely covering specific events and the navy’s overall transformation from sail to steam (ix). Beeler has achieved this by selecting 510 official and private documents dating from February 1860 to January 1862. They are arranged chronologically in four chapters, covering the time periods of February to November 1860, December 1860 to June 1861, July to October 1861, and November 1861 to January 1862. A quick reference index of all documents follows.

As is the style of Navy Records Society publications, analysis of this work is largely found in the introduction, with the compiled documents standing alone, save for occasional examination through footnotes. The introduction is a work unto itself, offering a contextualization of Milne’s papers, analysis of both the logistical aspects of his command and the situations encountered, and the editor’s rationale for certain choices, such as the ordering of same-date documents. Beeler also discusses record types and survivability, especially the culled public records of the Royal Naval Records and the remaining private correspondence of Admiral Milne. A nice inclusion in this analytical segment is a list of Royal Navy ships on the stations, offering each vessel’s name, displacement, commander, dates on station, a brief description, and the document numbers of each vessel’s sailing orders contained within the main body of the text (l-liii).

Milne’s transcribed documents date from February 6, 1860 to January 31, 1862. They vary in topic
from mundane things like sailing orders to the more complex issues of disease, discipline, large scale operations, and responses to crises. Among the subjects which would be of great interest to historians of Britain’s Victorian navy are Milne’s efforts at redressing problems with deserters, such as fully documenting crewmen and their identifying tattoos, identifying and dealing with captains overstepping their bounds in both actions and discipline, the re-rigging of ships to allow for better functionality of the upper guns, the problems of resupply and ship maintenance, including problems with steam engines in a tropical climate, medical conditions, mortality rates, and the evolution of responses to outbreaks of diseases such as yellow fever. The reference to the American Civil War in the title, while by no means Milne’s singular focus during his tenure, offers a unique look at the conflict as well as other aspects of American history that are not as well documented as they should be. Milne’s efforts at conducting anti-slavery operations, anti-smuggling patrols, and ensuring free trade in the Caribbean, as well as the logistical problems he faced, would be of interest not only to naval historians, but to political scientists as well. As Beeler states in his introduction, “it was the Royal Navy, not American naval power, that upheld the [Monroe] Doctrine… took the lead in combating piracy and the slave trade, and… upholding the rule of law… in places where the indigenous authorities lacked the inclination or power to do so” (x-xi). Largely forgotten in today’s public consciousness, the actions of American William Walker and his Filibusters in the Caribbean are rather well documented by Milne, with references to his pursuit and capture, most notable being Commander Nowell Salmon’s first-hand accounts of Walker’s last actions (88-99).

The largest subject of interest, of course, is the Trent Crisis of late 1861, and Beeler has assembled quite a selection of documents on the subject. As stated in the Introduction’s four-page analysis, Milne’s autonomy in regard to enacting policy was at its zenith, allowing him to craft plans “directed as much toward the defense of British possessions as to offensive operations against the US and its forces” (xxxviii-xxxix). There are 23 non-sailing order documents spread across 77 pages fully devoted to this political nightmare, and they illustrate the role that Milne’s decisions played in preparing for all possible outcomes. One of the volume’s most interesting documents that arose out of his preparations during this troubled time is a “List of Foreign Vessels of War on the North American and West Indian Station with latest intelligence of their movements” from January 23, 1862 (620-625). Recording 85 warships along with “a fleet of gunboats” and “several sailing ships” from six different nations, the data provides a unique snapshot of how combatant
and non-combatant forces were disposed in western Atlantic waters during the early years of the American Civil War, and the various international navies with whom Milne’s crews were most commonly in contact. (621, 624)

There are some shortcomings to this volume, however. The most glaring is the omission of maps. A wide array of ports and locations are discussed, yet there are often merely footnoted coordinates when it comes to contextualizing the names. The simple inclusion of a map of Milne’s Station with the main locations identified would greatly increase the work’s effectiveness. Also, there is no real analysis of the documents within each chapter, just divisions into groupings of several months. Understandably, certain attachments or sections of documents are omitted due to repetition or lack of pertinence to the subject. Nevertheless, it would be beneficial to have a paragraph or two explaining why the editor made these decisions, and what Milne’s focus was during each specific section. These are, admittedly, minor quibbles in the grand scale of the work, but such an explanation could work nicely after the main body of text alongside the compiled “Source and Documents” list and ship-specific index.

As it stands, The Milne Papers, Volume II provides an impressive wealth of compiled material for any researcher interested in the evolution of the Royal Navy in the mid-nineteenth century and the geopolitical situations of the western Atlantic region during Milne’s tenure. The assembled documents offer new venues for examining the naval world during its transition to steam and iron. Given the length of Milne’s career, there are doubtlessly more intriguing data and documents to be gleaned from successive volumes covering the 1860s and beyond.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The documented image of Admiral Percy Nelles who, as Chief of the Naval Staff, presided over the RCN’s explosive expansion from 1939 to 1944, is mostly— and unfairly—underwhelming. Nelles was made a scapegoat when deficiencies in the wartime fleet became a toxic political liability. His photograph of a stocky, bespectacled figure sometimes shown carrying a briefcase, is out of sync with contemporary images of the senior naval leaders of other nations. Yet, in April 1942, when a vigorous series of sinkings by German submarines forced stoppages of tanker traffic
Long Night of the Tankers is based on extensive archival research, sources published in German and English and contemporary newspapers. There are fresh insights from German sources on the tensions between Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, respectively, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the Admiral Commanding the German Submarine fleet. There is no Foreword to clarify what the authors set out to do, but the span of topics covered in 286 pages is ambitious—vignettes of attacks by U-boats and Allied units; US military activities in the area prior to the outbreak of war; the impact of the American presence on local economies and societies; racial tensions on the islands due to the arrival of GIs, white and black; a mutiny by Chinese stokers employed in the small tankers which hauled oil from Venezuela to refineries in Curacao; the geostrategic importance of oil and bauxite; the geography of the oil and bauxite extraction and refining industries; the evolving technologies on both sides of the U-boat campaigns; how the United States launched a bold program of building pipelines (most notably the “Big Inch”) from the Gulf to the eastern seaboard in 1943, to lessen dependence on tanker shipments; and the roles played by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and the German Führer.

Five long-range type IXC U-boats launched the German U-boat campaign in the Caribbean four weeks after the first operations in

from the Caribbean and shrunk Canada’s naval fuel stocks to fifteen-days’ supply, Nelles announced “To hell with that, we’ll get our own”. And he did—by ordering escorts under Canadian control to proceed south to convoy tankers supplying Canadian ports.

1942 was the worst year for Allied merchant ship losses. By the time Nelles acted to protect tanker shipments from the Caribbean, U-boats had been actively sinking largely undefended Allied vessels in this strategic area since mid-February. According to Long Night of the Tankers, which is about the German offensive in the area, 75 tankers and 310 other merchant ships were sunk in the Caribbean between February and December 1942 (198). The most critical cargoes being transported out of the Caribbean were oil and bauxite being extracted in South America. These losses were serious enough; but when added to the earlier depletion of shipping between 1939 and the end of 1941, the worldwide, cumulative effect of these sinkings severely limited Allied strategic choices by the end of December 1942.

Authors David Bercuson and Holger Herwig, both professors at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, appear to have been helped by four researchers who are named in the acknowledgements. Both scholars have previously collaborated on three popular histories focused on specific aspects of the Second World War.
Canadian and northeastern American waters. On 16 February 1942, simultaneous attacks off three oil terminal ports were timed to coincide with the start of the New Moon period, making it harder to spot U-boats visually. The attacks found the British fully stretched elsewhere and the United States was unprepared. In fact, the Americans had been moving air and ground forces into the area since 1941 under the “Destryers for Bases” arrangement of 1940, but defensive efforts had focused on creating an outer ring of protection for the Panama Canal and did not anticipate submarine attacks. The authors comment: “When the United States went to war in early December 1941, its troops and aircraft were ready to take on the non-existent German aircraft carriers but were completely unready for German submarines.” (36) Operating U-boats in the Caribbean involved long passages from their bases in France, but since the Allies were unable to cover this “Atlantic Air Gap” at the time, U-boats were able to make these two- to four-week ocean transits each way largely on the surface. Initially spotty aircraft patrols in the Caribbean flown by inexperienced aircrew in aircraft not optimised for ASW allowed the U-boats to locate targets easily in shipping choke points. Once the area proved so lucrative, more submarines followed. In May, the first U-tankers—submarines configured to provide replenishment—were deployed to areas safe from Allied aircraft east of the Caribbean. This enabled shorter range type VII boats to join the larger type IXCs and by mid-summer, there were generally 10 to 12 U-boats in the Caribbean and off Trinidad. Meanwhile, Italian submarines based in Bordeaux operated east of the Antilles as part of the campaign to interdict Allied shipping.

Long Night of the Tankers does not analyse the successive phases of the U-boat campaign and Allied responses in detail, but rather, provides graphic vignettes about seven successful German submarine skippers and, as the campaign unfolded, seven Allied attacks on U-boats, three by warships and four by aircraft. The narrative is strong on technical details of individual units and the sketches of these incidents are fast-paced. While based solidly on operational and eye witness accounts, the invented dialogue enhances immediacy. The narrative graphically conveys how arduous operating in warm tropical waters was for the submarine crews. It also records how Allied aircraft, initially poorly trained and equipped, but omnipresent by four months into the campaign, restricted the ability of U-boats to shift their patrol areas easily. In the early months, aggressive U-boat commanders pulled off spectacular attacks, such as penetrating defended harbours to torpedo ships alongside. The one-dimensional manner in which the skippers are portrayed is surprising, however, and is a reminder of the cult
surrounding U-boats analysed by Michael Hadley in *Count Not the Dead* (1995). *Long Night of the Tankers* presents the youthful commanding officers as modern Paladins; spotting a hapless merchant ship, positioning the U-boat, and knocking off another “hostile” in bloodless fashion. There are full-page portraits of these skippers and frequent deferential references to the guiding hand of their revered commander, Admiral Dönitz, a hard-driving and charismatic leader known as “the Great Lion” by his admiring crews. Most of the action vignettes are presented from the perspective of the successful attacker. The seven episodes involving Allied aircraft and ships describe encounters from both sides. The aircraft attacks are well done and give the reader a dynamic feel for how an aircrew worked together in 1942–43 in detecting and destroying a submarine.

Duplication of the same information and gremlins in the narrative suggest that a more rigorous editing would have been beneficial. For example, the reader is told, as if for the first time, on pages 35, 181 and 184 that American coastal gunners were sent to Curacao in February 1942. The fact that the U.S. Navy was engaged elsewhere and thus, largely absent from the Battle of the Atlantic until mid-1943, is noted correctly on page 217 (“the US Navy….was hardly present in the North Atlantic…”), but on page 213 readers are told that the North Atlantic “…remained the most important area of operations [for the RN, RCN and] and it came first for all three navies”. The excellent bibliography is 13 pages long because half of it describes the sources used. Günter Hessler, who worked with two fellow veterans shortly after the war to compile the seminal *The U-Boat War in the Atlantic* published in English by the UK Ministry of Defence in 1989, appears in footnote citations as “Hasslinger” (217, 318).

There are also some questionable generalizations that undermine confidence in the narrative. For example, the caption under the picture of U-boat captain Otto Ites notes his receipt of the Knight’s Cross and states “…he became of the very few U-boat commanders to accept service in the West German Navy (Bundesmarine).” In fact, a check of a standard reference shows that of the 104 U-boat veteran Knight’s Cross holders still alive when the Bundesmarine was established in the mid-1950s, just over one-third, 36, joined and eight of them (including Ites, who retired as a Rear Admiral) became Flag Officers. (Busch and Röll, Volume 5, 2003). Despite this, two successful U-boat captains, Ites and Kapitsky, are oddly missing from the index.

Another generalization open to challenge is the assertion that the delayed introduction of convoys in the Caribbean starting in mid-May 1942 “did not hinder [the U-boats] much… Sinkings for the balance of May and June continued at the rate of
one to two ships per day. “(52) It took weeks before most merchant ship were fully organized into convoys; but in May and June only a single vessel was lost out of a convoy. (Rohwer, *Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two*, 1999, pp. 92-107.) It’s true that sinkings by the eight to nine U-boats in the area continued —but these were of ships still being routed independently. The authors observe that unlike in the open ocean, convoys could not be easily diverted around known U-boat concentrations and that choke points made it easier for submarines to locate the convoys. This ignores the reality that attacking a convoy, even if sketchily escorted, was always more risky than firing at an undefended target. U-94 attacked a convoy with a scratch group of escorts from three navies including HMCS *Oakville* in August but was destroyed. It was first detected and attacked by a U. S. amphibious aircraft flying cover and then by *Oakville*. Moreover, bunching merchant ships into convoys meant that a U-boat had only one crack at the group instead of being able to pick off ships singly. S.E. Morison noted as early as 1947 that between 1 July and 7 December 1942 “less than one percent of the ships in [Caribbean] coastal convoys were sunk. This was an even better record than that of the transatlantic convoys.” (*The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1943* (265).

*Long Night of the Tankers* offers a useful 9-page glossary of terms possibly new to general readers, but unfortunately, lacks a single map. The final chapter (“Conclusion”) by Professor Herwig provides a worthwhile overview of the U-boat Caribbean campaign, adding to a small but growing body of work on the war in the Caribbean. The latest may be *Imprisoned in the Caribbean: The 1942 German U-Boat Blockade* (2014) about the impact of the campaign on Puerto Rico by a local author, L. Domench. Bercuson and Herwig acknowledge their reliance on Gaylord Kelshall’s pioneering *The U-Boat War in the Caribbean* (1988). It is a comprehensive look at the operations of individual U-boats informed by the author’s background as a mariner and aviator well familiar with the area. He, however, succumbed to the alluring notion “that nearly all” of the U-boats in the early period of the campaign took “an occasional day off to rest and recuperate” and notes boats calling in “small obscure ports to buy provisions and even “female company”. This engaging speculation is repeated in *Long Night of the Tankers* without qualification. (166) The extensive post-war literature by U-boat veterans and other records do not mention such episodes and it is surprising that Bercuson and Herwig give the notion fresh credence.

Winner of a North American Society for Oceanic History 2014 book award, *Long Night of the Tankers* places the German campaign to interdict Allied movement of oil and bauxite across the Caribbean in a regional context. A strength of this
book of popular history—based on extensive research—is that it is not limited to actions at sea but touches on wider aspects of the conflict. Since these themes are not always tightly connected, the reader has to make the linkages. While the book’s sweep is extensive, detailed coverage of operations is largely focused on the campaign’s early months, which saw U-boats achieve spectacular successes against poorly prepared Allied defences.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


There are few buildings as evocative as lighthouses. They hold a fascination for people, set as they are in lofty, remote or picturesque positions, often all three at once. This fascination is amply portrayed in fiction, including in such diverse works as the children’s book, *Moominpapa at Sea*, where life in a lighthouse proves a testing ground for self-sufficiency and adaptability, *To The Lighthouse*, Virginia Woolf’s reverie on the passage of time and the nature of perception, and Kipling’s short story, ‘The Disturber of Traffic’, in which a lighthouse keeper is driven mad by isolation. *Scottish and Manx Lighthouses* is Ian Cowe’s spectacular photographic tribute to these distinctive structures and the product of his quest to photograph all the lighthouses built by the engineers of the famous Stevenson family.

The author is a senior lecturer at Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, specializing in health and safety, and is a Chartered Member of the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health. He also holds an MSc in Petroleum Production Engineering. He states that he has always had a passion for lighthouses which, in a sense, embody his areas of expertise: good engineering, and the health and safety of those at sea. Over a period of seven years, he journeyed by boat, helicopter, car and foot around the coasts of Scotland and the Isle of Man, photographing the Stevenson lighthouses. He amassed a collection of beautiful images of these buildings from air and land, as well as striking and unusual close-ups of such details as the initials of lighthouse keepers carved in rock, the glossy lens of a light, and an upward-spiralling iron staircase.

The first permanently manned lighthouse in Scotland was built in 1636, and more were constructed over the next century. All, however, were simple structures with coal braziers installed on top, which proved to be unreliable. In the late 1700s, the first proper lamps were installed using a system designed by Thomas Smith, a tinsmith and
lampmaker. These burned whale oil, and a reflector behind the row of lamps amplified the light effectively. It was Smith who hired the young Robert Stevenson as his assistant in 1791 and in the following year he became the young man’s stepfather when he married Robert’s mother. The assistant soon surpassed the master, and in time, Robert became famous for designing lighthouses, bridges, railways and harbours, not to mention founding five generations of Stevenson engineers. His son, Alan, made improvements to the lighting system by installing the newly developed Fresnel glass lens in Scottish lighthouses. Later generations of Stevensons continued to upgrade the lighting apparatus, and in 1885, the first electric lamp was installed in the lighthouse on the Isle of May.

Throughout their careers, the Stevensons and the men who worked for them endured considerable hardship conveying materials to perilous and challenging locations, battling the elements, and experiencing the constant risk of drowning or injury. One has only to look at Cowe’s photographs to marvel at how the men managed to erect these lofty, enduring structures on the edges of cliffs, on remote islands, and on tiny rocky outcrops in the middle of heaving seas. Some of the sites were even submerged for large parts of the day.

The author systematically covers the Stevenson lighthouses, working around Scotland from the East Coast, Orkney, Shetland, the North Coast, the West Coast, the Outer and Inner Hebrides, the South-West and Arran, and finally, the Isle of Man, the last of which comprises ten pages. Within each region, the lighthouses are presented alphabetically, together with information on the engineer, date, height, and so on, as well as interesting facts and stories related to the sites. At Chicken Rock off the Isle of Man, for instance, a fire broke out in the lighthouse in 1960. Three keepers were able to escape via ropes from the balcony and one was rescued by lifeboat, but the others had to shelter for several hours in the entrance doorway until the turn of the tide allowed the lifeboat to return.

The author frequently records his impressions as he arrives at and explores a location, giving the reader a sense of accompanying him on his journey. “I’m staying at the Corsewall Lighthouse Hotel on a stormy December night,” Cowe writes. “There can be few more atmospheric locations for a hotel. Stepping outside, I’m mesmerised by the old Fresnel lens casting beams of light out into the cold darkness of the Irish sea.” The beauty of the accompanying glossy photographs and the insight they provide into the location, design and artistic details of the lighthouses cannot be stressed enough.

Although other books on lighthouses have tended to focus on the keepers and their families, the focal point of Cowe’s book is firmly on the lights and the buildings themselves. This beautiful and
informative book would appeal to anyone interested in lighthouses, the Stevenson family, the seacoast, and Scottish and Manx maritime history.

Michael Clark
London, England


At first glance, this looks like a slightly larger-than-normal paperback, and even, in places, reads much like fiction. But it is entirely non-fiction and would not exist except for the sole efforts of Garry Cranford, who spent thousands of hours researching, and hundreds more hours cross-checking his research, sorting fact from fiction before writing the book over a ten-year period. He then had to publish the book himself as no other publisher would entertain the idea. Well organized and laid out, it provides a look at the life of the schooner Norma & Gladys from her building to her eventual and unexpected loss in Placentia Bay. There are 24 pages of photographs included.

In reality, this could be a couple of books; the life of Norma & Gladys as she was intended to be used, working in the Labrador Floater fishery, fishing on the Grand Banks, and in her later years, freighting out-port to out-port. When she retired after forty years, she was put up for sale and probably headed for the breaker’s yard. Instead, she was purchased by the Newfoundland government to be overhauled and fitted out as a travelling museum to promote Newfoundland and its fisheries in the out-ports of Newfoundland and Labrador. She later toured much of Europe, promoting Newfoundland and Canada, and its fisheries.

Cranford chose to write about the life of a very ordinary vessel, crewed by ordinary men from an Island in the North Atlantic— subjects that attract few writers. She was simply what most would consider to be a locally built, nondescript knockabout schooner, meaning that she was not fitted with a bowsprit, or a foreboom, making her safer for the crew when setting or taking in sail. This was exactly the way I described her when her skipper asked me if I knew what she was when she was in Toronto. In his broad Newfoundland accent he replied; "Lord, I never thought I would find someone here that would know that"!

The first chapter looks at the Labrador Floater Fishery; the second, the Construction of Norma & Gladys; the third looks at the Grand Banks Fishery, while the fourth chapter discusses her role freighting around the coastal out-ports of Newfoundland and Labrador.
Norma & Gladys was built in 1944 along with an identical schooner Sid & Sam at Captain Henry Stone's shipyard in Monroe, Trinity Bay, Newfoundland. They were built using lines taken off a carved half-hull made by William Mill. Constructed by Captain Stone with Lon Frampton as the general foreman, a demanding man who expected perfection from his men. The keels were laid down 2 January 1945, both vessels were completed in four months and launched 26 May 1945—one hour apart.

As was common in Newfoundland, schooners were launched with spars, standing and running rigging completed and sails bent on ready for use; the anchor was ready for use immediately after launching. Norma & Gladys was powered by a 75-horsepower Lathrop gasoline engine. This may have been used to move her to St. Jones Within, further up the Bay where her skipper lived. Provisioned and fitted out, she sailed on, or around, 20 June on her first trip Down North to the Labrador to fish for cod, using traps and, or jigging. Unfortunately, her first year fishing on the Labrador Coast, where her skipper, Captain Tucker, had fished with his father and brother for most of his adult life, was so poor that Tucker decided to turn Norma & Gladys back to her financier, Steers Limited.

The next season Captain Tucker took the smaller schooner, Dorothy Beryl, north to continue fishing the Labrador Floater Fishery, until the fishermen were driven ashore at Confederation in 1949.

Steers offered Norma & Gladys to Wareham's, whose family owners were heavily involved with the Grand Banks cod fishery, dory fishing. Over the winter months, Wareham's converted her to an auxiliary by removing her gasoline engine and replacing it with twin diesels, and installed a pilot house aft. They moved the forward bulkhead aft, creating a much longer fo’c’sle to accommodate 24 men; a far larger crew than would be used in the Labrador Fishery. Her outside jib and mainsail were removed as she would now operate under power, rarely under sail, other than possibly a riding sail.

Four years later, modifications were made to accommodate a much smaller crew, reversing the changes made earlier, as Wareham's took her out of the Grand Banks Fishery and converted her for use in the freighting business. Her forward bulkhead was moved forward creating a far bigger hold, and her aft cabin, normally the domain of the captain, mate and engineer, was stripped to be used to accommodate additional freight. Her captain, mate and engineer now bunked in the far shorter fo’c’sle with a very small crew.

Norma & Gladys continued freighting around Newfoundland and Labrador until she was sold and fitted out as a sailing Museum for use around the province. While in that role, and purely by chance, she was selected to attend the 1975 World's
Fair in Okinawa, Japan, to tell the story of Newfoundland and the fisheries on the Grand Banks; in essence, identifying Newfoundland as the best positioned land-mass to regulate the Grand Banks fisheries, while also promoting Newfoundland and Canada.

Before becoming a museum, she was sent to a local shipyard to be surveyed and to make the necessary repairs and changes to bring her back into excellent condition under her as-built appearance. From there, she became a political football, with the Government in power constantly badgered by the Loyal Opposition, along with its supporting newspaper.

The chapters in this section unfold like a story. First came A New Owner and a Grand Scheme (5), which was Okinawa or Bust (6). When it was discovered that her new masts were cedar and had to be replaced came Busted in New York (7) and Wrestling with Ballast Pigs (cleaning the bilges and repositioning ballast) (8). Shoddy work previously undertaken led to a chapter on Panama Turnaround (9), where necessary repairs were corrected in a Panamanian yard, but the delay prevented her from reaching Okinawa in time for the World's Fair. On her enforced Caribbean Holiday (10), a new plan was devised for her—she would now undertake a European Tour instead. What followed was Trouble in Barbados (11), when neither her radar nor radio was working and the engines were inoperative. With no skipper, mate, engineer or cook aboard, a watchman was hired to prevent theft, then another hired to watch the first one. Needless to say, the crew did not miss the opportunity. The next chapter involved Mutiny over a Stowaway (12). The crew had to be male and born in Newfoundland, which disqualified Lili Wagner, a slightly-built young white woman from off-island on both counts. Fluent in five languages, an excellent cook, and well-trained in the arts of the sailor, she repaired a ripped sail while hanging upside-down from the gaff, 30 feet above the deck while she did it, to prove to the mate that she was well qualified. Nonetheless, Newfoundland gossip once described Lili Wagner, as being a voluptuous black female cook. Another chapter, another stowaway attempt planned for Lili (13). Luck intervened, however, and she was hired to become Exhibit Manager and Multinational Guide for the European Tour. Lili would fly ahead to the next port of call to make necessary arrangements.

The Successful Mediterranean Tour (14) was followed by a tour of many other European and Scandinavian Ports where she was well received. Next came Unexpected Help (15) in the form of a ghost, listed in the crew manifest by Customs. Then there was A Royal Wedding in Stockholm (16) where she was to attend the sailpast, but didn't. Visits to England and Ireland (17), and finally, her Welcome Home (18) followed. Once in Canadian
waters, *Norma & Gladys* went Sailing with Bluenose (19); ran Aground in Baccalieu Tickle (20) and became a Newfoundland Schooner for Sale (21). Finally came *The Loss of Norma & Gladys* (22) unexpectedly in Placentia Bay.

A postscript, an afterword and two indexes conclude the book. Index A documents visitors on the international tour and Index B, visitors on the 1976 provincial tour. There is also a subject index.

The first part of the book provides a worthwhile history of the Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries; technical enough for most, and something most Canadians know little about. The second part, starting in the Caribbean, reads more like a comedy, given all the crew problems and activities. Constant infighting between the various provincial and federal political parties provides a look at the local opposition party, its supporting newspaper, and the government in power, and probably reflecting the typical relationship between provincial or federal governments. In the end, a well-trained crew toured Europe promoting both the province and the nation. In my opinion, *Norma and Gladys* would make an excellent movie.

Roger Cole  
Scarborough, Ontario


The secondary title of Graham Faiella’s compendium, *Maritime Casualties and Catastrophes*, tells a reader the book’s theme, a compilation of dramatic maritime events, reports of perils and misfortunes that befell sail and steam-powered vessels and those who sailed upon them. They are mostly summaries from the daily shipping newspaper reports known as *Lloyd’s List* that focused upon marine disasters from 1869 to the early part of the twentieth century.

Shipboard life was ever changing, from extremely monotonous to very dangerous. An angry sea could maim or kill, but all sailors were obliged to obey the captain, operate the vessel to a safe port, discharge cargo whether freight, passengers or both, and take on new goods for the next voyage. This is the book’s backdrop.

*Ate the Dog Yesterday* is divided into two grossly unequal parts, the first, only 16 pages long, is introductory and provides background information about sailors, ships, and the sea in general; the second, at 492 pages, focuses on calamities, catastrophes and curiosities. The book’s primary title is a quote from a 19 May 1873 message found in a bottle that had washed ashore, the last testament of crewman James Jones of Liverpool,
before facing his fate at sea. It was found on the Galveston, Texas shore on 29 June 1875. It is an example of the simple message that a sailor might write as a brief farewell as he was facing death. The book includes many similarly moving accounts.

From a historian’s standpoint, the book’s organization is frustrating. The author gives the date of Lloyd’s List entries, but does not index them for sources or retrieval of specific information concerning “who, what, when and where.” Faiella intersperses his stories with well-written snippets of relevant nautical information as background. They are scattered throughout the book in the guise of so-called “narratives” of events that he calls “maritime intelligence,” plus “miscellaneous” which are informational digressions. The chapters are quite diverse covering messages in a bottle, corpses, troublesome weather events, remarkable voyages, accidents, losses of life, sickness, disease, mutiny, mayhem, fire, ice, shipwrecks, collisions and castaways, great disasters, etc. plus “Odds & Sods & Mollycods.”

Many of the stories within these chapters are repetitious and some not terribly memorable. There are a few that stand out: the story of the roughly 20-foot sailboat New Bedford that crossed the Atlantic in 49 days sailed by only Captain Thomas Crapo and his wife Joanna; the fishing smack Columbine, badly damaged in a storm off Scotland, was set adrift after its crew abandoned ship while a 60-year old passenger, Elizabeth Mocat, was trapped lashed to the deck. The vessel washed ashore 250 miles away at Åeslund, Norway and the woman survived; the tale of a mysterious Atlantic ghost ship, the Celeste that fully-manned vessels encountered upon the high seas; the French barque, President Felix Faure that had fifteen young sailors washed from her deck by the swirling water, but safely completed her voyage with only nine men left onboard; and the account of Asian pirates who took over a ship off China, murdered the captain, but negotiated with the remaining crew to run the ship so that they could safely abscond with their booty, among many similar pirate stories.

The entries are numerous and, although organized by topic, they can be a tedious read. Because the documentation is either missing or weak, it is of limited use to maritime historians. Since some tales offer insight into what real people went through when confronted with a myriad of disasters, the book can, however, serve a source of ideas for the maritime fiction writer. The account of the 1820 Essex disaster led to Herman Melville’s 1851 novel Moby-Dick. One entry in the book’s chapter on “Whales and Fishermen” describes the 1902 sinking of the whaling ship Kathleen by an apparently infuriated sperm whale. The aftermath and rescue, although they were not nearly as powerful historic incidents as that of the Essex, might inspire an author who might
combine and/or extrapolate this tale with another into a great fictional sea story.

The reportage of these historical episodes occurs in rapid sequence. They vividly transport the reader onto a wildly pitching deck or below where one’s stomach churns in a dank, dark, cramped cabin—tales of the sea where slavery and piracy flourished and where thousands of sailors and refugees drowned trying to reach safety and prosperity. In more recent times, the danger is little changed.

Faella’s book is lengthy and relatively costly, but at times presents unexpected informative and entertaining nuggets of maritime lore. It is unfortunate that it is missing careful documentation and an index to help find one’s way through the maelstrom of sea stories.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


No navy has had so much written about it as the British Royal Navy. Every aspect: materiel, policy, strategy and performance in action has been described, dissected and analyzed by many qualified and unqualified commentators. This is not surprising considering its long period of world dominance and its innovations in warship design that most other navies followed. Of all ship types, British battleships have received the most attention—again not surprising, as they were the embodiment of naval power until they were supplanted by the aircraft carrier during the Second World War. Among the numerous books on this particular subject, Oscar Parkes’ British Battleships 1860-1950 (published in 1966) is rightly considered definitive, while David K. Brown has used his expertise as a senior naval constructor to evaluate the different ship designs from the naval architect’s point of view. There have been books on battleships of the world, battleships of the opposing sides in both World Wars and books about specific classes. And then there is Norman Friedman, who is unique.

On the back cover of The British Battleship 1906-1946 is the following comment: “Norman Friedman has the ability to bring new ideas to even the most widely studied subjects and a talent for explaining technology in the wider context of politics, economics and strategy……. Replete with original insights, the story that emerges will enlighten and surprise even the most knowledgeable.” I completely agree with this assessment. Friedman’s approach to the
subject was initially launched by visits in 1973 to the Draught Room at the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich and the Public Records Office at Kew. He realized that back in the United States, the American National Archives must hold similar material on the U. S. Navy. From 1973 to 1984 he was at the Hudson Institute as Director for National Security Affairs. During this time, he started writing his meticulous technical descriptions of American warships as well as books on other military subjects. (He has published over thirty). When it came time to refocus his attention on the Royal Navy, the Draught Room had been closed but the material had been transferred elsewhere, notably to the “Brass Foundry” (its former use) which contains what he describes as a treasure trove of information. He enjoyed full cooperation from museum staff and from British historians.

Friedman’s primary source of information has been the “covers” which contain all the correspondence proposals and preliminary designs of each class and ship. From this information one can see what the Admiralty wanted and how the designers and constructors tried to meet these demands. There was much give and take as practical solutions were worked out, ending in the final design. Friedman augmented this with every other source of official information he could find. The result is an examination of the whole process that is perhaps too detailed for some readers, but has been validated by the popularity of his books on both the British and United States navies.

Prior to the publication of this book, Friedman published two volumes on British cruisers. The timeframe of *The British Battleship 1906-1946*, corresponds to that of the second cruiser book, *British Cruisers, Two World Wars and After* (published in 2010). The approach in all of them is similar. *The British Battleship 1906-1946* which, of course, also covers battlecruisers, starts with an excellent, quite lengthy, introduction that puts the problems facing the designers, the Admiralty and the nation into perspective. The policies and influence of Admiral Jackie Fisher were certainly most influential in the early period while between the wars, the various arms limitation treaties were the dominant factors. Then in 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 the practical exigencies of combat clarified the requirements and successful solutions were devised.

Once past the introduction, each chapter describes the ships class by class, starting with the *King Edwards* and *Lord Nelsons*, the immediate predecessors of the *Dreadnought*. Friedman has done his best to record and illustrate the many changes that affected the ships during their active service. With the early dreadnoughts, the correct positioning of masts and bridges with respect to smoke-belching funnels in coal-fired ships took some time to work out and there were frequent changes to the siting of
fire control positions and searchlights. Between the wars and during the Second World War, many ships underwent major rebuilds that totally changed their appearance. There was continuous augmentation of anti-aircraft armament along with the removal of aircraft and catapults as reliance was placed on the new aircraft carriers. These changes to every class are illustrated by numerous excellent photographs; in many cases, photos of the same ship at different dates. The illustrations, in fact, are the most striking feature of the book. Some are spread across two pages and are arresting in their detail, although in some cases, depending on their position in the book, the middle of the ship appears to disappear into the binding. (The same technique was used in the two cruiser books). In the middle of this volume there is a section of reproductions of Admiralty “as fitted” draughts showing the profiles of thirteen different ships, some in fold-out format for even greater detail.

This is a technical, not an operational history. Friedman does not (like, for instance, R. A. Burt) describe the stations, assignments and actions of each vessel, except where lessons learnt resulted in changes in the ship involved or to subsequent designs. But for a meticulous description of every capital ship of the Royal Navy from Dreadnought to Vanguard, not only as built but throughout their lives, The British Battleship 1906-1946 cannot be beat.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Suzanne Geissler’s biography of Alfred T. Mahan presents a different perspective on the life and work of the great naval historian and strategist. Mahan’s Episcopalian religious beliefs are juxtaposed against the development of his views on the navy’s role in establishing a nation’s international prowess. This perspective reveals his faith’s strong influence on his academic work, as both professor and writer, and his service afloat. Past biographies have either largely ignored Mahan’s religious views, or belittled him for seeing the world from the perspective of a strong Christian faith.

Alfred’s father, Dennis Mahan and uncle, Milo, are the main subject of the first chapter. Dennis Mahan taught at West Point, leaving an indelible mark on the institution and all who passed through it, during his tenure. Uncle Milo, an ordained Episcopalian, taught at a seminary. He was regarded as “livelier and less rigid than Dennis” (19). Both men were extremely intelligent and
devoutly religious. Each would be a significant influence in Alfred’s life. This influence is seen in his early life, described in the second chapter. School and church were the focus of his youth leading to his entry into the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Graduating in 1859, Alfred Mahan went to sea as a midshipman. His service during the Civil War made him an abolitionist and gave him his first trans-Atlantic experience with a cruise to Britain and Europe. It is also when he met his future mentor, Lt. Cdr. Stephen Luce.

The religious element of Alfred’s life begins to be addressed in detail in the third chapter. Geissler lays out his continued development as a Christian, detailing what he read, the religious remarks and questions he discussed in his personal correspondence and his diary. Alfred struggled with his faith, convinced as a young man that he had to be a perfect Christian, a self-imposed condition that left him more depressed than fulfilled. His conversion to a more settled and fuller understanding of his relationship with God came in 1871. Although details are minimal, it seems he threw off the need for behavioural perfection and focused on the effort to have faith. Much of this struggle took place while serving in the navy. His relationships with his fellow officers were limited and tense, his friends few. The chapter ends with his marriage to Ellen Evans, a relationship described as more practical and about companionship, than romantic or passionate.

Chapter 4 covers his life ashore in the navy, with postings to the Boston and later, New York dock yards. At Boston he saw corruption within the service and the Navy’s failure to adequately address it. The start of Mahan’s academic writing appears in this chapter with a discussion of his first article on key characteristics of the naval officer. This theme would generate three of his books, each demonstrating the need for the good officer to have a moral compass, physical stamina and a robust intellectual ability. His first book (Gulf and Inland Waters, 1883) about the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Mexico during the Civil War, became quite popular and drew attention to his abilities as a writer and historian. Mahan’s appointment, in 1885, to the new Naval War College (influenced by Luce) took him from service afloat to the academic service that would help to cement his fame as a naval historian. Interspersed among these developments is the birth of his children and continued religious development. Perhaps most importantly, in terms of his legacy, is Mahan’s decision to focus on the importance of sea power in the development of nations and empires.

Chapter 5 is where Geissler clearly states the connection of religion with Mahan’s view of history, naval power and naval leadership. Mahan believed in “divine sovereignty” (102), with God’s active hand in the course of
worldly events and the idea of original sin, casting all humans as potentially weak and given to moral failure. The author suggests these underlie Mahan’s position on the importance of naval power. Countries that develop naval resources to protect and extend their trade, making their countries strong and prosperous did the right thing and would be successful. Those that failed to protect their trade or relied on others to do so would be weak and fail. This idea is first seen in Mahan’s book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1894) and later in his volumes on the French Revolution and the War of 1812, forming a trilogy on the topic. His biographies of naval leaders, Farragut, Nelson and the generic *Types of Naval Officers* (1901) also carry the mark of his religious convictions, in particular the strength of moral character, commitment and intellectual ability. Interspersed within this analysis of his writing we see glimpses of his domestic life and growing fame.

The lengthy chapter 6 focuses on Mahan’s later career, his brief stint on the Naval War Board, his part in the American delegation to the First Hague Conference and his continued production of books on naval history. The majority of the chapter however, focuses on Mahan’s late adult religious life. In his post-teaching career he wrote editorials, articles, and books, and delivered sermons and speeches on the subject of faith and the Episcopal Church. Never hesitant to share his opinion, Alfred Mahan freely raised his concerns on matters of a religious or moral nature. Geissler gives multiple examples, including his highly critical remarks on Unitarianism (184), his disapproval of the Episcopal Church’s support of the arbitration peace movement (173), and the problems with the Social Gospel Movement (176). Geissler also defends Mahan against the accusation of racism for his writing about non-Christian cultures and people of developing nations. While the biological racism of Social Darwinism was much in vogue at the time, Geissler demonstrates that Mahan used the term race in reference to culture and not biology. Still, it is clear he saw Christian societies as superior to non-Christian ones.

A very brief chapter 7 covers the final years of Mahan’s life, his death and the immediate positive assessment of his legacy by his contemporaries.

Underlying the biographical purpose of this book is Suzanne Geissler’s intent to recast Mahan’s reputation and historic legacy back into a favourable light, after biographer Robert Seager II’s less-than-positive 1977 book on Mahan (*Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press). At every turn, Geissler calls out Seager’s negative analysis of Mahan’s character and work, countering it with a fuller analysis of the archival material, challenging his reading of documents...
and deepening the discussion of the place of religion within Mahan’s life. Seager is left with the tainted image of a biographer who selectively edited his evidence and misread much of Mahan’s work to support his negative critique. Geissler’s remonstrance, however, approaches the excessive and almost overshadows the real subject of the book. This is mirrored in part by the space taken up in the index for Seager, which is only barely surpassed by that for Alfred Thayer Mahan, himself.

There are thirteen images spread across the book providing interesting glimpses into Mahan’s personal world. The index is very usable. Geissler has conducted extensive research to write this book, which is evident in the copious endnotes and thorough bibliography. The book will appeal to those studying Alfred T. Mahan and his influence on naval policy, contextual influences on the historian (in particular, the writing of naval history) and the place of religion in life at the turn of the twentieth century.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


To most people, the tragic legend of the Age of Luxury Ocean Liners is that of *RMS Titanic*, but Canada’s heart is pulled to *RMS Empress of Ireland*, the pride of Canadian Pacific’s Atlantic Fleet. Not satisfied to merely extend its rails across Canada, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) provided service between Liverpool and Maritime and Quebec ports. After entering the Atlantic trade by the purchase of 15 vessels from Elder Dempster Line in 1891, CPR saw the need for upgrades to make its “all British” line from London to Hong Kong an attractive delight to sojourners. Turning to The Fairfield shipyard on the River Clyde at Glasgow, two Empresses took shape. Originally designated as the *Empress of Germany* and *Empress of Austria*, the worsening international relations led to their names being changed to the *Empress of Ireland* and *Empress of Britain*. Never mind that Ireland never had an Empress, it now shared one with Canada.

The Empresses broke no new ground in technology. Sticking to the tried-and-true coal fired boilers, the steel-hulled, 548 foot, eight-deck palaces entered the fleet in 1906. Although adhering to traditional construction and power, the Empresses established new standards in comfort with the revolutionary cabins, rather than dormitories, in third class and elegance above. Holding approximately 350 passengers in each of first and second classes and 1,000 in third, the Empresses provided transport for
Lords and migrants alike. With two smoke stacks and sleek lines, an Empress was an awesome sight to behold and an object of pride.

For RMS Empress of Ireland eight years of elegance ended after leaving Quebec on Black Friday, 28 May 1914. A world still at peace and an ice-free St. Lawrence River could not save the Empress when the collier Storstad emerged from a fog and rammed the Empress on the starboard side below the waterline. In 14 minutes she rolled over, taking 1,012 passengers and crew in Canada’s worst maritime disaster. The rescue, the funerals of the recovered victims, the relief efforts, the investigation and memorialization commanded the attention, sympathy and generosity of the world.

Author Derek Grout did not write RMS Empress of Ireland: The Pride of the Canadian Pacific’s Atlantic Fleet to merely relate the details of a tragic sinking. On these pages he tells the story of a ship through the pictures of its photographers and artists, the flyers of its publicists and the words of its passengers. I really enjoyed the diaries of passengers, the faceless immigrants, the Black Dyke Band from Yorkshire embarking on a North American tour, college students, Rudyard Kipling and others. Their words bring to life the smell of the sea, the roll of the waves, the entertainment in the salons, the routine on the decks, and the sights and sounds of the crossing. Like any denizen of the deep, the Empress had its lines to the shore that tied it to Quebec, one of its frequent landfalls. The last chapter includes brief biographies of the masters and the statistics of the passengers, its sailings and records.

Read the book, but absorb the pictures. Begin with the cover image of the Empress on a moderately calm sea, beneath a blue sky spotted by white clouds. On page after page enjoy the black and white photographs of the ship at harbour or at sea, the salons, dining rooms and open decks, the crew at attention, the passengers reading, playing cards or physical games or attending worship services and the men who guided her on her journeys. Even a century ago, colour caught the imagination of customers. The paintings, Christmas greetings, post cards, the menus, passenger lists and Canadian Pacific advertising posters capture the romance of the age. This is a book to read, to enjoy and to leave on your table for your guests to browse.

Jim Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri

While much has been written about submarines and their operations in both world wars, little comprehensive historical work has been published concerning their post-Second World War activities. There have been several books of a sensational nature purporting to reveal the secrets of the US Navy’s nuclear submarine operations in the Cold War, and a sprinkling of individual memoirs, but there is not much serious work on the subject. Part of the reason for this is that navies prefer to keep their ‘Silent Service’ silent about just what they are up to in the ocean depths. Just as navies prefer to keep their submarines as silent as possible while at sea, there is no need to publicize methods and operational practices to a potential adversary.

That the ‘Silent Service’ has been that way for such a long time makes this book all the more interesting. *Silent Deep* is not an official history, nor has it been officially sanctioned. Nevertheless, the level of access and cooperation given by the Submarine Service of the Royal Navy (RN) is noteworthy. The Submarine Service is a recognized branch of the RN with its own Flag Officer in command and without its assistance, this book likely could not have been written in its present form. While the veil of secrecy has not been completely raised—some things remain sensitive even after 30 or more years—what is revealed in this book, in the opinion of this reviewer, is remarkable.

At the end of the Second World War, the RN had a large number of submarines. The majority were either obsolete or of an obsolete design unsuitable for post-war operations. Compared with the US Navy’s submarine fleet, Britain’s submarines were badly outdated, a fact further emphasized when the RN examined the advanced technology implemented in the later versions of the German U-boats. The early chapters of the book examine the impact of these issues as the leadership of the Service managed the transition from a wartime posture into the early phases of the Cold War.

The Service was very busy in the immediate post-war years and this level of activity was maintained well into the 1960s. During this period, the force was reaping the benefits of the modernization programs which produced the ongoing construction of advanced technology diesel-electric (or ‘conventional’) submarines, some of which were based on German technological ideas. At the same time, the RN joined forces with its NATO Allies, particularly the USN, using its submarines to begin probing the underwater edges of the Soviet Union. This period is described comprehensively, particularly the training process and the gruelling exercise known as the “Perisher”, whereby prospective submarine commanding officers had their mettle tested in a pass or perish process.

One aspect of the historical record that is not widely known is the extent and depth of the RN’s cooperative relationship with the US Navy submarine force. This the
authors bring out well. It is very obvious that without the level of confidence and mutual trust that was developed between key individuals, including Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten and US Admiral Hyman Rickover, the RN would have taken many more years to develop its own nuclear submarine (SSN). The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement provided for the introduction of the SSN HMS Dreadnought in 1963. The next logical step was the adoption of the Polaris missile system and the use of the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) as the platform for the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The book covers this policy struggle very well.

One of the most fascinating aspects of this book for this reviewer is the description of the kinds of operations and activities that submarines engaged in during the Cold War. The RN, and the USN, regularly conducted patrols into the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere to keep tabs on the Soviet Navy. The authors had access to classified patrol reports and first-hand accounts and the events they describe make for gripping reading. This reviewer was surprised to discover a fairly detailed description of a somewhat hair-raising encounter between a British submarine and Soviet naval forces in 1965. As the Canadian navigator of the submarine in question, I was surprised by the extent of what was revealed—including the fact that the incident was actually reported to the British Prime Minister himself!

The authors also devote a full chapter to the war for the Falkland Islands in 1982. Although it does not answer some key questions about submarine involvement, it is one of the best accounts of the Falklands sea war from that perspective.

The final chapters focus on the on the realities facing the RN, and its Submarine Service, in a post-Cold War world together with questions concerning the role and function of the now all-nuclear submarine force and its SSBN component in the twenty-first century.

The Silent Deep is an absorbing read, although it really is of primary interest to the submarine community and not a general audience. The photographs are superb and the inclusion of a complete set of submarine profiles is a clever idea. The proofreading is excellent—only two minor mistakes—‘Hungry’ instead of Hungary (110) and the note that USS Squalus sank “¼ off the west coast of New Hampshire¼” (60). The opening and closing chapters seem intended to ‘bookend’ the main body. The first chapter is a bit disconcerting, since it is written a little breathlessly about the submarine conducting the Commanding Officers Qualifying course (the “Perisher”). It comes across as a bit too “Tom Clancy” for a serious history and perhaps could have been done as a stand-alone appendix. The many personal recollections by a broad range of serving and former submariners enliven the book. The final
The discussion of the policy questions of the future of the Service, while important, can be a little eye-glazing. Nevertheless, The Silent Deep is an important contribution to naval history and it deserves to be read by a much wider audience.

E.J. Michael Young
Nepean, Ontario


In A Confederate Biography: The Cruise of the CSS Shenandoah, naval historian and sailor Dwight S. Hughes details the saga of a Secessionist armed raider bent on destroying Yankee commerce during America’s Civil War. Less well known than Confederate Alabama, nonetheless, Shenandoah captured, and burned, sunk, or bonded, some 38 Union vessels, as over a period of 12-and-a-half months, from October 1864 to November 1865, inflicting serious damage on the North’s economy. She also fired the last Confederate shots of the Civil War, says Hughes, having shown the “Stars and Bars” on all the world’s seas. Shenandoah was finally forced to furl her sails in November 1865, an incredible seven months after Lee’s surrender to Grant at Appomattox had ostensibly ended the War between the States.

According to Hughes, the future raider Shenandoah was built in Scotland in 1863 as Sea King, a fully-rigged clipper with an auxiliary engine to assist her in contrary winds. He describes her as “a swift and graceful clipper and a state-of-the-art steamer…the epitome of tall ship construction and a prime example of Machine Age technology” (3). On her maiden voyage, under government charter, she landed troops in New Zealand for the Maori War, and on her return home she put in at Sydney, Shanghai, and Hong Kong before arriving in London with a load of tea. Shortly thereafter, British interests sold her secretly to the Confederate States. Commissioned and re-named CSS Shenandoah at Funchal, Madeira, as a ship-of-war she took on officers and crew as well as guns, ammunition, and ship stores. With the Confederacy faltering, and in light of the recent loss of CSS Alabama, her orders were “to seek out and utterly destroy the enemy’s property, [inflicting] the greatest [amount of] injury on him in the shortest [possible] time” (22).

Sailor Hughes enlists us on the cruise of Shenandoah, as she takes Yankee prizes off Brazil and faces dirty weather at sea. He describes one ocean gale the raider meets: Officers and crew focused on the “feel” of the ship, he says: “the oscillating cant of her deck...
rumble of the water rushing by, the shriek of the wind, the moan of her lines, and the bursting belly of her sails...” all comprising “a symphony of forces” as Shenandoah “rushed headlong” through the seas (59). He tells us about “the Queen of the Delphine,” the plucky bride of Skipper Nichols whose ship had surrendered to the raider. And, we arrive “down under” with her where she puts in for repairs, crew recruitment, supplies, and, sometimes, a bit of frivolity.

Leaving “down under” in February, 1865, Shenandoah took aim at Yankee whalers. Hughes describes her burning four whalers in April 1865 at Pohnpei in the Carolines, and a fifth in May in the sea of Okhotsk. But better pickings were to be found in the Bering and Arctic seas.

In one week in the Bering Sea, Shenandoah took a total of 24 whalers—“an unprecedented accomplishment.” Hughes continues: “the unfamiliar boom of cannon echoed across frigid waters [and] an unexpected flag appeared; boats scuttled like beetles; whale carcasses floated loose; [and] sails flapped in frantic attempts to escape....Under steam or sail,” Shenandoah “devoured victims individually or in groups.... Giant pillars of black smoke smudged the crystal air. Towers of flame glowed through the fog or illuminated the midnight dusk” (171-72). As late as June 1865 the rebel harvest of Northern whalers went on.

On 2 August 1865, Shenandoah experienced what Hughes terms her “darkest day,” and the raiders’ worst fears, when the English bark Barracouta informed her in mid-Pacific that the Confederacy had fallen. She became a lawful prize of the United States and her officers and crew deemed to be pirates, and subject to hanging if she failed to surrender to Union authorities. Reluctant to concede, and 17,000 miles from England, her captain determined to sail her ‘round the Horn and make for her “home port” of Liverpool. She surrendered to HMS Donegal in the Mersey on 6 November 1865, seven months after the War between the States had ended.

In Shenandoah’s final years, as a possession of the United States, she was sold to the Sultan of Zanzibar for a yacht and re-named El Majidi. Damaged in a hurricane, she foundered and sank off the coast of Africa in 1872. As animosities softened, former officers of Shenandoah, the cream of Southern society, eventually returned to the United States.

Hughes’ sources are impressive and he uses them to good effect. They include first-person accounts—four personal cruise journals, two memoirs and the annotated log of Shenandoah’s captain, James Waddell. He also sources the official postwar claims against Britain for her support of Confederate commerce raiders, the records of the Union and Confederate
navies, and contemporary newspaper accounts, and adds “the author’s personal training and experiences” to clarify “the esoteric life at sea” (xvii). Helpful is a world map of Shenandoah’s odyssey with the locations and dates of her captures, her sail and builder’s plans, and many contemporary photos and prints of people and places.

_A Confederate Biography_ is a good read for naval historians, American Civil War buffs, and armchair admirals alike.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


_Embassy to the Eastern Courts_ describes American efforts to effect trading pacts with a number of Asiatic powers in the 1830s through the biography of an obscure businessman and diplomat, Edmund Roberts, of New Hampshire. Jampoler brings us aboard a U.S. Navy vessel with Roberts and carries us to exotic Eastern shores. The result is a venture into uncharted waters, and provides us with insights into the life and culture of the Orient in the early nineteenth century.

Ten years before the United States had a treaty with China, and twenty years before Commodore Perry would “open up” Japan to Western influence, at the behest of Navy Secretary Levi Woodbury, President Andrew Jackson sent Woodbury’s kinsman and fellow New Hampshirite, Edmund Roberts, on a secret mission “to formalize American trade on a most favored nation basis with Cochin China (currently southern Vietnam), Siam, and other powers of Arabia on the Red Sea” (8). According to Jampoler, Roberts’ mission was secret because of Britain’s jealousy and her tendency to pressure distant countries into easing their trade restrictions exclusively for her. Banned from British ports in North America after the Revolution, American merchants turned for trade to the South and East China Seas, and the Indian Ocean. From the 1780s onward, American trade with Asia prospered, with American textiles, seal and otter skins, and ginseng being exchanged for Oriental teas, porcelains, and spices. Yet, certain “inconveniences” from which U.S. trade suffered prompted Washington to seek formal commercial agreements in the East in the 1830s. Hence, Roberts’ missions to the Orient.

_USS Peacock_ left Boston on 8 March 1832, under Master Commandant David Geisinger, USN. As a sloop of war, she carried aboard her 170 people, including officers, men, and passengers, and Edmund Roberts, special agent of the U.S.
State Department. She would spend 26 months away from home and not see another American port until May 1834. To describe Peacock’s cruise, Jamboler draws from the journals and memoirs of the warship’s officers and men. Ship surgeon, Benajah Ticknor, complained that Peacock was “badly ventilated, largely unlit, often wet and cold, and always damp. When she was not cold, she was insufferably hot…and totally unfit to be employed on a long cruise in hot climates” (52). Putting in at Montevideo in South America on the first leg of Peacock’s voyage, Jampoler notes Roberts’ observation that he [Roberts] was “better satisfied to wander ten thousand miles over a trackless ocean than remain [at Mount Video]” (65). Sailing eastward around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean to enter Sunda Strait, Jamoler records Roberts’ comments on the “beautiful submarine garden” over which Peacock “slowly glided,” comparing the corals beneath the warship’s keel to “sunflowers, mushrooms, and roses” (70). Arrived at Manila for Peacock’s crew to rest and restore themselves after seven months at sea, and to resupply the ship with beef and bread, Roberts spent his time on shore with the American consul in a “healthy and pleasant abode” (76).

From Manila, Peacock moved on to China, mooring at Macao, near Canton. While he spent seven weeks in Canton (November-December 1832), Roberts failed to mention any trade talks with China, though he did note a fleet of vessels, one-third American, at Lintin engaged in smuggling opium, despite Chinese law prohibiting drug imports. Lintin was the “center of an American trade in Turkish opium with China” (79), the U.S. standing second only to Britain in conducting this shameful commerce.

Sailing to Cochin China (Vietnam) aboard Peacock, Roberts’ diplomacy failed him, because, as Jampoler claims, he refused “to debase himself and his country…by performing Ko-tow” to local officials (93). In March 1833, however, he was more successful with the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand), negotiating “the first treaty between the United States and any Asian country” (95). Another pact with Muscat (Oman) on the Arabian peninsula followed in October. With two trade agreements in hand Roberts’ mission ended, and he returned home to the United States.

Less than a year after his return, Roberts left on a second mission to the East, still an envoy of the United States. Assigned to Peacock again, he departed from New York on 25 April 1835. His orders were to negotiate “commercial agreements” with powers that border on the Indian Ocean “as may tend to the advantage of the U.S.” Specifically, he was to proceed to Cochin China, and use every endeavour “consistent with the dignity of our Government…to form a commercial treaty with that country” (124). In May 1836, for the second time, an ailing Roberts failed
to lure the Cochin Chinese into trade talks, and a month later he was dead from cholera, at the age of fifty-two. So ended Roberts’ second mission to the East. He was buried in the Protestant and Old Church Graveyard in Macao.

Jampoler has mined a plethora of sources to produce his *Embassy to the Eastern Courts*, most importantly, Roberts’ personal papers, and his journal. His charts and maps are informative too, and his reproductions of famous paintings of scenes and places in the Orient are remarkably attractive. A quibble, perhaps, on his presentation. Jampoler’s long diversions on the past and future of ships and people might distract a reader. Nonetheless, *Embassy to the Eastern Courts* is a welcome addition to the literature on Asiatic-American relations in the early nineteenth century.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


With the exceptions of the Gallipoli campaign and the exploits of T.E. Lawrence (better known as “Lawrence of Arabia”), the role of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War been largely overlooked in English-language publications. The least-known aspect of this little-studied part of The Great War is the efforts of the Ottoman Navy during that conflict. With Osprey’s *Ottoman Navy Warships 1914-18*, Noppen has provided a short but comprehensive study of the Ottoman Navy in the First World War.

Wisely, Noppen begins the narrative with background information on the Ottoman Navy beginning in the early twentieth century. While the navy had been a very potent one as late as the 1870s, the Ottoman government allowed it to decline thereafter. Turkish Sultan Abdülhamid feared a coup by naval officers and kept the Ottoman Navy weak. But a Greek government increasing in importance and influence caused Abdülhamid to rethink his position vis-à-vis his navy. He proceeded to place a number of shipbuilding contracts with foreign governments as a means to pay off foreign debts. By the time of the “Young Turk” revolution which overthrew Abdülhamid in 1908, the navy was modernizing. That revolution caused instability, however; in six years, the Ottoman government appointed 12 grand viziers and 14 marine ministers. Finally, the poor performance of the Ottoman Navy in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 and the First Balkan War in 1912-13, plus Turkey’s geographical position—a country
surrounded by enemies Greece, Bulgaria, and Imperial Russia—forced the Young Turk government to modernize at a faster pace than planned.

It was against this background of simultaneous instability and fleet modernization that Turkey observed the start of the First World War. While the government leaned towards the German/Austro-Hungarian side, two factors, both naval in character, tipped the scale toward Turkey’s entrance into the war on the side of Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The first was the decision by Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, to prevent two dreadnought battleships being built in England from being delivered to the Turks. The second factor was the arrival of two German warships, dreadnought Goeben and light cruiser Breslau, in Turkish waters. (The epic cruise of the Goeben and Breslau has been chronicled in Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August and Robert Massie’s Castles of Steel.) Both ships were assimilated into the Ottoman Navy: Goeben became Yavuz and Breslau became Midilli. The German Admiral in command of Goeben/Yavuz, Admiral Souchon, became an Ottoman Navy Admiral and the ships’ crews, members of the Ottoman Navy. It is emblematic of the condition of the navy that Yavuz and Midilli were easily its two premier ships.

The Ottoman Navy’s operational areas were the Black Sea, against the Imperial Russian Navy, and the Dardanelles, against the British Royal Navy and the French Navy, both supporting the Gallipoli campaign and further operations against those navies that were supporting the Salonika campaign. Noppen covers naval operations in these areas in sufficient detail to satisfy all but the most devoted researcher. He also includes a brief mention of the tiny Bulgarian Navy, the naval branch of the fourth member of the Central Powers in the First World War. The Bulgarian Navy’s contribution to the war at sea was largely limited to support of the Ottoman Navy in the Black Sea.

The book is heavily illustrated with period photographs which add much to the narrative. A few of the photographs are rare, “in-action” photos of sea battles between the Ottoman Navy and the Imperial Russian Navy. As well, there are a couple of contemporary colour photographs illustrating preserved First World War naval equipment. Examples of the major ships of the Ottoman Navy are shown in colour plates with accompanying specification charts. Yavuz and Midilli are among the ships illustrated and one plate shows side views of two torpedo boats. An Ottoman dreadnought, Torgut Reis, is the subject of a cutaway colour plate. The illustrations, photographs, and colour plates complement the text.

Noppen ends the narrative with the ultimate fate of Yavuz. Its formerly-German companion, Midilli,
sank in 1918 after striking a mine. Yavuz survived both World Wars and served until 1960, when it was finally decommissioned. It had even had a NATO ship designation. Turkey offered Yavuz to the West German government as a museum but the offer was declined. The last serving dreadnought in the world was scrapped in the early 1970s.

This reviewer learned much from this brief account of the First World War Ottoman Navy. Ottoman Navy Warships 1914-18 is an excellent introduction to the subject for those unfamiliar with this topic. The bibliography lists a number of works for readers interested in further study. It is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Operation Torch was the Anglo-Allied invasion of Vichy French-occupied North Africa in November, 1942. It was the first step in Anglo-American military cooperation in the Second World War and the initial military effort against Nazi Germany after the American entrance into the war. In Torch: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, Vincent P. O’Hara has written what must surely become the definitive account of that vital military effort.

After the Nazi invasion of France in May-June 1940, France was partitioned into a German-occupied zone and a French-controlled zone run from the town of Vichy in central France. The Vichy French government also had nominal control over France’s overseas possessions, including Morocco and Algeria. Throughout the period 1940-41, British military forces had several engagements against Vichy French forces, including an invasion of Vichy French-controlled Syria. Although not formally allied with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Vichy’s forces were definitely NOT on the side of the British.

Then came the Japanese attack on the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, which brought America into war with the Japanese Empire. Subsequent declarations of war against America by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy transformed two disparate wars—the War in Europe and the Sino-Japanese War—into the Second World War.

Conferences between American and British military staffs resulted in the struggle against Nazi Germany being given priority over the Pacific conflict. The American military wanted a cross-English Channel invasion in 1942, but Britain was wary of this approach. British memories of the slaughter of soldiers in the First World War were still fresh and also, the Americans were
not ready to take on the Germany military directly. Further, with the brief exception of American involvement in the First World War, American troops had not fought as part of a coalition since the American Revolution ended in 1783.

Thus, they chose to invade North Africa. British troops had been fighting Germans and Italians in eastern North Africa since 1940. An Anglo-American invasion of Morocco and Algeria would trap the Axis forces between the invading forces and the British forces already present in North Africa.

O’Hara’s narrative of Operation Torch is thorough and complete. He describes combat in all three environments—air, land, and sea. This book should dispel any lingering bias or stereotype that Vichy French forces were weak and cowardly: they actively resisted the Anglo-American invaders. O’Hara details virtually every action, even giving the names or identification numbers of the vessels involved. The book is heavily illustrated with appropriate maps and photographs. He writes well and keeps the narrative moving. Quite properly, he divides the narrative by location of each landing—Algiers, Oran, Port Lyautey, Casablanca, and Safi. This focuses the reader on the location, conditions, and combats for each landing and prevents confusion. The naval battle of Casablanca, between U.S. Navy and Vichy naval ships is covered in detail. It is illuminating to note that this was the largest surface action carried out by the American navy in the Second World War. The political intrigue between Vichy and the invaders, which resulted in French forces in North Africa fighting with the Allies, is fully detailed.

The research that went into the book is impressive: O’Hara used primarily primary sources and the secondary sources used are of high-quality.

In his conclusion, O’Hara posits that Operation Torch, along with the earlier British efforts in North Africa, and the post-North African campaigns in Sicily and Italy, did not materially reduce Nazi Germany’s war ability and that it was only the 1944-45 campaign in northwestern Europe, together with the Soviet advance from the East, which ended the European war. This is true, but O’Hara either overlooks or minimizes the fact that by sending troops to North Africa, and later Sicily and Italy, Germany spent men and materiel that could have been used in other fronts. Also, after the successful Allied invasion of Sicily, Italy left the war and the subsequent invasion of the Italian mainland enabled Allied air assets to attack targets in southern Europe—some of which supplied the necessary oil for Hitler’s war machine.

But O’Hara is on solid ground when he states the positives of Operation Torch: learning is a cumulative process and the lessons learned in Torch were applied to the Allied landings in Sicily. The lessons learned from Torch and Sicily were
applied to the invasion of Italy and the lessons learned from those invasions led to the successful invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944. O’Hara speculates another benefit of Torch. Because it caused Germany to occupy the remainder of metropolitan France, the German takeover prevented Vichy from formally entering the war on the side of the Axis. A reinforced Vichy French army, made up of freed POWs from 1940, could have put forty or fifty divisions in France to oppose any cross-Channel invasion. The result would have been that the United States and Britain would have faced even more resistance than they did in 1944-45.

Second World War historians and lay people should read this book. It is likely to be the best account of the Allied offensive, one that started, as the subtitle states, “[T]he Allied Path to Victory.”

Robert L. Shoop  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Rear Adm. David Oliver, USN (Ret.)  

Against the Tide is primarily about the management approach of the enigmatic yet fascinating Admiral Hyman Rickover. On a secondary level, it is about how Rickover influenced author Oliver’s career, his thinking about the nuclear navy and understanding of leadership. Altogether, the book is an analysis of the making of America’s nuclear navy under Admiral Rickover presented in a very breezy, narrative style.

Rickover was a most unlikely American officer to rise to the rank of admiral. He finished academically high in his Annapolis class, at a military academy that valued command bearing; he was short, extremely thin and non-athletic. Shy, socially inept at times, and slow to make friends, he was blunt in his interactions with others. Rickover often appeared arrogant, yet exuded intellect. Although not mentioned by the author, in biographic data, he was one of few Jewish midshipmen at the time. Religious prejudice and Rickover’s personality made him a target for derision among the students training to become officers.

Historically, the route to officer advancement in the navy was by assuming positions of responsibly onboard a ship towards proving one’s ability as a commander. Rickover’s sole command at sea was of the Navy’s smallest ship with limited responsibility. “A minesweeper does not project power or provide presence. It does cleanup work” (107). His classmates rose through the bureaucratic pecking order at a faster pace.
Being assigned as an engineering officer was not a good way of ascending the arduous ladder of rank position. Among engineering officers, those on diesel submarines were placed just above the ship’s barnacles. When Rickover asked to be assigned as an engineer and work within the aging diesel submarine fleet, he appeared to be truncating his career potential. He had few, if any, influential friends in the highest echelons of the navy. Fate intervened at just the right time for Rickover when he was assigned to work at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. This move to a non-combat post could have led to an early retirement, but being a quick and imaginative learner, Rickover saw the potential of nuclear energy in an evolving navy. Diesel submarines were slow under water, vulnerable on the surface, and their range was limited. The navy employed them more for harassment than as a strategic weapon. Rickover realized that a nuclear-powered submarine could radically change its use and emerge as a potential game-changer as America engaged in the Cold War. In order to accomplish this, he had to persuade the U.S. government to build a nuclear-powered underwater vessel that was safe, reliable and cost-effective. No prototype existed and the traditional navy was largely committed to conventional surface-based warfare. In spite of Rickover’s lack of political connections, command status and personality challenges, his knowledge and logic persuaded the naval hierarchy and Congress that he could build such a working vessel. His management method was to be scientifically prepared and anticipate all questions with thoroughly planned answers. Oliver gives many examples of Rickover’s talent, bordering on clairvoyance, in solving technological problems, but these were often accompanied by uncomfortable interactions with his superiors. Rickover, while certainly not congenial, largely earned the respect of those with whom he worked. Therefore, Against the Tide is an apt title for a book that attempts to capture the essence of Hyman Rickover’s career.

Rickover personally interviewed all of the officers for admission to submarine school and these interrogations were legendary for being uncomfortable trials. For example, young officers could be seated in a chair with the front legs shortened, or ordered to stand in a closet if the admiral considered an answer “stupid,” a term he used frequently. While being cantankerous, foul-mouthed, undaunted and combative, his unconventional, provocative methods brought him the desired results. Today, the midshipmen taking exams in Annapolis’s Rickover Hall rub the sizable nose of the admiral’s bronze bust for luck.

Rickover’s management formula can roughly be summarized by a dozen principles: 1. Use as few rules possible since they can hamper...
rational and original thought; 2. Facts can be transient, so maintain an open mind; 3. Free discussion should be free of intimidation by authority figures; 4. Conservatism can, at times, endanger a nation’s ability to defend itself; 5. Failure can be your friend and best teacher; 6. Loyalty is the maxim in the military, but subordination in the face of knowingly making a wrong choice can be a form of cowardice; 7. Being consistent for consistency’s sake can lead to foolishness; 8. Practical experiences can curb or prompt; 9. “Optimism and stupidity are nearly synonymous” (159); 10. Over-coordination can slow progress to a near halt; 11. Always check the activities of your subordinates, but too much checking can strangle initiative; 12. Work to your maximum, but always train others to be competent so that they could step in if the need arose.

Rickover’s formula helped David Oliver rise throughout his years of success in the navy from a junior officer on Nautilus (SSN-571), commander of Plunger (SSN-595), to several important Pentagon assignments, and finally to retiring as a rear admiral. Oliver mixes tales of the often-eccentric Rickover with genuine admiration for his leadership abilities, especially in the face of many adversities, such as the fabrication of Nautilus, building and maintaining the nuclear fleet during the Cold and Vietnam Wars, and his conflicts with high profile officers such as Admiral Elmo Zumwalt.

Along the way, Oliver relates stories from his own naval career; examples of how he applied Rickover’s managerial principles. In summary, Against the Tide, illuminating on many levels, is a reasoned path toward understanding what made the complex Hyman Rickover such a special naval officer.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


The predominant interpretation of the Second World War in the Pacific is laid out from the American perspective here. To some extent, that is to be expected. Unlike Europe, which fought a coalition war of vast scale, the Pacific War was predominantly an American campaign. Dominated by the American narrative, the Pacific War has been, primarily, a tale of daring carrier battles, like that at Midway in June 1942, or dramatic amphibious assaults on small islands, like Tarawa or Iwo Jima. This is the tale taught in most classrooms in North America and is uniquely American-centric. Fueled by a huge publishing market, it gives the illusion that the war
started, in essence, on December 7, 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This is far from the case.

The war in the Pacific really should be called the Asian-Pacific War. Its vast nature began in Japan and China with the rise of militancy in one and the disintegration of the government of the other. In the 1930s, Japan took steps to overcome what it saw as its second-class treatment at the hands of Europeans and Americans. The result was the emergence of Japan as an empire seeking expansion and direct confrontation with the west. This led to operations in Korea and China and, eventually, to open war. The idea of an Asian-Pacific war has slowly been gaining traction in historical circles which is helping to provide a more balanced interpretation of history. Francis Pike’s book, *Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War, 1941-1945*, is certainly a major stepping stone in this direction. Structured into 37 chapters grouped together into seven parts, the 1,110 pages of *Hirohito’s War* begin with the Meiji restoration of 1868 and lead the reader chronologically up to and through the war.

Francis Pike brings a great deal of experience to this work. An historian with a strong geopolitical and economic background, he has worked in Japan, China, and India and has published in both article and book formats, including his first book on Modern Asia which, in many ways, has become a standard work in the field. Pike maintains this level of research in *Hirohito’s War*, a book so incredibly rich and dense that it is difficult to assess. Each chapter presents a massive amount of material. The fact that it is predominantly from the Japanese perspective makes it an invaluable resource on the Asian-Pacific War. Each chapter presents the reader with a mix of new materials mated with a more conventional chronology. The result is a fascinating look into the other side of the war. Whether examining the rise of ultra-nationalism within the Japanese government in the first half of the 1930s, the war against China and the atrocities conducted there, or the progress of the war across the Pacific, Pike presents a vast amount of material in a cohesive and entertaining narrative. In the process, he does not shy away from important issues like the Rape of Nanking, the issue of war guilt for the Emperor, or the disgusting failure of MacArthur to properly defend the Philippines and his deliberate attempts to conceal the truth. The text crosses the line of conventional military history into something broader and more encompassing, weaving in political and economic history as well as the history of other nations not usually discussed in great detail.

The vast scale of the book produces a truly unique perspective of the war, but it also raises a few concerns. As an academic source, it is important for the text to not only present a cohesive argument, but to
provide a solid foundation of research. Here, a few issues come together to limit the overall value of the text. The first is the absence of really important information in the form of the citations, tables, maps, appendicies or bibliography. This information is usually considered vital in most academic sources, and unfortunately, the book was published without it. Given the already considerable size of the book, it is likely that the publisher wanted to control the contents by making the information available from the publisher’s web site, but this is a rather serious omission as it reduces the book’s value. The text provides references to this material, so it should be relatively easy to merge the text and the material on the web site. There are two major limitations to this: first and foremost, it means that readers require internet access every time they want to check a citation, map or table. This makes the text far less usable for academics; second, it depends on ease of access to the web sites. When accessing them, I found one of the listed web sites did not provide viable links to the material. Once I found a usable list, it seemed to work alright but this reveals the greatest threat. The internet is often not a stable archive for materials and should the links be removed, the resource value of the text will disappear with them. Either way, the need for internet access limits the book’s convenience for research and study.

The appendix has another set of issues. The appendix, charts, and tables seem to lack a solid foundation. Often the tables do not include an indication of where the material originated or citations for the sources. If the appendix is to be useful to students of history, the paper trail is essential. For example, in the charts relating to submarine operations, where the material comes from matters a great deal, as the original sources had errors in reporting. In the long run, lack of citations makes the material more questionable. Also, some of the appendicies did not reveal anything of real importance or substance. The discussion of the submarine war, for example, seemed really generic to the overall discussion of the book. Perhaps a merging of the appendix into the text would have been more valuable to the reader. In light of the book’s dependence on the web for materials and its already considerable size, dividing the text into two books might have been preferable. There is so much excellent information packed into each chapter that it can be overwhelming. A division into two volumes might have helped to alleviate that feeling.

Pike’s Hirohito’s War also suffers from one additional problem, factual issues. While it is easy to miss minor issues in a text of such size, it is not the small issues that are the problem. A major issue arises, for example, on page 17. The author provides background information on the start of the First World War
where he maintains that the von Schlieffen Plan was aimed at circumventing the Maginot Line, a defensive structure that was created in the years after the First World War ended. When something like that is missed it raises questions about the rest of the text.

_Hirohito’s War_ is, nevertheless, a unique addition to the field of Second World War history. By providing a Japanese perspective on events, Pike dramatically changes our perception and helps to provide a far more balanced understanding of the war, in spite of some serious limitations. Factual errors, the lacking of citations/charts/etc as part of the actual text, and the vast scale of the subject, not to mention the physical size of the book, make it daunting and challenging to use. Densely packed with a great deal of information, it needs to be utilized carefully. Yet despite its being overwhelming at times, the overall value of the text cannot be denied. As a window into the Japanese perspective of the war, this book is truly unique and a must for any serious student of the Pacific War.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


Not since the days when Herbert Richmond occupied Cambridge University's Vere Harmsworth chair in imperial and naval history has the interconnections between the two fields been so studiously regarded by a newer generation of historians comfortable in the historiography of both genres. Increased attention to cultural and social aspects has added to the traditional focus on political, economic, and operational dimensions of Great Britain's relationship with dominions, colonies, and protectorates that encompassed the British Empire and British Commonwealth, from a maritime perspective. Daniel Owen Spence, educated at Sheffield Hallam University in South Yorkshire and a senior lecturer at University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, South Africa, adds a valuable and original contribution to the highly regarded Manchester University Press Studies in Imperial History series, with his study of colonial naval culture in selected former British colonies in the last stages of imperialism and colonial withdrawal.

The book is organized into four distinct parts that present regional case studies of how locally recruited and organized naval forces were rationalized in the internal and external contexts of colonies and relations with the Royal Navy. These were not the navies of larger components of the British imperial
construct like Canada, Australia, or India. In fact, the smallish volunteer naval forces of the colonies studied here have typically been overlooked by most maritime historians as operationally insignificant for their size and relative ranking. Spence, however, ably argues that looking at each on its own terms provides a much richer understanding and offers comparatively many insights into race and cultural construction. The first part examines changes in identity and a search for relevance in the Caribbean islands of Trinidad/Tobago and the Caymans, as the British struggled to maintain adherence to the imperial notion in the face of growing American influence. The second part turns to East Africa, in particular Kenya, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika, where the Royal Navy's presence during and after the Second World War was strong due to strategic and operational imperatives. Further recruitment of Africans into positions of responsibility ran up against longstanding racial barriers, and concerns about reliability in cases of internal disorder, even though support from indigenous leaders, such as the Sultan, for the symbols of naval trappings remained palpable.

Locally-recruited naval forces comprising Malays were under-rated, and their loyalties questioned when in exile and struggling for respect and the barest essentials, that occasionally manifested in disorder and unrest. The fourth part, titled East Asia, essentially deals entirely with Hong Kong, the small British colony on mainland China in the South China Sea, which was militarily indefensible though economically important. Chinese attitudes in general and local prejudices made maintaining even modest naval forces difficult, as Europeans and Eurasians were overwhelmingly predominant as volunteers. Collectively, the individual cases chosen by Spence advance the book's stated purpose of giving more insight into the social and cultural aspects of previously under-valued non-white colonies and the naval forces attached to them.

Central to Spence's argument is the introduction of a seafaring race theory, which builds upon and borrows from the martial race construct fashionable in British imperial historiography for some years past, especially in regard to military forces on land and ethnic recruitment. Certain peoples and ethnic groups came to be associated with maritime employment, either by their existing ties to the sea, or as a deliberate attempt to create the idea that they were, so that naval service and promotion became more acceptable and prized. Spence likens this development to the Gurkha
syndrome, whereby the British actively fostered and favoured one group for its supposed martial values. Certainly, in the colonial naval forces studied here, the inculcation of seafaring race ideas were tried with varying degrees of success, or at least informed how the British considered and treated persons under service and the management of the respective naval forces as a whole. It is really quite remarkable how long race remained influential and an important determinant well after the Second World War when the former colonies on the way to becoming independent nations reconsidered relations with Great Britain inside the Commonwealth. Besides a firm grounding in methodology, Spence brings extensive research in archives at a diverse range of locations, both back in London and the various countries that are the focus of this book. The extent of primary research is impressive, and the different sources handled well with good effect in building the argument.

Spence has delivered a very well put-together book based on solid research and cogent argumentation. It complements of his recent books, A History of the Royal Navy: Empire and Imperialism, from London-based international publisher I.B. Tauris. The production values in Colonial naval culture and British imperialism are high, with the back and front cover incorporating the stock graphic from Manchester University Press for the Studies in Imperial History series. The book will appeal to both specialized academics studying in the naval and imperial history fields, as well as general readers.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


Ben Stewart’s work tells the tale of the crew of the Arctic Sunrise, a group of Greenpeace environmental protesters, who, in the course of attempting to scale the Gazprom-owned Prirazlomnaya Russian oil platform in the Barents Sea on 19 September 2013, were boarded by Russian military commandos. Charged first with piracy, then “hooliganism,” the Arctic 30, as they became known, were held in isolation prisons in Murmansk and St. Petersburg for about two months as international protests and political pressures mounted. Stewart follows the experiences of 6 of the 30 through this ordeal: Frank Hewetson, Dima Litvinov, Sini Saarela, Pete Willcox, Kieron Bryan Alex Harris, and Phil Ball. Freedom came for the protestors with bail, and then an Amnesty Bill as preparations for the 2014 Sochi Olympics drew near, with several members of the Arctic 30
continuing to speak out against Arctic drilling after their pardons.

*Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg*’s title comes from a Russian phrase that served as a motto in the Murmansk SIZO-1 prison. In many ways, the motto encapsulates the focus and purpose of the book: to tell the personal stories of the Arctic 30 and their experiences throughout the protest and its aftermath. Stewart’s prose is written from the centre of the action, reconstructing conversations, events, and emotions from interviews with many of the Arctic 30 after the events depicted. Ben Stewart, himself, however, was also involved in these events, as he discusses in the afterword to the text. He served as a leading figure in the Greenpeace campaign to free the Arctic 30, although he avoids inserting himself into the narrative.

Critical analysis in this book primarily focuses on Russian politics and the response of Putin and his administration to the Arctic 30 protests, and an examination of the legacy of political protest in Russia. This last point is especially framed around Dimi Litvinov, one of the Arctic 30, whose family had a long history of political activism and legal persecution within Russia/the USSR. Overall, the discussion is rooted in present politics and future concerns.

Although the book does a good job of covering the events surrounding the Arctic 30 and personal stories, it lacks two key perspectives: a discussion of the contested control in the Arctic region and its relation to the Arctic 30 protests, and exclusion of external or contradictory perspectives.

Firstly, Stewart only minimally discusses the maritime history of northern European and Asian involvement in the Arctic, beginning with the planting of a flag in Russia’s name by Artur Chilingarov in 2007. Although drilling within the Arctic has only recently become feasible due to global climate change, Russia, as well as other northern hemisphere powers, has had a long history of claiming access and mineral rights to the area, which this reviewer feels would have added a deeper layer of understanding to the situation of the Arctic 30. By maintaining focus on the Greenpeace activists and their allies, perspective was lost on the political and socio-historical factors of the international situation encapsulated by the race to Arctic oil deposits. As pointed out by Stewart, this conflict will only intensify as petroleum deposits in easy-access areas are gradually depleted: the maritime Arctic, with untapped natural resources and opportunities for geographical expansion, will be key areas of interest in upcoming global politics.

Secondly, this book excluded some dissenting opinions and experiences which would have been valuable for a richer understanding of Greenpeace activities and their implications for maritime activity in the region. For example, although Stewart addresses the fact that some of the Arctic 30 felt betrayed by
Greenpeace leadership, none of these dissenting members appear as part of the narrative. Instead, discussions of the tensions among the protesters centered on the core group, who have gone on since to act as spokespeople for the Arctic 30 in press releases and other material in Greenpeace’s official statements.

For contemporary discussion of a hotly-contested and important region for northern maritime studies, Stewart’s book offers a well-written, page-turning story and an excellent introduction to the events of the Arctic Sunrise. Discussions about external factors, social pressures, and the political landscape shaping these current events remain focused around the key figures of the Arctic 30, producing a tightly-woven narrative never bogged down by lengthy digressions or esoteric terminology. As our changing climate allows increasing access to rapidly-changing northern seas, this book highlights a key struggle in the fight to control the Arctic. Overall, this is an excellent telling of the story of the Arctic 30 centered on key figures in the center of the whirlwind of activity during those two months of prison and protest.

Mara Deckinga
Bryan, Texas


In *Floating Palaces of the Great Lakes*, author Joel Stone takes the reader on a chronological exploration of the evolution of Great Lakes passenger steamboats in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He defines the principal periods of the passenger steamboat era in two primary ways: pre-/post-Civil War and the presence/absence of railroad access for passengers and commercial freight.

The book begins with a brief overview of the development of steam power for use in vessel propulsion, which adds little to understanding steamboat design and use on the Great Lakes. The reader would have been better served with an opening chapter that situates the introduction of steam-powered vessels into the existing Great Lakes maritime industry. Sail power remained a powerful and important mode of transportation for all but the very end of the nineteenth century. The introduction of steam power fundamentally changed how these vessels were used, what they carried, how they were maintained and/or insured, and the risks their operators and owners took with them. This, of course, evolved along with the evolution of steamboat design and use.
The first part of this book, spanning the introduction of the first steamboats on the Great Lakes in 1817—Ontario, Frontenac, and Walk-in-the-Water—to the Civil War, is an excellent discussion of the personal and commercial motivations behind their funding and construction. Stone clearly conveys the aspirations and apprehensions of all involved. Because the post-War of 1812 period focuses primarily on these three vessels, Stone has the opportunity to incorporate personal stories of these innovators, investors, captains, and adventurers. This is the heart of the book. The steamboats are incorporated into this history as products and tools of individuals, communities, and the overall maritime culture of the region.

In the decades leading up to the Civil War, the era of the true Palace Steamers bloomed into maturity. Steamboats were no longer considered to be an experimental mode of transportation, though experiments in propulsion and design of vessels—no two were truly alike—continued throughout the nineteenth century. Passengers traveled in luxury, compared to other available options, into a rapidly disappearing American frontier. That these mid-century vessels also carried full cargo manifests in all directions allowed for low passenger fares and the availability of profits to decadently furnish and decorate passenger accommodations in an effort to promote individual vessels. Stone’s repeated use of terms such as romantic, graceful, and elegant in their description is truly fitting. Yet missing from this discussion are the experiences of the passengers themselves. We need the voice of the immigrant and other passengers, not just the captains and owners.

During the decades following the Civil War, steamboats had to compete increasingly with the quickly expanding system of Canadian and American railroads for freight commissions. Shipping rates fell sharply. Many of the passenger steamboat companies had to fundamentally redefine their business model or risk bankruptcy. The most successful of these transitioned from mixed passenger and freight transportation companies to passenger-only recreational cruise lines. Stone successfully analyzes the seemingly contradictory restriction of the passenger steamboat industry with the continued construction of larger, more expensive, and more opulent vessels during this period. While the steamboat companies invested in recreation parks and comfortable hotels, it was the voyage as much as the destination that marked the motivation for tourists to fill the vessels’ staterooms.

Stone makes an effort to include in this section and that of the early twentieth century every major passenger steamboat, both paddlewheel and propeller. He includes their builders and place of construction, owners, ports of call, unique architectural and decorative features, and final disposition. He
also provides descriptions of the steamboat lines themselves, with the evolution of their ownership, business model, and ports of call. This has resulted in pages of data that would be more useful as a reference had they been incorporated in tables, either in the text or as an appendix. The inclusion of this data as text ultimately sacrifices the human stories. It is about the companies and their boats, not the people who commanded, worked, or voyaged on them.

It is understandable why Stone purposefully minimizes the discussion of steamboat disasters. They have been the subject of several books by amateur and professional historians, and a narrow focus on the demise of these vessels would miss the fundamental point of this book—to discuss the importance of their use-life. So many of these vessels, however, regularly sustained accidents, that the final disposition of many derelict passenger vessels was ultimately on the lake floor. This was not considered abnormal, and speaks to the culture of business, risk, and maritime behaviour in the nineteenth century.

This book is most appropriate for a general audience, especially for those who might reflect with nostalgia on a remembered childhood that may have included watching the last of these grand steamers plying the waters of the Great Lakes. While not learning anything particularly new about these vessels or the passenger steamboat industry, historians and other scholars will find this book an excellent compendium of basic information associated with the major Great Lakes passenger steamboats, including place of construction, construction firm, owners, investors, major overhauls, and final disposition, from which in-depth research can be instigated. Stone accomplished his fundamental goals for writing this book: a thorough appreciation for a maritime institution that has only recently taken its final bow from the Great Lakes stage.

Alicia Caporaso
New Orleans, Louisiana


The Grumman F9F Panther was one of the first generation aircraft that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) flew. The F9F was used heavily by both services in the Korean War; in Osprey Combat Aircraft # 103, author Warren Thompson tells the story of the units that flew this first-generation aircraft in that conflict.

When jet aircraft were developed during the Second World War and
refined thereafter, it was inevitable that the world’s navies would want jet technology for their aviation units. The F9F Panther was the second USN jet aircraft and served both the USN and USMC faithfully for many years. The Panther’s supreme moment, its place in aviation history, was established in the Korean War. Korean War aerial conflict is almost always thought of as the F-86 Sabre jet flown by the U.S. Air Force versus North Korean and Chinese MiG-15 jets (often flown by Soviet pilots). In fact, much aerial fighting was between the F9F Panther and the MiG-15. The F9F Panther was characteristic of most first-generation jets: it was a straight-wing aircraft, where the wings were installed straight from the fuselage. This configuration created drag and impeded performance. Second-generation jets (of which the Soviet MiG-15, the Panther’s chief adversary, was one) had a swept wing design, which lessened drag, and thus, increased performance. The F9F Panther was, then, at a performance disadvantage when pitted against a MiG-15. But it had two characteristics that made it a worthy opponent: Grumman aircraft were solidly built, able to absorb much battle damage, and the F9F was no exception. Furthermore, the Panther was equipped with a defensive armament of four 20-mm. cannons, thus giving it punch in aerial combat.

The primary mission of both USN aviation and USMC squadrons in Korea was attack and close support of troops. In this role, the F9F Panther was well suited. In addition to its cannon armament, the Panther had four underwing pylons for bombs or air-to-ground rockets. Quite often they took on one of the most hazardous duties of any combat aircraft: anti-aircraft suppression. In this, the F9Fs would attack anti-aircraft emplacements surrounding a specific target, such as a bridge, which enabled propeller-driven aircraft such as the F4U Corsair or AD Skyraider to attack the target without exposure to antiaircraft fire. Losses were heavy; from 16 July 1950 to 26 July 1953, the USN and USMC lost 162 F9Fs due to ground fire or operational causes—a loss rate of 4.5 aircraft per month, or one F9F per week. The F9F also was modified into a reconnaissance aircraft, with the deletion of the 20mm cannon and installation of cameras in a longer nose. In this role, the F9F performed well.

In air-to-air combat, the F9F’s rugged construction and good defensive firepower meant it could put up a fight. The F9F was the first USN jet aircraft to shoot down an enemy aircraft (in this case, a propeller-driven North Korean Yak-9 fighter), the first USN jet to fly operational missions off a carrier, and the first USN jet to fly combat missions. In one mission, USN Lieutenant Royce Williams and his wingman engaged seven MiG-15s near the Soviet coastline. Williams shot down four MiGs and made the
other three MiGs turn for home. (Although he managed to return to his aircraft carrier safely, Williams’ F9F was so badly shot up that it was quickly stripped of all usable equipment, then shoved overboard.) Very quickly, intelligence learned that the MiGs were not North Korean but actually Soviet aircraft. Williams was only credited with one aerial victory and a probable damaged MiG. With neither the USA nor the USSR wanting to enlarge this incident into World War Three, the incident was hushed up until the end of the Cold War in 1992, when Soviet records gave Williams credit for all four aerial victories.

Thompson’s book follows the standard Osprey format for the Combat Aircraft series and its other publications: a vivid cover—in this case, depicting F9F Panther jets attacking a Chinese convoy in spring, 1951; a valuable text; heavily illustrated, with most of the photographs in colour; a centre-spread showing colour sideviews of F9Fs; and appendices showing the various carrier deployments and also a chronological listing of USN and USMC F9F combat and operational losses. The photos and sideviews will be of help to modellers and enthusiasts. The photographs often show how much damage the F9F could take and still get its pilot home safely: many photographs show incredible damage to control surfaces. The narrative is replete with many first-hand accounts of F9F missions and those add much to the narrative. Moreover, several celebrities flew F9F missions in Korea: Neil Armstrong, the first man to walk on the moon, is shown flying a F9F; John Glenn, the first American to orbit to earth, is also pictured. Glenn’s frequent wingman, Ted Williams, the great baseball player and a USMC Reservist called back into service are also shown. Williams narrowly escaped with his life when one of his aircraft was damaged by ground fire and he barely made it back to base. There is also a tie to the Royal Canadian Navy: Lt. Joseph J. MacBrien, RCN, was an exchange pilot with the USN and flew combat missions in F9Fs. One photo shows him landing an F9F aboard the aircraft carrier USS Oriskany.

In short, this is a useful work on a historic aircraft of the USN and USMC. The expert will find this a short and helpful reference while those unfamiliar with the F9F will learn much. It is hoped that Thompson will write a companion work in this series on the F9F’s contemporary, the F2H Banshee.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

The Grumman F6F Hellcat was the premier carrier fighter aircraft of the Second World War, and U.S. Navy squadron VF-9 was the first unit to take that immortal aircraft into combat. In Osprey Aircraft of the Aces #119: F6F Hellcat Aces of VF-9, Edward M. Young tells the story of this historic squadron and its men and aircraft.

VF-9 (the “V” designates a heavier-than air unit and the “F” indicates a fighter squadron) was formed in March, 1942, shortly after the American entry into the war. VF-9 saw action in the Mediterranean theatre but achieved its greatest fame in the Pacific conflict. In all, VF-9 had three combat cruises—one to support Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November, 1942, and two combat cruises in the Pacific.

Most USN squadrons operated in the Pacific and the vast majority of USN aces (pilots who have five or more aerial victories) gained their victories over Japanese aircraft in the Pacific. Indeed, VF-9’s pilots scored 256.75 aerial victories and 171 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Twenty VF-9 pilots became aces—placing the squadron third in the rankings of aces using the Grumman F6F Hellcat and fourth overall in the rankings of USN squadrons. Eugene Valencia, who had 23 aerial victories, scored all of his victories with VF-9. Valencia is tied for second place with Cecil Harris on the list of USN aces.

Six of VF-9’s aerial victories were achieved against the Vichy French in November, 1942, which put VF-9 into a very select category—it was one of the few USN squadrons that produced aces with aerial victories over an enemy not the Japanese. During Operation Torch, VF-9’s pilots even strafed the Vichy French battleship Jean Bart and two other French destroyers on another mission.

After Operation Torch, VF-9 returned to the United States aboard USS Ranger. The squadron crew was given brief leave before returning to find two critical and welcome changes. First, the number of fighter aircraft per squadron was increased from 27 aircraft to 36, with the number of pilots and aircrew increased accordingly. It was at this time that Valencia joined VF-9.

The squadron’s pilots greeted the second change with even greater joy. VF-9 had previously been equipped with the Grumman F4F Wildcat—a capable aircraft that was ruggedly built (a feature of Grumman aircraft) but was inferior in performance to the Japanese A6M Zero-Sen fighter, the mainstay of the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF). Now they were going to fly the Grumman F6F Hellcat. Many USN F4F Wildcat pilots had learned how to successfully combat the A6M Zero, but the arrival of the Hellcat changed everything.
There was a definite family relationship to the Wildcat but the Hellcat was larger and more powerful. With it, the USN finally had a fighter aircraft that could take on the A6M Zero and come out on top in aerial combat. VF-9 took the Hellcat on two further combat cruises, each time in the Pacific; the results of those cruises earned VF-9 its place in naval aviation history.

In its second combat cruise, from late August, 1943, to the end of March, 1944, VF-9’s pilots shot down 120 Japanese aircraft with a further eight Japanese aircraft probably destroyed and 124 Japanese aircraft destroyed on the ground. All this accomplished with the loss of only eight USN pilots!

VF-9 returned to the United States in late March 1944; after a brief rest, the squadron reformed with many new pilots along with a significant number of experienced pilots from the previous combat cruise. Following training, VF-9 went back into action in early 1945. Its second combat cruise was just as effective as its first two cruises had been. By the time VF-9 returned home in July, 1945, its pilots had logged an additional 128.75 aerial victories, 18 Japanese aircraft probably destroyed, 47 aircraft destroyed on the ground with another 58 aircraft probably destroyed on the ground and 209 Japanese aircraft damaged as a result of ground attacks. All told, in its three combat cruises, VF-9 destroyed 256.75 Vichy French and Japanese aircraft in aerial combat with another 171 aircraft destroyed on the ground. The USN disestablished VF-9 in October, 1945; the squadron was briefly reformed in late 1946 but was again disestablished, this time permanently, in 1948. One of the USN’s premier fighter squadrons vanished into history.

Young’s story of this highly successful squadron is a well-written, easy-to-read account of its history. He sprinkles the narrative liberally throughout with quotes from the pilots themselves, which add spice to the narrative. It is highly illustrated with many good photographs of the aircraft, pilots, and “in action” photographs. The book is in the standard format of the Osprey Aircraft of the Aces series, with a vivid, colour cover and a centre section with 29 colour plates illustrating the principal types of VF-9’s aircraft. It should be noted that the USN had a very strict markings system and the colour schemes used show little variation—the novice to this topic may find the plates repetitive.

This book is highly recommended for modellers, USN enthusiasts, aviation enthusiasts, and students of the Second World War. It is not recommended for the strict maritime enthusiast.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado
In Volume XXV, no. 4, the October 2015 issue of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord we published a review of Empire, Technology and Seapower: Royal Navy Crisis in the Age of Palmerston by Howard J. Fuller. Mr. Fuller requested an opportunity to respond to the review.

To the Reviews editor:

Empire, Technology and Seapower disagrees with much of John Beeler’s (and Andrew Lambert’s) theories of how British naval power-politics worked during the mid-19th century. For this it’s regarded as rather heretical. Indeed, Beeler’s review complains that my research and analysis lines up with that of Arthur Marder and Oscar Parkes but presumably also N.A.M. Rodger and Paul Kennedy, who each dared question the notion that the mid-Victorian Royal Navy was anything less than all-powerful — always — against everyone and anyone — and arrays ‘Lambert, myself, Robert Mullins and Richard Dunley’ in an opposing line-of-battle.

But that’s not my main concern here, or in the book in question, and that’s not really the reason why no amount of scholarship seems likely to shake at least Beeler’s cult-like devotion to not just ‘Britannia’ but in the ubiquity of modern naval supremacy itself. In his view, any amount of historical evidence gathered which suggests the contrary remains nothing more than ‘alarmist screeds’ and ‘doom-mongering’ blindly taken at face value; Victorian naval officers who warned or worried were simply ‘disgruntled’ while British political leaders’ or diplomats’ concerns about Britain and the ‘Balance of Power’ were likewise mired by ‘navalist hyperbole’. Thus it’s more important how revisionist scholarship ‘since the 1980s’ tells us what people at the time really thought, and why, rather than the actual record of what those people said and what they did. Not only have myself and other historians been fooled but so were the historical actors themselves(!) Much of this stems from the context in which Beeler and Lambert themselves ‘upended’ the history: the late Cold War and early 1990s in particular when terms like ‘deterrence’ or ‘power projection’ were in vogue and what the defence community especially liked to hear from academics. Invest in enough superior technology and—whether you wield that big stick softly or not—potential troublemakers should fall into line with your proclaimed national or imperial interests, just like they did throughout the Pax.

Of course, such reasoning goes further: we are told there was a whole (uniquely British) ‘grand strategy’; age-old Admiralty policy that won the wars it couldn’t deter. ‘No, it’s not exactly written down’, the revisionist historian adds, it was both ‘too secret’ to show up in any surviving memo or even private correspondence and yet also ‘too broadly understood’ by savvy British
sea dogs (ex: local C-in-Cs of various stations) to even need to be clearly articulated. Heeding his mentor’s voice, Dunley for one has recently suggested, in an article on “Technology and Tradition: Mine Warfare and the Royal Navy’s Strategy of Coastal Assault, 1870-1890”, that the absence of actual plans or strategic doctrine means instead that it was ‘common knowledge’.

In other words, just because it doesn’t exist doesn’t mean it wasn’t real. Beeler’s review tries to mitigate that: in his words, “war planning in the nineteenth-century Royal Navy was not a centralized undertaking” by suggesting “this ad hoc approach” at least left local commanders like Milne during the American Civil War free to decide on the spot what was best. One immediately recalls this did not help the Crimean War expedition to Sevastopol in 1854 or even the attempt to force the Dardanelles in 1915. Why? Because a lack of central planning and preparation, militarily or politically, meant the forces deployed were ill-equipped and misapplied. Lambert, Beeler and their disciples desperately want us to believe that a vast British coastal assault flotilla was on hand throughout most of the Pax, for example. This was the ultimate strategic deterrent. Lambert called it the ‘Cherbourg Strategy’ (no one at the time called it anything). And yet the ‘Great Armament’ of the Crimean War (a term which Lambert also created and which has since been too often mistaken for actual history) was not ordered up until after the war began, and subsequently was not ready until after Sevastopol had fallen. Nor was Fisher’s ‘Baltic’ force ordered up until things went pear-shaped for the Allies (and Germany) in 1914; Churchill’s monitors arrived too late for the Dardanelles. And when the Admiralty rushed out line-of-battleships to Milne during the Trent Crisis of late 1861/early 1862, the commander at the scene had to write back to Somerset, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that “for war service on the coast of the U. States give me by all means Paddle Steamers. Altho I could not carry out these views as a Member of the Board of Admiralty, I still cling to this opinion, and the more I see and the more I consider what I want for War service, the more I feel assured they are Efficient and useful” (Beeler, ed., The Milne Papers, vol. 2, 627). That is, a purpose-built force had yet to be built. “You seem to be under the impression that I had suggested an attack on Portland or Boston”, Somerset had by then already written to Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary. “My opinion would be against any such operations.” (Russell Papers, National Archives, Kew, PRO 30-22, 24)

No, my main concern is that Beeler’s review does not actually respond to the far more serious charge which Empire, Technology and Seapower takes some pains to make, which is the chronic lack of
proper research methodology on the revisionist side of the firing line. Page 48, for example, quotes from Beeler’s *The Birth of the Battleship* (2001) how he was “indebted” to Lambert for suggesting a “tactical scenario” whereby “there can be no doubt that [light-draft coast-defence monitors] were crucial for the implantation of the Navy’s coast-assault strategy”. This by the way, concocting wargames in one’s head, is the only way Lambert or Beeler could make the square peg of HMS *Devastation*, a deep-draught ironclad-capital ship, fit into the round hole of British turret ships ‘clearly’ intended for coastal assault operations. And this is a no-no. You don’t fill in the blanks with what you wish the past to be. So I’m still waiting for a response to this and other examples of bad practice (Dunley’s article, almost as if following a tradition of expediency lending itself to fabrication, is similarly littered with references to documents which actually say nothing to support his case and in fact contradict it when read through in their entirety.)

Beeler protests no one has argued the Royal Navy was ‘all-powerful’ but perhaps he’s overlooked even Dunley’s nod to Lambert’s chapter “Under the Heel of Britannia” (in Peter Hore, ed., *Seapower Ashore*, 2001), for example, where “every great power with a significant sea coast had good cause to fear the power of the Royal Navy” and how “The British Empire had been secured by the global reach and deterrent threat of [coastal assault] operations for almost a century” (124). Even in his own review Beeler can’t resist to state it was really all about the numbers: we just have to tally the 1st Class (oceangoing) ironclads in each navy at any given time to see there was only ‘one standard’ which mattered: the Royal Navy ensign. Fine, but are we also counting shore batteries and minefields?

The same goes for his criticism that I ignore those comments (and they are comparatively very few indeed) made by Spencer Robinson, for example, that monitors might be useful for coastal assault (43). But please read further, Professor: such turret ships were designed to kill ships not forts—hence their large-calibre, slow-firing armament — and hence their designation as ‘coast defence vessels’. Ten monitors or so launched over ten years and placed in reserve or stationed in India or Australia to rust does not a ‘littoral strike force’ make.

I’m glad, however, that Beeler wavers in the slightest degree at the end of his review by admitting “those he labels ‘revisionists’ may have pushed their arguments too far.” I would add that the reason they do this is in compensation for a lack of hard evidence to actually sustain their theories. They have no big stick, therefore they speak bombastically. I leave it to readers of my work to scrutinize for themselves.