

BOOK REVIEWS

David Childs. *Invading America: The English Assault on the New World, 1497-1630*. Barnsley, S. Yorks.: Pen & Sword Books Limited, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2012. xi + 306 pp., illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. UK £25.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-84832-145-8.

Historians since Hakluyt have remarked on England's slowness in establishing New World colonies, especially in comparison with her rival, Spain. David Childs seeks to explain the widespread failure of early English colonies by viewing them as beachheads in an extended amphibious campaign. Childs identifies the factors crucial for successful amphibious operations, which, when absent, doomed would-be settlers from Baffin Island to the Carolinas. These factors included proper reconnaissance and intelligence, sufficient forces and supplies, realistic objectives, effective naval forces and joint command, and timely resupply. Childs uses the examples of the Frobisher voyages, Roanoke, Jamestown, New England, and Newfoundland to demonstrate the importance of these elements in the fortunes of a colony. The work is organized thematically rather than chronologically. While this allows the author to focus on a particular topic, the result is a something of a juggling act, where events and personalities in different colonies are mentioned in quick succession. A more effective way to organize the work might have been to devote a specific chapter to each colony, identifying the factors inherent in its success or failure. Despite this criticism, *Invading America* is a detailed,

cleverly written synthesis. Childs has an excellent grasp of the material, and an impressive command of the primary sources. While his focus may be too broad for specialist readers, Childs should be commended for attempting to blaze a new trail into this well-trodden territory.

Childs' declared timeframe is the "long sixteenth century," from John Cabot to John Winthrop. The information on Cabot is sketchy in the extreme, however, and the author focuses almost exclusively on the period between Frobisher's first voyage in 1576 and the Jamestown massacre of 1622. A literature review identifies the intellectual underpinnings for New World voyages, ranging from John Donne to the King James Bible. The failure of the Roanoke colony on the windswept Carolina Outer Banks is used to illustrate the importance of proper reconnaissance and site selection. Chapters on period vessels and navigation show that impressive feats of seamanship aside, early English voyages were hamstrung by poor planning and provisioning. Photos and numerous references to reconstructed vessels show that the author has done considerable legwork, but these photos are often of poor quality, and one is left wondering how accurate these reconstructions really are. Childs is right to emphasize the cramped confines of these vessels, but how much worse were these conditions than those experienced ashore? More information on the background, experiences, and values of these Tudor and Jacobean soldiers, sailors, and settlers would also be useful. Gilbert, Raleigh, and Lane all served in Ireland,

while John Smith fought as a mercenary on the Continent. Some mention is made of these Irish events, such as Raleigh's massacre of the garrison of Smerwick in 1580, but these are isolated examples. The English experience in Ireland was formative, and provided a blueprint on how to subdue a restive, alien population. Ivor Noël Hume and others have examined how Elizabethan fortifications in Ireland formed a model for similar structures in the New World. Childs does not consider this evidence, nor does he turn to archaeology in his brief discussion of Amerindian forts and settlements.

Childs primarily blames greed and unrealistic expectations for the failure of early English colonies. Investors expected quick returns on their outlay, which forced the settlers to fruitlessly mine for gold, or delayed resupply voyages while their commanders sought richer pickings through piracy. While these factors were certainly evident at Roanoke and Jamestown, they are less applicable to the New England and Newfoundland experiences. Since these latter colonies do not readily fit into Childs explanatory paradigm, he devotes considerably less space to them, and focuses almost exclusively on the mid-Atlantic colonies. The author also identifies problems with joint land-sea command as one of the major factors influencing the success or failure of a colony. Tudor and Jacobean expeditions usually featured two commanders: one in charge of soldiers and colonists, and an admiral to oversee naval matters. Childs shows that the two rarely saw eye-to-eye, as the strident condemnation of Sir Richard Grenville in Ralph Lane's correspondence shows. Happy exceptions included John Smith and Christopher Newport, and the effective collaboration between Sir George Somers and Sir Thomas Dale after the *Sea Venture* was wrecked in 1609. In line with most

writers on the subject, Childs attributes the eventual success of the English New World colonies to superior demographics and technology.

Invading America is a well written summary of the early English voyages to North America. It is rich with detail and anecdote, but marred by unwieldy organization and mediocre images. Discussing each of the five colonies in turn, chronologically, might have produced a more cohesive work. There are no citations in the text, but the bibliography is serviceable. The appendices form a handy reference, especially the chronology of "Significant English Voyages to the New World." This volume could form a useful classroom text, and will also appeal to those interested in visiting historic sites and vessels.

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Peter Dutton, Robert Ross and Oystein Tunsjo (eds). *Twenty-First Century Seapower: cooperation and conflict at sea*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, Taylor Francis Group, Cass Series, www.routledge.com 2012. xii + 325 pp., notes, index. US \$135, hardback; ISBN 978-0-415-69812-2.

The last thirty or so years have seen a growth in the number, size and sophistication of maritime forces; initially coastguards to manage surveillance and enforcement responsibilities in newly designated exclusive economic zones under the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982* (LOSC), but also navies. Why these navies are modernizing and growing, how they might be used by their governments, and how they will interact with, and impact upon other navies, is currently engaging many defence and naval analysts.

In the Indo-Pacific region there are

some concerns that a naval arms race is underway, generally stated as either a reaction to a Chinese naval modernization and building program, or to unresolved maritime boundary claims arising from the LOSC. Notwithstanding the plethora of studies and reports on the subject, the jury remains out over whether there is such a race. There is also a complementary range of studies examining how navies cooperate at sea, not least to overcome any possibility of conflict between them due to strategic miscalculation. It is also natural (and nothing new) for navies to cooperate at sea, as the sea is inherently dangerous, while many naval activities actually cannot be done by one navy alone.

This leads to the book under review, which consists of the proceedings of an international conference; albeit the conference theme, location and date it was held are unstated. The book examines the “emerging” navies of India, China, Japan and (an oft-forgotten) Russia in the context of how, where and why navies operate; how they may be constrained by international law; and their relationship with other navies and international organizations. The book is structured in four parts examining why land powers go to sea, the aforementioned emerging navies, a new maritime strategy for the twenty-first century, and how to manage contemporary maritime security.

To introduce some context for current naval expansion, Part 1 contains three papers. The first paper provides a historical context by examining how smaller navies in Europe fit within the international relations framework of the time. The second paper examines the importance and impact of geography on navies and concepts of sea power; this is a frequently neglected topic and I found it very useful. The third paper is also historical and examines conflict at sea within the context of Mahanian thinking. These three papers form the background for the rest of the

book.

Part 2 examines each of the four (re-) emerging navies, why they are expanding, how they are doing so, etc. Each chapter is succinct and, together, they provide a good overview and snapshot of the navies examined. Of course, these navies are not emerging into a vacuum, so Part 3 examines the existing security architecture and role of navies: for example, how navies are used to maintain the current global trading system; the role of NATO as a longstanding military alliance and how navies are used within it; the impact of Chinese naval developments; and how many navies are cooperating to counter piracy. Thus, we get good coverage of the utility of navies at both the high and low ends of activity.

This leads to Part 4, which is concerned with managing contemporary maritime security, and comprises four papers which examine maritime law issues which effect maritime boundaries and freedom of navigation, the growing “rivalry” between China and the United States in the Pacific Ocean, and how navies might cooperate in the future, while encouraging maritime capacity building. This latter theme is important, as navies have worked together for centuries, collaboration often not visible to those on land.

There are some very interesting papers in the book (some of which have appeared elsewhere), but overall the book lacks coherence as the papers/topics just do not fit well together; this appears to be the natural outcome of publishing conference proceedings. Some of the Chinese-authored papers, which purport to be “academic,” are, unfortunately, just emphatic restatements of Chinese government policy; but they do serve another use, their dogmatic nature demonstrates why it can be so difficult dealing with China in international fora.

These days, all books seem to have minor proofreading issues, but disappointingly, this book falls into a category of its own, as it does not appear to have been “edited” at all. It is riddled with errors in both the text and its references, there are sentences that do not make sense, and there is no consistency in terms and abbreviations within chapters, let alone across chapters. With the high price Routledge charges for its limited print-run books, both the authors and the readers are entitled to expect far more quality control than is delivered here.

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Nicole Eustace. *1812. War and the Passions of Patriotism*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, www.upenn.edu, 2012. xxvii + 315 pp., illustrations, notes, index. US \$34.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-8122-4431-1.

Nicole Eustace has written a cultural history of the life and rhythm of the patriotic zeal experienced by the American population between the eve of the War of 1812 and the years immediately following the peace. In her view, patriotism was rooted in a highly romanticized understanding of passionate love, family formation and reproduction. She demonstrates how the advocates of war and their supporters used notions of love, female virtue, the sanctity of marriage and family, and the need to have many children to rouse men to take up arms and convince the remaining civilians that the events of the war (even when less than favourable) would lead to a safe, prosperous and geographically expanded United States. Oddly enough, those who rejected the war (and rejected the place of passion) used the same emotional powder to ignite support among their followers.

In the first chapter, American

rejection of Thomas Malthus’ essay on population growth, in particular the third edition in which the United States served as an example of problematic population growth, serves as a springboard for the discussion of family reproduction and freedom. Eustace strikes a conflict between Malthus’s concerns and Benjamin Franklin’s earlier call for Americans to marry and reproduce in order to build the future United States population that would develop the land still covered in wilderness. Americans, such as Baltimore publisher Hezekiah Niles, chafed against Malthus’ work, casting it as British hypocrisy and the desire to see the new America fail. With the building of tensions between the United States and Britain, pro-war advocates, such as Niles, used their call for family formation and reproduction to generate emotional support for the declaration of war. Eustace depicts the nation’s men going to war based on a passionate patriotic pretext to protect the right to love and propagate; that is, on inflamed emotion rather than the restricted rational reasons of sailor’s rights and free trade. These rational themes were read by the anti-Malthusians and war supporters as threats to the sanctity of American marriage and the right to have children.

Chapter two uses Hull’s defeat at Detroit to demonstrate the role emotional ardour played out in the retelling of the events surrounding the “national disaster.” It is both a defence of Hull’s decision to surrender and a powerful negative critique of his failure to fight. Eustace holds that the popular portrayal of Hull as being overly emotional in the face of the enemy, unable to motivate his troops and a coward for not fighting determined the guilty verdict at his court martial. This version overcame the rational explanation that Hull was unsure of the reliability of his troops to fight and duped by Brock’s ploy of exaggerated troop numbers and the threat of an Indian-led massacre. The war promoters turned the

failure of Detroit around, creating a Phoenix- rising-from-the-ashes moment as the youthful nation, driven by ardour, could reclaim its manliness by beating the British.

The Battle of Lake Erie is the event that facilitates Eustace's discussion in chapter 3. As the victor, Oliver H. Perry symbolized the good, true American male at war, showered with an outpouring of love and adoration by a grateful nation. The battle was depicted by politicians and the press as a struggle to defeat British oppression through the press gang, seen as an attack on American families and reproduction. "Conjugal love" was portrayed as the "bedrock of freedom" (p.115). The absence of any extended discussion of the naval war in the Atlantic in relation to her perspective is surprising; so is the missed point that Perry had five children during the eight years he was married (1811-1818). This chapter offers an extended view of the contemporary poetic and fictional representations of family and reproduction.

The fourth chapter deals with the coupled events of Tecumseh's death and the British loss at Moraviantown. The American victory at Moraviantown gave them potential control over the western reaches of Upper Canada and more security in their own western territories. For Eustace though, the significance of the battle was the death of the Shawnee Chief, Tecumseh, a man both despised and feared by American expansionists. Using captivity stories (from the 1600s to the early nineteenth century), Eustace shows the clear distinction between American feelings for the nobility and correctness of their own family formation and the complete contempt in which they held any Indian family. In a sense, the death of Tecumseh marks the beginning of Americans out-populating the aboriginals who lived on the land the United States would seize in the years after the war. While Eustace

continues the passion, family and reproduction theme in this chapter, another louder message pushes through, the absolute hatred and prejudice towards native Indians found in the early republic.

A burned-out President's mansion with a slave market opposite is the image that leads the reader into the fifth chapter. Here Eustace compares the white American slave owners' vision of marriage and family with their disregard for the unions and families of those they held in bondage. Slaves who volunteered to serve in the American forces presented the nation with a dilemma; accept their service and they would be eligible for the same family rights that white Americans were fighting for. The fear of slave revolt, pervasive in the south during the War of 1812, is interpreted as coming largely from the sheer numbers of slaves living next to the slave owners, making it ultimately a battle of population growth between the two groups. This chapter introduces the idea of a racist passionate patriotism, where Black Americans were excluded from the culturally-valued notions of family formation and reproduction.

The conclusion swirls around the Battle of New Orleans and the fabricated story that the British had boasted the capture of New Orleans would lead to "beauty and booty" (p.213). Jackson's victory at New Orleans is seen as a symbol of the ultimate reason for war; protection of females from being ravaged by the horrid British, thus saving them for the honourable marriage to and impregnation by the patriotic American male. Jackson's defeat of the Creek Indians in 1814 and the follow-up Seminole Wars represent the subsequent seizing of Indian lands to the west (a return to the theme of chapter four) which followed in the decades after the War of 1812. Here again, Eustace uses contemporary representations of the war to conclude that it was a war, "...over the

meaning and validity of American claims to champion liberty in an expansionist age” (p.214). The stirring of passionate patriotic emotion to protect the American family, encourage reproduction and expanded the country was the motivational device employed to inspire support for the war.

Eustace spends little energy on battles or officers, only to the extent that they serve as a spark for contemporary commentary on the American war effort, which often had little to do with accuracy or insight into the martial elements of the events and the true abilities of the key players. The book reveals the political use of events to advance personal agendas, twisting facts to suit the tellers’ ulterior goals. A fine example was the letter to the Secretary of War by Colonel Lewis Cass, in which he criticizes General Hull’s performance at Detroit. Cass used long excerpts from the journal of Robert Lucas, without mentioning the fact, giving Cass’s audience the notion he was present that day when, in fact, he was not. The problem with Eustace spending so little time describing military and naval events is that they are often unclear and errors creep in to her summaries. In the description of the campaign at New Orleans, she has “Jackson’s troops” on the 8 January waiting “patiently for the invading British regulars to exit their boats and begin the tough scramble up the banks...” before firing on them (p.211). The assault was overland, no boats were involved in the attack on Jackson’s main line of defence; boats were used to land a force across the river which then marched a distance to attack his flank position. Her description negates the fact the Americans launched an attack on the British as soon as they arrived at the plantations south of the city on 23 December.

At both the outset and end of the book, Eustace makes it clear that she sees the War of 1812 as a minor affair when

compared with Civil War mobilization, destruction and human losses. This position helps her to elevate the cultural perspective she explores to more significance than the martial perspective of the historiography of the War of 1812. At the end, she states that little developed in “American military history” until the Civil War. This seems to ignore the outcomes of the battles of Queenston Heights, Chippawa, and Lundy’s Lane, which surely had some influence on the decision to establish a better standing army, or of the American frigate victories in 1812-1813, and the effect of the British blockade in influencing the American Government to create a larger navy after the war. While the fighting is deemed minor, Eustace does grant that the expansion to the west between 1815 and 1865 was due to the cultural impact of the war; a reinforced call to expand, both in family size and territory.

Eustace’s sources, from contemporary poems, songs, imagery and fiction to “factual accounts” are numerous, and she adeptly interprets them to support her position. The endnotes are a treasure chest for any researcher of the era. They are extensive, with many bordering on mini essays. The fifth endnote for the preface discusses the importance of examining the culture of war promotion in the age of democratically-started wars (p.238). The seventh note of the preface is a full page and quarter, placing her view of the “early American public sphere” in the larger historiography. Both of these “notes,” as well as others, could be in the main text grounding or expanding her argument. To not make use of her endnotes is to miss significant elements of the author’s case. The recent sources on the actual military and naval fighting of the war are severely limited (only nine general books on the war and four journal articles), though that is clearly not her focus. If the reader is interested in the military and naval contest, this book is not for them. It is a book to be

read if one wants to explore an understanding of the cultural creation of patriotism in the early American Republic, with the War of 1812 as the backdrop.

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Larrie D. Ferreiro. *Measure of the Earth: The Enlightenment Expedition that Reshaped our World*. New York, NY: Basic Books, www.perseusbooksgroup, 2011. xix+353 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, index. US \$28.00, cloth; ISBN 978-0-465-01723-2. E-book ISBN 978-0-465-02345-5.

Maritime historians familiar with Larrie D. Ferreiro's first book, *Ships and Science: The Birth of Naval Architecture in the Scientific Revolution, 1600–1800* (MIT Press, 2006), will likely find themselves disappointed in his latest monograph, *Measure of the Earth: The Enlightenment Expedition that Reshaped our World*. While the publishers suggest the narrative is about the impact of the joint French and Spanish geodesic mission to measure the distance of a degree of latitude on maritime navigation, in reality, the book is less about the impact of the scientific expedition on maritime navigation than it is about the scientists who participated in the mission. Ferreiro attempts to elevate lesser-known enlightenment scientists such as Pierre Bouguer, Louis Godin, and Jorge Juan y Santacilla to greater prominence in the historical narrative. He casts Bouguer in the lead role, much as he did in *Ships and Science*. Drawing on the records of the geodesic mission and the private writings of the mission's members, Ferreiro claims Bouguer was both the brains for and the salvation of the oft-troubled enterprise.

In the early eighteenth century, Isaac Newton and René Descartes engaged in a dialogue about the shape of the earth.

Newton argued the earth was oblate (flattened), while Descartes believed the world was prolate (elongated). This Newtonian-Cartesian debate was not only important to accurate maritime navigation; it also held the potential to shift the imperial power base within Europe and the New World colonies. Resolving the dispute was of national importance. At a time when Britain and France were bitter rivals, the nation that correctly determined the earth's shape could claim superiority in the field of mathematics and science. In an attempt to win the debate and bring recognition and fame to France, *Ministre de la Marine*, Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Comte de Maurepas recruited Bouguer, Godin and a handful of others to take measurements of the earth's surface at the equator. The expedition required cooperation from Spain. Once the mission arrived in Colombia, they were joined by two Spanish military officers, Jorge Juan y Santacilla and Antonio de Ulloa, and began their journey to northern Peru (present-day Ecuador).

Initially, Bouguer, Godin, and Maurepas expected the expedition to last three to four years. In the end, the geodesic mission spent a decade abroad, with some members staying as many as four decades and others never returning to Europe. The expedition took so long, the mission was virtually forgotten; written off when a later competing mission to the Arctic returned earlier with definitive proof of Newton's theory of a flattened earth. Ferreiro demonstrates the intellect and steadfast leadership of Bouguer in bringing the mission to a successful close, despite being constantly plagued by internal disagreements, financial crisis, bouts of inclement weather and poor atmospheric visibility, legal issues and interruptions of war. But a successful mission was not necessarily cause for joy and celebration. Many of the geodesic mission's members returned to a very different world of

unhappy endings.

Contesting Mary Terrall's Maupertuis-centered *The Man Who Flattened the Earth* (2006), Ferreiro returns Bouguer, Godin and their assistants from the land of the forgotten (both figuratively and literally, as Ferreiro describes it) to their proper places in history and in the world of Enlightenment science. Ferreiro's research is impeccable; drawing on 13 different archives in four countries on two continents and several maritime histories such as Jan Glete's *Navies and Nations* and John Elliot's *Empires of the Atlantic World*. His attention to detail makes for a compelling account of the mission's trials and tribulations and he successfully achieves his goal of returning fame and glory to Pierre Bouguer. Ferreiro also avoids a problem that plagued his *Ships and Science*—the inclusion of numerous and cumbersome mathematical formulas and scientific equations. In the absence of these, *Measure of the Earth* is a captivating, engaging, and enjoyable read that is sure to delight both historians of science and general audiences.

Despite the glowing prose, Ferreiro's narrative is not without problems. The major fault is that *Measure of the Earth* does not engage a broader historical question. While Ferreiro acknowledges the mission's importance to maritime navigation and solving the debate on the earth's shape, his references to the historical significance of the expedition are only passing ones. He fails to reference and engage the other works on the subject of the earth's size, such as Ken Alder's *The Measure of All Things* (2003) or Nicholas Nicastro's *Circumference* (2008). *Measure of the Earth* simply tells the story of the geodesic mission to the equator without a deeper discussion of what the mission really meant to cartography, navigation, and the imperialistic plans of Europe's major powers. Knowing the precise length of a degree of latitude could potentially alter

existing maps, redefine knowledge of existing landmasses, and aid navigation on the open sea.

Minor problems include the lack of a bibliography and the editorial decision to bury the "Notes on Language" and "Units of Measure and Currency" sections at the back of the book. Both sections would be better served at the beginning of the monologue before readers come across these items in the text. Nevertheless, *Measure of the Earth* will undoubtedly appear on many undergraduate reading lists for introductory courses on the history of science and technology.

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Myra C. Glenn. *Jack Tar's Story: The Autobiographies and Memoirs of Sailors in Antebellum America*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, www.cambridge.org, 2010. xi +194 pp., appendix, index. US \$85.00, cloth; ISBN 978-0-521-19368-9.)

The Age of Revolution (1750-1850) unleashed powerful forces that reshaped our understanding of basic individual rights and liberties, and historians have been trying to understand the meaning of those changes and how we remember them ever since. Elmira College historian, Myra C. Glenn, author of *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, Sailors, Women and Children in Antebellum America* (1984), explores the contested meanings of manhood and nationalism during the early American republic.

By using traditional institutional sources—ships' logs, crew lists, and impressment records—and a bevy of literary sources, Glenn is able to document the stories that sailors told and how they remembered and interpreted the events they experienced.

Focusing on antebellum American seamen between 1815 and 1860 who subsequently published their memoirs and autobiographies, this book examines the themes, rhetorical strategies and tropes that sailors articulated to convey their exhilarating stories. For the sailors, these stories represented the adventures of their lives, yet for landsmen readers, these narratives reminded them that sailors embodied the backbone of American economic growth and development. Sailors, in effect, were responsible for making the United States a major economic power, even though they seemed far removed from the process since their long absences at sea seemingly gave them little collective voice.

These maritime accounts—straddling different literary genres—represented coming-of-age tales, moral reform works, stories of war, rogue accounts, captivity narratives, exposés of cruelty and injustice at sea, and even religious conversion narratives. *Jack Tar's Story* uses sailor autobiographies and memoirs to investigate the many, often conflicting, meanings of manhood and nationalism during the early American republic. Glenn's introduction reminds us why these antebellum sailors' narratives should be remembered—their lives were woven into the very fabric of the country. The book's five chapters develop these themes.

Antebellum American sailors truly believed that the United States was on the precipice of greatness and their literary exercises offered their version of this journey. They had resisted British impressment and incarceration as prisoners of war during the War of 1812. They had fought the Barbary pirates, Caribbean privateers, and British warships. Moreover, they had witnessed the Haitian Revolution and the Latin American wars of independence. Throughout their

experiences in captivity or combat, they gained important insights and recounted these new attitudes about manhood, tyranny and patriotism. Sailors' willingness to describe their experiences also helped shape the views of antebellum Americans about their own struggle for liberty against Great Britain. Yet despite the exciting and exotic allure of the sea, many sailors also found that maritime discipline bordered on cruelty. Floggings and the cat-o'-nine-tails threatened sailors' liberty and independence and even smacked of slavery, revealing how harsh maritime discipline jeopardized their manhood as well as the welfare of the nation. Jack Tar's resulting stories embodied a strident nationalism that strongly resonated with land-bound Americans, especially those opposed to cruelty and slavery.

Glenn's study does not use sailor narratives simply to describe the life of mariners during the Age of Sail. Instead, it focuses on how mariner authors remembered and interpreted various events and experiences—it is both a history and a memory of antebellum sailor narratives. By delving into the question of memory, Glenn makes major contributions to the field of maritime history. She systematically investigates the veracity of sailor narratives by cross-referencing them to the myriad of extant institutional records. Such a time-consuming task has revealed that several self-narratives purportedly written by sailors were actually rousing fictional accounts. And while Glenn does not explain or analyze why authors fabricated such stories, she maintains that authors present multiple agendas in their narratives. They offer graphic stories of danger and adventure about exotic places grounded in fact.

This book straddles different fields of scholarship and suggests how their concerns intersect or resonate with each other: the history of print culture, the study of autobiographical writing, and the

historiography of seafaring life and of masculinity in antebellum America. Glenn maintains that sailors' narratives resemble an archaeological site with multiple conflicted meanings. Yet archaeological sites also serve as time capsules of a specific place and time. The sample of antebellum sailors' narratives that Glenn uses to form the basis of her study provides but one view of this group at only one point in time. While handsomely produced and a fine study—in fact, one of the best that we have on antebellum sailors—there still remains considerable work to be done on how and why working-class sailors crafted stories of their lives at sea. Future studies will undoubtedly be built on the foundation of Glenn's outstanding book.

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James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie. *Navies of South-East Asia. A comparative study*. Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, www.routledge.com, 2013. xvi + 302 pp., tables, notes, bibliography, index. US \$135, hardback: ISBN 978-0-415-80942-9.

Researching other navies is far more difficult than it sounds, as there are differing levels of transparency over what type of information a state might make available, and whether this information is in English. The standard sources that provide an annual technical snapshot of the organization, size and capabilities of navies include *Jane's Fighting Ships*, and more broadly, the *Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, to name but a few. By their nature, however, these publications do not contain more detailed information that might provide a history of each navy. Why is a history of each navy important? Because it provides a context and framework for

understanding how/why a navy is the way it is, which enables more nuanced assessments and judgements over the real naval capabilities possessed by a state.

With the states of the Asia-Pacific region becoming the driver of the global economy, predominantly through seaborne trade; and with Southeast Asia connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans while also experiencing its own considerable economic growth, an understanding of these navies is both timely and useful. The authors of this book, both retired senior Australian naval officers and former directors of what is now the Sea Power Centre - Australia, the think tank of the Royal Australian Navy, are eminently suited for the task they have set themselves.

One obvious initial point is that these navies are “young,” all but one of the nine navies examined having colonial origins now generally superseded by their own indigenous interests and requirements. Many of the states have a history of battling land-based insurgencies and/or needing to focus on internal security rather than maritime issues. Notwithstanding they are developing states, their prolonged economic growth has enabled a slow development of naval forces of varying capabilities reflecting the funding available to invest in navies, as well as increasing maritime interests generated through sovereign rights to oceanic resources under the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982*.

Each navy has its own chapter, where the authors outline the origins of the naval forces, usually colonial, what was bequeathed to them at independence, and the slow modernization of these forces. The way some of these states achieved their independence determined whether good relations were maintained with their former colonial power and whether continuing support was provided; sometimes it was and sometimes not.

To varying degrees, each of the navies, except that of Singapore, has faced similar problems. The first has been a bias in government funding towards armies rather than navies, and in some cases, this has been very difficult to overcome. A greater problem has been the vagaries in funding allocated to military forces in general, and to navies in particular. Navies are costly to operate and require prolonged and consistent funding, not only to “build” a navy, but also the supporting infrastructure behind it. Long-term planning and funding are crucial for navies, but often governments arbitrarily reduce funding allocations. This is, of course, the right of any government, but the concern is that governments do not understand the long-term consequences of such decisions.

Reduced funding leads to a situation where navies may be forced to focus on one-for-one replacement of very old ships rather than an effective modernization and growth program. Often warships might be bought that were not necessarily what the navy wanted, either reflecting the funding available, or more likely, what friendly governments might sell cheaply or gift to the recipient state. For the affected navy, this might mean an unbalanced fleet that can not undertake the tasks expected of it by its government. More critically, it leaves the navy with a complex mix of warships assembled over time from a variety of different suppliers, without standardized training or logistics support, the impact of which is an unnecessary increase in the cost of running the fleet.

Of course, the affected navies might also have aspirations that far exceed the ability or desire of the government to fund, and critically, the technological capacity of industry to sustain them. While naval capability requirements can be used to create domestic defence industries to support them, there are no guarantees that

the necessary skills exist, can be imported or can be maintained. This is demonstrated by the slow development of shipbuilding industries in some countries, and associated problems with cost overruns and poor workmanship.

Importantly, it should also be noted that the difficulties faced by these new navies are not unique to them and are also faced, to a lesser degree, by older and more powerful navies.

As the navies examined in this book are so disparate in their origins, funding allocations, capabilities and roles, there is little utility in trying to compare them in detail; instead, the authors wisely consider the broad trends that have been discussed earlier in this review. A key issue for other states and their navies is what these Southeast Asian navies can operationally achieve now and what they might be able to do in the future, not least because this affects the types of cooperation there might be between regional and external navies. In general, the Southeast Asian navies have capabilities for brown and green water operations and are projected over the next ten years to migrate to green and a limited blue-water capability (for the Singaporean navy).

The book has extensive endnotes, a solid bibliography and an index (often a rarity these days). My only criticism is a lack of maps for each state, which would have indicated where the various naval bases were located. This book is highly recommended.

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Robert M. Grogans (ed.). *To Auckland by the Ganges - the Journal of a Sea Voyage to New Zealand in 1863*. Dunbeath, Scotland; Whittles Publishing, www.whittlespublishing.com, 2012. xvii+138 pp., illustrations, map, appendices, bibliography. UK £16.99, paper; ISBN 978-1-84995-056-5.

In the mid-nineteenth century, emigrants from Europe seeking a new life in Australasia faced a perilous 15,000 mile passage by sailing ship. Depending on the vagaries of wind and weather, the voyage could take four months or more, and the letters and diaries of the passengers and crew recorded the daily risks they encountered to their health and welfare.

Robert M. Grogans has written numerous articles on such diverse subjects as nautical life, astronomy, transport, British railways, and Scottish social, sporting and industrial history. For this book, he has adapted an original diary written in 1863 by David Buchanan, a journalist and editor of several prominent Scottish newspapers. Buchanan had opted for a new life in New Zealand in the hope of improving his health and the fortunes of his family and, drawing on his ample journalistic skills, he wrote an engrossing diary of the voyage.

Published in early 1864 by Buchanan's former newspaper, the traditional and intellectual *Glasgow Daily Herald*, the 13 instalments appeared twice-weekly under the heading *Life in an Emigrant Ship by D.B. late of Glasgow*. Buchanan's background was similar to that of his affluent readers and, not unnaturally, his lively and intelligent account of the voyage of the *Ganges*, with 260 emigrants aboard, was written in the style to which his educated readers were accustomed.

In making Buchanan's account more accessible to modern readers, Grogans has edited the original "wordy and laboured sentences" to "unclutter [Buchanan's]

repetitive and some times superfluous text." In addition, Grogans has divided the text into thematic paragraphs, whereas previously they had only marked each day's new entry. This, however, raises the question of how far an editor should go in altering an original document. Although the paragraphing is very useful, the change in tense from present to past and the simplification of vocabulary might not appeal to readers with an interest in literature or maritime history, who might prefer the original newspaper columns to the "ironed out" version.

Grogans' key contribution to the book is his inclusion of many detailed endnotes identifying the people mentioned in the text and explaining contemporary events and places that might not be familiar to twenty-first century readership. He has also included, as appendices, the *Ganges'* passenger list, a nautical glossary, and a note on ships' masts and rigging. These last two are particularly useful to the reader because, as the voyage progressed, Buchanan became more knowledgeable about the way the ship was run and he frequently described the operation of the sails and rigging.

Buchanan's account is different from those of other nineteenth century voyages bound for Botany Bay, Norfolk Island and Van Dieman's Land (Brooke 2005), and from the well-known voyages of the Black Ball Line's legendary American-built three-mast ships in the heady gold rush days of the 1850s (Fraser 1999). Most of those were written by shipmasters (Holmes 1965), crewmen (Hichborn 1860) or migrants (Lewis 1949). Buchanan, however, offered the rare perspective of a professional journalist and revealed his intimate understanding of the life of people on board an emigrant passenger ship.

While other letters and diaries from the 1860s reveal passengers' hopes for the future and grief over the burial of spouses

and children at sea, we now know that most passages to New Zealand gradually became less eventful, even tedious. Following numerous suggestions from colonial Immigration Agents, new sanitary and hygiene routines dramatically improved life-saving procedures, and advances in navigation lowered the risk of death in adults and older children, making it no higher at sea than on land (Haines 2006). Only one to two per cent of immigrants to Australasia and New Zealand failed to arrive at their destination and, inevitably, the more mundane narratives from fair-weather ships, written by immigrants with little interest in procedures on board, have taken second place to those with an emphasis on illness, bereavement and disaster.

Readers who have a taste for adventure will be especially interested in the *Ganges*' arrival in New Zealand. Buchanan and his fellow passengers stepped into the unrest of the Maori Wars, which were closely reported in British newspapers such as the *Glasgow Herald*. It makes dramatic reading and is coupled with an interesting description of early Auckland. The eight-year-old *Ganges*, which had given a good account of herself during the 111-day voyage from Gravesend to Auckland, visited New Zealand again in February 1865 with 472 immigrants.

David Buchanan and Robert M. Grogans have provided us with an interesting and valuable record of the experience of migration in this portrait of everyday life on board an emigrant ship during the age of sail.

Michael Clark
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Jon Guttman. *Osprey Aircraft of the Aces #97: Naval Aces of World War 1 Part 1*. Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, Inc., www.ospreypublishing.com, 2011. 80 pp.,

illustrations, colour plates, appendix, index. UK £13.99, US \$22.95, CDN \$25.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-84908-345-4.

Jon Guttman. *Osprey Aircraft of the Aces #104: Naval Aces of World War 1 Part 2*. Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, Inc., www.ospreypublishing.com, 2012. 80 pp., illustrations, colour plates, appendix, index. UK £13.99, US \$22.95, CDN \$25.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-84908-664-6.

When First World War air combat is mentioned, the image of brightly coloured biplanes over the skies of France comes to mind. Less well-known is the aerial conflict between the naval air arms of Imperial Germany, Great Britain, and other nations. This neglected aspect of First World War aviation produced its share of aces; in these two volumes of the *Osprey Aircraft of the Aces* series, author Jon Guttman relates the stories of those naval pilots who each shot down five or more enemy aircraft.

To understand First World War naval air warfare, two contrasts and one comparison must be made between naval air warfare in the First World War and its counterparts on the Western Front, as well as with naval air warfare in later conflicts. First, the scale of naval air combat in the First War was often much smaller than the classic air war of the Western Front. Only along the Belgian coast did substantial naval air combat occur. Great Britain's Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) produced 89 aces of whom the top ace was Raymond Collishaw of British Columbia, Canada. His RNAS total was 40 aerial victories, to which another 20 victories were added after the creation of the Royal Air Force (RAF). An additional 47 RNAS pilots became aces in RAF units. The top-scoring German naval ace was Theo Osterkamp, with 32 aerial victories, while the Imperial German Navy produced twenty aces. (There is a discrepancy in this total: other accounts add

an extra pilot that Guttman does not include.)

The aerial victory totals among other nations reflect the lesser scale of aerial combat on other fronts: the Austro-Hungarian Navy produced only two aces, Gottfried von Banfield (nine confirmed victories) and Friedrich Lang (five victories). Their chief adversary, the Royal Italian Navy, produced only two bona fide aces: Orazio Pierozzi (seven aerial victories) and Federico Martinengo (five aerial victories). An additional Italian naval pilot, Umberto Calvello, was included in the list of Royal Italian Naval aces although the records show he had only four aerial victories. Add to this very brief list the Imperial Russian naval aces, Alexander Seversky (six aerial victories) and Mikhail Safonov (five aerial victories), plus the lone U.S. Navy ace, David Ingalls (six aerial victories) and the sole Greek naval ace, Aristeides Moraitinis (nine aerial victories). When compared with the Western Front aces, or even the aces of the RNAS and German Navy, the much lower aerial victory totals indicate how infrequently aerial combat occurred on other fronts.

Another contrast between naval air warfare in the First World War and subsequent wars: many of the aces achieved all or part of their scores in flying boats.

Finally, the structure of the First World War naval air arms resembled that of post-Second World War naval air arms. The air arms of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were part of the naval structure—unlike the Second World War German Luftwaffe, which controlled virtually all air assets, the Italian Navy, which had only a small naval air arm, and the interwar Fleet Air Arm of Great Britain, which was part of the RAF but assigned to the Royal Navy.

Guttman's Volume One is devoted to the ace pilots of the RNAS, while Volume Two relates the stories of the naval ace

pilots of Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary, Imperial Russia, Italy, Greece, and the United States. Only the RNAS and Imperial Germany produced a substantial number of aces. These volumes are in the by-now standard Osprey *Aircraft of the Aces* format: a vivid colour drawing on the cover, a narrative of the ace pilots—a brief biography of their lives both before and after the First World War, and a detailed narrative of their military careers including their air-to-air victories. The text is heavily illustrated with photographs; an excellent selection of colour plates—generally side views of various aces' aircraft, but also some top views; appendices containing the lists of naval aces by total victories; and indices which aid in locating topics and the stories of the naval aces. The colour plates give modelers a wide variety of topics for potential projects: Volume One contains plates of RNAS Nieuports, Sopwith Pups, Triplanes, Camels, and a Sopwith Baby seaplane—certainly an unusual subject. Volume Two contains equally diverse illustrations of German seaplanes, Fokker fighters and Albatros fighters, Austro-Hungarian flying boats and a landplane, Italian and Imperial Russian flying boats, as well as the aircraft used by U.S. Navy pilots and the sole Greek naval ace. Such detailed plates add interest to the narratives.

Guttman's books illuminate a little-known portion of First World War aviation history. With the exception of Raymond Collishaw and perhaps one or two other aces, the naval aces of the Great War have taken a deep back seat to their colleagues in other air services. Thus, the need for a study of First World War naval aces is evident and has been well fulfilled by these works. The novice to this subject will find these books to be a valuable introduction, while the expert will consider them an excellent resource.

The First World War happened nearly a century ago, but its survivors were

with us until quite recently. Among the naval aces, Theo Osterkamp of Germany died in 1971; Alexander Seversky of Russia in 1974. Raymond Collishaw, the top RNAS ace, passed away in 1976, while David Ingalls, the sole First War U.S. Navy ace, departed in 1985. Gottfried von Banfield of Austria-Hungary died in 1986, and Henry Allington, the last survivor of the RNAS (although not a pilot) died at the magnificent age of 113 on 13 July 2009. They are all gone now, but Guttman's books will keep their collective memory fresh. *Naval Aces of World War I*, Parts 1 and 2 are recommended.

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Nicole Hegener and Lars U. Scholl (Hrsg). *Vom Anker zum Krähenest/From the anchor to the Crow's Nest. Naval Imagery from the Renaissance to the Age of Photography. (German Maritime Studies, vol. 17)* Bremen: Hauschild Verlag, www.dsm.museum, 2011. 214 pp., illustrations, notes, index. English and German chapters. Euro €36.00, hardback; ISBN 978-3-89757-508-0.

Vom Anker Zum Krähenest/From the Anchor to the Crow's Nest is an eclectic, bilingual collection of articles bound by central themes in nautical art. With varying artistic, historical, and political perspectives, the contributing authors follow the ship through thousands of years of imagery. As this compilation developed out of a session for the Annual Meeting of the Renaissance Society of America, it took on a multidisciplinary and multicultural character, drawing from worldwide sources and incorporating articles in German and English.

The uniqueness of this volume stems from its well-rounded contributors. With the critical perspectives of historians

and artists, they address an array of topics including art history, iconography, ship construction, cartography, and architecture. Though the topics are diverse, they search for commonality in nautical imagery. The editors, Nicole Hegener and Lars Scholl, highlight significant patterns by arranging the book into four chapters: "The Ship in Cartography, Seals and Vedute," "The Ship as Metaphor for Church, Court and State Domination," "The Ship in Book Illumination and Treasury Art," and "The Ship in Painting and Photography." The editors might have grouped the articles in any number of arbitrary ways; for instance, chronologically or geographically. Instead, rather than cater to the historian with a conventional chronology or to the artist with a critique, this book focuses on the representation of the ship itself. Their editorial design shows a depth of consideration for the book's theme, keeping nautical imagery as the main focus.

In their foreward, Hegener and Scholl mention that they hope to appeal to art historians, architects, cartographers, and political scientists. Indeed, they are able to catch the attention of an even wider academic audience, particularly that of nautical archaeologists. Where nautical archaeology may reveal much about the material remains of particular sites, its techniques are limited to identifying and analyzing materials on hand. Several contributors explore nautical imagery in the same way an archaeologist might explore a shipwreck—identifying and interpreting ship typology, construction, and rigging—but the authors do so without any physical ship remains. For instance, Jan Pieper's article interprets the painted image of a Mediterranean carrack to date the Berlin Panel on which it appears. It illustrates just one of many methodological techniques which archaeologists might take away from this volume. Articles by Jutta Kappel and Piero Falchetta generate methodologies for

using art to analyze naval typologies, as well.

While this book appeals to academic readers, it has the potential to excite anyone interested in nautical art or history. Its layout and beautiful illustrations lend themselves to a coffee-table appeal. The text is casual and generally free of jargon; although, some of the discussions on ship typology can be, at times, too technical for the casual enthusiast of art or history. The illustrations are well-placed in the text, appropriate, and are not so overwhelming with that hint of romantic kitsch often present in casual nautical literature. The authors draw from celebrated paintings, manuscripts, black and white photographs, and photographs of *Schatzkunst* (art treasure) artifacts. Citations for many of these images include website addresses, where the curious reader is able to access the images with ease. While the illustrations and their citations are good quality, the captions might be improved with additional explanation.

The multiculturalism of the book enhances its eclecticism, but there are a few drawbacks to this type of publication. First, monolingual readers will be disappointed if they hope to find each article rendered in both English and German. There are five English-language contributions, six in German, and one German translation of an Italian essay. Each of the articles is dependent upon the linguistic comfort and proficiency of its author, not necessarily a geographic region or historical topic. Secondly, many of the bibliographies draw from sources in several different languages. Extensive as they are, they would be of little use to a researcher who is not bi- or trilingual. That said, the deliberate choice to publish bilingually is a further reflection of the editors' careful consideration. The discussions of this book remain open to the international community because of their editorial style. Perhaps the biggest editorial

flaw of the book is that it features a short index of persons but lacks a comprehensive index. The omission makes it difficult to navigate the text on a research basis and nearly impossible to connect relevant concepts from the chapters at a glance. Textual pages do not include chapter headings, an oversight which further hinders the research process.

Vom Anker Zum Krähennest/From the Anchor to the Crow's Nest, though a compilation, is a seamless body of nautical literature. Its editors deserve praise for staying true to a multicultural, multidisciplinary vision, which keeps the ship at its core. In the same vein as the ship, which connected the world of old, Hegener, Scholl, and their contributors connect nautical motifs from the ancient world to the present.

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Stephen Howarth. *To Shining Sea. A History of the United States Navy 1775-1998*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, www.oupres.com, 1999. xv+630 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US \$32.95, paper; ISBN 978-0-8061-3026-2. (Originally reviewed in hard cover, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1992.)

The normal reaction when picking up a one-volume history of an institution or organization as huge as the United States Navy (USN) is skepticism. The USN traces its history all the way back to 1775 and the American Revolution and its operational history spans the globe. Still, Stephen Howarth took on the challenge and produced an admirable work in the process. A lifetime member of the United States Naval Institute and a fellow of both the Royal Historical Society and the Royal Geographical Society, Howarth is a gifted writer with a solid publication record

including works on naval history, business history and biographical studies like *Lord Nelson*, co-authored with David Howarth. This skill and background served him well in *To Shining Sea*.

To his credit the author admitted that this was not meant to be complete or definitive history of the USN. With the body of literature to date already large enough for its own library, such a history is not viable. Howarth's strength is that he approached the subject to produce not detailed nuts-and-bolts study, but a series of panoramas of critical aspects of the American naval experience. Presented chronologically, his book comprises eleven parts loosely combined into two "books." The first book starts in 1775 and takes the reader through to the rise of steam power and steel warship construction in 1881. The second part takes up the story in 1881 and leads the reader into the late-1990s. The 630 pages, divided into 25 chapters, present the reader with a fascinating series of windows into the American Navy.

Writing in 1991, Howarth achieved not just a history of the United States Navy, but a history of America in the process. Since the navy reflected and still reflects American society, this book is a fascinating examination of America from the sea. Economic issues, political and social changes, technological innovation, and to some extent, even contemporary popular opinion are reflected in and merged with American naval history. Some of the information found within the pages is absolutely unique. The account of the *Chesapeake* affair presented by Howarth is an excellent example of the value, of the text. The usual interpretation of the *Chesapeake* affair, as presented in most histories, revolves around the USS *Chesapeake*, a 36-gun frigate en route to the Mediterranean in the summer of 1807, that was intercepted and boarded by a 50-gun fourth-rate British ship, HMS *Leopard*, after

a short but vicious battle. The arrest was ostensibly an effort to find and return deserters. The simple term for this is impressment and as the *Chesapeake* limped back into port, it became a major goad to war in 1812. Howarth's description of events is quite different. He emphasized that three of the men on the *Chesapeake* were known British deserters who sailed despite a British request for their return via diplomatic channels. Aware of the *Chesapeake's* departure, the *Leopard* followed and, after being refused permission to board, opened fire and then took the men. The vicious fight remembered in U.S. history was, in fact, totally one-sided, as the *Chesapeake* was unfit for service when she sailed. Politically, this event had a huge impact on American-British relations as the repercussions had far reaching implications (pp.89-92).

Similar examples of the unique windows created by the text can be found in virtually every section. While some of the information is vitally critical to our understanding of events internationally, like the role of President Theodore Roosevelt in the negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese War, the battles of the Second World War, Vietnam and the Cold War, others are just fascinating for other reasons. Although told in the prologue not to expect a disconnected series of naval adventure stories, the reader, ironically, finds both. For example, the account of then-ensign, later President George H.W. Bush and his experience of being rescued by a U.S. submarine after ditching during operations. Something Bush shared with over 500 other airmen during the Second World War, this experience adds nothing to the great tableau of naval history beyond the human component. Nevertheless, such anecdotes help *To Shining Sea* find a fascinating balance that produces a lively and interesting text that captures the reader's

attention as only good sea tales do. They are, in fact, an interconnected series of adventure stories, well told and fascinating.

The question remains as to how valuable this book is for scholars, students and lovers of history twenty years after its original publication. Those who simply love a good sea tale or have a passion for naval history will appreciate it. Compressing a vast stretch of naval history into a small package, Howarth managed to distill a very readable book that can still be enjoyed. As a general text for undergraduate courses or a starting point for further study, it is excellent. The organization, the inclusion of political, economic and other issues and the consistency in the use of sources and materials makes this a good general text although much new material has since become available. Any scholar deeply immersed in the history of the U.S. Navy may find it a bit dated and too broad in nature, but it still can be read for the sheer pleasure of it and is highly recommended for those seeking great stories from the sea.

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John Jordan. *Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets, 1922-1930*. Barnsley, S. Yorks: Seaforth Publishing, www.seaforthpublishing.com, 2011. xiv+338 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, appendices, bibliography, notes, index. UK £30.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-84832-117-5.

The Washington Naval Treaty is well known as a major landmark in twentieth century naval history and more generally, as the first successful arms limitation treaty. Certainly, it prevented a repeat of what is usually seen as the Anglo-German naval rivalry of the 1906-1914 period, post-Dreadnought to the start of the First World

War, but which also involved other world naval powers. The fact that few of the world powers could afford another debilitating naval race after their exertions during the First World War is often disregarded in the well-meaning desire of governments to limit weapons of war, or at least those of their rivals.

The treaty not only limited the construction of capital ships (i.e. those over 10,000 tonnes displacement, based on a new, standard "Washington" basis) in the well known 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio for the principal signatories (U.S.A., U.K., Japan, France, Italy), it also had a major influence, during the ten-year period it applied, to the design of those ships and also the design of the ships it did not control. These latter would require a failed conference at Geneva in 1927, and another in London in 1930, to come to some form of agreed limitation, if only to try and control all the ingenious approaches that were being adopted by the signatories to cope with or evade its provisions. This is the theme of this book.

John Jordan, previously a teacher of European languages, initially began writing about the Soviet Navy in the late 1970s-80s, but then turned his attention to the French Navy. Since 2005, he has also taken over the editorship of *Warship* annual. He therefore, has an ideal background to look at this topic. He deals with it in eleven chapters, starting with an overview of the situation of each of the major naval powers immediately after the First World War and the particular projects and programmes they had under consideration prior to the treaty, before looking at the details of the treaty itself. He then considers each of the various categories of warships, from battleships down to destroyers, before examining the two subsequent conferences in Geneva and London. On the way, he reviews each of the ship types, and how they were developed by the signatories in their own ways (but often in response to perceived

developments by the others). These included the “Treaty Cruisers” (the new 10,000 tonne, 8-inch gun type), aircraft carriers in all their many forms and submarines. There was also the special class of super-large non-flotilla destroyers known as *Esploratori*, *Contre-torpilleurs* and *Condottieri*, that were a particular feature of the fast-growing rivalry between France and Italy in the Mediterranean, constrained as they were by their 1.75:1.75 capital ship ratio. Jordan’s account of the development of each type, with its conflicting demands of speed, protection, guns and range is clearly and concisely written. It is well illustrated by ship plans and sections and a series of tables which makes a comparison between the various types in the category and the various navies easy to understand. In addition, there are numerous photographs (mostly from the Leo Van Ginderen and the Fukui Shiguo collections and from Robert Dumas, with whom Jordan collaborated on his books on French battleships of the period). Jordan also manages to explain various technical issues, such as protection by armour, waterline bulges and positioning of machinery and fuel storage in clear and concise terms that are a boon for the non-technical reader, who is often beset by a mass of technical data. He does not shy away from discussing the problems that some navies, notably Italy and Japan, experienced in trying to cram too much into minimum-sized hulls, often producing top-heavy ships or ones that exceeded their tonnage limits. It is in reviewing these ship developments that Jordan writes with special authority.

There are two very useful appendices giving full details of both the Washington and London Treaties, together with a bibliography (although this is rather short), eight pages of end-notes, and a three-page index (although this is mainly of ship names). There is also a very useful

conversion table to aid comparison between metric and imperial figures.

Overall, this is an extremely well-written and interesting account of an aspect of the Treaty that has, until now, been less well-explored than the Treaty itself. A number of other reviewers have also commented favourably, so it should be a “must” for any reader of naval works. Perhaps a sequel covering the years from 1930 to 1939 covering further developments, particularly anti-aircraft and anti-submarine armament and the divergence in aircraft carrier types between the U.K., U.S.A. and Japan, should be given serious consideration?

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Mark Lardas. *Bonhomme Richard vs Serapis, Flamborough Head 1779*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, 2012. 80 pp. illustrations, bibliography, index. UK £12.99, US \$18.95, CDN \$19.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-84908-785-5.

Lardas’ entry into the Osprey Duel series between the converted East Indiaman, *Bonhomme Richard*, and her famous captain, John Paul Jones, and the HMS *Serapis* and her captain, Richard Pearson, is a nice introduction to the history and tactics of an eighteenth-century naval engagement. This book is not for the scholar looking for new information or insight into the battle or the combatants, and will be more at home in a middle-school library than as a research tool for scholars or professionals. That is not to say the book is without merit: Lardas compiles a topic of great interest to maritime historians in a short, easily-read volume with beautiful colour illustrations and photographs. Overall, the book makes for an enjoyable introduction into an aspect of maritime and naval history.

While certainly not an authority on the events at Flamborough Head, Lardas does provide a good introduction to naval tactics, shipboard life, weapons, and the alliance between the French and Americans during the American Revolution. Given the length of the book (only 80 pages), he obviously only scratches the surface of a very important topic, but despite the limited size, he includes an admirable amount of information; artillery, small arms, and technical specifications of the ships, rigging, ship layout, nautical terms, naval life and rank structure are all presented.

While Lardas gives the British and American navies relatively equal press, the book appears to have a decidedly American leaning. Perhaps it is because the victors write the history, but many authors seem to pay an undue amount of attention to John Paul Jones. In truth, there is much more to the victory than the tenacity (or insanity) of John Paul Jones. On the day of the engagement, he was in control of a larger number of vessels and crew. Unequally equipped, Jones should have won the engagement; it is only noteworthy because he did it while much more poorly provisioned than the British. Lardas convincingly attributes the victory to the larger number of American marine snipers in the rigging of the *Bonhomme Richard* firing down into the British. The British navy was obviously better equipped in a new, purpose-built naval vessel operated by experienced sailors. The Americans, in their cobbled-together French Indiaman, manned by merchant sailors and former British sailors, had greater numbers that day and used superior tactics to defeat the British.

It is a difficult task to try to explain an event such as a naval battle without adequate background information on how such an event fits into the *longue durée*. It is an especially daunting task trying to engage young readers, which seems to be

the primary audience for this work. Lardas, however, covers this narrow, albeit rich, subject with solid writing for the length of the book, and illustrates it with a generous number of colourful images to engage a younger or less scholarly audience than most works on Jones.

Lardas' writing is enjoyable, engaging, and saturated with his obvious interest and enjoyment of the subject. His engineering and model-making background is evident throughout, for example, enhancing his discussion of the impact of various types of cannon shot on the vessels and rigging. While it is difficult to condense such a pivotal naval engagement as that between the *Bonhomme Richard* and *Serapis*, Lardas does a fine job without omitting any obvious details about the engagement, what led up to it, or the results of the engagement for each side.

Allen Wilson
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Mark Lardas. *CSS Alabama vs USS Kearsarge, Cherbourg, 1864*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, 2011. 80 pp., illustrations, maps, chronology, bibliography, index. UK £ 12.99, US \$17.95, CDN \$18.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-84908-492-5.

The title of this well-written book only hints at its contents. It certainly focuses on the battle between two famous Civil War naval vessels, but it also addresses the background of the architectural evolution that led to these vessels in their respective fleets, their armament, men, tactics and analysis of their confrontation.

The Civil War produced a great many changes in naval warfare. New technology involved marine steam power, maritime iron construction techniques and percussion fuses. The increased use of diagonal riders (or braces) created truss

reinforcements on seagoing ships, enabling the vessels to become longer and, in some cases, more svelte. For example, Lardas notes that the length-to-breadth ratio went from USS *Constitution's* 3.9:1 in 1812 to *Alabama's* 6.7:1 and *Florida's* 7:1. Union naval architects used more iron to strengthen infrastructure once access to live oak for ship's knees and compass timbers was restricted because this extremely hard wood grew in the southern coastal states. The vessels now were able to carry much larger guns, but in return, they required stronger decks and bulwarks. Hulls were sometimes armoured with old railroad track, heavy chain or occasionally, bales of cotton. Steel was difficult to produce and iron proved brittle when struck by a cannon ball. On the other hand, ship's carpenters could easily repair superstructure punctures on planked wooden hulls.

The most important technological advance was the incorporation of heavy steam engines resting below the waterline for protection from enemy gunnery. Since these engines burned large quantities of coal, compromises were necessary to allow space for crew quarters, ship's stores, weapons, munitions and fuel bunkers. At first, side-wheelers were preferred because of their superior maneuverability, but they were vulnerable to broadside attacks and not very good in heavy seas. Therefore, screw propeller propulsion developed in sophistication and became common. Oceangoing vessels were forced to use sails to husband their fuel stock. A dependable coal supply was indispensable, and coaling stations, the province of many foreign nations, increased both antagonists need for diplomacy.

Cannon technology also evolved during the Civil War. Weapons of various calibres fired heavy projectiles through smooth bore and rifled tubes. There were 7- and 8-inch Blakeley and 11-inch Dahlgren muzzle-loading smooth bore cannon and

4.2-inch Parrott rifles plus old fashioned but reliable 32-pounder long guns and short-range carronades. Few massive naval guns were breech loaded because they could rupture causing a disastrous ship fire. The shot itself, besides shells being heavier (133-lb. and 68-lb. shot, 42-lb. shells), now had timed fuses or were made to explode on contact causing greater damage. Instead of battering a ship's hull with successive, poorly aimed broadsides, gunnery accuracy improved and hits at a vessel's points of vulnerability were more common.

Battle tactics also changed. Short-range broadsides and boarding became routine, since battles were fought over longer ship-to-ship distances than in previous conflicts. Steam-powered engines made the wind far less of a factor in a vessel's maneuverability. Perhaps the biggest changes were not in the number of guns brought to bear, the weight of iron hurled at an opponent or the rate of fire, but increased accuracy and decisive hits that would cripple an enemy. Warships were now sophisticated floating weapons that could be pitted against each other.

The author includes mini-biographies of Confederate Captain Raphael Semmes and Union Captain John Winslow. Semmes, commander of the raider *Alabama*, was a rogue, but arguably, one of the truly heroic figures of the Confederate Navy. Winslow, captain of *Kearsarge*, was thought by the naval hierarchy to be a failed naval officer, but rocketed to fame as a result of his triumph over the colourful Semmes and his *Alabama*. There are also passing references to Commanders Napoleon Collins and James Thornton, plus Semmes's first lieutenant, John McIntosh Kell.

The heart of the book is a relatively detailed narrative of the duel between *Alabama* and *Kearsarge* in the 1864 battle off Cherbourg on the coast of France, but also includes the fights between *Alabama*

and USS *Hatteras* and CSS *Florida* against USS *Wachusett*. The book ends with a chapter titled “Statistics and Analysis,” a critical examination of the actions and some of the chief characters in these dramas.

Lardas’ book is one of what Osprey Publishing calls its “duel series.” It is a good, quick, informative 80-page read. Many more in-depth books have been written about the classic battle between the Confederate raider CSS *Alabama* and its rival USS *Kearsarge*. The most well-known and thorough are those by *Alabama*’s former captain, Raphael Semmes, *The Cruise of the Alabama and the Sumter* (1864) and his *Memoirs of Service Afloat During the War between the States* (1869), but contain an obvious bias concerning the history of the events surrounding *Alabama*’s defeat. The most recent in-depth books of note are William Marvel’s *The Alabama and the Kearsarge: The Sailor’s Civil War* (1996) and Stephen Fox’s moving *Wolf of the Deep* (2007). Another classic is *The Alabama-Kearsarge battle: A study in original sources*, by William M. Robinson (1924), but there have been similar recent books by James Gindlesperger (2003), Frederick Milnes Edge (2012), and a new biography of Captain John Winslow by John Morris Elliott (2012). In spite of the volume of historiography covering this event, Lardas’ *CSS Alabama vs USS Kearsarge* offers a tightly written and nicely illustrated synopsis of one famous battle and several other similar clashes between naval raiders of the Civil War.

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Don Leggett and Richard Dunn. *Re-inventing the Ship: Science, Technology and the Maritime World, 1800-1918*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, www.ashgate.com, 2012. xiv+224 pp.,

illustrations, tables, notes, index. US \$124.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-4094-1849-8.

This is the latest first-rate offering in the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series yielded through the combined expertise of the Defence Studies Department of King’s College, London, and the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the U.K. Defence Academy. The well-conceived collection of essays edited by Don Leggett, Research Associate in the History of Science and Technology at the University of Kent, and Richard Dunn, Curator of the History of Navigation at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, underlines the primacy of the ship within the context of the social, political and cultural history of the maritime world. Principally concerned with the years 1800 to 1918, which historians would consider well within the period generally referred to as “the long nineteenth century,” this volume examines the complexity of actors and considerations that drove multiple re-inventions of the ship during an enormously transformative era.

Although recent scholarship in maritime studies has increasingly appreciated the ship as more than simply a means of oceanic transport, the editors of this volume point to the prevailing tendency of historians to become fixated on one of three models of technological change when attempting to explain the major developments relating to ships in their appearance, design, capability, use and consequence. The “heroic inventor” theory, that places a single great man at the centre of path-breaking innovation, is far too simplistic an explanation for change as it traditionally undervalues the contributions of others including scientists, theorists and employers. The evolutionary model, which describes technological change occurring along a progressive track, fails to consider the range of influences that were absolutely

integral to decision-making. Technological determinism, the theory that technology in and of itself is the key factor in major historical change, largely dismisses the idea of human agency and the capacity for a society to interact and shape the ways in which technology is used. Together, the ten essays presented here address the weaknesses of these models and convincingly argue that a deeper understanding of the ship's many re-inventions must consider the settings, spaces and contexts in which technological changes to ships originated and were shaped and adapted.

A wide range of actors, each effecting change, becomes visible through these pages. Crosbie Smith's superbly-researched contribution on the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company uncovers new forms of power and authority in the world of ocean steam navigation. Individuals, such as naval architect and natural philosopher John Scott Russell, and marine superintendent Captain Edward Chappell, as well as groups that included the company's Court of Directors, the Royal Navy's master shipwrights, private shipbuilders and marine engine builders, and City of London merchants and bankers, played active roles in the complex decision-making process behind the task of supplying the company with the largest fleet of steamers among overseas mail companies at the time. Oliver Carpenter skillfully connects the private and public networks of trust, incorporating local Methodists and several dozen shareholders, which developed and guided the storied tramp shipping company, Robinson Line of Boats, from a small-scale firm in the 1870s to one of the most trusted and dependable steamship entities by 1914.

Jointly involved with the architects, builders, financiers, and owners in the multifarious process of re-inventing the ship in its numerous manifestations, be it the steam packet, the tramp steamer, the mid-

Victorian warship, the floating laboratory or the Royal Navy's Fleet submarine, were dockyard workers, naval officers, sailors and scientists. Richard Biddle investigates the increasingly dangerous work environment of the naval dockyard and the Admiralty's response to health concerns among labourers as new warship designs necessitated changes in the tools, machines and materials required. Biddle ably demonstrates that a higher frequency of serious injury and sickness led to the introduction of preventative measures and labour regulations, thereby modifying the relationships between all parties involved in the work of the dockyard. Richard Dunn's particularly well-crafted essay describes how the adoption of scientific instruments aboard ship, such as the magnetic compass and the mechanical depth sounder, also required a negotiation of interests, in this case between engineers, naval officials and crews. His work is complemented by that of Anne-Flore Laloë, who finds that as an instrument and as a "space of science" in a period of large-scale scientific exploration, the ship required specific modifications, both physically, to accommodate the apparatus necessary for conducting science at sea, and socially, to reflect the new living and working environment shared between scientists and ships' crews. In providing what is perhaps the most effective essay in melding the collection's core themes, Don Leggett explores the multiple shifts that took place in the context of reshaping the Victorian navy. He points to the social and cultural process that guided the Admiralty's gradual adoption of changes to matériel, a process that reflected the differing attitudes towards the naval warship held by such groups as engineers, naval officers, politicians, sailors and scientists.

As a whole, the contributors to this volume offer a hugely enriching "behind the scenes" perspective on the re-invention of the ship in the long nineteenth century. The

approaches, questions and findings generated by these authors afford historians of science, technology and the sea a much fuller understanding of the intersection of science and technology during this collaborative period of transition from wood and sail to steam and iron.

Michael F. Dove
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John Mack. *The Sea. A Cultural History*. London: Reaktion Books, www.reaktionbooks.co.uk, 2011. 272 pp. illustrations, references, bibliography, index. UK £19.95, US \$35.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-86189-809-8.

Robert Louis Stevenson described the sea as our approach and bulwark, and maritime historians have long accepted that the oceans were integral to the development of the modern world. This thoughtful book explores the multitude of ways in which humans have interacted with the sea and why it has both united and divided us.

John Mack was formerly Keeper of the British Museum's Department of Ethnography (Museum of Mankind), which he joined in 1976, before becoming Senior Keeper of the British Museum as a whole. He is an internationally-recognized authority on the arts and cultures of Africa and, since 2004, has been Professor of World Art Studies at the University of East Anglia. He has published extensively, including *Madagascar, Island of the Ancestors* (1986), *Museum of the Mind: Art and Memory in World Cultures* (2003) and *The Art of Small Things* (2007).

Mack has studied how our innate inquisitiveness has driven us to challenge and engage with the sea in a variety of cultural and temporal contexts. His focus ranges from the earliest recorded commercial links between sea and land to the development of iron shipping and the

evolution of the compass, both of which transformed navigation. The ancient art of finding and following the pole star has progressed to the modern science of Global Positioning Systems which permits the navigator on the bridge to know where his vessel is to within a few centimeters. The author, however, credits this development with rendering all seas the same.

Concentrating primarily on the African continent, Mack has reassessed the world of salt water, the influence of ships as societies and the role of so-called "sea gypsies." He argues from a maritime rather than a terrestrial perspective, that during the Phoenician era, between 3000 and 2000 BC, the westward movement of maritime trade was as much by chance as by design. As evidence, he cites trading missions to the Red Sea in about 1500 BC by the ancient Egyptians, whose commercial success in the Indian Ocean depended more on the ability to communicate through similar languages than conquering winds and currents. In addition, he points out that between 1400 AD and 1700 AD, trade routes tended to follow the same approximate line from the Mediterranean westward through Europe.

Others have described how, five thousand years ago, Mesopotamians exchanged their oil and dates for copper and ivory from the Indus Valley. Although these communities were linked by land, sheltered coastal sea routes were chosen as an easier environment for trade to develop (Stopford 2009). Portugal traded with the northernmost kingdoms of Senegal from 1448 and Prince Henry the Navigator, a man firmly rooted in medieval times, exploited the Atlantic winds to import strong timber frames from Madeira. This enabled Lisboners to construct two-storey houses and change the city's traditional profile for ever (Russell 2001). In the early modern age, Genoa transformed itself three times: from city state to tumultuous maritime republic, then to important European financial centre,

and finally, back to a maritime nation (Kirk 2005). Easy access by sea encouraged the development of English colonies in the New World between 1800 and 1900, long before their commercial benefit was evident (Mancall 2007).

It is Mack's contention that, if we are to understand the sea, we have to know more about the people who inhabited it and therefore, the accounts of mariners are highly significant. Although this field is not well documented, Mack has traveled extensively along the African coast where he has uncovered some forgotten archival histories. In this respect, his research succeeds spectacularly in illustrating how the history of any one sea or ocean quickly becomes the history of others. Of particular interest is his analysis of the ancient vessel at Sutton Hoo, following a similar discovery recently on Scotland's Ardnamurchan peninsula. Equally inspired is the author's choice of illustration for an appraisal of Hokusai's 1830 iconic woodblock seascape "Under the Wave off Kanagawa," which depicts Japan as a great wave in a tranquil sea.

To chart the evolution of human contact with the sea, the book draws on a range of maritime cultures to reconfigure social, symbolic and economic constructions. Mack believes that pre-industrial engagement with the sea was hampered rather than encouraged by developments in cartography; that is to say, complacency. Representing an anthropologist's intellectual exploration, the book reveals the fascinating variety of ways in which saltwater people have "inhabited" the oceans and compares them with their activities further inland. This is a stimulating and scholarly work, rich in original ideas, and is a major contribution to contemporary historiography. No serious student of maritime or economic history can afford to overlook this book.

Michael Clark
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Edward J. Marolda. *Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet*. Washington DC: Naval History & Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil, 2012. xvi+195 pp., illustrations, maps, chronology, appendix, bibliography, index. US \$37.00 (within the USA), \$51.80 (International), paper; ISBN 978-0-945274-67-4.

Robert J. Schneller, Jr. *Anchor of Resolve: A History of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet*. Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, www.history.navy.mil, 2012. xiii+136 pp., illustrations, maps, chronology, acronym glossary, bibliography, index. US \$21.00, paper; ISBN 978-0-945274-55-1.

There is much to like about these two books whose similarities of subject and design suggest a brief comparison may be useful. In terms of content, the basic structure of each book is similar, beginning with a chronology of the respective Fifth and Seventh Fleets of the United States Navy (USN). This provides a useful guide to events shaping the standing up and respective operational histories of events. The U.S. Fifth Fleet refers to the service personnel and ships charged with providing security within the Indian Ocean region. The Seventh Fleet is assigned to the Asia-Pacific region. Both monitor vast ocean spaces shared by many maritime countries with a multitude of national interests where any maritime forces are otherwise mere specks on a chart.

Many countries have naval forces capable to some extent of operating beyond their own 12-nautical mile (nm) territorial seas, and within the 200-nm Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), yet no other country can match the range and naval capabilities that are currently available to the United States Navy. Therefore, it is appropriate that these two naval histories have been made available and accessible to a wide audience. As taught in modern schools and universities,

history is often about “issues” rather than simply laying out the known facts about events. These two books clearly tell a story rather than trying to discuss specific issues. This may well be how many American servicemen and women would tell the stories themselves, no doubt with embellishments!

The twentieth century was really the most significant in terms of the development of American sea power, and reading about the operations involving the Fifth and Seventh Fleets reminds us that much of this power really stemmed from the Second World War and the various security issues that arose in its aftermath. This legacy of American naval activity, from the Seventh Fleet’s Second World War and Cold War skirmishes in the South China Seas, to later Middle Eastern oil-wars and more recent counter-terrorism operations involving the Fifth Fleet continues to this day, despite suggestions from some quarters that it is in decline. Both books are uncritical histories of these two great American fleets, why they were created, their purpose since being created, and roles they and their crews have played in carrying out their assigned duties and deployments. The wide range of roles each has played, from conflict at sea and supporting amphibious forces, to providing humanitarian aid are presented in detail with accompanying photo imagery.

For this type of publication, the photographs are (or should be) key to securing prospective reader interest and both books achieve this nicely. Some images are well known, such as the surrender by the Japanese Imperial Forces (Marolda, p.12) on board the battleship USS *Missouri* (BB 63). Other images may not be as familiar, such as an accompanying photo (p.13) of American servicemen instructing a Japanese Army officer in 1945, or a United States Marine assisting a Somali woman at a medical clinic in Mogadishu in 1993 (Schneller, p.52). These photographs (and many others) enliven the perhaps drier historical narrative

in both books.

Although this is a review of printed versions, both books are available as free, downloadable, online (PDF) texts from the same publisher. Unfortunately, the online versions suffer greatly from poor quality photographs and illustrations. While this may be a deliberate ploy to get potential purchasers to buy the actual book, it must be said that the images are much clearer in the printed copies. In this age of digital photography and availability of inexpensive enhancement software, image quality, especially for the casual reader, could be improved for the downloadable version. On the subject of imagery, there is also a difference in quality between the two printed versions that suggest improvements are ongoing. Each book depicts an American Carrier (the USS *Abraham Lincoln* CVN 72 on Schneller, the USS *George Washington* CVN 73 on Marolda) charging towards the photographer in very similar dramatic poses, but the image of the *George Washington* is much clearer, which is a credit to the publisher (Naval History & Heritage Command).

These two publications from the US Naval History and Heritage Command appear to be aimed at the light-reading/coffee-table set, and naval enthusiast markets. Both books are histories that do not aim to make ground breaking arguments within academia but do outline clearly the who, why and wherefore of the U.S. Navy Fifth and Seventh Fleets. Nicely illustrated with maps and plenty of photographs, these editions achieve their goal of striking a balance between being informative and entertaining— a balance that should appeal to many readers whose interest in naval affairs derives from either experience or simply a curiosity in maritime naval operations.

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Mark Nicholls and Penry Williams. *Sir Walter Raleigh in Life & Legend*. London: Continuum Books, www.continuumbooks.com, 2011. xviii+378 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US \$34.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-4411-1209-5.

Sir Walter Raleigh continues to fascinate us almost four hundred years after his execution. This is evidenced by a steady stream of new works about this ill-fated Renaissance Man. Mark Nicholls and Penry Williams feel that previous offerings have not fully explored Raleigh's public life as part of the tumultuous ebb and flow of court politics. The authors also believe that other biographies do not always put enough weight on Raleigh's writings as a means of understanding him. Thus, they try to ferret out the real Raleigh amid contemporary opinion and his posthumous reputation.

As a younger son with very limited prospects, Raleigh needed to make his own way in the world. He was blessed with charm and talents which he tried to hone to perfection. He sought his fortune in the snake pit that was the Tudor-Stuart court where the risks and rewards included wealth and glory, or conversely, disgrace, poverty and death. Raleigh visited the heights and depths during his career.

Despite the legend that he rose to prominence quickly after placing his cloak over a puddle for Queen Elizabeth to pass, the reality is different. He remained on the periphery of the court for some time before becoming a royal favourite in the 1580s. Nor was Raleigh just another pretty face: Elizabeth I valued his wit and passion for learning, although she never rewarded him with a seat on her Privy Council. She doubted his discretion in state affairs.

Like most aspects of his life, Raleigh's marriage was mercurial. While some Hollywood films portray him as a womanizer, contemporaries did not paint

him as a "serial seducer" (p.27). His romantic reputation is dominated by his liaison with Bess Throckmorton which resulted in her pregnancy and their secret marriage. Despite the ensuing royal wrath and scandal, the authors claim that Bess was no naive damsel: "Here was no maid, weeping her way to marriage with a hesitant lover, grimly determined to 'do the right thing'" (p.75). Raleigh and Bess Throckmorton were a Tudor "power couple," looking to make a romantic and political merger. Bess must have been a formidable woman: her fall from grace as one of the Queen's ladies-in-waiting was only the beginning of her troubles as spouse to the perpetual adventurer.

Nicholls and Williams demonstrate the importance of war to Raleigh's career, time and again. His rise takes place against a backdrop of war on land and sea and he was a keen participant in both. Raleigh sailed on, and invested in, privateering voyages like many gentlemen at court. Such ventures often crossed the line into piracy and Raleigh was not immune from accusations of wrongdoing at sea. He also sought glory on the battlefield, and Ireland, in particular, "was an opportunity state" (p.18). It was also a graveyard of reputations, as another of the Queen's favourite, the Earl of Essex, would discover.

On the whole, Raleigh prospered from Elizabeth's armed conflicts. War did, however, interfere with his efforts to colonize the New World. Raleigh's role in the preparation and defense of England against the Spanish Armada in 1588 may have been the death knell for the fledgling settlement. Unable to reprovision the colony with men and supplies because all efforts were directed at protecting England, the mother country seemingly abandoned the first settlers. The uncertain, but presumably tragic fate of the Lost Colonists is a blemish on Raleigh's reputation and will remain part of his legend.

The authors try to deal with the complex matter of Raleigh's religious beliefs even though they readily admit the matter will never be settled definitively. We know that Raleigh was accused of atheism – a shocking and radical assertion for this era. Much had to do with the company he kept with controversial scholars; as an inquisitive and argumentative courtier, he was vulnerable to such slanders. The authors discuss Raleigh's *The History of the World* as evidence of his belief in a providential God. They conclude that Raleigh's belief system was a "mixture of the deist, the naturally sceptical, and (less certainly) the fundamentally devout" (p.96).

While Raleigh's considerable charisma facilitated his rise at Elizabeth's court, King James I was immune to his magnetism. Moreover, he was tainted by charges of treason from which he could never free himself. As a former privateer, soldier and naval captain, he was a liability as the King sought peace with Spain. James might have granted Raleigh mercy if he had been able to fill the indigent king's coffers with gold from the New World. King James I caged this courtier and eventually ordered his execution.

One of the strengths of this biography is that the authors examine contemporary opinions of Raleigh as well as his posthumous reputation. His image as Protestant popular hero began immediately after his death. Even though it is unlikely he can be credited with being the first to bring tobacco and potatoes to England, his transatlantic appeal is also a longstanding one. The authors do not whitewash Raleigh's considerable failings but rather embrace them as readily as his attributes. This book is also noteworthy for its examination of Raleigh as one of several fascinating personalities at the English court. Overall, Nicholls and Williams have produced an incredibly readable biography which analyzes several aspects of this

enigmatic figure who paid the ultimate price for his ambitions at court.

Cheryl Fury

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Ryan Noppen. *Austro-Hungarian Battleships 1914-18*. Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, New Vanguard Series No. 193, 2012. 48 pp., illustrations, photographs, bibliography, index. UK £9.99, US \$17.95, CDN \$18.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-84908-688-2.

It is not well-known that the long-dissolved Austro-Hungarian (A-H) Empire had a navy based in the Adriatic Sea. Indeed, this was a force of some importance, as it possessed 16 battleships in five different classes along with all other ships, combat and support. In *Austro-Hungarian Battleships 1914-18*, Ryan Noppen tells the story of these forgotten battleships and their service histories.

To understand the stories of the A-H battleships, it is necessary to understand the Austro-Hungarian Empire, often referred to as the Dual Monarchy. Austria and Hungary were separate nations, joined together by a common monarch who held the titles "Kaiser" (Emperor) of Austria and "König" (King) of Hungary. Both Austria and Hungary had their own governments and jointly funded an Imperial army and an Imperial navy. As well, both nations possessed parts of the Dalmatian coastline.

While Austria had a fair amount of overseas trade in the Mediterranean, Hungary did not. As a result, the Hungarian government reluctantly funded the A-H Imperial Navy and, in many years, refused to provide funding for naval ships at all. Moreover, Italy formed an alliance with Austro-Hungary and Imperial Germany in 1882, thereby removing a major potential threat to the Dual Monarchy. It was only in

the 1890s that the Austro-Hungarian Empire began to fund, design, and build battleships together with other naval vessels. Due to the budgetary constraints imposed on the Navy, A-H battleships of all classes tended to be smaller and less heavily armed than their contemporaries in Britain, France, Imperial Germany, or Italy. Also affecting A-H shipbuilding was the need to spread the ship construction between shipyards in the Austrian coastline and Hungarian coastline. (The need to spread out government contracting is a fact of life that persists even to this day.) Finally, the A-H battleships offered cramped living spaces for the crew, substandard food, and little or no combat action. The result was poor morale and a mutiny aboard several A-H ships in February 1918—a striking parallel to the Imperial German Navy's mutiny in late October 1918.

The five classes of A-H Imperial Navy battleships built between 1893 and 1915 were: *Monarch* class (3 ships); *Habsburg* class (3 ships); *Erzherzog Karl* class (3 ships); *Radetzky* class (3 ships); and the *Tegethoff* class (4 ships.) All were designed by *Generalschiffbauingenieur* Siegfried Popper. None of these battleships saw ship-to-ship combat in the First World War, although they were active in offshore bombardment, a role they performed superbly. Naval staff, knowing their ships were not up to fighting the British, French, Italian, or much later, American fleets, used their capital ships cautiously. The force constituted a “fleet in being,” forcing the Allies to keep some ships on alert for them, which could have been used more profitably in other sectors. In fact, the performance of the A-H battleships in offshore bombardment soon after Italy entered the war was so effective that the Italian fleet did not sail into the upper Adriatic until late in the First World War.

Two A-H battleships were lost to Italian torpedo boats but the remainder were

handed over to the victorious Allies in 1918. They did not last long, however; all were scrapped or sunk as target ships by the mid-1920s.

Noppen's account of these long-forgotten men of war follows the standard Osprey New Vanguard format: a brief but comprehensive narrative; colour drawings of the various A-H battleship classes, many valuable photographs, a useful and comprehensive bibliography, and an index. Noppen tells the complete story of the A-H ships very well. It is all here: the political issues that constrained the size and armament of the battleships, their technical data, and the service lives of the various ships. Nor does he neglect the human aspect of these ships. One noteworthy photograph shows A-H sailors on deck being totally bored with their inactivity. Portraits of several commanders of the A-H battleships add a human dimension to the text. Indeed, their last commander, Admiral Horthy, survived to become Regent of Hungary and lead his country throughout the Second World War.

This book is useful on several levels. The ship modeler will find new topics and colour schemes in it. The novice to the field will find Noppen's work a useful introduction to the subject and the bibliography a guide to further study. The expert can use it as a handy brief reference work. Noppen's work is a long-overdue and worthy tribute to long-forgotten sailors and warships. It is recommended.

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Colorado Springs, Colorado

Roger Sarty. *War in the St. Lawrence. The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada's Shores*. Toronto, ON: Allen Lane, www.penguin.ca, 2012. xxviii+355 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. CDN \$34.00, cloth; ISBN 978-0-670-06787-9.

This latest offering by Roger Sarty is part of the History of Canada series put together by Margaret MacMillan and Robert Bothwell. One colleague, observing that there had been no less than three monographs as well as two official histories covering this topic, quipped that it was hardly forgotten. And yet when I brought the book home, several family members who read avidly were surprised to learn that German submarines had been so close to Canadian territory during the Second World War. Apparently, they had not delved into the first-rate, well-written, detailed two-volume official history which sits on my book shelf. Perhaps other large, dark books on that shelf had lived up to the worn-out truism that historians write for limited audiences, utilizing a specialized vocabulary and expert approach that render their topics unattractive or incomprehensible to lay people. Whatever the reason, something about *War in the St. Lawrence* sparked their interest.

Sarty breathes new life into this well-studied topic. His narrative flows beautifully and, like a good mystery novel, draws the reader from one page to the next. He sprinkles this story with amusing anecdotes and entertaining details, without detracting from an authoritative and very complex account. What are the key themes? The war in the St. Lawrence River was a small part of the Battle of the Atlantic and most of the Canadian war effort went elsewhere. The government of W.L. Mackenzie King managed a public relations campaign which combined with successful defence efforts to offset an initial appearance

of military and naval incompetence and indifference. The increasing and skilful use of Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft allowed the navy to defend the St. Lawrence with a very few resources—"a half dozen Bangor minesweepers, a half dozen trawlers (only in 1943 and 1944), and a maximum of two dozen Fairmile motor launches" (p.293). Conditions in the Gulf of St. Lawrence allowed submarines to hide below warmer surface water in a cold water layer to avoid detection by asdic. Using direction finding bearings and high-grade Ultra intelligence, offensive air patrols forced submarines to dive repeatedly and disrupted their tactics.

We learn about the determined and the brave—German submariners, the commanders of small naval vessels, ordinary seamen, merchant seamen, and the pilots who made such a difference in Canadian and Newfoundland defences. Sarty handles the palpable undercurrent of tension between the small permanent force members of the navy and reservists with adeptness, but the official histories accomplished the same. What does *War in the St. Lawrence* add to our knowledge?

There are differences in interpretation, emphasis, and detail from the recent official history of the Royal Canadian Navy which focuses on naval operational matters. For example, in the aftermath of *U 518*'s successful attack on *Rose Castle* and *PLM 27* off Wabana, Newfoundland, the official history describes how Captain R.E.S. Bidwell defended the commanding officer of *Drumheller* from censure, arguing he had done his best, yet concluding that *Drumheller*'s rush to the sinking vessels rather than sweeping the approaches to cut off the submarine's escape reflected a lack of experience, organization, and planning. Sarty's version reveals that the garrison managing the coastal battery's searchlights neglected to sweep at irregular intervals and made it possible for the commander officer of *U 518* to elude the lights which swept at

predictable ten minute intervals. The official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force mentions an attack by *U 69* on the *Rose Castle* prior to this attack and also how *U 518* went on to land a spy, Werner Janowski, in Quebec, but because the air force played no direct role in the action at Wabana, there is no mention of it. Readers need to read both these accounts to get the full story. Steve Neary's *The Enemy on our Doorstep* highlights how much the attacks off Wabana affected Newfoundlanders. Writing fifty years after these events, Neary was still haunted by how the enemy had penetrated defences and hoped that one day the full story would be told. Now, twenty years later, Sarty and others have done so.

As Sarty notes, the towns of Channel and Port aux Basque and others in Newfoundland never forgot the loss of the *Caribou*, the North Sydney-to-Port aux Basque ferry which was sunk by *U-69*. A second *Caribou* ferry serving on this run from 1986 until 2010 carried a memorial flag with a maple leaf in flames after 1999. A strange image—Newfoundland did not join Canada until 1949. If, however, such symbolic reminders of losses help build national identity, Canadians do not yet know much about their history. Local and national identities are built from a myriad of half-remembered truths, legends, and lies; historians set the record straight and ideally, build common ground among people with diverse backgrounds, cultures, and languages. For French Canadians as for Newfoundlanders, memory and identity remain distinct. Tellingly, Sarty's bibliography does not list a single work in French, although there's not much to list on the topic. The Canadian Department of Veterans' Affairs has translated a short book and the long-awaited French translation of the official history has helped, along with the Military History Gateway and government web-sites. Fortunately, *Le Musée naval de Québec* has an impressive permanent exhibit

which places this war in the strategic historical perspective of the St. Lawrence River over the centuries, but the two solitudes are still with us.

Sarty rightly pays tribute to Alec Douglas, Michael Whitby, and the large team of people who contributed to the official histories of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy, laying the groundwork for this and other volumes. Thus, Sarty drew upon decades of his own and other people's research. Post-war cutbacks to naval history research prevented Canadians from learning the full truth about this battle on their doorstep. Some of the story was classified and unavailable to historians before the 1980s and Sarty's arguments about declassification, resources, and the ability to tell the full story remain relevant. What impresses me the most about his book is how Canadians during the Second World War used ingenuity and few resources to achieve a relatively large effect, but it saddens me that it took so very long for these histories to come to fruition and that seventy years later we have limited insight into the unique French Canadian perspective on these events.

Buy this book. It adds some new details relevant to experts in the field and it may attract a larger audience, including family members and friends.

Isabel Campbell
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Albrecht Sauer. *Zeit auf See/Time at Sea. Chronometers and their Creators: Three Centuries of Cutting Edge Chronometers*. Bremerhaven: Exhibition Catalogue, Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum and Ocean Verlag, www.dsm.museum, 2012. 136 pp., illustrations, German and English text. €19.90, paper; ISBN 978-3-86927-009-8.

This exquisitely illustrated short catalogue features German and English text,

essentially as captions, for its many photos. The work focuses upon the evolution of chronometers and their creators with emphasis upon the German contribution to these complex and elegant instruments. The term in the subtitle *Three Centuries of Cutting Edge Chronometers* “Cutting Edge” has a double meaning. A significant portion of the book is devoted to the sophisticated tools used to create these marvels at the hands of skilled European watchmakers. The bilingual legends start by briefly outlining the early measurements of the earth, the efforts of physical scientists such as Tobias Mayer, Johannes Kepler, Isaac Newton, and Christiaan Huygens. The theme then switches to the need for a chronometer to establish longitude at sea and the competition for a monetary prize. Ultimately, John Harrison won the contest but others, such as John Arnold and Ferdinand Berthoud, made subsequent substantial contributions.

Sauer also briefly addresses the development of “timeballs,” huge balls set on towers adjacent to waterfronts that dropped at very precise times, enabling a ship’s captain to calibrate his chronometer. (This likely was the maritime origin of the similar annual Times Square New Year’s Eve event.) At sea, vessels would often hail each other to compare calculated positions and the accuracy of their chronometers. Once the cost of these devices became reasonable, it was not unusual for ships to carry two and sometimes as many as four chronometers, to make sure that they could calculate their position correctly. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, mariners gained confidence in their mechanical devices and prices tumbled. After the Second World War, inexpensive quartz timers replaced the mechanical clocks, followed by radio signals and finally, very accurate and easy to use GPS systems. In recent years space-based technology has made mechanical chronometers obsolete.

As a publication of the German maritime museum, this work is largely centered upon German contributions to the development and advances in the chronographs. The photograph captions that make up the prose are short, tightly written, and informative; the quality of the photography and the paper upon which they are printed is outstanding. Sauer’s small but excellent book would appeal to a limited audience, those interested in the history of chronometers. Dava Sobel’s best selling *Longitude* covers this topic in greater detail and has better prose, but Sauer’s work is a complement to *Longitude* containing many facts about German contributions to the science of horology in general and chronometers in particular.

Louis Arthur Norton
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Gene Allen Smith and Sylvia L. Hilton (eds). *Nexus of Empire: Negotiating Loyalty and Identity in the Revolutionary Borderlands, 1760s–1820s*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, www.upf.com, 2010. 375 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, notes, index. US \$69.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-8130-3399-0.

Tangled in the internecine power struggles of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century Atlantic world was the heterogeneous North American territory bordering the Gulf of Mexico. In *Nexus of Empire: Negotiating Loyalty and Identity in the Revolutionary Borderlands, 1760-1820s*, editors Gene Smith and Sylvia Hilton tie together 14 monographs about the Gulf Coast region during America’s early period of formation. By weaving the thread of loyalty through the chapters, Smith and Hilton present an interesting link to a disparate region consisting of numerous stakeholders.

Extensive historiography exists

regarding the development of America's original thirteen colonies; less study has been devoted to the diverse ethnic groups who staked claims along the nation's southern perimeter. Prior to joining the Union, the states of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas flew numerous flags representative of shifting dominions. The governments of Spain, France, Britain and, after the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the United States, all laid claim to the Gulf Coast. Before the arrival of European settlers, Native Americans, most notably the Mississippians, occupied the land. East Coast tribes, including the Creeks, sought refuge from encroaching settlers in the Gulf Coast frontier. These borderlands also offered sanctuary to free blacks and escaped slaves. Home to ancient peoples, refugees, settlers and opportunists, the Gulf Coast was a cacophony of cultures.

Divided into four sections — Changing Flags and Political Uncertainty, Dilemmas Among Native Americans and Free Blacks, Building Fortunes through Family Connections, and Local Community and Personal Ambition in Government and Military Service — Smith and Hilton's *Nexus of Empire* examines how different sets of people adapted to the changing environment along America's Gulf Coast. Each monograph focuses either on a single character or on a small group of people who lived in the borderlands during the sixty-year period beginning from just before the onset of the American Revolution until the Adams Onis Treaty transferred West Florida to the United States (1760-1820). Exploring how the inhabitants negotiated their way through the perpetually shifting political climate enlightens the reader to the complexities faced by those who tried to maintain their footing in a constantly shifting world.

Both Smith and Hilton question the ways a nation secures loyalty and how

individuals determine their allegiance. In the first chapter, "Loyalty and Patriotism on North American Frontiers: Being and Becoming Spanish in the Mississippi Valley, 1776-1803," Hilton explores Spanish loyalty oaths. In an effort to deter American encroachment, Spain offered liberty in exchange for loyalty. Those liberties included freedom of religious worship and expanded rights to anyone willing to settle in Spanish West Florida. Arguing that historians have dismissed those loyalty oaths as perfunctory, Hilton asserts that they were part of Spain's larger plan to maintain its empire in the New World. What components ensure loyalty? Does loyalty stem from the government down to its people or does it emerge out of personal interests such as agency, family, land, and wealth? Spain offered citizenship to everyone who settled in Spanish West Florida, yet loyalty remained elusive because residents developed no shared history, religion, language, or culture.

In chapter six, "Dehahuit: An Indian Diplomat on the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1804-1815," F. Todd Smith delves into attempts by Dehahuit, chief of the Kadohadacho Indians, to form peaceful alliances with their white neighbours, the Spanish, and then, with the Americans. Negotiations and compromise by the indigenous peoples along the Texas and Louisiana borders demonstrate the difficulty faced by a native group trying to maintain their ancestral lands amid the shifting powers' quest for hegemony.

While Meriwether Lewis and William Clark explored the northern part of America, William Dunbar surveyed the Red River area of southern Louisiana. Andrew McMichael's chapter, "William Dunbar, William Claiborne, and Daniel Clark: Intersections of Loyalty and National Identity on the Florida Frontier," appraises the intentions of Thomas Jefferson to extend the boundaries of this newly acquired land

well before he fathomed its expanse. William Dunbar, with ties to both the Spanish and American governments, was the ideal choice for the inspection. Dunbar was a landholder and thus, a stakeholder in stability. His reconnaissance not only encompassed flora and fauna, it reported on Spanish fortifications along the American frontier.

Historians are the contributors to the book. Each author documents his or her monograph with solid primary and secondary evidence. Researchers will find the book thorough with an extensive index. The editors' conclusion unites the monographs by discussing the nuances of each chapter and how each one underscores national fealty. The stories of settlement along the Gulf Coast borderlands accentuate the struggle for position amid the complex Atlantic world. The selected essays demonstrate how individuals dealt with their own issues of loyalty during a time of great change. Underlying the frequently explored history of United States' expansion to its natural borders is the micro-history of diverse people caught in the changing tides of political domination.

Cynthia Catellier
Gulf Breeze, Florida

Robert C. Stern. *The U.S. Navy and the War in Europe*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.nip.org, 2012. xiv+306 pp., illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US \$55.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-59114-896-8.

The U.S. Navy's most well-known contribution to Allied victory in the Second World War is the war in the Pacific. The famous fast-carrier task forces and amphibious landings from Guadalcanal to Okinawa are emblematic of the Navy's wartime role. Robert Stern's *The U.S. Navy and the War in Europe* seeks to redirect

historical attention to the Navy's contribution to Allied operations in the European theater. Stern identifies several themes in the introduction, including an emphasis on the Navy's decidedly "non-neutral" operations in 1941 prior to the December attack on Pearl Harbor and how the Americans could, and should, have learned from the Royal Navy's greater experience in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Stern returns to these themes at points throughout the book, though he does not develop them thoroughly.

The work begins by tracing the transformation of the Patrol Force into the Atlantic Fleet under Admiral Ernest King. The Atlantic Fleet grew rapidly throughout 1940 and 1941, though not fast enough in the eyes of its commander, due to the even more rapid increase in operational responsibilities. Neutrality patrols and growing escort duties stretched King's resources to the limit. Throughout this period, the United States gradually extended increasingly more aid to Great Britain, culminating in the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941. Stern notes that one of the results of this act was that American shipyards were opened up to repair damaged British warships.

After the United States entered the war, a series of poor decisions by American commanders, combined with inadequate convoy escorts, brought about a massive rise in sinkings of cargo ships and tankers by German submarines off the American coast. In particular, Stern notes that King and his subordinate commanders failed to institute coastal convoys to protect merchant shipping. He rejects, however, the argument that King did so because of deep-seated animosity towards the British in general, and the Royal Navy in particular.

As operations in the Atlantic continued, the U.S. Navy sent a series of heavy warships to Britain for temporary service with the British Home Fleet. The

American vessels were used to free up British warships for other tasks, such as operations in the Mediterranean or maintenance work. Stern describes the operations and experiences of these American ships on loan, including the well-known episode involving convoy PQ-17 to Russia in July 1942 and raids by American carrier aircraft on German coastal shipping off Norway in 1944.

A significant portion of the narrative is devoted to operations in the Mediterranean, where the allied navies supported amphibious assaults in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Stern highlights the naval action off Casablanca in November 1942, as well as smaller engagements that took place in the Mediterranean. As part of these amphibious operations, sometimes for weeks at a time, American warships provided fire support, for allied ground forces in the midst of strong German air opposition.

American warships also supported the June 1944 landings in Normandy, though Stern does not give significant attention to the U.S. Navy's salvage efforts in French ports such as Cherbourg. While amphibious training efforts in England are barely acknowledged, the amphibious landing in southern France in August 1944 is covered extensively. Final chapters examine the Navy's role in crossing the Rhine River and the final months of the Battle of the Atlantic.

This book is based on skillful use of primary and secondary sources, especially unpublished action reports and war diaries kept on American warships. Those familiar with the naval side of the European theater will find little new material, though Stern synthesizes previous works effectively. Numerous photographs illustrate the text and are spread throughout the work. For readers in search of a well-written, if at times detailed, narrative of the U.S. Navy in Europe during the war, Stern's

book will do nicely.

Corbin Williamson
Columbus, Ohio

Craig L. Symonds. *The Battle of Midway*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 452 pp., illustrations, maps, appendices, bibliography, index. US \$27.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-19-539793-2.

In the newest addition to the Pivotal Moments in American History series, renowned nineteenth-century naval historian, Craig Symonds, turns his attention to the most famous battle of the Pacific War. *The Battle of Midway* is a synthetic work, making use of the most recent scholarship as well as multiple archival sources, particularly the Nimitz Library at the United States Naval Academy. Symonds argues that older accounts that emphasized the role of luck and chance in the American victory were inaccurate. He asserts, rather, that the decisions made by those involved in the battle were decisive in determining the outcome. Symonds successfully develops this argument throughout the book by highlighting these individual influences on the course of events.

The work begins with two short chapters on the opposing commanders-in-chief, Nimitz and Yamamoto, who are respectively described as reserved and a "gambler" (p.36). Symonds then addresses the state of each navy in 1941, emphasizing the influence of culture and history on technological and doctrinal developments within each fleet. The Japanese experience in China combined with an offensive-minded military to produce powerful attack planes with limited defensive capabilities. American naval officers were reluctant to accept Japanese technical superiority, especially in torpedoes, which significantly delayed efforts to correct problems with

American torpedoes. While both navies suffered from internal divisions, Symonds sees those of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as more pronounced. The treaty faction of the IJN called for adherence to the Washington treaty system, in opposition to the expansionist fleet faction. The United States Navy (USN) worked throughout the interwar period to integrate naval aviation and naval aviators into its tactics and plans. While broadly successful as an organization, the USN could not avoid tension and friction between “brown shoe” naval aviators and “black shoe” surface warfare officers.

Symonds concisely details early carrier raids by both navies, including the Indian Ocean raid by the IJN and the Doolittle raid by the USN. He highlights the Australian influence on American naval deployments, as Prime Minister John Curtin pressed Washington for carriers to defend the sea lines of communication from the West Coast and Hawaii to the South Pacific. A chapter on American code-breaking efforts illustrates the tension within the naval intelligence service. Symonds provides an informative primer on the Japanese encryption process, clearly demonstrating the challenge facing Second World War code breakers of all nationalities. These introductory chapters are invaluable for placing the battle in a broader context, though with the inevitable result that the battle does not start until page 176.

In contrast to historians who emphasize the flawed nature of the Japanese plan, Symonds argues that Yamamoto’s dispersion of the Japanese fleet for the Midway operation was designed to prevent a single, massed fleet from so intimidating the Americans that they would not respond to the offensive. Symonds’ account of the battle itself is riveting as he traces the experience of individual air groups, squadrons, and warships across the Pacific.

He lucidly describes the options available to Nagumo, Fletcher, and Spruance at each decision point in the course of events. The experience of the carrier *Hornet*’s air group, the “flight to nowhere,” receives particular attention, with the conclusion that Stanhope Ride’s leadership style left much to be desired. Symonds demonstrates the significant influence of combat experience on the performance of each of the three American air groups. The reader is brought into the confusion surrounding several of the American air attacks, in particular the pivotal dive-bombing attack by Wade McClusky. Symonds highlights the movements and experiences of aircraft on both sides more than the shipboard experience of being attacked. He does not cover the effect of exploding bombs and torpedoes on a carrier’s hull to the extent that other authors have, though this is a minor quibble.

At the end of the second day of fighting, Admiral Spruance had searchlights turned on to help American dive bombers find their carriers in the gathering dark, setting the pattern for the better known use of searchlights at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Symonds ends with an epilogue describing the later careers of the major participants, concluding that Fletcher was never given due credit and Mitscher was never sufficiently challenged. Six appendices provide technical information on ships and aircraft, a detailed order of battle for each side, an essay on the contribution of American intelligence, and an extended discussion of the performance of the *Hornet*’s air group. A short bibliographic essay rounds out this well-written, well-researched narrative. *The Battle of Midway* provides an excellent treatment for survey classes, specialists, and the general reader.

Corbin Williamson
Columbus, Ohio

Bruce Taylor. *The End of Glory: War and Peace in HMS Hood, 1916-1941*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.nip.org, 2012. x+246 pp., illustrations, roll of honour, bibliography, index. US \$37.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-59114-235-5.

Over 25 years, the battlecruiser HMS *Hood* became the highly visible symbol of British seapower and the “Pride” of the Royal Navy (RN), known as the “mighty *Hood*.” On 24 May 1941, when the *Hood* blew up and quickly sank under the gunfire of the German battleship *Bismarck*, with the loss of all but three of the ship’s company of 1418 officers and men, the British nation went into a state of shock and national morale plummeted.

Hood was conceived during the First World War at a time when the battlecruiser was regarded as the elite of the Fleet; an offensive weapons system without equal. Events at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916, however, exposed serious flaws in the design of British battlecruisers. Many of the lessons learned from this experience were applied to the design of *Hood*. Unfortunately, in one critical aspect, the design perpetuated earlier weaknesses—it lacked an effective layer of armour plating over the main deck. This made it vulnerable to the plunging trajectory of shells fired at long range by an adversary. In the end, this would be the fatal flaw.

The keel for Ship No. 460 was laid at the John Brown shipyard in Clydebank, Scotland on 1 September 1916. The John Brown yard would later build both the *Queen Mary* and the *Queen Elizabeth* for the Cunard Line. Ship No. 460 commissioned as HMS *Hood* on 29 March 1920. It was the largest, most powerful and most expensive warship in the world. It also possessed a powerfully elegant visual appearance and published photographs of HMS *Hood* at sea at speed captured the

imagination of the British public and laid the foundations for the subsequent, almost mythical, symbol the ship became.

In 2005, historian Bruce Taylor published a definitive work, *The Battlecruiser HMS Hood*. It is a comprehensive and technically detailed biography of the iconic ship. Profusely illustrated, it is the product of broad and meticulous research and an essential reference work for any serious naval library. Recognizing that there is a wider audience beyond the naval aficionados and those (such as this reviewer) with a family connection to the ship, Taylor has produced the current book. It is a much abridged and condensed version of the 2005 work but in a smaller format. The author states that some new material has been included but this material is not immediately obvious—and, in any case, would be irrelevant to anyone who has not read the 2005 book.

The book is logically organized and generally follows the chronology of the battlecruiser’s career. The opening chapter gives a brief but thorough description of the origin of the design and how that design progressed from paper to steel. There is little technical detail but that is in keeping with the purpose of a book for the general reader. The main body of the book gives an overview of the activities of the ship, and its company, over the years of active service. Extensive use of personal recollections and memoirs—some published, some not, from both officers and men—give an added dimension to the overall narrative. Among those often quoted is the late Commander L. B. “Yogi” Jenson, RCN, who served in *Hood* as a young Canadian Midshipman for five months. Fortuitously, he left the ship in April 1941. After naval service, Jenson became a well-known author and illustrator in Nova Scotia. His observations were recorded in the mandatory Midshipman’s Journal and give a different perspective of life in the ship.

One full chapter deals with the mutiny at Invergordon in the fall of 1931. Although *Hood's* sailors were willing and active participants in the mutiny—precipitated by a unilateral imposition by the Government, and a compliant Admiralty, of a drastic reduction in the pay of RN sailors—there was none of the near total breakdown of discipline that occurred in some other ships. Nevertheless, in the aftermath, some ten of *Hood's* men were arrested and eventually discharged from the RN. The author does a good job of encapsulating what happened in the ship during that tense period.

The final chapters deal with *Hood* at war and the impact the transition from peacetime conditions had on the ship and its company. The author clearly shows how the years of deferred and delayed modernization refits by a parsimonious Government greatly impaired the ability of the ship to fight in modern naval warfare. That, ultimately, *Hood* was no match for *Bismarck* provides the tragic proof. The author quotes a former First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Chatfield; “The *Hood* was destroyed because she had to fight a ship 22 years more modern than herself...[i]t was the direct responsibility of those who opposed the rebuilding of the British Battle Fleet until 1937...” (p.138).

This is an excellent, easy to read and well-illustrated overview of the life and times of a legendary ship. For those who do not wish to delve into extensive detail, this would be a good choice to learn something of a legend.

Michael Young
Nepean, Ontario

Conrad Waters (ed.). *Seaforth World Naval Review 2012*. Barnsley, S. Yorks: www.seaforthpublishing.com, 2011. 192 pp., illustrations, tables, notes, index. UK £30.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-84832-120-5.

The 2012 *Seaforth World Naval Review* is the third in what is, no doubt, intended to be a fixture on the contemporary naval publications scene. It is not a direct competitor with the hoary *Jane's Fighting Ships*, which is unquestionably such a fixture, and has been so for well over a century. The *World Naval Review* is perhaps best considered a complementary publication that can help anyone, professional or lay, understand the key issues and developments in the naval world in an easy-to-read-and-absorb package. It has the considerable merit of brevity.

Conrad Waters, the editor, wrote the introduction, as well as the regional reviews. Others have written sections that provide additional analysis of specific navies, or technical matters. The book is organized into four sections: an overview, world fleet reviews (by region), significant ships (designs), and technical issues (in this edition, sonar and naval air). All this is presented in a compact 192 pages, richly illustrated with photographs and diagrams.

The introduction provides a quick overview of some major themes explored in greater depth elsewhere in the book. In particular, Waters notes that the financial pressure on all Western navies is having a deleterious effect on capabilities and capacities that may well be harbinger of a real loss of influence. Suffering particularly dramatically is the Royal Navy, which is but a shadow of its former self. No longer even the pre-eminent European navy, the Royal Navy is struggling to retain relevance in the face of savage budget cuts that is dropping it into the third rank. While the Royal Navy's woes are perhaps an extreme, much the same issue affects all the European navies and even, albeit on a very different scale, the U. S. Navy (USN). This fact underlines the relative decline in world affairs of the West and is a fact that has real geo-political effects. Waters has the ability to compact a great deal of analysis into a

small space.

He makes two useful observations here. The first is that naval strength is directly linked to economic strength. An obvious point, perhaps, but with the loss of economic power comes a diminishment in naval and military capacity. The financial difficulties of the entire Western world, with massive debt and intractable deficits, have implacable implications. Financial incompetence and malfeasance have consequences. Alas. The second is that shipbuilding programmes nearly uniformly across the Western world, again particularly British and American, are plagued by cost overruns and indifferent quality. Waters asks the pertinent question regarding the capacity of either nation to reform a bloated, inefficient, ineffective and bureaucratic procurement structure. No answer is offered. This is an obvious question the answer to which might trouble Canadians, with the Department of National Defence clearly floundering in this whole arena with a long list of botched procurement initiatives, naval and otherwise.

The second section is split into four parts that examine, at a high level, fleet developments in the world's four main areas: the Americas; Asia and the Pacific; Indian Ocean and Africa; and, Europe (including Russia). After each section is an in-depth analysis of the circumstances affecting a single country. Australia is positively reviewed, which shows what can be done. There is an overview on the Royal Navy that explores the effects of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) on its capabilities and future. The SDSR was triggered by Britain's dire financial situation and its world role and military posture is being adjusted to suit Britain's straitened circumstances. This is well done and makes for a sobering analysis.

The third section examines in some

depth three "significant ships" that have some wider importance than ordinary vessels that comprise the bulk of warships currently operated or being built. The first looks at British-built offshore patrol vessels, the second, the new USN assault ship, and third, the Swedish *Visby* class stealth corvettes. This latter tale is interesting as an illustration of the lead time required from order to delivery—a staggering 12 to 19 years (1995–2014). This is entirely occasioned by the stealth design, which drove the entire programme. Nonetheless, it is an astonishing gestation period, to put it mildly. The three programmes covered in this part are interesting and well worth the detailed examination. The modular construction techniques of the British patrol vessels are innovative; the evolutionary improvements in the final ship of the *Wasp* Class of LHDs (Landing Helicopter Deck) illustrates what can be achieved over the life of a programme; and, of course, the stealthy *Visby* class of corvettes represents world-leading technology.

The final section examines developments in sonar and naval air. A useful review of both areas over the past number of decades situates the discussion for the current era. Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) seems, wrongly, redolent of the past and I am sure some might think it ancient history and of limited relevance at present. The number of countries investing in submarines, however, suggests that it would be prudent to retain leading edge ASW capabilities, although future ASW operations are very different from those illustrated in the movie *Das Boot*. Drones, sensors and the processing capacities of modern computers are changing the whole world of sonar. The section on naval air concentrates on current programmes and the ups and downs of various projects around the world. The USN is in its own class, with the rest of the world having difficulties of various kinds in securing effective

aircraft able to operate off flight decks of all dimensions. The topic of drones presages a new world indeed.

The *World Naval Review* possesses significant strengths. It provides a high level examination of basic fleet composition across the world. More significantly, it provides a critical essay on all major navies, their strengths, weaknesses and challenges, new developments and an assessment as to operational effectiveness. In this regard, the book offers a contrast with the gold standard provided by Jane's. The comprehensive coverage of the latter, in particular, the reams of technical detail (weapons, machinery, sensors, etc), the line drawings and schematics provide a completely different product. One might acquire a copy of Jane's on occasion—perhaps every five or ten years. I would recommend acquiring the much more compact *World Naval Review* annually, as it provides analysis, context and is well written, illustrated and relevant.

Ian Yeates
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Timothy Wilford. *Canada's Road to the Pacific War: Intelligence Strategy and the Far East Crisis*. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, www.ubcpress.ca, 2011. 312 pp., illustrations; chronology; bibliography; index; endnotes. CDN \$ 85.00 cloth, \$ 34.95 paper; ISBN 978-0-7748-2123-0.

This study looks at what information was available to Canada's government and how developments were being assessed in the period prior to Japan's attacks on several targets in the Far East and Hawaii on 7/8 December 1941. Canada was, in fact, receiving information from its own diplomats in Tokyo, Washington and London and through a nascent national intelligence capability which had been

launched as a vital strand in cooperation with Britain in addition to assessments by American and British agencies. Author Timothy Wilford works in the electronics industry and has an ongoing interest in history, having returned to university to earn a doctorate in this area. His PhD research was a starting point for this new study. Wilford has done a prodigious amount of research in archives in Canada, the U.S. and Britain and his text is supported by extensive endnotes.

The opening chapter of *Canada's Road to the Pacific War*—one of the book's best—sketches in the status of the various Pacific powers between the two world wars. While the Statute of Westminster in 1931 gave the dominions authority to conduct their own foreign relations, assessments and policies decided in London dominated Canadian deliberations. Canada had only four diplomatic missions abroad, but the legation in Tokyo, fortuitously established in 1928, became a source of information for Ottawa on Japan's expansionist moves into China starting in the early 1930s. From 1935 onward, the Roosevelt administration, in part influenced by concerns about potential Japanese actions in the eastern Pacific, created new bilateral links with Canada. The Canadian legation in Washington began passing on American assessments of the situation in the Far East. The geopolitical reality which governed the government's actions was expressed in 1935 by Lester B. Pearson, while representing Canada at the League of Nations: "Canada's position becomes impossible if Great Britain and the United States drift apart on any major [Far Eastern] issue...Canada is a British Dominion. She is also an American State. She cannot permit herself to be put in a position where she has to choose between these two destinies. Either choice would be fateful to her unity; indeed to her very existence as a State" (p.22).

The bulk of the book traces

developments starting in 1940. Each chapter is both introduced and summarized methodically. The narrative is largely a summary of archival documents which produces a synthesis of information available in Ottawa. The text includes only the general context which triggered these encapsulated documents. A useful chronology of events at the back of the book helps to establish the developments behind the archival sources. Readers, however, need an overall knowledge of how the international situation was developing to be able to appreciate the significance of the individual assessments.

Having said this, the document summaries provide a fascinating look at contemporary views. The names of several of the first generation of Canada's foreign service officers—a sort of Pantheon of these capable officials (Oscar Skelton, Norman Robertson, Lester Pearson, Hugh Keenleyside, and Hume Wrong) who were in place as Canada's status grew—crop up as the authors of assessments and reports. The summaries provide a sense of immediacy; thus, when Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941, the Japanese press soon predicted that the Russia would be defeated within weeks (p.68); an assessment from London only one month after the attack predicted that the invasion would reach Moscow within three weeks (p.69). By the end of July, a prescient External Affairs report correctly assessed that it was “a vital Canadian and Allied interest to keep Russia in the war against Germany” (p.74). The author underlines that Canada gained increased importance after metropolitan France was knocked out of the war in June 1940, becoming Britain's “Senior Ally.” Nonetheless, growing cooperation with the officially-still-neutral United States was creating a new North American relationship. It's interesting that the importance to the United States to the outcome of the war was clearly understood. An assessment,

probably written by External Affairs assistant under-secretary, Hugh Keenleyside, days after the German offensive, speculated on the impact it would have on the United States. He considered that the “whole future of the British, Canadian and allied cause” depended on American policy (p.73).

Britain and Canada were haunted by apprehension that the Commonwealth and Empire would somehow be provoked into a war with Japan while the United States remained neutral. At the same time, a determination to avoid incidents led Ottawa and Washington to reject some British initiatives. In early 1941, when Britain tried to get the Americans to intercept Japanese merchant ships believed to be carrying contraband cargoes to Germany, Washington, wishing to avoid confrontation with Japan, demurred. Prime Minister Mackenzie King also held Canada's External Affairs portfolio; his trademark caution influenced his decision not to act on interceptions at sea. The USSR was providing Germany with strategic raw materials and, as part of the British effort to enforce the blockade against the Reich, Canada was first asked in March 1940 to intercept and inspect the cargo of a Soviet ship bound across the North Pacific for Germany. In 1941, Canada was again asked to intercept another Soviet freighter and Japanese vessels, all voyaging to Germany with suspected contraband. It appears that, in one case, two corvettes had actually been positioned off California to intercept a Soviet freighter but were then called off. Mackenzie King closed off this series of refusals with a characteristic gesture, telling London that ships diverted by the RN in the Pacific could be diverted to Canadian west coast ports (pp.25, 78-80).

The requirements of war would transform Canada on several planes. Jack Granatstein has aptly written that by late 1944 “the nation's quantum jump in

influence and power had been incredible.” (*A Man of Influence* (1981), p.196). By 1941, the challenges of war were already a forcing house for Canada’s industrial capacity. They had also provided the impetus for creating what would become a sophisticated national intelligence gathering and analysis capability. In the interwar period, the Royal Navy’s radio intercept network had monitored traffic worldwide. RCN intercept stations in Esquimalt and Ottawa had been part of this network, passing traffic to Britain for analysis. As a part of this arrangement, the Royal Navy had provided the officer in charge of Canadian Naval Intelligence in Ottawa. When war came in 1939, the Royal Navy also activated a worldwide organization for controlling the flow of shipping in which the officer in Ottawa’s role was to control a network of shipping-movement reporting stations in ports throughout North America, including the United States. Timothy Wilford’s documents show how this organization expanded when war came and almost immediately established “Direction Finding” stations to determine the direction from which signals transmitted from ships at sea were coming. The Canadian Army also established its own signals intercept system. Foreign commercial and government traffic was generally sent in various codes and within a short time Canada was working on breaking these. By June 1941, an “Examination Unit”—run by the National Research Council under an interdepartmental supervisory committee—was working on deciphering German, Vichy French and Japanese traffic. This Examination Unit was the precursor to today’s Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC). The fact that Ottawa turned to Washington for help in May 1941 to establish this code-breaking unit is a fascinating aspect of the growing Canada-U.S. relationship. The exchange of intercepted messages, in both broken and

original formats, and the analyses of traffic and patterns with Britain and subsequently with the United States, would become Canada’s entrée into a tight circle of shared signals intelligence which was continued after the war. This information gathering and sharing remains an important link between the governments of the “Anglosphere” to this day.

Wilford devotes a chapter near the end of the book to a useful survey of intelligence available to the Allies in the weeks before the Japanese simultaneously attacked in the Far East and Hawaii. While this includes a review of the still-murky information about hard evidence of foreknowledge of the raid on Pearl Harbor, it is particularly interesting to learn about what information the Allies were exchanging from November onwards about possible moves against Malaya and the Philippines.

The archival photos in *Canada’s Road to the Pacific War* are outstanding. Many have not been published before and they are pertinent and vivid. This workmanlike book illuminates the information received in Ottawa about the deteriorating situation in the Pacific between 1939 and 1941. Wilford’s detailed summaries prove useful background information on several aspects of the initial phase of Canada’s burgeoning war effort and growing independent ability to evaluate information and formulate policy. The documents discussed also show how the pressures of wartime cooperation were transforming not only the relationships between Canada and the United States but also those between Washington and London.

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Alan D Zimm. *Attack on Pearl Harbor—Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions*. Oxford, UK: Casemate Publishing, www.casematepublishing.co.uk, 2011. 480 pages, illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US \$32.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-6120-0010-7.

“Surely not another book about Pearl Harbor?” was the phrase that immediately sprang to mind on seeing this book. The attack, President Roosevelt’s “a date that will live in infamy” when the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, is well known to many people. Few events in the history of the United States have generated as much controversy. That people still argue about this attack shows the depth of feeling that has grown up about it. But why do we need another book and, although 2011 marked the 70th anniversary of the attack, why now?

This book is not another piece of revisionist literature, other examples of which have appeared with increasing frequency of late. Given this author’s reputation as a former naval officer and specialist in operations research and computer simulations, who then moved on to the Aviation Systems & Advanced Concepts Group at Johns Hopkins University, there was every reason to expect a different approach to the one adopted by naval historians. These authors, starting with Morison, Lord and Prange and running through the revisionists and conspiracy theories of Toland Stinnett, Gannon, Slackman and company, have tended to look at American command failures and the recollections of various survivors.

What Alan Zimm has done is to use Japanese information, and not the uncorroborated thoughts of Mitsuo Fuchida, the leader of the attack, who is now well

known for being “careless with the truth.” With this information, Zimm has carried out a bottom-up analysis of the attack in the first eight chapters covering the strategic and operational setting, the targets (and it is clear that these were the Pacific Fleet’s battleships and not the aircraft carriers), the weapons and the weapon-target pairings, the war games, planning, training, rehearsals, briefings, etc. followed by the execution of the attack. He goes on to assess the attack, the battle damage and the folklore, such as the tardy 14-Point Message, that Japanese aviators were experienced super pilots, attempts to block the Channel, the Third Strike Controversy and the midget submarine attack, among others. He concludes with a reassessment of the main participants, a summary and conclusions. He also indulges in a series of well-informed “what-ifs.” Zimm’s analysis ranges from the contradictions in Japanese strategic thinking at one level down to the comparative fuse settings of American and Japanese general purpose bombs and its effect on damage to various types of warships.

Among his conclusions is the fact that the attack was far from a “brilliantly conceived tactical masterpiece,” rather it was poorly planned in many respects with a lack of fighter cover for the key torpedo bombers, lack of flak suppression, a poor mix of weapons and planes for the targets, difficult crossing attack paths and a lack of flexibility with the plan. It was also poorly controlled by Fuchida, who used flares rather than radio (and made a mess of them as well), and who did not control the attack on USS *Nevada* in the Channel. It was (with some exceptions) poorly executed with many torpedoes and the specially-adapted armour-piercing bombs being wasted while many other bombs were duds. The list of changes in conventional wisdom in Zimm’s analysis could go on. There was

no plan for a third strike, but even if there had been, it would not have added to the Japanese goal of sinking or crippling at least four battleships, if not more. Yet the attack did cripple the battle line, so why was it not seen as a success? Apart from the aircraft carriers not being in harbour, Zimm points out that it forced the U.S. into a “long war strategy” which was exactly what the Japanese could not hope to win and for which they did not have a plan.

As might be expected with such a detailed analysis, the chapters are well supported by 20 charts and diagrams (some rather small for clarity); 28 archival photographs, many of which are not the usual views but which specifically illustrate points in the analysis; five appendices, including Zimm’s own version of a perfect attack; a 10-page bibliography including not just books and articles but TV programmes and websites; 28 pages of very detailed end notes containing full references to all points; and a 10-page index. Clearly this is not a Pearl Harbor primer for somebody wishing to learn about the attack. Rather, it is a thorough analysis of many aspects of the attack, completely overturning much of the established wisdom.

At the end of it there remain the images of the attack and its outcome. The battle line was crippled, American public opinion was enraged (though the public were not given the full picture) and America entered the war. But Zimm also shows that much of the attack’s success was due to Admiral Kimmel’s decision to relax the state of readiness of the ships that weekend and Lieutenant General Short’s decision to line aircraft up close together to avoid the chance of sabotage following a war warning that was issued, but not to maintain the radar and air patrol searches. As Zimm points out, Admiral Yamamoto, supposedly the aviation admiral, had been prepared to lose up to half of his fleet carriers in what

was very much a personal gamble. No wonder Vice-Admiral Nagumo gratefully retired with a loss of only 29 aircraft and 55 aviators. What Zimm has done is to draw out of the planning and tactical failures, the strategic errors in Yamamoto’s scheme for the defeat of the U.S. The puzzle that remains is how somebody who knew that country so well could misjudge his opponent so badly. Or was it all just a massive gamble in his eyes?

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