
All too often, whaling is represented solely by the story of Moby Dick; one very long voyage to the Pacific under a tyrannical captain. But voyage length, destination, captain, and a myriad of other factors all varied from voyage to voyage. The diaries and memoirs presented in “The Voyage of the F.H. Moore” and Other 19th Century Whaling Accounts help “complicate” this view of whaling. They present a multi-faceted view of the New England whaling trade by following a boat-steerer, passenger, greenhorn, and captain to the Caribbean, North Atlantic, Pacific Ocean, and Arctic Ocean where they hunted black fish, sperm whales, and right whales.

This is by no means, however, an introductory piece on whaling. The lack of supporting interpretation of the sources or even a glossary of maritime and whaling terms makes the collection challenging for someone with little background in the trade. The Voyage of the F.H. Moore by Samuel Grant Williams, is the collection’s raison d’être; it has never been published before and this, along with its contents – a reasonable informative account of a Caribbean whaling trip – spurred editor Greg Bailey to build a book around it. The second piece by Williams, though, is quite fragmented, with many illegible words and disconnected stories; it adds little to the overall themes. The third section is a very short account by a passenger on a whaling voyage, followed by the much more comprehensive excerpts from Etchings of a Whaling Cruise by J. Ross Browne. The excerpts from Etchings do present more of an introduction to whaling, but these are hidden away in a fourth chapter and would really have been much better positioned at the beginning. The book is rounded out by the promising, but again fragmented, memoirs of a New England whaling captain.

Although none of the works (apart from Browne’s) could stand alone, together they help support the author’s singular theme that whaling was a necessary, everyday part of nineteenth century life. He seeks to present the “human side of an inhumane trade” that is “ugly, repugnant, but also fascinating”(3). In this goal, he is successful; the collected stories do present a relatable view of the trade.

While this is the only theme that Bailey articulates, he appears to have focused on several main themes: the lack of whales and resulting boredom; the mix of comradeship and conflict; race relations; and temperance. Whaling is perhaps a misleading name for the trade; it only occupies the crew for a very small fraction of each voyage. While the excitement of landing a whale is displayed in the excerpts, it is balanced with long periods of looking for whales or chores such as mending, cleaning and processing the blubber. In this instance, Bailey has done well; he’s resisted the urge to concentrate on the “exciting” parts and includes much of the everyday life.

The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, XXV No. 1, (January 2015), 69-115
of the whalers, furthering his theme of humanity.

Long periods of boredom result in the theme of comradeship and conflict. In all of the voyages presented, the crews were between a dozen to two dozen men, all confined on relatively small boats for months on end–close friendships and fraught animosities were inevitable. Browne gives many examples of both: his friendship with “W”; his problems with the mulatto cook and the Portuguese crew; and his winning over other crew members with his sketches.

As mentioned by Browne, conflicts sometimes resulted from the mixing of cultures on the ships. Whaling crews were often international, composed of men from multi-cultural home ports and men that were picked up to replace crew members who had taken ill or deserted. Williams had two Cape Verde Island Portuguese and a number of black sailors, including a large West Indian. Editor Bailey, in one of the few “helping hands” he grants the reader, comments that the “black members of the crew did not even merit the mention of their names in the log book”(57). Browne is particularly scathing in his treatment of the Portuguese onboard, disliking their appearance, attitude and musical abilities.

Boredom, friendships, conflict, and mixed crews are all to be expected. What was surprising is the prevalence of temperance. Sailors of any kind are assumed to like their tipple. But in three of the excerpts, the boats are declared for the temperance movement, if not the men themselves. In Williams’ account, he notes the mates coming from their Christmas dinner looking as if they had been drinking despite of their declaration as a temperance vessel; he also tells of crew members trading their shirts for gin on an island. Passenger Francis Allyn Olmsted comments: “To the credit of the American Whale Fishery...the proportion of vessels of this character [temperance], is much greater in this service that in any other departments of our marine”(90).

This collection presents an interesting, if fragmented, view on nineteenth century whaling. Standing alone, it may not fully inform a reader, but could add to the literature already existing on the trade. It is a pity that many of the themes are not more fully drawn out, but it does provide an excellent resource for those looking to do so.

Kate Jordan
Melbourne, Australia


Historians have long sought to discover the origins of the British and Irish peoples – who they were and where they came from. This subject still remains a popular one for study, particularly the early development of the North Sea World, which has fascinated students and professional historians as well as general readers of economic and maritime history.

The co-authors of this beautifully presented collection of essays on the North Sea in the Middle-Ages, Professor David Bates and Dr. Robert Liddiard, are attached to the University of East Anglia, the former being the Professorial Fellow in History and the latter a Senior Lecturer in History. They have produced an intelligent and stimulating book, featuring contributions by 18 scholars who delivered papers on different elements of this topic at the “East Anglia and its North Sea World” conference in 2010.

Each of the contributors to this book explains in detail how East Anglia had
been a distinctive region since the Middle Ages. They examine the development of trade between Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium from AD 580 to AD 675 and show how, for the most part, relations between these maritime neighbours were peaceful – until, that is, the so-called Age of Northmen (AD 600 to AD 1100), when the God-fearing Christians of Western Europe faced the pagan Northmen in what has described as “the wrath of God let loose” (Cunliffe 2013).

The editors have skillfully chosen representative case studies on economic relations with Flanders during the Anglo-Norman period, which describe the extent to which North Sea maritime neighbours developed enduring economic links in a distinctive community of trading partners. A Germanic settlement in eastern Britain was firmly established by AD 600 and, following the battle of Catterick in the same year, they crossed the Tees and moved northwards, reaching almost to the Firth of Forth.

The year AD 866 has been highlighted as the turning point when a movement of the population from Mercia into Northumbria marked a new phase of Viking control at the heart of East Anglia. While contemporary sources usually refer to the Scandinavian raiders and settlers as Northmen, they have since become more popularly known as Vikings. Their raids engulfed Britain and Ireland and spread insidiously along Europe’s Atlantic coasts and estuaries. They founded settlements in Britain, France, Iceland and Greenland (eventually exploring as far as the coast of America).

Twenty some years later in AD 892, Alfred’s military preparations were tested when two Danish armies descended on Kent. The authors believe there is evidence of East Anglia’s use of coins for its economic relations with Flanders in the Anglo Norman period, and claim that the nature of the stone buildings in Romanesque East Anglia indicates the inhabitants’ relative sophistication. Describing the Flemish influence on English Manuscript Painting in the late fourteenth century, the authors compare it with pre-Viking everyday artefacts including coinage and their detailed maps of the “North Sea World.” Thus it seems that not only was trade of great importance to the region, but it resulted in almost thirty years of respite from Viking raids.

According to other sources, English rural society was highly differentiated and contained a large minority of substantial households by the fifteenth century (Wrightson 2000). Similarly, in the seventeenth century, entrepreneurial initiatives with a narrow geographic radius were hampered by transport, communication and other obstacles. In Europe, for example, high tolls and poor roads limited the transport of goods (Munck 1990). Although transport costs were not the only expense, it was only in the late nineteenth century that traffic in the North Sea reached 5.5 million tons (Hobsbawm 1975).

Histories of medieval East Anglia have not often been attempted, especially ones that commence as early as the Ice-Age and centre on a region bound together by little more than the shared frontier of the sea. This fascinating book will be enjoyed by readers of economic and maritime history for its clear explanation of the development of East Anglia from medieval times to its status as a distinctive region of the British Isles.

Professor Bates and Dr. Liddiard are to be congratulated for their intelligent organization of the material and for putting together a book that makes a valuable contribution to maritime history. Together with an exhaustive index and a multitude of illustrations, the editors give a clear and
interesting explanation of why, even today, the North Sea is so important to the regional economy, principally in the exploitation of oil and gas.

This book is the product of a successful and comprehensive conference in East Anglia, and its contents reflect the diversity of the papers presented. This in itself should guarantee it a place on the shelves of any reader with an interest in early maritime history.

Michael Clark
London, England


This welcome reissue of a classic short narrative history of the war at sea in the First World War by Pen & Sword is one of a large number of similar publications that this indefatigable publisher has released in recent years. I recall reading Bennett’s book as a teenager within a few years of its publication and remember it well with pleasure.

Bennett served in the RN from the mid-1920s to the mid-1950s, rising to the rank of captain, and had a typical career for the period. He took to writing narrative histories on retirement of which this volume is a fine example. In general, his books are a straightforward recounting of the events in question, written in an engaging style that is easy to read. His judgements of the actors in the scenes he describes are trenchant but sympathetic – he well knows the difficulties and obstacles they faced from personal experience. He also put his finger on the key issues and why things were so in a way that is impressive given the relatively short space involved with any of his books, this one included.

The book commences with a description of the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet to the Grand Fleet at the conclusion of the war. It is an effective and innovative introduction. Bennett then covers the global aspects of the naval war by recounting the pursuit of the *Goeben*, the Dardanelles campaign, the hunt for the German merchant raiders, and the disaster of Coronel and the triumph of the Falklands. The next section details the war in home waters, touching on the early engagements, such as Heligoland Bight, the German bombardment raids, Dogger Bank and then, of course, Jutland. The final section, almost an afterthought and light on detail, covers the war on merchant shipping and how the U-boat campaign nearly succeeded in bringing Britain to its knees. The book concludes with a short discussion on the scuttling of the German fleet and a brief summing up. All in all, a well written, comprehensive, if brief, and competent account.

There are some shortcomings. I was surprised that the book does not include a new introduction by a practising historian. The book has been reissued unadorned, which I think a pity and a missed opportunity by the publisher to contribute something new with the book’s resurrection in today’s bookshops. More fundamentally, the account only covers the activities of the RN and its principal adversary, the German Navy. Clearly these two antagonists are the dominant players in the conflict, but the absence of all the other nations involved is a significant gap. There is also no discussion on the pre-war years, the road to war and the role of German naval policy in bringing that war about. The quality of the diagrams illustrating the engagements is uneven, with some quite clear and uncluttered, with others anything but. The bibliography is
entirely from secondary sources, which underlines the point that this is not a scholarly book. Finally, the index is only adequate and not comprehensive. It only touches on ships and individuals. Not a crucial defect given the nature of the book.

For the general reader this account of the war at sea from 1914-1918 is perfectly adequate. It recounts the story at a good pace, is engagingly written, and Bennett’s judgements have stood up reasonably well. For the serious student, the book has inevitably been overtaken by a vast amount of scholarship over the past 45 years. The gaps in the account are significant and its chief value must lie in the book’s swift recounting of the war’s major incidents which can help frame the thinking of the modern researcher. Perhaps the best audience today remains that “interested teenager” who retains the capacity of actually reading.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


W. Jeffrey Bolster’s *The Mortal Sea: Fishing the Atlantic in the Age of Sail* is a book at once fascinating – and alarming. From late medieval times to the present, Bolster writes, humans have exploited and depleted the rich fishing grounds of the western North Atlantic, and in so doing have led us to the brink of ecological disaster today. Yet, as historian and environmentalist, Bolster is not all about drowning us in a sea of doom and gloom. He offers valuable insights as well as to how the ecological cataclysm he predicts for North Atlantic waters in the twenty-first century can also be avoided.

Overfishing for cod and herring, and the overharvesting of shellfish, seals, walruses, whales, and seabirds prompted Europeans to venture into Western waters in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They found in today’s New England and Atlantic Canada new ecosystems of seemingly inexhaustible sealife to satisfy, they hoped, the Old World’s insatiable and growing needs. Settlement of and survival in the New World by Europeans, however, soon threatened ecosystems there, and well before the end of the seventeenth century the Massachusetts Bay Colony, for one, was experimenting with regulating weiring and netting in its rivers and streams and imposing a closed season on all commercial fishing in an effort to conserve what it saw as a finite supply of cod, mackerel, and bass. Nonetheless, as Bolster tells us, despite such modest attempts to mitigate the results of largely unrestricted harvesting, the western North Atlantic, washing the shores of the new United States and Atlantic Canada, had come to resemble the depleted seas of Europe by 1800.

Over several chapters, Bolster describes with great proficiency the evolution of fishing technology during the nineteenth century as fishermen sought greater efficiency in a time of declining stocks. The invention of jigging and the arrival of purse seining for mackerel along with development of the pinkey schooner served the needs of the mackerel trade well. The mackerel catch peaked in the 1830s, then declined due to the fickle and unpredictable nature of the fish, but was attributable as well to what many observers claimed was “human interference”(108). Schooners in the cod fishery got bigger and more powerful too, and more capable of ranging farther afield, yet cod landings in the Gulf of Maine continued to drop precipitously from 1865 to 1890. Maine
fishermen exacerbated their own problems beginning in 1850 by engaging in internecine strife among themselves in the so-called menhaden wars. One group of fishermen began pursuing schools of menhaden in small vessels to render them for oil, while other fishermen protested the practice as destroying the forage base on which the already struggling cod and mackerel fisheries depended. Additional pressure on fishing stock occurred with the arrival of industrial canning in the late-nineteenth century with the consequent increase in the number of fish dealers and fishing merchants. While scientists at the United States Fish Commission, established in 1871, concluded in the 1880s that humans had little impact on supplies of cod, mackerel, and herring, a position with which G. Brown Goode in his monumental seven-volume *Fisheries and the Fisheries Industries in the United States* (Washington, DC, 1884-1887) agreed, fishermen themselves vigorously dissented and called upon the federal government to act to insure a sufficient stock of fish for future generations. Unhappily, over the protests of Mayor John F. Fitzgerald of Boston, speaking as long ago as 1912 for “the biggest fishing port in the western world” (243), the continued use of previously shunned mechanized bottom trawling in the twentieth century, combined with government lethargy, has left the former teeming fishing banks of the western North Atlantic virtually devoid of fish as we see them today. Bolster concludes, after what he terms five hundred years of ruthless human exploitation.

Bolster writes well, his sources are comprehensive, and he argues his positions persuasively. His maps, vintage photos, reproductions of marine paintings, his graphs and charts, and glossary of nautical terms and sketches of fish species in an appendix all enhance an already impressive work. *The Mortal Sea* should appeal to historians, environmentalists, scholars, and lay readers alike.

More important, after his dreary story of decay and decline, Bolster leaves us with some sense of hope for the future of the North Atlantic fisheries. Restoration of our seas, he notes, calls for vision, commitment, and action on the part of fishermen, politicians, and scientists, as well as an understanding by all parties of the sad history of the fishing trade. Five hundred years of fishing history shows us that more efficient harvesting technology is not a substitute for resource management. It should teach our generation too, he says, two simple rules: we as humans have a limited ability to control nature, and we cannot always bring about all the outcomes we want. Our course is to pilot our craft within these rules. A precautionary approach to sustainability through the lens of history should be our guide.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


From a time long past, the four-masted barque *Passat* lying at anchor in the German Baltic port of Travemünde, near the Hanseatic city of Lubeck, is a beautiful and vivid reminder of what sailing used to be. Over a century ago, *Passat* was launched in Hamburg, Germany. She sailed to South America with general cargo to exchange for nitrate destined for Europe. Later she transported grain from Australia to the old continent. In 1957, *Passat* was
decommissioned. Two years later she was purchased by the city of Lubeck, and is now a museum ship.

New knowledge on the reconstruction of standing and running rigging allowed Thomas Bottcher to write *Viermastbark PASSAT, eine Baudokumentation.* Baudokumentation means documentation of construction. It is a technical description of the rigging of a four-masted barque. The book is not, however, about techniques used or the quality of materials. Nor is it about the history of the *Passat* or sailing itself. Over a quarter of the book consists of a reprint of the 1910 *Bauvorschrift,* a truly tedious collection of ship-building regulations. Fortunately, the book is very graphic, with many drawings and photographs, since apart from the reprinted rules, there is little text. It does contain, however, more than 60 pages of photographs of the *Passat* under full sail at sea, showing the splendour of a ship in its element. These pictures give the best impression on life on board these great windjammers.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands


The biography begins with a summary of the Wilson family heritage and its emigration from Scotland to Clermont, New York, in 1784. The family became prominent in local society and political circles. Stephen Bayard Wilson was born in 1795 into an already large immediate family. In 1810, at the age of fourteen, he decided he wanted to follow the sea and journeyed to New York to seek a berth on a merchant vessel. His initial letter is to his father, detailing his efforts to seek a berth. Between 1810 and 1812 Stephen made three merchant voyages to Spain, Russia and India. In 1812, his family secured him an appointment as a midshipman in the U.S. Navy. As Stephen is on his way to India, the War of 1812 is declared and the appointment is put on hold. Upon their arrival in Calcutta, the crew of Stephen’s vessel is arrested and he is transported to Dartmoor Prison in England. He is assumed dead since there is no further correspondence with his family until he turns up in Charleston in 1816 after being released from Dartmoor. Stephen returns to Clermont and in July 1816, activates his appointment as a midshipman.

Boston harbour was Stephen’s initial duty assignment aboard the USS *Independence* where he remained until 1818. His letters to his family during this period deal mostly with his lack of funds and attempts to seek promotion. In August 1818, he is assigned to the new USS *Guerriere* for sea duty in the Mediterranean, where he served until 1820, still a midshipman. During this time, the Navy Department ordered that all midshipmen should take a written examination for promotion. Unfortunately for Stephen, the exams were to be given in the United States. Author Buss presents several of his lengthy letters describing the political and social atmosphere during his Mediterranean assignment. He briefly mentions the suspension of the American captains and the
assignment of new officers. Most of his other letters refer to family matters and requests for more letters about home. As she does throughout her book, Buss fills in gaps between letters with details of the family from additional documents in the Wilson papers.

Back in New York in 1820, Stephen was assigned to the USS Washington. He sat for the lieutenant’s examination but failed to pass due to a weakness in mathematics. By 1822, he had been assigned to duty in the West Indies and the Gulf of Mexico, serving on three different vessels chasing pirates. In 1821, between cruises, Stephen retook the lieutenant’s examination and this time succeeded. The promotion, however, was not made official until early 1825. He was given command of the USS Grampus and returned to duty in the West Indies. Stephen remained at sea until 1827 when was ordered to shore duty in Baltimore, Maryland. The next year was an eventful one with his marriage to Margaretta Sanderson in May of 1828 and the death of his father in December of the same year. Many of Stephan’s letters from 1829 deal with the settlement of his father’s estate.

In 1831, Stephen and Margaretta decided to purchase a farm, finally settling on Hickory Hill in Clermont, New York. Whenever Stephen was assigned shore duty, Margaretta and his ever growing family would move to a residence near his duty station. That June, Lt. Stephen Wilson was ordered to the frigate USS Potomac for a three-year cruise around the world sending only one letter to his family over this entire voyage dated 1832. The author fills in the history of the cruise with excerpts from Jeremiah N. Reynolds’ 1935 book The Voyage of the United States Frigate Potomac.

Detached from USS Potomac in late May of 1834, Stephen was granted a six-month leave of absence. He went home to his farm and family in Clermont, not returning to active duty until 1837. He then served at sea on five different vessels until 1843. While on this tour of duty Stephen was promoted to the rank of commander. He had spent most of his time in the West Indies and off the coast of South America.

Assigned to the Boston Navy by May 1845, he held the post for the next two years. Stephen moved his family from the farm in Clermont to the Boston area where, over the next two years, his letters to his family would deal mostly with the problems of renting proper quarters in Boston and the leasing and maintenance of the Clermont farm.

In August of 1847, Stephen was detached from the Boston Navy Yard and given a sea command. He and Margaret had decided to sell the Clermont farm and move to Hudson, New York, where the children would be able to attend good schools. During the Mexican War Stephen commanded five different vessels blockading both the east and west coasts of Mexico. Back in New York, his brother negotiated the sale of the Hickory Hill farm. Much of the correspondence relates to the transactions necessary for the sale. In early 1850, Stephen was transferred from sea duty to command of the receiving ship in New York. Again he moves his family, this time to Poughkeepsie, New York. Ordered back to sea, Stephen left New York in October of 1854 and remained at sea until 1855. His last command was the Cyane until September of 1855. He returned to Poughkeepsie and while awaiting new orders was promoted the rank of captain. His final letter found in the Wilson Family Papers is dated 8 July 1857, indicating that he was on his way to Washington, DC, to serve as a witness at a trial of an officer who had formerly served under him.

To follow the final years of Captain Wilson’s career, the author has assembled sources outside of the Wilson family papers.
Stephen was assigned to the command of the USS *Constellation* in May of 1859 and took along his son, Bayard, Jr. to serve as ship’s clerk. Shortly before their departure for Boston, where *Constellation* was docked, Stephen slipped on some ice and fractured his thigh bone. He continued the trip with Stephen, Jr., but could not continue command and asked to be relieved. His son remained with *Constellation* and served on her on the African Station. In January 1861, Stephen, Jr., took part in the capture of the slaver *Triton* on the Congo River and, while part of the prize crew sailing *Triton* to Norfolk, Virginia, Stephen, Jr. apparently contracted coast fever from members of the captured crew. He died at the age of eighteen on 2 June 1861. His body was buried in Bonetta Cemetery on Ascension Island where a modest tombstone was erected. Sixteen months later, on 15 March 1863 Captain Stephen Bayard Wilson passed away and was buried in the cemetery of St. Luke’s Church in Clermont, New York.

Buss presents an intimate look into the private life of Captain Wilson and the entire Wilson family. Using both letters and relevant documents from the family papers, she outlines the captain’s naval career, but perhaps more importantly, the everyday trials and tribulations incurred by a nineteenth-century naval family managing a life interrupted by duty at sea. It is a view of military families that is not often related.

Fred Hopkins
Baltimore, Maryland


Religion, military force, and nationalism or politics readily mix for volatile and combustible circumstances. This is, in part, exactly what occurred in the Indian Rebellion of 1857 that resulted in the nationalization and demise of the East India Company. Penelope Carson provides an exceptionally well-written and well-researched volume on a century and a half of efforts by the East India Company to address the religious concerns of those it employed (mostly Christian, Muslim, and Hindu), ecclesiastical and social leaders in Britain, and the Muslim and Hindu populations in which the Company operated. She capably demonstrates how the religious dynamics in Britain, especially evangelicalism, both within the Church of England and within nonconformist churches affected the political and economic dimensions of British life reaching far into India, the crown jewel of the colonial empire. The question that quickly arose for the East India Company was – on a daily and practical level – how should religious issues be addressed in the far-reaching and multi-faith empire in which the Company operated? The East India Company, steeped in Christianity, operated in a region where multiple faith traditions, among them Jains, Parsis, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jews, Muslims, Christians, and what Company officials termed “Hindoo.” Although the main purpose of the company was trade, religion and matters of religious freedom and accommodations quickly became concerns of policy and practice as the company dealt with its own employees and those under its governance. Whatever balance was achieved by the company was challenged as the nineteenth century progressed and Evangelicals increasingly called for free access of Christians of all denominations in India with a view to greater missionary efforts that would end “barbaric” religious views and practices by Hindus and Muslims and others in India. Christians wanted to evangelize India under the auspices and with the help of the East India Company
and directors of the company were fearful that proselytizing would create enormous social and economic instability that would ignite conflict in India and company efforts.

The author skillfully presents the story of the tensions faced by Christian officials who were repulsed by the religious practices and beliefs they found in India, but who also wanted to keep their Indian territory and resources stable and secure. Once the company became a sovereign power with an economic monopoly in the mid-eighteenth century, the stakes were even higher and pressures were greater in both India and Britain as the British government wrestled with British control in India. The story told in the volume is that of the integration, separation, and disintegration of religion, economics, and public policy. In 1813, when the company’s charter was under negotiation for renewal, Parliament was asked to consider whether or not the acquisition of empire entailed a duty of Christian evangelism and propagation of Christianity in the empire. In national policy and actions, answers were sought to second-century Christian apologist Justin Martyr’s questions “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” And within this question there was further debate regarding what expression of British Christianity would be pursued – the Established Church or all expressions of Protestantism (and some tolerance of Roman Catholicism).

The volume contains 19 chapters structured chronologically around the company’s history and presence in India. Into that history, the ebb and flow of the religious dynamics and policies and their effects are skillfully navigated. Chapters are nicely balanced, giving the reader a blend of history, policy, personality, and consequences for the actions of the company in India. Early in the company’s history there were evasions of the requirement by Parliament to provide chaplains aboard ships of 500 tons or more. There were also diplomatic challenges with respect to the political loyalties of Roman Catholic Portuguese priests and priests of other nationalities who ministered in geographic regions under company control and to Roman Catholic employees who were Irish, Spanish, and French. Concerns regarding religious disaffection among the sepoys or Indian soldiers employed to defend British India were high within the company and frequently at odds with the desires of political and religious leaders back in England, as well as with Christian missionaries seeking to work in India.

Behind policies and politics were personalities with strong values and views and the book does an excellent job of explaining the relationships, actions, and attitudes of such people. For example, chapter three surveys the religious and political alliance and efforts of friends William Wilberforce and Charles Grant. Through their friendship and positions in Parliament and for Grant, as a director and later chairman of the company, enormous influence was exerted for Christianity within the company and India.

In the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (also known as the Indian Uprising or Indian Mutiny), it was clear that the religious policies and practices of the East India Company failed to please any of the interested parties. Any perceived or real connections between the Christianity and the State were viewed as a liability with respect to the governance of India. Even though the numbers of missionaries was small in comparison to the population (360 Protestant missionaries working among 180 million Indians in 1858), there were enormous social and political ramifications of their work.

What began in the late 1600s and early 1700s as a question of providing chaplains aboard company ships, developed over the next century-and-a half into a much
larger debate about the role of religion and the British Empire. This is a remarkable and important historical study that stands as reminder to all to consider the interplay of religion, economics, politics, and power. To fail to do so can be tragic because values have consequences.

Timothy J. Demy
Newport, Rhode Island


Written by a former federal court judge and former United States Judge Advocate General officer, The Liberty Incident Revealed: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship (The Expanded and Revised Edition) purports to offer the reader the entirety of facts pertaining to the accidental attack by Israeli air force aircraft and naval assets on a United States ship testing new radio surveillance methods just outside Israeli waters. Captain Cristol states that 27 years after he began researching the incident, all the facts are now available. Unfortunately, he contradicts this in several places, usually by some variation of “some of the intercept technology of 1967 probably still requires security classification …” (30), or “for reasons unknown …,” both of which refute his earlier assertion that he has gathered all extant information pertaining to the attack. Despite the remarkable amount of research Cristol has obviously undertaken, these inconsistencies, coupled with his frequent appeals to authority, left this reader dissatisfied and with a certain amount of mistrust for Cristol’s claims.

Constructed along the lines of a legal argument, the book is heavy with facts and, while written exceedingly well for a legal document, it makes for poor reading. The reader is so quickly overwhelmed by facts that it is difficult to maintain any level of interest for longer than a handful of pages. Political correctness is obviously of great importance to Cristol, for he heavily emphasizes the accidental nature of the incident and works very hard to avoid placing blame on any party. As a study of international military law and international relations, The Liberty Incident is an excellent tome; as a volume of historical fact, it is an ideal text for specialists in Near East studies; as a book for undergraduates and arm-chair historians, however, it fails … unless the reader has a high tolerance for slow, pedantic, and rhetorical prose. This is not to say Cristol’s work is not excellent or interesting, rather, it is merely indicative that Cristol is not the world’s most engaging writer.

To support his assertion that the incident was entirely accidental, Cristol includes detailed and interesting maps, illustrations, charts, and the like. This is solid material for scholars interested in the Near East. Cristol also provides comprehensive comparisons of audiotapes and other materials from the Israelis and the United States naval records, an excellent inclusion. He provides only a selected bibliography, however, a practice this reviewer finds frustrating. Nevertheless, his index is adequate and his substantive end notes are remarkable.

In sum, The Liberty Incident Revealed: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship is worth the time and effort required to read it, but is neither for slouches nor for casual historians.

Ambjorn L. Adomeit
London, Ontario

At first glance, Sören Dannhauer’s book, translated as The German Rice Trade from 1850 to 1914: The Central Role of Bremen and the Family Rickmers in a world-wide Food Market, seems to appeal to a select audience of historical scholars and trade enthusiasts. Dannhauer, whose labour of love originated as his doctoral dissertation, studied political science at the Carl-von-Ossietzky University at Oldenburg and history at the University of Bremen, where his passion for nineteenth and twentieth century political, social, and maritime history flourished, influencing his research methodology and approach to history. Aside from chronicling the lifetime achievements of three generations of Rickmers and their family business in Bremen and northern Germany, Dannhauer’s book presents, in exquisite detail, how German (or Bremen) entrepreneurs came to dominate the world-wide rice trade throughout the later nineteenth century. The book combines a myriad of thematic approaches with the author’s own interests to create a scholarly contribution to the developing historiography of trade, in this case “Globalisierungsgeschichte.”

Dannhauer’s earlier chapters provide a detailed background to many of the histories within the book. Beginning with the introduction, Dannhauer draws us a clear road map, shifting from the early historiography and origins of the Rickmers family and their business, to world-wide rice cultivation and its use in society, to delve, finally, into his own research methodology. Dannhauer’s adherence to “Globalisierungsgeschichte,” or “globalization history,” centres on the essential categories of political decision-making; economic change, technological development, communication, and market adjustment. All of these reflect Dannhauer’s objective and serve as pillars supporting and connecting all facets of the Rickmers’ business.

The background history begins with early rice cultivation practices in North America, where rice became an integral part of the colonial economy in South Carolina and Georgia, employing slave labour for commercial gains. Although Dannhauer does not discuss the North American contribution in depth, he notes the shift in the epicentre of rice cultivation to Southeast Asia by the early nineteenth century, mainly due to the new American nation’s economic estrangement from Europe. Land and maritime exploration directed European attention to the Asian trade as western entrepreneurs sought to exploit various commodities, such as rice. While rice cultivation was certainly possible in regions such as Siam, India, and French-Indochina, it was the fertile lands of Burma (now Myanmar) that succeeded in meeting the demand. As the British began annexing and colonizing parts of Burma, western businessmen seized the opportunity to grab a piece of the empire. Eventually, capital cities like Rangoon became imperial hotbeds of international trade and business, where professionals and skilled workers converged based on the promise of work and possibly, a better life. As Dannhauer points out however, while the British amply provided Burma with administrative oversight, German entrepreneurs thrived on the day-to-day trade.

Unlike the British, the German perspective on maintaining commercial
operations involved seeking a cultural understanding of the indigenous population. German traders learned the local languages by living alongside the Burmese, which allowed the creation of better working relationships and, ultimately, enabled them to dominate the market. Rickmer Classen Rickmers, a Bremen native and father of the Rickmers enterprise, got an early taste for life on the open seas during the Napoleonic wars, smuggling goods between Heligoland and Bremen. Soon after, Rickmers’ professional life evolved from working as an employed ship’s carpenter and builder to running his own ship-building firm, producing top-quality vessels such as the first German clipper, *Ida Ziegler*, which was showcased at the 1867 Paris International Exposition. Oddly refusing to adopt or adapt to technological changes in shipbuilding, such as the conversion from wood to iron and sail to steam, Rickmers saw his sales stagnate so significantly that, as Dannhauer remarks, he couldn’t give his ships away. Fortunately, a new business adventure materialized in 1872 when Rickmers bought into the former Konitzky rice mill in Bremen with Eduard Ichon. By 1878, Rickmers had bought out Ichon’s half-share, fully intending to establish his own rice mill between Bremerhaven and Geestemünde. After Rickmers’ death in 1886, his three sons, Andreas Classen, Peter Andreas, and Wilhelm Heinrich Rickmers, along with grandson Paul Henry Rickmers, assumed leadership of the family enterprise. Each brought his unique skills from ship construction to administrative oversight to the establishment of new rice mills in the towns of Hannoversch Münden and Osterholz. This ultimately transformed the Rickmers enterprise into an all-inclusive corporation, the German Aktiengesellschaft, or the 1901 Rice and Trade AG, which allowed the Rickmers to dominate the Bremen rice trade by the First World War.

Dannhauer fills the remainder of the book with excruciatingly keen detail about late-nineteenth century German commerce. He supplements his analysis of early global exchange with a discussion of the economic fluctuations of the German rice trade, the multiple uses of rice in textiles, cosmetics, and animal fodder, changes in the corporate and labour climate between Europe and Asia, and lastly, the future of the German rice trade post-1918. With comprehensive tables and charts derived from extensive legwork throughout European state and family archives, Dannhauer’s book is indeed a “Gesamtkunstwerk” of research, methodology, and genuine interest. Overall, Dannhauer’s scholarly contribution to “globalisation history” provides further discourse for the ever-changing field of history.

Christopher Pearcy
Virginia Beach, Virginia


The traditional story of convoy HX 84 is well known to those interested in the naval actions of the Second World War. This was the first convoy to be attacked by a surface raider and history has immortalized the action between the convoy’s only escort, the Armed Merchant Cruiser (AMC) HMS *Jervis Bay* and Admiral Scheer. Captain E.S.F. Fegen, commanding *Jervis Bay*, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his gallant attempt to halt the raider in a short and sharp action whose results were inevitable. Once the AMC was sunk, the raider ran wild in an attempt to sink as many ships as possible before continuing on
with what would be become one of the most successful raids on commerce by a German surface warship.

With this in mind, it is quite conceivable that with such an important and well-known action during the Battle of the Atlantic, there was little new material to be presented. Bernard Edwards shatters this illusion with his latest book providing a plethora of new aspects to the story in a very engaging fashion. The author does a fine job of explaining the strategic backdrop to the convoy action and the events leading up to it. Readers are introduced to both sides and are familiar with the situation before battle is joined.

It is well known that *Admiral Scheer*’s B-Dienst intelligence team knew of HX 84 and the interception was no accident. For the German raider, running across the merchant *Mopan*, steaming independently was an unwelcome delay, but the latter’s captain chose to save the lives of his crew rather than be sunk while broadcasting an RRR warning. Nevertheless, the smoke from the sinking *Mopan* was sighted by the convoy which went on alert. Interesting to note is that this was not the first warning that not all was well in the area. A third officer of one of the merchant vessels had spotted a float plane, *Admiral Scheer*’s – which could not be identified as such, but was known to be from a warship for certain. For one reason or another, this information was never passed on to the Admiralty by either the commodore or Captain Fegen.

Initially mistaken for a British R-class battleship, *Admiral Scheer* was soon made out and *Jervis Bay* swung out to engage as HX 84 scattered behind her. Although there could be no question of the outcome, considering the impossible odds, the author notes that *Jervis Bay* lasted over 20 minutes in action and even more importantly, forced the raider to expend 335 shells. Furthermore, the firing disabled *Admiral Scheer*’s forward radar and thus eliminated the raider’s night advantage.

What has been seriously overlooked in previous literature is what transpired as the raider descended upon the 37 fleeing ships. The Canadian Pacific steamer *Beaverford*, commanded by Captain Hugh Pettigrew and armed with nothing more than the typical 4-inch gun on the stern and a single 3-inch on her bow, decided not to go quietly. One of her shells landed close enough to the raider that her full attention turned to the merchantman. Captain Pettigrew had, in fact, made the conscious decision to become HX-84’s protector, taking his ship out of cover and engaging the German warship. This he did with considerable skill as the *Beaverford*’s action lasted an unbelievable four hours before she finally succumbed to shellfire. After the sinking of the *Beaverford*, *Admiral Scheer* achieved only one more success that night, largely by chance. Having been in action for ten hours and forced to expend one-third of his ammunition thanks to two gunnery duels, Theodore Kranke made the decision to break off action with his raider and steamed on into the South Atlantic.

Two more “unknown” merchant ships made a great contribution to the battle. The Swedish *Stureholm*, commanded by Sven Olander, rescued the survivors from *Jervis Bay*, many of them having spent ten hours in the water, and decided to return to Halifax. *Gloucester City*, a convoy rescue ship of the dispersed OB 237 steamed as fast as she could and the day following the action rescued seven boatloads of survivors from four ships, totalling 92 men. The author also mentions that while a single merchant vessel was able to accomplish this, a group of “four-stacker” Royal Navy destroyers that were ordered to the scene after the Admiralty received the initial reports, reported finding nothing in the same area.
It is these contributions by the merchantmen that the author wants to ensure are not forgotten and, indeed, he recognizes the Beaverford, Stureholm, and Gloucester City for their key roles. Given Edwards’ background in the merchant navy, it is evident that his focus is on the history of the merchant ships. Nevertheless, the research in this book is excellent and the quality shows despite the absence of footnotes. The only thing that this reviewer can point out is that although Edwards mentions Admiral Hipper’s abortive effort to attack convoy WS5A, he does state that no ships were sunk. According to Arnold Hague’s work on Allied convoys, the convoy was dispersed and did not reform until several days later. Besides these minor nagging comments from a naval historian, there is little else to critique.

Edwards promises to tell the “full” story of the battle of HX 84 and this he has achieved with skill. The biggest contribution the book makes is bringing the merchant ship’s sacrifice out from the depths of history and making their story known within the greater story that was the Convoy battle of HX 84 on 6 November 1940.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


Too often, the study of history is considered just an endless succession of names, places, dates, and battles. Good history is more than a chronicle or a simple accounting of impersonal events. Good history can be a deeply engaging story. Fortunately, that is what Greg Flemming has produced with At the Point of a Cutlass: The Pirate Capture, Bold Escape, and Lonely Exile of Philip Ashton. Based chiefly on Ashton’s own account, published nearly 300 years ago, Flemming’s book details the capture, ordeal, and eventual return of Massachusetts fisherman Philip Ashton between 1723 and 1725. Along with Ashton’s amazing tale of survival, Flemming captures a sense of the golden age of piracy. The reader is hauled up and down the east coast of North America, circled around the Caribbean, and even transported to Europe and Africa tracing the movements of some of the most notorious pirates of the age.

In the first chapter Flemming introduces the main character, Philip Ashton, as well as the pirate who captured him, Edward Low. The two meet when Low’s crew captures the small fishing vessel containing Ashton and other fishermen off the coast of New England. Mainly from Ashton’s account, the following chapter tells of Ashton’s resistance to joining the pirate crew and his harrowing experiences on board as a captive. Ashton finally finds himself with a split-second decision to make as an opportunity arises to leave the ship for the island of Roatan (off the coast of modern day Belize). Ashton boards a longboat with seven pirates sent to shore to retrieve fresh water. In one of the more detailed sections of the book, Flemming recounts Ashton’s careful maneuvering away from the pirates and into the thickness of the island jungle.

Once free from the pirates, Ashton faces starvation and mosquitoes, and even encounters the occasional passerby. Unbeknownst to him, Roatan sits along a path taken by ships transporting logwood from the mainland to various parts of the Caribbean and beyond. This trade was also part of a territorial dispute between the Spanish and English. The Baymen, sailors
and labourers who cut and hauled the logwood, were just as wary of pirates as they were of ships bearing the flag of an opposing country. Despite being marooned on a deserted island, Ashton found himself in the middle of an international tug-of-war. In April 1725, a British warship, HMS *Diamond*, along with several brigantines bound for New England, anchored just off Roatan. Ashton spotted the vessels and shortly thereafter made contact with a few sailors who had taken a longboat to shore to fill their water casks. Ironically, the same need that had driven the pirates to shore to allow Ashton’s initial escape also granted him his freedom from the island. The emaciated Ashton was allowed passage back to New England on one of the brigantines. By May 1725, Ashton had returned home.

Ashton’s ordeal became known to New England minister John Barnard, who facilitated its writing and publication. Barnard’s motivation was to show how the godly Ashton had survived due to his faith in God and his resistance to the unsavory and immoral pirates. Without Barnard spearheading the publication of the work, *Ashton’s Memorial* may never have been published. Flemming strongly claims that the published work was read by Daniel Defoe and influenced Defoe’s novel, *The Four Years Voyages of Capt. George Roberts*, published in 1726. The follow-up to that most famous of shipwreck narratives, *The Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*, *George Roberts* includes several details that could only have been taken from *Ashton’s Memorial*. Defoe even names the pirate captain Edward Low and his quartermaster Francis Spriggs. We get a sense of the worry of the Baymen hiding on Roatan from their leader dubbed “Father Hope.” From Ashton himself, if one is to take his published narrative as his own words, the reader is privy to his struggles resisting Low’s pirate crew and his moral reasons for doing so.

A story with so many characters, places, ship names, and locations could easily get confusing. At times, the book struggles with this but Flemming always manages to bring his reader back to Ashton and the main trunk of the story before the details become overwhelming. A few times, Flemming introduces segments that seem tangential to Ashton’s story. An anecdote about the infamous pirate Henry Morgan, or the experiences of Boston minister John Barnard, appear at first to have little to do with Ashton. To Flemming’s credit, however, his use of these passages fills in yet more gaps and leads the reader to a deeper understanding of the individuals who interact in Ashton’s story.

There are few details regarding the end of Ashton’s life. Flemming states that he returned to fishing and likely died at sea sometime in his 40s. As for his captor, Edward Low, the existing records do not reveal his fate. This paucity of facts could easily be over-romanticized, but Flemming does a good job of sticking to his evidence in making conclusions.

With a tale involving widespread
locales and little-known islands, a more comprehensive map would be a welcome addition. Flemming includes a few tantalizing photos of Roatan Island, but these provide only scant imagery to go along with the fantastic story. The reproductions of eighteenth century maps of Nova Scotia and the Caribbean are too small to be of much use in tracking events of the story. In attempting to flesh out a personal story with ship’s logs, court records, and newspaper articles, the narrative can appear a bit disjointed at times and an overall map of Ashton’s journey would be a useful way to track the events in the book. Even a careful reader will have to occasionally backtrack to double-check names and places.

For an academic reader, Flemming’s synthesis of information is well done. Gleaning the necessary details from records three centuries old is never an easy task and those who study the period will appreciate Flemming’s attention to detail and thorough endnotes. For any reader, At the Point of a Cutlass is an amazing tale of adventure, danger, and survival. Philip Ashton really was captured, lived among pirates, escaped, and became a castaway on a remote Caribbean island. Even more remarkably, he made it back home to tell the tale. Ashton himself likely never knew the impact his story would have even in his own lifetime. We are lucky someone in our lifetime came along to situate Ashton in his rightful place in maritime history.

Shane Bell
Atlanta, Georgia


Palgrave Macmillan has embarked on a series of volumes entitled “Britain and the World” which covers empire and cultural themes, largely within the past two centuries, and is edited by the British Scholar Society. Barry Gough’s latest book, Pax Britannica, forms an important and impressive part of the series, which includes volumes such as Imperial Endgame, Ordering Independence, Sport and the British World and British Images of Germany. Most readers would be familiar, in an offhand way, with the term Pax Britannica, without any clear idea of what it really means. A typical view might be: “It is part of that ancient time during which Great Britain dominated the world, usually to the detriment of everyone else, and which is thankfully, safely in the rear-view mirror.” That this is facile and ill-informed is no doubt axiomatic for members of the CNRS, but its rebuttal by Gough is an important addition to the literature and he clearly articulates the reality of the term and what it means for us today.

Gough covers the period from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the outbreak of the First World War. This century was certainly not as peaceful as some might have it, but the upheaval it experienced was not as all-consuming as the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic period. The wars that occurred after Napoleon’s were either of short duration, such as the wars of German and Italian unification or the Crimean War, or were the minor colonial scuffles of a G.H. Henty adventure in scale and flavour. One must exclude the bloodletting of the American Civil War, since that conflict’s relevance to the wider world was marginal. And, one might also wonder at considering the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War in the last years of the peaceable century as being “minor,” but compared to the vast European conflict at the turn of the nineteenth century, and the one to come at the conclusion of
Gough’s period, they were indeed of a lesser order. It is in this context that the *Pax Britannica* was established and imposed, and this is Gough’s subject.

*Pax Britannica* arose out of the struggle with France that ended at Waterloo in 1815. The preceding 60 years had seen British naval predominance grow until it was unrivaled and its control of the seas unchallenged. Britain’s early industrialization, sophisticated finance and insurance markets led to a trading behemoth that leveraged its naval dominance and kept the sea routes open and safe. These factors were underpinned by an intellectual preference for free trade with anyone, combined with the readily available markets within the formal empire. Britain used its navy to impose its will on the seaborne forces of rivals, as well as using the inherent flexibility of its warships to land troops to deal with troubles wherever they arose. At the same time, Britain also adopted policies that were more neutral, such as the active surveying of coastal waters around the globe, building on the legacy of individuals such as Captain James Cook in the middle to late decades of the eighteenth century. More aggressively, and with a strong moral and ethical foundation, Britain also endeavoured, with mixed results, but ultimately with success, to suppress both simple piracy and to end the slave trade (in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans). Closely associated with the latter matter, Britain strongly supported its missionary activities and actively spread the Christian gospel to the four corners of the world. Underpinning the entire enterprise was an unwavering commitment to law, to justice, and to British institutions, ethics and culture. The ultimate outcome of the *Pax Britannica* was a prosperous, advanced, largely peaceful world that was open to commerce and ideas to an extent never before experienced. Was all this self-interested? Of course. But the achievements were very real none the less.

Gough has organized his thorough analysis of the *Pax Britannica* topically and geographically rather than chronologically. He commences with a preface that introduces his themes, a prologue that sets the scene, and then opens with a chapter on what the *Pax Britannica* was – notably by observing that the term is retrospective, and was of organic growth and establishment rather than a coherent and consistent national strategy. Gough then provides chapters on the Royal Navy of the period, along with an outline of the empire as it existed and grew throughout the century. Of interest, and contrary to the common view, Gough notes that much of the empire’s growth was reluctant, with many examples of London repudiating the acquisitive actions of the “man on the spot,” largely on the grounds of expense and the desire not to provoke hostile reaction without cause. (For example, on visiting Hawaii, one might notice that the state flag incorporates the Union Jack as a legacy of the British presence, although ultimate possession was conceded to the United States. This need not have happened had Britain been more aggressive.) If trade could be maintained without formal empire, it was much to be preferred.

Next, Gough examines surveying the seas and coastlines, an activity that was constant throughout the period and a benefit that remains to this day. Chapters on the informal empire of the Americas, activities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and dealing with piracy and the slave trade follow. It is a complex story that suits the organizational approach adopted by Gough well.

The final chapters deal with the last decades of the *Pax Britannica* period and the competition with Germany that provided the impetus for the breakdown of the entire structure. There are many elements to the story of the rivalry with Germany, but the
key for Gough is to note how it forced Britain into the alliance system that dominated Europe and led to the continental commitment. In turn, the resulting First World War crippled Britain’s financial and economic power and led to the Pax Britannica’s eclipse and decline. Admittedly, there was a flowering in the between-war decades, but it was a last gasp. The trident was unambiguously passed to the United States after the Second World War, and the unravelling of the empire accelerated in the 25 years that followed to its ultimate demise into the rump that remains (and likely always will). Gough leaves the question open as to whether the American version will be as significant and enduring.

The book is thoroughly researched, making use of both primary and extensive secondary resources, with detailed chapter notes, as well as an annotated bibliography. The only maps included in the book are the end papers, which show the empire in 1815 and then in 1914. It would have been of some benefit to have provided more detailed regional maps at the appropriate points in the narrative. This is not a major omission. The photos included are very well chosen, and the selection clearly indicates the author’s Canadian nationality, with many coming from the archives in Esquimalt. Having this focus on the Canadian element of the Pax Britannica period is a nice touch; however, there are many other illustrations from other corners of the empire, so nothing is truly neglected. My only complaint with the book’s production is the selection of the font, which is rather small. This might be a sign more of advancing decrepitude on my part than anything else, but I would have appreciated a larger font at the cost of increased book length. No doubt the publisher had different priorities.

Gough has produced a fine history of a poorly understood feature of British and Imperial history, and has successfully pulled together a wide range of seemingly disparate topics into a coherent whole. Future students of the empire in general, as well as those focusing on naval policy, diplomacy and trade will have much with which to engage. I have no trouble in recommending this book accordingly.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


Geirr Haarr’s first Naval Institute volumes on the battles for Norway in 1940 have been described as “monumental and unsurpassed.” This volume, to some extent a widening of those volumes’ history, extends that deserved praise. Covering just the first seven months of the expanding struggle at sea with meticulous research (his references cover seven and one-half pages, from primary documents to newspapers of the day, with 38 pages of notes, many worth reading in themselves), Haarr tells in careful and impartial detail both the wider story of the growing U-boat battles, the new air war at sea, and the world-wide German panzerkreig of the heavily armed raiders. He intersperses this extensive picture with a careful re-telling of such exploits as the sinking of the Athenia, Prien’s attack on Scapa Flow, the Norwegian side of the “Altmark affair,” and several early U-boat attacks and counter attacks. His narrative style is both carefully crafted and yet mesmerising. Even though one tends to know the stories in general, his expanded research makes each a new assessment.

Possibly the most illuminating and
valuable pages, even for historians familiar with the field, are Haarr’s appendices. I had not really appreciated how much had been happening in the “war at sea” even in those first months, often referred to as “the phoney war.” In fact, 232 merchant ships were sunk in the fall of 1939 alone; 35 German ships were captured; 26 Allied warships were sunk in the seven months. There were 11 German destroyer mine-laying operations off U.K. estuaries and convoy routes, resulting in the probable loss of 64 ships. Other appendices list the names and some details of the RN’s 49 Armed Merchant Cruisers in operation during the period, and the German and British mine-layers in commission, a detail usually glossed over in previous histories. Other details include the tonnages of iron ore shipments (one of the two basic reasons for the German invasion) and Norway’s protective minefields that were laid or planned. While this detail is available elsewhere, it is not as carefully tabulated, and is fascinating in itself.

The stories featured in Haarr’s narrative are based on many of these tables. He evaluates the status of the various potential combatants just before the war’s outbreak, and quotes commanders-in-chief regarding their plans and reactions to the enemy’s early operations. There are chapters on early operations in German home waters, on “the winter war,” the introduction of anti-shipping air strikes, and the successes and unexpected shortcomings of asdic as the anticipated solution to the German adoption of U-boat warfare. Haarr not only recounts these many stories but links them to the wider and rapidly changing struggle, and impartially assesses the results. The book ends with two chapters, “Storm Warning” and “Conclusions,” the latter reflecting Haarr’s opinion that by failing to win the early naval war quickly, the German Navy, partly hindered by maintenance difficulties and a far-too-early start of the conflict for their preparations, could never have won the Battle of the Atlantic.

This is a difficult book to read straight through, but a most rewarding one to dip into at any point and re-think one’s assessment of individual actions or the sweep of events from such an often-neglected period. There are many photographs, often unique and of high quality, while the charts of a few actions are both clear and readable. The reader gains the impression that, even though the Norwegians became allies, Haarr has taken a relatively neutral stand in not only his narrative but his assessments. This book would be well worth acquiring for any naval library.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


The year’s Warship annual follows the themes of previous issues, providing technical descriptions of a variety of interesting warship types, new and old. Three of these articles deal with aircraft carriers – Italian, British and Japanese – and four with warship classes of the past, German, Japanese, French and Russian. There is an analysis of fire control in the Royal Navy in the post-Second World War period, and a very interesting account of the escape of the uncompleted French battleship Jean Bart from St. Nazaire in June 1940. There are also the usual “notes,” book reviews and gallery of photographs.

For the aircraft carrier articles, retired Italian Navy Commodore Michele
Consentino in his first contribution to *Warship* provides a very detailed description of the versatile Italian aircraft-carrier *Cavour*, which can operate Harrier jets and helicopters of various types besides being able to embark assault troops with their vehicles and equipment and having a dock for landing craft; all this on a displacement of 27,500 tonnes. The evolution of its design from the earlier and smaller *Garibaldi* is described and the article is illustrated with excellent photographs, plans, cross-sections and perspective drawings. Rather similar treatment is given by Ian Sturton to “CVA-01: Portrait of a Missing Link” but this time the few photographs are only of the aircraft she would have embarked, because the ship was never built. CVA-01 would have been the first post-war designed carrier for the Royal Navy but her size and complexity was almost too much for a British shipbuilding industry in decline and none of the shipbuilding firms was anxious to take it on, even in consortium. The project was cancelled in February 1966. Hans Lengerer, who has contributed many articles on the Japanese navy, describes the third carrier featured, the Japanese Second World War light carrier *Ryujo*. Again the detailed descriptions with plans and illustrations take the reader through the initial design and two reconstructions. *Ryujo* was lost in August 1942.

Turning to the more historical features, *The Last of the Line* by Aidan Dodson is a history of the last two classes of German pre-Dreadnought battleships. It is not a detailed technical description but an account of their service and changing appearance illustrated with many photographs and elevations. In the post-First World War period, four of these obsolete ships were all that were allowed to the German Navy by the Versailles treaty and, in fact, two of them were operational right to the end of the Second World War.

As a sequel to his article in *Warship 2011* on the *Dupuy-de-Lome*, Luc Feron has provided a full description of the *Amiral Charner* class French cruisers which immediately followed that ship in the early 1890s and were much more successful, three of them giving useful service in the First World War. Stephen McLaughlin continues his series on early Russian ironclads with a description of four turret ships named for famous Russian admirals. Combined with his previous articles on the *Pervenets* class floating batteries, the ten Ericson monitors and the three Coles monitors, this completes his coverage of the early coast defense ships and we should next expect him to turn his attention to the seagoing ironclads of the 1870s. A fourth such article by Kathrin Milanovitch describes the eight Japanese armoured cruisers that fought in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), with some interesting comments on the reasons behind their design.

At the end of the Second World War, the Royal Navy found itself well behind the United States Navy in anti-aircraft fire control. “Post-War Fire Control in the Royal Navy” by Peter Marland, a former weapons engineer, describes the RN’s efforts to catch up to the USN. It was well into the 1960s before anything near a comparable level was reached. The photographs and diagrams show the bulky equipment and consoles of that pre-digital age.

With his two recent books on the French battleships and cruisers of the inter-war period, *Warship* editor John Jordan has established himself as an authority on that country’s navy. Here he tells how, as the German army closed in, the uncompleted battleship *Jean Bart* escaped from St. Nazaire, managed to rendezvous with a small tanker to get just enough fuel and, with some destroyers as escort, made her slow way to Casablanca where she stayed.
In November 1942 when the Allies invaded North Africa she was able, with her single heavy gun turret, to fire from her berth at the invasion fleet until disabled by heavy American bombing. The Jean Bart eventually ran her trials in 1949 and it was 1955 before she was finally completed.

Each Warship volume is interesting in itself, but it is as a series that it is most valuable and is well worth the shelf space a set of them occupies.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


At first glance, Drew Keeling’s The Business of Transatlantic Migration appears to be a comprehensive, tedious volume of early twentieth-century shipping statistics and immigration figures. Upon closer examination, though, Keeling’s work is a rich, creative study of the intersection of migration, business, and policy in the North Atlantic from 1900 to 1914. Keeling makes important connections among the shipping companies, the migrant passengers using them, and the role of governments in controlling that migration. The author brilliantly conceives a framework to analyze the risks of transatlantic shipping and the ways shipping lines, immigrants and nations mitigated those risks in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century. As a result, The Business of Transatlantic Migration serves as a major contribution in the fields of business history, immigration history, and shipping history.

Keeling seeks to understand the “causality between migration and [its] transport mechanisms,” by focusing “on the oceanic crossing” (xvi). While analyzing why immigrants voluntarily migrated across the Atlantic, he attempts to “address the fundamental causes of modern mass migration, through systematic explication of its fundamental processes” (xix). His larger purpose is to offer insights into contemporary migration movements, a project that he supplements with his “Business of Migration” website, at www.business-of-migration.com. Unlike other histories that focus on either business or migration, Keeling’s book avoids covering any specific company, industry or ethnic group. Instead, he produces an innovative approach to understanding the forces that affected migration between Europe and the United States in this 14-year period. The result is a text that is accessible to the general reader as well as the seasoned scholar.

In seven chapters, Keeling examines the pushes and pulls, the risks and rewards that motivated immigrants and shipping companies to make these transatlantic crossings a common occurrence in the early twentieth century. Chapter one describes the influences of European migration and the rise of the steam ship industry in the nineteenth century. Chapters two through four explore the economics, shipping capitalists, and fare wars of the era. Chapters five through seven examine immigration policy on both sides of the Atlantic, the emergence of “repeat migration” and the modification of onboard berthing to improve passenger accommodations. Throughout the book are useful statistical tables, hand-drawn charts, cartoons, and photos. Each subsection is annotated with an outline number and title, and Keeling’s footnotes are a treasure trove of primary and secondary sources complete with descriptive notes for those wishing to investigate further. At the end of the book
are over 40 pages of appendices that supplement Keeling’s observations and conclusions. All of these features make *The Business of Transatlantic Migration* a navigable narrative that can also serve as a reference for further research in twentieth-century shipping and immigration.

If there are any shortfalls to this history, they may result from Keeling’s approach of merging statistical analysis with an historical narrative, occasionally giving his chapters the look and feel of a shareholder report for a major company. By the middle of the book, however, Keeling’s style and method effectively convey the relationship between supply and demand for transatlantic passages, and the ability of the prospective travelers to afford the cost of migrating from Europe to the United States. The author supplements discoveries derived from his primary research by placing them in context with the larger narrative of previous efforts in the field of immigration history. The seminal works of J.D. Gould, Oscar Handlin, and John Higham are all included in the bibliography.

Keeling’s central figures in this story create a recognizable touchstone for his argument. In addition to the European groups that voyaged to America in the first decade of the twentieth century, readers will be familiar with Theodore Roosevelt, J.P. Morgan, and the tragic voyage of the *Titanic*. Perhaps not as familiar, but clearly among the main characters in this study are the four major shipping lines of that era: the Cunard Line, North German Lloyd (NDL), White Star, and the Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG). Shipping executives Albert Ballin and Joseph Bruce Ismay are also important to understanding the business interests of the transatlantic industry on the eve of the First World War.

*The Business of Transatlantic Migration* wonderfully recounts the successes and shortfalls experienced by these shipping giants. Just as refreshing is Keeling’s ability to make the immigrants an equally significant human force in this story. He astutely observes that the migrants, shipping line executives, and the governments managed all of the risks of transoceanic travel save one—an implosion of the global system that occurred during the First World War. The Great War ended a unique period of “mass relocation as a major global travel business,” but as the author concludes, the march of population relocation globalization has endured (268). This book is an important contribution to understanding that march.

Jon Scott Logel  
Portsmouth, Rhode Island


Roger Knight’s *Britain Against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory, 1793-1815* is the culminating work of his exploration of the British Government’s efforts to preserve the country and defeat the French and their assortment of allies during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Touching only briefly on the battles that form the usual narrative of the story, Knight places the efforts of the people and departments that ran the war for Britain in the foreground; the politicians, appointed heads of departments, secretaries and clerks. He lays out the development in government bureaucracy, the organization of the army and navy, and the growth in industry to meet the scale of production necessary to wage the 22 years of war that swept across Europe, spilling over to spots around the
globe. Knight turns the focus from the manoeuvring and combat on the field of battle to the struggle of politics and logistics to send, maintain, and operate British and allied forces. The book makes clear the massive scope of the effort to defend the island nation between 1793 and 1815.

The book is divided into four sections. The first sets out the context and early preparations that Britain made for future wars in the decade prior to 1793. After the American Revolution, Britain turned its attention to the balance of power in Europe and worked to secure new sources of materials needed to maintain its navy and develop new commerce. A naval competition between France and Britain led to increases in naval funding and creation of a sufficiently prepared fleet to readily meet continental threats. William Pitt’s willingness to finance the navy in a time of peace (among other revisions to British finances) is seen as the key to Britain’s preparedness at the outbreak of the French Revolution.

The second section focuses on the first eight years of conflict between Britain and France but two chapters do extend the discussion up to 1812. Knight suggests that the war was waged much like other eighteenth-century wars with battles in Europe, colonies attacked, alliances formed and broken, and naval engagements in European waters. The difference is one of scale. The French Revolutionary War enveloped a much larger geographical area and required far more resources. At first, the British were not prepared for war on this new scale, best exemplified by Knight’s discussion of the 1796 effort to seize the French colonies in the West Indies. Abercromby’s mission to the West Indies stretched British resources to the breaking point. The response to the problems encountered was to revamp how the bureaucracy worked, stressing efficiencies, timeliness and accuracy of the work. This, in turn, resulted in the hiring of additional secretaries and hundreds of clerks to process the information needed to conduct the war. Knight devotes a chapter to discussing how developing intelligence about enemy movements (both martial and political) became crucial. Of critical importance was the construction of a telegraph system to communicate vital information quickly from the ships arriving in England to London. The next two chapters outline the victualing and transportation needs and stretch the section’s narrative to 1812. Feeding both the navy and army required the accumulation, processing, packaging and transportation of a significant portion of the island’s food resources, not without local protest. Coordinating the effort to send the appropriate amount of supplies to a squadron at sea or an army fighting on the continent was continually refined, perhaps best exemplified by Britain’s success in maintaining Admiral Saumarez in the Baltic between 1808 and 1812. Transportation also involved moving regiments around the coast of Europe and into the far colonies. This logistical nightmare was gradually smoothed into more successful operations as the war continued. Using merchant vessels as transports allowed the navy to amass the required numbers of ships, while practice perfected the art of landing and removing thousands of troops and their tons of equipment.

Section three turns to the political situation in Britain between 1801 and 1815, the threat of invasion and the growth of the armament industry. Rather than seriously impeding the war effort, Knight reveals that during the political turmoil from Pitt’s death to the ascendancy of Lord Liverpool in 1812, Britain’s ability to wage war steadily improved. The threat of invasion served to unite most of the British population behind the war effort. It resulted in the building of massive fortifications and a defensive line of blockhouses along the coast and changes
to militia laws to arm the nation to resist French invaders. Changing governments led to the uncovering of irregularities within the Admiralty and Navy Board, the Military Department and in the Board of Ordnance. Most importantly, this led to improved accounting procedures – the last necessary major development in the various departments during the period.

The growth of the industrial complex needed to arm and outfit the army and navy was an essential element in the victory over Napoleon. Large manufacturing and assembly plants were constructed in British cities, most notably, the block mills at Portsmouth. Extremely expensive, these various factories allowed Britain to supply, repair and replace naval and army materiel to maintain their forces at sea or in the field far better than any opponent. The production capacity repeatedly allowed Britain to supply its allies’ armies with tens of thousands of firearms and their accoutrements. France never approached this level or production. The section ends with a discussion of how the government raised funds to pay for the war. A range of taxes, including a personal tax, and a banking system that could raise loans when necessary ultimately met the financial needs. There is overlap between the second and third sections of the book which could be confusing to the reader as time is passed through in one context and then again in another with a slightly different perspective on events.

Three final chapters focus on the last three years of conflict. One chapter deals with Napoleon’s disastrous Russian Campaign and the British effort in the Peninsula in 1812 and 1813. While Napoleon encounters the problems of overstepping his supply line’s capability, a well-oiled system supports Wellington’s efforts in the Peninsula and into southern France. Another explores the manpower shortage faced by Britain in the final years of the war. This starts with a look at the influence of the War with America taking British seamen from the European theatre but quickly leaves this to explore the experience of militia units in Britain. More could be said about the draining effect the War of 1812 had on Britain’s European effort. The third chapter covers events leading to the Battle of Waterloo. An economically stressed British government immediately spends the needed money to field an allied army against the returned Napoleon. With the ever-agile Wellington at the helm, a combined British and German army defeated Bonaparte’s smaller force on a field in Belgium. An Afterward describes the post-war downsizing of the navy, army and government and the future careers of key individuals mentioned in the book.

The reader takes away four key elements. The first is the incredible number of people Knight describes (with detail) who played a vital role in Britain’s success. They are an assortment of personalities; strong, dynamic, sometimes quirky, occasionally self-possessed, stubborn, inventive and above all, driven. For example, Samuel Bentham’s genius of organizing work played a key role in the industrialization which took place in the latter half of the war, but his lack of social skills ultimately sidelined him. Wellington’s adeptness at choosing and using a battlefield to his advantage and his logistical abilities was enough for Whitehall to tolerate his exceptional talent for complaining. Lord Liverpool and those he gathered around him from 1812 to 1815 were able set aside their differences and work together as an efficient, effective group. During the course of the period we see an old group of leaders and bureaucrats shuffle off the stage in the 1790s and a new more effective and younger group begins to form as Napoleon wages war.

A second major element is Britain’s industrial development and the rise of mass
production, coupled with the capacity to coordinate raw resources, including food, for delivery to the navy or army wherever they might be. These critical elements grew out of the earlier preparations, before 1793, and the war spurred them on to new heights.

Thirdly, Knight identifies the British government’s willingness to tax and the existing economic conditions, particularly the banks’ ability to help the government debt. Britain was simply superior to any other nation at the time, most importantly, France. Although close to the end of a frayed economic tether by 1815, the British government willingly dived further into debt to meet the emergency of Napoleon’s return from exile.

The fourth, and for this reviewer, central factor in Britain’s victory over Napoleon is the massive growth of government which allowed politicians as well as military leaders to organize national resources. The huge expansion of a clerical bureaucracy, the commitment to systematically recording, organizing and dispatching information and directions, and the improvement in accounting procedures lay at the very heart of Britain’s success. Knight’s description of this expansion is exceptional and will serve as the authoritative account for some time to come.

There are illustrations of key government, army and naval officials, government buildings, naval yards, and the odd engagement. Their selection reflects the focus of the book. Nine maps graphically represent various discussions within the text. The first, the European theatre of war (58), drives home the scale and difficulty of placing, provisioning and directing Britain’s armed forces in its struggle with France. Other maps identify British sites of ship building, telegraph systems, and defensive lines. The map which accompanies the description of the convoluted movement of the West Essex Militia around Britain between 1803 and 1816 (442) is exemplary at driving the point home.

Of the two appendices, the first lists the names and dates of service for the officials involved in government during the war years 1793-1815. Though all the individuals and their service are described in detail within the text, this list does provide an overall temporal sequence. The second appendix lists “The Reports of Parliamentary Commissions and Enquiries relating to the Army and Navy 1780-1812” and the commissioners of each one. This, too, presents a nice overview of the sequence of commissions and enquires discussed within the book. The detailed chronology of major events in the period is a nice addition but not necessary. The glossary of terms (mainly military and naval) is for those with little background in the era.

Knight’s bibliography is a solid list of major academic works on the economic, social, naval, military and government history of the period. He describes archival sources more generally, while including contemporary memoirs, pamphlets and books among the academic sources. The notes are adequate to locate the source of episodes, quotes and figures mentioned in the book. The index is workable and thorough.

The book will be a valuable asset for those interested in the growth of government during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Roger Knight reminds us that wars are not won only on a battlefield but require an immense effort from a highly organized government to direct and support the effort of those who fight.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario

The literature and film industry abound with tales of the mutiny on His Majesty’s Armed Vessel *Bounty.* HMAV *Bounty* (formerly *Bethia*) was a 90-foot long converted merchant ship displacing 215 tons. She was armed with four 4-pounders and ten swivel guns and sailed on her historic voyage with a complement of 46 officers and men. Lorbach revisits the oft-told story of the events surrounding the mutiny episode and some subsequent incidents (see *Voyage of HMS Pandora* by Captain Edward Edwards RN). In about 300 sometimes-rambling pages, he proffers his theory about what really happened with selective but intriguing evidence.

*Bounty*’s captain was Lieutenant William Bligh, an ambitious man who started life in the British navy as a ship’s boy (captain’s steward) and, sometime later, appeared as sailing master on HMS *Resolution* under famed Captain James Cook. Bligh was the son of a Plymouth excise and customs official (not the best background for rising in a class-conscious Royal Navy). The lieutenant was an enigma. Short in stature with a prominent facial scar, he was effeminate in his demeanour, had a curt temper, displayed a sadistic streak, drank heavily and was likely bisexual. Generally a poor leader, Bligh displayed violent, unpredictable mood swings. The author notes that these symptoms are consistent with bipolar disorder or manic-depressive illness, a disorder that causes unusual shifts in temperament, energy, activity, and the ability consistently to perform ordinary tasks. (This psychological diagnosis is the author’s speculation.) On the positive side, Bligh was intelligent, a good navigator, and a creditable cartographer. A clever and successful schemer, he rose to the rank of vice admiral – no small feat.

The *Bounty*’s primary mission was to first harvest, and then transport, viable breadfruit plants to British colonies. The large melon-like fruit was a good source of nutrients for slaves working in warm climates where these plants could easily propagate. According to the author, this mission was a fool’s errand. There was no vital need for Coral Sea breadfruit. Much closer than Tahiti, a seeded species of breadfruit grew in East India. Similar to an African variety, it was more to the slaves’ liking. Meanwhile, other species were already growing in the British botanical gardens at St. Vincent and Jamaica. Secondly, even if one could justify the breadfruit expedition, Lorbach makes a compelling case that the size and configuration of *Bounty* was a poor choice for a mission designed to transport live plant specimens for propagation.

Bligh’s secondary personal mission was to be the first British naval officer to safely transit the dangerous uncharted Torres Strait just north of the Australian Continent.

Such a voyage was unlikely in a deep drafted vessel like *Bounty*, especially when loaded with a cargo of breadfruit plants and a full crew.

Lorbach analyzes many of the characters in this drama, especially Master’s Mate Fletcher Christian, gardeners David Nelson and William Brown, and some minor players such as surgeon John Huggan and steward John Smith. Nelson and Christian spend the most time at centre stage and, after Bligh, are the most interesting men onboard.

Nelson’s job was to obtain the breadfruit plants, care for them once aboard,
and assure their survival to *Bounty*’s destination. Lorbach spends many pages explaining why this mission was probably doomed from the start and how, once Bligh apparently realized it, he grew fearful of the career consequences of such a failure. He may then have thought of a dubious way to salvage his reputation with the Admiralty in London.

Christian, the second in command, was popular with the crew and, according to the author, may have spurned Bligh in a murky homosexual relationship. The two men had been close for much of the voyage, dining together at least three times a week. In fact, Bligh allowed Christian free access to his personal liquor stash in the captain’s cabin. Before the mutiny, Christian bore the brunt of several of Bligh’s public tirades, which may have helped precipitate the revolt against Bligh’s command. There may also have been a hidden twist to the tale as usually related – a causal arrow pointing in an unanticipated direction. The breadfruit mission was obviously doomed, but a calculated risk might salvage Bligh’s reputation. According to Lorbach, the mutiny may have either been agreed upon between Bligh and Christian beforehand, or at least planned by Bligh to take place at a certain favourable location, so that when given the ship’s launch, a crew and supplies, he would stand a good chance of sailing through the Torres Strait. His 3,618 nautical mile, (4,618 statute miles) 25-day voyage to Timor in a 23-foot open boat did bring a measure of success from the notoriously aborted voyage.

Lorbach examines many aspects of the *Bounty* incident in great detail and, in an unusual chapter, graphically describes the sexual mores of the South Sea islanders, particularly those who inhabited Tahiti. Focusing on the sexual freedoms that were the native custom is important because it explains why many of the mutineers wished to return to an idyllic South Sea island life rather than return to cold, dank England under the command of an often-tyrannical captain.

Because Lorbach frequently shifts focus in his chapters, *Conspiracy On The Bounty* can be a frustrating read. His prose, while excellent at times, is uneven and his digressions are frequently redundant. Conan Doyle wrote about theorizing from incomplete data in *A Scandal in Bohemia*. In the novel Sherlock Holmes noted, “insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.” Similarly, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish Lorbach’s facts from his theories.

In spite of these flaws, the work is far more than just another “*Mutiny on the Bounty*” book. The author takes the reader on a journey to the realm of breadfruit horticulture, as well as what it was like inside this great floating greenhouse. This is done in richer detail and depth than in previous *Bounty* stories. Lorbach succeeds in capturing one’s imagination about the events that may really have happened and why. The validity of his theories is still an open question, but it is a thought-provoking read.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


*Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by the Naval War College’s Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, emphasizes the importance of bases and other naval
facilities, both ashore and afloat to America’s strategic interests in this critical region of the globe. The spectre of China’s growing challenge to U.S. strategic dominance in the Asia-Pacific hovers over the entire work and indeed suggests why it was undertaken.

President Barak Obama’s major foreign policy venture of 2011, the so-called “pivot to Asia,” was supposed to inaugurate an era characterized by a U.S. drawdown from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a renewed focus on the security situation in the Far East. Events, however, have conspired to lessen the impact of that rebalancing effort and secondarily the rationale for this study. The Taliban’s resilience in Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s conquest of major portions of Syria and Iraq, the Assad regime’s continued existence in Syria, and Russian adventurism in Ukraine command the Obama administration’s attention on a daily basis. In short, other world affairs keep pulling the United States back in.

Nonetheless, _Rebalancing U.S. Forces_ reinforces the inescapable conclusion that America’s military presence in the Asia-Pacific has been and will continue to be vital, not only to U.S. interests but to the political stability and economic well-being of the region. The majority of America’s 750 overseas bases and facilities are found there. The overriding message of the book is that U.S. naval bases and other installations in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and elsewhere provide the foundation for the American commitment. The physical presence of these bases helps reassure their host nations that treaties of alliance and other formal agreements with the United States are no mere pieces of paper. Less comforting, however, is the study’s argument that major advances in Chinese missile and other military technologies have put these facilities at great risk. Not only does China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability threaten to limit the operational freedom of America’s aircraft carrier task forces in, for instance, a confrontation over Taiwan, but it puts at risk the bases in Japan proper and on Okinawa.

The editors have enlisted eight distinguished American and Australian scholars of the Asia-Pacific whose treatises detail the historical development of the bases, their current importance, and new strategic approaches to basing both ashore and afloat. Individual chapters focus on the bases and other facilities on Guam, in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, and Central Asia. Sam Tangredi concludes the work with a chapter revisiting the concept of Sea Basing, widely debated earlier in the century, as a possible solution to the base-vulnerability issue.

Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay make a convincing argument that Guam should be developed as a major logistics hub for U.S. forces in the Pacific because of its welcoming American population and freedom from political problems connected to the bases in Japan and elsewhere. The Naval War College’s Toshi Yoshihara concludes, after a comprehensive review of Chinese-language materials, that Beijing regards the base at Yokosuka in Japan, host to America’s only forward-deployed carrier USS _George Washington_ (CVN 73), with great concern. Influential Chinese commentators believe that this threat could be neutralized through coercion of the Japanese government or direct missile attack, perhaps even a preemptive strike a la Pearl Harbor. And Yoshihara ends with the sobering thought that “no one would know for sure whether a Chinese warhead hurrying toward Yokosuka was a nuclear or conventional weapon” (60).

Terence Roehrig details the evolution of the U.S. basing structure in
South Korea and the key issue of which country would exercise operational control of Korean and American forces in wartime. As of this writing, both governments have agreed to shelve the contentious subject indefinitely. Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman provide similar coverage of the mutually beneficial U.S.-Australia alliance that has facilitated numerous basing agreements and combined exercises in Australia.

The next chapter, by Rahman, is especially welcome because it documents a story probably unfamiliar to most observers – the phenomenal growth and maturity of the U.S.-Singapore military relationship. He posits that “Singapore has become the most important partner in the U.S. Pacific Command . . . after Japan, South Korea, and Australia” (121). U.S. naval facilities in the island nation have become key to U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia. Walter C. Ludwig III, Erickson, and Mikolay present a large chapter that covers the history and development of Diego Garcia as a strategic asset for the United States in the Indian Ocean, and explores similar Indian and Chinese interests in the region.

Alexander Cooley explores the vicissitudes of U.S. base development in Central Asia, making the point that local politics have usually been the driving force with regard to the opening and/or closing of U.S. military bases. While well-researched and written, this chapter strikes the reviewer as an odd choice for a study of U.S. bases – primarily naval bases – in the maritime domain of the Asia-Pacific. In addition, the bases in Central Asia supported the conflict in Afghanistan, from which the United States is supposedly pivoting.

A chapter on the Philippines, with its long history of hosting U.S. military installations and recent efforts to facilitate U.S. access to the island nation’s basing resources, would have enhanced the overall coverage of the subject. The work would also have benefitted from an extended discussion of basing possibilities with India and Vietnam, potential allies in any confrontation with China.

These points aside, Rebalancing U.S. Forces presents a wealth of information and authoritative analysis on a subject of major importance to the United States and its future in the pivotal Asia-Pacific region.

Edward J. Marolda
Dumfries, Virginia


Galley Slave is a new edition of French Huguenot Jean Marteilhe’s (1684-1777) experiences as a slave in France and on French galleys during the 1702-1713 Wars of Spanish Succession. The first title in Seaforth Publishing’s series Seafarers’ Voices, the book contains a four-page editorial note and 29-page introduction by BBC writer Vincent McInerney, a map plotting key locations that concerned Marteilhe in France, The Netherlands and England, and 39 endnotes. There is no bibliography or selected reading list. For a depiction of a galley, readers will need to make do with the jacket illustration, Cornelis Hendrikz Vroom’s “Spanish Men-of-War Engaging Barbary Corsairs” (undated, but 1615, and incorrectly titled ‘Spanish men-of-war engaging corsair galleys’). Marteilhe’s narrative is one of the few surviving captivity accounts from the early eighteenth century. Attractively priced, it will appeal to maritime history enthusiasts and those interested in the impact of the Catholic-Protestant turmoil in early modern Europe.

Marteilhe wrote his autobiography or Memoirs in French, probably in the
Netherlands, at some unspecified time in the mid-1700s after his release from captivity in 1713. English readers first would have learned about his account from a brief note about it published in the London *Monthly Review* in May 1757. The next year, translator James Willington and London printer R. Griffiths produced the two-volume *Memoirs of a Protestant, Condemned to the Galleys of France, for his Religion*. Like many narratives with a maritime theme, there have been several reprints of Marteilhe’s *Memoirs* during the past 250 years. In 1765, a Dublin edition appeared, upon which this Seaforth edition is based. Most editors abridged Marteilhe’s theological discussion; *Galley Slave* reduced the text from 80,000 to 40,000 words. There are ten chapter titles, but since they do not appear in the 1757 or 1765 English-language editions, it is unclear when they were added.

McInerney’s lengthy introduction helps place the captivity narrative in historical context. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) removed protection for non-Catholics living in France, and prompted anti-Protestant campaigns during economic crises and European warfare, such as in 1689-1697 and 1702-1713. Captured during a raid in 1702, young Jean Marteilhe was marched along with other Huguenots north, from west-central France to the Atlantic ports of Le Havre and Dunkerque, where French galleys were moored. To complement and buttress our Huguenot’s account, the editor locates contemporary descriptions of galley life by Catholic priest Jean-Francois Bion and King Louis XIV’s galley admiral, Jean Barras de La Penne. A stronger introduction would have placed the Huguenot’s slave status in an Atlantic-wide context, discussing, for example, the number of white European slaves and the number of slaves from the Mideast or Africa, or comparing the conditions on board a French slave galley to that of a French slaving vessel. One also wonders whether the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (1756), largely contested between England and France, helped to trigger the publication of the first English-language edition in 1757.

Some of the surprise of reading Marteilhe’s narrative is lost as McInerney’s Introduction quotes several of our captive’s important passages at length. Thus, one re-reads key information about imprisonment, punishment, galley construction, and skirmishes involving the galley slaves. Marteilhe’s 250-word discussion about how “a Galley cannot be moved without Slaves,” for example, is transcribed word for word. Readers should also know that they may not be reading Marteilhe’s own words. The editorial note states that the volume is an “edited abridgement” and that “spelling and punctuation and the use of capitalised nouns have been modernised” (xi). The editor has paraphrased many of Marteilhe’s sentences and some passages in the new edition may differ significantly from Marteilhe’s text, as translated by the first English editors. For example, in both the 1757 (London) and 1765 (Dublin) editions, paragraph five of his memoirs reads:

> During the War which was terminated by the Peace of Ryswick, the Jesuits and Priests enjoyed none of the Pleasures of Dragooning the Protestants of France, as the King had his Troops employed on the Frontiers of the Kingdom; but no sooner was the Peace concluded, than they were resolved to compensate for their former Inactivity. Those merciless and bloody Bigots now let loose their Fury in every Province where they could find Instruments upon whom to wreck their Malice.

Though an “abridgement” of this 1765 edition, Seaforth Publishing’s passage reads:
During the Nine Years’ War which terminated in the Peace of Ryswick (1697), the Jesuits had not been able to indulge in the pleasure of harassing the Huguenots with the King’s troops, because the latter were needed to guard the kingdom. But no sooner was peace concluded that these pitiless soldiers made their rage felt throughout France.

One might question Seaforth Publishing’s decision to launch their Seafarers’ Voices series with an early eighteenth-century account that contains much non-maritime history material. Readers learn as much about French city and town prisons as they do about life on board a galley. Those interested in Huguenot networks and religious conflicts will appreciate the new edition; indeed, the Religious Tract Society published an edition in 1864 (and it is now available in full-text online via openlibrary.org), confirming the importance of Marteilhe’s memoir to the religious history of Western Europe. Other seventeenth and early-eighteenth century maritime authors, however, are better known than Marteilhe, and many of their narratives appeared in contemporary multi-volume collections of voyages and travels and the more recent Hakluyt Society series. The three other abridged seafaring memoirs published in 2010 by Seaforth – George Shelvocke, *A Privateer’s Voyage Round the World* (a voyage in 1719-1722); John Newton, *Slaver Captain* (a Liverpool slaving ship captain in 1750-1754); and Robert Hay, *Landsman Hay* (a landsman in the British navy, 1804-1811) – centre on shipboard experiences and may be of greater interest to readers.

Stephen D. Behrendt
Wellington, New Zealand


Stephen May’s biography of the celebrated artist, Joseph Mallord William Turner, largely focuses upon one of his famous paintings titled “The Slave Ship.” This haunting work is a metaphor depicting a dreadful event that took place during the Middle Passage on the slave ship *Zong.* In the painting’s dramatic foreground, manacled slaves are cast overboard into the shark-infested water in order to collect insurance money before the vessel makes land. The book vividly describes the floating dungeons, known as slave ships, as they moved their perishable human cargo to the sultry plantations of the Caribbean. Events like this later sparked a humanitarian abolitionist movement that, in time, swept the western world through the roughly 40-year efforts of Thomas Clarkson, Granville Sharp, Olaudah Equiano, and William Wilberforce. As the horrors of slave trading and slavery affected the collective consciences of the United States and Great Britain, Turner, as a former investor in a plantation in Jamaica, struggled with his own evolving moral convictions about the treatment of the slaves who lived there.

The story is told from the perspective of the grime and squalor of eighteenth and early-nineteenth century London, “awash in gin, sin, and din” (53), contrasted against the brazen elegance of the Royal Academy of Arts; the site of high, but often licentious, society. Turner, a fashionable artist, painted several highly regarded maritime works including “The Shipwreck,” “Peace – Burial at Sea” and the evocative, melancholy painting “The Fighting *Temeraire.*” According to May, the...
artist used light as a distinct entity to produce a dramatic effect. Any observer will note that Turner’s works are frequently enveloped in mist, haze, or tempests, yet retain artistic balance, line and perspective.

Stephen May uses his gift for vivid prose in describing “The Slave Ship.” He writes “the molten, blood-red sea, the strange ocean creatures devouring human flesh, the slave’s hands groping air above the water while shackles bobbed in the flood, the sun’s rays slashing down the center of the painting, illuminating a severed, elegant, still shackled human leg. Here was the sea and sky at their utmost sublime. Here was pure madness – and sheer genius” (13).

May’s physical description of a young Turner is magnificently graphic. “He was dressed casually, almost shabbily, as if this day meant nothing to him. He wore an old smock caked in various pigments; his brown hair, now peppered grey, curled over his temples; his shaggy eyebrows arched gracefully over ruddy cheeks creased by years of wind, rain, and sun; and although he courted a wild appearance, his eyes remained steady, confident and knowing” (12). Also, May’s analytical exploration of Turner’s sometimes-tormented mind coupled with his sense of morality presents the reader with a unique insight into the complex and quixotic psyche of one of Britain’s greatest nineteenth-century artists; a painter of light, but a creature of darkness.

The book’s most successful chapters describe the horrific Middle Passage events while presenting a painstaking history and critique of “The Slave Ship.” The latter is the equivalent of an art history masterclass focused on J.M.W. Turner through one of his seminal works. The author writes that Turner “longed for the sound of the sea grating on a shingled beach or the slosh of waves slapping the moored sailing boats against a net-webbed wall. Sunrises . . . prompted the whole cosmos to blink and yawn awake; sunsets . . . burned with the intensity of a long painful death.”

The author details the lives of those who either influenced Turner in his art or brought his work to the attention of the art world. In later chapters, he chronicles the history of the painting after the artist’s death in 1851. John Ruskin, an English art critic, had purchased “The Slave Ship” and, in early 1872, it arrived in New York for the work’s first public exhibition in America. Ruskin wanted the painting to be shown in the United States because of the huge loss of human life that had resulted from the recent Civil War. It was not universally embraced by the American art world, but many influential critics found it captivating. Ruskin displayed it in his London home for many years, but later sold it to John Taylor Johnston, the first president of New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art. Johnson bought the painting so those who might see it would reflect on the human moral weakness that contributed to the war’s cause. It hung at the Metropolitan for many years. Ultimately, through heiress Alice Hooper and Harvard’s renowned professor of art history, Charles Eliot Norton, the painting was placed in its current home in Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts.

As to the importance of Voyage of The Slave Ship as maritime history, Olaudah Equiano’s The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, Marcus Rediker’s The Slave Ship: A Human History and James Walvin’s The Zong: The Massacre, the Law and the End of Slavery deal with the horrors of the maritime slavery industry more graphically. Still, May’s extraordinary writing ability places this book in their company, if not at the head of this select
class. His erudite scrutiny of this particular painting and features of nineteenth-century maritime art in general are thought provoking. It is an excellent biography of a complex, influential, British artist and a pleasurably satisfying read.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


During the Spanish American Wars of Independence both the Spanish and the insurgent governments employed privateers to supplement their meagre naval forces. Pirates operating from the northwest coast of Cuba further complicated the issues of prize taking. Britain, attempting to avoid involvement in the Spanish-American conflict, was challenged to remain neutral and protect its mercantile and political interests in both Europe and Spanish America.

The author, Matthew McCarthy, received his PhD from the University of Hull in 2011 and is currently research officer at Hull University’s Maritime Historical Studies Centre. He indicates that the subject of privateering and piracy during the Spanish American Wars of Independence has been largely ignored by historians, even though the wars had a strong impact on the diplomatic decisions of the period and the development of international maritime law. McCarthy’s introduction discusses the deficiencies of earlier studies of this period and how he intends to fill in the gaps. In his initial chapter, he reviews Britain’s commercial and political interests in Spanish America. From the late-fifteenth century Spain had claimed a monopoly on all commercial trade with her colonies in the New World. As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, Spain relaxed its monopoly and afterwards Britain was permitted to trade with the Spanish colonies. With the outbreak of the Wars of Independence, however, Britain declared herself a neutral nation with the right to trade with the insurgent states and admitting only contraband, attempting to run a blockade, and the transportation of enemy property as subject to seizure. Trade with South America was essential to the expansion of Britain’s economy. By 1808, this trade accounted for six percent of her total exports. Politically, the British foreign Secretary, Robert Castlereagh, and his successor, George Canning, had to deal with the insurgent and Spanish prize taking as well Cuban-based pirates. British merchants claimed their vessels were being seized by privateers and sent to admiralty courts that were often capricious in their decisions as to legal seizures. The new insurgent states often had little control over their privateer fleets. The foreign secretaries had to balance interference in the prize courts with keeping on friendly terms with the insurgents should these states eventually become independent. In order to maintain a balance of power in Europe, it was necessary to keep the support of Spain. The depredations of the Cuba-based pirates presented British diplomats with the problem of renegades who lived on Cuban soil and ventured forth only to attack merchant vessels and return to Spanish Cuban soil. To solve the problem effectively would mean landing in Spanish territory.

Chapters two and three deal respectively with a history of privateering and piracy in Spanish American waters and accounts of search and seizures of specific British vessels and the economic problems that merchants and ship-owners had as a result of these acts. In reviewing the history
of privateering, McCarthy concludes that both Spain and the insurgent states initially operated by the established international rules. Prizes were brought into admiralty courts and cases adjudicated in the accepted manner. As the wars dragged on, the insurgents diverged from accepted standards by licensing non-Hispanic citizens as privateers – the most conspicuous being North Americans, most often those from Baltimore – and by permitting captured vessels to be brought in and sold in the ports of neutral countries. Spain, on the other hand, attempted to re-instate its monopoly on all trade in Spanish American waters, and as a result, many neutral British vessels were stopped and seized. In the third chapter the author elaborates in great detail the financial losses suffered by British shipowners and merchants. McCarthy’s research for the years 1817-1820, the height of privateering and Cuban piracy, indicates that 1688 prize actions were instituted. Of this number, 336 involved British ships with 227 seizures able to be identified as to the nationality of the predatory vessel. The author further analyzes the type of seizure and its resolution, if any, in foreign prize courts. Details are given for many vessels and merchants by name. In addition to the losses suffered by the merchants, McCarthy also investigates the increase in insurance rates. In his final analysis, however, McCarthy comments that the British losses to privateering and piracy had minimal impact on the overall British economy.

In chapters four through seven McCarthy reviews the British Foreign Office response to insurgent and Spanish privateering and Cuban piracy. Foreign Secretaries Castlereagh and Canning responded with different strategies to each of the three problems. Britain had not recognized any of the insurgent countries as independent and, therefore, had a problem dealing with the insurgents government-to-government. In addition, Britain did not wish to antagonize the insurgents and hinder trade opportunities in the present or future. The response to insurgent privateering was to direct the British consuls in each insurgent state to investigate each case of search and or seizure as the particular case was adjudicated by the insurgent courts. The consuls, with guidance from the Foreign Office, would then press the insurgent governments to settle the British claim. In dealing with Spanish privateers, the situation could be dealt with diplomatically. Spain claimed their privateers were acting legally, since Spain had re-activated its trade monopoly in Spanish America, blockaded certain insurgent ports, and insisted on their right to seize goods of insurgent merchants carried on neutral British ships. Britain had two major considerations in dealing with Spain. Firstly, Britain needed to retain the Anglo-Spanish Alliance in order not to upset the balance of power in Europe, and secondly, Britain needed to enforce its neutral status in order to maintain trade with the insurgents. When appeals to Spain appeared to have no effect on Spanish policy, the Foreign Office played its two “trump cards” – deploying a British naval squadron to Spanish America and then rejecting neutral status and recognizing the insurgent states. The strategy was successful and Spain backed down. What remained, however, was the settlement of British claims against Spain for privateering actions against British shipping. In January 1823, Spain proposed the joint Anglo-Spanish Claims Commission to consider all British claims against Spain. The plan was accepted in March of 1823 and a four-person mixed commission was established. By October 1823, while the commission was slowly establishing rules, procedures, and methods of payment, France invaded Spain and re-established the monarchy. Ferdinand VII immediately cancelled all the commission’s agreements. Not until August
1824 did the commissioners finally begin work and all of the settlements were not reached until 1829. As with the insurgent privateer settlements, McCarthy gives detailed analyses of the individual claims brought before the commission.

Britain’s response to Cuban piracy presented a third type of problem. The pirates were not a fixed state but were inhabiting Spanish soil. To subdue the pirates, Britain would have to invade Spanish territory or establish a naval presence. Not wishing to endanger the Anglo-Spanish Alliance, Britain sent a naval squadron which with the cooperation of a United States squadron soon solved the problem without violating Spanish territory.

Matthew McCarthy’s text is deftly researched and well written. His footnotes are extensive, covering sources in Spain, Great Britain, South America, and the United States. A reader seeking stories of ship against ship engagements and lively biographies of privateers may not find this book to their liking. Readers interested in the diplomatic and economic problems caused by the privateers and pirates and the solutions developed to assure a degree of stability will want to add McCarthy’s work to their libraries.

Fred Hopkins
Linthicum, Maryland


The Dieppe story about the unsuccessful allied raid on the German-occupied town of Dieppe, located on the French coast of the British Channel on 19 August 1942, suffers from no lack of scholarly attention. Historical narratives began immediately after the event, followed by a host of academic, official, popular, controversial and specialized works with contributions from C.P. Stacey, Terrence Robertson, John Campbell, Brian Villa, Brereton Greenhous, Hugh Henry, the Whitakers, and Beatrice Richard among others. The U.S. Army Command’s 2012 bibliography lists over 56 articles and books, citing Dieppe as an example of a military disaster. Since 2012, another popular history and several new scholarly articles have appeared. One might wonder what fresh interpretations or new facts could possibly be offered by David O’Keefe.

*One Day in August* surprises and rewards its readers with a sophisticated, original interpretation of the raid, drawing upon recently released intelligence documents, enhanced by a complex analysis which highlights the importance of the Battle of the Atlantic and the desperation faced by Churchill and other authorities who tried to keep open the sea lines of communication in face of a formidable German U-boat campaign. When the Germans adopted a four-rotor Enigma machine for communications, they began to dominate at sea. O’Keefe’s argument is that the overriding requirement for a four-rotor Enigma machine to enable decryption of the German ULTRA intelligence provided the driving force behind the raid – that the raid covered a pinch operation to secretly capture, or “pinch,” such a machine. This conclusion is controversial. Given the secrecy of this operation and the continued sensitivity of related information, O’Keefe is the first serious scholar to uncover and analyze its importance as a motive for the raid. O’Keefe pitched this case in the 2012 film *Dieppe Uncovered.* The book provides more nuanced argument and detailed documentation than was possible in the film.
O’Keefe does his interpretation justice – dedicating a large part of his work to careful analysis of the Battle of the Atlantic, its overall importance to the war effort, and the role of intelligence to underpin his conclusions. Previous versions of the Dieppe jigsaw puzzle did not include the central placement of these large pieces because prior to O’Keefe’s discovery, they seemed no more than background bits – not directly related to any motive for the decision-making. His discussion of earlier raids is intelligent and pointed – especially the failure of Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Combined Operations to learn appropriate lessons from the one at St.-Nazaire. He briefly describes the Dieppe planning and operations, stressing the role of a misleading message in reinforcing the disaster and exposing the prior and subsequent carnage with short, poignant quotes. Readers will find thorough accounts of the general plans and the tactical successes and failures of Dieppe elsewhere and O’Keefe spends little time reiterating the work of others. He acknowledges, however, that Dieppe appeared on the long list of possible sites for allied raids before the idea of the pinch operation for the four-rotor machine arose. He concedes this is not a “monocausal” argument, noting the contribution of other factors, such as American and Soviet pressure for a Second Front, the need for battle experience and action for restless, bored Canadian and other troops, the requirement to test and probe German defences, to gather intelligence, to take the offensive, and to deceive the enemy, possibly achieving surprise, in his concluding chapter. Thus, his interpretation allows strategic, political, and military factors a secondary role in the decision-making. Experts in the field will vigorously debate the relative importance of these factors compared to the added pinch operation in driving the Dieppe raid, but O’Keefe has changed the boundaries of the debate, making a key contribution to the scholarship.

If some question his assessment, there is no doubt about the opinion of the surviving veterans. For those like Private Ron Beal, who fought in the raid and who suffered the loss of friends, *One Day in August*, provides valued closure. Although the pinch failed, O’Keefe’s explanation of the over-riding need for intelligence has satisfied Beal about why his friends died in what had previously seemed only a senseless tragedy. *One Day in August* gives the last word to Beal.

My inner curmudgeon objects to his characterization of various historical actors as “dashing,” “brave,” and “handsome,” seemingly reflecting wartime propaganda, but his description of Ian Fleming’s, John Hughes-Hallett’s, and Mountbatten’s overly ambitious and ruthless determination is fair enough. Dieppe was a nasty business. No one should dismiss this work with quick perusal of the introduction and conclusion – so often the practice of graduate students, professors, and others with burdened schedules. O’Keefe’s entire text and the many footnotes citing a wide array of primary sources merit attention and appreciation.

This work brings the Dieppe raid to life, telling a compelling story and supporting a complex interpretation with careful analysis based upon years of original painstaking research. Read the book and buy a second copy to give to a young person. This is a history that will motivate others to challenge what they know, to think carefully, to research broadly, to argue with their elders, and to produce new accounts about old events. And what could be better than an historical debate which makes us rethink what we thought knew?

Isobel Campbell
Ottawa, Ontario

“Then he jumped ship – Folk Psychology and Mental Illness onboard British Ships in the 19th Century” is a most unique and welcome contribution to the literature about everyday-life and more importantly, medical conditions on board naval and merchant vessels during the transition period from sail to steam.

Due to his double qualification as a practising medical doctor and psychologist and academically-trained historian, Karl-Heinz Reger is not only extremely well prepared for such a study, but he delivers it with an analytical depth far beyond most published works on everyday life, medical conditions and mental illnesses aboard ships.

Contrary to most historical publications concerning shipboard naval medicine and health conditions, Reger uses an analytical approach that is predominantly based on a substantial number of medical histories of individual patients and their respective records of onboard treatment by surgeons and naval doctors. These case studies are extracted from Royal Navy medical reports, particular records related to ships operating in the Far East.

Reger’s book is divided into three parts: the first part providing a detailed, carefully researched overview of various aspects of everyday life relevant to health and mental health onboard ship; the second, consisting of case studies, is organized by medical conditions; and the third part, analyzing the case studies based on modern medical knowledge, uses modern diagnostic assumptions based on the respective historical documentation of the individual cases. To a certain extent, the book lacks an historical narrative and reads much more like a modern medical research publication than a typical maritime history book. Nonetheless, the organization of the book and its medical analytical approach is also its strength, allowing Reger to not only evaluate the diagnoses of the surgeons and doctors based on modern medical knowledge, but also to evaluate their respective medical treatments.

Overall, the study clearly shows that most of the historical diagnoses were more or less correct, and that medical treatments and procedures were appropriate given modern medical knowledge of the nineteenth century. In fact, the analysis clearly shows that mental illnesses were not only a substantial problem aboard the ships, particularly overcrowded naval vessels, but also, they were often not understood by surgeons and doctors. Finally, the study illustrates that the function of surgeons and doctors was by no means limited to medical procedures of all kinds, but that medical personnel played a crucial role within the social construct of the ship, serving as a bridge between the world before the mast and the officers. Some remarks on the arrangements of the hospitals or wardrooms aboard Royal Navy ships and a description of the most common medical procedures on board round out the study.

Overall the book deserves high praise for the light it sheds on an aspect of everyday life aboard sailing ships that was of crucial relevance, but has thus far been overlooked by most naval historians. While the language is sometimes a little dry and overly scientific, the book is often a real page-turner. It is definitely a most welcome addition to the literature about maritime and naval history of the transition period from sail to steam and can only be highly recommended to maritime and naval historians interested in this particular
period. If there is one point of criticism, it is that the book has only been published in German, despite dealing more or less exclusively with the situation on board ships of the Royal Navy. Understandably, with the author being a German native speaker and the book being a PhD thesis at a German university, it is appropriate that the first edition of the book be published in German. But if a German maritime history publication deserves a translation into English, it is without any doubt this book.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


When considering submarines, one more often than not thinks of silent stalkers, lurking below the waves to either torpedo an enemy ship or act as a forward launching base for missiles. Few, especially in the early days, thought of how dangerous these boats were to the people who manned them. A crack in the pressurized hull, a broken valve or vent, an immobilized plane or rudder and the whole boat can be lost to the sea. For the early pioneers of subsurface warfare, these risks multiplied as the standard practice and expertise on which future generations of submariners came to rely had to be stumbled upon through a process of trial and error, often at the cost of lives. This danger was increased when operating in foreign ports and colonial harbours, where locals did not necessarily adhere to European standards of traffic control. Such was in the case when the HMS Poseidon collided with the SS Yuta off the coast of China in 1931.

The Poseidon incident, at least prior to Schwankert’s efforts to publicize the three-quarters-of-a-century-old disaster, was not the most studied part of maritime history. A small, peacetime disaster in a nondescript corner of the empire would not be the stuff of rousing reading so frequently associated with the medium. This is, however, something the author is trying to change. In his new book, Poseidon. China’s Secret Salvage of Britain’s Lost Submarine, Steven R. Schwankert tells the story of HMS Poseidon, a Parthian-class submarine that sank while on exercise near Weihai, China in 1931. All told, the sinking cost the lives of 21 people. Surprisingly, for the serious nature of the topic discussed, this book is not a standard monograph. Rather, Schwankert divides the text into two separate narratives; one that describes the submarine’s construction, outfitting, crewing, stationing, sinking, the escape of survivors and subsequent court-martial of the skipper, Lieutenant-Commander Bernard William Galpin, and another detailing Schwankert’s own odyssey, in a style reminiscent of Tony Horowitz, in uncovering the history of this little-remembered submarine.

Schwankert, a Beijing-based journalist with a fondness for scuba diving, makes no claims to being an expert on subsurface vessels and, as such, he writes for an audience that may not be familiar with the jargon associated with submarines or the maritime service more generally. This is one of the book’s strengths. It makes the first section of the book, the part that describes the development of the submarine up to and including the Parthian-class; Weihai, where Poseidon was stationed, and its environs; the incident of the sinking itself; and the subsequent courts martial of Galpin, readily understandable by persons at all levels. This part of the book is so well researched that the reader comes to believe that all the
information that can currently be found about the Poseidon, its sinking and its sailors is on display in the text; certainly, a rare characteristic among books. From Lieutenant-Commander Galpin on down, it is clear that Schwankert took great pains researching everything to the last detail, an astounding feat given the geographical dispersion of documents between China and the United Kingdom.

It is this search that constitutes the rest of the book. Told entirely in the first person, something unusual among university press books aimed at scholarly historians, it details the story of how Schwankert happened upon the story of the Poseidon. He was interested in possibly diving the wreck, something it quickly became apparent he would be unable to do, and his journey in researching the boat, its crewmen, and the remains of those lost in the disaster. Utilizing photographic evidence, Schwankert and a rotating cast of friends search the forests of Weihai in an effort to find the old colonial graveyard. They ultimately learn of the Poseidon’s fate through a lucky find of an article in the popular Chinese magazine Modern Ships. It was a find that would eventually drag the House of Commons and the Chinese government into a battle over the sanctity of war graves abroad. Although Schwankert frequently abandons his main topic in an effort to maintain his narrative (London’s Arsenal football-club connections that often have little to do with the Poseidon make a frequent appearance throughout the book), ultimately these diversions prove a light-hearted distraction in what otherwise is a depressingly deadly affair.

Schwankert’s text should interest anyone fond of subsurface warfare, salvage operations, interwar British naval policies, the complexities of imperial war graves in a decolonized world, or imperial history more generally. Schwankert’s tale is something that, although its subjects were uniquely subject to the limitations of technology of the interwar period, is something that could still occur today. If the 2000 sinking of the Russian submarine K-141 Kursk reminds one of anything, it is that those members of the subsurface service are still subject to the same risks and dangers that their predecessors faced, even in the nuclear age. Ultimately, Schwankert, through this book, contributes an important chapter to the history of subsurface warfare.

Zachary Kopin
Chicago, Illinois


Writing a review of a study of American captives in Islamic territories in the autumn of 2014 inevitably brings to mind the terrible recent events in Syria. Also inevitably, a study of captivity offers a deeper insight into the society into which the unfortunate men had fallen prisoner. (No transatlantic women suffered this fate in the period under study, 1776-1820). It is also a means of examining the deeper assumptions of the captive, and how these assumptions were challenged or brought to the surface by the experience, nearly always traumatic, of losing his freedom. Captivity was also a societal balancing act for all concerned. The slave-master was disinclined to punish his human merchandise too severely, as each slave or captive was a valuable commodity; on the other hand, some sort of fear had to be instilled in the captives, most of whom were almost guaranteed to try to escape. Captives nearly always formed some sort of community. This was certainly the case for
those unfortunate Americans who found themselves in Algiers. On the other hand, this community tended to reflect the divisions and hierarchies of their home society, specifically in the sense that hard-working and well-educated figures could secure for themselves a relatively comfortable job, especially if they had a thick-skin or a capacity to overlook the scruples of conscience. Most slaves expressed little but resentment and hatred of the religion in which they found themselves (the perception of the majority of Americans was that “Africans’ lack of compassion, hatred of Christianity, and barbarism stemmed from Islam” (153)). A few prisoners, in contrast, tried to understand the world into which they had fallen and set its qualities and failings in comparison with the conditions prevalent in their homeland. The far-sighted and multi-lingual James Riley was able to see that the phenomenon of slavery in “Barbary” was only different in degree to the system used in the plantations of the United States. James Leander Cathcart, who had used his time in Algiers to forge a remarkable career for himself as an official in the pay of the governor-general or Dey, condemned Africa and Islam in the strongest terms, but dreamed of one day being a plantation owner himself.

Christine E. Sears’ study of American Slaves and African Masters offers an insight into the outlooks and character of individual captives – Riley and Cathcart feature prominently – but also into the collision of two different worlds, thus exposing all sorts of comparative perspectives on progress, tolerance, and economic and social organization. Most Algerian slaves rarely interacted with their owner; the precise opposite was the case for northwest Africa, were they often ate together (152). Forms of slavery were very different. There are some fascinating details on the environment and its perception by foreign slaves, as well as on language and forms of communication, sexual mores, costume, health and cleanliness.

The other great strength of this study lies in its discussion of the phenomenon in relation to American history. Were these men captives or slaves? If the latter was the case, how does the experience of Americans in Algiers and the Western Sahara correspond with the life of slaves in the plantations in the United States itself? At numerous points the author brings her knowledge of American history to bear, offering revealing insights and points of comparison. The separation of European and American history, and the dividing line that habitually separates the early modern and the modern periods, means that Sears’ work offers a lot of interesting perspectives and insights. One day an enormous conference will be organized on the history of slavery and the discussion set out in chapter one might almost serve as a template for a discussion of the phenomenon over the centuries.

The major weakness of the study is directly related to this. A small army of research students are currently working away on the phenomenon of Mediterranean slavery, while more senior researchers (Bartolomé Bennassar, Salvatore Bono, Michel Fontenay, Géraud Poumarède, Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, Mercedes García-Arenal, Gerard Wiegers, Beatriz Alonso Acero, Arturo Morgado García, Ismet Terki-Hassaine, José Antonio Martínez Torres, with collected volumes edited by Fabienne P.Gullén, Salah Trabelsi and Wolfgang Kaiser) have contributed a great deal to the understanding of the business of piracy and captivity in “Barbary” and the western Mediterranean (broadly understood) and the socio-economic relations that underpinned it. Sears’ bibliography is almost entirely constrained to works in English, and much more might have been made of the studies
of Algiers and its world throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Bartolomé and Lucile Bennassar’s study of the “Christians of Allah” features only sporadically, and its pages might have allowed more progress to have been made to differentiate between rhetoric and reality, confessional polemic, and social norms. Bridging this gap is extremely important because it allows us to view the relationship between Islam and the Christian West for all its complexity: certainly, Algiers witnessed acts of extreme brutality, and many of these acts can only be attributed to the contemporary interpretation of Islamic tradition, but there was always a human dimension, a tendency towards tolerance or forgiveness which mitigated the harsh strictures of the law.

Sex is one case in point. Here some pertinent examples are offered of the harsh punishments given to Muslim women and Christian male captives who engaged in sexual congress (32-3). Using the studies mentioned above, it would be possible to set these episodes in a much broader context, in which business interests coincided with religious teaching. Certainly the legal code set down death for those couples who began a physical relationship, but this law was very often used to coerce skilled Christian captives into “taking the turban.” Having said this, Sears does make the extremely interesting observation that American captives seldom interacted with Muslim women: many, indeed, seem seldom to have set eyes on a female Muslim.

In this respect, as in some others, Christian captives already seemed to reveal the assumptions derived from a more recognizably tolerant or modern society. The Catholic-Protestant division was, for example, of little importance in the minds of American slaves, whose assumption was that Christians of all denominations should help one other (40-41). African society was still organized along tribal lines; American and European slaves distinguished between “wild” or “wandering Arabs” and the “trading Arabs,” who were settled and thoroughly capitalistic. On the other hand, the Muslim culture of Barbary had – or seems to have had – a curiously ambivalent attitude towards sodomy, while the letters and accounts bequeathed by American captives is permeated by a sense of a society that was more conscious of its environment and, in particular, of the need to make the most of its streams, pools and rivers. Islam certainly had slavery, but its point of definition was confessional, rather than racial. All Muslims were brothers, regardless of their colour of their skin: one common assumption was that African-American seamen who found themselves in Barbary would chose to convert to Islam and marry Arab women. In this way, the rival interpretations set down by Riley and Cathcart continue to offer insights and points of debate and polemic two centuries after they were penned.

Philip Williams
Southsea, Hampshire, UK


I am not sure if Billy Smith is right. In the *Ship of Death*, he argues that the great yellow fever epidemic that swept the Atlantic in 1793 began with one ship sailing from the West Coast of Africa. Although Smith offers some compelling circumstantial evidence to support this argument, I remain unconvinced. But even if I have my doubts that one ship was responsible for the havoc wreaked by yellow jack in 1793, Smith has written a
powerful book that offers us a compelling chart to navigate the turbulent waters churning the revolutionary Atlantic at the end of the eighteenth century.

Smith’s story begins with the Hankey setting sail from Great Britain in 1792 packed with reformers and heading for the island of Bolama in what is now Guinea-Bissau – although no one on the ship, or the two other vessels that accompanied it, actually knew where Bolama was. These idealists hoped to demonstrate that it was possible to be successful colonists in the heart of slave country by using free African labour. The moment was propitious. The United States had gained its independence less than a decade before. France was in the midst of its revolution for liberty, equality, and fraternity, but had not yet killed a king nor gone to war with Great Britain. Revolutionary ideals were sending tremors throughout the West Indies which were already erupting into bitter racial warfare in St. Domingue – the French colony which would become Haiti in 1804. In Great Britain, an abolitionist movement was gaining traction leading to the establishment of a haven for freed slaves in Sierra Leone. Anything seemed possible, or at least so thought the Bolama colonists.

Smith, in a masterful narrative, devotes over half of Ship of Death to the sad tale of the Bolama experiment. Indeed, this saga is the true heart of the book as we learn of this ill-fated expedition. Smith’s skill as a historian and as a writer comes to the fore, successfully capturing the voices of the colonists as well as the Africans they encountered. Regardless of the relationship of Bolama to yellow fever, this book could be read for this story alone because it tells us so much about the Atlantic world and the possibilities and impossibilities confronted by those who lived in it. As it turns out, and unfortunately for the colonists, they found Bolama. Unfortunately, because instead of a new Eden, the island turned into a veritable Hell. Initially the natives were hostile, and although the colonists ultimately gained a tenuous peace with the African owners of Bolama, there was no negotiating with the microbes that assaulted their immune systems. Debilitating sickness and death awaited those who tried to keep the dream alive. Several diseases besieged the colonists. Yellow fever was among them – a yellow fever caught by eating infected monkeys and, of course, spread by the ubiquitous mosquitoes that thrived in the environment altered by the clearing of trees. If yellow fever struck with a potent virulence, malaria and other agues also beset these would-be reformers. Almost a year and a half after the first colonists arrived, the handful who were left abandoned the enterprise and headed back to Great Britain.

A year earlier, the Hankey had sailed away from Bolama with colonists who did not take so long to make up their minds and had decided to escape with their lives while they could. They, too, faced misfortune. Several of them already had yellow fever pulsating in their veins, and aboard the vessel were unwanted passengers hovering around the water casks – disease-bearing mosquitoes that found new hosts in a crew recruited in the Portuguese colony of Bissau. Rather than heading for the colder climes of the British Isles, the ship of death sailed for the Caribbean, intending to join a British convoy since war had just broken out with the French revolutionaries. As the Hankey crossed the Atlantic yellow jack spread, killing crew and passengers alike. Once in the Caribbean, the disease became an epidemic. The Hankey visited St. Domingue and then sailed to Philadelphia, docking in late July. At this point Smith takes the book on a slightly different tack, writing two splendid chapters on the terrifying experience of the yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia that broke out that
summer. After offering his “Journal of the Plague Months” (the title of one of the two chapters), Smith concludes the book with an epilogue that traces the end of the Hankey’s doleful voyage. Although no one knew how yellow fever was transmitted, several contemporary commentators identified the outbreak of the disease in 1793 with Bolama and the Hankey. By the time the ship of death arrived in Great Britain that fall, the Privy Council had ordered that it be sunk to insure it would not bring yellow fever ashore.

As this narrative suggests, there does seem to be some correlation between Bolama, the Hankey, and the yellow fever epidemic of 1793. And Smith might be right in his insistence on the connection. Yet, whatever the circumstantial evidence, there are other mitigating factors. First, yellow fever was not new to Philadelphia and had visited the city several times before, even if it had not wrought such devastation for decades. Second, and more importantly, yellow fever was a persistent pestilence in the tropical climes of the West Indies and West Africa. Thousands of ships passed between the two hot-house regions in the decades before 1793. Loaded with slaves who no doubt had been exposed to yellow fever, slaver ships had large crews of Europeans ripe for infection. These vessels, too, had mosquitoes swarming around water casks eager to suck blood and transmit disease. Trade between Philadelphia and the West Indies expanded rapidly during the early years of the French Revolution. Therefore, there were plenty of opportunities to carry the contagion. Finally, we must remember that during the summer of 1793 there was a vast wave of emigrés sweeping into American ports, escaping the racial bloodshed in St. Domingue. Thanks to Smith, we now know a great deal about the Hankey and how some people at the time associated it with yellow fever. But there were many potential ships of death, and before we can be absolutely sure that the Hankey alone was responsible for the tragic spread of yellow fever in 1793, we would need to look at their history – a task that might be nigh on impossible.

In the end, it does not matter if Smith is right or wrong about the Hankey. By bringing to life the history of this one ship of death, and the woeful tale of the lost colony of Bolama, Smith has taken us on a wondrous voyage into the Atlantic world in the age of revolution.

Paul A. Gilje
Norman, Oklahoma


Readers of this journal know very well that there has been an effusion of maritime labour histories since New Left academics began bottom-up history in the 1960s. These studies have collectively explored issues surrounding two central questions: Who worked at sea? And under what conditions was the work done? Much of this scholarship has demonstrated that a substantial number of seafarers were compelled to work in the wooden world. Marcus Rediker has argued that merchant mariners and pirates were primarily dispossessed and exploited labourers who were pushed into seafaring by harsh economic circumstances as a way to keep body and soul together. Daniel Vickers and other fisheries historians have examined the ways in which chronic debt obliged men to go on fishing expeditions for the same employers season after season. A host of scholars including Jesse Lemisch, Nicholas...
Rogers, and Denver Brunsman have demonstrated that a certain percentage of the British navy was comprised of pressed men who did not go to sea voluntarily. Mark Strecker adds a discussion of shanghaied mariners to our knowledge of the unfree characteristics of seafaring.

*Shanghaiing Sailors* is a popular history based largely on a combination of newspaper evidence and secondary sources. Strecker explores the process by which men were coerced into work in commercial shipping between 1849 and 1915. The author explains the book’s chronology by arguing that shanghaiing “peaked” at this time. (1) Desperate maritime employers went to great lengths to get workers quickly and without raising wages. Men and women around the world made it their business to fill these positions with warm bodies.

The book is organized thematically into a series of short chapters. In chapter one, Strecker identifies causes of the nineteenth-century spike in shanghaiing. The California Gold Rush heightened demand for ships and crews to man them. Great Britain repealed navigation acts that had restricted international trade with British possessions. The Treaty of Nanking further opened the possibility for international trade with China. Each of these factors generated a great need for mariners. Chapter two explores the working lives of the maritime labourers who filled this void, willingly or no. Strecker discusses the exotic nature of sailors’ tattoos. He notes that motley crews of African and Chinese workers were fairly common. Working conditions at sea entailed poor food, disease, and the ever present risk of fire and pirate attack. Chapter three focuses on the negative aspects of work in commercial shipping, including flogging, which necessitated the use of shanghaiing. Chapter four is, in many ways, the heart of the book. Here, the author details the various dimensions of the shanghaiing business. Strecker refers to the unscrupulous entrepreneurs who coerced and captured maritime labourers before selling them to ship captains as “crims.” (4, 63) For Strecker, this is a useful catch-all phrase that applies to all the various people who shanghaied sailors at boardinghouses, brothels, shipping offices, and taverns in waterfront districts around the world. The tactics crimps employed to get mariners to captains desperate for manpower included financial blackmail, intoxication, and physical assault. Strecker details their activities in ports around the United States and Canada, including San Francisco, Portland, and Quebec. The following chapter discusses the debauched aspects of life for Jack in port cities. Here, readers find the stereotypical mariner engaged in drinking hard liquor and frolicking with loose women. The author could have nuanced this portrait with accounts of married mariners’ life on shore. Chapter six provides accounts of people who were shanghaied. Victims included men with little or no maritime work experience. For example, Edward Miller, a violinist, and Lester B. Willett, an interior designer, were taken against their will and forced onto a commercial vessel when they visited San Francisco in 1907. (105) Anyone, it seems, could be shanghaied in port cities. The author shifts gears in chapter seven and discusses British naval impressment. This odious practice involved the state appropriation of labour. But, the linkage to shanghaiing in the private sector is never elucidated. Chapters eight and nine provide accounts of maritime labourers being shanghaied into working in the manpower-hungry oyster and whaling industries. The final chapter details the passage of the 1915 Seaman’s Act, which effectively ended shanghaiing.

Non-academic lovers of maritime labour history will appreciate this
fascinating examination of a little-studied but important component of seafaring. Strecker is to be praised for his unyielding sensitivity toward the plight of the maritime labourer. Academic readers will wish for a historiographic introduction and footnotes. Further research will have to be done on the history of maritime labour recruitment before we know the full extent to which coercion was responsible for making men work at sea. But, Strecker’s book is an interesting, well-written entry point into the world of shanghaiing sailors.

Christopher P. Magra
Knoxville, Tennessee


Most histories of the War of 1812 focus on the major battles fought on the border between New York and Upper Canada. The plight of Maine rarely merits a chapter and frequently consists of no more than a few pages. Although George F.W. Young is a Canadian historian, he has written a brief but thoroughly researched and engaging account of the war in Maine.  

In order to comprehend Young’s contribution to the historiography, it is necessary to examine the words he uses in his title. Young’s book is appropriately named The British Capture and Occupation of Down-east Maine, 1814-1815/1818. He describes the military conquest and occupation of the area of Maine that had been settled by people catching the prevailing west wind or traveling down-east, from the time of the occupation of Eastport until its evacuation in 1818. According to Young, the British decided to occupy Eastport to rectify a diplomatic blunder that grew out of the Peace of Paris in 1783. The British claimed the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay after the treaty was signed and interpreted the construction of Fort Sullivan in 1808 on Moose Island as an act of encroachment. “So when war was declared in June 1812 Moose Island was a fair target for British capture and possession”(xiii).

When a combined British military and naval force appeared off Eastport on 11 July 1814, the garrison of Fort Sullivan commanded by Major Perley Putnam capitulated. Although Putnam had considered making a token resistance, he decided against it when he found his escape blocked by the HMS Borer and the town’s residents opposed to it. Once the residents of Eastport had signed the terms of capitulation, the British agreed to protect their property. Young cites the fact that most of the signers of the terms of capitulation had only been in Eastport for 30-32 years since the Island had only been settled after the treaty concluding the American Revolution had been signed. Eastport secured, the British turned their attention to the eastern side of the Penobscot River. During the Revolutionary War, Britain had attempted to establish the Loyalist colony of New Ireland at Castine. Thinking the Penobscot River the logical boundary between the United States and British North America, they decided to implement this policy by seizing Machias.  

On 26 August 1814, a second expedition under Lieutenant General Sir John Sherbrooke and Rear Admiral Edward Griffith were heading from Halifax to Machias until an unusual opportunity presented itself. When expedition fell in with HMS Rifleman, they learned the USS Adams had run aground and traveled up the Penobscot River for repairs. Unable to resist capturing a valuable warship, the expedition altered its course for Penobscot Bay.
As the expedition arrived at Castine, the American garrison commanded by Lieutenant Lewis fired one shot, spiked their guns and fled. With Castine in their possession, Sherbrooke and Griffith dispatched a smaller British force upriver to capture the USS Adams. On the morning of 3 September 1814, a combined British military and naval force arrived in Hampden, Maine. Their progress up the Penobscot River was blocked by a battery composed of the USS Adams’s guns on Crosby’s Wharf under Captain Charles Morris, militia led by Brigadier General John Blake, and Lieutenant Lewis’s soldiers. According to Young, the battle turned into a rout when the militia panicked and fled. Once the militia broke ranks, Captain Morris was forced to spike the guns and burn the USS Adams. Afterwards, the British proceed to Bangor where they began looting the town. Although the British burned the vessels moored in the Penobscot River, the selectmen of Bangor and Hampden saved their communities by offering to deliver the vessels under construction to the British at Castine and agreeing to pay them $42,000.

With the USS Adams destroyed and Castine in their hands, the British turned their attention back to their original objective. On 11 September 1814, Sherbrooke and Griffith dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Pilkington to seize Machias. At 10:00 p.m., Pilkington and his men landed at Bucks Harbor and made their way through the woods to take Fort O’Brien during the night. Once they drove in the pickets, however, they found the fort empty. “The sheriff in consultation with some of the leading men proposed a formal capitulation for the civil officers of the county, to be followed by a similar capitulation by the militia” (65).

During the British occupation of Downeast Maine, there was no official resistance. Most of Castine’s residents complied with regulations enacted by General Gosselin. Trade quickly resumed after Sherbrooke appointed Henry Newton as Castine’s customs collector. Many residents were content to provide the British occupiers with provisions. The resumption of trade, however, created opportunities for American privateers. Despite widespread collaboration with the enemy, Governor Strong’s complacency eventually convinced many Maine residents they needed a state of their own.

Although Young’s book is brief, it is well researched and engagingly written which makes it appropriate for academic and general readers alike. He incorporates local landmarks from Eastport, Castine, and Machias into his narrative, making it an ideal companion for anyone who wants to take a self-guided walking tour of the places where these events occurred.

Edward J. Martin
Orono, Maine