
*Fishing for a Solution* by Donald Barry, Bob Applebaum and Earl Wiseman sheds light on one of the twentieth century’s most interesting chapters in international fisheries history, the development of the fisheries relationship between Canada and the European Union (EU) following the extension of the Canadian fisheries limit to 200 nautical miles (nm).

Co-authors Bob Applebaum and Earl Wiseman are former high-ranking officials of the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and Donald Barry is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Calgary. Their book should be understood as an historical reflection on the development of Canada-EU fisheries relations by former actors and stakeholders, rather than a traditional piece of scholarly historical analysis. These particular authors are both the main strength of the book and also its main weakness. They are, without any doubt, well qualified to discuss the topic, but, having been actively involved in the issues described, lack the critical distance from the subject normally required for an analytical historical approach. Furthermore, while the book benefits from the authors’ in-depth knowledge of the subject, it is characterized by a clearly Canadian perspective rather than a neutral historical approach.

The book follows a chronological line, describing the main stages of EU-Canadian relations post-1977 along with related international or bilateral agreements, including access to fish stocks, tariffs and EU import regulations for Canadian fisheries products. Worth noting is how Canada was taken by surprise when, after declaring the 200nm fisheries limit, EU trawlers first fished for their quotas inside the Canadian limit, and then continued fishing for the same stocks outside the Canadian limit instead of returning to their homeports. While this was legal according to the letters of agreement of the time, it was definitely neither expected nor welcomed by Canada. This is a key example of the problems of modern international fisheries agreements. Unfortunately, the book mainly addresses national fisheries policy rather than discussing developments on the company level; for example, the idea of building up European (German)–Canadian joint ventures. Integrating the history of these working-level developments into the story would have provided a more nuanced picture. Despite this, the book is a more than welcome starting point and will hopefully help to initiate future historical

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research on topics like the proposed EU-Canada joint ventures.

Statistical data, an index and a bibliography make the book an important research tool for any historian interested in the subject, even if the book itself contains more historical reflection than historical analysis. The bibliography is somewhat limited, as sources in languages other than English are rare, despite the relevance of Spanish, Portuguese and German sources to the topic.

Perhaps this reviewer’s sense of the book’s incompleteness is simply the result of an historian mainly interested in the European (German) side of the developments under discussion reviewing a book written by Canadian authors for a largely Canadian audience. That being said, the authors’ efforts to draw attention to a period that has, so far, rarely caught the interest of historians is much appreciated. The book clearly explains that the extension of fishing limits in the North Atlantic to 200nm did not resolve all fishing conflicts but served as a turning point that resulted in new conflicts and regulatory challenges that will generate a rich catch for future generations of fisheries historians.

_Fishing for a Solution_ is a most welcome addition to the existing literature on the history of the international fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic, even though a final historical analysis still needs to be written. Taking into account that the period under review is less than 50 years in the past, footnotes referring to ‘confidential information’ might have been unavoidable, but from an historian’s point of view, it is unsatisfactory, if not even unacceptable. Nevertheless, the book is recommended to any researcher interested in the fisheries history of the North Atlantic and/or the development of Canadian fisheries policy. The questions it raises should be answered by future generations of historians once they have access to the related sources that will no longer be ‘confidential information’.

Ingo Heidbrink
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U.S. Navy Fighter Squadron VF-2 was the first USN unit to receive fighter aircraft. In _Osprey Aircraft of the Aces # 125: F4F Wildcat and F6F Hellcat Aces of VF-2_, the author tells the story of this historic aircraft unit between 1921 and 1944.

In reading this book, one thing must be kept in mind: the USN often dis-establishes units and later reforms them with different personnel. The new unit bearing the old numeric designation has no direct lineage with the prior unit beyond the same number, though the new unit may (and frequently does) choose to adopt the insignia, nickname, and traditions of the prior unit. From 1921 to 1945, VF-2 was formed, dis-established, reformed, dis-established again, reformed again, and dis-established after its last combat tour in late 1944. Therefore, this book relates the story of three distinct squadrons, each bearing the same number.
The first VF-2 squadron was formed in 1921 in San Diego, California, and was originally named Combat Squadron Four. It gained the VF-2 designation the next year. For the next twenty years, VF-2 would be in the forefront of USN carrier operation development. Flying biplanes for years, and then upgrading to the Brewster F2A Buffalo monoplane, the first VF-2 flew off the USN’s first aircraft carrier, U.S.S. *Langley*, and then U.S.S. *Lexington*. During this time, VF-2 laid the groundwork for USN carrier operations. When the Japanese attacked the USN base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, VF-2 was at sea aboard the *Lexington*. For the next several weeks, VF-2’s pilots and airplanes carried out patrols with little combat. Experience with the F2A Buffalo indicated that the aircraft was not as good as its contemporary, the Grumman F4F Wildcat. Therefore, in January, 1942, the first VF-2 was dis-established. Many of its pilots never saw combat as the USN needed experienced pilots to train the many pilot cadets that would see future combat in the Pacific.

The second VF-2 was formed in January 1942 and its pilots and aircraft were once again assigned to U.S.S. *Lexington*. This time, VF-2 saw combat: the USN carried out several little-known combat operations against Japanese installations in the South Pacific and VF-2 and *Lexington* were part of those operations. But the second VF-2 had a short lifespan: *Lexington* was sunk during the Coral Sea battle in May 1942. (It should be noted that many of the second VF-2’s pilots went on to distinguish themselves during the remainder of the Second World War and thereafter.)

The third VF-2 was formed a year later, in June 1943, and it is this “version” of VF-2 that made combat history. The squadron was originally equipped with the FM-2 Wildcat (a variant of the F4F Wildcat) but was soon re-equipped with the Grumman F6F hellcat—a larger, faster and more powerful aircraft than the earlier Wildcat. By common consent, the Hellcat was the best carrier fighter aircraft of the Second World War.

After a period of training on the Hellcat, the third VF-2 went into combat in November 1943. From then until its return to the USA in September 1944, the pilots of VF-2 destroyed 506 Japanese aircraft—261 aircraft in aerial combat and 245 Japanese aircraft on the ground. When the one aerial victory of the second VF-2 is added to the total, the two versions of VF-2 destroyed 262 Japanese aircraft. This is all the more remarkable when it is noted that VF-2 lost only three Hellcats and nine pilots during its second combat tour—a victory-to-loss ratio of almost nine-to-one. In addition, 28 VF-2 pilots shot down five or more enemy aircraft, which still stands as a USN record for the most aces in one squadron.

Cleaver’s history of this great squadron follows the standard Osprey format of this series: a well-written narrative that includes pilots’ accounts of their times with VF-2, even going back to the first VF-2 in the 1930s. The book is heavily illustrated and the personal accounts add much to the narrative. As well, the colour section contains plates of aircraft from all three VF-2s. The very colourful prewar schemes of USN biplanes are well-represented as is a F2A Buffalo in the bright pre-war colour scheme. The following plates of Buffalos, Wildcats, and Hellcats show the transition to camouflage and the consequent wartime
USN colour schemes. These are valuable for the modeller and historian. The author indicates in the Introduction that VF-2 was reformed a third time; its fourth version which has seen action in recent years. A sidebar with a brief description of this latest VF-2 would have been helpful.

It would be tempting to dismiss this work as “just another Osprey book,” but the accounts of the first and second versions of VF-2 lift this above that trite designation. The chapter dealing with the first VF-2 gives a wealth of information as to the development of USN carrier operations. The chapters dealing with the first and second versions of VF-2 contain detail on little-known post-Pearl Harbor USN operations and a close look at the Coral Sea battle. The chapters on the third VF-2 have much information on Pacific War aerial combat. For those reasons, this book is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
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Few volumes can address the complex scope of the areas and peoples living along the Atlantic Ocean between the mid-fifteenth and the early twenty-first centuries. In *The Atlantic World*, D’Maris Coffman, Adrian Leonard, and William O’Reilly, all faculty of the University of Cambridge, bring Atlantic world history to life in a series of 35 articles. This hardcover anthology consists of 726 pages divided into eight parts, each of which is centred on an important theme in Atlantic world history. Topics covered include exploration, immigration and emigration, cultural encounters, warfare and governance, finance and trade, commerce and consumption, and the circulation of ideas. The notes and references after each article are useful for those who wish to read more on a particular topic. The volume is supplemented by two maps and 49 black-and-white images.

Coffman and Leonard begin chapter one by framing the debate over the definition of “Atlantic World” and the different methodological approaches to understanding the past. The goal of this book is to avoid reductionism and Eurocentrism by including articles on overlooked topics. To address relevant issues in the field and avoid limiting explanations, the editors chose an ecumenical approach when deciding which articles to include, so that the book encompasses methodological, theoretical, thematic, and geographic diversity. Even with the large number of topics covered, the editors do not claim to have produced a comprehensive guide to Atlantic history, but rather a volume that sheds new light on topics that have been previously ignored. Because there were no specific criteria on the types of articles included, however, there is little coherency to the publication as a whole. A broad spectrum of interesting and uncommon topics is covered, but there is a lack of depth within each subject, unavoidable given the approach of tackling each topic in a single article. *The Atlantic World* is a pedagogic book, and is most appropriate for advanced
scholars. Longstanding debates in history are touched upon and many chapters include jargon that may overwhelm those who are novices in Atlantic history. This volume would be most helpful for those who are already interested in one of the books’ topics and want an additional source.

As advertised, the editors include articles on unconventional subjects not previously covered. For example, South Africa, Austria, and Morocco, which are not normally included in Atlantic history, are discussed in depth. Racism, or “colour prejudice”, during the French colonization of Guadeloupe is explored from both the views of both the French and the indigenous peoples. And, while the more commonly covered experiences of Catholics and Protestants are present, the editors also include articles on the rarely-mentioned experiences of Jews and Muslims in the Atlantic world.

Familiar concepts are also re-explored from new points of view. For example, slavery is discussed from several unique angles, such as the enslavement of Britons by Barbary pirates. There are different perspectives on the role of paper money in changing the Atlantic world, maritime insurance, the effects of public taste on free trade policies, fish and fisheries in the New World, and endemic flora and fauna in North America. In addition, new methods for studying the Atlantic world are explored. For example, chapter twelve re-examines Atlantic history by applying the knowledge and methods used in Pacific world history. The book covers diverse and rare topics, adding new literature to the field, but the topics covered seem to lack coherence. This book is excellent for those looking for specific articles on Barbary pirates or fisheries in the New World for example, but is not recommended for those looking for comprehensive coverage of life along the Atlantic coast.

Lastly, I find that reductionism and Eurocentricity would have been better avoided by ensuring more diversity within the contributors themselves. According to chapter one, “one can give greater weight to events in one’s own Atlantic world than they merit in a broader context” (2). Yet, the majority of contributors appear to be Western-educated, and all except for two are affiliated with universities in the United Kingdom or a former British colony (e.g. United States, Australia, Canada, and South Africa).

The editors’ joint efforts have yielded a wealth of detail that will delight both academics and anyone with a scholastic interest in the Atlantic world. Readers will be able to enjoy the diverse approaches, methodological pluralism, and unique perspectives presented in this volume.

Grace Tsai
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In 1984, Nimbus Publishing produced Yogi Jensen and Thomas Lynch’s small book Gun-shield Graffiti, an admirable selection
of the artwork that had appeared on a selection of RCN ships’ gunshields during the Second World War. Occasionally, other unofficial badges have appeared in photographs in various RCN histories, often just in the background. In his new volume, Dave Freeman has once again produced a heavily-researched identification book that has taken over 15 years to compile, a companion for his earlier, very valuable, Canadian Warship Names (Vanwell Publishing, 2000). This is a major leap forward from the introduction to unofficial RCN ships’ emblems in that Gunshield Graffiti. It also will serve as a supplement to the official DND publication Badges of the Canadian Forces (1965) and other smaller booklets that depicted the official badges produced post-1948.

The list of the book’s sections alone will indicate its scope. The notes on heraldry include the artists’ original design modifications and Freeman’s efforts to make the descriptions clearer for those unfamiliar with heraldic terms. The Wartime Designs section starts with gunshield artwork and front-of-the-bridge badges, but expands to include blazer crests, boats’ badges, stationery, plaques, group insignia—whatever turned up or could be found. Next come notes on honours, unidentified designs, unsuccessful searches for reported badges and more. Non-ship badges include those for NSHQ, schools, stations, WRCNS, DEMS, rugby teams, a pay office—and other material generated by the author’s appeals for submissions. He identifies the difference in crowns used, funnel markings used during the war for ship groups, and in some cases, by individual ships, missing badges, post-1948 insignia derivations and changes. The author concludes the 353 pages of badges with 9 appendices with such useful guides as The Crow’s Nest Club in St. John’s; U-boat insignia (a descriptive table—flotillas, and a few boats with similar badges); insignia known but not found; painters and designers. There are three valuable indices: by people, by ships and a general index. This book is not only fascinating to leaf through, but highly valuable for identifying badges.

Not all ships developed an insignia (my own Armed Yacht, HMCS Vison, for instance!), but Freeman has not missed many. He has even located insignia for some of the later British-built Castle Class corvettes, and has confirmed that he is already accumulating an addendum for future use. Despite the high cost of producing a volume with so much colour, it will undoubtedly produce more hidden gems as time goes on. The standard of colour reproduction is mostly excellent, except where Freeman had to rely on a poorer quality illustration, such as a distant photograph, although he has manipulated these to the best of his considerable abilities.

The book’s value will be in identifying crew photographs otherwise not identified, by means of some fanciful depiction on a cartoon figure, a Kisbie ring or ship’s badge in the background. Many ships, particularly the destroyers and earlier vessels, have as many as five different insignia/badges/cartoons illustrated, often wildly different, ranging from gunshield art to blazer crests and other sources. HMCS Calgary has four, Iroquois has six, for example. Freeman provides a description for each illustration, detailing source, material, a semi-heraldic description if it is
in the form of a badge, date (if known) and often a brief commentary as to location on
the ship, and the artist where known. Some
badges adhered closely to proper heraldic
format, while others, such as a cowboy
riding stylized corvettes biting U-boats,
were the subject of a painter’s or badge-
maker’s imagination. Some are handsome
and evocative and were even carried over,
in part, into the official post-war badges.
Others are dull or simply anal, depicting the
traditional fouled anchor with a name added. Dawson and Wentworth, for
instance, simply carry that “normal” naval
badge within the oval of leaves with a name
under it. All that surfaced from Freeman’s
appeals for information.

The period covered ranges from HMCS
Niobe and Rainbow of 1910 and other pre-
First World War vessels, such as Vancouver
and Thiepval, to post-Second World War;
such as, the ships from Uganda (her RN
badge) to Armed Yachts in a couple of
cases; almost every early corvette; a few
MTBs and LCTs, 13 out of the 80 Fairmiles
commissioned; Reserve Divisions (Hunter
and Unicorn, even for one of the pre-war
Half Companies). HMCS Trentonian’s
example, a cloth blazer badge, was not
produced until 1990 for a reunion
commemorating the ship’s loss off the U.K.
in February 1945—no wartime badge was
found.

One example will give an ideas of how
complete (and complex) a reference this
compendium of insignia is. The 1944
Castle Class corvette, Arnprior, has two
badges; one a suspected gunshield (from
Yogi Jensen), and the other, a painted jacket
patch, described as:

“Within a diamond frame proper on a
red field, a raised golden heraldic arm,
holding an arrow. At the bottom of the arm,
the word PRIMUS in red letters on an
alternating blue and white striped pennant.
On each side of the arm and below, three
blue maple leaves highlighted and
fimbriated in gold. In the tally plate, the
ship’s name in black on a gold field. At the
bottom of the naval crown, the ship’s title
{HMCS} in black letters on a gold field.”
The four designs for the next ship entry,
HMCS Arrowhead, all contain variations on
the Indian chief’s headdress, on a gunshield,
a sweatshirt and two jacket patches, and
include their sources and a note on the
career of one of the donors.

This is a fascinating collection insignia,
but also, a wartime naval mini-history of
events and memories. It will, like
Freeman’s earlier volume on ships’ names,
be an essential reference for anyone trying
to source or date photos or other items with
the help of the appended notes. It is well
worth the cost to any researcher or serious
student of the RCN’s record.

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Norman Friedman. Fighting the Great War
at Sea. Strategy, Tactics and Technology.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
www.nip.org, 2014, 416 pp., illustrations,
maps, notes, bibliography, index. US

The secondary title of Norman Friedman’s
scholarly study succinctly expresses the
book’s themes, the Strategy, Tactics and
Technology of World War I at sea. He
describes the way each of the protagonists
attempted to use the sea to their advantage
and thereby, deny it to their adversaries during a time of advanced industrial and technical sophistication, coupled with inventive naval warfare strategies.

The book opens with an overview of the strategic objectives and resources of the greatest European maritime powers at the beginning of the war; those of Great Britain, Germany and, to a lesser degree, France. A review of the participating fleets’ operations and outcomes of their combat engagements follows. Although Friedman recounts details of many battles including Dogger Bank, Jutland, Heligoland, and Gallipoli, his literary purpose is more an evaluation and analysis rather than a narrative of the historical events. The heart of the book is a detailed examination of the maritime character or technological advancement within many classes of vessels involved in this conflict. These include dreadnoughts (capital ships), cruisers, destroyers, crude aircraft carriers, minelayers, mine sweepers, specialized logistical craft, submarines, submarine chasers, transports, and more close-in littoral vessels, such as torpedo boats. Friedman also provides an academic appraisal of weapons and weapon-systems that were developed and deployed along with their effectiveness, flaws and evolution, their protective armour, and finally, their swiftness and agility.

Of particular note is a substantial discussion about vessels designed to deliver torpedoes and mine warfare; topics that are rarely covered in other texts concerned with the First World War. As the author points out, torpedoes had deficient targeting systems making it difficult to accurately plot a target’s course and distance. Combined with the inability of most submarines to fire more than a single salvo at a target, this made a potentially deadly weapon much less potent. The author devotes considerable attention to variations in types of mines, their strategic placement and the safe clearing of underwater minefields. In describing the problems of mine removal from the Narrows in preparation for the Dardanelle campaign Friedman noted, “Because of shore batteries, all sweeping attempts [for mines] were made at night. . . .the strong current flow in the Narrows caused the mines to dip, bringing them below the trawler draught. Sweeping wires often could not cut mooring cables, so that sweepers dragged mines out of the straits, where special dumping areas were set up;” details that have received scant attention in most accounts of the historic assault on Turkey.

The author also addresses the question of logistical support. Albeit unglamorous, supplies of munitions, spare parts, medical support, food and clothing are critical to the successful conduct of any military engagement. As the technology of complex naval systems evolved, it became vital to recruit educated men rather than the brawn needed during the age of sail—and provide advanced training to the sailors. One obvious example is the intelligent use of radio communications to acquire situational awareness particularly at sea where precise navigation was wanting.

_Fighting the Great War at Sea_ is not just another book about a war that has been extensively covered. Friedman revisits the conflict armed with declassified documents opened some seventy-five years after the war’s end. This new material casts some light upon what was going through the minds of the maritime hierarchies just prior to the start of the conflict.

Friedman, a renowned naval historian, expresses his opinions seen through the lens
of his accomplished “retrospectoscope.” He notes that both sides knew that a war in the early part of the twentieth century would seriously disrupt the British economy because Germany was a major trading partner and their respective monarchs were cousins. The two nations were fiscally interdependent, but Germany’s failure to stockpile spare parts and munitions meant it was ill prepared for war. Thus, both sides thought that if war were declared, it would likely end quickly. “The British war aim was the defeat of Germany, not the preservation of France. [But in an untoward scenario] if the Germans did overrun France, but lost the war, they would have had to disgorge what they had seized. That is just what happened in the Second World War...” (355)

Friedman’s book is a supplement and update of the readily available works of many other scholars of the naval history of the First World War including the monumental multi-volume works of Arthur Jacob Marder. Fighting the Great War at Sea is a physically large volume. One might classify it as a coffee table book, but Friedman’s authoritative work should not be superficially perused. Although its quasi-encyclopedic treatment of the subject makes it a bit less accessible than it deserves to be, it makes an important contribution to the maritime history of this conflict. The well-organized data are well documented with regard to its various sources. The book’s many illustrations augment the written descriptions and new information adds important insights about the war’s beginnings and its conduct at sea.

Louis Arthur Norton
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For a full century the perception that the Royal Navy of the 1870s and 1880s was inadequate to meet the demands that would have been made of it in the event of war went virtually unchallenged. This view originated in the mid-1880s and gathered steam the following decade courtesy of alarmist screeds by journalists such as William T. Stead and Spenser Wilkinson. It was in turn adopted, lock, stock and barrel, by later writers such as Arthur J. Marder and Oscar Parkes, the latter of whom coined the resonant phrase “the dark ages of the Victorian navy” to describe the decade 1874-84.

Since the 1980s, this interpretation has been largely upended by the work of Andrew Lambert, myself, Robert Mullins, Richard Dunley, and others, who have argued that the “dark ages” school drew almost exclusively on the views of disgruntled naval officers such as Lord Charles Beresford, Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, and John A. Fisher, whose professional antipathy towards politicians’ alleged parsimony should be taken for granted and whose doom-mongering ought to be taken with several grains of salt, rather than accepted at face value, as did Marder, Parkes, and others.

Once one cuts through the navalist hyperbole and assesses the mid-Victorian battlefleet against its rivals—such as they were—First Lord G.J. Goschen’s pronouncement to the House of Commons
in 1873 that Britain possessed twelve ironclads so powerful that they had no peers in other navies appears not whistling in the dark, but the confident utterance of a man who knew the country held a winning hand. (Hansard, 3rd Ser., vol. 215, col. 44-45) Moreover, so far from failing to develop an alternative operational strategy to the blockade—its efficacy thrown open to doubt by the arrival of steam power—the Royal Navy adopted coastal assault as a means of destroying enemy forces before they could sally forth.

In this, his latest volume, Howard J. Fuller would have us return to the “dark ages” paradigm. Indeed, he goes further, arguing that Britain’s decline as a world power—hitherto dated variously to the 1890s, the Edwardian era, post-World War One, or even post-1945, depending on which book one consults—was in fact underway by the 1850s. Why, especially given that, as Paul Kennedy stressed in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, the 1860s marked the apogee of Britain’s economic and industrial dominance? (Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 151) Fuller takes as evidence for his claim Lord Palmerston’s failure to back up his bellicose utterances with action in the Schleswig-Holstein crisis (1864), the narrow margin of superiority that the British settled for in the ironclad shipbuilding race with France 1858-62, and above all Britain’s refusal to intervene in the American Civil War.

Moreover, he maintains that the Royal Navy lacked the offensive capacity as a serious threat to France, Russia, and the United States, and that whatever strength it possessed was therefore defensive. Indeed, he bluntly denies the existence of what Andrew Lambert has described as the “Cherbourg strategy” for destroying enemy forces and arsenals with mortar- and gunboats, working in conjunction heavily-armoured and armed breastwork monitors such as HMS Devastation. (48) Were that not enough, he misses few opportunities to denigrate HMS Warrior’s battle worthiness, while lauding not only the American monitor design’s fighting qualities, but its seaworthiness as well.

In his eagerness to make his case, however, Fuller has misrepresented the arguments of his scholarly opponents to the point of caricature. Contra his allegations, nobody of whom I am aware has claimed that “[n]othing could prevent British naval power from destroying at will even the most heavily defended fortresses in the world,” or that “that British foreign policy—backed by an all-powerful Royal Navy—all but dictated world peace in the nineteenth century.” (3, 7-8) Still less defensibly, he takes pot shots at Dr. Rebecca Matzke’s fine Deterrence Through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy Under Pax Britannica (2011) despite the fact that the period it surveys (the 1830s and early 40s) falls well outside the chronological scope of his own study. Why? A clue is found in footnote 4 on page 63, where it is stated that Dr. Matzke “gratefully acknowledges the ‘particular help on the nineteenth-century Royal Navy’ given her by Andrew Lambert and John Beeler.” (7, 63)

Fuller’s argument is grounded on the presumption that Britain would have intervened in many of the era’s numerous crises had it possessed the means to do so, and interprets its failure to act in any of them, especially the American Civil War, as evidence that it could not, owing chiefly to the Royal Navy’s weakness, not to mention its want of a viable offensive operational strategy. That there might have been more
cogent reasons for Britain’s remaining aloof than fear of American monitors—starting with the fundamental fact that no core national interests were at stake—is not countenanced.

The same is true of his treatment of Britain’s aloofness during the Italian crisis of 1859-60 and the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864, which he attributes in part to “the growing realization that the Royal Navy was not quite supreme with the advent of the ironclad....”(4) Missing is any consideration of the bases on which British foreign policy rested. Intervention on the continent was in the offing only if national security was threatened, and if a continental ally was forthcoming. Tellingly, when Belgian neutrality appeared to be in jeopardy in the summer of 1870 even the unwarlike Gladstone sought guarantees from France and the North German Confederation and was prepared to commit Britain to the fray should either of the combatants occupy the country, by cooperating with the party did not.

Fuller’s derisive dismissal of coastal assault rests on his claim that no “plans” for its employment have surfaced, charging at one point that “no one has published any measured proof of its existence” and at another that “in the absence of any real plans which were formulated at the time...an imaginary reality is substituted” for reality itself.(179, 48) Yet he repeatedly quotes contemporaries who evidently took the concept seriously, starting with Robert Spencer Robinson, Controller of the Navy 1861-71, who in 1866 pressed for the construction of several small vessels of “the Monitor type being intended either for coast defences or for the attack of shipping in an enemy’s harbour.” (42, emphasis added) Nine years later, First Naval Lord Alexander Milne deprecated using such ships for high seas service: “however great and important the power of their guns and how admirable [sic] they may be adapted for the attack of an Enemy’s fleet, forts, or harbours, yet their sphere of action is limited by the means of obtaining coal nor are they adapted for ocean cruising....”(Quoted in Beeler, Birth of the Battleship. 91, emphasis added) Numerous other examples could be adduced.

What, then, are readers to make of Fuller’s claim that no “plans” for precisely that employment exist? Are they to conclude that Robinson and Milne (and many others) did not mean what they wrote or said? To be sure, no bound volume conveniently labeled “plans for the employment of coastal assault vessels” is to be found among the Admiralty Papers, but Fuller’s own research should have made him aware of why: war planning in the nineteenth-century Royal Navy was not a centralized undertaking. Rather, the Admiralty devolved that function to commanders on the spot. When hostilities threatened with the U.S. over the Trent affair in late 1861, First Lord the Duke of Somerset informed Milne, then in command of the North America and West India Station, that “[i]n the event of war I do not send from here any plan of operations as you have probably better means of judging what it may be advisable to do,” only suggesting the advisability of raising the Union blockade of the South’s ports.(Beeler, ed., The Milne Papers, vol. 2, 559)

Was this ad hoc approach the most efficient way of proceeding? Perhaps not, but there was much to be said for the view Somerset expressed: that those on the spot were better placed to judge what was
possible and what measures were needed to achieve British aims, especially prior to instantaneous global communications, than were those at the Admiralty. Moreover, this devolved approach persisted long after the Palmerston era, even after the creation of a Naval Intelligence Department in 1887.

Was the Royal Navy “all-powerful” in the 1860s, 70s, and 80s? No. It generally maintained a modest level of superiority over France and Russia, not because politicians were unmindful of possible threats—although with the exception of 1858-62 there were no such worth mentioning—but because they were mindful of the taxpaying electorate that had to foot the bill. By the standards of 1900-1914 the £10-13 million expended annually on the senior service appears paltry, but compared to the £7-8 million per year typically spent during the 1840s and early 50s it appeared enormous, and was regarded so by many, if not most, contemporaries save the usual suspects: naval officers and their hawkish allies in Parliament and the press.

Moreover, sensible statesmen such as Gladstone, Disraeli, Goschen, and others were mindful that Britain held virtually all the trumps should any rival be so foolhardy as to provoke a naval arms race, in particular unmatched financial resources, the most advanced steam engineering industry in the world, and a shipbuilding sector that was still producing almost 60 percent of the world’s tonnage as of 1914. Early in the book Fuller paraphrases Bryan Ranft’s assessment of Britain’s behaviour during the period 1889-1914: “Ranft decided that the driving force behind Britain’s naval expansion at the turn of the century was a sense of vulnerability.” (22)

Unfortunately, he then fails to follow this line of thought to its logical outcome and conclude that perhaps the reason for Britain’s comparatively modest naval expansion from the late 1850s to 1889 was because it largely lacked that sense of vulnerability.

In justice to Fuller, a case can be made that, in countering the “dark ages” interpretation, those he labels “revisionists” may have pushed their arguments too far. His approach, however, does not strike me as the most persuasive way to make it.

John Beeler
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The outbreak of war in August 1914 followed a decade of unprecedented change in warships and naval technologies. Within the Royal Navy it was recognized that this was the first major war in a century but there were many “unknowns” about what was to come. In fact, the initial mobilization and deployments to war stations—initiated even before hostilities formally began—were well handled. But switching to a war fighting mode had its odd features. On the night Britain declared war, the battleship Dreadnought was part of a darkened formation heading through the Strait of Dover. Lionel Dawson had been surprised that part of his turnover when taking over the Middle Watch was an order, soon rescinded, that all officers on duty
were to wear revolvers. (Captain Lionel Dawson, *Flotillas: A Hard-Lying Story*, London 1933, 152).

*Before Jutland* is a very competent operational history, from a British perspective, of the first six months of the war at sea in the North Sea and Baltic. It is an updated and slightly longer version of the same author’s *The King’s Ships Were at Sea*, also published by the Naval Institute Press in 1984, which became generally recognized as an authoritative modern battle history. Between publishing the two versions of this history, James Goldrick has had a distinguished career as an officer in the Royal Australian Navy, retiring as a Rear Admiral, and as the author of several publications about British and Australian defence policies and modern naval history. In his introduction, Goldrick writes engagingly that since the first edition, he “grew up”. His experiences at sea, including command of several ships and serving at more senior operational levels, have better informed his understanding of how the opposing forces functioned and of the challenges which affected their performance.

The author writes “... that the six months described here can be called the true beginning of modern naval warfare.”(299) Almost all of the new technologies profoundly influenced operations: submarines, aircraft both in reconnaissance and attack, open sea minelaying, surface engagements fought at long range and high speed in adverse weather, and radio communications. Then there was the exploitation of an enemy’s use of radio through signals intelligence. At the same time, detection of enemy forces was still limited to visual ranges. Goldrick observes that both the Battles of Doggerbank in January 1915, described in this book, and Jutland, in May 1916, started in conditions of exceptional visibility. Inevitable navigational errors bedevilled reports from units out of sight of each other. It would take decades to introduce mechanized plotting tables to record the track of a manoeuvring warship and to develop techniques to coordinate the understood positions of widely dispersed units. Goldrick also notes how British commanders at sea failed to grasp their responsibilities beyond an individual ship, or formation-level as part of a fighting organization. One result was lamentably poor reporting of contact with the enemy. Reporting problems and a lack of understanding of the importance of feeding vital information upwards surfaced early but continued and would have serious consequences at Jutland more than a year after the period covered in this narrative.

The book covers events in chronological order after establishing a context in six succinct introductory chapters on the individual navies, war plans, and operational challenges. This second edition also includes coverage of Russian and German operations in the Baltic. The author explains that what he describes as “a fundamental source” for both editions was the Royal Navy’s Great War “internal history” the *Naval Staff Monographs (Historical)* which had been produced between 1919 and 1939. Perhaps because the *Monographs* were his jumping off point, Goldrick’s narrative focus is, as he says, “primarily on the British”. Thus, even though the events examined happened a century ago, this new book—possibly the best in this genre—joins a long list of works which concentrate largely on presenting the Royal Navy side of operations.
Goldrick’s narrative is buttressed by frequent allusions to writings and studies by others. The bibliography of English language references is almost intimidating. For example, it lists 68 personal manuscripts in various British archives. This new edition reflects scholarly work over the 30 years since the first edition, including Andrew Gordon’s dissection of the RN’s cult of command in *The Rules of the Game* (1996) and studies such as Nicholas Lambert’s *Planning for Armageddon* (2012) which have clarified the British war plan to wage economic warfare on Germany by imposing a distant blockade. Stephen Roskill had already published criticisms of Churchill’s actions as First Sea Lord by 1984 and there have been further searching appraisals since. Goldrick writes: “The Admiralty would have been a different place without Churchill, but the question is open as to whether it benefitted from his energy more than it suffered from his ignorance”. (301) The difficulties the Germans had because of inferior coal had already been written about in English back in 1984, but Goldrick had published an article on this topic in 2014 and weaves it into the story. The difficulties both the British and the Germans experienced when wartime demanded more sustained steaming and at higher speeds are well brought out.

Chapter 5, “Operational Challenges”, is particularly rewarding. Goldrick brings his own professional background and sea experience to bear by outlining issues such as environmental conditions, contemporary navigation techniques, endurance and fuel, the gaps between prewar expectations of new technologies and actual performance in operational conditions, problems in radio communications and the embryonic nature of both signals intelligence and the Admiralty’s organization control forces at sea.

More could have been done to help the reader grasp North Sea geography and the engagements described so fluidly. The text carries a litany of evocative place names whose location is not clarified: Swarte Bank, Smith’s Knoll, Norderney Gat, “the Gabbards” and most exotic of all “The Broad Fourteens” (a large area to the west of the Dutch coast with fairly uniform depths around 14 fathoms). There is a map as frontispiece but these points are not shown, nor are they defined as in other books about the North Sea encounters. The track charts show times and sinkings but nothing else (the one showing U-9’s famous sinkings of three cruisers on 22 September does indicate whereWeddingen fired his torpedoes). Track charts in other works about these actions have annotations about how many ships were in formation, when the enemy was first sighted, when they opened fire etc.—some even very usefully indicate areas of restricted visibility. The photographs are disappointing — the same stodgy small images of individual ships and mostly stodgy images of individuals as in the first edition. Pictures showing contemporary warships belching smoke and the torpedo beats with their low freeboard plunging into seas would have underlined points made in the text about how heavy smoke inhibited gunnery and poor performance in heavy weather hampered small warships. The index is useful because it cites page numbers for specific aspects of a particular heading. There has been an odd change, however, since the first edition because the new index curiously does not list individual submarines or include the names of commanding officers other than Max Horton.
Thanks to the author’s combination of a naval operational background and meticulous research, *Before Jutland* can truly be described as an authoritative battle history of the opening months of the war at sea in Northern Europe in 1914-15. This study reads easily and incorporates current scholarship about how new technologies were influencing naval warfare and about British plans to use seapower against the German economy. While German and Russian intentions and operations are covered, the emphasis is on how the Royal Navy—not only at sea but as an organization—planned and conducted the opening phases in home waters of its first major war in a century.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Great Britain was unprepared to tackle Imperial Germany’s so-called ‘U-boats’ and its fast torpedo boats that preyed upon Allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic Ocean. The Admiralty faced a steep learning curve in supporting Britain’s war effort in the Atlantic and, as early as May 1915, Britain’s situation was being openly described as desperate.

After obtaining an MA in War Studies from King’s College London, the author served in the Royal Air Force in a variety of locations, including Afghanistan and Oman. His fifth book for Osprey Publishing is illustrated by Peter Dennis and Ian Palmer who contribute a wide range of fascinating photographs, ship’s profiles and illustrations of weaponry to the book.

This illustrated account of the First World War at sea shows how these early machines of naval warfare—the British ‘Q-ship’ and German ‘U-boat’, as well as the combatants who operated them—were pitted against each other. The author explains how, from the summer of 1915 on, the German Navy was sinking up to sixty Allied merchant vessels per week. The Admiralty was initially at a loss as to how to respond to the threat to their main fleets in the North Sea while French *Jeune Ecole* strategists had suggested building a barrage across the North Sea to block German access to the Atlantic. Britain promptly dismissed this notion as unworkable, despite having lost over 328,000 tons of shipping to submarines by April 1917.

Greentree describes in some detail how the Admiralty, backed by Winston Churchill, developed the novel solution of ‘decoy vessels’. Constructed to appear to the enemy as innocent merchant ships, they were, in fact, fully armed with cannons concealed behind camouflage screens and were crewed by Royal Navy personnel in fishermen’s clothes. Allied freighters and ocean-going fishing boats stalked their adversary unrecognized and, when attacked, the crew would theatrically appear to be undisciplined landlubbers or panic-stricken civilians. They also launched lifeboats to further tempt the so-called wolf packs of German U-boats to surface (Morris 1995), at which point the hidden guns of the Q-ships would open fire. (Massie 1991)

Greentree carefully explains much of the technology involved in creating
Britain’s Q-ships while analyzing Admiralty tactics during the pioneering years of anti-submarine warfare. The evidence clearly shows that naval service at that time was highly dangerous for the participants and required training in the new art of marine deception. The author has also detailed the vessels, technology and tactics of the two main sides. He explains how, as the war progressed, U-boats in the Atlantic became more wary, taking fewer risks as Germany evolved new tactics in the battle for superiority to match those of the Royal Navy.

Although parts of this story have been told elsewhere, this new book gives a fascinating account of how these ships faced off against each other. It also details the dangers which the Q-ships faced and highlights how the crews acquired unique training in the black arts of deception. The First World War saw many unexpected maritime innovations, such as seaplanes and communication at sea, which are outlined here. Fortunately, this book is just one part of an illustrated series which highlights not only Q-ships and U-Boats, but the Destroyer Escorts, British Cruisers, German Commerce Raiders, E-Boats and MTBs.

Greentree has made good use of many of the less conventional maritime sources in writing this book. The result is a chronology that skilfully analyses how the threat to Allied merchant shipping developed during the First World War and how Britain effectively dealt with Germany’s novel U-boats.

Officially backed by Winston Churchill at the Admiralty and the dynamic senior Sea Lord, Admiral Jacky Fisher, a new dawn of contesting submarine warfare was heralded in. Yet, within two decades, the Treaty of Versailles had disappeared in a fog of misunderstanding, missed opportunities and events, and the seven great navies of the world had rebuilt their fleets. This slim book ‘punches above its weight’ and, as such, it deserves a prominent place on the shelves of any reader with an interest in the centenary of the First World War and the Royal Navy.

Michael Clark
London, England


Most historians of the War of 1812 have not been kind to Governor-in-Chief Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, the man in command of British North America during the war. Portrayed in the past as a good civil administrator, his military leadership has been viewed as timid, interfering, and outright incompetent. A fractured relationship with Royal Navy commander Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, plus Prevost’s own failed attack on Plattsburgh, New York, in September 1814, led to Prevost’s recall to London and the demand for his court martial. Prevost’s death before the court could sit left a permanent bad odor around his time as military leader in Canada.

John Grodzinski’s Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812 is a complete revision of the former narrative surrounding Prevost’s military leadership in British North America. With strong and
clear prose, Grodzinski elevates Prevost out of the dustbin and into the position of insightful leader, strategist, tactician and innocent victim of a self-protective political assault by his critics. It is a persuasive argument.

The first chapter takes us from his birth in 1767 in the New Jersey colony through his arrival in Nova Scotia as governor in 1808. Prevost’s military credentials are established with his involvement in the defense of St Vincent. Time as governor of St Lucia and Dominica led to his appointment as the governor and military leader for Nova Scotia in 1808. With the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair in 1807 souring relationships between Britain and the United States, Prevost’s posting to Nova Scotia’s was important.

The second chapter focuses on Prevost’s time in Nova Scotia and the expedition to capture Martinique in 1809. His reorganization of the local militia, the raising of a regiment of fencible infantry for Nova Scotia, and repairs and additional works for the defense of Halifax prepared the colony for the coming war. Grodzinski describes Prevost’s active part in the capture of Martinique, leading his troops in pursuit of the French, and setting the British siege guns.

Chapter Three covers his arrival in Quebec to assume the position of Governor-in-Chief through to the beginning of the War of 1812. The problems in defending the colonies, with too few regular troops, a small logistics staff, limited food supplies, a shaky militia, an incompetent provincial marine and a supply line over 1,700 miles in length are sketched out for the reader. The British Government ordered Prevost to adopt a defensive stand. Grodzinski points to this directive as critical in understanding how Prevost approached the war. Passing this defensive strategy along, he did, however, tell Generals Brock and Sherbrooke to attack the enemy if opportunity allowed. This rather minimal instruction is used by Grodzinski to support later critiques of Brock and his successors. Meanwhile, by accommodating the French population of Lower Canada, Prevost turned several of the English ruling class in the colony into his worst enemies.

The opening of the war is the subject of the next chapter. Continued disadvantages for Prevost play across this chapter, but its main target is Isaac Brock and his perceived heroic defense of Upper Canada. Grodzinski notes that Brock’s moves against Fort Mackinac and Detroit were suggested by Francis Gore, the previous Governor-in-Chief, and that both actions were completely in line with Prevost’s plan. Brock’s rash behaviour at the Battle of Queenston Heights is turned into an ignorant blunder and Sir Isaac is toppled from his mythic pedestal.

Chapters Five and Six address the war during 1813, including various American invasion efforts, although the central focus is the arrival of Sir James Yeo and the British Navy on the Great Lakes. Yeo was to report to the Admiralty and Admiral Warren in Halifax, and consult and cooperate with Prevost. Grodzinski sees this as giving Yeo room to ignore whomever he liked. The attack on Sacketts Harbor at the end of May 1813 is the first break in the relationship between Prevost and Yeo. Prevost suggested the attack, a sure sign of his aggressiveness. The assault did not go well, but in Grodzinski’s telling, Prevost was the one who pushed the attack to its breaking point before ordering a withdrawal. Yeo is noted as wanting an
attack but abandoned his ships to fight ashore. The failure of naval support and an enemy ensconced in fortified positions defeated the mission. The second break in their relationship involved how to use the Lake Ontario squadron. During 1813, the British and American squadrons met three times. These indecisive engagements reveal Yeo’s hesitation to fight American Commodore Chauncey and win control of the lake. At the same time, Prevost had requested Yeo cooperate with the army by moving troops and supplies. The engagements interrupted such cooperation. On both counts Grodzinski scores hits against Yeo and points for Prevost. At the end of Chapter Six, Grodzinski addresses the criticism that Prevost’s failure to support Major General Henry Proctor at Amherstburg led to the defeats of the British squadron on Lake Erie in September and Proctor’s at Moraviantown in October 1813. Barclay’s defeat is easily turned into Yeo’s failure to send seamen to Lake Erie. Proctor’s defeat is racked up to incompetence and failing to obey Prevost’s orders.

The assault on Yeo continues in Chapter Seven. Prevost’s desire for Yeo’s cooperation with the army on the Niagara Peninsula in 1814 went largely unfulfilled, causing the former great stress. Grodzinski also claims that Prevost influenced (at least in part) the attack against Washington. He writes that the destructive raids on Dover in May 1814 and St David’s and Queenston in July 1814 moved Prevost to suggest a similar raid to Cochrane (commanding the British Naval forces on the Station). Cochrane decided on Washington.

The central reason for the book lies in Chapters Eight and Nine dealing with the September 1814 Plattsburgh campaign, in which Prevost led an army of 10,000 British troops. They were sent from Europe to capture the forts and town of Plattsburgh, on the shore of Lake Champlain. Cooperation with a squadron of four ships and eleven gunboats that would engage the American squadron anchored off the town was a critical feature of the assault. The failure of this effort is the main military strike against Prevost; its reassessment by Grodzinski is critical to his argument.

Prevost is clearly in charge, but he uses his aides to communicate with the generals commanding the troops and for logistics. Logistical problems slow the transportation of supplies with the army as it moves south. Yeo would later claim that an agreement was made between Prevost and Captain Downey (in command of the squadron) that a coordinated assault on the forts at Plattsburgh would occur as the British squadron attacked the American ships. This was to distract the cannons of the forts from firing on the British vessels. Grodzinski shows that the ships were too far away from the forts for this to be necessary. He questions the need for a coordinated attack and the possibility that captured American ordnance could be used to bombard the American squadron into submission, even after it had captured the British ships. What is clear is that as the British ships sailed into fight their American counterparts, there was no corresponding attack by British land forces, with the exception of a minimal cannonade. The uncoordinated preparations and the loss of the squadron caused Prevost to call off the attack and head for Lower Canada. Fear of a counter attack by American forces in the area also played into Prevost’s decisions. Mutterings of disapproval from the British officers with European experience emerged as the troops
re-entered Lower Canada. Their main concern was Prevost’s failure “to issue a scheme of operations” (164) before the force left to attack Plattsburgh.

As Grodzinski points out, the British troops were not an elite force and there was an absence of siege engineers and appropriate artillery. The naval situation on Lake Champlain was a desperate one, with the new ship only partially finished, though armed, and with the bulk of new recruits arriving within days of the battle. One concern is Yeo’s sending Captain Peter Fisher to replace Commander Daniel Pring as commander of the squadron and then quickly replacing Fisher with Captain Robert Downey, who only arrived 1 September. Yeo is also rightfully blamed for ignoring Pring’s requests for more sailors, as he had ignored Barclay’s. Reviewing the exchange of letters between Downie and Prevost, Grodzinski is clear that Prevost did not order, nor goad Downie into sailing before he was ready, as put forth by Yeo and other critics. When the navy sailed into the bay off Plattsburgh it was their choice. Yet the letters indicate that Prevost wanted action to happen soon and that two days of delay did not please him. They also indicate some form of coordinated attack by the British army and navy against the American forces, but that coordination did not occur. Grodzinski states that, “Prevost may have misemployed the division, but he had preserved it” (191).

Preparations for Prevost’s court martial on charges stemming from surviving Royal Navy officers complaining about his urging of Downey to engage and then failing to support him as promised are the focus of Chapter Ten. At the end of the war, Prevost was recalled to explain the loss at Plattsburgh to the Admiralty. Yeo returned home to respond to similar questions, but these concerns disappeared as Yeo pressed to have the former Governor-in-Chief of British North America tried for the defeat at Plattsburgh. As this court martial was being prepared, with Yeo serving as a prosecutor, Sir George Prevost, already in declining health, died. The questions over his military and civil conduct in North America were never fully investigated leaving the cloud that, Grodzinski holds, unfairly marred Prevost’s reputation. In a final comment on Prevost’s career, Grodzinski states that Prevost led the war effort, dealt with incredibly demanding logistical concerns for both the army and the navy and had fewer troops than he needed for most of the war. Instead of criticism, Prevost deserves praise for his efforts and ultimate success in preserving the colonies.

Grodzinski’s argument is convincing, but the rendering of Prevost we are left with is that of the saviour of Canada (almost single-handedly). While Gore and Prevost realized their importance, it was Brock who decided (albeit with a bit of a waffle) to order the attack on Fort Mackinac before the Americans there heard about the declaration of war. It was Brock who went after the Americans at Detroit, delivering a crippling blow. Both of these events ensured the Aboriginal tribes, including those under Tecumseh stayed with the British, an alliance that was never assured, even with earlier agreements. Grodzinski’s criticism of Proctor’s performance fails to note his success at the Battle of Frenchtown in January 1813, and underplays the pressure from Tecumseh to fight. The author’s suggestion that Prevost had something to do with the raid on Washington is a stretch. The British had been raiding Chesapeake Bay for over a year, getting more daring and
destructive. Washington was a natural progression in these raids, especially with the arrival of reinforcements in early August. The overall narrative is that few, other than Prevost, succeeded, and if they did, it was because of him, which is simply not reflective of the historic record. Prevost had some talented officers and steady regulars, seamen and militia who made their boss look good.

Black and white illustrations include a portrait of Prevost, maps of St Lucia, Martinique, Dominica, the Great Lakes region and Prevost’s family coat of arms and grave-site. Two maps appear in the chapter on Plattsburgh. The most dynamic of the six appendices is the last, a copy of Yeo’s incomplete preparatory notes for the court martial (a great find, produced here for the first time) that reveal Sir James’ plan to demonstrate Prevost’s forcing Downie to engage the enemy before his squadron was ready, and then Prevost’s failure to deliver the support he had vowed to give. Grodzinski suggests it is a bizarre “pretend” trial written up by Sir James Yeo himself. Endnotes are thorough, numerous and useful, as is the bibliography. The index is more than adequate and easy to work with.

As a revision to the old story of Sir George Prevost’s command of British North America during the War of 1812, this book helps to set a bent record straight, but in doing so, makes it shine just a little too brightly.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


Reviewing yearbooks published by academic institutions, and in particular, yearbooks from research-focused museums, are always a challenge because they serve a number of different functions, and not all of these functions are directly related to a traditional academic publication. A review of the 2014 yearbook of the fisheries and maritime museum in Esbjerg, however, is a comparably easy task as the volume combines a number of scholarly articles that would have been easily accepted by virtually any academic journal within the field.

The volume combines nine articles covering various museum research areas ranging in time from Early Modern to the present. Mette Guldberg provides a history of the northernmost North Sea port, Hjerting, in the Early Modern period and Ida Christine Jørgensen discusses the ideas of life and the world of Danish seafarers in the same period. Both articles are well researched and highlight topics often overlooked, but definitely important for a better understanding of the past. Contributions by Holger Munchaus Petersen and Benny Boysen deal with the transition period from sail to steam and from timber to iron-built ships.

Søren Byskov and Knud Jakobsen focus on fisheries history and in particular, Danish plaice fisheries and Danish fisheries during the Second World War. Probably the most interesting article in this edition of the yearbook is Morten Hahn-Pedersen’s discussion of the development of the Danish North Sea tourist industry over the last 200
years. It reads like a blueprint for not only Danish seaside-resorts, but also for resorts on the German or Dutch North Sea coast. Readers from these areas will not only appreciate the detailed historical analysis, but will definitely enjoy the numerous parallels with their own childhood memories at the beach. With tourism one of today’s most important industries for coastal areas all around the globe, such an analysis seems to be especially relevant for understanding the changing coastal culture of the last two centuries.

The final two articles by Carl Christian Kinze and Bie Thøstesen are dedicated to the wider field of natural history and focus on humpback whales in the Baltic and beached whales in Denmark; in other words, whales that left their traditional habitat. While both articles are primarily natural history articles, they are at the same time important contributions to maritime environmental history.

Altogether the nine articles successfully demonstrate that it is no longer enough for a maritime (and fisheries) museum to focus exclusively on traditional maritime history topics, but that new fields like coastal culture and/or maritime environmental history can contribute to the future of institutions like the museum in Esbjerg and maritime history at large. While some might regard these fields as outside the focus of an institution dedicated to maritime and fisheries history, it should be stated that this research is critical for keeping and widening the societal relevance of such institutions and the discipline. With the publication of their 2014 yearbook, the fisheries and maritime museum in Esbjerg has demonstrated once again that it is not only one of the foremost Danish institutions in the field of maritime history, but that it provides intellectual leadership for the discipline at large. It serves as an example for many other institutions regardless of whether they are on the North Sea or on any other coast around the globe.

I would recommend Esbjerg’s 2014 yearbook to any historian interested in the history of the North Sea region, whether pursuing traditional maritime history research or a broader cultural history of coastal regions. Although published in Danish for a primarily Danish audience (which might limit international readership somewhat), there are English summaries available for all articles. This makes the book more accessible while ensuring the essential clarity of the original article, which can sometimes be lost in translation. The yearbook’s scholarly content is a welcome addition to the existing literature. Moreover, the museum should be commended for its decision to continue to communicate its research at a time when many museums are drifting towards the idea of ‘edutainment’ or focusing on exhibitions designed to drag a maximum number of visitors into the museum regardless of their scholarly quality or importance.

The high quality of the publication and the large number of previously unpublished illustrations, in combination with a reasonable price, make it easy recommend this book, even to readers with limited skills in Danish.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia

Jon K. Hendrickson. *Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904-1914*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
Hendrickson has written an interesting book about a little-known side of the naval rivalry in the years prior to the Great War. Inevitably, focus is on the two main protagonists—Great Britain and Germany—with the navies of other powers either completely invisible, or skipped over in passing. Consequently, Hendrickson’s volume fulfills a useful service in raising the profile of the navies of France, Italy and Austria-Hungary. Remaining obscure is the naval force of the Ottoman Empire.

The author’s basic theme is the existence of a naval rivalry in the Mediterranean that was every bit as important as that of the far better known contest in the North Sea. In particular, Great Britain’s weakness threw open the domination of the ancient crucible of Rome’s Mare Nostrum to new powers after a century of Pax Britannica. It is an intriguing story. Is it true?

It must be noted that the war’s opening days absolutely witnessed drama of enormous consequences. The pursuit of SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau by an arguably outgunned, certainly outmanoeuvred, British squadron led to the Ottoman’s Empire’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers. In turn, this led to the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign, and then ultimately, to the more successful campaigns up the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys and the littoral struggle up the Mediterranean coast from Egypt, all leading to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the autumn of 1918. No need to enter into a digression as to the malign consequences of the Treaty of Versailles on the Middle East. Agreement as to the criticality of the region in the Great War’s progress itself as well as for the subsequent decades of the twentieth century and into today seems axiomatic and uncontroversial.

Once these opening scenes were over, however, the naval war in the Mediterranean fled off the front pages of the newspapers and it became a secondary theatre. Essentially, the Central Powers could not effectively challenge the dominance of the Entente navies and control of the Mediterranean was essentially, but by no means entirely, uncontested. Has Hendrickson set the scene for this outcome with his review of naval developments in the decade before the Great War’s outbreak in 1914?

In my view, the premise of Hendrickson’s thesis is ill-founded. Great Britain did not abandon its Pax Britannica dominance of the Mediterranean in favour of an unsupervised struggle of minnows, and hence, risk loss of prestige and power in a critical theatre. Britain’s reduced presence was entirely due to the arrangements made with France and the modernization and centralization of its fleet in home waters to confront its main rival, Germany. Possession of bases at Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Egypt would permit a rapid deployment of naval forces to uphold British interests very swiftly as circumstances dictated. The power of the French fleet was assessed as more than adequate to deal with the presumed rivals Italy and Austria-Hungary. If the French needed assistance, the surfeit of naval power in the North Sea would certainly allow the redeployment of sufficient forces to deal with whatever issue arose. In the event, of course, the Italians never supported their
Central Power allies and so the potential problem evaporated in 1915, after considerable tensions in 1914.

Indeed, the struggle between the ‘minnows’ was intense at that level, but never a ‘First Division’ struggle represented by the North Sea protagonists. Describing this as a crisis seems to be overstating the matter. It was certainly important, and the difficulties faced by authorities principally in Paris, Rome and Vienna were significant (London seems to have been much less troubled). But the scale of the matter was very much a second-order struggle. Hendrickson relates with some relish the manoeuvrings for financing that affected the Austria-Hungary fleet, which rather makes the case for a second-string issue. The sleight of hand involved for the Austro-Hungarian naval authorities to secure the funds needed to build their fleet makes for an interesting story, but it illustrates how marginal the navy was for that government. As was the case with the other powers, the key branch of the military was unambiguously the army. Funds spent on the navy were funds that were not available for the far more important army. Given the performance of the Austro-Hungarian army during the war, it can be argued that the navy funds might have been more profitably spent elsewhere. (Indeed, this theme is well known with regard to Germany. It is no new thesis to suggest that the resources poured into the Kaiser’s fleet were a geopolitical disaster of the first order. Had Germany maintained a small, cruiser-based fleet designed to maintain colonial interests, and not challenged Great Britain for naval supremacy, we would be living in an entirely different world today.)

I don’t think Hendrickson has made the case for his ‘crisis’, but that does not mean the book is not worthwhile. He relates his story with some verve and he sheds light on an aspect of the naval rivalries prior to the Great War that is ignored or glossed over by most. True, this “Mediterranean” rivalry is minor in big picture terms, but it is not without interest. In particular, the role of the Italo-Turkish War over Libya (1911-1912) is well covered, and provides a significant new interpretation on a much ignored aspect of great power rivalry in the pre-war years. Hendrickson has, therefore, provided useful insights that will round out any reader’s knowledge of both the era and the area involved. He has also made use of the primary sources of the four main nations involved and so has shed light on a topic that is essentially deeply obscure. Hendrickson writes well.

The book is bare bones. There are no illustrations, or maps, or photographs of the vessels involved, or of the naval facilities that were the backbone of the region’s navies. This is a pity as the familiarity of most readers with the subject of the book will be limited and hence, illustrations all the more valued. There is also minimal discussion as to the material quality of the navies so painfully built or of their operational performance in the war to come. Admittedly the book ends with the outbreak of war in 1914, but a short concluding chapter touching on such matters would have been a useful addition to the book. I recommend Hendrickson’s book but note the caveats raised.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan

In his introduction, Hobbs provides the reader with a brief overview of the state of the Royal Navy in 1914 as it entered the First World War, mentioning the growth and addition of thousands of new ships and vessels under its command, along with their capabilities relating to communications, armament and machinery. He then goes on to discuss the importance scale ship models can play today in the study of these ships.

The second chapter/section starts out with a discussion on battleships and how standardization of the battleship came with Sir William White’s Royal Sovereign class of ship. Using pictures of a highly detailed, 1/48 scale model of the Royal Sovereign class ship Ramillies that was made for the builder, the reader is able to view various constructional details of the ship as Hobbs describes them in his narrative. He then discusses the King Edward VII and Lord Nelson pre-dreadnought classes of ships and their armaments, the Dreadnought revolution and the Super-dreadnought. This section ends with a look at some of the underwater threats and protection of these ships.

In Chapter/Section 3, Hobbs covers battlecruisers, the capitol ship and its development 1914-1918. In this section, he makes use of various highly detailed models to highlight various construction details of the ships.

The next chapter/section discusses the cruiser, beginning with a general overview of the cruiser and its beginnings and also covers scout cruisers, light cruisers and armoured cruisers. Included is a brief discussion of how Britain dominated the world market for iron-hulled warships and how it also built ships for other nations.

Next comes a chapter on the torpedo-boat destroyer, later simply shortened to destroyer. This section starts with an overview on the early River, Tribal and Beagle (or ‘G’) class torpedo-boat destroyers. The Acorn (‘H’) and Acheron (‘I’) class ships based on Admiralty designs are then looked at. Next is a discussion on standardization and refinement of features of the destroyer covering the ‘M’ through ‘U’ classes. The Royal Navy’s ultimate First World War destroyer classes, the ‘V & W’, are covered and the section ends with some examples of comparable German torpedo boats.

Chapter/Section 6 is dedicated to submarines, while Chapter/Section 7 is dedicated to a variety of other types of warships used, including aircraft-carrying ships, anti-submarine escorts and coastal motor boats to name a few. This chapter provides the reader with some fine examples (models) that show the diversity of the ships used by the Royal Navy during the First Great War. The last chapter completes the book with some examples of merchant ships armed for war.

With almost all of the ships of this era now gone, this book will be of interest to a wide audience of warship enthusiasts from scale model ship builders to researchers. Hobbs’ narrative carries the reader through a logical progression of ship development, using highly detailed models to illustrate some of the construction details, in some cases, the configuration of the same ship at different times. I highly recommend this book to any warship enthusiasts.

Winston E. Scoville
Clinton, Ontario

With the downfall of the mighty Soviet Union and its stranglehold over Eastern Europe, scholars from all walks of academia have gained access to a myriad of archival repositories in which to conduct their respective research. German maritime historians have often focused on the well established, world-wide trading port cities of Hamburg and Bremen, as well as smaller German cities, such as Lübeck and Kiel, because of their reputations as centrally located "gateways" between east and west. Historians Hückstädt, Larsen, Schmelzkopf, and Wentzel shifted their focus from such internationally rich harbours to the old Mecklenburgian city of Rostock, located in the former East German Democratic Republic. In *Von Rostock nach See: Die Geschichte der Rostocker Dampfschifffahrt, 1850 bis 1945* (From Rostock to the Sea: The History of Rostock Steam Shipping, 1850 to 1945), the authors chronicle the history of steam-powered shipping—the ships and ship owners, their development, and daily operation—in a port city that has, for years, stubbornly depended upon the perpetual employment of sailing ships and their manpower.

At the beginning of *Von Rostock nach See*, the authors supply a history behind the city’s established practices of maritime transport and trade, transitioning to their focus on the use of steam-powered ships within the region. In nineteenth-century Germany, Rostock was the third largest harbour city, next to Bremen and Hamburg, the maritime giant. As the authors note, Rostock maintained a stubborn bravado when it came to modernizing towards steam power. One of the early practices among Rostock merchants was the "Partenreederei", the concept of shipping entrepreneurs seeking financial backing from other participants—be they captains, ship builders, agents, or brokers—to promote their enterprise. Each partner bought a share into the ship hoping the productivity of its respective trade route would pay off; yet by the mid-nineteenth century, the lack of capital generated rendered this practice futile, which ultimately left shippers in the same position of maintaining their already-established fleet.

By 1866, Rostock coal and sugar trader Martin Petersen commissioned a shipyard in Inverkeithing, Scotland to build the *Wilhelm Tell*, a small steamer of 225 BRT (Bruttoregistertonne or gross registered tonnage). He ran the steamer until 1881, navigating its usual trade route from St. Petersburg to the United Kingdom carrying sugar and wood out and bringing back British coal to Mecklenburg. With the wars of German unification, first between Prussia and Denmark and then with Austria, the advancement of steam-powered shipping halted slightly until 1869, when shipping entrepreneur N. H. Witte assumed ownership of the *Concurrent* from the local Rostock shipyard. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, shippers such as Petersen built his fleet up to five steam-
powered ships, setting the precedent for future shipping tycoons such as August Cords, the Fischer family, Erik Larsen, and Otto Zelck to amass steam-powered fleets at extraordinary strength. Lesser ship owners, such as Witte, partnered with tradesmen like engineer Carl Abendroth, to establish the Rostocker Actien-Gesellschaft für Schiffs- und Maschinenbau—the Rostock Corporation for Ship and Engine Building—which ultimately became Germany's famous shipyard, Neptunwerft, located in Rostock.

Just before the onset of the First World War, rail lines were established between Berlin and Neusterlitz by the Deutsch-Nordischer Lloyd that stretched all the way to Rostock's seaside area of Warnemünde. This linked Berlin directly to areas in the north and outside of Germany, as well as establishing Rostock as a ferry port. In 1914, the First World War erupted, as the authors say, "with no warning system." Rostock merchants were hit hard as they tried to maintain their everyday business of sending ships to all parts of Europe; 18 of the 54 total ships in Rostock were lost to enemy harbours, either seized by Allied powers, or else attacked and sunk. Towards war's end, the German government provided some assistance through the "Gesetz über die Wiederherstellung der deutschen Handelsflotte", allowing some companies, such as F. W. Fischer, to recover eight steam-powered ships. Allied powers also offered to sell confiscated ships back at a lower price, through which about six ships were resold to Germany. During the interwar rebuilding period, shipping names like Cords and Zelck flourished, while others, such as Fischer, were either bought up or simply went out of business, selling off any remaining ships. Life in National Socialist Germany, according to the authors, seemed surprisingly less stressful than the losses suffered in the First World War, save for the typical bureaucratic red tape, where by 1941, all ships essentially took orders from the Reichskommissar für die Seeschifffahrt (ReiKoSee). With the war's end in sight, the Baltic became a death trap as Soviet submarines and Allied bombers preyed on Rostock ships. In the end, the city was in ruins as Rostock's businessmen fled in fear of the onslaught of Soviet occupation.

Von Rostock nach See provides a well-researched chronicle of steam-powered shipping as well as a user-friendly registry of all the Rostock shippers and their respective ships, a list which encompasses nearly half the book. Unfortunately, the authors occasionally fail to provide enough details; for example, a chapter devoted to shipyards like the Neptunwerft, or more information behind the day-to-day operations these ships experienced in European waters would have been helpful. Nevertheless, enthusiasts and scholars of maritime history in Germany will find Von Rostock nach See an insightful addition.

Christopher Pearcy
Virginia Beach, Virginia


*HMS Belfast Cruiser 1939* was written as
both a visual and historic guide, and is part of a series that focuses on specific historic vessels. The book brings to life the story of HMS Belfast, a ship which played a vital part in the Royal Navy from the early- to mid-twentieth century. The author set out to present a colourful and interesting narrative, supported by numerous images and drawings, on the history of this class of warship. But this was not his only aim. From a broader perspective, he describes and illustrates the Belfast’s rescue from a scrapyard in the early 1970s, its preservation and conservation, and its continuing service to the public and maritime community as a floating museum.

Cruiser development, in general, started in the late-eighteenth century when individual warships would undertake independent operations well away from their home fleets and go “cruising” for pirates, privateers, enemy ships, and intelligence gathering. The word “cruiser” did not yet designate a specific type of vessel; instead, it described a method of naval warfare. The definition of cruiser changed, however, with the advent of steam propulsion and iron hull armour in the mid-nineteenth century. By the end of that century, the term “cruiser” signified a specific type of medium-sized, well-armed, long-range warship capable of undertaking the traditional cruising role. After the maritime arms race, the dreadnought era, the First World War and the naval-limitation treaties of the 1920s and 1930s, governments developed various types of cruisers. Many of them were characterized by unique combinations since, depending upon the needs of the country that ordered them, the developers could customize the following: tonnage, speed, armour, and gun calibre. Great Britain, because of its scattered colonies and potential maritime enemies, such as Japan, became extremely interested in developing various classes of cruisers. The initial result of this development was a line of English cruisers, the Southampton-class cruiser, which included HMS Belfast, commissioned in August of 1939, just one month before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Directly after her timely commission and acceptance into the Royal Navy, HMS Belfast proved to be an excellent ship, crewed by first-rate officers and men. What followed was an outstanding and illustrious career that spanned more than three decades. The author provides a fascinating description of the ship’s activities, including its historic combat actions from the beginning of the Second World War in the North Atlantic, through the interwar years, the Korean War, and peace-keeping missions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In addition to approaching his subject in a well-organized manner, the author also supports his narrative with a well-rounded, detailed, and authoritative bibliography. This bibliography, with its quality sources, is a sufficient starting point for readers who wish to further research this ship, other twentieth-century warships, or the Royal Navy in general.

In terms of an exhibit, Johnstone-Bryden provides a superbly illustrated tour of HMS Belfast from bow to stern, and topmast to keel. He is well-qualified for the job: not only is he a professional maritime author, historian, and photographer, but he is active in many efforts to maintain Great Britain’s maritime past. HMS Belfast is Britain’s largest remaining historic warship, and serves as a lasting reminder of the era of powerful, big-gun, armoured warships that maintained the
strength and backbone of the Royal Navy in the first half of the twentieth century. It is now a floating museum maintained by the Imperial War Museum on the Thames in London, presenting what life was like for those who served in her from before the Second World War until the 1960s. Both the author and publisher should be congratulated for providing a fascinating insight into the technology of the period from the 1930s to the 1960s. This work, like the ship itself, contributes to maritime studies and history. Thanks to the historical nature of the narrative, vivid illustrations of the ship’s layout, and a detailed bibliography, this work would be useful to anyone who is interested in pursuing a better understanding the Royal Navy and cruiser development in the first half of the twentieth century.

Wayne Abrahamson
Pensacola, Florida


The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is the newest of Canada’s uniformed services and also the smallest, yet despite its size, it plays an important part in Canadian commerce, safety, and exploration. In The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet, authors Maginley, Collin, and Barrie, all veterans of the CCG, tell the story of this vital service.

In 1962, the Canadian Department of Transportation announcing that the former Canadian Marine Service would be renamed as the CCG. This was in recognition that the booming postwar economy required a maritime service capable of harbour safety and search and rescue. Also—some noted that the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) had often rescued troubled Canadian vessels; thus, the need for a different organization. The creation of the CCG is one of the lesser-known and less-appreciated accomplishments of the Diefenbaker government (1957-1963). In 1995, the Fisheries and Ocean fleets of the Canadian government were amalgamated into the CCG.

The CCG’s missions are varied: in common with other nations’ coast guards, the CCG is involved in search and rescue, harbour safety, environmental protection, commercial development, hydrography, and exploration. In 2005, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the CCG has added border security in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Arctic sovereignty with the Royal Canadian Navy to its list of duties.

The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet is a fine introduction to this maritime service. It is divided into three parts: the first relates the origins and development of the CCG, including descriptions of the CCG Auxiliary and Inshore Rescue Program; the second part is an in-depth look at the ships, hovercraft, and helicopters of the CCG; while the last is comprised of five statistical tables containing the dimensions and statistics of each CCG vessel.

Part One contains a description of the antecedents of the CCG, as well as its development during its first 50 years of existence. This is a valuable overview
which gives the reader a sense of the roles played by the CCG.

Part Two is the meat of the book. The introduction defines tonnage and dimensions used in the book, then the general machinery used in CCG vessels, the colour schemes used in the CCG (valuable information for modellers and maritime artists,) designations of operating range, and abbreviations used in the following pages. This is helpful to the reader as the information given is placed up front, rather than in an appendix or scattered throughout the narrative. Next, it moves on to subchapters containing descriptions of each class of CCG ship—Eastern Arctic Patrol Ships, Icebreakers, as well as weather ships, search and rescue cutters, fisheries patrol and research vessels, hydrographic and oceanographic ships, icebreaking cable ships, light icebreakers, navigation aid tenders, survey ships, northern supply vessels, miscellaneous vessels, as well as hovercraft and helicopters. Within each subchapter is a narrative of each vessel of the class described—basic statistical data, when each ship of that class was introduced into CCG service, and when (if applicable) that ship was taken out of service and at least one photograph of the ship or of a ship of that particular class. The sections on hovercraft and helicopters follow that format as well. There is one omission—the CCG operated a DC-3 aircraft in the 1980s—this is not mentioned in the text. Also, the authors point out that CCG helicopters, unlike helicopters used by other national coast guards, are not primarily tasked with search and rescue. The search and rescue function is primarily one for the Royal Canadian Air Force and also the RCMP. CCG helicopters can and have been used for search and rescue, but their primary role is logistical support for CCG ships and shore stations. Finally, in addition to the colour cover, the centre section of the book, contained in Part Two, has 18 pages of colour prints of CCG ships—attractive and pleasing to see, and of value again to the modeller and maritime artist. These colour prints add much to the book.

Part Three is a comprehensive set of statistical tables which give the pertinent data on CCG assets.

This book is a valuable reference tool. The authors’ knowledge of the CCG shows through. The research is detailed and meticulous and the writing is easy to follow. The authors obviously took their collective time in researching the CCG history and the history of each CCG asset. The many photographs aid in connecting the reader to the accompanying text. The cover carries a colour plate of the CCG ship Henry Larsen and the CCG maple leaf badge.

North Americans are fortunate to have two such fine white-water navies protecting their shores—the USCG and the CCG. The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet well relates the story of one of those white-water navies. It is an excellent work and deserves to be on the shelf of every maritime enthusiast.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Founded in 1838 in Kiel, Germany, the machine factory Schweffel & Howaldt initially produced boilers, then later turned to building ships and submarines. During the Second World War, the company delivered over 100 U-boats to the Nazi-regime. In May 1945, the future of the Howaldswerke shipbuilding company was in dire straits. Germany lay in ruins. At "Stunde Null", Zero Hour, the country had to start from scratch, in all aspects of society. Although hampered by severely damaged facilities and Allied restrictions on German shipbuilding, the shipyard set course to recovery.

The Second World War drew a long shadow over the post-war era. The Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 signed by the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., prohibited the shipyard from building new ocean-going vessels. On 26 September 1946, the Allied Control Council stated the conditions for the construction of ocean-going vessels by German shipyards, partially annulling the Potsdam Agreement. On 14 April 1949, Britain, America and France signed the Washington Agreement, which granted the shipyard permission to build new ships. With the signing of the Petersberg Agreement on 22 November 1949 by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western occupying powers, Germany was allowed to build larger ships, up to a maximum 7200 GT for tankers. The Allied Western Powers lifted the ban on building passenger ships when France, Britain and the U.S. signed the General Treaty (Deutschlandvertrag) in 1952. In response to increasing tensions between the Eastern Bloc and the West, the Allied Western Powers desired to create a stronger bond with the Federal Republic of Germany.

Between 1945 and 1948, the shipyard repaired and converted German merchant ships which had been given to other countries as part of the war reparations. The company was allowed to repair German coastal and fishing vessels and foreign ships. Two years after the war, a total of 835 merchant vessels had passed through the yard. Contracts to repair salvaged vessels were actually more like contracts for new construction, since in some cases, very little remained of the original ship. Some of the "repaired" ships were close to ninety percent newly built. Such extensive experience in ship repair enabled Howaldswerke to add the repair branch to their key markets. Conversion of tankers into whaling factory ships and the reconditioning of ships into whalers were central to the business of the shipyard during the post-War years. In 1957/58, Howaldt reconditioned two former German navy submarines which had been scuttled by their own crews only days before the surrender of the German armed forces on 8/9 May 1945. Both submarines became part of Germany's new Federal Navy. Fulfilling submarine-related contracts provided the company with a basic knowledge of submarine construction and thereby, the key to a business segment that would become critical to the company later on.

New construction undertaken by the yard included all the major ship types, including tankers, bulk carriers, freighters, reefer ships and trawlers. It was in tanker construction that the most rapid development occurred, particularly with regard to ship size. While tankers in the early 1950s had an average size of 18,000 to
23,000 DWT, the tonnage of those delivered towards the end of the decade was 70,000 DWT. By 1967, it had reached 212,000 DWT.

In the 1960s, the shipyard began construction of a dozen class-201 submarines, which the German Navy had commissioned in 1959. To make further use of their new submarine production facilities and their acquired know-how in the field, Howaldtswerke endeavoured to export submarines. According to the agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western European Union, German yards were allowed to build and export submarines with a standard displacement of up to 1,000 tons. In 1967, Howaldt landed its first submarine export contract with the Greek Navy.

In 1967 the Kieler Howaldtswerke merged with Howaldtswerke Hamburg AG, and Deutsche Werft AG, Hamburg, to form the company Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG. The construction of submarines became a decisive economic factor for the new shipyard. Howaldtswerke also began to chart new waters by developing a tank system for the transportation of liquefied natural gas. Then they explored the use of nuclear power in shipping. In 1968 Howaldtswerke delivered the nuclear-powered ore carrier OTTO HAHN with a capacity of around 14,000 DWT, to be used for testing, experimentation and demonstration.

This book, the first of the trilogy *The Ships of Howaldt and HDW*, presents the history of the company and the history, technical data, photographs and side drawings of some 400 vessels, which were constructed, completed, reconditioned or otherwise converted from 1945 until the merger in 1967.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, the Netherlands


In the October 2013 issue of this journal I reviewed a trio of books by these authors. The works in sequence of publication are *Mile End Old Town, Wapping, and Whitechapel*. Taken altogether these constitute a path-breaking contribution to social and business history. At once important to the metropolitan history of greater London, they also have helped to save from neglect vital commercial centres of Great Britain and indeed, of the British Empire. Now we have the fourth book in the series

At a time that Britain was virtually at war for a century or more, and when the merchant marine and the Royal Navy were powerful agencies and factors in the profit and power of the kingdom, Shadwell and Ratcliff, once part of the great mediaeval parish of Stepney, played remarkable roles. Hardly a history of Great Britain of the era under consideration mentions these riverside locales. Now, all of this is being rectified. It may be hoped that budding historians, young and old alike, will take these works to heart. Perhaps supervising professors in the fields of urban history will take note, too.

Professor Jerry White of Birkbeck College in the University of London, among the first of the academics to accord Morris
and Cozens their rightful place in the historical literature, writes in his Preface to the volume under review: “Revelatory is not too strong a word for the work undertaken here. The public understanding of the East End of London at any time up to the First World War is of a uniformly bleak, often terrible, place of desperate poverty. This monochrome picture has been challenged by historians who have stressed the importance of an indigenous merchant and industrial class, especially in the years before 1800. But we have never before had revealed to us in such immense and convincing detail just how prosperous, diverse and cultured this East End heritage was in fact.” Professor White points out how Morris and Cozens have shown the cross-class complexity of this district. Of greatest surprise and delight is the exploration of the lives and connections of “the middling sort of people.” London’s eastern parishes were a place of astonishing commercial and social diversity. Morris and Cozens lay before us all sorts of details about the merchants, ships’ captains, manufacturers, contractors, clergymen, doctors and other professionals. And as Professor White also correctly notes, the lives of women come strongly to the fore. I would add that we see, too, the direction applied on the social fabric by parish and council governments, for as the British state came into its powerful formation in the years beginning with Queen Anne, the profit and the power of the whole in the national and imperial interest rested not solely on individual, mercantile and corporate advancement, and capital accumulation and investment, but on what we might call the enabling state, one that made possible the conditions on which these persons and entities in London’s eastern parishes prospered and laboured.

These riverside parishes linked the Thames River to the flanking interior to the north, and they were also adjacent to the south side (that of Greenwich Hospital and the naval complex based around the Royal Dockyards of Deptford and Woolwich) that seemed to represent the more government-directed, or government-owned, aspect of the proto-military state. In the parish of Shadwell and the now forgotten hamlet of Ratcliff, as in Wapping and Limehouse, we find enterprises supplying the thousands of ships that had found their way into the Pool of London (both coastal shipping and those ocean-going vessels that could navigate upstream) with essential repairs and materials: sails, ropes, masts, anchors, victuals, and other necessities, together with pilots, seamen and sea captains. The Royal Navy required extensive foodstuffs and various liquid refreshments. Hence we find Sir William Curtis, “Billy Biscuit,” supplying biscuit for the fleet (and learn that weevils might have provided essential Vitamin C as an antiscorbutic). We also find that India Pale Ale (IPA) was developed here, and if the reviewer is correct in his brewing history, IPA is twice-processed, and the final, resulting fluid has greater travelling potential than something single-fermented which, in time, will sour. Among the items purchased by the Hudson’s Bay Company were nails: in 1751 no less than 10,000 No.40 nails and 500 No. 30 nails were shipped. Processed iron was precious in HBC territories, and I recollect that York boats at the conclusion of their upcountry passages were burned for their nails, and the latter recycled to bayside for the construction of new boats. Under contract were delivered seeds supplied by James Gordon, who had also sold seeds to Joseph Banks, Daniel Solander and his neighbor, Captain James Cook, before their first voyage of exploration. Etches and St.
Barbe had their ships in the whaling trade supplied here, as did firms shipping to the Baltic and the Greenland seas and America. Once again, the quoting from Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* proves irresistible: “The tidal current runs to and fro in its unceasing service, crowded with memories of men and ships it had borne to the rest of home or to the battles of the sea.... Hunters for gold and pursuers of fame, they all had gone out on that stream, bearing the sword, and often the torch, messengers of the might within the land, bearers of a spark from the sacred fire. What greatness had not floated on the ebb of that river into the mystery of an unknown earth!... The dreams of men, the seed of commonwealths, the germs of empire.”

The work contains useful indexes as well as bibliographies (these accompany each section of the book). There is a glossary, useful when we need to find out that *kentledge* means pig iron used in ballast; *link*, a torch carried by a link boy; *lumpers*, stevedores; *small beer*, weak beer; *trenail*, a wooden pin for securing timbers; and more. There’s a sailmaker’s glossary of those terms found in the text. There are assorted lists and indexes. The bibliographies are intended as guides to future reading.

The student or inquisitive scholar reading this book will find the enterprise of doing so not for the weak of heart. It is true that the material is set out in general chapters, as the table of contents declares, and the work as a whole is comprehensive and full of facts. But getting at these facts is not easy, and perhaps one general index would have been best in the long run. More cross-referencing would have helped. Perhaps, too, one general bibliography would have been preferable along with a calendar of primary sources. From an editorial perspective, too, running heads for the individual chapters, if adopted, would have aided the reader. It could be that the final, and summary volume, will give us a better guide to the whole and be a compendium for the entire set. And putting that together may be the greatest challenge of all.

Before closing, it is pleasing to see the history of commerce being given attention in what might be called the microcosm, for it is from the local that we learn about relationships to larger entities. With wisdom, John S. Galbraith, the dean of corporate imperial histories of the British Empire of the nineteenth century, concluded that the expansion of the Empire had been largely motivated by the energies of the mercantile class. Of greater importance in the shaping of imperial policy than the secretaries and under-secretaries of state credited with its formation, were countless persons in the commercial community who created the conditions upon which that policy was based. These persons are mostly unknown to history. The same could be said of these communities of east London until the Morris and Cozens team began to publish their findings. As the publisher says of *London’s Sailortown*, this is the first book to describe this unique area of seventeenth and eighteenth century London. It features the rich and poor, the churches and chapels, the East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, brewers, coopers, mariners, sailmakers, shipbuilders, ship chandlers, and more. I have stressed above the merchant and mercantile marine aspects of this work that have attracted my attention, and the evolution of docks and warehouses has been excluded in this review on account of space limitations. Many social and institutional aspects of Shadwell and Ratcliffe are laid out in detail.
by Morris and Cozens, and in these aspects, too, the diligent student will discover many vitally important findings besides new perspectives that show that this part of greater London was no dismal and backwater slum of the metropolis as portrayed by the Victorians Charles Dickens and William Booth, rather the opposite: it was a living organism that served local needs and the marine trades and the Navy with global reach and global capacity. London was the port of the world. Trade brought England its liquid wealth, and in 1724, Daniel Defoe spoke of the “silver Thames” because of the revenue that the river generated. Morris and Cozens have found true silver in those insurance, parish, company and tax records that are of the greatest value to historical studies.

Barry Gough
Victoria, British Columbia


This is one of many recent books on the Dreadnought and the First World War published at the one hundredth anniversary of the event. It is an analysis of the capital ship building programs of world navies, focusing on Britain and Germany, leading to the worldwide “dreadnought” arms race prior to and during the First World War. Other navies represented are those of the United States, Japan, France, Italy and other minor and historical countries. The author covers a wide range of factors, including technological development, as well as economics, politics, and diplomacy. He writes, “An alternative title for this book might have been, The Navalist Era in Defence 1889-1922” (xi). It is an account of the most dangerous period in naval history before our own age from a British perspective. The definition of the dreadnought includes battleships and battlecruisers, that is, large, turbine-driven, armoured vessels, carrying for primary armament a number of a single type of large naval rifles.

The chapter on “Origins of the Pre-Dreadnought Era” offers a concise survey of historical developments in the technology and economics of steel-making for armour plate and engines (turbines) and propellants for large guns. The development of fire control technology is reviewed briefly. In the next chapters the evolution of the capital ship in the Royal Navy is traced in the context of British politics, beginning with the Naval Defence Act of 1889 and international diplomacy in the years leading up to their trial of the Battle of Jutland. “The New Navies of the 1890s” covers the rapid rise of the American and Japanese navies, illuminating Britain’s formative role in the development of the Japanese navy, first as a supplier of ships, and later of technology. There is a detailed description of the realities of maintaining ships on the other side of the world which required deep water docking and other facilities available in Japan. Parkinson analyzes the behaviour of the vessels of the combatant fleets of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, culminating at the Battle of Tsushima, which was a proving ground for new technologies and tactics.

Beginning with “Fisher and the Dreadnought”, the reader is introduced to the individual people who were the main actors. Prime movers in the arms race, like
Admiral “Jacky” Fisher and Kaiser Wilhelm II, are presented in great detail. The author traces the strong ties between Britain and Germany based on the relationships of their royal families and those of leading aristocratic families. He shows where the theories of Mahan fit into the logic of one big battle that became Jutland. Individual leaders include Bülow, Tirpitz, Battenberg (later Mountbatten) and other figures of British political history. The performances of Beatty, Hipper, Jellicoe, Scheer, and Togo are analyzed.

In “From Dreadnoughts to Super-Dreadnoughts” the author traces the acceleration in size and range of guns in the period prior to the First World War, from 12-inch in en echelon turrets in the Dreadnought to 13.5-inch and heavier guns in superimposed turrets in the super-dreadnoughts. The author shows how the inexorable drive for faster ships firing heavier shells with ever increasing ranges became a world-wide arms race, in which each generation of ship was quickly rendered obsolete by the next. This race finally went some way toward bankrupting the main participants, Britain and Germany.

In the denouement at the Battle of Jutland; Parkinson traces the fate of the individual ships back to their design, attributing British losses to misuse (lack of armour) of the battlecruisers and the unsafe handling of explosives.

The study ends with the exhaustion of the British and their attempt to control events at the first Washington conference. In closing, the author looks forward to the demise of the battleship, which he concludes, was caused by the prohibitive costs of the ship that evolved out of the dreadnought and the advance in the constraints to their use, especially torpedoes and mines. The author only alludes to the coming of airpower.

Parkinson ably demonstrates that while the Dreadnought was the culmination of the theories of Admiral Jacky Fisher, its completion marked the beginning of a disastrous naval race. It was also “simply a ship whose time had come” (102). All the elements were present and other navies, particularly the U.S. Navy, were moving in the direction of an all-big-gun ship powered by turbines. What was revolutionary about the ship and its construction was that, for the first time, the British Navy dramatically and publicly became a first adopter. Before that, the policy of reaction to innovation had efficiently served the British Empire for a century. Now this balance was shattered: in terms of building time, Dreadnought took a scant 14 months compared to the more common two to three years.

Among the best features of the work are small-scale drawings (based on Brassey’s annuals) and specifications for individual vessels. These drawings are situated with the text related to the vessels and the important developments they represent. They give compressed data. The appendix, “Dreadnought building times, costs and fate”, presents valuable tabular information on battleships in world navies. Additional data includes time to build in months; estimates under which the ships were built; and fate of the vessel (cancelled, sunk, scrapped, and so on) all in a format that allows comparison within and among navies. This is testament to Fisher’s desire to demonstrate Britain’s superiority in design and ship-building.

In terms of weights and measures, the size of guns, being the primary weapon, is given in inches (Imperial measure) unless the country of origin was using International measure at the time, for example Germany, France and Italy, where it is given in
centimetres. Interestingly, Japanese guns are also measured in inches.

The “Bibliography” section has problems. It lists under “Primary sources” some published articles and omits Admiralty and other government papers. Under “Secondary sources”, location and year of publication are given but the name of the publisher omitted, which makes it hard for the reader to judge their value. Sources are almost entirely British and in the English language, which indicates the very British prism through which the author views events.

A list of acronyms or glossary would be helpful. The Notes section is easy to navigate, being arranged under headings showing the page numbers, for example, “Notes to pages 4-11”.

Ian Dew and Kathy Traynor
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Editors Payton, Kennerley and Doe have provided a collection of papers which examine specific elements of Cornwall’s maritime past, organized into five time periods from the pre-medieval age through to the present. The book tells of the power of sea and terrain in shaping the course of a community’s life. The people of Cornwall were drawn to the sea that surrounded them on three sides to bring in the harvest of pilchard, mackerel and crustaceans. The inland veins of tin, copper and china clay provided another kind of livelihood. After filling their local needs the excess of earth and sea bounty was placed aboard ships and delivered to ports along the adjoining British coastline and beyond.

Section one lays down the origin of the Cornwall to be studied in depth in the following sections. Settlement in the Iron Age, development of coastal towns and the rise of coastal and international trade are covered in three detailed chapters. Chapter four, by Wendy R. Childs, provides a rich description of the rise in exports of tin and china clay and the import of foreign food and wares, placing Cornwall in the thick of international trade.

‘The Age of Turbulence’ Maritime Disorder in Tudor and Stuart Cornwall,’ section two, turns to the period of 1485 to 1714. After a lengthy introductory piece by the editors, three chapters address key aspects of the era which is dominated by the integration of Cornwall into the rest of the nation, a task that in some ways is never completely accomplished. Piracy and privateering, the region’s involvement in the naval aspects of the English Civil War and the customs service’s corruption and ineptness form the focused chapters in this section.

Section three examines the long eighteenth century, beginning with an overview essay of the period and four chapters dedicated to the tin trade, development of Cornish ports, navigation, and wrecking and salvage. This section holds the prerequisite piece on the Royal Navy by Nicholas Rodger. As expected, it is well written and provides a good survey of the navy at this time, dotted with local connections to Cornwall.

Profit from wreckage, smuggling and
piracy keeps appearing in the volume. While not the mainstay for most of the Cornish population, the rough coastline provided many wrecks that would deposit their cargoes on the beaches, to which locals helped themselves. The book explores the history of the people’s right to collect these lost goods and authority’s entitlement to claim a portion, or all of it. The coasting trade and foreign vessels attempting to make landfall offered targets for sea marauders. The smuggler’s dance with authority occurred frequently along the Cornwall coast.

Section four covers the age of industrial expansion and empire. The 30-page introduction gives a detailed description of maritime developments including insurance, life saving technology, port expansions, the emigration of Cornish people to North America and the continuing tale of wrecking and salvage. It was a time of change and turmoil. Seven chapters fill out this section, touching on the fisheries, yachting, China Clay trade, the rise of steam, smuggling and wrecking, and Cornish ports.

Section five deals with the twentieth century and Cornwall’s maritime future. This section explores the decline in the use of sail, the region’s roles in the First and Second World Wars, the shift of trading ports into a variety of different functions and the significant changes to the fisheries since 1950, essentially the economic downturn of Cornwall. But not all is doom and gloom as Philip Payton contemplates Cornwall’s potential future development as a tourist destination with a focus on historical sites and recreation possibilities. Attracting visitors to the spectacularly beautiful coast and seaside towns holds out some hope for the future economic wellbeing of the region.

Throughout the book we are told that Cornwall is separate from the rest of England. At first, this is due to the rough terrain and the Tamar River (at the very east end of the region) almost running the full width of the peninsula, making it all but an island. Later, the sheer distance from the political centre of the country led to a certain sense of isolation, but canal building, the age of the train, and large span bridge development somewhat changed this, linking Cornwall more directly with the rest of the country. It also undermined the role of merchant shipping in transporting mined ores and clay, fish, and local products to markets in Britain. In part, the linkage began Cornwall’s decline. More could be said about the rail and canal development and its direct competition with the coasting trade.

The strongest element in the book is the introductory chapters for each of the five sections. Written by the editors, they provide a thorough grounding in the major historic, economic and social developments of the time period, both of regional importance and the larger context within which Cornwall life was woven. They are excellent essays, combining established sources with new research into the era under exploration. Reading these alone is worth the price of the volume.

Many of the chapters use terms and assume a certain level of knowledge of ships and fishing that might frustrate the novice to maritime studies; so too the statistics that appear in some of the analysis. The use of stats, however, is supremely done, especially in Alston Kennerley’s “Cornwall and the Decline of Commercial Sail.” He integrates his number crunching perfectly into his argument. If there is an area that needs significantly more emphasis, it would be that of women and the sea. Not
only women who went to sea or owned boats, but the impact of a husband’s sea life on his wife and family ashore and how they maintained a home.

The volume contains many images, at least three per chapter. Black and white illustrations dominate but there are coloured images, both paintings and photographs, throughout but most noticeably in a collection between pages six and seven. They contribute a visual documentation to the work that adds significantly to the value of the book as a source, if not simply to the pleasure of reading. The various tables are easy to interpret. Maps are limited, but clear and helpful where they appear. A map showing the progress of rail and canal development would have been helpful, perhaps with Terry Chapman’s chapter, “Cornwall’s Trading Ports.” The detailed index is very useful and the brief, selected bibliography is a good addition to the references at the end of each of the 29 chapters.

As the editors note in their introduction this is the first academic collection of articles on the maritime history of Cornwall (3). It holds many jewels, but its real purpose is to lead others interested in maritime, social, economic and cultural studies to the coast, rivers and upland of Cornwall.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


This work is a compendium of British and German documents designed to allow scholarly study of the Anglo-German naval arms race via side-by-side comparison, rather than through the traditional lens of either an Anglo-centric or German-centric work. In doing so, the editors, British Naval Historian Dr. Matthew S. Seligmann of Brunel University London, retired German Naval Officer and current Lecturer at the University of Potsdam Dr. Frank Nägler, and the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences’ leading Naval historian Dr. Michael Epkenhans, have gathered a selection of 153 single or multi-part documents and partitioned them into groups following key changes in the Anglo-German naval dynamic. Essentially, these paired chapters are broken up into the years 1898-1904, 1905-1907, 1908-1911, and 1912-1914, with German documents of the first period actually extending back to 1895 to highlight the initial actions that triggered the whole debacle.

The work largely allows the primary source documents to stand on their own, as is the style of such Navy Record Society books, but it leads with a rather impressive introduction and historiography that allows one to get a feel for the editors’ hand and the logic of their approach. The historiography addresses both British and German contexts in depth, covering record survivability and the interpretative trends of scholarly studies for both nationalities. Compared to the corresponding Imperial German Archive, fewer British naval documents survive since the former was heavily and almost indiscriminately culled from 1958 to 1961, whereas the latter was kept safe during the Second World War via
a transfer to Bavaria and guards ignoring orders to burn the archive. Some additional traces of lost British records did survive outside the Admiralty Papers, in correspondence between governmental bodies and in the works of American historian Arthur J. Marder, who quoted several lost documents in his pre-1958 works. Both historiographies operate on a cyclical trend, with initial basis forming out of the immediate post-war publications of British and German naval leaders, followed by revisionism. This occurred in Germany after the Kriegsmarine documents were declassified in the 1960s, whereas British revisionism took another two decades to emerge. Now, both sides are experiencing a fresh wave of counter-revisionism and new approaches, starting at the turn of the century and ramping up during the centennial of the War.

The introduction heavily documents the analysis of these trends and really showcases the views held by the editors, most notably their staunch defense of Arthur Marder’s works (xix). Additionally, each chapter’s primary source collection is predicated with an introductory section, where the editors are able to offer scholarly analysis and place the text within the larger context of world events, such as “domestic considerations” within Germany and the rise of the ‘black-blue bloc’ coalition spurring the 1907 escalation of German Naval manufacturing, or the October 1911 appointment of Winston Churchill as First Sea Lord and his rapid reorganization of naval leadership to include much younger and more innovative individuals just on the eve of war (161, 164, 415). Within the document sections are a myriad assortment of notes that offer concise biographies on people mentioned, ship data upon a vessel’s first mentioning, and explanations regarding references to people and events outside the purview of the document itself. This works extremely well, save for one instance. The 1904 Dogger Bank Incident is alluded to in a November 1904 letter from Admiral Tirpitz to Freiherr von Richthofen, but without any note to explain to the uninformed that it entailed paranoid Russian sailors opening fire on British fishermen and their own ships while under the false assumption that they were Japanese warships, an action that outraged the British and lowered their opinion of the Russian Navy (99). Other than this single oversight, the design allows for the work to stand alone quite well, with almost no need for cross-referencing to achieve the maximum amount of understanding of the text’s content.

In terms of said content, all selected documents were chosen to show what both sides intended to achieve, how they regarded each other, and what actions were truly aggressive or actually reactive. Correspondence and budgetary documents compose a large portion of the earlier work, back when France and Russia were still viewed as the threat to Britain and Germany was only just beginning to ramp up ship production. After Japan’s resounding defeat of the Russian Navy in 1904-1905 and Germany’s emergence as a burgeoning naval entity, texts began to shift in tone and type. Ship designs and memoranda regarding financing warship construction litter the German chapters, and while British documents offer arguments on how to deal with the German naval presence. Newly designed Naval War Plans begin to appear on both sides, showing their increased focus against one another. By the time of the 1908-1911 chapters, the papers indicate that the battle lines for the First World War are more or less set in what would become the
preferred actions for both sides on the waves once the fighting commenced, with the last few German documents highlighting the Navy’s fall from the German spotlight in favour of the Army, as the British texts highlight their reactionary measures and exploding battleship construction plan that would ultimately form the core of the wartime Grand Fleet.

The Naval Route to the Abyss is definitely an important piece of scholarship, coming in at the start of new historiographical trends with a unique combined nature that offers a much more impartial view of an often unintentionally partisan subject. With the centennial of the First World War well underway and this metamorphosis of scholarly opinion, such an impressive source compendium is all the more valuable to understanding the origins of the fleets made immortal at Jutland.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


In this excellent biography, Harold G. Simms sets out the life and achievements of his father, the American master wooden-yacht-builder, William Ernest Simms. With his brother, Eric James Simms, William founded a boat-building business on the east coast of the United States in the early 1930s. Producing everything from luxury yachts to military vessels, it became one of Boston’s most respected shipyards.

This is the second book Harold Simms has written about a family member. In the early 1980s, he began making a list of boats that his maternal grandfather, Amos Pentz, had built and after thirteen years of research, he published One Hundred Forty-One Wooden Ships, 1872-1922: Amos Pentz Master Shipbuilder of Shelburne, Nova Scotia (2004). It was after this that Harold decided to write about his father, William Ernest Simms, for the benefit of future generations of the family. Although the book contains many interesting stories about the family, it is also filled with detailed information about the sailing boats and military vessels built by the Simms brothers. It is illustrated with numerous photographs of vessels, plans, documents and advertisements from William’s extensive collection.

William Ernest Simms was born in Newfoundland, Canada, in 1896 and although he grew up on a farm, he showed an interest in boat building from childhood. In 1919, at the age of 23, he moved to Shelbourne, Nova Scotia, to learn the art of wooden shipbuilding. Unable to find much work there, he moved down the coast to Boston in 1922 and began working for George Lawley & Son, one of the largest yacht-building companies in the United States. Although hired as a carpenter, he worked in every department, including the blacksmith shop, the rigging department and the mast-making department, to learn all aspects of yacht construction. After becoming foreman of the small boat division, he married Ruby Pentz, the daughter of Amos. In 1928, he left Lawley’s and after some years struggling to find steady work as a yacht builder, he and his brother Eric finally decided to found their own boat-building yard. William knew wooden yacht construction and finish
work, and Eric knew engines and anything mechanical, so with a small amount of capital, they leased the old Lawson Boatyard in Dorchester, Boston, in 1933. Under the name Simms Brothers, they began building wooden sailing boats. Overcoming initial financial difficulties, their business and reputation steadily grew and by 1938, they were in a position to buy the yard outright.

It was not long before the American government noticed the capabilities of Simms Brothers. In 1940, the yard built and sold their first mine yawl to the Navy. They went on to build the sardine boat William Underwood, but in 1941, the Navy contracted Simms Brothers to build two harbour barges, then three more, the last of which was delivered in October of that year.

The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 changed everything. In 1942, Simms Brothers turned their boatyard over to wartime work for the Navy, dredging the basin in front of their yard, repairing the pier and building a long shed on it, and installing a second railway to haul and launch large yachts. Their first post-Pearl Harbour government contract was with the Army for four harbour freight boats. In the same year, 1942, they won a contract to build four marine sub-chasers for the Navy, and over the next two and a half years, they built twelve of these. By this time, 99 men were working at the boatyard. William became an American citizen in 1943 at the Navy’s request in order to facilitate relations between the boatyard and the government. In the following year, the Navy ordered eight air-sea rescue boats, the last of which left the yard in May 1945.

After the war, they returned to the business of building and servicing yachts. In 1946, they began work on the famous ocean racer Argyll, along with other yachts, including the 89-foot motor sailer Versatile, built for Harold S. Vanderbilt and launched in September 1950. This was the heyday of Simms Brothers and the same year in which Harold joined his father’s company with a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from Tufts College and a year of naval architecture studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Simms Brothers resumed building military vessels, producing nine minesweepers and ten air-sea rescue boats for the Navy between 1951 and 1957. When it was found that the Dorchester link of the new Southeast Expressway was to pass through their boatyard, however, they sold up and moved to Jacksonville, Florida, taking over the site of Knight Boats and Motors in May 1957. At this point, William decided he no longer wished to bid on government contracts and instead the yard sold, serviced and stored yachts. In 1961, the family sold the business and returned to the northeast, where they bought and ran a boatyard in Scituate under the name Simms Yacht Yard, Inc. They built one more vessel in 1962, the sloop Dottie G., then concentrated on servicing and storing vessels. At its maximum size, the yard had more than fifty yachts. When the yard was finally sold in 1977, William officially retired at the age of 82.

Ending with a list of 76 vessels built by Simms Brothers, Harold Simm’s book offers an in-depth, lavishly illustrated insight into the world of wooden boat construction in the 1900s. It will be appreciated by anyone interested in the history of boat-building.

Michael Clark
London, England
For Admiral James Stavridis to claim that his selection to the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States’ European Command (EUCOM) represents an “accident” may be one of the greatest examples of humility from the last several years. Given his decades of exemplary service, his razor-sharp mind, and his “outside-the-box” ideas about messaging and strategic communication, Stavridis more than met the lofty standard set for NATO commanders since Eisenhower. The fact that he would become the first admiral to command the largely land-based alliance at a time when it faced war, transitions and crises proved unique, but his handling of the complexities of his command exhibited why he was no “accident.” Under his able hand, the alliance sailed well into the twenty-first century, updating to meet emerging threats while maintaining its core values.

The Accidental Admiral charts Stavridis’ more than four years in command. Arriving in 2009, the new commander faced the problem of fighting an ongoing and difficult war in Afghanistan while also having to navigate the ever-changing dynamics of the Arab Spring, a resurgent Russia, and a new war in Libya. All of these events occurred amid a bureaucratic morass of heated internal and external politics among Europe’s leaders. Stavridis dutifully explains the complexities of the NATO decision-making process and how he tried to streamline it when he could. He avoids excessive detail when it comes to the machinations of these crises; as he states in his preface, his intent is not to discuss “what happened,” but rather to analyze “why it happened.” (xi) As such, his narrative remains reader-friendly throughout. His treatments of Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Russia, all less than 20 pages each, provide a brief primer not just on what occurred while he led NATO, but where he sees the various situations going and why. A lengthy reading list at the end of the book provides ready recommendations for anyone wanting to dig deeper.

Stavridis’ last several chapters are the best. Here he moves the narrative away from diplomatic and operational discussions to illuminate more ephemeral concepts: team-building, globalization, strategic communication, and planning. It is within these chapters where he proves he is no accident. One could tear out each of these separate sections and insert them into manuals on leadership, strategy, or business and not only enliven the texts, but provide much needed insight in a very readable manner. The admiral iconoclastically tore down traditional ways of thinking at NATO and worked to insert modernization into the institution. In The Accidental Admiral he explains how he did it, his thought processes behind it, and how one could build these changes into their organizations. His chapter on “convergence,” or the intersection of seemingly dissimilar global trends to create exponentially more threatening crises, provides one of the best overviews of the darker side of globalization ever written.

Stavridis devotes much of his narrative to examining leaders and the traits that helped them succeed. His analysis of the leadership personalities he worked with
while in command of NATO is outstanding. From the perspective of an “insider looking inside”, Stavridis reflects on several of the commanders he worked with: Generals Stanley McChrystal, David Petraeus, and John Allen. Each of these military men reached the pinnacle of their careers and then, through an unanticipated misstep, found themselves forced to resign or retire. Always gracious, Stavridis clearly thinks very highly of all three, but understands how perception can create problems. To further drive the point home, he turns the focus on himself, recounting the investigation into some of his travel finances while NATO commander. Although ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing, the rumour of misconduct proved enough to prevent his promotion to Chief of Naval Operations. As a result, Stavridis elected to retire after four decades of service, and the United States lost an outstanding military leader.

The Accidental Admiral does not spin any sea yarns, nor does it provide an operational recounting of a military campaign. Instead, it’s a fitting memoir to cap the exemplary career of one of the brightest minds the United States military has seen in a generation. Stavridis clearly misses the sea, but more so the navy and the camaraderie it builds. The hint of bittersweet farewell pervades his narrative, and you pine for the sea along with the former admiral. His recounting of his last week in the navy is touching and deeply personal, reflecting a humility that can be felt on every page. Surely Stavridis will find future success (he is now the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University) and will not be out of the limelight for long. At his core, though, he will always be a navy man. That fact, when one considers that his last command entailed over watching a land-based alliance spread out over thousands of square miles, might be considered ironic, if not accidental.

Andrew J. Forney
West Point, New York


Despite the ambiguity in the title, this book is not primarily an examination of battles involving big-gunned battleships. It offers a different take on a particular aspect of the Second World War at sea. The author has focussed exclusively on significant engagements where only surface ships participated—to the exclusion of aircraft and submarines—and where the primary weapons used were naval guns. While this focus leaves out much of the campaigns in the Pacific, including major surface ship battles in the Solomon Islands, much of the Battle of the Atlantic and other key battles, there is still a wealth of material for those interested in naval history.

In the early twentieth century, the introduction of the long-range, large calibre naval gun mounted in a rotating turret—as exemplified in HMS Dreadnought in 1906—changed the naval tactical equation. No longer would it be necessary, as Nelson exhorted, to “engage the enemy more closely.” But technology exacted a price. Longer range firing introduced both ballistics complexities and point-of-impact uncertainties—in other words, a
sophisticated fire-control solution needed to be developed to take advantage of the capabilities of the weapon. Naval gunnery differs greatly from its artillery counterpart on land. Naval guns are usually shooting at a moving target that is likely also firing back, as well as taking evasive action. And they are being fired from a moving platform which may equally be conducting evasive manoeuvres. Practical solutions to the problem were developed to the point that, at the outbreak of the Second World War, relatively sophisticated electro-mechanical systems coupled with superb optics were at sea in all major navies. The crux of this book is how these systems performed in battle and how they were exploited by the men in command of the ships that carried them.

Robert Stern has arranged the narrative chronologically so that the first three chapters deal with the Royal Navy’s struggles with the Kriegsmarine and the Italian Regia Marina in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Subsequent chapters deal with engagements between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Allied forces, predominantly the United States Navy, in South East Asian waters. In between is a chapter which examines the battles between British and German surface forces in the Barents Sea in defence of the Arctic convoys.

The opening gambit of the Kriegsmarine was the deployment of commerce raiders or “Panzerschiffe” into the Atlantic to attack the British seaborne trade routes. In the vast reaches of the North and South Atlantic, these long-legged cruisers could effectively disappear, forcing the Royal Navy to expend considerable resources to both find and destroy them. The most famous of these was Graf Spee and her exploits are succinctly detailed and analyzed. The author offers some different insights into what took place off the River Plate in December 1939.

The book then traces the strategically inconclusive series of surface ship engagements between British and Italian forces in the Mediterranean from June 1940 to March 1941, including an incisive analysis of the events and outcome. This segment deals with lesser known engagements and some fascinating aspects are revealed; for example, the post-action analysis by the Regia Marina of the accuracy and firing techniques of the British salvos. It is interesting to note the author’s observation that while both opposing Admirals claimed victory in one battle, the British Admiral was criticised for his lack of aggression. The author considers that this may have had an influence on his actions in his subsequent command—HMS Hood and Prince of Wales—when they fought Bismarck.

Chapter three follows the generally successful activities of the German commerce raiders up to the Bismarck’s excursion into the Atlantic in May 1941. Stern’s account of the events leading up to the engagement in which Hood was sunk is one of the best. Then the focus moves east as the Imperial Japanese Navy began its assault into Southeast Asian waters. The Allied forces, known as ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian), were completely outnumbered by the Japanese yet they fought ferociously and had some local successes. Again, the author is examining lesser known battles in out-of-the-way places.

The final chapter looks at what was the last surface ship gunnery battle of the Second World War in October 1944. This was the Battle of Surigao Strait, a key part of what became known as the Battle of
Leyte Gulf. It was a last ditch attempt of the IJN to dislodge the American landing on the Philippines and involved most of the heavy units of the IJN. It was a classic, complex battle and the author describes it with skill and understanding.

One of the most interesting (at least to this reviewer) facets of the book is the extent and detail of the analysis. The author cites statistics of the engagements in terms of rounds fired and hits obtained. In many cases, the actual damage inflicted by those hits or near misses is also described. It is sobering to learn how profligate the gunners could be on occasion and how few really damaging hits were often actually made. And yet, as the author observes in his Afterword, in 1944 it was technologically possible to achieve a hit with the first salvo at night at a range in excess of 20,000 yards (10 nautical miles/18.5 Km). This, he contends, was “…the harbinger of the end of naval gunnery as a major factor in warfare” (229).

This is a remarkable book. Robert Stern’s narrative exhibits a deep understanding of the tactical and technical issues involved in naval warfare. His analysis is incisive and he often poses interesting historical “what if” type questions. The endnotes also contain a wealth of additional information. The photographs and illustrations complement the text and the publisher has chosen a visually pleasing layout. It is an important contribution to naval history and naval technical history.

E.J.M. Young
Ottawa, Ontario


Since the introduction of steam power as a propulsion system, technology has become a greater feature of nautical history than many people realize. For generations, the latest technology or the limits of the technology of the day have set the tempo of naval operations. Technology is also the foundation for understanding the dramatic changes in naval capability and generally defines the ability of navies to project power and, therefore, command of the sea. For many readers, it is also the easiest point of connection between great naval events and the more difficult concept of naval power. The technology of the ship and its equipment is easily recognizable and more readily digested.

Naturally, this has led to an entire genre of books detailing the technology of warfare for easy comparison and comprehension. Mark Stille’s recent work, The Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War, stands as an excellent example. In nine chapters, he seeks to establish an understanding of the Japanese naval order of battle during the Second World War and succeeds by providing much more than a simple list of ships.

Each major fleet of the period generally had six major types of ships on an operational basis. Starting from the largest capital ships, such as aircraft carriers and battleships, and working through to submarines, the six chapters at the core of work revolve around these divisions. Each chapter represents one of the key ship types and within each, the author then dissects the various ships and their development, their operational experiences, weapon systems,
and similar key issues. This situates each individual ship type as an operational unit, identifies its capabilities and more importantly, places it within the Japanese philosophy and how they used it.

Since each ship type consisted of more than one design, the author identifies variations of each common theme as a unique class of ship which reflected the evolution of technical developments at the time of production. While sharing a common design construct (in the sense that they are all the same type of ship), each class exhibits unique features, providing a useful chronology of ship development by class and individual ship. This allows the reader to follow individual ships of a particular class and type from construction through upgrades and into the conflict itself. Aircraft carriers, for example are discussed in terms of carrier development and operations, aircraft carried and shipboard weapon systems and other key issues like radar and fighter defense. There follows an examination of each ship type from pre-war construction forward, based on armament and salient features. Thus, the reader is able to examine the IJN Soryu briefly from creation to loss.

Stille rounds out his text by providing three additional chapters and an introduction. One chapter discusses Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) strategy and doctrine and tries to set up the strategic thinking and doctrinal underpinnings of the IJN. A stand-alone chapter summarizing the Pacific War is also provided with some excellent maps to produce a sense of the context in which the fleet was operating and the events they experienced. Finally, an analysis/conclusion brings all this together. Lavishly illustrated with maps and images along with annotations discussing minor details of the Japanese Navy, the book produces a powerful visual impact on the reader.

While an interesting read and a fascinating tool for tracking changes in the IJN over time, the book suffers from serious limitations of scale. Such an attempt to produce a study of the Imperial Japanese Navy fleet units and their development is to tackle a subject of epic size. Trying to include doctrinal discussions as well as a survey of the Second World War, is a recipe for potential disaster. Pulling all this together into a coherent narrative in 392 short pages forced the author to be reductionist in terms of the details provided and necessarily required him to skim over a great deal of information. This has seriously reduced the academic value of the book, further marginalized by the huge number of photographs and illustrations which took up space that could have been used for substantive additions to reinforce the value of the text. That the author manages to provide some valuable material this way is a testimony to Stille, but it begs the question of how much other information was sacrificed for brevity and illustrations. Unfortunately, when combined with a lack of citations and a very limited bibliography, the overall value of this book drops appreciably. It is a beautifully illustrated book based on extensive research, but it is more useful to those with no background in the field than it is to most serious scholars.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario

William Warner was a teenage signalman who served in the battlecruiser HMAS Australia during 1916-18. He wrote this book in the 1930s, but it was never published. In 2014, his children, Robert Warner and Olwyn Green, edited their father’s manuscript and produced this work. Accounts of life on the lower deck in the RAN during the First World War are few and far between and William Warner’s book is a very welcome addition to the history of the RAN. That said, it is a ‘diamond in the rough’ and has its flaws.

Warner’s detailed descriptions of his life in the battlecruiser include long and monotonous patrols in the North Sea, arduous living and working conditions (especially the much-hated coaling ship), frequent gunnery and torpedo training exercises, the boredom of the Scapa Flow anchorage, his shipmates (including the alcoholic senior boat coxswain ‘Gentle Dick’ who was frequently dis-rated but still maintained his position as the senior boat coxswain due to his skill), time on leave in London, and the food, which he states was not too bad and that ‘sailors are not normal if they are not grumbling about something’. He also provides insights into some of the ship’s officers, such as the 1st lieutenant and the surgeon, for their unceasing demands for cleanliness, and Australian-born gunnery officer, Lieutenant Commander Frederick Darley, who was highly respected and revered for his calm manner and bravery.

The ship’s officers actually receive due credit for their ability with the only real (and often repeated) complaint being the men were rarely kept informed of the ship’s program. Warner states, quite rightly, if the men had known more about why they were steaming in ever decreasing circles around the North Sea, their morale and operational focus would have been improved. Even as a junior sailor, Warner understood the value of British sea power and its ability to win the war. In June 1916 he wrote: “In fact the British were in command of the seas. In the fleet we knew this. We also knew the price that had been paid in the Battle of Jutland to maintain supremacy.”

The book covers much of Australia’s career, including the ill-fated collision with HMS New Zealand in April 1916, which kept the Australian ship out of the battle of Jutland on 31 May/1June 1916, another collision with HMS Repulse in December 1917, embarking of aircraft in 1918 (which were launched from platforms constructed on P and Q Turrets), convoy escort duties in the North Sea, the detachment of 11 men to take part in the Zeebrugge Raid, and the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet in November 1918.

What spoils the book overall is poor editing. When Warner produced his manuscript in the 1930s, he was recalling events from a decade before and many events became jumbled and out of sequence. The collision with Repulse in December 1917 (which saw Australia go into dock again) gets mixed up with the disastrous ‘Battle of May Island’ in January 1918, where the fleet departed Rosyth at night resulting in damage to several vessels and the sinking of two K-Class submarines. These two separate incidents become the same incident in the book, incorrectly said to occur in late 1916. Additionally, the arrival of US warships to join the Grand Fleet in December 1917 somehow gets moved to mid-1916 and the embarking of aircraft in Australia in 1917-18 is detailed as also occurring in 1916. These errors could have
been avoided by simply reading the *Official History of the RAN in World War I* by Arthur Jose to get an appreciation of an accurate time line of events.

Additionally, there is some poor proof reading regarding dates (the Battle of Jutland occurs in 1915, 1916 and 1917 at different points in the book) and incorrect spelling of ship and place names that is annoying. The editors also state that they omitted paragraphs including descriptions of scenery, personal impressions and opinions but do not contain factual material. This is a pity, as several of William Warner’s comments are well worth remembering. My favourite is his description of life in the North Sea in bad weather: “The only means of signaling in such conditions was by flashing the 24 inch searchlights, which were at best indistinct in the misty thick spray. It was very difficult to manipulate these searchlights and this job was hard work. Despite the use of several pairs of woolen mittens, one on top of the other, my hands would soon become numb and my face would ache from the cold. It was almost impossible to keep a foothold on the slippery, sloppy uncovered brass deck and I could easily fall a number of times….. It was far worse at night in the pitchy darkness when nothing was clearly visible and you could have persons or things bumping into you. The sound of retching, with interspersed groans coming from the bridge corner was nauseating. On such dark nights in a gale the only sanctuary was your hammock, but even this jerked around like a suspended gyro, and the air of the mess deck was foul. If and when you got to your hammock it was likely as not to be lying in a sloppy pool of water.”

As an 18 year old signalman, even after his tough training in HMAS *Tingira* in 1914-15 the North Sea was hard and dangerous work. This is the value of William Warner’s book in describing life on the lower deck in a much forgotten part of the Australian experience of World War I. With a little more polish this rough diamond could have been a much better production. It is still very highly recommended to a wide range of readers from the professional historian through to those wanting to know more about the RANs role in World War I.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


In "*A Race of Shipbuilders*," historian Richard E. Winslow III brings us the story of a remarkable American family, the Hanscoms of Eliot, Maine, designers and constructors extraordinaire of vessels, large and small, for over three hundred years. As the author of several books published by the Marine Society of Portsmouth, Winslow is an expert on all things maritime and naval along the shores of the Piscataqua River in Maine and New Hampshire.

According to Winslow, the first Hanscoms arrived in the New World as English colonists in the seventeenth century, with subsequent generations being employed as seamen and shipwrights in the era of the Revolution and War of 1812. By the 1820s and 30s, Hanscoms had earned the title of master shipwrights, and were turning out ships and schooners at their own, as well as at several other yards along
the Piscataqua, under the direction of William Hanscom, Sr. His son, William Leighton Hanscom, continued the family business at Eliot for several years. William’s brother, Isaiah, opted for government service and became Clerk at the Navy Yard at Portsmouth in the 1840s, overseeing the building of ships, schooners, sloops, and frigates for ‘Uncle Sam,’ including the steam frigate USS Saranac, launched in 1848. Isaiah also led a successful lobbying effort to expand the Portsmouth Yard to include a ship-repairing dry dock.

“Gold Fever” changed the lives of many Americans in the 1840s, including at least one Hanscom, William Leighton. Temporarily relocating to the West, Hanscom designed and briefly operated Lot Whitcomb, the first steamboat built on the Pacific coast. Other Hanscoms, Uncle Samuel and his two nephews, also launched several clippers on the Piscataqua in the 1850s, most notably Nighingale, called by the U.S. Nautical and Naval Journal in 1855 “the swiftest ship in the world” (39). Victims of the business depression of the 1850s, however, the Hanscom brothers were forced to close their Piscataqua operations, and entered government service full-time as civilian employees of the Navy; Isaiah successively in Florida, California, Portsmouth, and Norfolk, and William at Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn.

The Civil War found the Hanscoms designing, building, and launching ships for the Union Navy. Notably Hanscom-built, with William as designer and Isaiah as constructor, was the steamer USS Kearsarge, famous for sinking the Confederate sloop-of-war Alabama in 1864. Hanscom-built, as well, were ironclads Monadnock and Agamenticus launched in the wake of the Merrimac-Monitor clash at Hampton Roads in 1862. As Winslow reminds us, Hanscoms were there at the birth of modern naval warships.

Despite his admiration for the Hanscoms, Winslow does not shy away from detailing a possible blot on the family’s escutcheon. In 1871, Isaiah marked the zenith of his professional career when he became chief of the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair. As members of the graft-ridden Grant administration, not surprisingly, he and Secretary Robeson were recommended for impeachment in 1876 on charges of corruption in their department by a Democrat-controlled Congressional committee. The charges were likely politically motivated, as no legal action followed, and both men retained their positions. Nonetheless, it seems, Isaiah was tainted by the amoral atmosphere of Gilded Age Washington.

Winslow devotes many of his later chapters in “A Race of Shipbuilders” to biographical vignettes of other Hanscom notables. He describes Captain John Hanscom (1835-1863) as “an energetic young shipmaster” (85) who served his country in the Northern Merchant Marine during the Civil War. To the usual hazards of shipwreck, accidents, storms, disease, and unruly crews endemic to the merchant marine in peacetime, says Winslow, were added Confederate privateers, blockade runners, and British-built raiders in wartime. With little Southern cotton available for the Anglo-American market, John Hanscom engaged in the trade for Indian cotton at Calcutta. Though he successfully conducted the Calcutta run for several years, he was mysteriously murdered in 1863, likely by a mutinous crew, a heinous crime that still remains unsolved.
Winslow calls Simon Parker Hanscom (1819-1876) a “Journalist and Friend of Presidents” (111). A cousin of William L. and Isaiah Hanscom, Simon was the exception to the Hanscom family’s attachment to the sea. He pursued a successful newspaper career, serving as Washington correspondent for various New York sheets, ultimately becoming editor of the Washington National Republican, a strong pro-Lincoln journal during the Civil War. Winslow calls the Republican and its editor “Lincoln’s favorites” (120).

Admiral John Forsyth Hanscom (1842-1912) helped build America’s Steel Navy. He served at various private and government yards, designing and renovating ships to fight in the Spanish-American War and, according to Winslow, “the biggest battleships [of the day] show many of Hanscom’s ideas” (203).

Charles Ridgely Hanscom (1850-1918) became a preeminent designer of naval vessels, yachts, and merchant ships, including two ocean-going steamboats for railroad baron James J. Hill. This Hanscom also served as general superintendent at Bath Iron Works in Maine.

Last in Winslow’s parade of Hanscom notables is Lawrence G. Hanscom (1906-1941), journalist and aviator, who became a leading proponent of building airports for national security on the eve of the Second World War. Hanscom Field and Hanscom Air Force base in Massachusetts are named in his honour.

Meticulously researched from a wide array of sources, both primary and secondary, “A Race of Shipbuilders” is an impressive work of scholarship. Winslow has enhanced his study with numerous photographs, ship plans and drawings, and images of oil paintings, plus a helpful map of the Piscataqua region. Though his title seems to imply he has written a local history, his book is really the story of maritime America as told through the lives of a remarkable American family.

William L. Welch
Natick, Massachusetts


Managing information while underway has been a challenge for maritime commanders since the earliest ships of war put to sea. In recent years, the United States Navy has made significant efforts to incorporate cyberspace into its processes for managing information in peace, war and other contested environments. The establishing of Fleet Cyber Command and the creation of Information Dominance Corps in 2010 highlight two of the USN’s latest efforts to keep up with the newest technological and information challenges of today’s maritime operations. While the challenges may seem new, the problems presented when managing and using information at sea are enduring, a point well proven in Information at Sea: Shipboard Command and Control in the Navy from Mobile Bay to Okinawa.

Wolters’ book chronicles the navy’s pursuit “to improve the fleet’s systems for managing information” from the Virginius affair in 1873 through the end of the Second World War. This history is a relevant and timely study that explores the timeless challenges of innovating during austere
times. By focusing on the past, Wolters seeks to provide historical insights from the evolution of naval information management that culminated in the creation of the Command Information Center (CIC) on board American war ships in the Second World War. More importantly, this evolution resulted not just from the development of new devices and processes, but also from the work and ingenuity of several generations of naval officers and leaders. In Wolters’ terms, this history is “an examination of the brains behind this brawn” (2). With the implementation of the CIC during the Second World War II, Wolters posits that the responsibility for decision-making transformed from one, singular officer (à la Lord Nelson in the age of sail) into a more “distributed” model where “the junior personnel assuming unprecedented responsibility” (4).

The junior personnel, the navy middlemen who made this evolution possible are a central focus of the book. Similar to Paul Kennedy’s 2013 book, *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War*, this study looks to the men who solved the problems of information sharing and communications along the way. Both studies seek to understand “how things got done” with respect the developing and implementing the innovations created to fight the war. *Information at Sea* describes the achievements of inventors, sailors and radiomen such as Foxhall Parker, Edward Very, Daniel Wurstbaugh, Stanford Hooper, and Charles Badger; men who created signal and flag systems, applied “spark and arc” radio technology and other processes to improve fleet “signaling” at the turn of the last century.

Wolters also explores the role of the Navy Department’s bureaucracy in advancing the signal and communication systems into the fleet, both materially and with respect to the training of the operators. The author includes accounts of how responsibility for integrating radio technology into the fleet alternated between the Bureau of Equipment and the Bureau of Steam Engineering prior to the creation of the Radio Division and the Fleet Radio officer. While certainly this approach is all encompassing, the author’s narrative is somewhat difficult to follow chronologically. Still, he succeeds in telling the story of these men and the machines.

In particular, the book navigates the emergence of aircraft carriers, submarines, radar, and direction finder radios in the lead-up to the Second World War. The penultimate chapter, titled “A Most Complex Problem,” examines how each of these new technologies presented new streams of information for naval leaders to manage and then coordinate. While some readers may find this chapter not as familiar as the book’s final chapter on the CIC in war, Wolters’ analysis of how the Navy figured out these new developments during the interwar period is rich with analogs to the current challenges of maritime information management. During the annual “Fleet Problems” between the 1924 and 1940, naval leaders developed operational concepts to fight the fleet that included using “radio silence,” leveraging mission command type orders, and employing encrypted radio messages. The pace of information management accelerated from days and hours down to minutes. Officers at the Naval War College and the Naval Research Laboratory also had significant roles in creating the new doctrine. Wolters recounts how Nimitz’s circular formation led to improved radio communications. On the eve of the Second
World War, “senior officers [created] a common operational doctrine that emphasized initiative and tactical flexibility” (168). Moreover, the interwar years showed that “superior command and control gave combatant commanders a decisive advantage” (169).

The result of the interwar exercises and research was the Command Information Center becoming “the brain” of the ship. As radar emerged as one of the most indispensable sources of tactical information on the ship, J.C. Wylie, Mahlon Tisdale, and Caleb Laning proved to be pivotal in the design and creation of the CIC on board American ships. At Admiral Nimitz’s urging, they designed the CIC layout and wrote the CIC doctrine that would be used throughout the fleet during the war. For Wolters, theirs is not a story of individual achievement, but rather, yet another example of the Second World War generation willingly putting the needs of the service and nation ahead of self.

With Information at Sea, Wolters has filled a gap in the story of the American navy’s crowning success at war. He includes over 66 pages of endnotes that provide a great resource for further research in maritime command and control. The story of maritime information from the 1870s through 1945 can and should inform how the Navy tackles the information challenges of the future.

Jon Scott Logel
Portsmouth, Rhode Island


A book entitled China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped China might reasonably be expected to focus on maritime affairs, especially the activities of Chinese mariners, merchants, and officials. As Zheng writes in her introduction, she wants to reassess Qing China by “putting the seas at the center of the narrative and using the oceans to elucidate the complexity of Chinese history.” While the book is full of fascinating vignettes about how an increasingly open-door policy towards foreign trade exposed the Chinese to a variety of imports, Chinese mariners and maritime trade-related institutions are all but absent from most of the book; the index contains no entries for “crew,” “port,” or “ships.”

That a missed opportunity may be in the offing is suggested when she writes of her three-fold periodization of Chinese maritime history: “the pre–Sui-Tang period (to 589 CE), the Tang-Song-Yuan period (589–1367), when seafaring and trade developed fully, and the Ming-Qing period (1368–1911), when it stagnated.” While the government did impose strict limits (haijin, which Zheng does not discuss) on overseas trade, Zheng He’s voyages took place during the early Ming, and trade liberalized after 1567. The new Qing government imposed haijin specifically in response to the threat of the fleets of Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), but the Kangxi emperor relaxed them following the rebels’ defeat in 1683. This encouraged western traders to visit, but it also led to an unprecedented growth in China’s sea trade and the flourishing of communities of overseas Chinese—“merchants without empire” as Wang Gungwu put it.
Zheng covers these developments in chapter 2 and, almost exclusively in the context of the rice trade with Thailand in chapter 3. While she briefly discusses the Chinese presence in Dutch Batavia (Jakarta), she has little to say about it beyond the number of junks calling there in the first half of the eighteenth century and remarking that the Dutch murdered 10,000 Chinese in 1740. Manila gets a brief mention, but nothing is said of the massacre—or resilience—of Chinese communities in Manila, Cho Lon (Vietnam), Borneo, and elsewhere, to say nothing of how they came to be or how they functioned within Asia’s maritime networks.

More than half the book is given over to discussions of various commodities and novelties introduced by “western” merchants—cotton, clocks, opium, and architectural, musical, and artistic styles—how these were initially the preserve of the elite, and how they were eventually indigenized (or not) by a growing consumer base. Zheng concludes with a truncated assessment of how China’s exports changed foreign cultures. Far from being at the centre of the narrative, however, the seas are almost entirely absent. Instead, we are left with a China all but stripped of agency with respect to its foreign trade, and at the mercy of European interlopers. Nothing is said of Chinese navigators’ increased knowledge of the world as revealed in maps and writings, the strength of China’s merchant marine and naval defense forces, or its important trade with Japan in the two centuries after the Tokugawa shogun issued the sakoku (closed country) edict in 1635.

The text often has the feel of a literature review, and Zheng frequently raises subjects that call for further research, without acknowledging that the research is often well under way. She even fumbles some of her own conclusions. Discussing the English taste for Chinese tea, she quotes a nineteenth-century author who “sums up the importance of tea” in terms of revenues to the exchequer and the East India Company (EIC) and the numbers of seamen and ships employed. As a precursor to the American Revolution, the Boston tea party—a protest over the EIC’s dumping tea in the North American colonies—was perhaps more important, though it goes unnoticed. But Zheng’s anglophilia is acute, and she adds that in the nineteenth century “The English, rather than the Chinese, had come to perfect the art of tea,” a claim she supports by quoting an advertisement for Tea at the Ritz in 2010. The authors of Chinese and Japanese tea classics written as early as the eighth century might dissent.

Foreign trade shaped China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it did all of the world’s major powers, and most of that trade moved by sea. But how goods that happened to move across the sea changed their recipients is not the same as how a country or people operated in and around the maritime world, or on the sea. A full assessment of China’s long and complex maritime history remains to be written.

Lincoln Paine
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