

primitive days, Abulafia demonstrates connections revealed by archaeology. These include Mediterranean artifacts on the Portuguese coast and an Atlantic roasting spit in faraway Cyprus.

After 1492 the Portuguese and Spanish, followed by the English and Dutch, rose to a startling reach and influence throughout the world. This is nowhere better demonstrated than by Spain's Manila galleons. These hulking ships linked the Philippines "to China and Japan, but also to Mexico and Peru; goods transported across Central America reached Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico, were ferried to Havana, and were then carried across the Atlantic to Seville and Cádiz." (617) Again and again throughout this extraordinary book, the reader is treated to such staggering achievements, as well as to the diverse peoples who made them happen. Then as now, folks got around.

The book's final chapters build to a crescendo of sorts with the completion of the Suez and Panama Canals, containerization, the cruise industry, and air travel, all of which served to flatten barriers and make what were once dangerous, arduous enterprises seem routine. With a flourish worthy of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*, Abulafia contends that "the ocean world of the last four millennia" has "ceased to exist." (908)

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Sebastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos (eds.) *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (ret.)*. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, www.nomos-elibrary.de, 2020. 373 pp., ISBN 978-3-8487-5753-4. (E-book ISBN 978-3-8452-9915-0.)

This *Festschrift*, besides offering a well-deserved homage to Captain Peter Swartz, highlights the importance of strategic thinking for naval and maritime strategy, bringing together important authors from several backgrounds and nationalities for this exercise.

To create a new national maritime strategy is a herculean work. Strategy lies both in the political and military dimension, being a congregation of political objectives by means of the disposition of military forces. Therefore, a "Maritime Strategy" must follow a country's national defense objectives, but also its naval policies regarding the budget and the needs of the navy. Naval officers, strategists, analysts, researchers, and decision-makers directly face the difficulties and the pressure surrounding the process of creation, and every step must be justified logically through a comprehensive analysis. There are two tools/exercises that can be used as part of this effort: to resort to works and sources about "making Maritime Strategy" or to review past errors in history. What *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy* does is invite the reader to take part in these exercises, reinforcing the need to create more documentation around the essentials of maritime strategy; and this correlates directly with the life of Captain Peter Swartz and his importance to the field.

Swartz is famous not only for his naval career, but also for his career post-retirement. During his time in the US Navy, Swartz was an advisor for the South Vietnamese Navy during the Vietnam War. He also worked on the staff of the Rear Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr, who was later designated CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) of the US Navy. Captain Swartz also played a crucial role in elaborating a new maritime strategy for the navy during the 1980s, one of the hardest times for the United

States Navy during the Cold War.

Swartz seems to have had a restless spirit, researching tirelessly among the issues around naval and maritime strategies after he retired, working at Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) for more than 25 years. His legacy personifies the unification of practice and theory. Today he is one most celebrated participants in the field of maritime and naval strategy, having influenced numerous scholars, especially the editors and the authors of the book.

Developing a concise maritime strategy means subjecting it to a full analytical process, not just the single perspective of a leader and what he thinks a navy needs to do. Using the history of Project SIXTY, the book illustrates how important the structure of the Navy is to the process. Established by Admiral Zumwalt in the 1970s, Project SIXTY was an initial step towards reforming the US Navy. Without giving too much of the story away, Zumwalt challenged a group of officers to devise an action plan for the USN, analyzing its means, ends, and needs and create a strategy within 60 days. While not completely “bulletproof,” their work established reform within the naval structure, and motivated debate about maritime strategy. It also serves as an example for other nations seeking to improve aspects of their own maritime strategy.

The book presents several Cold War case studies, but rather than focusing on the past, they reflect today’s reality. We are once more living within the context of a great power struggle where competition among China, Russia and the United States is slowly increasing. Thus, it is reasonable to explore the dimensions and consequences of the Cold War Era, searching out lessons and questions that can help us to understand today’s dynamics (many resulting from the Cold War) and prepare for what is

coming.

The major flaw of the book is the heterogeneity of the backgrounds and nationalities of the various contributors. There could have been more perspectives from outside the Global North—only one article offers a perspective outside the European-US case studies, presenting the challenges of *India’s Naval and Maritime Power* (241). This, however, does not take away from the basic quality of the work: the text flows easily and the articles present a range of interesting perspectives that encourage the reader to learn more about the processes and issues of around maritime strategy in another nations.

Professor Colin Gray (former director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Reading University) once pointed out that the problem facing those who study or are responsible for defense planning or national strategies is that no one can predict the future, nor how the wars of the future will be fought. The only thing that one can do, is study, research the sources and the good works available. There is so much to know, and yet civilian and military institutions from around the world have produced so little on the topic of maritime strategy. Initiatives like this Festschrift must not only be praised, but encouraged. I look forward to the fourth volume, further exploring the maritime strategy, issues and challenges elsewhere in the world, especially in the Global South, where there is a different dynamic involving geopolitics and international relations.

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Timothy J. Demy (ed.), *The U.S. Naval Institute on Arctic Naval Operations*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2019. xii+200 pp., notes,