BOOK REVIEWS


Certain things heighten British awareness of nationhood: if it’s not the historical plays of Shakespeare or the war-time speeches of Winston Churchill, it will almost certainly be the legends surrounding the Elizabethan Sea Dogs of Devon, Francis Drake and his cousin, John Hawkins.

Author Hugh Bicheno has an interest in historical conflict and politics. Born in Cuba in 1948, he was educated in Chile and Scotland as well as in Cambridge, where he gained a first class honours degree in history. For five years he worked for the U.K.’s intelligence service and, before the Falkland Islands invasion, he spied for Britain in the Argentine. He claims that the government chose to ignore the corroborated intelligence he gathered, which he later turned into an unofficial and controversial revisionist history of the Falklands War. His other books have covered Gettysburg, Midway, the Battle of Lepanto, and the American Revolution.

England’s push for a European “out-thrust” in the sixteenth century affected most forms of exploration and maritime commerce, and the consequent rapid growth in Elizabethan colonization during the cycles of war and peace was predicted by the propagandist Richard Hakluyt. Bicheno argues that for English seamen, the Tudor-Stuart era was both formative and turbulent because as the economy developed, the shipping interest grew and the demand for sailors increased.

Bicheno meticulously explains how profits made by explorers like Drake and Hawkins, or Sir Walter Raleigh and even Martin Frobisher, represented only a small proportion of England’s maritime expansion. One important consequence, however, was that privateering in the New World became an essential part of Spanish colonization. Bicheno understands how sea-battles were fought, especially within global events, and his clear analysis of their roles slices through contemporary myth and prejudice.

Francis Drake was renowned as a skillful seaman, naval tactician and inspirational leader. From his first ocean voyage in 1566, his patriotism remained as intense as his Protestantism. In 1590, he co-founded the Chatham Chest to distribute small pensions to disabled naval seamen. (Cheryl Fury, The Social History of English Seamen 1485-1649 (2002) and ________, ed., Seamen’s Wives and Widows (2012)) Yet, the author shows how Drake was capable of disloyalty, often displayed poor judgment as a naval strategist and had a blatant lust for prize money stemming from his origins from poor yeoman stock. Drake’s ambition was also encouraged by a predatory aristocracy eager to sanction piracy against France, Portugal and, above all, Spain. Despite Elizabeth’s favouritism to “her pirates,” who gave her a lion’s share of their booty, Raleigh prospered but Drake did not.

Drake’s attack on the Spanish at Panama in 1571, for instance, misfired.
because the cargo of silver he was seeking had already been shipped. Uncertainty surrounded his true intention for circumnavigating the globe because he carried three “dainty pinnaces” for exploration, yet fitted them out for combat. (N.A.M. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea (1997)) When Drake returned to England in September 1580, he found that the honour of the first circumnavigation had gone posthumously to Magellan, yet he himself had sailed through the eponymous Strait and seen the west coast of North America.

Bicheno sympathetically describes the September morning in 1580 when the Golden Hind returned to Plymouth and excited citizens learned of the circumnavigation and the diminished threat of invasion. Most importantly, the Spanish still considered El Draque to be the devil incarnate. (Neville Williams, Great Lives – Francis Drake (1973)) In the long run, Queen Elizabeth’s sea wars, especially against Spain, became a symbol of English national pride and identity. (Rodger 1997)

Almost every English generation grows up believing that Francis Drake was an ideal national hero, who sadly died in 1596 after failing to capture Panama City. This vividly written story will entertain those who enjoy reading about the rise and fall of a unique group of seamen-adventurers who were regarded as heroes in England but as pirates in Spain. They established a lasting English presence in the Americas, defeated the Spanish Armada, enriched the Queen and were instrumental in establishing a true navy under Henry VIII. (Marcus Pitaichly, “Piracy and Anglo-Hansiatic Relations 1385-1420” in Richard Gorski, ed., Roles of the Sea in Medieval England (2012), pp.125-46)

Some may think it unlikely that anything new can be written about Francis Drake but Hugh Bicheno shows us that Drake was not only attuned to the age as a circumnavigator, but was also an important member of Elizabeth’s Sea-Dogs, a unique group of corsairs who defined an era. He skillfully illuminates the voyages and victories that justified the Sea Dogs’ reputation as the scourge of the sea, and not only adds significantly to our understanding of how sixteenth-century sea battles were planned and fought but explains why Drake’s exploits became legendary.

The author has identified many new sources of material surrounding the Armada, in particular how Drake’s rivals, jealous of his Royal patronage, claimed he “dined off silver plate” during the voyage of 1577 while his seamen had to fish or else buy their own provisions. He also lists sources on sixteenth-century inflation, currency and exchange rates, the details of over 3,000 Spanish “little” ships and warships and contemporary English vessels and naval artillery. This is accompanied by a comprehensive bibliography, which includes Spanish sources.

Elizabeth’s Sea Dogs is an intelligent, informative and beautifully illustrated history book, which is not only well worth the cover price but will grace the shelves of anyone interested in maritime matters.

Michael Clark
London, England


Despite its rather odd title (would the RCN be referred to as “Harper’s Navy”?), it is a nice change for a volume’s sub-title to be an accurate description. “A Reference Guide ...” is what this large-sized volume
assuredly is. While the back cover refers to it as “a complete guide,” something few books ever achieve, this one comes pretty close. The chapter headings give an accurate idea of the contents. “The Regia Marina from 1861 to 1939” is a reasonable 18-page introduction to the state of the Italian navy at the start of the Second World War, with the usual focus on its purpose being comparable to that of the French navy. “Dockyards, Naval Bases, Ports, Shipyards and Coast Defences” offers several maps and drawings giving locations and layouts. “Fleet Organization and Operations” lists various commanders along with a quick summary of all fleet and major operations by date, location and result. “Ships in Service, 1940-45” provides a complete listing, from battleships to the one-man explosive MAS boats. These Motoscafo Armato Silurante (Torpedo Armed Motorboat) proved very worrisome to their opponents. Another chapter deals specifically with those assault craft together with submarines and auxiliaries. Further chapters addressing naval aviation, camouflage, flags, uniforms, ranks, badges and decorations” and finally a “Who’s Who of the Italian Navy in the Second World War” make this a reference volume indeed.

For some, the mass of photos, many of double-page spreads, often four or five to a page, will prove the most entertaining and informative. They range through all the ships, from building to identity views, shots of various ships in action, damaged and even abandoned at the time of Italy’s surrender in 1943. There are Royal Air Force reconnaissance photos before and after Taranto, including grounded battleships after that raid, hospital ships, yachts in naval service and personnel from admirals to EOD divers. These images alone make for a full evening’s browsing.

The text is well translated, with only the odd case of unusual syntax, and, in most cases, every photo has a useful caption. The Allies tended to agree that the RM ships were well built, usually fast, although their large ones tended to be “short legged,” i.e. not of great endurance. But as Italy did not have a large overseas empire or other commitments, this was not seen as a significant drawback. In reading how the RN used their battle fleet of major warships, there is an impression that the RM shore staff controlling events, if not the commanding rear admirals at sea, tended to caution rather than aggressiveness. The brief chronologies of all naval actions are useful and interesting, ranging from June 1940 (submarines leaving their Mediterranean bases to participate in the Atlantic war under German control) to 17 April 1945 when Italian-manned explosive motorboats attacked and damaged a French Vichy destroyer on the northwest coast of Italy and then destroyed the uncompleted aircraft carrier *Aquila* at Genoa two days later. Both sides of the struggle are given – successes and losses. In the chapter on particular ships, there is almost always comment on specific actions in which the ships participated, including lessons learned ... or not.

For model-makers, there are coloured pages of camouflage and aircraft markings, apart from numerous broadside and overhead drawings of various classes, and of course the many photographs of details. The text explains the Regia Marina’s reasoning for adopting various designs, from the battleships to their large submarines and the explosive motorboats, often based, as was the case with their opponents, on experience from the First World War, only twenty years before. There are good descriptions of the building of each of the various classes, with the named designer, comments on the building yards and locations, and changes in design as war experience dictated. An example, under “Submarines”: “It was decided to build
medium-sized submarines (di media crociera), able to dive in 30 seconds and with much higher surface speed; the design of these boats derived directly from the successful “600” and Argo class and lead to the laying down of the Acciaio and Flutto classes, very good vessels indeed” (p.161).

There are numerous tables included in the appropriate chapter, not unlike the format of Jane’s Fighting Ships (and nearly as complete), a more useful arrangement than placing large tables at the back. The index of ships and other material is very comprehensive. For Canadian readers searching for the three submarines sunk by RCN corvettes and HMCS Ottawa, there is only the reference directly to Port Arthur’s sinking of Tritone in January, 1943. In 240 pages, however, you can’t have everything.

Altogether, despite its hefty price for non-Naval Institute members, this is a very valuable and useful book. Like the previous handsome volume in this series on the Littorio battleships, reviewed in the January 2012 issue of this journal (vol. XXII, no. 1), this makes a very valuable addition to any reference bookshelf.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Except for indigenous people, our ancestors emigrated from foreign lands to where our present families took root. What was their experience from the decision to make the perilous ocean journey, the actual passage, to the reception they encountered once they arrived? Passage to the New World addresses these questions and is, therefore, a compelling book. It is a collection of stories with which every reader can identify. There are detailed historical accounts of the bad food, crowded spaces, injuries, temporary illnesses and devastating diseases, problems common to many during sea voyages related to immigration.

The book is a journey of discovery to the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. For most immigrants, the actual voyage itself was a relatively short incident, a rite of passage to a new life. It was a portal to an unforgettable experience, a trial in the court of the unknown that took place over a vast, unforgiving, terrifying expanse. The first passengers to North America were from Western Europe and the Mediterranean, followed by Eastern Europe and Russia. Later there were the workers, who tended not to immigrate with their families and did not plan to stay—the so-called “coolies” from China and India. Each chapter of the book focuses on different emigrant problems as they relate to the age of wooden sailing ships and later to more modern iron-hulled steam-driven vessels with relatively better conditions.

Kevin Brown first reflects upon the identities of the initial immigrants, the unwilling victims and/or castoffs of society. Immigration was a convenient way of removing the underclasses without killing them—even, perhaps, profiting from their labour once they became established. Many were the under-educated, the desperately poor and the petty criminals. Others were escaping famine and/or long compulsory military service. By immigrating, these families were given the opportunity for a better or at least a different life; a fresh start but among strangers.

After making the decision to leave their ancestral homeland, the next problem was getting to the points of embarkation and then finding safe and reasonably priced passage. Scams and bogus financial deals
regularly trapped the unsophisticated. In addition, many of the passengers did not speak the languages of the booking agents or the ship’s crew. Transoceanic commerce largely dictated the ports where the immigrants assembled. For example, during the nineteenth-century industrial revolution, Britain imported much of its bulk raw materials from American ports into Liverpool. Once their vessels were emptied, captains and/or owners were eager to accept far less bulky finished goods and human cargo. Thus Liverpool and similar busy importing areas were magnets for western-bound passenger traffic. By the twentieth century, the departure of ships bearing emigrants resembled a tourist attraction.

There was a huge disparity between the relative luxury of first class to the repulsive conditions of steerage. The danger of shipwreck was a constant threat and those on the upper decks near lifeboats had a greater chance for survival than those who traveled in the bowels of the ship. Fortunately, these impediments to travel improved in time, but at a significant cost in lives lost.

The author graphically details the discomfort of the passage: the cramped quarters, the poor and often inadequate amount of food, seasickness, sometimes filthy conditions, the horrid smell from poor sanitation and inadequate ventilation, accidents at sea treated by ill-trained doctors, the spread of communicable diseases leading to death among the passengers and crew. Typhus, typhoid and cholera could take the lives of many of the passengers, and their vessels became known as “coffin ships.” If an epidemic struck a ship when near a port, those on land often did not welcome the passengers for fear that the illness might spread to them. By the mid-nineteenth century, every European maritime nation had established a comprehensive code of regulations concerning passenger space, food and potable water and standards for ventilation and sanitation.

At the end of an often-traumatic ocean voyage, an unanticipated, almost spiritual transition occurred—the “earthly likeness to the final Day of Judgement [sic], when we had to prove our fitness to enter Heaven” (p.184). There was the threat of being quarantined or sent back within sight of their destination. The countless physical and mental examinations required before entry produced occasional “Catch 22” situations. For example, if one was very poor, one might be deported to avoid becoming a burden on the public purse, or if highly skilled, sent back so as not to displace an American worker. In spite of this, common sense prevailed and the populations of the New World increased in a series of great waves of humanity.

Kevin Brown’s Passage to the New World provides a fascinating glimpse into this rarely covered period of maritime history in a well-written, erudite and thought-provoking work; a worthwhile addition to any maritime historian’s library. It is also an extension of his recent Poxed & Scurvied, an equally scholarly and important book reviewed in vol. XXII, no. 2, the April 2012 issue of this journal.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Almost everything you ever wanted to know about the Royal Navy’s Victualling Board in
wartime can be found in Christian Buchet’s book. The only source he failed to employ was the Audit Office accounts. These were often a decade in arrears, but they represent the final rendering of accounts of all naval expenditure.

Few historians of the British navy have displayed more than a passing interest in the work of the Victualling Board. Rather, their focus has been on the records provided especially by the Board of Admiralty and Navy Board. Three early exceptions are to be found in Buchet’s own work, Daniel A. Baugh’s British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (1965), and The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years’ War (1980) by the late Stephen Gradish.

Trained in the Annales school of historical research, Buchet set out to establish the economic impact of British provisioning on English and Irish markets and on those in the North American colonies. His focus has been on the Seven Years’ War 1756-63 and Caribbean and British success in paralysing “Spain’s and France’s rich trade” (p.1), an achievement made possible in part by the increasing dependence on North American food supplies. By contrast, Quebec agriculture to 1759 proved incapable of providing the same crucial service to the French navy.

The rise in importance of the North American supply to the British squadrons sent to the Caribbean in wartime, Buchet calls “extraordinary” (p.153). The lower costs and relative security convinced contractors to purchase for the navy as much as possible in North America, in place of depending solely on convoys from Ireland and England.

In strategic terms, this was of enormous value as Buchet made clear in his long-ago published doctoral thesis. It meant that, at the time, the French Navy was never able to be adequately supplied by its victualling contractors. The result was that French fleets sent to the Caribbean could spend less time there and victual fewer men than their British rivals.

Just as the Navy Board contracted privately to build some of Britain’s warships, so the Victualling Board contracted with merchants to provision those ships in distant ports. In English dockyard ports, the Victualling Board managed and processed the foodstuffs which contract merchants supplied. “Breweries, bakeries, slaughter houses, salting centres, cooperages and warehouses” (p.22) developed into Victualling Yards usually located near naval shipyards.

Private contractors supplied 15 ports in England and Ireland, five in Europe and West Africa, three in the West Indies and five in North America. The American supply centres were Louisbourg, Halifax, Quebec (beginning in 1760), New York and Charlestown.

Buchet discusses the contracting system in detail and identifies the various contractors. Towering above all of the contractors was John Biggin, whose biographical details Buchet searched in vain. The changing diet for seamen and the Victualling Board’s prolonged attempts to battle scurvy are studied. Dietary improvements involved the substitution of fresh meat for salt pork and beef, as well as introducing fresh vegetables, including turnips and potatoes, into seamen’s meals (p.57).

As the book is graced with some 86 tables and 25 figures, it would have been very useful to have printed lists of both in the front matter. One minor irritant was the author’s use of two decimal points in his data beginning with Table 4.2 (p.72). This practice implies a measure of accuracy which such data from the eighteenth century simply cannot claim. The author was sadly let down by proofreaders, who failed to detect dating errors in Figure 9.9 (p.222) and Figure 10.4 (p.237).
Originally published in Paris in 1999, and of immediate interest to historians, Christian Buchet’s research was rightly paid the rare honour of having a study of the eighteenth-century British navy translated from French.

Julian Gwyn
Berwick, Nova Scotia


Less than nine hours after Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the Donaldson Atlantic passenger liner TSS Athenia was torpedoed by Fritz-Julius Lemp, commander of U-30, becoming the first victim of the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. Overnight, 1300 survivors were rescued by Norwegian tanker Knute Nelson, the private yacht Southern Cross, the U.S. freighter City of Flint, and Royal Navy destroyers. Ninety-three passengers and nineteen crewmembers died. Francis Carroll adroitly weaves together materials from memoirs and websites, as well as archival records and personal recollections found in five Canadian provinces, ten U.S. states, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Norway. He examines public and governmental responses while deploying over one hundred survivors’ stories to capture the experience of disaster and rescue and the significance of this event and its aftermath. Athenia Torpedoed is a meticulously researched, carefully organized, and brilliantly contextualized micro-history that will appeal to readers of maritime and military history, especially those looking for a representative window into the “lived” Battle of the Atlantic. He situates real people in the twilight between peace and the as-yet-unknown conduct of total war, capturing their dread and uncertainty.

Carroll examines the approach of war over the preceding year and the final few days of peace as Canadians and Americans were warned by their governments to get out of the danger zone. Hundreds of additional passengers embarked in Glasgow, Belfast Lough, and Liverpool because His Majesty’s Government threw their bookings into disarray by requisitioning other commercial liners for troopship service. The Athenia sailed during the brief window between Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the British declaration of war. The crew prepared lifeboats for use and also (as per Admiralty instructions) moved north of regular shipping lanes and blacked out windows, perhaps inadvertently contributing to the overzealous Lemp’s misidentification of his target.

Carroll patiently unfolds the ripple effect of one ship’s destruction, for those directly affected as well as those in the diplomatic sphere. He moves effortlessly between the tragedy and its implications, referencing the legacy of First World War submarine warfare, detailing the damage and deaths caused and the immediate reactions of passengers and crew, explaining the impact of the ship’s list to port and the loss of crucial crewmen who descended into lifeboats. He recounts the harrowing experiences of both entering lifeboats from a sinking ship and exiting them once help arrived, and analyzes the challenges of housing over a thousand (often injured) survivors in temporary accommodations compounded by the separation of families during the rescue. He situates this maritime event in its broader context by describing care for survivors ashore, the difficulties of repatriation and compensation accentuated by the German denial of responsibility, the
eventual reunion of (some) families, and the reactions of public opinion and governments in several countries.

The details which emerge from passengers’ stories provide the book’s greatest strength and appeal. Judith Evelyn (an aspiring actress who would appear in Alfred Hitchcock’s *Rear Window*) traveled with her fiancé, Andrew Allan, who lost his father when their lifeboat became entangled with the *Knute Nelson*’s propeller. Nearly half of the passenger deaths actually occurred during abysmal rescue conditions rather than as a result of the destruction of the *Athenia* itself, a point Carroll could have made more directly. In the aftermath of the tragedy, Evelyn and Allan never married; on the other hand, romance budded between a *City of Flint* crewman and the passenger he rescued. Aboard the *Knute Nelson*, “Dr. Edward Wilkes, who had lost his wife and as far as he knew both of his sons, was the only physician on board the ship who spoke English and went around patiently applying first aid…” (p.72). Heroes emerged among passengers and crew from the *Athenia* and the rescuing vessels. The interaction of the various neutral and belligerent nationalities involved, however, triggered confusion and separated families, as Norwegian authorities ordered the *Knute Nelson* to disgorge survivors in neutral Ireland, the Royal Navy brought survivors to Greenock, and the *City of Flint* continued to Halifax. On board that ship, a ten-year-old Canadian, Margaret Hayworth, died of injuries suffered in the initial attack; her death and ensuing public funeral ashore shaped Canadian public opinion as war began.

Carroll might have more explicitly pointed out the impact of socioeconomic status in providing wealthier passengers with connections to arrange for passage and repatriation; also useful would have been an appended list of the dead passengers, especially since one such list appears in one of the websites he consulted. But these are minor details; he effectively analyzes the broader implications of the event and its aftermath. “Germany appeared to have begun the Second World War exactly where she ended the First World War, with a ruthless submarine campaign” (p.36). While German denials clouded official understanding of responsibility for the explosion until the Nuremberg Trials and thereby prevented an outcry on the scale of the *Lusitania* incident, Britain moved toward expanding its convoy protection zone, the U.S. decided to revise its Neutrality Act, and Roosevelt and Churchill began their legendary correspondence in response to German propaganda related to the incident. Francis Carroll has woven personal narratives and historical analysis into an eminently readable and highly recommended tale that powerfully and sensitively conveys historical significance and emotional resonance.

Kevin Smith
Muncie, Indiana


James Davey’s book is a study of the efforts by Britain’s Victualling and Transport Board to supply British squadrons assigned to the Baltic Sea between 1808 and 1812. The main title speaks of “The Transformation of British Naval Strategy,” but the five-year period in the subtitle appears too short for such a task to be accomplished. This is not the case. Over the course of those five critical years, Davey describes how the navy reformed its practices for fitting out ships for service, and supplying and maintaining them once at
sea. This allowed Britain to have a dominant naval presence in the Baltic which, in turn, allowed the British government to exert its foreign policy against France and its allies.

As Davey states, the Baltic Sea during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War era has not received the attention it deserves beyond the British (Nelson’s) visit to Copenhagen in 1801 and the second attack on that fair city in 1807. With the deforesting of Britain, the loss of timber supplies from the American colonies and the inability of British North America to supply the quality of timber required for naval construction and repair, the Baltic was the source for the beams, boards, spars and hemp that built and maintained the wooden walls of the Royal Navy. He reminds us that it contained critical entry points for British goods into Europe after the French Berlin and Milan Decrees. Finally, the Baltic allowed the British access to Prussia and Russia both of which, when not enemies, were allies, or at least neutrals. The first chapter drives all these points home.

Chapter 2 outlines the “evolution of the logistical structure” (p.39) from the beginning of the 1700s, when ships were basically supplied for a voyage and returned to port once the supplies were exhausted, to the replenishing of ships at sea, thus keeping them on service for extended periods of time. The advantage of this ability is illustrated by Hawke’s victory in Quiberon Bay after just such a replenishment of victuals. The American Revolution saw the navy develop the facility to deliver supplies over great distances, though by 1783, the Navy Board was terribly short of transports. The reappointment of a Transport Board in 1794 (after a 70-year absence) was an important step forward for securing adequate transportation. Davey also acknowledges allowing the Victualling Board to deal directly with the Transport Board as a critical advancement in efficiency for the navy.

Sir James Saumarez’s mission to the Baltic in 1808 to secure trade and harass the French allies there is the topic of the third chapter. Supplies are a central issue for Saumarez from the beginning, as neither Sweden nor the Prussian states could provide enough local food to sustain his squadron. The situation was aggravated by the absence of reliable charts which made passage through the Great Belt into the Baltic extremely hazardous. The loss of transports, ships of war and merchant ships in the passage was not uncommon. One such disaster in 1811 took the lives of 2,000 seamen (pp.70-71).

The next chapter tells the story of the Transport Board, a body which aligned itself more with the Treasury Department, due to an auditing relationship, than the Admiralty. In 1808-09, the Transport Board’s civil servants struggled to obtain enough shipping to meet the navy’s demands from various stations (including the Baltic), not to mention the British Army’s demands for transport. The chapter delves in some depth into the relationship between the Board and the merchant companies it dealt with when hiring ships. Though not as profitable as purely commercial work, it is apparent that many ship owners made a good wage hauling victuals and supplies for the Royal Navy.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the efforts to replenish the Baltic squadron in 1808 and 1809, respectively. The first year appears to have worked well with supplies reaching the squadron when required with little delay and no real disruption of the mission. With an increase in the size of the British Baltic squadron in 1809, the task became harder. The needs of the Scheldt expedition also drew from the transports and supplies available for the Baltic. By the summer of 1809, victualling problems
began to arise in the Baltic with delays in finding shipping causing shortages of food and other material aboard ships of the squadron. These problems were exacerbated by the loss of several transports. Davey describes the Victualling and Transport Board’s failure to meet the demands of the service in a timely and ample manner, as creating the call for reform.

Chapter 7 describes the reform that the Victualling and Transport Boards went through at the end of 1809 and into 1810. The period from 1793 through 1812 saw an incredible expansion in the bureaucracy that served the navy and its Boards. The expansion came as a response to increasingly complex problems of organization and resource management. Efficiency, in terms of both speed of delivery of victuals and supplies and the reduction of wastage, was critical. Reforms arising from the many reports of the “Commission of Naval Revision” led to the implementation of many changes. Timely and full reports on what supplies were still in the ships on station were required in order to assist in sending out just what was needed. The procurement of transports was increased so adequate numbers of ships were available. In the subsequent years both speed of delivery from request and wastage were altered in the desired directions. Davey concludes this key chapter with the statement that the British Government had “proved adept at enacting systematic change” (p.172). The State system was able to improve itself.

The years of 1810 through 1812 demonstrate the success of these reforms in the British effort to keep the Baltic open to British trade and access to essential naval supplies. Davey states that even with the fall of Sweden into Napoleon’s grasp and his extreme pressure to close the entire Baltic shoreline to British goods, the continued presence (even if reduced) of the British merchant ships and the Royal Navy served to undermine the Continental System.

There are no great or small battles in Davey’s narrative. The Danish navy was still suffering from the effects of the 1807 attack at Copenhagen, when it was carried off by the British navy. Danish privateers did have a small impact on the merchant vessels and transports as they made their way through the Great Belt, but the Royal Navy convoyed the vast majority of transports and merchant ships safely to their Baltic destinations. The Russian Baltic Fleet was not a threat, bottled up in Reval and St. Petersburg. The Swedish navy was an ally for the first two years, before being swept under French control. In that second half of the story the Baltic was ringed by enemy states and the Swedish navy could have dealt major problems to the British but its manpower was sapped by disease and its ships’ harbour bound by Sweden’s inability to do what the British were able to, supply and victual. While a minor element in Davey’s tale, the state of Sweden’s navy serves to underline his central point, that a sustained squadron can exert political and economic power (besides martial prowess) far from home, for a long period of time.

Twenty-eight figures and tables are spread across the text, each supported with description and discussion in the surrounding paragraphs. They are easy to understand and extremely relevant. The appendices offer a rawer expression of data that constitutes several of the tables in the text. For example, Appendix 3 (p.199) appears to be the sample that creates the findings expressed in Table 11 (p.167). The archival sources used in the study are superb, with most coming from the British National Archives and the National Maritime Museum. The NMM’s collection of records from Michael Henley and Sons forms the backbone of the data analyzed for the arranging of contracts between the
Transport Board and the ship owners. Secondary sources represent the classic and new views on the growth and reforming of the Royal Navy’s organizational structure during the long eighteenth century.

Growing out of his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Greenwich’s Maritime Institute, Davey’s book is part of a larger “project investigating the victualing of the Royal Navy” (p. vii) between 1793 and 1815. His work here will draw attention to the need to study the wider naval activity in the Baltic during this era, beyond the battles at Copenhagen. It also offers support for the idea that a focus on a shorter time period can provide historians with new and important insights into the emergence of British naval policy and organization. This book is recommended to anyone interested in the development of supportive systems that allowed the ships of the British navy to perform their assigned tasks.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


Looking forward to an exciting account of a recently discovered miniature submarine that had been involved in some clandestine mission and forgotten by time—I found this book not at all what I was expecting to read. Rather, it is an interesting social history of nineteenth century America using a U.S. Civil War-era submarine as a vehicle to tell a fascinating story of war, innovation, entrepreneurship and technological arrogance. The author, a well-published marine archaeologist and TV-show host, has conducted extensive technological and social research into the “why” of how a mid-nineteenth century American submarine came to be abandoned in a cove on the Isla San Telmo off Panama.

James P. Delgado is no stranger to historical adventure with his connections to Clive Cussler in the TV show “The Sea Hunters.” He explains, with journalistic flair, how he stumbled upon the wreck of what looked to be a midget submarine in 2001, on Isla San Telmo off Panama, as he was very interested in the history of old submarines. Local legend purported it to be a Second World War Japanese midget submarine, but the author had studied Japanese submarines extensively and knew it wasn’t one—it looked much older. His initial research through a colleague at Texas A&M University revealed that it was, in fact, a post-Civil War American submarine named the *Sub Marine Explorer* from which he then embarks upon the story of the submarine and its inventor, a German immigrant named Julius Kroehl.

There is not much of a story to tell about the submarine’s operational life, so instead, the author does a first-rate job of fleshing out every angle of Kroehl’s struggle to make the submarine a commercial success, from widow’s pensions to the influence of Free Masonry. In a period of western history where technology was viewed as a panacea for all issues, this submarine design was marketed as a much more efficient way of harvesting pearls from Panamanian oyster beds “than breath holding, shark fearing naked divers” (p.174). The author explains how the *Sub Marine Explorer* was very much a part of a contemporary American culture whereby technology was used “to incorporate Panama into an American dominated market system” (p.171). Unfortunately, this technological arrogance, coupled with an Anglo-Saxon refusal to consult unsophisticated local populaces, became a
commercial failure, as by the time the Sub Marine Explorer arrived the pearl beds had been fished out thus pushing the submarine into deeper water, which were less favourable to the growth of oysters.

There was also another side of the Sub Marine Explorer story, as the recent discovery and raising of a number of original submarine prototypes serves to remind us of how recent a technological development the modern submarine is today. Much like aviation, submarines are seen to be a twentieth-century creation, however, anyone with a cursory knowledge of submarine history knows of the extensive groundwork done by submarine pioneers in the nineteenth century—most notably in the United States of America.

The Sub Marine Explorer was a clever design for the time, with ballast tanks and other features of modern submarines, but it also had a fatal flaw. Accurately described by the author as a link between a diving bell and a submarine, the interior of the Sub Marine Explorer was pressurized to the depth of water at a time when decompression sickness (the bends) was not understood. The flaw was that technology had outstripped human ability to employ it. Decompression sickness eventually forced the termination of the dives and the Sub Marine Explorer was laid up and abandoned because it was simply not worth the cost of bringing it back to New York. It would be another 37 years before human knowledge caught up with this technology, with the invention of the first recompression chambers and an understanding of the bends. The book ends with a short overview of options for the future, which is likely to leave it to decay in place, “melt into the sea and sand” (p.186).

Very easy to read, the book has extensive endnotes and a bibliography, with detailed technical appendices, which include superbly reproduced drawings and black and white photos. Although the Sub Marine Explorer is a very basic and simple submarine in design and construction, the technical descriptions throughout the book are really quite detailed, while remaining refreshingly uncomplicated. Moreover, the descriptions of the construction and current state of the submarine are precise, without being over-the-top, with well-placed explanations of technical terms and useful anecdotal information such as the origin of the name “the bends” for decompression sickness.

Misadventures is truly a good read, offering an interesting segment of the social history of the United States of America in the nineteenth century, as most of the book is about Sub Marine Explorer’s inventor, Julius Kroehl—a name now lost to history. The author goes a long way to correct this last point by comprehensively articulating the trials and tribulations of early submarine development in which Kroehl played a significant part. I would recommend this book to anyone with an interest in maritime history, as it is an excellent synopsis of innovation when faced with the realities of society, technology and business in a uniquely maritime environment.

Norman Jolin
Kanata, Ontario


Greenwich, a suburb of metropolitan London on the Thames River's south shore, has a long association with Great Britain's maritime heritage and the Royal Navy. The Royal Naval College, once so integral a part of professional education and training delivered to generations of British and
select foreign naval officers, is now closed and the historic buildings on site given over to other uses, one of which is, fittingly, a university. The famous Painted Hall and naval-themed chapel, however, still remain nationally protected and open to the public. The nearby National Maritime Museum with its newly refurbished reading room and library, as well as the observatory at the top of the hill, attracts visitors from all parts of Great Britain and around the world. For most people, the historic architecture of the former naval college is probably the most striking, though Harry Dickinson, previous history lecturer at Greenwich, now at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham, reminds those interested in academically rigorous professional military education relevant to service needs and national defence priorities, that the Royal Naval College occupied a significant, if at times tenuous, existence as an educational institution dedicated to the British navy spanning more than a century.

Dickinson's chosen framework to tell this story is primarily chronological. Twelve chapters trace the origins of the lands from unfinished Tudor palace to hospice for maritime pensioners, the choice of Greenwich for establishment of a naval college, the ups and downs of official interest in educating naval officers and financial retrenchment, wartime usage of facilities and staff, the impact of changing technology on the type of courses delivered and research done on behalf of the Admiralty, the rise and wane of British sea power dictating the size of the Royal Navy and number of trained personnel required, and finally, the prolonged process (notwithstanding the quickness of actual decision) resulting in closing down the college and moving primary activities elsewhere. Greenwich was far from ideal for the purposes intended. The footprint was geographically constrained, with aging and cramped buildings set in a built-up neighbourhood near an expensive city. It was hard to convince many naval officers, skeptical in the first place about the value of staff training and higher learning to careers, to come there—both students and staff. Outright critics questioned why the Royal Navy even bothered. Certainly, the likes of Phillip Colomb, Henry May, Julian Corbett, Herbert Richmond, and Jack Edwards believed differently and made sure that the curriculum and methods of instruction at Greenwich suitably prepared officers for future postings and met the demands of the navy and armed forces in an increasingly joint environment.

Greenwich's brand became intertwined with the reputation of the Royal Navy as a professional fighting force, perhaps no longer the best, nor the largest, but steeped in tradition and history. The anniversaries and celebrated pageantry described by Dickinson harkened back to an imagined glorious past recorded in the physical surroundings of the place and its artifacts. Behind the façade, the reality was more sobering. The Royal Naval College was usually crowded with too many courses, programmes, and other lodgers exceeding available space; students, differentiated by rank, social standing, experience, and age, rarely mixed; learning periods lagged in duration and breadth behind the other services; an emphasis on technical and practical pursuits displaced exposure to foreign languages and relations with internationals beyond the British Commonwealth and NATO partners; courses were uneven and the credentials of instructors not always appropriate; academic research was progressively devalued in favour of the military's concentration on teaching; and, an underlying anti-intellectualism prevalent in the Royal Navy frustrated reformers, policy makers, and educators interested in better professional education. The Royal Naval College, which so long rested on past
laurels, simply could not be considered best in class among naval and war colleges as time went on, if it ever was.

Any military staff college has many constituents and participants, very adeptly captured by Dickinson. In the first instance, this unique educational institution served the needs of the service and broader military as an investment in the skills and knowledge needed for the present and going into the future. It was crucial to leadership, good administration, and sound decision-making in day-to-day running of militaries and situations of crisis, conflict, and war. Equally, the government and the guardians of public finances, in this case the Treasury, ensured that expenditures were justified and stayed within prescribed limits, perhaps not to the liking of senior officers at Greenwich and the Admiralty. Funding was always central to what was possible, the improvements that could be made to courses and the physical layout of the campus, and ultimately staying open for business. For the most part, the uniformed military took, or retained, control over most affairs at the Royal Naval College. Civilian academics were present for subject matter expertise, experience in teaching and research methodology, and the aura of legitimacy their presence added to a place of higher learning outside the university fold. Neither a military staff college nor a war college, either individually or collectively, constitute a university, and efforts to describe them as such misinterpreted the actual function, namely to produce trained officers with suitable education and knowledge to perform at higher levels of command and responsibility inside and outside the military bureaucracy. So much of an officer’s career was spent in training and education, particularly during peacetime. Dickinson's descriptions and short vignettes of the Greenwich experience, gleaned from personal papers and reminiscences, provide the perspectives of students, staff, and alumni, some of whom attended the Royal Naval College at various points. The students were products of the teaching and curriculum, slotted into headquarters and the wider defence establishment to use their training and knowledge to best advantage.

*Wisdom and War* is part of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series, connected with the Department of Defence Studies at King's College, London, and residing at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, where Dickinson teaches. The book could appeal to a broader general audience interested in the history of Greenwich, but the work’s focus and the relatively high retail price targets defence-related libraries, military colleges, and academics working in the specialized field of maritime strategy. In that sense, it provides a good overall historical survey for closer study of the curriculum and doctrine taught at the single service college—good and bad—before closing.

Chris Madsen
Toronto, Ontario


Every so often, a little gem of a book comes along that does not quite fit into any one category yet brims with scholarship and personality. *In Their Own Words* is one of those. Unlike so many recent books published to commemorate the bicentennial of the War of 1812, written from certain viewpoints or directed at specific events, this collection highlights documents, one man’s dedicated acquisition of books, manuscripts, ephemera, etc. from all aspects of the maritime War of 1812. Undoubtedly
representing just the tip of a Titanic-sized iceberg of a collection, the 60 documents featured in this little catalogue offer everything from personal letters signed by famous American naval captains like William Bainbridge and John Rogers, to a rare letter from Lieutenant William Henry Allen written aboard USS *Argus* in 1813. There are official letters from Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, and Vice-President Elbridge Gerry, and private ones like Benjamin D. Hadley’s advising “Dear Wife and Honored parent” (p.22) that his ship, the Newburyport privateer *Decatur*, had been captured by HMS *Surprise* and sent into Barbados. Clearly the treasures of a committed collector, the book includes newspaper clippings, broadsides, memoirs, poems, sketches, biographies, diaries and a wealth of manuscript and printed documents relating to the War of 1812 at sea and in the lakes. Chronologically arranged and thoroughly explained, almost all of the documents are also beautifully photographed. Additional colour portraits, prints and paintings from the Naval History and Heritage Centre collection enhance the publication.

As interesting as it is to compare Isaac Hull’s handwriting with that of James Lawrence, or to see a rare copy of James Fenimore Cooper’s original 1843 publication entitled *The Battle of Lake Erie*, the collection is further enhanced by bibliographic descriptions of each document providing date, author, full title, number of pages, publisher, and appearance in various master catalogues such as WorldCat, Howes (*U.S. Iana* (1650-1950), 1962) and Moebis (*America’s Naval Heritage. A Catalogue of Early Imprints from the Navy Department Library*, 2000). The foreword by Christopher McKee of Chicago’s Newberry Library indicates the serious scholarship behind the catalogue information. There is also wonderful contextual information about each item so that the ticket admitting Jesse Putman, Esq. to a party celebrating Commodore Bainbridge’s defeat of HMS *Java* in accompanied by a quote from Tyrone Martin’s book on the USS *Constitution*, *A Most Fortunate Ship* (Annapolis, 1977) describing the procession to Boston’s Exchange Coffee House where the celebration was held and a report of the event the day after in the *Columbian Centinel*, Wednesday, 3 March 1813.

The collector of this documentary treasure trove is as fascinating as his collection. Vice Admiral George W. Emery earned his stripes in the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine service, retiring in 1996 as commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet/commander Submarine Allied Command Atlantic. Emery’s career took him from beneath the North Pole to advising the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. But it appears that his real love was submerging himself in the navy’s documentary history. He has written a number of books published by the Naval Historical Center including *Historical Manuscripts in the Navy Department Library*, 1994, an expanded version in 2000 and contributed to *U.S. Navy: A Complete History*, 2003; and *Leadership Embodied: The Secrets to Success of the Most Effective Navy and Marine Corps Leaders*, 2005. He has also compiled finding aids for Navy Department Library of both *The George Henry Preble Collection* (2006) and *The Rodgers Family Collection* (2007).

*In Their Own Words* is far more than selections from a sailor’s collection, as it is modestly subtitled. It is a preview of some rare and unusual documents that enhance our knowledge of the War of 1812 on a more personal and immediate level. Difficult to display in an exhibition format, documents come to life on a printed page where they can be closely examined and appreciated as artifacts of their time as well as sources of historical information. I would recommend this small book to
bibliophiles, historians and students. It is a
testament to a dedicated collector who has
spent many years of research acquiring a
splendid collection and has graciously
offered to share it. I, for one, am looking
forward to more.

Faye Kert
Ottawa, Ontario

press.com, 2012. 3112 pp., illustrations,
maps, chronology, notes, suggestions for
further reading, index. US $28.00, cloth:

*Beyond the Blue Horizon* is a multifaceted,
scholarly book; part maritime history,
historical fiction, anthropology, archeology
and oceanography, with a touch of
philosophy. It is about anonymous people
who are not the leading figures of maritime
history, but the unsung forbears who form
history’s backbone. They are people who
floated over the deep studying waves,
winds, currents, tides, and occasional
landmarks to decode the ocean’s mysteries.

Brian Fagan’s thesis reinforces the
commonly-held maritime historian’s view
that water in its guises as rivers, lakes and
oceans led to the development of human
society.

Fagan, a best selling author, is a
professor emeritus of anthropology at the
University of California, Santa Barbara. An
experienced sailor and navigator, he has
diverse nautical skills that are reflected in
this tour of the world’s shores. The book is
a work of imagination, yet it is coupled with
historical and scientific evidence to produce
fictional scenes from prehistory as well as a
more recent past. He imagines how the
oceans, rather than being barriers filled with
dangers and mystery, morphed into
highways that connected distant corners of
the earth to spread human populations,
culture, commerce, and ultimately
civilization as well as diverse religions,
disease and wars. These salty thoroughfares
bore eclectic vehicles and passengers via
winds and tides; their signposts were the
sun and stars.

*Beyond the Blue Horizon* is unique
in its organization. Although the topics are
presented in chronological order, it is
designed to make sense if read out of
sequence, each narrative or chapter being
relatively independent of the others. Also,
the author has included a number of
insertions or related digressions such as
“The prestige of a canoe,” and “The
Pacific’s waltz of atmosphere and ocean,”
etc., which represent just several of many
informational nuggets.

Fagan’s prose is almost poetic at
times. He introduces his work as follows:
“You raise your eyes and the land falls away
from your feet … Below me, precipitous
cliffs battered by the ocean swells tumble
into the surf with a low roar . . . I sat there
for more than an hour, my face buffeted by
rain and wind, contemplating the immensity
of the open ocean. My mind wandered, as it
so often does, into the past, lulled by the
endless rush of wind and sea . . . in pursuit
of a dream, of a mythic land . . . a place
where the unknown began” (p.1). He later
concludes, “The now anonymous ocean is
no longer in the realm of ancestors, gods, or
dreaded spiritual forces, but, for all our
seeming mastery of its secrets, we ignore its
dangers at our peril. We will never
completely decode its mysteries” (p.281).

Sailing out of the sight of land, man
found the need to become knowledgeable
about the seasons and predicting weather.
Armed with seasonal cycle facts, one could
almost guarantee a safe return from a
voyage. The earliest quasi-scientific
method of water transportation was
coasting, watching headlands and adjusting
for current and tidal changes. The detailed design of these crafts is lost in history. Of necessity they had to be sturdy working boats, but few have survived because the lumber was so difficult to shape and use, that any part of the vessel that could be recycled found its way into its next iteration.

The sailing canoes of the south seas, the Broighter boat, the Ferriby boat, the Irish currach, and the Dover boat, to name but a few, have survived in drawings, literature, and archeological artifacts. A few, such as the Vietnamese basket boats (thung chai), are still used today. The evolution of more efficient rigging is evinced in maritime archeology and expressed in modern versions of specialized craft for specific waters. Fagan routinely takes his readers on imagined voyages on primitive vessels, relating the dangers and triumphs that these designs may have produced. Through these meanderings, he investigates the Southeast Asian waters of the Indian Ocean’s Red Sea, Arabia, East Africa, and the Malabar Coast; the Central American and Northwest coasts of North America; the Bering land bridge area; the Northern European and Mediterranean waters; and China’s vast and adjacent coasts.

Fagan’s frequently riveting travel/anthropologic adventure story is difficult to classify. It is a hybrid of academic and literary genres, but does not definitively answer the primary question it raises: How did these natives manage to conquer the oceans? That said, it is difficult to argue with the intellectual logic and likelihoods that the author conjures up. Beyond the Blue Horizon does much to stimulate and stretch a reader’s imagination. In summary, it is both an entertaining yet challenging read.

As a side note, a reader may be drawn to hum a vaguely familiar tune when paging through this book. Fagan borrowed the title from a song in the 1930 film, Monte Carlo. Richard Whiting and Franke Harling composed the score, Leo Robin wrote its lyrics and Jeannette MacDonald sang the song.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Historians have long debated the causes and meaning of the War of 1812, emphasizing Western land-hunger, the rhetoric of national “honour,” and Congressional politicking to name only three. Among historians who affirm the centrality of maritime causes, some (most notably J.C.A. Stagg) see the conflict as a necessary “second war for independence,” while others (such as Donald Hickey) define American grievances as the price of business during wartime. In Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812, Paul A. Gilje speaks authoritatively to this debate, arguing that by 1812 “the issues of unimpeded commerce and freedom from impressment became the accepted reason” for a necessary conflict (p.7). Focusing on the significance of rhetoric, he skillfully surveys the entwined histories of legal-maritime questions in American politics, diplomacy, and popular culture during the first half-century of independence. The phrase “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” derives from a banner Captain David Porter raised above the frigate USS Essex as she cleared New York on 2 July 1812. This widely-embraced, pithy motto symbolically united two initially separate, complex and evolving diplomatic principles. The slogan advanced American ideals of liberal
commerce against European mercantilist imperial norms. It simultaneously rejected Old World hierarchical social order, asserting equitable citizenship and inalienable rights for common tars. Thus, Porter deftly articulated “a potent mixture of patrician ideas borrowed from the enlightenment and plebeian ideas derived from experience of the Age of Revolution” (p.337).

The book’s first section clarifies the somewhat amorphous concept of “free trade,” which could variously refer to “the opening of any market, ending colonial restrictions, establishing reciprocal agreements, eliminating tariffs, or protecting neutral commerce” (p.30). Enlightenment ideals of replacing exclusionary commercial empires and the ancient laws of war at sea with reciprocal low duty rates and wider protection for neutrals formed the twin bedrocks of early U.S. foreign policy. But America’s elite statesmen differed as to the best means for achieving these ends. Pragmatic Federalists preferred to compromise and attain limited concessions by treaty, while Jeffersonians advocated unilateral action and sought to withhold trade from those who rejected the “new diplomacy.” Section two addresses the latter half of Porter’s slogan. Gilje describes the evolution of colonial-era resistance to Royal Navy press gangs into the broader principle of “sailors’ rights.” Reflecting his career-long interest in the popular politics of common mariners, Gilje argues that seamen’s determinative participation in the American Revolution broadened understandings of citizenship and human rights. Opposition to British impressment following U.S. independence continued this trend. By 1799, Congressman Albert Gallatin represented almost universal sentiment in denouncing impressment “an act of lawless violence” (p.122) and justifying even homicide in mutiny as a means to emancipation.

Gilje expands upon his central theme of political rhetoric in section three, illuminating the Federalist-Republican struggle to define and monopolize both the “free trade” and “sailors’ rights” causes. While Thomas Jefferson’s administration, for example, justified the 1807 Embargo Act as a stand designed to curtail impressment and command liberal terms of trade, Federalists decried it as ruinous to now-destitute merchant and mariner alike. Section four then explores the ways in which Americans employed loaded phrases to explain the war even as they fought or opposed it, and in how they celebrated victories—particularly on water. Though Federalists continued to attempt appropriation of Porter’s slogan, Gilje credits James Madison with a propaganda coup in successfully framing a military stalemate and uninspiring peace treaty as a national triumph. He did so even in spite of the infamous Dartmoor massacre’s poor reflection on his administration’s commitment to speedy repatriation of American sailors from British prisoner-of-war camps. This fifth and final section then assesses the enduring significance of the war’s most lasting refrain in subsequent American political, diplomatic, and cultural memory. As late as the 1850s “free trade and sailors’ rights” enjoyed association with causes as varied as low tariffs, opposition to the right of search in British-backed anti-slave trade treaties, African-American resistance to Southern states’ Negro sailors acts, and many more. Wide use in often contradictory ways eventually meant that “Porter’s motto... became disembodied and gradually lost its currency” (p.323). Nevertheless, Gilje argues that its longevity is a testament to the widely understood centrality of maritime questions to the war’s origins, meaning, and legacy.

*Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812* is engagingly written and, while experts will find much treasure to
mine from exhaustive footnotes, it is easily accessible to neophytes. Succinct definitions of terms laymen cannot be expected to understand do not unduly disrupt the narrative. A broad research base reflecting four decades of Early Republic scholarship is particularly impressive for the breadth of newspaper citations and Gilje’s mastery of the secondary literature. Historiographically, the monograph reasserts the centrality of the War of 1812’s maritime causes, and presents a strong case for a clearly meaningful and ultimately successful conflict. Gilje suggests that domestically the theme of “sailors’ rights” belongs to the broader context of nascent popular democracy—a historical process reaching back to the Revolution and forward into the Jacksonian era and beyond. He makes a far bolder claim in portraying the war as a diplomatic success, pointing out that despite the Treaty of Ghent’s shortcomings the U.S. secured many reciprocal commercial agreements during the immediate post-war decades. Equally importantly, “by the 1840s the American flag came to protect a ship’s crew” despite the absence of any “official concession in a treaty” (p.340). Only two chapters reviewing the politics and diplomacy of westward expansion between 1783 and 1812 without adding anything to the central narrative detract from the book’s overall strength. Regardless, this work must become a standard text on legal-maritime issues during the Early Republic era.

Samuel Negus
Hillsdale, Michigan


This is a significant work that provides an intimate history of Madeira and its wine industry through two centuries while offering a fresh view of the Atlantic merchants and the development of the American colonies from the perspective of an island situated along the most important trade route. David Hancock accomplishes a thorough, deep, and wide study that is well organized and well written. In fact, I found this book difficult to review in a reasonable amount of time as I carefully read and considered almost every paragraph, rather than reading it quickly for content and conclusions.

Hancock presents the geography of Madeira in the Atlantic, far away from the inhabited continents and yet perfectly positioned in the most important Atlantic trade route that developed in the sixteenth century. The island’s climate and soil were perfect for growing almost anything, but Madeira’s Portuguese inhabitants in the seventeenth century found that wine grapes were the most lucrative.

In time, Madeira wine became the important drink in the American colonies because of the island’s geographical location and the willingness of the growers, winemakers, and merchants to produce and send to each region of the Americas the kinds of wines they preferred. The island’s wine merchants, increasingly British in the eighteenth century, added various amounts of brandy to the wine, to fortify it according to their customers’ feedback. Since Madeira wines improved with tropical heat and were hurt by cold temperatures, quite unlike French wines, merchants sometimes sent pipes of Madeira to the East Indies and back in ships’ holds to ready it for sale.

Hancock details the process of growing several types of grapes on the island, the processing, and the multifarious ways the wine business proceeded on Madeira, always shifting to meet
consumers’ demands. He provides much information on the British/Madeira wine politics and shipping business through the centuries, and explains the many-faceted distribution system, using individual examples, in the British American colonies. The author also brings the story to the table, describing the utilitarian and cultural aspects of storing, consuming, and presenting wine in eighteenth century America.

Throughout his book Hancock explores many interesting aspects of the Madeira wine trade/business. One example is “The Factory,” a British merchants’ organization in Funchal that dealt with quality control and local officials, set prices, helped travelers, and generally kept the island’s business peaceful and profitable. He describes a complex relationship in which the merchants consciously educated American consumers about better ways to store and serve their wines, while at the same time the customers’ demands changed the way wines were made. Such was the organization of the American wine distribution network that when there was a glut in one port, distributors in the colonies had a working system of selling for credit their wine to another port in need.

The author’s important conclusions include a correction for those who view the colonial Atlantic trade as a system ruled by a few men with set routes, cargos, and regulations. He found that the Madeira trade was based on an intricate web of variables, communication lines, and many people making individual decisions. There were no central firms or figures that controlled the development of the business or conducted the trade; or who determined the evolution of Madeira wines.

David Hancock’s Oceans of Wine is a scholarly work with textual information, data, statistics, and anecdotes skillfully analyzed and woven into a very readable book. The author provides an exceptional overview and intricate look at the complexity and importance of the Atlantic wine trade—an essential component of the Atlantic merchant trade and culture, especially in Madeira and the British colonies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Warren Riess
Bristol, Maine


In this superbly written and lavishly illustrated book the authors, both with excellent credentials, take an extremely detailed look at the development and history of France’s cruiser type warships. Part I, the technical section, with an introduction, and chapters on the various cruiser classes, was the work of John Jordan, with some assistance from Moulin. Jordan took over the editorship of the annual Warship following Antony Preston in 2005; he also wrote French Battleships, with Robert Dumas, published by Seaforth in 2009.

Part II, the historical section, is the work of Jean Moulin, who has authored or co-authored, numerous monographs on the light cruisers of the La Galissonniere class, the Treaty cruiser Algerie, and the contre-torpilleurs (destroyers) of the Guépard and Aigle classes. So each of the authors brings a wealth of knowledge to this book in which they present a study that will likely satisfy the most fastidious researcher, or at least provide sufficient information from which researchers can easily expand their own knowledge.

While this imprint is from The Naval Institute Press, the first edition was from Seaforth. The superb drawings,
schematics and tables, of which there are many, were prepared by John Jordan from official plans and other documentation. There are also countless excellent photographs of the various ships throughout the book.

The book contains a preface, followed by a section on acronyms and abbreviations, and then, in Part 1, chapters on the Duguay-Trouin class; Duquesne and Tourville, the Suffren class; Pluton, Jeanne d’Arc and Emile Bertin; and Algérie, which was the only cruiser not named for a noted French individual. This is followed by coloured plates of paintings of the ships by Jean Blade, who also produced the dust-jacket painting. Blade was the Director Central du Service des Armes. A chapter on the De Grasse Class follows, with chapters on the C5 and Saint Louis designs completing the design section. Part 2, the history section, discusses four periods: 1926-1939, 1939-1943, 1943-1945 and 1945-1956, and closes with a sources section and an index.

It’s amazing that the records on which the authors based much of their research survived. When the armistice took effect the Germans, long known for their penchant for amassing records, seized French naval records, including the files dealing with the cruisers and moved them to the Kriegsmarine headquarters in Berlin. When Berlin in turn was overrun, the records were seized by the Russians, but were returned to France after the Berlin Wall fell; there they were archived at the Centre d'Archives de l'Armament (CAA). The records were made available on the website of the Service Historique de la Defense. That these records were neither destroyed in the war, or simply kept by Russia is quite remarkable.

There were nine classes of cruisers totalling 20 ships designed and built for the Marine Nationale over the period discussed. Part 1 indicates that the first of each class of ships was built in the Brest Naval Dockyard with Brest being responsible for providing detailed plans to yards building the follow-on cruisers.

Part 1 discusses development, design and fitting out of the ships through to successful trials. The design of French cruisers was seriously hampered by the fact that, during the inter-war years, French metallurgy lagged well behind that of Britain and the U.S. Consequently, French ships had to be built with heavier, thicker rolled steel to obtain the same degree of tensile strength as in British and U.S. warships, thus denying the French the same degree of armour protection in critical areas. Moreover, riveting was used throughout France for all hull construction adding additional weight. Electric welding was only used in internal, and less critical areas. Even considering that duralamin was used extensively in interior structures, meeting the overall weight limitations imposed by the Washington Treaty (1922) was impossible without sacrificing armour protection. Therefore, the French relied on speed and subdivision for protection by using a combination of longitudinal and transverse bulk-heading so that relatively small spaces could be isolated if breached. In addition, by finally adopting the conventional practice used in other navies where only part of the weight of combustibles, rather than the full weight, was reported, additional weight became available for armour in later ships.

In Part 2, Moulin provides an extremely detailed history of the various ships prior to, and following the Armistice, including the scuttling of seven cruisers at Toulon. Other ships were impounded by the British at Alexandria, while three were stranded in the Far East. This book goes well beyond the history of the ships, however, and presents the complicated political situation surrounding their scuttling or internment, and, more broadly, France’s
situation following the Armistice. Moulin goes into depth regarding naval infrastructure, tactical organization, and even delves into national culture, something that is not well understood in the English-speaking world.

Highly recommended—an excellent study of a complex period in French naval history.

N. Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


Modern maritime history is occasionally written with the ink of light. Although there are many enthusiasts, a mere few are professionally involved in photographing ships and ports. One of these professionals was Germany’s Karl Schemkes (1890-1994). Born in the city of Duisburg, near Europe’s largest inland port on the river Rhine, the young Schemkes got a whiff of the maritime life. He joined the German Imperial Navy but soon found his enthusiasm fading, left the navy and went back to school. On the outbreak of war in 1914, he joined the navy again. A few weeks after he boarded the armoured cruiser Yorck, the ship was sunk by a German defensive mine. Although hundreds of crewmen perished, Schemkes survived. After the war, Schemkes finished his study as an engineer and shortly afterwards, took over a small photography business in Bremerhaven. He specialized in taking photographs of ports and ship building, gradually expanding his business to 15 employees.

In September 1944, Schemkes’ photo shop was destroyed, bombed out of business, along with nearly two decades of work as his entire archive of negatives was lost. In 1948, Schemkes started over, rebuilding from scratch like Germany itself, while the country’s economy once more took off. Karl Schemkes surfed along on the waves of prosperity in Bremerhaven. Besides taking photographs, he sold cameras, photographic material and instruments. His photographs of ships, slipways, docks and quays ended on the walls of board rooms, in books and leaflets.

From the 1930s onwards, many photographers switched to small film cameras (24x36mm or 6x6 cm). These cameras were more suited for a dynamic subjects but images suffered a loss in sharpness; details were less clear than on the 13x18 cm images. Karl Schemkes stuck to his old camera, more static but rich in detail and sharpness. If necessary, the pictures were retouched and unwanted background features like buildings, chimneys or other vessels were removed. Schemkes retired in 1963 and died in 1994 at the age of 103. Among his legacy were 3500 glass plate negatives, mostly black and white on glass plates 13x17 and 9x12cm. About five percent of the collection was in colour. The negatives were given to the Bremerhavener Schiffahrtsmuseum, now the Nationalmuseum Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum (National German Maritime Museum).

The book is really a showcase for Schemkes’ images of classic liners, merchant vessels and docks, a wonderful composition with beautiful photographs of a time gone by.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands

*Decatur’s Bold and Daring Act: The Philadelphia in Tripoli 1804* by Mark Lardas is one of the latest editions of Osprey’s Raid series. Many scholars have recounted Stephen Decatur’s heroic raid to keep the captured American frigate, USS *Philadelphia*, out of the hands of pirates, but this new interpretation attributes the raid’s success squarely to Decatur. Lardas gives Decatur credit for planning, preparing and leading this covert operation.

In order to appreciate Lardas’ contribution to the historiography of Stephen Decatur’s raid, it is necessary to examine the book’s title. This new interpretation owes its name to a comment from the great admiral, Horatio Nelson, who called the burning of the *Philadelphia*, “the most bold and daring act of the age” (p.6). After achieving success in the Quasi War, the United States Navy turned its attention to combating pirates from the Barbary States in North Africa. Although William Bainbridge, the commander of USS *Philadelphia* had successfully blockaded the harbour of Tripoli, he made a grievous error when he pursued two pirate vessels into the harbour on 31 October 1803.

When the frigate ran aground on a sandbar and attempts to free or scuttle it failed, gunboats from shore were able to capture the *Philadelphia* and its crew. American naval officers quickly realized the danger their frigate in enemy hands presented to international shipping. Yusuf Karamanli, Tripoli’s ruler, could refit the *Philadelphia* and engage in piracy on an unprecedented scale. Almost simultaneously Edward Preble, the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet, William Bainbridge, and Stephen Decatur, a promising young lieutenant, came to the conclusion that the frigate had to be destroyed. According to Lardas, each of these men made significant contributions to the operation which would result in destroying the *Philadelphia*. Despite his imprisonment, Bainbridge was able to smuggle valuable intelligence concerning the *Philadelphia* and Tripoli’s harbour to Preble through the Danish consul. Decatur captured a Tripolitan ketch named *Mastico* and proposed to use it in an attack similar to the one Preble was planning. Renamed *Intrepid, Mastico* was placed under Decatur’s command for the raid.

Although Decatur volunteered to lead the operation, Preble gave command to Charles Stewart, a senior lieutenant who commanded the *Syren*. According to Preble’s plan, the officers and men on both vessels would disguise themselves as Arab and Maltese sailors, while *Syren* would alter its rigging to appear more like the vessels in the harbour. Since both the attackers and the defenders of the *Philadelphia* would be dressed the same, the attackers would identify themselves during this nighttime raid by shouting “Philadelphia”. The raiders practised their technique by boarding the USS *Constitution* and placing incendiaries while it was moored in Syracuse Harbour, training, Lardas argues, that increased the men’s confidence. “When they carried out the raid in earnest, they knew they could reach their destinations and return to the spar deck in less time than it took during their practice sessions” (p.30).

Despite careful planning and considerable practice, the operation was hamstrung by unforeseen problems, beginning when Decatur learned that the provisions of salted beef had been
contaminated. Then a storm off the North African coast blew the raiders off course. In spite of these difficulties, Decatur was able to achieve the raid’s objective through his extraordinary leadership. When the Syren failed to arrive at the entrance of Tripoli Harbour, Decatur ordered the Intrepid to enter the harbour before the wind died. Once within twenty yards of the Philadelphia, Salvatore Catalano, the Intrepid’s multilingual Sicilian pilot was able to convince the frigate’s Arab defenders to pull his ketch alongside. Decatur and his men boarded the Philadelphia and defeated its defenders using only cutlasses and clubbed pistols. Since Preble had ordered the raiders to burn the Philadelphia, no time was wasted attempting to rescue the frigate. Decatur’s men placed their incendiaries in key locations within the frigate’s hull and set them ablaze with battle lanterns they carried with them. After Decatur and his men fired the Philadelphia, they boarded the Intrepid and made a hasty escape under the power of large oars, known as sweeps.

Unfortunately, the reader will find mistakes in the text that should have been caught by a proof reader. For instance, the text refers to the commander of the Mediterranean fleet as Edwin Preble instead of Edward Preble. Although irritating, the errors do not detract from Lardas’ overall argument which is informed by his extensive knowledge of naval architecture and engineering. These insights help the reader to understand key aspects of the raid such as rearranging sails and ropes to disguise the Syren’s true identity, as well as how the placing of incendiaries on the Philadelphia could destroy a frigate.

Even though the Philadelphia’s story has been told before, Decatur’s Bold and Daring Act: The Philadelphia in Tripoli 1804 will entertain the reader with its engaging narrative, perceptive insights and beautiful illustrations. Despite minor errors, the book is worth spending the afternoon it takes to read it.

Edward Martin
Orono, Maine


This book is part of a major international editing and publication project initiated in 1962 under the auspices of the Union Academique Internationale, whose aim was to create critical editions on the sources for a history of Africa covering most of the sub-Saharan lands. A decade later, the British Academy established an international committee to publish a series of books and by 1995, ten had been prepared, representing about half the project’s output.

Robin Law is Emeritus Professor of African History at the University of Stirling and Visiting Professor of History at the University of Liverpool. He is the author of, among other books, Ouidah: the Social History of a West African Slaving Port 1727-1892, The Slave Coast of West Africa 1550-1750 and The Horse in West African History. He has also edited The English in West Africa 1691-1699. The Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England 1681-1699 part 3.

In the early sixteenth century, the slave trade emerged as an important mainstay of commerce between Africa, Europe and America. Although the principal concern of this book is how the British trans-Atlantic slave trade ended, the author also considers how it developed from
small-scale beginnings in West Africa in the 1560s into a partnership (albeit of an increasingly unequal nature) between black and white traders in the nineteenth century.

Now known as part of the Republic of Benin, the Kingdom of Dahomey was one of the most active West African states and ports involved in both the European and trans-Atlantic slave trades. Growing demand along the coast for slaves created a strain on the established sources of supply, which gradually shifted southwards to reach deeper into the interior (Kolchin 1993). Visitors to Dahomey vied with one another in depicting the savagery of King Gezo’s regime. Archibald Dalzel, the sometime governor of Cape Coast Castle and a slave trader, historian and bankrupt, described Gezo’s palace as “ornamented with human heads and bestrewn with bodies” (Christopher 2006).

Much has been written about the West African coastline being the least healthy place on earth for Europeans, but this generally alluded to the islands off the coast where ships weighed anchor for long periods. For seamen, it was also the scene of desertions and rebellion, unrequited fantasies, tall stories and a place of punishment. Yet most of them also considered Africa to hold a dreamlike quality where untold luxuries and welcomes could be found.

The first 250 years of African-European commercial relations used gold as the basis of exchange. Not until the early eighteenth century did the value of slaves exceed that of gold, and some historians have claimed that Europeans were in search of gold rather than slaves (Greene and Morgan 2009). It was considered that Africans were eager, discriminating consumers and not easily satisfied with shoddy goods. They willingly sold gold, then ivory, hides, pepper, beeswax and dye-woods for the European textile industries and, only finally, slaves.

Efik merchants acted as middlemen between ship captains and inland African traders, overlapping colonial plundering and overseas trade. In the Angolan territory, the peak was reached in 1782, as barter, pillage and even military raids generated new cycles of demand for Portuguese and Brazilian goods in the inland markets of Central Africa (Bethancourt 2007).

The book is an indispensable source for understanding African and European interconnections and the extensive bibliography includes 19 of Law’s own works. His ample footnotes and lists of sources, as well as his comprehensive comments on the journals and documents, augment the value of the letters and reports of the British vice-consul, Louis Fraser, who was appointed by Queen Victoria in December 1850. These documents cover not only the development of Britain’s policy on the slave trade but also explain the important role of Dahomey which, since the seventeenth century, had affirmed its independence and exploited European rivalries in neighbouring Lagos, Cotonou and Porto Seguro.

In laying the foundations for social histories of West African ports as part of the larger Atlantic context, the British Academy has highlighted the extent to which the Atlantic trade networks maintained control over local cross-cultural commerce. Professor Law has come to the conclusion that in the years 1851-1852, the appointment of Louis Fraser proved to be a very poor choice on the grounds that the diarist was no linguist, was abrasive with naval colleagues and arrogant towards the king and the people of Dahomey.

Robin Law presents a master class in editing in this remarkable work of scholarship that adds considerably to our knowledge of the Atlantic world in general and the nineteenth century slave trade in particular. Fortunately for the modern reader, Mr Fraser’s shortcomings as a
diplomat do not detract from the value of his account as a historical resource. This book will not only fascinate but greatly entertain readers of social, political, commercial and maritime history.

Michael Clark
London, England


A U.S. Marine Corps Japanese language specialist and intelligence officer during the Second World War, Bob Sheeks became the target of Gerald Meehl’s interest during a snorkelling expedition in Borneo in 1979. Meehl, a prolific author and a specialist in the American Pacific Campaign during the Second World War, was also a member of the “science team of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.” He has traced Sheeks’ tale from his birth in Shanghai in 1922, to his language training at the Navy Japanese Language School in Boulder, Colorado in 1942-43, and then to his deployment as a Japanese-language officer in island combat with the 2nd Marine Division in the Pacific in 1943. Meehl tells this one Marine’s tale from when he began his war-time adventure with a deep hatred for his Japanese adversaries to when he ended his time in the Corps (but not as a Marine) with a greater understanding and appreciation for the sympathy, compassion, and simple humanity that balances all our personalities with the darkest impulses of our most hidden nightmares.

Meehl opens his book with a look at the battle at Saipan in the Western Tropical Pacific in 1944. The Japanese had dug in, fighting to the death and, to prevent American “victory,” killing their own civilian population rather than allowing them to surrender to the Marines. Bob Sheeks was called to the front lines with his radio equipment and megaphones, tasked with the job of convincing the Japanese forces killing their own brethren-in-arms to surrender, if not to save their own lives, then at the very least, to save the lives of the Marines they fought. In 1944, Sheeks shared a generalized perception of the Japanese soldier as a nameless cog in the “Imperial Japanese machinery”. His experience with a young Japanese soldier, who was willing to kill his own countrymen in order to prevent further deaths, contradicted everything he had learned about the Japanese. He couldn’t see it as a betrayal, although perhaps it was: rather, what he witnessed was an act of humanity, the willingness of a hated enemy to end senseless violence in the interests of everyone on the battlefield. Moreover, it was an incident that shook the very foundation of his opinion of the Japanese that he had held since growing up in Shanghai.

Sheeks was raised in a life of relative luxury as the son of an American business executive. The local presence of the U.S. 4th Marine Regiment prompted him and his brother to dream of becoming Marines, goals they would eventually reach. In downtown Shanghai, the young Sheeks had already been exposed to death: the gang violence that had plagued the area was exacerbated as the Japanese came in and began executing any Chinese civilian who resisted their presence. The grim reality of murder, however, did not hit home for him until, one day, he watched a young boy—a peanut seller—topple out of the back of a truck and dash his head to bits, literally, on the asphalt. As reports of Japanese atrocities became increasingly frequent, the young Bob Sheeks became increasingly
hostile toward the invading Japanese, unable to understand why they were targeting his friends and their families: when, one weekend, his father took him and his brother George to visit the home of some family friends, Bob Sheeks came face-to-face with the nightmare that, until then, he had been divorced from—the Chinese servants of his friends’ family had been roasted alive. This coloured his perception of the Japanese for the rest of his youth.

Sheeks’ academic career saw him attend Harvard University on a full scholarship while in the Marine Corps Reserve, but once the United States entered the war, his particular linguistic skills became in high demand, and, as a reward for attending the new Japanese language school at Berkeley, he was offered a potential commission as a Marine Corps officer. Meehl follows Sheek’s life chronologically from his studies at Berkeley, to combat training at Camp Elliott. Afterwards, in 1943, he spent time in New Zealand and New Caledonia refining his grasp of the Japanese language and working to aid the American war effort. Sheeks saw his first combat at Tarawa, an operation nearly crippled by the ill-conceived (if necessary) use of the deep-keeled Higgins boat and the constant, inevitable miscommunications between the Marines at the front lines and command units farther back. His general orders were to gather intelligence, but this was hampered by the Japanese practice of committing suicide, in one form or another, rather than being captured by the enemy. By the end of the battle, Sheeks had determined that the Japanese had never learned of surrender as a military option, and the cultural barriers that prevented the Japanese from understanding the significance that raised hands or white flags held for the Americans had almost certainly led to many unnecessary deaths.

Meehl tells us of Sheeks’ time in Hawaii in 1943-44, and return to the operation at Saipan in 1944 to round out his tale of Sheeks’ most formative period as a Marine on the front lines. When Sheeks was sent to Tinian in 1944, he formed “A Human Connection with the Enemy,” a phrase appropriately titling Meehl’s eighth chapter. The end of the brutal landings at Tinian found Bob Sheeks caught between the “can-do” attitudes of those directing the American efforts and the war-weariness of the Japanese ensconced on the island. A cooperative relationship with Warrant Officer Nakazawa, who helped smooth the cessation of hostilities at Tinian, gave Sheeks an insight into the mentality of a culture he had hated for most of his life, and he was able to negotiate a conference between Colonel Dave Shoup and Nakazawa. Interpreting this conversation forced Sheeks to realize that he had begun to sympathize with the perspectives of the Japanese, while becoming alienated from the “gung-ho” militancy of the American command, who seemed totally uninterested in forging a connection with their Japanese counterparts: “It was a mismatch of minds, perceptions, and beliefs, with no real communication. Language was not the barrier,” says Meehl. The final chapter relates the events of a reunion of Japanese Language School recruits in 2002, and summarizes Sheeks’ post-war career. Poignantly, Meehl underscores his book with Sheeks’ own reflection at the reunion that racism, whether consciously held or merely an unconscious bias ingrained by simple, benign ignorance, combined with an unwillingness or inability to understand one another’s cultures, prolonged the war beyond its rational ending point. Of Sheeks, Meehl says: “He was an eyewitness to that great range of human behaviour and had, in the end, found life-affirming humanity in the midst of the brutality of war.”
The technical aspects of the book, given its nature, are quite acceptable, and Meehl has done a good job balancing his references with the material at hand: anything more would be excessive and detract from the book’s content. One Marine’s War is an undeniably valuable resource for anyone interested in the Marines’ war in the Pacific, whether as a student, an “arm-chair historian,” or as a professional. This is one of the few books this reviewer has read that successfully combines popular history, biography and military history in a single volume without making it either too light-hearted or too intense. Meehl’s telling of Sheeks’ story effectively illustrates the micro- and macro-perspectives of the American Pacific campaign and the cultural difficulties that prolonged it. It is strongly recommended for American war-studies classes as well as for courses on international relations.

Ambjorn L. Adomeit
London, Ontario


The Battle of the Pacific was really waged at two levels. The most visible one was the surface and air war, the story of carrier battles and dramatic amphibious invasions. Exciting and flashy, it has drawn the attention of scholars and readers for decades. The second war, waged beneath the surface by small submarines against the length and breadth of the Empire of Japan has not received nearly the dramatic attention that the surface war has. Conducted by the “Silent Service,” this war of attrition was fraught with danger and drama. Yet the lives of the men who served in the submarine fleet and their experiences have yet to be truly heard by the masses. With The Silent Service in World War II: The Story of the U.S. Navy Submarine Force in the Words of the Men Who Lived It Edward Monroe-Jones and Michael Green have attempted to rectify this, at least in part.

Neither editor is new to military history. Michael Green is a freelance author with 90 books under his belt with an emphasis on military history. Edward Monroe-Jones is himself an ex-submariner who writes on military matters. Together they strive to bring the submarine experience to life for the reader by associating it with the people and their experiences.

Primarily chronological in format, 249 pages of text provide a series of vignettes about individual crew members deployed throughout the fleet spanning the entire period of the Second World War. In each case, the subject is introduced with a short excerpt regarding his rank, the boat he was assigned to and brief one- or two-sentence descriptions of the experience presented to the reader. The result is an interesting taste of the submarine war at all levels. The value of this approach is that the editors are able to feature examples from both the Atlantic and Pacific theatres, as well from every command area. Thus, patrols are sampled from older O and S class submarines as well as from the Gato- and Balao-class fleet boats. Operations from treacherous Alaskan waters to the South Pacific, from the Sea of Japan to the American east coast are also highlighted.

With all ranks included and such a wide swath of experience sampled, the authors have captured a great deal of the flavour and experience for the reader. They augment this with a glossary of terms, a short introduction presenting various
aspects of submarine design and structure, and finally, a criticism of Hollywood’s portrayal of submarines. The combination reproduces a sense of the submarine experience with slightly more historical accuracy than most anecdotal accounts of the war. The text, however, is not a history of submarine operations. As the title suggests, it is the story of the submarine fleet. There is a clear and defined difference. The absence of any real systematic study that places the accounts into the greater context of the submarine war limits the value of the work. For example, stories of submarine operations out of Alaska, as in chapter 6 “The First and Only Patrol of the S-27,” are fascinating to read, since submarine activities in Alaskan waters are not the usual ones associated with the submarine fleet. Yet without any supporting material, it is just a neat story about the crew’s survival after grounding the submarine. It lacks context which diminishes its value (pp.48-54). Similarly, the discussion of operations in the first months of the war, and the problems of the fleet deployed in the South West Pacific lack the context needed to explain why this is significant.

While an enjoyable read, the absence of historical analysis is a clear limitation of the work. The text does not even emphasize the torpedo problems with which the fleet suffered. Here anecdotal information might help shed light on this important issue. It is not even mentioned in the index. These limitations seriously reduce the value of the book to most readers.

If you are looking for an enjoyable collection of good sea tales, with stories that intrigue and capture the imagination, then by all means buy this book. It is fun and tantalizing and a really good read. But if you want a history of the submarine war, the book alone does not satisfy that role. You will need to keep looking. For scholars and academics, the book is long on anecdotal evidence but short on research value.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


In the wake of the Second World War, many books have been written about the exploits of the Royal Navy and its ships. Very few, however, chart the history of a single ship. More specifically, the vast majority either examine a specific naval campaign, or detail the operations of well-known capital ships such as HMS *Hood* or HMS *Ark Royal*. The life and commission of a single destroyer is hardly ever the focus of such attention. This book does just that, however, and does it exceedingly well.

Now into its second edition, John A. Rodgaard has taken up the story of HMS *Venomous* previously covered in a 1990 study by his close friend, Robert Moore. As the former commanding officer of the Sea Cadet Corps’ Training Ship *Venomous*, Moore had sought to provide the corps with a history of their namesake. By updating the original manuscript with additional research and numerous personal interviews and photographs, Rodgaard has provided the reader with an exceptional insight into the life of a destroyer crew. Deftly written, this edition provides further context to the story of HMS *Venomous* within the international sphere from her commissioning in 1919 to her final paying-off in the breaker’s yard 28 years later. This is a book that not merely discusses the exploits of a destroyer, but instinctively
captures life aboard a destroyer. 

Laid down on 31 May 1918, HMS *Venomous* was a V&W Class destroyer and was subsequently launched on 17 April 1919. With a full displacement of 1,120 tons, 300 feet long, 29.5 feet beam and a draught of 10.8 feet, *Venomous* was not a capital ship by any stretch of the imagination. Instead, it was a workhorse of the fleet with a top speed of 32 knots carrying a mixed armament comprising four 4.7-inch guns, one 12-pounder gun, and six 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Having started this edition by detailing the role and purpose of a destroyer within the Royal Navy, Rodgaard goes on to lay down the foundation upon which the reader will better understand the value and utility of this particular type of warship and truly appreciate all that *Venomous* covered throughout its commission. It is not simply the story of the ship, as much as that will interest readers; it is the author’s pulling together of a broad assortment of personal insights and recollections, along with official reports, photographs and personal caricatures drawn by those who actually lived the events, that really brings the story of HMS *Venomous* to life.

The story itself will be of interest to professional historians and people with a general interest in naval history. Historians will appreciate the attention to detail and the vast use of primary sources that would have otherwise been lost. As an examination of a single warship in the vast wartime fleet of the Royal Navy, it provides a personal perspective on life in the Royal Navy during the war and the dangers encountered; as written by the author, with corroboration by those who experienced it firsthand. In that sense, the story of HMS *Venomous* is a time capsule, which allows the reader to rediscover a world that existed several decades ago. The author’s own experience as a captain in the United States Navy must have exercised an influence in his crafting this book, if only by enabling him to so clearly articulate the experiences of the crew of a Royal Navy destroyer in the Second World War.

This book will also be greatly appreciated by anyone who wishes to know more about the average sailor in Britain’s wartime fleet or more importantly, to obtain a better understanding of what their great-uncle or grandfather might have experienced during the war at sea. While a great deal of attention is paid to some of the finer points of ‘fitting out’ and maintaining a ship for operations, the book is outstanding for its detailed insight into the life of not just a single destroyer but, by extension, life at sea aboard any Royal Navy destroyer. *Venomous* participated in operations in the Baltic during the inter-war years, the evacuation of Dunkirk, convoy duty in both the Arctic and Mediterranean theatres along with the Invasion of Sicily and the loss of HMS *Hecla* during Operation *Torch*. Further service as a target ship before joining Operation “Apostle” in which she accepted the surrender of German naval forces in Norway cannot help but leave readers amazed by the career of HMS *Venomous* and the accompanying exploits of the crew, a shining example of how ordinary men rise to the challenge during extraordinary and difficult times.

This book is a must-read for all who desire to understand the daily life of a sailor in the Royal Navy from between the wars and until the end of the Second World War. While helping readers better comprehend the challenges associated with life aboard a Royal Navy warship, it will make them realize that *Venomous* clearly lived up to the ship’s motto: “Deadly to foes, Harmless to friends.”

Malcolm A.P. Butler  
Nepean, Ontario

Ferry fleets, which transport people, goods and vehicles in many parts of the world, are remarkably diverse. The ships, however, share some common characteristics, such as spacious vehicle decks and air-conditioned passenger accommodation. They also range in size from small, fast vessels that traverse narrow channels to large roll-on roll-off ships carrying up to 3,000 people and some 650 vehicles.

The author, Peter C. Smith, has published over 20 books on nautical subjects, principally concerning naval vessels in wartime. This book, subtitled “a useful guide to the shipping lines and routes,” is a detailed review of the state of European offshore and channel ferry services and the ships that are employed in them. It is indicative of the steamers’ sad decline, however, that all the current services within and between Scotland, England, Wales, Ireland and the near Continent can be contained within this one slim guide. The author is presently working on a second volume covering river and inshore crossings.

Britain is a land of rivers, estuaries, sounds and straits, where the development of outlying island communities in the nineteenth century was hindered by a lack of reliable shipping services to and from the mainland. Travellers risked their lives in rustic coracles or primitive chain ferries to reach island destinations. Until 1812, Liverpool, London, Hull and the Clyde Estuary were virtually inaccessible, but in that year, Henry Bell launched Europe’s first commercial steamship, the *Comet*. Although the public were charmed by the steamer’s elegance, they greeted steam-powered boats in general with a mixture of disbelief and fear. Early steamers frequently suffered fires and boiler explosions but, as their technology improved, coastal services grew more reliable. After a slow start, steamers reached their heyday between 1820 and 1850 and were one of the most popular forms of transport to remote areas of mainland Britain. Glasgow and the Firth of Clyde prospered through a well-established network of offshore ferry services transporting goods, passengers, livestock and mails.

Steamship companies catered to two markets: the essential communication link between coastal communities and the nearest railhead, and the leisure travel of a population with previously unheard-of free time. The turning point came in the early 1900s, when ferries faced strong competition from the Government’s rail-friendly policy of building bridges and tunnels, rather than harbours and landing stages, leading to the wholesale removal of ferry routes. Whereas in 1913, 40 steamers daily plied their trade between 120 working piers on the west coast of Scotland, in the 1930s, that number had declined to 53. In 1955, 32 piers remained open but only 18 were still open to traffic in 1963. (Paterson 2001, Robins 2006, Sherwood 2007, Osborne 2007)

While this book does not claim to be a history of steam ferries, Smith devotes several chapters to the origins of regular cross-channel passenger traffic. He includes a short article on the first excavations of Ramsgate harbour in 1749, which were not completed until a century later, and a sailing ship route between Sussex and the French coast which existed as early as 1790. Two years later, packets were plying their trade between Brighton and Dieppe. The Firth of Clyde was another competitive arena with intense
rivalries between companies. The roots of the ferry service between Ardrossan and the Isle of Arran can be traced back to the Castle Steam Packet Company founded in 1832. The route was so popular that during the next sixty years, some ten vessels, each one larger than the one before, succeeded each other.

Today, the economics of the ferry business remain complex, with fleets generally operated by large companies, and even long established routes face changes as local communities cope with financial restraints on services and timetables. Surprisingly, the number of genuine islands surrounding Britain’s rocky coast is still hotly disputed. The currently accepted estimate is that a boat would be needed to gain access to 6,289 of them, most of them located in Scotland.

Ferries are still an essential means of transport for many outlying communities in Europe, and on routes that have constantly adapted to changing circumstances, economic as well as political. This intelligent book is a snapshot of important offshore ferry routes as they currently stand, as well as a guide for passengers to the maze of services run by various shipping lines. It is profusely illustrated and informative and makes a valuable contribution to an oft-neglected aspect of the history of maritime commerce that would be enjoyed by those interested in economics and the maritime industry.

Michael Clark
London, England


The United States became involved in the Second World War with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the nadir of America’s preparedness for war. Toll tells how the American sailors and marines frequently conducted simulated combat exercises on the island of Oahu. “On these days, a colossal amount of ammunition was thrown up into the air, and the island’s lightly built wood-frame houses would shake and rattle as if an earthquake had struck. So when the familiar racket started up, at a little before eight in the morning on that first Sunday in December 1941, most of the residents pulled a pillow over their heads, or turned back to their coffee and comic strips and radio programs, and tried to ignore the deep concussive thuds of distant bombs, the heavy booming of antiaircraft batteries, and the faint rat-a-tat-tat of machine-guns. . . But it was soon clear that these were no ordinary exercises. Floors shook, windows rattled, airplanes roared low overhead, and empty machine-gun casings fell on rooftops like hail” (p.7).

Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto saw the conflict that his carrier fleet initiated as “two combatant’s strategic paradigms for the remaining war. Japan’s transcendent ‘fighting spirit’ was [to be] pitted against America’s overwhelming industrial might” (p.486).

During this brief span of time, many historical events changed naval warfare for all time. Ian Toll’s *Pacific Crucible* covers a wide range of topics related to this period in a masterful manner. Historians have a penchant for writing about minutia, yet Toll weaves trivia and anecdotes into a captivating chronicle using clear, well-crafted language.

He vividly describes the primary battles from Pearl Harbor through the raid on the Marshall Islands, the carrier-based Doolittle raid on mainland Japan, and most graphically, the Battle of Midway. He describes the storied Battle of the Coral Sea as “one of the most confused and confusing
battles in the history of war at sea, characterized on both sides by an almost incredible series of miscues, miscommunications, misidentifications, misinterpretations, and miscalculations. . . A tactical victory for the Japanese: a strategic victory for the Allies” (p.374).

America’s revered naval strategist, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, was convinced that dreadnaughts controlled sea battles, but aircraft carriers evolved into the navy’s main battle asset. Toll analyzes the weapons or weapon systems used on both sides. Some worked superbly while others were incredibly deficient, especially the poorly-designed American torpedoes. Rapid advances and dependence on code-breaking and sophisticated intelligence units, such as the secretive “Station Hypo,” plus the installation of radar on vessels at sea made for a deadly chess game where advantages changed constantly. There were triumphs, mistakes, good and bad luck situations, losses on both sides, all played out against a constant backdrop of incredible heroics performed by ordinary men under extraordinary circumstances.

Toll examines and assesses the leadership qualities and quirks of many of the most famous personages of the times. On the American side, the author starts with Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Mahan then goes on to Franklin Roosevelt, George Marshall, and Chester Nimitz. All of these men come across as very competent in their positions. England’s Winston Churchill appears by far the most colourful of this band of allied leaders. As a White House guest, “[Churchill] imbibed throughout the day, remaining razor sharp and supremely articulate like the high-functioning alcoholic that he was—he drank sherry in the morning, whiskey at midday, wine with dinner, smoked Cuban cigars and nursed glasses of brandy well into the small hours of the morning.” The chief of the Secret Service added that Churchill, “ate, and thoroughly enjoyed, more food than two men or three diplomats; and he consumed brandy and scotch with a grace and enthusiasm that left us all openmouthed in awe” (p.178)—much to the annoyance of Eleanor Roosevelt, who feared that the affable and ebullient British prime minister was influencing her Franklin.

William “Bull” Halsey is depicted as a decent man, but a flawed leader; more of a product of the media that needed a naval hero. Halsey fit the image. Frank Jack Fetcher appears as somewhat timid and indecisive, but brave. Enigmatic Ernest King, who combined the positions of commander-in-chief U.S. Fleet and chief of naval operations, was part curmudgeon, part martinet and part brilliant commander, a lady’s man, heavy drinker, and avoider of the limelight. Toll considers Douglas MacArthur the prototypical military self-promoter and, because of many serious blunders, the author does not consider the storied general the great military hero of the war in the Pacific that most people now perceive him.

Toll also profiles many of the Japanese leaders including Emperor Hirohito, Hideki Togo, Takeo “King Kong” Takagi, and Matome Ugaki. The most extensive examination is that of Isoroku Yamamoto, who comes across as a worthy opponent on many levels. Yamamoto, an inveterate gambler and geisha frequenter, made his share of blunders, but, as a two-year “Harvard Man” and former naval attaché in the Japanese Embassy in Washington, he understood and respected the Americans because of their vast untapped resources and ingenuity. He thought it unlikely that Japan could defeat the United States, having seen “enough of the United States to develop a healthy respect for the size and military potential of its industrial base” (p.70). The best that Japan could hope for was a stalemate and post-war gains from diplomatic and political
In summary, the Pacific Crucible is excellent; one of the best Second World War maritime histories that this reviewer has encountered. It is packed with details that mark the tide-like ebb and flow of events, some monstrous in magnitude and others minor mosaic pieces. All those who participated in these actions come alive in Toll’s narrative. This book is scholarly, but at the same time both moving and occasionally entertaining—a significant contribution to the Second World War historical literature. I heartily recommend Pacific Crucible to anyone with an interest in this fascinating period of naval history.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


This interesting small book is not the first, nor even the most comprehensive, on the sinking of three Royal Navy cruisers off the coast of the Netherlands in September 1914. Probably the best known to English readers is Alan Coles’ Three Before Breakfast (Homewell, Hampshire: Kenneth Mason, 1979). This book is rather a more personal telling of the tale by a local man who came across some graves in a Dutch cemetery and, knowing nothing of the story, has carefully researched it, almost entirely from secondary sources comprising books, both official and like Coles’, based on local, English and German newspapers of the day and some supplemental background records. Its primary interest lies in the fact that this is the story of the very first opening salvo in the world of submarine warfare. There had been earlier odd sinkings and attacks by what passed as submarines, such as the Confederate States’ C.L. Hunley of 1863 that sank the USS Housatonic. But such submarines were so little regarded that Hunley, for instance, was a private venture ship, manned by civilians. In fact, before 1914, submarines as a genre were regarded with much suspicion by all major navies as simply a minor threat to their surface dominance. Only Germany, patently threatened with some sort of blockade in any war with Britain, had adopted the submarine as a very real challenge to the RN’s superiority, at least in numbers. The RN and the USN were still reluctant to adopt the submarine into their planning, and largely added them “because the other fellow was doing so.” Although both had included submarines in their navies for six or eight years, those who elected to serve in them were usually ill-regarded, and no anti-submarine doctrine had been developed. In fact, in an exercise in the Channel about 1912, when a squadron admiral was told by signal that his flagship had been (theoretically) torpedoed, he responded “You go to hell!!” There were no depth charges of any type, nor anti-submarine nets.

On 22 September 1914, the torpedoing and subsequent sinking of three somewhat out-of-date RN cruisers—HMS Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy—on blockade patrol off the Dutch coast, in just over an hour by a single U-boat, was a tremendous shock, particularly to the Royal Navy. So much so that many responsible officers announced assuredly it could not have possibly been accomplished by one boat, but certainly there must have been several. In fact there was only one — Kapitänleutnant Otto Weddigen’s U-9, who was at once very much a hero. In particular the story points out that although most major nations had acquired submarines, and
reasonably efficient ones for their day, there was absolutely no way of either locating or attacking them if submerged. Ramming had been successful in a few cases—both accidentally and after war started, intentionally, but that required the submarine to be sighted on the surface. Mining was considered, and was, a far greater danger. Submarine detection was really only being studied by 1915, and it was 1917 before any effective devices were developed. Even then ships usually had to stop and lower hydrophones over the side to listen, a dangerous practice in itself. It was somewhat ex post facto called a “live bait squadron,” not to bait submarines but to lure out German surface forces, which just did not happen.

Van der Linden does not dwell much on this discrepancy between the submarine weapon and defence against it. He devotes a couple of chapters to preparations for war, the battle off Heligoland, and the reasons for the three cruisers being on patrol. He is as much interested and affected by the loss of some 1,459 men and boys from the three ships. He gives a clear minute-by-minute description of the four attacks by Weddigen, and the subsequent rescue of survivors by two small Dutch merchantmen, Flora and Titan. There were four attacks because Weddigen put two torpedoes into Cressy but she didn’t seem to be obviously sinking, so calmly circled around and added a third and fatal one. In particular van der Linden notes the presence aboard the three largely Reserve-manned ships of 28 fifteen and sixteen year old cadets from Dartmouth. With the outbreak of war, their classes had been abruptly ended and the youngsters sent off to be shared around the fleet. Thirteen of them lost their lives in the sinking. There then developed a political contretemps regarding all the survivors, since the Netherlands was neutral and naval personnel should be interned. This was resolved primarily by both sides agreeing they were but distressed seamen and could be returned home. He makes the point, as the British were to furiously comment, that the second and third ships were sunk as a result of their humanitarian efforts to rescue Aboukir’s survivors. It was an eye-opener for all that naval warfare had changed, and not for the better.

The book particularly features personal stories, of the senior officers who ordered the patrols, the commanding officers of the three cruisers and of Weddigen and his first officer, and the survivors, some of whom were subsequently lost in other ships.

The action, really the start of submarine warfare that was to dominate both world wars, provides a fascinating picture of how unprepared navies were for this new weapon. But then we learn slowly. HMCS Regina was torpedoed off the north coast of Cornwall in August 1944 when she stopped to see if a merchantman she was escorting could be towed after, supposedly, being mined; this is what Cressy and Hogue initially believed had happened to Aboukir in 1914. But Regina’s ship had also been torpedoed, by U-667, and 30 RCN seamen paid the price—as had the RN crews 30 years earlier.

An easy read, and an interesting perspective on the first days of submarine warfare.

Fraser McKee
Toronto


This is an important, impressive book. Owing to tremendous savings of costs and time, containerization has transformed
maritime transportation and become the major pillar of global trade. According to The Economist (18 May 2013), the container has been more of a driver of globalization than all trade agreements in the past 50 years taken together. Yet, much remains to learn in order to understand the breadth of the transportation revolution that has remade the world. Most accounts of the container revolution have been presented from the viewpoint of changes in transportation or its economic impact on trade. Hans van Ham and Joan Rijsenbrij have a different perspective and have made an important contribution to greater understanding by presenting the history of the container revolution from a technological viewpoint.

They are well qualified to do so. Both authors teach at the Delft University of Technology and combine a broad general knowledge of trade economics and transportations policies with decades of operational experience in container handling and movement and terminal management. This expertise has been employed to gather together knowledge from shipping lines, terminals and equipment manufacturers about rapidly developing technologies both afloat and ashore, the innovative approaches of engineers and technicians to countless new problems, and ever changing challenges to logistical management in the face of rapid, monumental growth to deliver a broader understanding of containerization than might be found in a strictly historical account of its evolution.

Their book is organized in an interesting fashion into 15 chapters. The first two deal with early developments in the years before 1956 and are by way of a comprehensive introduction. Each of five brief chapters (nos. 3, 5, 9, 11 and 14) deals with subsequent decades of development (e.g. 1956-1966, etc.). The authors highlight one or two features from each period to present straightforward accounts of significant developments in shipping and liner trading around the world. Thus, the first post-1956 decade treats the take-off of the concept of container shipping, the genius of Malcom McLean, an American trucking magnate, and the impact of the Vietnam War, while the next decade examines the spread of containers to Europe. The third decade focuses on ship development, liner trading and the transport chain and containerization spread around the world. Shippers struggled with the question of how much vertical and horizontal integration was possible or desirable. The fourth decade, 1996-2006, characterized by fluctuating profits, emphasizes mergers and acquisition, further ship development and economic performance. The final period, post-2006, stresses the confrontation of ship development and container liner shipping business with the cyclical nature of the container industry. While these chapters provide excellent overviews of the development of containerization during the last half-century, the seven additional chapters interspersed between these five provide much that is new and important and reinforce the book’s technological perspective.

The development of container standardization, for example, was a long difficult struggle that has not ceased, nor is it likely to. Brilliance and excellence shone during the early years, but as companies reduced staffs, focused on their core business and on shareholder value, standardization committees grew weaker as lower level personnel without power of attorney and less keen on upsetting their superiors introduced non-standard containers. The case of the straddle carrier illustrates how a technology adapted from the timber industry became the workhorse of the container industry. Universally adopted for stacking and moving containers in terminals and for loading trucks and
railway cars, it then declined in usefulness as the industry grew beyond the carrier’s capabilities. Though still used extensively, straddle carriers have been by-passed in favour of ever-larger cranes. Other chapters deal with the challenges posed by larger and larger ships, requiring even larger terminals and cranes. As the authors point out, shipping lines push ports and terminals to invest in overcapacity to satisfy their hunger for economies of scale. But massive investments in hinterland terminals and transportation infrastructure lead to questions of whether the imbalance between vessel size and the demands on port and terminal facilities and the hinterland are cost effective for the whole industry. Chapter 12 is almost a book in itself. Its focus on container terminal development introduces the reader to the great changes during the last half-century, first in the United States, then, following a decade of turbulent development, the subsequent spread of container ports around the world. As vessels increased in size and volumes continued to grow, terminal capacity lagged behind demand. The building blocks of automation began to appear, first in the handling of paper work and yard inventories. Computer companies installed systems to reduce the paper burden and assist with sorting data. Telephones and telex gave way to VHF radios. Today, central computers control several semiautomatic stacking cranes equipped with sensors and on-board minicomputers continuously monitoring crane movements, stacking positions, yard inventory and stacking profile. As utility and savings did not always follow innovation, terminal companies introduced operations research in order to speed up activities to keep up with the always growing volume of trade. Over half a century, the container revolution has developed into a worldwide utility indispensable for the global economy, but as the authors argue, economies of scale are not infinite and further developments must rely on entrepreneurship, innovation and drive.

More than 400 illustrations enhance the text, but the several useful graphs and technical drawings are so small they must be read with a magnifying glass. The authors’ explanations are generally clear and to the point, but English is not their first language and the text would have benefitted from a good English editor. The detailed table of contents partially offsets the lack of an index. Few readers will tackle this book in a single read. It is rather a useful handbook, a reference work that readers will want to go back to. Every engineering library should obtain a copy and professionals will want their own copy for ready reference.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario


The annals of Second World War naval history are truly rich with the actions of belligerents waging fierce and exhaustive battles across the globe. From American and Japanese carriers in the Pacific to outmoded battleships seeking prestige in European waters, rival navies continuously sought to overtake their foes at all costs. Forgotten Sacrifice: The Arctic Convoys of World War II, explores the real-life adventures of sailors, airmen and civilians who participated in the “Murmansk Runs”—Arctic convoys—that sailed between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union from 1941 until the end of the war in 1945. Walling, a Coast Guard veteran and accomplished author, uses a plethora of
firsthand accounts written by Allied sailors to help bring their hell-on-earth experience to life. Beginning with a general synopsis of the conception of the Murmansk Runs, Walling focuses mainly on individual convoys sailing east and west which endured countless attacks by the German Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. He also highlights the sheer brutality of the Arctic weather conditions responsible for many of the deaths and horrors experienced by those either stranded at sea or forced to endure bitter frostbite and gangrene while recovering in hospital.

Forgotten Sacrifice opens with a general overview of the conception and organization of Arctic convoys and a synopsis of events culminating in the Second World War. The author essentially credits Winston Churchill with the idea of first gaining control of Iceland; Churchill agreed that “Whoever possesses Iceland holds a pistol firmly pointed at England, America, and Canada” (p.29). British forces, while part of a cooperative occupation maintaining Iceland’s neutrality, bore the brunt of escort duties due to their location and objective to provide aid to the Soviets. By 1941, Wehrmacht forces had already invaded and occupied Poland, Norway, Denmark and Western Europe, bringing most of Europe under Nazi control and further isolating the United Kingdom. With Operation “Barbarossa” in June 1941, not only were Soviet forces preoccupied fighting the German army, but more important logistically, they were cut off from any outside Allied aid, which is essentially the crux of Walling’s argument throughout the book. With the British at the helm, the Allies sought to open up the Arctic route to send relief aid into Soviet ports, despite the real threat of German attack.

The first encounter with enemy air and sea power occurred in December 1941, after the Germans realized the possibility of substantial supplies reaching the Soviets right over their heads. Convoys PQ-4, 6, and 7A were the first to suffer significant damage from Luftwaffe Junker 88s dive bombing PQ-4, and German destroyers mistaking ships of PQ-6 for Russian destroyers. They opened fire and damaged HMS Speedy, forcing her to return to Murmansk. The first U-boat encounter was between U-134 and the British freighter Waziristan, stranded within heavy ice, making her a prime target. After crippling attacks by the Luftwaffe, U-134 sank the British freighter with all her crew. According to Walling, as Allied convoys continued carrying supplies to Russia, the German High Command decided to station more U-boats, capital ships, and cruisers, namely, the Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau, to patrol the Arctic waters. This tactic led to an all-out “arctic shooting gallery” in 1942. The presence of the British Home Fleet, however, helped curb the threat of German surface ships.

Aside from Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine attacks, the worst threat sailors faced was the brutal Arctic weather conditions that Walling successfully recreates for readers. One particular story was that of shipmate Bill Shorts of the merchant vessel Induna, sunk by Luftwaffe bombers in April 1942 while in port at Murmansk. As he recovered in a makeshift hospital, formerly a school, Shorts’ Russian doctors discovered gangrene in both his legs warranting amputation; with no anesthetic, Shorts passed out from the excruciating pain and awoke to discover both legs “literally chopped off…the bone sticking out; the nerve endings exposed” (p.83). Then, to make matters worse, the Russian cold set in, bringing the threat of frostbite to those, like Shorts, whose wounds were still exposed five months after the amputation. Other references to the extreme suffering of crew members include men stranded at sea and exposed to frostbite, hypothermia,
starvation, and dehydration, or those aboard the Russian ship SS Dekabrist marooned on Hope Island near Spitsbergen, who had to endure the winter and spring months until rescued by U-703.

Targeting a general audience, Walling’s examination of Arctic convoys succeeds due to his reliance on first-hand accounts. Unfortunately, some readers may find his lack of analysis of the effectiveness of Allied convoys in aiding the struggling Soviets in the east slightly tiresome. Nevertheless, the author uses the words of sailors, airmen, and civilians to recreate scenes of hell-on-earth and gruesome combat images like those generated by Hollywood blockbusters. In Forgotten Sacrifice, Walling vividly tells the story of war in frigid temperatures through men whose struggles in the Arctic seas should never be forgotten.

Christopher Pearcy
West Haven, CT


A seemingly simple little book has been published about ancient warships. How can one give a good overview in only 48 pages? Credit goes to both the author, Wood, and the illustrator, Giuseppe Rava, for explaining 2,500 years of the history of naval warfare. Wood has training and experience in several different fields which enables him to translate well from academic science to this popular book.

Warships in the Ancient World is reminiscent of Sean McGrail’s Ancient Boats and Ships, published in the Shire Archaeology Series in 2006, although he thankfully leans on more sources, including primary ones. Osprey, publisher of the present volume, has also published related booklets with titles like Salamis 480 BC, Syracuse 415-413 BC, Ancient Greek Warship and finally, Bronze Age War Chariots.

Wood starts with a short chronology beginning with Egypt in 2,500 BC, then discusses Minoan Crete, Bronze-Age Syria, Phoenicia and finally Greece. Unfortunately, Roman ships are left out of the timeline but could, in fact, occupy a book like this per se. The Greek triremes are also absent, due to the cut-off in time, although the first ones were introduced in the 8th century BC. The book ends with a one-page bibliography (unfortunately, without many recent sources) and short index. A brief glossary covers the 30-odd most frequently used terms.

The chronology at the start would have read more easily had it been put into a table, with the addition of colours or symbols for readability. This is a piece of information which only makes sense after having read the whole book—something one would like to page back to.

Because of the lack of space, the author is forced to assume his readers’ background knowledge, like when he discusses Pharaonic Egypt (when for example was the New Kingdom?). Also missing is the 2500 BC Egyptian Khufu ship. It might have been a good idea to first discuss a bit of ship terminology before discussing any specific types of ship and their use, but with less than 50 pages, including almost 50 illustrations, this just is not the goal of this book. Due to the concise format, the author is unable to give as many details as could be wished, or supply exhaustive references.

Wood does not describe only specialized warships. He refers, for example, to the Uluburun find to illustrate how trade vessels may have played a role in
both ancient trade and the protection of it. Another reason to include such important finds is because there is not always much known about specific warships. Wood does offer a few great images of, among others, the Phoenica, but could have spent a few words more on what we have learned from building and sailing these ship replicas, for example, Kyrenia II.

Images in the book comprise illustrations other than Rava’s. With almost one image per page, there are photographs of archaeological artefacts, landscapes and coastlines as well as black and white line maps and drawings on boat building techniques. The 13 watercolours by Rava show ship reconstructions as well as moments from important battles.

The combination of different types of illustrations, together with the concise texts offer the reader a good “touch and feel” for these old warships. This book will certainly draw quite a number of readers, young and old, into the Mediterranean world of ancient warships. While re-reading and paging through the book, a lot more details surface than first meet the eye.

Roeland Paardekooper
Eindhoven, the Netherlands


The book is not overtly about maritime or naval history, yet without those factors the Elbe-Weser region would have been the epitome of a backwater. Its ties to the North Sea fishing industry and European commerce made the area one that attracted keen interest from local and outside governments. Historians should look no further than this study to realize that rivers and seas were the most practical highways of the early modern period. They were the sinews that allowed mercantile, military and political activity in the lands between the Elbe and Weser, and the lands to the south, west and north.

Zickermann’s first chapter is an overview of the conflicting jurisdictions and interests in the Elbe-Weser region. As she rightly points out (pp.10-11), most scholars of early modern Europe have at best only a passing knowledge of its intricacies, which involved the emperor, the king of Denmark-Norway, the free city of Hamburg and a number of local lay and secular rulers, as well as outsiders (the Dunkirkers, Dutch and English) who intervened militarily. She adroitly provides a solid foundation for the venue in which the Scots interacted. It is not uncommon for historians providing this sort of background to build largely upon secondary and printed primary works, but Zickermann’s felicity to scholarship leads her to use manuscript sources, too.

The following three chapters deal with commerce, political and military networks, and attempts to establish a community of exiled British Calvinists. As the author observes, these themes often overlap and extend beyond the area (back to Britain, south to the United Provinces or north to Denmark-Norway or Sweden). Again that phenomenon sustains the vital importance of sea lines of communications in early modern Europe. Zickermann examines the region’s ties with Scotland between c.1590 and c.1740. From the 1590s to the 1630s, Scots helped crew Hamburg’s ships. Longer lasting was the insinuation of Scots into the English Merchant Adventurers in Hamburg. Fishing exports (followed by salt and coal) predominated in connecting Scotland to the area. The focus of both the whitefish and herring trade was Shetland (starting in 1547)—a county often ignored in both its
Scottish and British contexts in the 1600s. Charles II’s enforcement of the Navigation Acts and the growing prevalence of war in northern Europe from the 1670s hampered the trade. Naturally, the Firth of Forth ports contributed the most to the salt and coal trades. Between the 1650s and 1690s a Scottish commercial network, partly kin-based, operated in Bremen and Hamburg, linking those ports to Britain, the United Provinces and Sweden. Still, Shetland was the longest thread. Chapter three, examining the Scots’ diplomatic, political and military networks, reinforces the concept of the North Sea as a unifying factor. It also shows that strict thematic divisions are impossible, because merchants played a role in political and military affairs, which could be continental or British. The propensity of the Scots to serve anti-Hapsburg countries during the Thirty Years’ War reinforces recent academic work. Initially, the British civil wars saw a mixture of Royalists, Covenanters and Parliamentarians frequent the region. That it served as a rallying ground for Royalists may seem odd, until one realizes that Sweden, which gained possession of Bremen and Verden, favored Charles II. After 1660, the ideological factors in military service become confused as professional soldiers sought service with Protestant polities in conflict with each other. Chapter four deals with attempts of exiled British Calvinists to establish an economically viable haven in the area and the subsequent transit of Jacobites (1689-1717). Again, the importance of maritime routes, this time in a largely political context, becomes apparent.

The book has many attractive features. For instance, footnotes, as opposed to end or chapter notes, are used for citations. Furthermore, it has a complete bibliography—not just selected sources. The use of contemporary maps of the area and the cities of Bremen and Hamburg has the tone of authenticity, but these maps are hard to read. Modern renditions would have been preferable. Two maps showing the political boundaries before and after the Treaty of Westphalia, and another showing its trading partners, would have been helped in following the text.

Zickermann’s study also illustrates the pitfalls faced by early modern historians. With her linguistic skills, she is far better prepared than most historians to examine multiple archives in hopes of eliminating lacunae in the sources. In the course of her research she consulted nearly 20 archives in four countries. Still, the disappearance of sources (especially port registers and customs books) or their intentional contemporary suppression (for reasons of statecraft or personal security) leave an untidy landscape, which early modernists share with medievalists. Despite the author’s linguistic ability, gaps in the evidence prevent her from determining the precise nature of economic activity, the size of the exiled reformed British community in Bremen or Brunswick-Lüneburg, or the full scope of Jacobite activities in the region.

The book makes two general contributions to our understanding of early modern Europe. First, it illustrates how sea lanes connected disparate populations from different political entities in commercial, military, political and religious affairs. Second, it discusses English, Scottish and British identities amongst those born in Britain and their descendants. While the area may not have served as an important strategic region, similar to the Low Countries or northern Italy, it was an area of contention. In some respects Zickermann’s book exemplifies the untidy nature of early modern Europe and its dependence on seaborne communications.

Edward M. Furgol
Rockville, Maryland