
The New York Times recently reported that the history of American capitalism is back, and that there is even a new book series on that subject from Columbia University Press. While Smuggler Nation is not a part of that series, it certainly qualifies in its breathless celebration of what it calls “contraband capitalism.” Political scientist Peter Andreas boldly proclaims that the United States is a “smuggler nation” in this sweeping narrative of illicit American trade from colonial times to the present. In so doing, he joins a long list of those who follow Adam Smith’s feeling about such traders: “The smuggler is a person who, though no doubt blamable for violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would have been in every respect an excellent citizen had not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so.”

The irony is, as Andreas points out, that while the United States was born in part as a result of illicit trade and grew economically because of it, today it is the world’s leading anti-smuggling crusader. His conclusion is that “For better or for worse, smuggling was an essential ingredient in the very birth and development of America and its transformation into a global power.” Andreas’s argument is that past policy debates about illicit trade have been mostly forgotten, and that current efforts to seal the border from smugglers have “been more devoid of historical memory, learning, and reflection” (329).

The scope is broad, organized chronologically and by commodity: the colonial era, early republic, westward expansion, gilded age, and modern era. This ambitious approach leaves the book a wide study rather than a deep one, allowing Andreas to paint the American past with a very broad brush indeed. A variety of goods are considered, from “pot to porn” as the author states (xi). Molasses, flour, enslaved Africans, pornography, industrial information, European manufactured goods, liquor, marijuana, Chinese immigrants, cocaine, and Mexican immigrants. What is shocking is just how much of this contraband was “live cargo,” especially people destined to do the most grueling labor in the nation. This includes enslaved Africans before the Civil War, and later illegal immigrants from China and Latin America, all valued for their cheap labour. Today, that live cargo is more likely to be Guatemalan or Cambodian infants, destined for childless couples in the developed world. Also important, but few in number, were the emigrants smuggled out of the United Kingdom, their brains stuffed with technical knowledge that helped initiate the industrial revolution in America. Smuggling is the constant, enforcement is what changed, ranging from the anemic British enforcement of mercantilist policies to the present armies of armed federal agents interdicting illegal trade and immigration in the present time. This
massive growth in the ability and desire of
government to control trade is one of the
more alarming aspects of this book, and
represents a major shift in American
governance from *laissez-faire* policies to
those of a security state.

While the early chapters on
colonial smuggling read like a textbook of
fifty years ago, the author’s observations
and arguments grow more interesting and
controversial when he addresses issues of
the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first
century. This is especially true regarding
the “War on Drugs,” which Andreas
compares to the British crusade in the
nineteenth century against the slave trade,
but where the British were freeing people,
the war on drugs is about locking them up.
Using his historical perspective, he also
points out that what is illegal today may be
licit tomorrow, holding marijuana up as an
example. Interestingly, Andreas portrays
the war on drugs as a failed century-long
effort to control citizens’ lives, and one that
has notably failed, at an enormous cost to
taxpayers and families.

The author’s conclusions are also
worth noting as they regard globalization
and enforcement of international trade
regulations. For Andreas, smuggling
demonstrates that globalization is both
limited and incomplete, and the United
States lies at the heart of globalization’s
failures, aggressively exporting a “global
anti-smuggling agenda more than any other
nation.” It has bullied or cajoled much of
the world into supporting a dismal “War on
Drugs,” even as it has obstructed efforts to
limit small weapons trafficking. True to
Adam Smith’s vision of trade, Andreas
argues that it is the existence of government
controls that make smugglers adapt and
devise creative and elaborate means of
moving contraband across borders. Given
that government resources are limited, and
that presumably the United States seeks to
maintain an open society and promote licit
trade and travel, Andreas argues that the
government will never fully control its
borders. Furthermore, the massive effort to
secure the border, especially that with
Mexico, has resulted in “enormous
collateral damage,” including the death of
illegal immigrants, a militarized and violent
southern border, and a dysfunctional
immigration system, not to mention a huge
number of people imprisoned for drug
violations. If smuggling does define and
shapes the nation, then the United States of
the twenty-first century is far from the
egalitarian republic it professes to be.

This book reads well, much like an
extended article in *Atlantic* magazine or one
of its ilk, with the aim of informing and
provoking the educated reading public
rather than persuading scholars. It has been
widely but not deeply researched with the
help of a number of assistants, and Andreas
does not conceal his own thoughts on
contraband commerce, which are to remove
as much regulation as possible, and to end
the war on drugs, using a mass of historical
evidence to support his views rather than to
arrive at an independent conclusion.

Joshua M. Smith
Port Washington, New York

Julia Angster. *Erdbeeren und Piraten: Die
Royal Navy und die Ordnung der Welt
1770-1860.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, www.v-r.de, 2012. 345 pp.,
illustrations, notes, index. €64,99, cloth;
978-3-647-30037-5.

It seems to be obligatory among English-
language publishers nowadays to give their
books a meaningless but catchy title, while
confining information about the contents to
a subtitle. Evidently the fashion has spread
to Germany: this is not really a book about
strawberries and pirates, though both are
mentioned, but about the Royal Navy and
the “ordering of the world.” It is concerned both with the activities of the Navy overseas, especially in the Pacific and the Arctic, and with an understanding of their wider significance in the course of history.

Successive chapters describe in detail the Navy as an organization of state and as a society afloat; naval voyages of exploration from Cook to Franklin; the naval hydrographers; the naturalists and other naval scientists; the contribution of the Navy to shaping what was later named anthropology; agriculture as an expression of a new economic order; and finally the fight against Greek and Malay pirates. At one level, this is a detailed analysis and narrative of selected aspects of British naval history over almost a century, directed at German readers who may not be familiar with them. It is based on selective research among manuscript collections, and wide reading in printed sources—though rather a lot of them are cited as titles alone, without page numbers, and almost all the publications of the Hakluyt Society are conspicuously absent. The level of accuracy is high but not infallible: when John Barrow was made a baronet he did not become a nobleman; the Duke of Clarence was installed in the revived office of Lord High Admiral in 1827, not “First Sea Lord, an equivalent of First Lord of the Admiralty”; the Ordnance Board was by no means the same as a modern Ministry of Defence; and the English term “civil law” does not refer to statutes. Occasionally the author falls back on stereotypes. On the failure of the first post-war Arctic expedition, that of Ross and Parry in 1817, to take anyone with experience of ice navigation, she comments that the hierarchical and class-bound Navy could not contemplate entrusting its ships to a whaling master rather than an officer and a gentleman—which rather overlooks the fact that captains had been putting their ships in pilots’ hands for hundreds of years. In this case the Admiralty learnt from its mistake, and subsequent Arctic expeditions embarked “ice-masters,” all of whom were whalers. But these are details: overall the book can be used as a thorough guide to its period, at a level of detail which only well-informed readers will be able to match.

The book’s real interest and originality, however, lie not in the factual details but in the interpretative framework. The author’s central thesis is that naval officers set out to discover new oceans and new worlds of scientific knowledge—but they were not simply filling in blank spaces on intellectual and physical maps. On the contrary, they sailed as “scientific gentlemen” of the late-Enlightenment era, already fully equipped with mental maps on which to locate their new discoveries. They took with them the Admiralty Manual of Scientific Enquiry (an extraordinary omission from Professor Angster’s bibliography) which laid out a complete programme of research in every branch of knowledge. The most characteristic intellectual activity of the Enlightenment was the imposing of order, the establishment of “systems” by which the chaos of new experience could be tamed. Botany was in the forefront of this work partly because Linneus had established the first and most comprehensive “system” of them all. Moreover, the Navy’s work exemplified the utilitarian and economic aspects of discovery. Officers well understood that they were the bearers of progress to backward parts of the world, to which it was their duty to impart what a Parliamentary committee in 1837 called “that civilization, that innocent commerce, that knowledge and that faith with which it has pleased a gracious Providence to bless our own country.” They also knew that their own country stood to benefit from Progress even more than everybody else. “Economic botany” meant among other things the transfer of plants around the world to
improve agriculture and promote economic growth. Sometimes, as with Captain Bligh’s breadfruit trees, the transplants did not flourish, but the effort endowed parts of the future British Empire with such crops as tea, silk, rubber, sisal and quinine. In order to promote agriculture and trade, it was essential to establish property rights (still a staple of development economics to-day), so agricultural reform on land involved a new legal order, just as trade at sea called for ancient forms of private warfare to be identified and suppressed as “piracy.” Both literally and metaphorically, the Navy was imposing a new law and a new order on the world. The Admiralty chart was a practical necessity for world-wide trade and navigation, but it was also an expression of intellectual mastery; a grid centred on Greenwich which contained and expressed British control of the geography of the floating world. The great age of “reform” in Britain was also the great age of reform overseas, as the beat of what Thackeray called the “civilizing paddle wheel” announced to the remotest islands the coming of Liberalism, progress and free trade.

Though settler colonies like New South Wales were founded in this period, this was more a matter of intellectual influence and “informal empire” than of direct rule. It extended over wide areas of the world which were never part of the British Empire, and in fundamental ways it shaped the whole modern world’s understanding of itself. The author is surely right to end her book after the Crimean War, when the Royal Navy began to turn back towards the lost arts of naval war just as the British government began to turn back towards the discredited idea of colonies overseas. A new empire began to be constructed—but thanks to the Navy, Britain already had intellectual control of the world, understood and organized in Enlightenment terms, as to a great extent it still is. This is the theme and importance of this book. Some of its ideas will be familiar to experts (notably from the Oxford History of the British Empire), but this is a powerful and elegant summary of them which deserves to be widely read and rapidly translated.

N.A.M. Rodger
Oxford, England


The editors of Britain’s Oceanic Empire have marshaled together a host of leading scholars whose work is as diverse as their points of origin. Their goal is to provide readers with a comparative study of vastly different regions of the British Empire. This has been a “work in progress” since 2004 and was birthed from conferences, numerous rounds of discussions among the participants as well as input from some of the world’s most respected scholars in imperial history. While the differences between these imperial spaces are obvious and undeniable, the comparative exercise yields a cornucopia of insights into the nature of British rule on land and sea in the early modern era and into more modern times.

At first, or even second glance, the reader is struck by how different these regions are in terms of the climates, indigenous populations, the nature of trade as well as a multiplicity of other factors. This is expressed in the use of language to discuss these regions as “worlds” unto themselves. Yet the editors and authors
assume that there must also be points of commonality that have been overlooked. To this end they explore a vast array of subjects—everything from arguments about the legal and constitutional underpinnings of empire to British-indigenous contacts within the empire, with its various incarnations. These chapters are grouped into sections based on overarching themes used to explore the early modern Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds.

The first section focuses on the oceans and their “metropolitan circuits”. It features “Geographies of the British Atlantic World” by Stephen J. Hornsby and “Britain in the Indian Ocean Region and Beyond: Contours, Connections, and the Creation of a Global Maritime Empire” by H. V. Bowen. These chapters emphasize the importance of British trade patterns and navigation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Huw Bowen comments about East India Company histories, the “sea disappears almost entirely from view when the story reaches the mid-eighteenth century” (45) and this is true of this volume as well. The “oceanic” part of empire features less and less in the subsequent sections. For those of us drawn to the book by its title and more interested in the seas than settlement, this is disappointing.

The second section discusses sovereignty, law and governance by way of an examination of how the British asserted their dominance over their subjects and their territories outside of Europe. It includes “Imperial Constitutions: Sovereignty and Law in the British Atlantic” by Ken MacMillan; “Constitutions, Contact Zones, and Imperial Ricochets: Sovereignty and Law in British Asia” by Robert Travers; “Company, State, and Empire: Governance and Regulatory Frameworks in Asia” by Philip J. Stern; and “The Oriental Atlantic: Governance and Regulatory Frameworks in the British Atlantic World” by Jerry Bannister.

The theme of the third group of essays deals with diplomatic and military interactions and explores the varied relationships between the British and their Irish, Amerindian, and Asian subjects: “Subjects, Clients, Allies or Mercenaries? The British Use of Irish and Amerindian Military Power, 1500–1800” by Wayne E. Lee; “Diplomacy between Britons and Native Americans, c.1600–1830” by Eric Hinderaker; “Diplomacy in India, 1526–1858” by Michael H. Fisher; and “Army Discipline, Military Cultures, and State Formation in Colonial India, 1780–1860” by Douglas M. Peers. These essays make it clear that Britain’s subjects in the far-flung empire were anything but passive participants in the British Empire.

The fourth section concentrates on British imperial commercial and social relations and the consequences for North America and India: “Seths and Sahibs: Negotiated Relationships between Indigenous Capital and the East India Company” by Lakshmi Subramanian; “The Commercial Economy of Eastern India under Early British rule” by Rajat Datta; “Anglo-Amerindian Commercial Relations” by Paul Grant-Costa and Elizabeth Mancke; and “Placing British Settlement in the Americas in Comparative Perspective” by Trevor Burnard.

The findings and the questions raised by editors in the introduction and afterword and the authors within their respective chapters can’t possibly be summed up in this short review. Suffice it to say that Britain’s Oceanic Empire is billed as a “pioneering comparative study of British imperialism in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds.” The editors intended for the disparate chapters to be bound together by the all-encompassing question of whether British Asia and the British Atlantic were two worlds or one. (xi) Their desire was that the volume should exceed the sum of its parts. Without question, it
has done that and more. Readers are given a vast number of vantage points from which to gaze at this sprawling empire. As we might expect, however, some chapters offer more to the overriding vision of examining “potential comparisons, contrasts, and connections” than others (xi).

This volume represents a movement away from individual historians producing extremely narrow studies without contributing much to the “big historical picture.” This is a very significant work in terms of what it reveals about British imperial history, but also in its collaborative approach. We should applaud the intrepid team of editors, authors, and advisors of *Britain’s Oceanic Empire* for providing us a buffet of food for thought on which historians can dine on for years. It remains to be seen whether their efforts spawn similar group ventures and if it leads to a major re-examination of the history of the early modern British world they desire (11).

Cheryl Fury  
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


Many readers will be familiar with the oft-used quotation that Britain and America are two countries divided by a common language. What they may be less familiar with is that during the Second World War they were two allies often divided by a common aim, or by the strategy to be adopted in pursuit of that aim. More specifically, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were often divided themselves in how to achieve the political aims they were set by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR).

Allied aims and strategy were agreed at a series of conferences known by their location (and their code name). These conferences started before America was officially at war with a meeting at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland (*Riviera*) and Churchill went to America immediately after Pearl Harbor for a series of conferences in Washington (*Arcadia*) in 1941-42. Further conferences followed, again at Washington (*Argonaut*) and Moscow (*Bracelet*) later in 1942. But it was with the increasing tempo of these from 1943 that this book is principally concerned. That year there were conferences at Casablanca (*Symbol*), another at Washington (*Trident*), at Quebec (*Quadrant*) and at the end of the year the three meetings at Cairo (*Sextant*), Tehran (*Eureka*) and back to Cairo. In many respects, Casablanca was one of the most important as it was there that FDR announced the key war aim of “Unconditional Surrender” in order to avoid any resurgence of Germany and Japan that could have occurred after a negotiated peace, and also to reaffirm the earlier “Germany First” principle.

Prior to each of these conferences there were extensive discussions and arguments among the U.S. JCS and various sub-committees set up to review options. The Americans were acutely aware of being outmanoeuvred by the British in the early conferences which led to the adoption of the British “Mediterranean Strategy” and the Torch landings in North Africa, rather than the Second Front that Stalin wanted and General George Marshall, the Army chief on the JCS, was pushing for and this had implications for later conferences. But for now FDR was also aware that after all the marching and counter-marching, it was essential for U.S. troops to be fighting Germans somewhere in 1942 if the overall aim of “Germany First” was to be
maintained. There was also heavy pressure, however, from Admiral Ernest King, the USN’s chief on the JCS for more resources to be devoted to the Pacific, the main area of USN activity. The events of Pearl Harbor had finally made the country realize it was in a real fight in the Pacific and, to paraphrase the President’s words, “a state of war had existed since the attack on December 7th.” It took six to twelve months (much as Isoroku Yamamoto had predicted) for the U.S. to stem the tide of the early defeats at Wake Island, the Philippines, etc. Having fought the Japanese to a standstill at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal, it was obviously still going to require a considerable effort (and additional resources) to roll-back their advance in both the western Pacific and S.E. Asia. What was needed was a plan.

But it was in the question of allocation of scarce resources, despite the U.S.A.’s vast industrial production, that problems often arose and compromises had to be agreed. Many of these stemmed from American determination to limit the Mediterranean “soft underbelly” approach and allocate resources to the second front in Normandy to defeat Germany and to Nimitz and McArthur’s drives in the Pacific to defeat Japan. An essential add-on to that thrust was to defeat Japan in North Burma and reopen the Burma road to support Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to liberate China from the Japanese.

Although the title of the book refers to the Pacific war, this needs to be read in context as the War against Japan because of the Burma/China situation. FDR saw the political importance of keeping Nationalist China involved in the war both as an ally against the Japanese, and for the post-war future of that country and U.S. influence. This lasted until exasperation with the lack of active Chinese involvement led to a reappraisal of that aim, the recall of General Stilwell in 1944, and increasing pressure on Stalin to become involved once Germany had been defeated.

Charles Brower, a retired Brigadier General with 32 years’ service and latterly, a career as a historian at Virginian Military Institute, is well placed to provide an analysis of these events. His previous books include WWII in Europe: The Final Year (ed.) and George C Marshall: Soldier of the American Nation.

What Brower has achieved with this book is to present a remarkably detailed record and assessment of the discussions and arguments both prior to and at the wartime conferences and meetings, the positions adopted by the various parties and how compromises and readjustments were achieved, often in spite of the influence of the political leaders FDR and Churchill. That he has managed to do this in only 152 pages without missing any of the key events is a remarkable achievement. He has done this partly by a very extensive series of endnotes which total 44 pages for only seven chapters, three times longer than is often found in books three times the size. His 14-page bibliography ranges from manuscripts, records in the U.S. and U.K. National Archives, interviews, published government records and various other works and articles. The list of these covers every major work by the various writers who have dealt with this topic, usually at much greater length. There is also an eight-page index, nine photographs of the main participants and a series of maps which provide a very useful illustration of the areas involved and the strategic direction.

What this book is not, is an account of the fighting between the U.S. and Japan. Rather it is concerned with strategic planning at the highest level and the fighting that took place among the JCS and at the various conferences. It is clear from this that although the Western Allies were united in their war aims, they were not united in the strategy of how to achieve
them. Furthermore, this was not simply a conflict between Britain and the U.S. It was frequently a conflict between the individual chiefs themselves. This culminated in the need for them to agree how to defeat Japan after Germany but before public war-weariness forced a rethink on unconditional surrender. Admiral King and the Army Air Force Chief, General Arnold, favoured siege and bombardment, but Marshall favoured invasion as the only quick method of bringing the war to an end, though all the JCS and newly-appointed President Harry S. Truman were worried about the estimates of casualties. In the event, other factors, like the Atomic Bomb and Soviet involvement, proved the deciding feature but Brower uses the debate to illustrate the extent to which the JCS recognized the essential connection between political aims and military strategy. It is in this part of the book that Brower provides his most cogent illustration of how the JCS, with the addition of Admiral Leahy’s prodding on behalf of the president, had evolved from purely military strategists to leaders who understood the political implications of the schemes they were proposing.

If there is one point of criticism, it is not of Brower but the publisher’s price of £55 (U.K.) which many readers will baulk at for seven chapters and 152 pages. They should not, however, ignore the prodigious 44 pages of endnotes and bibliography mentioned previously. Overall, it is a thoroughly intriguing analysis.

John Francis
Greenwich, England

The Ebersdorf ship model is an important historical find, known to science since the late 1970s, and dating to the fourteenth century. It is part of the collection of the Collegiate Church in Ebersdorf, Germany, situated far inland near Chemnitz in Saxony. The importance of this ship model equals that of the model from Mataró, near Barcelona dating from about 1450. It is the oldest known ship model in Northern Europe which is built like a real vessel.

Written in two languages, the book describes the legend around the ship model (Steusloff), the history of its discovery (Steusloff), and an extensive review of its building technique (Christensen). A brief concluding chapter discusses the tempting idea of making a full-size replica (Steusloff). The first author, Steusloff, has been a maritime ethnologist since the mid-1970s. His co-author, Christensen, has been a leading maritime archaeologist since the late 1960s. The two complement each other well: where the technical description is very factual, the legend and the history of the find place it in context.

There is a legend linked to the ship model in the Ebersdorf Collegiate church. It is supposedly a votive model dedicated by a knight who was saved from a raging storm in the Mediterranean on his way home from the Holy Land. He vowed to offer a model of his ship filled with gold in thanksgiving; that ship model is now in Ebersdorf. While the ship of legend was a Mediterranean ship, the votive ship was modeled after a Northern-European example.

In 1978, while working on a book about ship models in churches, Dr. Steusloff learned about the existence of the medieval Ebersdorf ship model. His description of the find reads like diary entries, starting in November 1977 and continuing up to 1983. Steusloff first heard about the ship model in July 1978. It had been sent for conservation in Dresden in 1972, but was never touched

and eventually forgotten. It must be realized that this was during the period when Dresden was part of what was known as the DDR or East Germany. It was more than a year before Steusloff could view the model and confirm its late medieval North-European style. He describes the condition in which he found the ship, grateful that it was not repaired and slowly forgotten, rather than repaired or replaced like other votive ship models in churches closer to the Baltic and North Sea coast. In 1988, Christensen, a Norwegian, examined it and the next year it was restored and exhibited for the first time. Interestingly, the exhibition was held in Hamburg, West Germany, the same year the Berlin Wall fell. The model then returned to Ebersdorf, 18 years after it was first scheduled for restoration.

Half of the book is a discussion by Christensen about the model-building technique, existing parallels and its possible original appearance. The Ebersdorf model was built by an experienced ship builder, although there is evidence of shortcuts or simplifications here and there. The iron nails, for example, are not to scale. From its characteristics it can be dated slightly later than the famous Bremen Cog of 1380, but cannot be assigned to a specific ship type (cog or hulk). Radiocarbon dating suggests a date around 1400 AD and some details could point to a Baltic, not North Sea origin. The model was in a bad state when it was found, many pieces were missing or damaged, therefore leaving many questions as to the original appearance unanswered. Christensen describes the model in great detail, and also describes how he actually did the measuring. He often compares details of the model to iconography, historical and archaeological sources. Christensen recognizes the strakes are cut by an axe, and not sawn; the chapter is full with such details. He lists archaeological finds with comparable details but obviously, there is no single ship which matches the Ebersdorf model in all details. A lot of information can be derived from the model, but there remain many ifs and buts. Even so, Christensen is able to conclude with several line drawings suggesting how the model originally looked.

Where Steusloff discusses full-size ship (re)constructions in the last three pages, he does so mainly to describe a failed attempt to build “a life size Ebersdorf ship.” The ship which seems to have been inspired by the Ebersdorf model is, however, over one-third longer than the original, to note just one detail. The approach in making it was semi-scientific. Unfortunately, the attempt to (re)construct the famous model in true scale failed hopelessly. This is a sad “bonus chapter” to the book; it would have been better without.

The book contains an image on every second page, taken from both the ship model itself and other relevant sources. The bilingual text is very important as the significance of this ship model reaches beyond Germany. One might argue that the engineering discussion alone could be published as a large scientific article (eliminating one language would save length but appendices and literature would add again substantially). The subject is, however, merits publication as a book. The Ebersdorf ship model is unique and deserves to be set extensively in context. This is a book many people will keep referring to for quite some time.

Roeland Paardekooper
Eindhoven, The Netherlands


In this golden age of naval history, no subject seems to attract so many historians as British naval planning before the Great War. Stephen Cobb’s book, with its curious title (“contingency” here seems to mean “strategy” or “planning”) is at least the fourth on the subject in little over a year, following Nicholas Lambert’s Planning Armageddon, Shawn Grimes’s Strategy and War Planning, and Matthew Seligmann’s The Royal Navy and the German Threat (and there are more on the way). This is an uncomfortable situation for an author to find himself in. Inevitably Dr. Cobb has not been able to take full account of these almost simultaneous rival publications, though he is aware of Seligmann’s argument, and one page describing Lambert’s book has been inserted, seemingly at the last minute. Inevitably, too, readers will compare these competing interpretations, and all of them are likely to suffer by comparison with Lambert’s extensive research and radical argument.

Dr. Cobb’s book began life as a 2007 doctoral thesis from King’s College, London, and with so many new ideas put forward since then, it is already looking rather dated. As a retired sociology lecturer, Dr. Cobb does not seem altogether at ease with history. Whereas the other authors all offer a distinctive argument, this book is primarily descriptive, with long passages simply paraphrasing its sources, and its brief attempts at analysis seem hesitant and unconvincing. In structure it reads as a semi-detached series of short studies of aspects of naval planning, based on a limited amount of original research and an incomplete knowledge of the existing literature. Key terms like “blockade,” the disputed meaning of which lies at the heart of the British strategic debate, are neither defined here nor used with precision. The wider political and diplomatic context of naval planning largely escapes him. The author discusses the French Jeune École, but seems scarcely aware of the politics without which it is impossible to make sense of its impact, either in France or Britain. He looks at British participation in the second Hague Conference of 1907, but seems to assume that there was a single agreed British position—which was very far from being the case. He has only a slight understanding of international law and what the Royal Navy intended to get from the Hague and London conventions.

There is a chapter on the professional education of late-Victorian officers, but it is superficial by comparison with the thorough analysis in Mary Jones’s 1999 Exeter thesis, which Cobb has not consulted. He devotes two chapters to armed merchant cruisers, a subject on which a good deal of research has been done over the past forty years, but he has not encountered all of it, and his treatment does not penetrate far beneath the surface. He abandons his promising account of the 1906 naval manoeuvres to plunge down a minor byway; the indemnity insurance policy which the Admiralty took out to cover the merchant ships which participated. Here Dr. Cobb insists that the underwriters’ premium of 3s 9d “per cent”—meaning of course per hundred pounds insured—actually meant per ton insured; an absurdity which reduces his explanation to an inextricable muddle.

The pity is that there is some good research behind this book, and tantalizing references which the reader longs to follow up. The 1906 manoeuvres, for example, were meant to meet Sir Arthur Wilson’s demand that trade defence be exercised “at a scale of twelve inches to the foot.” They were surely important; one could exchange a good deal of detail about liability insurance for a fuller and clearer treatment
than the manoeuvres receive here. If the book had a firm structure and a clear argument, then the significance of its underlying research could be understood. As it is, its most useful contribution is probably the extensive biographical appendix which constitutes a sort of “Who’s Who in British Naval Intelligence.”

N.A.M. Rodger
Oxford, England


This publication is the final report of the excavation, recording, conservation, and research of a Mediterranean shipwreck located in the Straits of Messina just off the Italian mainland, which dates to the Classic period. The documentation in this text includes a detailed analysis of what remains of the ship’s hull and of the items associated with the site. As a result, the report provides a complete catalogue of artefacts along with illustrations and historic use of those artefacts. The purpose of this volume is to bring to light the archaeology and evidence of early Mediterranean ship construction, sailing technology and trade in commodities spanning many cultures, especially that of Classical Greece.

Beyond the acknowledgements, bibliography and index, the chapters of the volume are presented in a clearly defined and orderly fashion. The first of the six chapters details the vessel’s discovery by looters, its eventual seizure by local authorities and subsequent study by responsible academics from Italy and faculty from the University of Pennsylvania. The following chapters focus on the ship itself and its fittings, the stern storage area, the cargo, a lengthy examination about the site’s key find, a life-sized bronze statue, and lastly, a concluding chapter. While the entire volume itself is a worthwhile read, each chapter does and can stand alone, which is a noteworthy aspect of this work. Individual chapters are enlightening and complete with comprehensive text, tables, artefact illustrations and footnotes, all specific to certain interests. The benefit of this organization is that a reader does not have to wade through an entire book looking for information since each chapter presents a single area of study and analysis.

The authors also succeed in using a variety of sources to clarify and solidify their research, which is necessary for two reasons. The first is that the dispersal and history of the artefacts on the site make it extremely difficult to assign any provenance, thus the integrity of the site and associated items are challenged. Lying at a depth of approximately 30 metres amid a scattering of huge rocks, it is evident that the ship suffered a brutal sinking which tore the hull to apart once it struck the bottom. The wreck is located in the Straits of Messina, an area known for treacherous waters and turbulent currents, which also contributed to the destruction of the ship and dispersal of artefacts. In addition, the area had served as a ship anchorage for centuries, thus anchors and other lost items from earlier ships interfering with an exacting study of the Porticello shipwreck. Lastly, the looters who initially found the site had several months to ransack it and move items around. Therefore, the use of outside sources is necessary in order to apply any sort of context to the site and its artefacts.

The second reason for using outside sources is that with so little remaining of the ship’s hull, it is necessary
to use the work and reports from other sites contemporaneous with the Porticello Wreck to bring it into context. The independent sources used are from esteemed archaeologists and other experts whose proficiency provides an excellent nexus between the Porticello Wreck and other wrecks and sites. Therefore, the authors avoid basing their conclusions on pure conjecture and minimal physical evidence. In turn, this work becomes not simply a report on what was found on the site but, in reality, a good and sufficient comparative study of an entire maritime era and genre. In the end, the authors are successful in placing their work on solid footing and making it clear that what was found on the site could be intrusive.

Another aspect that gives this volume authority and legitimacy are the authors themselves. Both authors are successful archaeologists and have written numerous publications on archaeological as well as other subjects. The result is a work assembled by a team whose level of knowledge and professionalism establishes the legitimacy and credibility of this work.

In conclusion, the book is not meant for the general audience; however, the information derived from the discussions serves as an excellent repository of information for those from many disciplines. Students and aficionados of classical Greek archaeology, art, and economy will do well by adding this monograph to their shelves. Those individuals interested in the classical period of early Mediterranean trade and history will also benefit from having this work available to them. Finally, archaeologists and maritime historians will find the text, tables and illustrations useful as a volume of comparative study.

Wayne Abrahamson
Pensacola, Florida


Edda Frankot sets out to investigate the concept of a common law of the sea in Late Medieval Northern Europe, in part from a Scottish perspective. Her materials are the sea laws, i.e. usually coherent bodies of law dealing with such necessary nautical matters as shipwreck, salvage, freight charges and crew wages, and also the extant records of court cases that employed them. A broad-based approach, in which she examines sea law through a lens that spans Scotland, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Germany, is a welcome feature in a world of tightly focused monographs.

The work covers the period 1200 to 1500 AD, with some concentration towards the end of this span, which was marked by increased codification and dissemination of sea laws. What did not increase, however, was uniformity. While the customary and well-known sea law the Rôles d’Oléron was used by certain voluntary associations and enforced in some regions—most famously England—its use across northern seas was far from consistent. Frankot demonstrates, with impressive attention to detail, that a broad range of different sea laws were established over the period. Most of these arose as a natural consequence of autonomous urban authorities.

Frankot is at pains to emphasize that similar legal norms may arise because certain conditions call for similar solutions, and not necessarily because they spring from a common source. In chapter two, she analyses three important areas of marine jurisprudence in Northern Europe:
shipwreck, ship collisions, and jettison (the practice of throwing cargo overboard to lighten a ship's load in dangerous conditions). Her survey, which compares the Rôles d'Oléron with the laws of Hamburg, Wisby, Kampen and others, emphasizes the differences between them. For example, the law of Wisby, in common with the Rôles d'Oléron, required a captain to consult with his merchants before throwing cargo overboard in harsh conditions, but this regulation is not found in most of the other urban sea laws. Likewise, compensation for jettisoned goods was calculated on the value of the lost cargo, but in some cases this was based on their estimated sale price in the ship's city of origin, and in others, at its destination. Incidental details in the codes provide valuable insight into shipping practices, as when we hear of captains of older ships allowing themselves to be struck by other vessels in order to collect the compensation. Despite many differences in detail, however, one commonality that emerges from the various sea laws is an increase in shared liability over time. This development, in which damages were shared more evenly between shipowners, captains, and merchants, would seem to have arisen from changing social conditions, but Frankot does not investigate the matter in detail.

In chapters three to seven, Frankot turns from the content of the sea laws to their enforcement in local courts. This is the meat of the book, and makes for a dense but informative read. It is based on archival work with court records and sea law manuscripts in five towns: Aberdeen, Kampen, Lübeck, Reval, and Danzig. This quintet is diverse in place and politics: Aberdeen was part of the Scottish Kingdom, Lübeck the leading town of the Hanseatic League, Danzig a football kicked between Poland and the Order of Teutonic Knights. But all five shared a like relationship with the sea, albeit on different scales. They depended on maritime commerce, either as entrepôts or commodity exporters, and their commerce in turn required laws. These were to be found in their archives, but, as by now the reader will expect, there was considerable diversity across the five towns. Frankot makes it clear that no single legal norm prevailed over the seas of Northern Europe in the medieval era. Not only did cities maintain different laws, they did not consistently apply them, even in their own courts. The judicial system described in chapter seven emerges as governed as much by common sense and oral practice as by written laws.

Frankot is more interested in demonstrating diversity than in analyzing its origins, although she gives the matter some cursory attention in chapter five and the conclusion. This reviewer might have preferred more investigation of the social dynamics distinguishing the adoption of customary sea law in some regions and local variants in others, as well as more discussion of how sea law, initially a distinct body, came to be assimilated to local urban law, a process suggesting a consolidation of the cities' nautical identity.

From the onset, Frankot sets herself against the idea of a common international law of the sea in medieval northern Europe, while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of examining maritime law in a European context. She evidently intends her work as a corrective to a historiographic tradition that has perhaps overemphasized the importance of customary sea laws, a heritage derived—although it is not discussed—from the universalizing attitude enshrined in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Custom of the Sea and Admiralty Law. The tension between local and large-scale serves as a useful critical approach, as she can consistently compare local law and practice against the (supposed) international norms of such customary law as the Rôles
d’Oléron. If her conclusion, that in diverse maritime cities there existed a great diversity of law and legal customs, is no surprise, the book is nonetheless valuable as a study of an underappreciated aspect of medieval legal and maritime history.

Romney Smith
London, Ontario


This book is beautifully illustrated with outstanding photographs of many superb models of frigates that were in use throughout the period under discussion. The models are either in the National Maritime Museum Collection in England, in United States Naval Academy Museum at Annapolis, Maryland, and one in the Thomson Collection in The Art Gallery of Ontario in Toronto. Gardiner has done a wonderful job of researching what had to have been a difficult subject, especially for the early years. Nonetheless, he has presented his findings clearly, logically and in an easy to read manner.

I was surprised to find that the book does not use footnotes, instead it provides access to material specific to this book through the Seaforth Publishing Website, allowing readers to pursue a given aspect further. The concept ties the book to the original research sources, quotations and the like, while continuing to follow the thread in the book; an interesting and useful feature. Presumably, this makes the book more compact and lower in cost, while providing all readers with information more easily than researching the same material on far larger and more broadly based websites.

There is also access to the National Maritime Museum website, where you can key in the SLR identification number for a specific model in the book to bring up a detailed description of the model, and all other photos of the model in the NMM files. This combination makes it a very useful tool for additional research whether it is related to this book or not.


Gardiner provides an explanation of the term frigate, which he indicates has its origin in the Mediterranean, and was generally applied to vessels that were small, fast, and lightly armed, all characteristics of subsequent ships called frigates. England was to appreciate their effectiveness when Spanish privateers (known as Dunkirk frigates) operating out of Spanish-controlled Flemish ports seized in excess of 300 British merchant ships during the 1625 - 1630 war with Spain. This was about one-fifth of the English merchant fleet at that time. Unfortunately, the King’s navy, while
well equipped with heavier vessels, had no smaller ships that could combat these fast frigates specifically designed for “fight or flight.” Even when they were fleeing under oars or sweeps, the English could not catch them with their powerful navy. Clearly, a new class of naval vessel was in order.

After the war, two Spanish frigates were arrested by the English when their crews were accused of piracy. This was the first time the navy had had a chance to examine Spanish, or Dunkirk, frigates. One of them, Swan, was to become the model for two vessels ordered by the King, when he instructed

Phineas Pett to design and build Greyhound and Roebuck, each displacing around 120 tons.

During the the Civil War in 1642, Charles I’s navy sided with the Parliamentary forces, with the country facing a repetition of the war on trade. Once again the navy was unprepared when the Royalists, unable to assemble a battle fleet, commissioned fast privateers, including Dunkirk frigates. In 1645, a new class of frigates was ordered by the government; Nonsuch, Adventure and Assurance were 32-gun vessels of about 380 tons and resembled some of the Dunkirk frigates.

A model of Tiger (1681) is referred to as a galley frigate, as it was equipped to handle oars (sweeps). It is the first model to provide a look at the configuration of a frigate of that time period. The next ships, however, were rapidly and radically modified. From this model Gardiner continues his study using models to describe the changes through time, ending with Warrior which, while being iron-hulled and armoured, and propelled by a combination of steam and sail, was still classified as a frigate; it was the most powerful ship in the Royal Navy.

Gardiner, in the chapter sequence listed above, introduces the political context of the development of the frigate, and successive design changes, not necessarily for the better. The book is highly recommended to those interested in the subject, but more importantly to model builders contemplating building any English frigate.

N. Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


Haywood and Spivak’s book provides a good introduction into how piracy emerged in the post-Second World War period, and why the traditional techniques of suppression have become anachronistic. It describes the current methods undertaken to suppress piracy, and explains their failure. The authors also detail several proposals that countries, companies and foundations have proposed.

The book’s seven chapters concentrate (rightly, given the nature of the series on global problems to which it belongs) on current and future possibilities (six of seven chapters). The authors lack an appreciation of the complexities of medieval and early modern maritime law, occasionally repeating the old fallacy that privateers were pirates. Briefly, they do not understand the concepts of letters of marque or letters of reprisal and their relationship to the strategic concept of guerre de course, and the absence of maritime insurance or international arbitration respectively. Thus, chapter two on history could be ignored, and those interested in the subject should consult S. Murdoch’s *Terror of the Seas*, M. Rediker’s books and J.A. Wombwell’s history of anti-piracy. On the other hand, if
one wants to understand the challenges faced in dealing with current pirates, chapters three to six give a good overview.

Three themes running throughout the book explain why the pre-Second World War responses to piracy no longer apply. One is that the countries that emerged after the end of European colonialism have greater sensitivity to their sovereign rights. If these new countries are weak or failed states, or open to corruption, then the established solution of depriving pirates of their land bases as a step in eliminating the issue is unavailable. The second is that international law now recognizes basic human rights, which accords those accused of piracy due process. That means establishing and maintaining judicial and correctional facilities for alleged pirates. The third issue is that multilateral and bilateral agreements between international bodies, countries and commercial concerns must be promulgated. In addition, shipping companies seem to find it more convenient to pay ransoms than to disrupt manning schedules and thus, shipping schedules, by providing time for merchant seamen to appear in court. If the legal and physical problems in prosecuting accused pirates were resolved, without allowing taped or remote testimony, then those efforts would be pointless. The prevalence of ships sailing under open registry removes the protection previously provided by a flag and creates legal problems.

The book has a few troubling gaps. While it starts with the premise of examining piracy as a global phenomenon, it chiefly concentrates on the problem off Somalia with far fewer references to the Straits of Malacca and the Nigerian coast. The superficial discussion of pirate logistics ignores the premise of knowing one’s enemy. For instance, given the small size of most pirate craft, do ports even matter? It seems a beach and trailer is all most of them need for launching and retrieval. In addition, there was no discussion of craft procurement—do the pirates build, buy or steal their boats? If, as seems likely, pirates need little in the way of a logistic tail, then targeting their bases is pointless. Finally, what role does international banking play in the payment and receipt of ransoms, and could interrupting that disincentivise piracy? Furthermore, while the authors discuss the possibility of a privately-operated Convoy Escort Program working under the legal cover of the flag states, they do not discuss a naval convoy program. It would seem that the private escorts and the pirates would have an equality of force. If the aim is to curtail attacks, then maritime history from the 1600s onwards shows that merchant shipping sailing in convoy with powerful escorts is generally immune to attack unless the attackers are willing to endure horrendous casualties. Perhaps the financial and human costs have not reached the threshold for the naval option?

Although employees of one of the institutions—One Earth Future Foundation—that has proposed an approach to reducing piracy, the authors’ tone is evenhanded and their case presented in a clear fashion. They demonstrate a broad and deep knowledge of the various aspects (legal, governmental, institutional, and corporate) of anti-piracy initiatives. Haywood and Spivak rightly observe that some of the anti-piracy initiatives seem more involved with justifying continued existence than in limiting or eradicating piracy. The book includes a number of relevant maps and charts. Unfortunately, the notes appear at the end, and the bibliography is an annotated one of only fourteen books.

The book addresses an issue for those with interests in international relations, economics and maritime law. Faculty looking for a short introduction for related courses will find this book will stimulate discussion. As stated above, those
desiring an overview and analysis of the pre-1860 history should examine other sources.

Edward M. Furgol
Silver Spring, Maryland


In 1784, the merchant ship *Empress of China* inaugurated America’s China maritime trade. During the nineteenth century it became evident that the merchantmen of the United States needed their markets expanded and protected. *Far China Station: The U.S. Navy in Asian Waters* scrutinizes the genesis and development of the United States Navy’s East Indian Squadron. There were exasperating misunderstandings between the Americans and the Chinese due to vast cultural and language differences, poorly chartered, dangerous waters, ubiquitous piracy, and rivalries from America’s western allies. Moreover, the Royal Navy had the largest and most powerful force in the area. Americans wisely displayed deference to their former British foes. Finally, the British, Dutch and French competed with the Americans for Asian goods and services.

American naval forces avoided armed skirmishes. Those that did occur were undertaken reluctantly and were generally on a small scale. This was in contrast with some of the other western navies that were on the Far Eastern station at the same time.

Britain’s Royal Navy was the world’s dominant oceanic force during this period of history and it provided an important measure of security needed to establish and develop trade. This trade development, however, proved problematic. The British found that although there was a great demand for Chinese goods at home, Queen Victoria’s empire had little of interest to the Chinese to exchange except for opium. This addictive drug spread into the population and led to the Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-1860).

Chinese officials wanted to end the drug trafficking to its people and confiscated approximately 20,000 chests of opium from British traders. The British government objected to this seizure and used its military to redress what it considered a wrongful seizure, plus to uphold its imperial honour and its commitment to global free trade. In order to maintain its prestige abroad, Britain decided to go to war. The Royal Navy used their broadsides against Chinese wooden-hulled vessels, fortifications at river mouths and the brick walls that protected its cities. On land, Chinese bows and arrows and primitive firelocks were no match for British muskets and artillery. Decisive British victories undermined the authority of the Qing Dynasty that eventually lost control of a population of 300 million.

As a result of the peace treaty, the British received virtually everything that they wished regarding entry into the Chinese lands and markets. The Americans mostly sat on the sidelines during this conflict, but, by being allied with the British, “the Yanks” also gained access to the Chinese market place.

Johnson details the events that established America’s trade relationship that was helped by its naval presence. Naval officers, such as Commodores Matthew Galbraith Perry and Robert W. Shufeldt, negotiated treaties with Japan and Korea, while a succession of commanders, such as James Biddle, and American diplomats did the same with the vast and disparate Chinese empire over time.

The American squadron’s primary mission was to “show the flag” in the Far East, but it also provided active service and
sea-training for the navy’s officers and men. The squadron saw little action except to quell small isolated instances of belligerency—angry mobs and Japanese rebels. The chapters covering the U.S. Civil War and Spanish American War, when the squadron was so far from the action theaters, were illuminating. The most persistent problem was piracy; attacks from innocent-appearing junks or from shore-based boats that could not be followed into shallow waters. These tactics still persist today in remote parts of Southeast Asia.

In the West, American Navy vessels were asked to stay close to friendly ports and, in the case of the coal-burning navy, economize on coal consumption. The Navy Department however made an exception in the vast Asiatic Theater. There the vessels were ordered to cruise actively to enhance seamanship skills and heighten military preparedness.

There were problems, however. Unusual Asiatic illness took a heavy toll on the officers and men. Common sexually transmitted diseases appeared among those who were allowed liberty in some ports. Local food and water was occasionally unsanitary or contaminated. The vessels that made up “the sailing navy” of the early part of the nineteenth century had difficulty reaching the populous inland riverine cities that served as trading centres. Vessel designs that were appropriate for coastal blockading or American riverine patrol duty had difficulties serving a similar use in Asiatic waters.

As the navy switched to steam power around the American Civil War era, adequate supplies of coal were hard to find. When boilers broke down, an all-too-common event, there was difficulty in finding or reaching repair facilities. The Western pacific climate offered the challenge of devastating monsoons and typhoons. Vessels seemed to be plagued with all manner of structural damage more often than those stationed at home. An even bigger problem stemmed from rampant alcoholism. “The bottle” offered an escape from the monotony of the sea duty, but caused the demise (disease, dementia, death or dismissal) of many otherwise competent personnel. As alcohol and disease decimated American crews, Chinese and Malays were recruited as replacements. Many proved to be undisciplined. An Admiral at one point “asked for one-hundred [American] marines, stating that [his] flagship could not turn out a respectable guard to honor visiting dignitaries” (174).

Professor Johnson has collected and summarized a great deal of disparate naval history data into a scholarly publication. The bibliographic section, notes and index were very useful for further reference. The author occasionally provided background information that could be considered historical minutia. For example: Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, had a penchant for naming American naval vessels after New England’s native tribes; U.S. exports to imports from China in 1831-1832 were a roughly 1 to 3.4 ratio as compared to the current 1 to 4 ratio. About 180 years has produced little change.

Johnson writes with precision, but he lacks a compelling narrative style. The book’s presentation is plodding and at times, tedious. The information almost drips like Chinese water torture upon the reader from page to page with few stories to make the described events memorable. The work, though scholarly, appears literarily monochromatic. It is more of a reference source about a specific period of American naval history, but hardly a “page turner”; a useful, noteworthy effort, but an unexciting read.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

Naval historians quite naturally are drawn to ships. The method by which command of the sea is gained and the venue for so much human activity, the ship is a focal point of study and often a visible connection with the past. HMS *Victory* and the USS *Constitution* are perfect examples of many preserved warships that act as a bridge to our maritime heritage. While scholars often talk about a specific ship and its construction and crew, very rarely is the industry of ship building the focal point of discussion. So when a book appears that is focused on the builders of warships, especially the capital-class warships built for England from 1900 to the end of the Second World War, it is a truly rare thing. Without a doubt, this helps distinguish *The Battleship Builders* as a unique and valuable resource.

Johnston and Buxton do not focus on the ships in the classic sense, but rather on the industry that produced them. The ships become an avenue into understanding the complex industrial relationships that created some of the largest ship-building companies in the world. The names of these companies stand out as a who’s who of warship and naval construction. Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. Ltd and Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. are excellent examples of what, in their day, were the equivalent of major modern industries like Chrysler and Ford. These companies had vast networks of factories and suppliers that were essential for the massive amount of material needed to produce ships of this size and complexity. In the process, they were major employers throughout most of England. This book on naval warship construction is, thus, a study of an industry that had a huge impact on hundreds of thousands of lives every day. These corporations have now all but vanished. Yet, the authors are clear, the records for such vast industrial undertakings are relatively scarce. Due to the collapse of the industry and the heavy bombing of the Second World War, very few records have survived so this study represents the reconstruction of a history almost completely lost.

Divided into thirteen chapters supported by three appendices, the text examines the industry in careful detail. After a relatively short introduction, the authors set the context of naval development and construction in two chapters spanning the period from 1860 to 1945. These two chapters provide a good general narrative of warship development and construction in the period, including details of the naval rivalry with Germany and naval construction budgets. The following chapter examines the main builders, providing a short history of each. The next eight chapters break down warship construction into its constituent parts, including design, construction elements such as forgings and castings, launching, and fitting out. There is also discussion of the facilities needed for construction, including cranes and gantries, and specific company facilities. Chapters seven through twelve provide greater detail on specific issues like armour and steel, armament, money, and manpower. The section on armament and gun construction provides some fascinating information on the fabrication of not just large calibre guns and turrets, but also ammunition production. Well documented, and lavishly appointed with charts, maps and rare images, the book provides the reader with a fascinating look into ship construction from the ground up.

The book fills an important niche in
the literature on the technological dimension of war and society studies. William McNeill’s *Pursuit of Power* (1982), for example, demonstrated the importance of the iron and steel ship-building industry to rapid technical development in the period. Johnston and Buxton’s book represents a detailed case-study of this industry that both supports and is supported by McNeill’s writings. They are a natural fit.

One aspect of McNeill’s work, the impact of combat experience on ship design, is not fully treated by Johnston and Buxton. While there is some discussion of Jutland and its implications, there is no real effort to explore the feedback loop from the users of technology, to the designers, and the builders. More generally, the book begs questions about the production of other ship types, such as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers. Thus, the book suggests by its example vast potential areas of work that still need to be done.

For anyone interested in the field, this book is highly recommended. It preserves and presents to the reader a window into an industry all but lost to history. In the process it is helping to reconstruct at least part of the lives of the hundreds of thousands who worked in the companies and their communities.

Rob Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


This fascinating collection of papers had its genesis in a workshop at the Institute of Iranian Studies of the Austrian Academy Sciences in 2004. Several cover subjects that are at least broadly familiar, like Martin Slama’s “The Hadhrami Diaspora as Agent of Change” (since treated in greater detail in Engseng Ho’s *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean*), Dejanirah Couto’s “Hormuz under the Portuguese Protectorate” in the early sixteenth century, and Giorgio Rota’s “Diplomatic Relations between the Safavids and Siam in the 17th Century.” But the first essay signals the start of a journey into some exotic areas.

Zoltán Biedermann’s “An Island under the Influence: Soqotra at the Crossroads of Egypt, Persia and India from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age,” is a crisp history of an island that was long an important link in Indian Ocean trade. Christianity reached the island from Ethiopia by the fifth century, and Islam did not replace it there for a thousand years. Even so, thanks to “a set of rather peculiar and even ironic twists and turns, both Kishn [in Yemen] and Soqotra entered a complex supra-regional sphere of ‘Oriental allies of the West’ against the Ottomans (23), and allowed the Portuguese to call there into the 1600s.

With its chronological sweep, this essay seems a fitting start to the volume, but Soqotra’s connection to China is shaky, and one is led to consider whether the silk road of the sea is synonymous with the monsoon seas.

In fact only one of the articles in part one, “The Iranian and Arabian Sides,” has much to say about China. Ralph Kauz’s “A Kazaruni Network?” examines the commercial diaspora of a Sufi order from the Red Sea to China in the eleventh to fifteenth centuries. Its origins roughly coincide with that of the Jewish karimi network in the western Indian Ocean, but the Kazaruni survived longer and their reach was greater. One of their most important contributions to long-distance trade seems
to have been the establishment of *hanaqahs*, or hospices, that could be found from Iran to Zaiton (Quanzhou) and which, Kauz proposes, “formed a network providing various services for the merchants” (69).

One of the great strengths of the collection is its attention to individuals who rarely get much play. Kauz’s second contribution is an amusing study of a late-fifteenth-century envoy named Paliuwan who “caused considerable headache to China’s officials” (160). The Samarqandi envoy travelled to China by land but convinced officials to let him sail from Guangzhou to Melaka. The Chinese were happy to see him go, but he seems to have returned to Guangzhou in 1489 and possibly again in 1492, this time representing Khalaj (or its merchants) in eastern Afghanistan, or Gujarat in India.

In the same vein, Geoff Wade’s “On ‘Ba-la-xi’ and the Parsis during the Ming Dynasty” centers on an envoy named Sha-ta-bai who reached Guangzhou in 1511. *Ba-la-xi* is an ethnonym denoting someone of Parsi or Persian origin, and Wade concentrates on establishing the origins of Sha-ta-bai, who in all likelihood was associated with a community of Zoroastrian merchants based in northern or western India (175).

Angela Schottenhammer’s “Transfer of Xiangyao [incense and medicinals] from Iran and Arabia to China—A Reinvestigation of Entries in the *Youyang zazu*” (863) is a more traditional analysis of commodity exchange, in the style of Edward H. Schafer’s *Golden Peaches of Samarkand*. But she is firmly grounded in the problem of the provenance of the goods enumerated, and in particular the involvement of Iranian traders in their transport.

“Patterns of Exchange in the Decorative Arts between China and Southwest Asia,” by Tim Stanley, a senior curator at the Victoria and Albert Museum, offers a brisk survey of Chinese influence on the design and manufacture of Iranian and Iraqi ceramics. Most intriguing is the likelihood that Muslim shippers exported cobalt from Southwest Asia to China and there “commissioned blue-and-white wares decorated in the Iraqi manner from their Chinese source, to whom they delivered the cobalt, and that their aim was to supply the market in their home country” (110)—in the ninth century!

Stanley’s article follows one that also considers cross-cultural influence. Morris Rossabi’s “Tabriz and Yuan China” treats the Ilkhanid capital as a cosmopolitan bridge between east and west. Internecine disputes among various Mongol-dominated states meant that much of the trade between China and Iran was conducted by sea rather than overland. (Marco Polo returned to the west from China with a fleet bearing a Yuan bride for the Ilkhan.)

But it is jarring for an essay on the fourteenth century to precede one on the ninth, and the book’s primary weakness is its division into three sections: “The Iranian and Arabian Sides,” “The Poles: Iran and China,” and “China’s Perspective.” There is a certain sense to this, but Schottenhammer’s article would seem better situated in part three than part two. Regardless, a thematic—and loosely chronological—order might have been preferable to a geocentric one that ignores chronology.

So, Kauz might have grouped Liu Yingsheng’s “A Lingua Franca along the Silk Road: Persian Language in China between the 14th and 16th Centuries” with Wade’s “On ‘Ba-la-xi’” and “The Li and Pu Surnames in East Asia—Middle East Maritime Silk Road Interactions during the 10th–12th Centuries.”

Kauz’s introduction cautions that the delay in publication means that some of the authors’ conclusions may have been
superseded by more recent research. Even so, Max Deeg’s otherwise valuable “Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean in Early Times According to Chinese Buddhist Texts” incorrectly repeats that in antiquity “open sea sailing was only enforced on seafarers by catastrophic weather conditions,” or that “the ‘discovery’ of monsoon sailing” (153) occurred in the first century BCE. His uncritical reference to “Indianization” in Southeast Asia (158) also seems dated.

Harrassowitz has given the book short shrift. The editing is subpar, there are neither maps nor an index, and the company website inexcusably claims that the book’s “time frame ranges from the 14th to the 17th century.” These criticisms notwithstanding, this book is a trove of recent research and thinking about the nature of cross-cultural interaction on the monsoon seas.

Lincoln Paine
Portland, Maine


On 28 April 1789, young Midshipman Peter Heywood awoke into the chaotic world of mutiny. As he came on deck he saw a bound Captain Bligh, his power usurped, facing a raging Fletcher Christian, leading the revolt. Heywood was in the centre of perhaps the most famous single-ship mutiny in the history of the Royal Navy. Bligh and 18 others were forced into one of the ship’s boats, to be set adrift in the South Pacific, a fate most thought would end in their death. Peter and another midshipman went below to gather their belongings to join Bligh in the boat, but were kept from retuning to the deck and thus, missed the opportunity to clearly identify with Bligh and avoid guilt by association with the mutineers. Heywood asked that his desire to go with Bligh be made known to the captain, but that request was not granted. Midshipman Heywood and several others left the Bounty as it returned to Tahiti on its search for a safe place for the mutineers to hide. When HMS Pandora arrived at Tahiti in March 1791, Heywood went out to the ship with the thought of rescue. Instead, he was stripped, placed in irons and housed in a cage on the main deck. His passage back to England was one of humiliation, deprivation and near death. Bligh had survived and named Heywood to be among the mutineers. Peter Heywood would endure a court martial resulting in a sentence of death, followed none too swiftly by a Royal pardon.

A small cottage industry has produced countless books, articles and three Hollywood films about the mutiny on the Bounty. Writers have argued over the causes of the affair, the relationships between the key figures and the nature of Bligh’s and Christian’s personalities. This book is a transcript of a rare family generated document that focuses on the correspondence between Peter Heywood and his sister Nester (Nessy) Heywood, from the time of his return to England to stand trial through his pardon. It offers a unique perspective to the story.

Editors Donald A. Maxton and Rolf E. Du Rietz have both written previously on the mutiny. They begin this book with a brief overview of the event which focuses on Heywood’s experience. This introduction also informs the reader on the relationship between Peter and Nessy and their many supporters (both familial and friends in places of power). Peter and Nessy were born and raised on the Isle of
Man, so this document also bears on Manx history, providing a view into late-eighteenth century social life and family relations. The introduction is followed by a “Textual Postscript” which describes the origins of the document. It is a collection of letters, primarily between Peter and Nessy, although other family members and friends are present as are others whose help is sought during the ordeal, including William Bligh (who was not helpful). The letters and poems were assembled by a family member after the event and transcribed into a number of copies (of which only five are known to exist) and disbursed to the family. The copy published here is held by the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois. Some of the letters have made their way into various accounts of the mutiny but this is the first full publication of all the material.

The remainder of the book is separated into two parts and three additional appendices. Part one contains 114 letters, of which 35 were written by Nessy and 34 by Peter (mainly to each other). Another 22 were addressed to Nessy and 17 to Peter by other people involved in the story. The correspondence reflects the rising and falling hopes of a family being reunited with its long-absent brother/son. Nessy’s letters reveal the incredible affection she felt for her brother and her unflappable determination to see him vindicated and in the face of the guilty verdict and death sentence, pardoned. To Peter, her letters are filled with affection and encouragement to believe that he will be freed. Nessy used deference, her status as “a sorrowful and mourning sister” (127) and her mother’s widowhood to great effect, when writing to those in authority who could help. Peter’s letters reveal a young man sure of his innocence but accepting of whatever comes his way. His ordeal on the Pandora certainly shaped his character. The letters directly related to the mutiny and court martial are numbers 14, 35, 79b and 91 (35-43, 67-70, 111-116 and 127-131, respectively). The first two contain narratives of the mutiny, Tahiti, and the Pandora; the first letter to his mother, the second to his sister. The third letter contains Peter’s defence statement at his court martial. The fourth is an insert in which Heywood responds to each element of the prosecution’s case. This insert was sent to Lord Chatham, by Nessy on 11 October 1792, 12 days before Peter’s pardon, a fact noted by the original compiler and hinted to be the cause of the pardon. The section of letters ends with news of Nessy’s untimely death in 1793.

The articulate letters are largely left to speak for themselves. The few annotations are from the original compiler. The correspondence gives the reader insight into late-eighteenth-century social life, social order and a glimpse at naval courts martial. On the last point there are letters on Peter’s legal defence and the severity of the court martial system (see letters 33, 59, 76, 79, pp. 66-67, 92-93, 107, 110-111 respectively).

Part two is a collection of poetry, as verse often accompanied the letters between correspondents. Forty-six efforts are found in this section, including short verse, sonnets, acoustics, and longer poems. They are penned mainly by Nessy, with a few by Peter (in particular a long poem written on Tahiti describing his ordeal to date, February 1790) and several family friends. Two other poems, for some unexplained reason are placed in part one. The poetry is representative of popular verse at that time, an activity that many people engaged in, but few of whom are still known for today. They are emotion laden, celebratory or mournful, and serve to reinforce the sense of strong emotional bound between Peter and his sister.

Appendix 1 contains eight edited letters, some of which appear to have been
previously published in whole or in part. A letter from Peter Heywood to Mrs. Bligh is the highlight, adding nothing beyond evidence of an attempt between the two to communicate. The second appendix is a handy, annotated list of the key people involved in the story and appearing in the letters. The final appendix is a brief summary of Peter Heywood’s naval career. Returning to the service he vowed to, and did, serve King and country faithfully for the next 23 years (1793 – 1816) retiring as a captain.

There are 23 black and white images and one map spread throughout the text. They range from portraits of the young Nessy and two of an older Peter, through their family home, ships, and other people involved in the story. One image is repeated three times. It is one of two small drawings Peter made in a letter to his sister where he describes the shipwreck of HMS *Pandora*. The actual shipwreck is the one selected to appear three times (68, 69 and 168), an unnecessary repetition. His drawings within the letter do remind the reader of the talent many naval officers had to represent the world into which they sailed in words, sketches and watercolours. Endnotes appear for the introduction and third appendix. A solid bibliography on the mutiny, Bligh and Heywood rounds out the book. The index is thorough and very useful.

This book is about how Peter Heywood, his sister Nester Heywood and their family and supporters dealt with his alleged involvement in the mutiny aboard HMS *Bounty*, not so much the mutiny itself nor the details of his trial. The book will appeal to the *Bounty* specialist who does not have a copy of the original manuscript of the correspondence, those interested in social history of this era and those focused on Manx (Isle of Man) history.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


During the Spanish American Wars of Independence, both the Spanish and the insurgent governments employed privateers to supplement their meagre naval forces. Pirates operating from the northwest coast of Cuba further complicated the issues of prize taking. Britain, attempting to avoid taking sides in the Spanish American conflict, faced a challenge trying to remain neutral and protect its mercantile and political interests in both Europe and Spanish America.

The author, Matthew McCarthy, received his PhD from the University of Hull in 2011 and is currently research officer at the university’s Maritime Historical Studies Centre. He indicates that the subject of privateering and piracy during the Spanish American Wars of Independence has been largely ignored by historians, even though the wars had a strong impact on the diplomatic decisions of the period and the development of international maritime law. McCarthy’s introduction discusses the deficiencies of earlier studies of this period and how he intends to begin filling the gaps. In his initial chapter, he reviews Britain’s commercial and political interests in Spanish America. From the late fifteenth century, Spain had claimed a monopoly on all commercial trade with her colonies in the New World. As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, Spain relaxed its monopoly and afterwards permitted Britain to trade with the Spanish colonies. With the outbreak of the Wars of Independence, however, Britain declared herself a neutral
nation with the right to trade with the insurgent states and with only contraband, attempting to run a blockade, and the transportation of enemy property subject to seizure. British trade with South America was essential to the expansion of her economy. By 1808, this trade accounted for six percent of her total exports. Politically, the British foreign secretary, Robert Castlereagh, and his successor, George Canning, had to deal with the insurgents and Spanish prize taking as well Cuban-based privateers. British merchants claimed their vessels were being seized by privateers and sent to admiralty courts that were often capricious in their decisions as to legal seizures. The new insurgent states often had little control over their privateer fleets. The foreign secretaries had to weigh the fallout from interference with the prize courts against keeping on friendly terms with the insurgents should these states eventually become independent. In order to maintain a balance of power in Europe, it was necessary to keep the support of Spain. The depredations of the Cuban-based pirates presented British diplomats with the problem of renegades who lived on Cuban soil and ventured forth only to attack merchant vessels and return to Spanish Cuban soil. The real solution to the problem would mean landing in Spanish territory.

Chapters two and three deal respectively with a history of privateering and piracy in Spanish-American waters and accounts of search and seizures of specific British vessels and the economic problems these acts caused for merchants and shipowners. In reviewing the history of privateering, McCarthy concludes that, initially, both Spain and the insurgent states operated by the established international rules. Prizes were brought into admiralty courts and cases adjudicated in the accepted manner. As the wars dragged on, the insurgents diverged from accepted standards by licensing non-Hispanic citizens as privateers—the most conspicuous were North Americans and those often from Baltimore—and by permitting captured vessels to be brought in and sold in their ports of neutral countries. Spain, on the other hand, attempted to re-instate its monopoly on all trade in Spanish American waters, and as a result many neutral British vessels were stopped and seized. In the third chapter, the author elaborates in great detail the financial losses suffered by British shipowners and merchants. McCarthy’s research for the years 1817-1820, the height of privateering and Cuban piracy, indicates that 1688 prize actions were instituted. Of these, 336 involved British ships with 227 seizures identified as to the nationality of the predatory vessel. The author further analyzes the type of seizure and its resolution, if any, in foreign prize courts. Details are given for many vessels and merchants by name. In addition to the losses suffered by the merchants, McCarthy also investigates the increase of insurance rates. In his final analysis, however, McCarthy comments that the British losses to privateering and piracy had minimal impact on overall British economics.

In chapters four through seven, McCarthy reviews the British response to insurgent and Spanish privateering and Cuban piracy by the Foreign Office. Foreign Secretaries Castlereagh and Canning responded with different strategies to each of the three problems. Britain had not recognized any of the insurgent countries as independent and therefore had a problem of dealing with the insurgents government to government. In addition Britain did not wish to antagonize the insurgents and hinder trade opportunities in the present and future. The response to the insurgent privateering was to direct the British consuls in each insurgent state to investigate each case of search and or seizure as the particular case was
adjudicated by the insurgent courts. The consuls, with guidance from the Foreign Office, would then press the insurgent governments to settle the British claim. In dealing with Spanish privateers the situation could be dealt with government to government. Spain claimed their privateers were acting legally since Spain had reactivated its trade monopoly in Spanish America, blockaded certain insurgent ports, and insisted on their right to seize goods of insurgent merchants carried on neutral British ships. Britain had two major considerations in dealing with Spain. First Britain needed to retain the Anglo-Spanish Alliance in order not to upset the balance of power in Europe and Britain needed to enforce its neutral status in order to maintain trade with the insurgents. When appeals to Spain appeared to have no effect on Spanish policy, the Foreign Office played its two “trump cards” — deploying a British naval squadron to Spanish America and then rejecting neutral status and recognizing the insurgent states. The strategy was successful and Spain backed down. What remained, however, was the settlement of British claims against Spain for privateering actions against British shipping. In January 1823, Spain proposed the joint Anglo-Spanish Claims Commission to consider all British claims against Spain. The plan was accepted in March of 1823 and a four-person mixed commission was established. By October 1823, the commission was at work establishing rules, procedures, and methods of payment. While progress was being made slowly, France invaded Spain and re-established the monarchy. Ferdinand VII immediately cancelled all the commission’s agreements. Not until August 1824 did the commissioners begin work and all of the settlements were not reached until 1829. As with the insurgent privateer settlements McCarthy gives detailed analysis of the individual claims brought before the commission.

Britain’s response to Cuban piracy presented a third type of problem. The pirates were not a fixed state yet they inhabited Spanish soil. To subdue the pirates, Britain would have to invade Spanish territory or establish a naval presence. Not wishing to endanger the Anglo-Spanish Alliance, Britain sent a naval squadron which with the cooperation of a United States squadron soon solved the problem without violating Spanish territory.

Matthew McCarthy’s text is deftly researched and well written. His footnotes are extensive, covering sources in Spain, Great Britain, South America, and the United States. A reader seeking stories of ship-against-ship engagements and lively biographies of privateers may not find this book to their liking. Readers interested in the diplomatic and economic problems caused by the privateers and pirates and the solutions developed to assure a degree of stability will want to add McCarthy’s work to their libraries.

Fred Hopkins Linthicum, Maryland


With the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815, European nations decided on the continent’s future. One of the outcomes of the Congress of Vienna was the formation of the confederation of 39 German states. In the same year, the German authorities introduced the freedom of emigration. Bad
harvests and famines, the need for more religious freedom or better economic opportunities motivated thousands of people to come to America and start a new chapter in their life.

Although Heinrich Wieting, born in the German town of Rönnebeck near Bremen in 1815, never settled down in America, at the end of his life he knew what that drive for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness was all about. As a captain of emigrant trade ships, he transported thousands of Germans to North America and Charleston in particular. In keeping with family tradition, at the age of fourteen Heinrich Wieting went to sea. The following year he made his second journey on board the brigantine Georg Heinrich of the Gloystein & Söhne shipping company. In 1833, after his fifth cruise to Argentina and Cuba, Wieting returned home and began his studies at a nautical college. In January 1836, he was on board the Johann Friedrich as second mate for his former employer, Gloystein, a relationship that lasted 32 years.

Heinrich Wieting anchored his ship Johann Friedrich in Charleston for the first time in 1842. Charleston was a port for trading tobacco, wood, cotton, leather and rice. It was a centre for contacts and trade finance. A journey from Bremerhaven to Charleston usually took five to six weeks, so by then, Wieting knew most of his passengers. The German community in Charleston was relatively homogeneous and well-off, developing into a “little Germany” with an extensive network of institutes and organizations of a political, military, cultural, sporting and social nature.

On 24 October 1850, Wieting’s ship, the bark Johann Friedrich, was en route from Bremerhaven to Charleston with 125 passengers and a crew of 14 when it grounded off Harwich, U.K. Although the ship was lost, all on board survived. In April 1851, Wieting had the Copernicus at his command. Between 1850 and 1858 Wieting managed to monopolise the passenger traffic from Bremerhaven to Charleston. These years were the most profitable for Gloystein and for the company’s best captain.

Heinrich Wieting also set up a private business network in Charleston. Since Gloystein traded cotton, rice and tobacco, Wieting concentrated on the goods German immigrants in Charleston missed most from Germany; for example ham, cheese, potatoes, liquor, herring and wine. To Bremen Wieting transported goods like rice, tobacco, sugar, soap and bricks. His business was profitable, and with the money he earned he invested in a house, in the business of one of his brothers and in stocks of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.

Wieting left Charleston in May 1861 on board Copernicus. In the months before the tension between Union and Confederate states had increased. On 9 January 1861, shots were fired at a Union ship entering the port of Charleston. A couple of months later, the Union-held Fort Sumter at the entrance of Charleston harbour was targeted by shore batteries in the harbour. The fort’s defenders surrendered after a 34-hour bombardment and it was occupied by Confederate army forces. War was a fact. In 1860, 1944 Germans comprised 31 percent of Charleston’s population and roughly one in five of them voluntarily served in ethnic German army units of the Confederacy. Throughout the war the Union attempted several attacks on Charleston by sea and land, but with limited success. The final blow was delivered early in 1865 by the Union’s long-range artillery that devastated large parts of the city.

Wieting would have to wait six-and-a-half years before he could return to Charleston. By then, his world was changed, he was financially ruined, and his brilliant career was over. During the war,
Gloystein did not manage to compensate for the loss of the market in the South. Wieting entered the port of Charleston twice after the war, in 1867 and on 29 November 1868 with the Gauss, his third vessel. On 2 December 1868, Captain Heinrich Wieting died of typhoid in Charleston, leaving behind his wife Therese with eight children, and unaware that Georg Wilhelm Gloystein had died some two weeks earlier. In 1869 Nicolaus Gloystein & Söhne ceased to exist.

The sources used for this book consisted mainly of letters, a total of 371 letters on business and shipping written between 1847 and 1860. To this already rich source on information, 27 private letters from and to Heinrich Wieting were added. They contain a wide variety of information on shipping, brokers, finances, agents, passengers, cargo, and repairs. The letters also show what life was like on board, from journeys taken, ports, accidents on board, deaths, storms, damage, sinking, to incidents of bad behaviour like desertion, insubordination, theft, suicide, loose tongues, drinking, good for nothings, stowaways and punishment on board.

The letters also give insight in personal lives of Heinrich Wieting, his family and friends, their children, careers, houses, and their businesses. In Wieting’s case, they reveal another side of this experienced captain and business man who, on occasion, found time to draw and write poetry.

In this book, the author succeeded in providing insight into the life and times of Heinrich Wieting and the German immigrants who added their lives, businesses and beliefs to the history of Charleston between 1840 and 1870. Excellent use is made of sources, both written as well as illustrated, like photographs, lithographs, drawings, paintings and maps, all adding to a dynamic layout. This book is a valuable contribution to maritime history and most certainly to the history of the United States of America.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands


The Battle of the River Plate of 13 December 1939 and the subsequent diplomatic intrigues in Montevideo, Uruguay, have attracted much scholarly attention. Even before the end of the Second World War, official and then historical accounts in English, and to a lesser extent in German and in Spanish, describing the eventual destruction of the Graf Spee found their way into print (and in 1956, the movie screen), a trend that continues. Such scholarly and public interest is not surprising, given that the encounter gave Britain its most significant naval victory of the war prior to the sinking of the Bismarck in 1941, and is arguably the most noteworthy naval battle in the South Atlantic in the twentieth century.

Most English-language accounts of the event either emphasize the British perspective or balance the narrative between the British and the German perspectives. There is a well-trodden path, namely studies by Dudley Pope and more recently Richard Woodman and Eric J. Grove, among others, that narrate the course and results of the engagement in the South Atlantic, most of which make the Germans secondary participants at best. Not in Langsdorff and the Battle of the River Plate. Rather, the major substantive contribution that David Miller makes to the literature of the battle and subsequent diplomatic intrigues in Montevideo is that he views them from the German perspective, focusing on the “the commanding officer of the Graf Spee,
Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorff, and the unique succession of challenges he had to face” (xii), especially in strategic and tactical decision-making.

After a brief biography of Langsdorff, a man who impresses the author as “decent, honourable, and compassionate” (xvi), Miller covers what lessons Germany learned about surface raiding from the First World War. Miller lists almost encyclopaedically the numerous vessels that targeted Allied commerce in that conflict and argues that the war taught Germans the value of logistics in surface raiding and, ultimately, that it was a low risk, high reward venture; it took few resources to attack merchant ships but diverted significant resources from the enemy. As such, raiding became an important part of German naval strategy early in the Second World War.

Afterwards, Miller offers a comprehensive, if dry, discussion of the three Deutschland-class ships, including the Graf Spee. He adroitly recounts the ships’ design, armament, propulsion systems, aircraft and crew capabilities, communications and logistics. He concludes firstly, that the English-language term for the ships as “pocket battleships” was “undeserved” (38) because the ships effectively were little more than armoured cruisers (Woodman argues likewise). The Graf Spee, Miller writes, was “a product of restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty, combined with the German desire to squeeze the absolute maximum into a relatively small hull” (81). Thus, the reader is to infer, Langsdorff was at a greater disadvantage than if he truly had a battleship.

The final section narrates the war cruise of the Graf Spee from its departure in August 1939 to its scuttling four months later. The prose here is engaging, even if the material is well-studied elsewhere. Relative to previous authors, Miller more systematically examines the course of the Graf Spee’s raiding in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, generally portraying Langsdorff’s treatment of his prey as “firm but fair,” (108) and pays more strict attention to Langsdorff’s method of operation in these raids than do prior studies. Miller asserts that Langsdorff disobeyed orders and attacked the British triumvirate of warships on the day of battle because of faulty intelligence as to the composition of the group and his misplaced confidence in his ship. During the battle, Miller praises Langsdorff’s command, even while critiquing his decisions to view the carnage from the foretop and to use his ineffectual 15-cm guns. No other option but the run to Montevideo was “really viable” (138) Miller correctly claims, and Langsdorff’s decision to scuttle the Graf Spee was his “only possible choice” (171). Finally, the author treats Langsdorff’s famous Buenos Aires suicide as honourable, if slightly misguided.

As compared to other studies of the battle off Uruguay’s coast, Langsdorff and the Battle of the River Plate focuses almost exclusively on German strategy and tactics. Miller offers copious details about the Deutschland-class ship’s capabilities, its raiding activities and German decision-making during the battle somewhat better and more thoroughly than prior studies. In discussing the ship’s war cruise, for example, the author examines Langsdorff’s options at each crucial juncture. The result is a readable examination of the battle and Langsdorff. Otherwise, there is little new here that Grove, especially, has not already explored.

The book has two faults, the first of which is the substantial issue of sources. Miller lacks many reference notes, but seems to rely heavily on published memoirs by the Graf Spee’s intelligence officer, Friedrich Rasenack, and of Patrick Dove, a British captain imprisoned aboard the ship. According to his bibliography, the only archive consulted was the National Archives in Kew. It concerns this reader to find that a book about the German side of a battle was constructed from British archival materials.
without recourse to unpublished German documents, many of which Grove used. Secondly, there are a few errors a copy editor should have caught, viz. “Port Arthur, New Mexico” (85) even as Port Arthur is in Texas. Likewise, the First World War-era ship Karlsruhe exploded in November 1914 and it sank completely “just before 1900” (7).

In sum, Langsdorff and the Battle of the River Plate treads very little new water in its examination of German strategic and tactical decision making during an important naval engagement and does so with few German sources. It may be an admirable aim to understand Kapitän Hans Langsdorff and German actions in the South Atlantic better than previous studies but a more robust examination of German primary sources would tell a fuller story and perhaps would alter conclusions. As it stands, Grove should still remain the standard study of the battle.

James C. Knarr
Fort Worth, Texas


Many oceanic historians postulate that maritime history both drives and reflects global history. Europe and the Maritime World provides strong evidence for this hypothesis through an erudite narrative of twentieth century European seaborne commerce.

At the turn of the twentieth century, maritime commerce was still heavily labour dependent. The few surviving sailing ships carried heavy, non-perishable bulk commodities. Steamship engines were mostly coal-fired requiring many stokers, colliers and/or strategically located coaling stations for refueling. Gangs of stevedores largely using manual winches and pulleys loaded and unloaded vessels over many days (or weeks) onto horse-drawn wagons that traveled on unpaved roads. Communications to and between ports and vessels at sea was rudimentary. Nationalism in the shipping companies was intense. The Panama Canal would open in 1914 forever changing worldwide shipping distances.

Fast-forward to the end of the century, container ships, “RoRos” (Roll on-Roll off) and other specialized vessels now ply the seas with minimal crews and burn automatically-fed bunker fuel. The vessels move around the globe using GPS within well-managed sea routes to and from vast, sophisticated container terminals. A few highly trained men, as opposed to stevedore teams, unload and load in hours using gigantic gantry cranes to lift two different standard-sized types of containers directly from or onto trucks or trains that move the cargo quickly to markets. This occurs in globalized transnational networks employing rapid communication where most goods arrive at consumers on a “just in time” schedule. The industrial revolution happened over a period during which there were two world wars, a vast shift in human populations and incredible changes in technology and business practices. Chronicling these events provides a fascinating story and, because it has so many “moving parts,” a challenge to write about cohesively and clearly.

The book is divided into two parts: the first recounts the structure and function of maritime commerce up until the 1960s, including both world wars. The chapters examine five sectors—ports, shipping, trading with intermediaries (middlemen) and finally, the maritime culture that extended throughout the globe. Part two chronologically progresses through the changes in maritime affairs from the turn of the twentieth century to the present, including containerization and the cruise industry.
World shipping and trade functioned as an integral network of complex logistics. “Maritime” in the book’s title means related to the sea but more broadly, it implies all trade at seaports, riverine ports, and the complex overland byways that delivered goods to and from markets to a nation’s population. Miller’s book focuses upon how the (mostly) European maritime world operated and coordinated the world’s flow of trading goods and services, the circulation of immigrants and their ideas, and the evolution of businesses that steadily marched toward globalization. Globalization entailed the interchange and connectivity of integrated markets and the exchange of innovations, new and improved products, and more efficient delivery of raw materials, parts or finished products in a highly competitive world.

Historically, long-distance travel and trade operated in a relatively stable, government-protected, hierarchal milieu of international banks, shipping and trading companies. The vessels, routes, ports, and trading links added up to world integration. “Port networks were geographical, physical (railroads, waterways), and human, and the latter split into business networks, or port operatives stationed in hinterlands and markets abroad. Shipping networks were route networks . . . with ties with shipyards, railroads, . . . port directors, . . . customhouses, travel agencies, government officials and other shipping companies . . . .The overlap between shipping, trading, and port networks was so great that it was possible to speak of networks within networks” (17).

As the century concluded, ports and/or terminals required large installations supplemented by elaborate networks. Skilled managers within shipping companies at these ports determined how well the transport operation worked locally and globally. The systems that they constructed for successfully navigating these diverse networks determined profitability. The advent of the cargo container and computerization cut theft. Decreased turnaround time into and out of ports and controlled overhead made shipping costs of little consequence in the total scheme of economic decisions thus leading to trade globalization. “The Barbie doll created out of hair from Japan, plastic from Taiwan, cloths from China, molds from America or Europe, and assembled in Indonesia, Malaysia and China, . . . [packaged in] Hong Kong where they were . . . then ultimately shipped back in containers] to America” (343).

This book is an investigation of how maritime history contributed to modernity. It is the story of the mechanics, the turning and meshing of a European society based upon ocean commerce that led to an intricate web of globalization. The seas mattered in the twentieth century, including times of peace and war, and contributed mightily to the economic life of the entire world.

This is a complex but masterfully organized and a well-written book. Certainly, academic jargon, acronyms and side issues abound, yet Miller presents a huge amount of well-referenced information allowing the reader to look at problems in the evolution of the maritime industry in a new light. At times Europe and the Maritime World is a challenge to read but overall it is quite rewarding. I recommend this book to all scholars of the maritime shipping industry.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


It has been twenty-five years since Roald Kverndal’s influential work Seamen’s Missions: Their Origin and Early Growth appeared, giving those interested in religion, missions, and the sea an excellent study of
that specialized portion of maritime and religious history. The present volume goes beyond Kverndal’s work with respect to the British seaman and provides what should become a standard work for those interested in religion and the merchant seafarer.

Even though some of the twelve disciples of Jesus of Nazareth were fishermen and the New Testament records the shipwreck of the Apostle Paul (Acts 27-28), the concept of a mission to seamen is a relatively late endeavour in the history of Christianity. Yet, as author R. W. H. Miller adeptly demonstrates, Christian history is not devoid of ministry to seafarers. It is largely a post-Reformation phenomenon, and more specifically, a nineteenth-century effort that arose sometimes out of the economic interests of ship owners and merchants, and sometimes out of spiritual and pastoral concern arising from the gospel mandate of evangelism. The work focuses primarily on efforts in British ministries that paralleled the rise of the British Empire and the dominance of the British merchant fleet in the nineteenth century. As indicated in the title, the emphasis is on the merchant seafarer and readers desiring information on naval religion, Royal Navy or otherwise, will need to look elsewhere (as in Richard Blake’s 2008 study Evangelicals in the Royal Navy, 1775-1815).

Following an introduction and chapter on the early Christian Church and the seafarer, Miller’s work is divided into four sections: the Medieval Scene; the Nineteenth Century, Nineteenth-Century Catholic Work, and Twentieth-Century Catholic Work, all followed by a helpful bibliography and index.

In early Christianity, the Mediterranean was the focus of the maritime experience. While Christianity spread westward to the British Isles and eastward to Sri Lanka, India, and China, the greatest interaction was in the Mediterranean with four of the five great patriarchal sees being important ports (Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople) leaving only Jerusalem out of the maritime economy. Early Christians, Marcion and Tertullian, had ties to the sea and by the time of Athanasius (d. 373), Christians in Alexandria had very definite links to the grain trade and fleet. This early chapter provides a good summary of the maritime metaphors and imagery used by the Church Fathers. While there was not a dedicated ministry to seafarers, the sea was part of the early Christian experience and understanding of the world.

Five chapters are devoted to medieval seafaring and the centuries leading up to the nineteenth century. In these, Miller surveys the demographics and difficulty of sources for studying the medieval maritime world. Notable in this era were Christian-Viking and Christian-Muslim interactions. Christian and Church involvement in ports was significant as was the assistance to seafarers of lights and landmarks that were often maintained by religious orders and individuals. In later centuries, the presence of accommodations ashore for the seafarer as well as physical safety and spiritual shelter for mariners increased and showed the beginning of a dedicated maritime ministry. Chapters on devotion to saints by seafarers and the rise of religious and secular law pertaining to the sea are extremely helpful. Chapter 5, “Religious Practice at Sea” studies topics such as crusade clergy at sea, religious life aboard ships, identity of Christians at sea, and the Bible and Mass at sea showing the growth and development of distinctive practices. Chapter 6 provides an overview of the three centuries during and following the Reformation. Worthy of a separate study of its own, seafarers during these centuries traversed the oceans of the world creating the world that would come to be dominated by the British Empire in the nineteenth century.

The core of Miller’s study is the section titled simply “The Nineteenth Century,” comprised of nine chapters: The Nineteenth-Century Revival, Early Anglican Societies, The Church Congresses, The
Missions to Seamen, St Andrew’s Waterside Church Mission, The Gibraltar Mission to Seamen, American Work, The Religious Orders, and Work Among Fishermen. Here Miller shows the strength and diversity, successes and failures of British and other efforts among merchant mariners, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. Noteworthy among the individuals and organizations studied in these chapters is the brief presentation on the Salvation Navy, organizational child of the more widely recognized Salvation Army. In the early years of the nineteenth century, it was Protestant Bible and tract societies as well as the work of individual Quakers and other mission organizations and societies that flourished, providing ministry to merchant seafarers (and convict transports). By mid-century these had coalesced into several larger organizations and served as a catalyst for more attention from the Church of England and other denominations. Beginning in 1809, groundbreaking and notable work that served as a model for future Protestant and Catholic efforts was that of Baptist minister George Charles Smith. Smith founded mission organizations such as the Port of London Society and the nondenominational British and Foreign Seamen’s Friend Society and Bethel Union. His pioneering work inspired similar activities in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Germany.

Significant and specific attention is given the three chapters comprising the section “Nineteenth-Century Catholic Work” comprised of: Fr Goldie SJ and the CTS [Catholic Truth Society], The Work for Catholic Bluejackets, and The Œuvres de Mer.

The final section “Twentieth-Century Catholic Work” devotes three chapters to work before the First World War, Peter Anson (1889-1975), and Catholic Work after Anson. Miller aptly shows the ability of those promoting religious outreach to merchant seafarers to adapt to the ever-present but ever-changing maritime community and maritime industry. He has provided readers with a rich and timely overview and history of Christian outreach to “those who go down to the sea in ships” (Psalm 107:23). It is a book well worth reading.

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In The Slaves’ Gamble. Choosing Sides in the War of 1812, Gene Allen Smith tackles the history of African Americans’ experience during the War of 1812. This complex story has not been as widely explored as other aspects of this war. Past historians have dwelt on the role of free American Blacks’ in the United States militia, regular army or the navy during the conflict, or on the American Blacks who escaped slavery in the Chesapeake Bay area by running to the British ships of war that came to conduct raids during 1813 and 1814. Smith shatters this dichotomous focus by weaving individual stories of African Americans weighing a variety of options as the war came to touch their lives, into the larger narrative of political, social and military events of the war. His work casts a new perspective on the place and experience of African Americans in the early republic at the start of the nineteenth century. For most, that place was as a slave, and for a few, as free persons, but often with a nebulous claim on the rights of citizenship. The experience was that of a person shaping their destiny as much as possible by assessing their choices within the changing context of the war and their place as a slave or free person.

The first chapter reviews the use of Blacks as soldiers in North America during the long eighteenth century (up to 1800). The
British came to accept Black soldiers fairly quickly, raising them from among their own slaves in the West Indies and from African slaves, whose freedom was promised after their period of service. Smith describes the formation of the West India Regiment, consisting of Black troops led by white British officers. As the American Revolution unfolded, the idea of arming slaves caused the slave-owning freedom fighters a fair bit of turmoil. Eventually, free Blacks were allowed to serve in the patriot army, while slaves were not. British efforts to recruit rebel-owned slaves are discussed as is the Spanish use of slaves and free men of African descent as soldiers in Florida during the era. Spanish Florida served as a haven for escaped American slaves who, in turn, served in Spanish units to protect their freedom.

Chapter 2 examines the Great Lakes region as war loomed between Britain and America. Smith lays out the causes of the war, the escalating tensions and the early war campaigns, covering 1807 through 1813. The movement of Black slaves and settlers across the border is discussed noting that in the 1780s enslaved Blacks in Upper Canada fled to the Michigan territory. In describing the ample presence of Black sailors in merchant vessels and U.S. ships of war, Smith reminds the reader that three of the four men taken from the Chesapeake by the HMS Leopard in 1807 were free African Americans and eventually returned to the United States. During the War of 1812, the use of Blacks in the navy and militia became routine and their service often received praise from their commanding officers.

The Florida Patriot War (1812-1814) is the topic of the third chapter. American expansionists’ desire to seize Spanish-held Florida, to defeat the Indians standing in the way of American settlement of Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi and to recapture escaped slaves who had fled to Spanish protection was the inspiration for the conflict. The free Blacks, escaped slaves and Seminole Indians helped the weak Spanish forces defend the colony from the invaders. The war ended with tensions remaining and the British shifting their attention to the region to strike further at the Americans with whom they were at war.

Chapters 4 and 5 address the African Americans’ experience in the Chesapeake Bay theatre during the War of 1812. Chapter four gives an overview of the events of 1813 and 1814, with the British conducting raids along the shore of the bay. American Blacks began to escape slavery as soon as the British appeared, fleeing directly to their ships, or coming away with landing parties in ever increasing numbers. This chapter details the exodus and the American response, primarily one of great fear, but also the removal of slaves from shoreline areas, an increase in patrols to interdict escapees and efforts to negotiate with the British and their former slaves for the ex-slaves’ return (the latter almost always failing). The British presence allowed entire families to exit slavery, which was not the usual case before the appearance of the Royal Navy, in 1813.

Chapter 5 deals with the British attacks against Washington and Baltimore. We read of more Blacks escaping slavery, but also of African Americans staying in slavery and not leaving with the invader. Free Blacks took an active part in the defence of Baltimore. Cochrane’s April 1814 proclamation, inviting slaves to run to the British and receive freedom and Cockburn’s organization of an ex-slave Black Colonial Marine company take centre stage. The arming of the former slaves caused further panic among the Americans as it raised the spectre of a bloody slave revolt. No slave revolt was intended and the Colonial Marine did not rise above 400 in strength during the war. The Colonial Marine, however, was an effective force involved in shore raids and at Washington and Baltimore.

Chapter 6 returns to the southern border lands and the presence of the British to
lead the free Blacks and Creek Indians against the American southern frontier. It follows the action from August 1814 through the years immediately after the war, covering the British failure to control West Florida, the American victory at New Orleans and the British invasion of Cumberland Island on the Georgia coast. American Blacks fleeing slavery in Florida assisted the British in their effort to control the northern area of Florida and harass American plantation owners in the southern Mississippi territory and Georgia. Smith details the British West India Regiment’s presence at New Orleans, as well as the African Americans (both free and slave) who helped defend New Orleans. The last British invasion of the war took place at Cumberland Island and resulted in the freeing of 1500 more slaves. As with the conflict in the Chesapeake, war along the southern border lands provided a range of opportunities for African Americans to alter the course of their lives.

The final chapter discusses the destinations of the African Americans who fled slavery. It begins by describing the “massacre” at Dartmoor Prison in 1815 and the role played by Black American seafarers in the prison and the riot. Smith suggests that 3,000 to 4,500 people escaped slavery during the war, a small dent in the much larger American slave population. Bermuda served as a clearing place for shifting the American Blacks to vessels that would carry them to their new homes. Nova Scotia received the lion’s share, with some going to Britain, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Barbados. Those who served in the Black Colonial marine unit for the British were settled with their families on Trinidad. In each location, the escaped slaves were settled as free people. Although their experiences were difficult, most established lives that supported them and their families, and built viable communities. In America, slave owners “doubled down” on their investment in a slave-based society. Black Americans were not allowed to serve in the United States Army again until the Civil War. Those runaway and free Blacks in Northern Florida who did not leave with the British after the war were hunted down over the next twenty years and either killed or re-enslaved, as Florida was gradually seized by the Americans.

Gene Smith inserts at least one story of a person (and their family) into each of the larger overarching narratives in chapters 2 through 7. I have avoided describing them as not to spoil their effect by indicating their outcomes. The individual stories Smith uses keenly demonstrate the twisting paths, the positive potentials or the life-threatening negative outcomes faced by the African Americans attempting to navigate through their personal context within the often frenetic ongoing larger events. The outcomes are not always positive.

This is a well written work, but there are several small bumps. In chapter 4 we are told that Cockburn used his “…black marines” in a raid on 3 May 1813, but the ex-slave Colonial Marines was not formed until April 1814 (91). In describing the defense of New Orleans, Smith declares that, “Jackson cobbled together a heterogeneous army that embodied the first genuine American fighting force…” (166). He does list the wide range of groups (pirates, slaves, French Louisiana Creoles to regular troops) but “the first genuine American fighting force…” seems to be a bit of an enthusiastic overstatement. He states that the first wave of Blacks reaching Halifax arrived in September 1813, when in fact, they were there by early summer (194). In discussing the destinations of the American Blacks who escaped slavery, Smith tells of the 5th West India Regiments’ settlement in Belize (202-3). This is interesting, but American Blacks refused to serve in any unit of the West India Regiment (as noted on 192-193) and so this diversion adds a touch of confusion to an otherwise clear story.

Twelve illustrations are spread throughout the book, usually on the page for
which they provide graphic support. Some have been seen many times before but there are some new views, for example, the print of Melville Island from the mid-nineteenth century (195). One image seems to be mistitled. The editorial cartoon depicting the British burning Washington and offering freedom to the slaves is titled “Slaves Burning Washington” (123) which is not what the text describes as occurring (125), nor is it what is shown in the image. The maps are among the best I have ever seen in any book on the war. They contain the historically correct names, are clearly drawn, labeled and provide a visual that supports the surrounding text. The only concern is due more to my failing eye sight perhaps, but the map of the Southern Coast (146) could be larger as the tiny print is very hard to read. The endnotes are thorough, revealing Smith’s use of a wide range of both primary and secondary sources to build his case.

This is a book to be read by all interested in the War of 1812, early American history and the experience of African Americans in the United States. For those specializing in maritime studies, it offers insight into the brief intersection between African Americans escaping slavery and the British Navy serving as a bridge to freedom.

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Historians have identified the Battle of Midway in June 1942, as the turning point in the Pacific Theatre in World War Two. In that battle, the U.S. Navy (USN) sank four aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) for the loss of one USN aircraft carrier. It would be easy to say that Midway broke the back of the IJN; indeed, that is the popular image of the Pacific War.

Despite Japan’s severe losses in ships, aircraft, aircrew and ships’ crew at Midway, the IJN still possessed tremendous combat capability and inflicted major losses on the USN in sea battles subsequent to Midway. This addition to the Osprey Campaign Series, Santa Cruz 1942: Carrier duel in the South Pacific, by Mark Stille, relates one of those battles which was both a tactical victory and a strategic loss for the IJN.

In early August 1942, American Marines landed on the islands of Tulagi, Guadalcanal and Gavutu-Tanambogo in the Solomon Islands and quickly secured them. The American offensive was in response to a perceived Japanese threat to Australia and New Zealand and the communication lines between those dominions and the United States. Further, the USN chief of naval operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, urged an immediate offensive after Midway. The IJN high command was determined to stop the U.S. offensive would be stopped. Many books have been written about the land battle for Guadalcanal; less has been written about the savage naval battles that attended the Guadalcanal campaign. The Battle of Santa Cruz, on 26 October 1942, was one of those.

During the period 24 August-25 October 1942, the IJN made numerous efforts to drive the Americans off Guadalcanal accompanied by land attacks on American positions. In the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942, the USN sank the Japanese aircraft carrier Ryujo, while IJN aircraft damaged the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise. In subsequent actions, the IJN damaged the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and sank another, USS Wasp. At this point in the Pacific War, the U.S. was left with two aircraft carriers, Enterprise (damaged) and USS Hornet.

The Battle of Santa Cruz began at 02:40 hours on 26 October 1942, when a USN
patrol plane spotted an IJN carrier force. During the next 20 hours, both sides launched air strikes against the respective enemy fleets. The combat was furious and lasted well into the night. The result was an immediate catastrophic loss for the USN: USS *Hornet* was sunk, the USS *Enterprise* and the battleship USS *South Dakota* were damaged and a destroyer, USS *Porter*, was sunk as well. The US also lost 80 aircraft and 22 aircrew. With only one operational aircraft carrier (the damaged *Enterprise*), the USN’s position near Guadalcanal was tenuous indeed.

The IJN did not escape Santa Cruz unscathed. Two carriers, *Shokaku* and *Zuiho*, and the heavy cruiser *Chikuma* were severely damaged and required extensive repairs in Japan. In addition, the IJN lost 99 aircraft and 145 aircrews—more than they had lost at Midway. The lost aircraft could be replaced, but aircrews took time to train. This is why Santa Cruz has gone down in history as a Japanese tactical victory but a strategic loss.

Stille’s account of the Santa Cruz battle is quite thorough. In keeping with the Osprey Campaign series format, the author discusses the qualities of the opposing commanders, from King of the USN and Yamamoto of the IJN down to the individual ship commanders. Following that is a chapter, laden with good detail, on the qualities of the ships and aircraft involved in the battle. The plans of the USN and IJN are related in the next chapter and the battle itself is given its own chapter, the longest of the book at 42 pages. The aftermath of Santa Cruz is detailed and a bibliography is included. The book is well-illustrated with many excellent photographs of the people, ships, and equipment, charts of ship movements and carrier attacks, and excellent plates of critical moments of the battle.

Stille’s book is analytical as well as narrative. He points out the differences between American and Japanese aircraft. For example, the famed IJN fighter, the A6M Zero, was superior in speed and maneuverability to the U.S. F4F Wildcat, but inferior to the American fighter in ruggedness—a distinction which saved many American pilots’ lives in this and other battles. The USN’s fighter defense, torpedoes, and air strike coordination, however, was less effective. Stille points out that the IJN had learned much in damage control from Midway but was still inflexible in one respect: the ability to move aircraft from one ship to another. The remaining IJN carrier in the area, *Zuikaku*, was left with a partial air group. The aircraft still operational from *Shokaku* and *Zuiho* could have been used to fill up *Zuikaku*’s air group.

The result of the Battle of Santa Cruz was mixed for both sides. Japan launched its finest air attacks of the Pacific War and deprived the USN of all but one aircraft carrier in the South Pacific. For the USN, the American airpower on Guadalcanal’s Henderson Field was left largely untouched and the Japanese were ultimately forced to evacuate their remaining forces from Guadalcanal in February 1943. The result of Santa Cruz was thus a catastrophic tactical loss for America but an equally catastrophic strategic loss for the Japanese.

Stille’s book is well-detailed and serves as a useful guide to this often-overlooked sea battle. It is recommended for a wide range of readership.

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In 1763, the Seven Years War ended with the decisive defeat of the French in North
America and India leaving Britain as the pre-eminent European colonial power. Nevertheless, the cautious British government anticipated that the National Convention of France would declare war on Britain within one or two decades.

This is the eighth book in a series of high-quality studies published under the banner of Worlds of the East India Company. The author, Peter A. Ward, had a professional career in personnel management with technology companies overseas. His initial idea was to research Admiral Rainier, but the project developed over several years into a fascination with Rainier’s pivotal role in Britain’s commercial, imperial, maritime and military history. This book is based on Ward’s PhD studies in naval history at the University of Exeter.

Peter Rainier’s rise through the ranks was steady, beginning with his 1768 appointment as lieutenant, then as captain in 1778, rear-admiral in 1795, vice-admiral in 1799 and admiral in 1805. In September 1794, Rainier, now knighted, received orders from the Admiralty to watch the Red Sea ports that might be used by the French navy. His voyage from England to Madras took only nineteen weeks, without any stops en route.

The morale of the Royal Navy at that time was at low ebb and the author describes how inflation further reduced the value of wages that had been static for almost a century. In city streets, press-gangs drove workers into the armed forces and around the ports and docks disenchanted seamen organized mutinies that eventually forced the Admiralty to declare a general mobilization.

Rainier’s posting in the East enhanced his managerial and diplomatic skills as he cooperated with the private joint-stock English East India Company (EIC), which effectively ruled British India. His broad knowledge of naval warfare, coupled with a deep understanding of strategic issues facing the Royal Navy in India encouraged him to make decisions based on British interests. Yet when the Admiralty dispatched an officer overland to warn that Bonaparte was in the Orient, Rainier was criticized for not taking the threat seriously enough.

The unique position of the English EIC made it the main channel through which trade passed between Europe and Asia. The company was sending 20 to 30 large ships each year to the east, but its relations with the Royal Navy were not always clear. Britain’s imperial, commercial, maritime and military role in the east benefited from Rainier’s skilled diplomacy, one positive result of which was that the myriad of independent rulers in India were kept on Britain’s side, ensuring their long-term co-operation.

Rainier’s success in advancing British interests in India may have been due to his appointment coinciding with the tenure of Lord Richard Wellesley as governor-general. To protect naval intelligence, Rainier communicated with the Admiralty in code, but soon had to inform Lord Dundas, the secretary of state for war, that his signal books had fallen into French hands and were now worthless. When Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798, Rainier acted without orders from the Admiralty, in spite of complaining afterwards about having had insufficient information from India and Canton.

In 1796, the cost of freight fell when the London-based East India Company re-introduced free and open competition. Rainier exploited this to secure British interests in the East and enhance relations with India. Protection of trade was regularly threatened by enemy privateers but he ensured that the EIC retained its monopoly east of the Cape of Good Hope until 1814. When Rainier finally returned to England, it was with £300,000 in prize money.

Peter Ward’s excellent and enjoyable book describes the enormous difficulties that Admiral Rainier faced in the 1790s. It also explains how British interests in the East were secured while avoiding the need to fight a major battle. Yet whatever the causes of
Britain’s success, none was more significant than the role played by the Royal Navy.

Ward has painstakingly trawled through the archives of the National Maritime Museum, the National Archives, the British Library and the University of Exeter to uncover the extensive fund of correspondence and documents on which this book is based. His excellent bibliography, careful choice of graphs, and appendices on trade statistics include many maps and references to electronic sources.

In recent years, the debate surrounding British naval power in the East has attracted the attention of scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds, but with a common interest in examining relations between Britain and India, Indonesia and China. The author concedes that as trade grew, wealth was created which flowed back to Britain, and that in spite of Rainier’s success at sea, he remained modestly ambitious but he was not a visionary.

Peter Ward echoes Nicholas Rodger’s claim in 2004 that the definitive history of what he calls “The Great Wars” in the East has yet to be written. If so, then this attractively presented book probably accomplishes it. In spite of being rather expensive, it should be on the shelves of naval and economic historians, and readers with an interest in maritime or early colonial history.

Michael Clark
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The Second World War at sea has been thoroughly covered in several thousand books, from the general strategic to the tactical, from major operations, such as Normandy, to one-day attacks such as that on the Italian Fleet at Taranto. Now we are seeing some of the missing bits filled in through personal memoirs, biographies of the more minor players, and a focus on lesser-known although sometimes significant operations. This very extensively researched biography of Basil Charles Godfrey Place, VC, CB, CVO, DSC offers a useful contribution to the corpus of such individual stories. Place is reasonably known in naval circles for a single event—the midget submarine X-7 attack on the monstrous German battleship Tirpitz moored in Kaa Fjord, north Norway, on 22 September 1943—which earned him the Victoria Cross. To a large extent, this is the reason for his biography, although he spent the rest of his working life with the Royal Navy, retiring as a rear admiral in June 1970. Paul Watkins, a veterinary surgeon with an interest in naval and VC history, has obviously done a major research job to produce this biography. His seven pages of notes refer to dozens of ships’ logs, official war diaries, Form 206 Officers Reports, quotations from other broader histories and newspaper articles. Place’s post-war career is illuminated with correspondence from those who knew him in those years.

Godfrey Place was born in England in 1921, but moved with his family to Uganda, Nigeria and Rhodesia where his father was a district magistrate and judge. Place moved back and forth between these locales and England until joining the RN in 1935. “Why the RN?” No reason is given for his choice, although his father served in the Army in the First World War. After the normal training in cruisers and an armed merchant cruiser in 1939 as a cadet, he did sub-lieutenant’s courses, and volunteered for submarines, serving for two years in various U-class boats and as liaison officer in the Polish S/M Sokol. This is where I found another problem with this largely useful tale; “Why submarines?” Whether Place or his family didn’t allow access to any significant
correspondence from him, or there is none, we have only the notation “Appointed to HMS Elfin ... to train for service in submarines.” (31) Only later, in more senior post-war appointments are there a few clues as to Place’s thoughts about the course of his career. Thus, apart from several official comments from reviewing officers, it is difficult to assess what kind of a person Place actually was, or why he chose certain paths. Relying on “official” reports is a very weak reed upon which to base a biography. In fact, the story would have been better served by a more rigorous editor to pare back extraneous detail about ships, people and even operations.

The description of Operation Source, the planning, training and execution of the attack on Tirpitz that so obsessed Churchill and the Admiralty makes the book both interesting and valuable. Two of four small submarines actually survived to attack the battleship. The description of the trials in Scotland, towing by fleet submarines to the site and the attacks themselves gives a good indication of how hazardous the whole thing was. One boat disappeared without trace en route, and two attacking boats were lost before they could penetrate the protective nets. The end, however, was assessed to have justified the means. Tirpitz was put out of action for many months and, while still immobilized, fell victim to RAF bombs. Of the four men in X-7, only Place and Sub-Lieutenant Aiken survived. This part of the tale is an excellent and detailed narration of that valiant operation from the viewpoint of the attackers.

Taken by the Germans as prisoners of war, Place and the others survived the war in pretty well-known difficult conditions. Repatriated in April 1945, and reunited with his wife with whom he had spent only a few weeks 18 months earlier, Pace soon applied to return to the submarine service. In a thoroughly unappreciative gesture, the RN told him if he returned to submarines he would lose 18 months seniority! After a couple of years in frigates as navigator, Place opted to transfer to the Fleet Air Arm for a complete career change, starting at once to train as a pilot of fixed-wing fighters. Again we are not told why in the world he chose that route. He qualified easily with good reports, and by the outbreak of the Korean War was combat flying as a very junior pilot aboard HMS Glory, although, by then, a commander in rank. Pace seems to have done well, was accepted by both peers and seamen working with him, and rarely made anything of his VC, although others did, particularly the media. Subsequently, he was appointed in command of the destroyer Tumult, as executive officer of a carrier, went to a couple of staff appointments at sea in carriers and at the Admiralty, took up more commands, then became CO of the boys’ training school, HMS Ganges. This he liked, as he felt such training was a valuable prelude to life in the RN. He nearly turned down his last appointment as admiral commanding reserves and director general naval recruiting since, as we are told several times, he was not in favour of Naval Reserves, believing that the Navy should only be run by professionals. This conviction and his difficulties with his seniors on more than one occasion give us some clues as to his inner thoughts. But these we must garner from sparse references, not from anything Place himself actually recorded.

In 1970 Pace retired, still well thought of in most circles, and for the next 23 years dedicated his time to his chairmanship of the VC and GC Association. He died in December 1995. This is an interesting tale of a very young hero who went on to spend 28 years in the service, gaining rank and awards in the days of Empire East of Suez. The meat is in the Operation Source description, and of Place’s part in the challenges faced by the post-war Royal Navy.

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