
The author of this re-examination of Norwegian Thor Heyerdahl’s 1947 balsa-log raft experiment, the *Kon-Tiki* Expedition, conveniently defines his motives in the very first paragraph. Heyerdahl was a hero, the author proclaims, yet unlike the heroes of mythology, or modern popular culture, for that matter, Heyerdahl somehow managed to finish his heroic life without the requisite and punishing fall from grace. The author is clearly galled by what he considers a massive and maddening oversight and sets out to correct the record. But across 200 overwrought pages, Andersson’s less-than-heroic attempt to devastate Heyerdahl fails on so many levels one is left to wonder why the effort was undertaken in the first place.

On 7 August 1947, after a drift voyage of more than 4,000 nautical miles, history’s most famous wooden raft crashed onto the windward reef of the Polynesian island of Raroia. Thor Heyerdahl, the 33-year-old captain of the raft and leader of the expedition, sought to pioneer a new method of experimental archaeology and thereby introduce a new type of experimental data into a largely stale, academic argument over how humans had first inhabited the islands of the Pacific. The popular result, when published three years later as *Kon-Tiki: Across the Pacific by Raft*, became both one of the greatest sea adventures of all time as well as archaeology’s most original and famous experiment.

The author of this new analysis, a Swedish historian, undertakes his radical deconstruction of *Kon-Tiki* in part because he feels that it has never been properly contextualized. Most everyone who has ever read *Kon-Tiki* remembers it as the thrilling and moving adventure of a recreated prehistoric raft drifting on a legendary, historic sea. Andersson writes that this is not only a misapprehension, but one that was deliberately designed as such. “Heyerdahl sailed in an atomic age on an atomic sea” (p. 180).

Placing the expedition squarely in the modern era, the *Kon-Tiki* is arrayed alongside the bikini as a clever marketing tool contrived to make the western world ignore the fact of its nuclear domination of the Pacific. Andersson sees Western domination of the Pacific as not only technological but racial. It is here that he critiques both *Kon-Tiki* the expedition and *Kon-Tiki* the book as essentially racist enterprises.

The narrative structure of both raft and writing were used, he argues, to hide Heyerdahl’s true, racist motives. It is in the middle of this argument that *A Hero for the Atomic Age* founders. There are too many instances in the narrative where the author has to invent or imply connections between Heyerdahl and those from whom he is allegedly gathering his racist impulses.

Andersson states that Heyerdahl deliberately sought to create a timeless narrative, one in which “whiteness was
almost always favored over the non-white” (p. 83), even though it was “improbable that Heyerdahl consciously studied how to write the appropriate plot in order to perfect his travel narration” (p. 78). Heyerdahl’s use of the bearded face of a Tiwanaku sculpture as the face of god Kon-Tiki allows the author to dishonestly connect Heyerdahl with Heinrich Himmler’s proposed expedition to find the archaeological remnants of an ancient Nordic race at the same site.

Then there is this extraordinary passage: “Heyerdahl also appears to have had a fear of ‘miscegenation’, or the mixing of the races. He could, after all, have carried present-day Polynesians or South Americans on his raft, but it seemed that these people were no longer white enough. Heyerdahl had to rely on a Scandinavian crew that, one is led to assume, had better preserved its racial purity” (pp. 86-87). In three consecutive sentences, the author levels a charge of racism using appear, seem, and assume—three of the weakest verbs in the English language. “One is led to assume” only if one is already predisposed to assume. As with so much of this volume, the arguments flow neatly from the conclusions, not the other way around.

There is more, but one tends to turn away after the Kon-Tiki raft is compared to a crafty Norwegian version of the World Bank. In trying to debunk a hero, the author has instead, consciously or not, cast himself as the post-modern crusader, out to slay what he sees as Heyerdahl’s unexamined racist (and, later in the volume, sexist and militarist) agenda.

As with so many other examinations of Heyerdahl’s early work, the major weakness of the book lies in its overreliance on the popular account of the expedition, Kon-Tiki: Across the Pacific by Raft, with little or no reference to the massive scholarly underpinnings of the experiment, published in 1952 as American Indians in the Pacific: The Theory behind the Kon-Tiki Expedition. One cannot understand the depth and breadth of Heyerdahl’s pioneering approach to experimental archaeology without a thorough study of this massive, nearly 1,000 pages of interdisciplinary research. By ignoring American Indians in the Pacific, the author of A Hero for the Atomic Age leads the reader to a conclusion based on a false premise: that Heyerdahl cynically arranged a Pacific drift expedition as a clever marketing ploy in order to sell his popular account of that expedition.

Ignoring American Indians in the Pacific allows the author to promote his own deconstruction of Heyerdahl as a Norwegian racist who somehow managed to escape the fate suffered by several men of the previous generation of famous Norwegians such as the novelist Knut Hamsun or the country’s leading polar scientist, Adolf Hoel, who found themselves ensnared and brought down by their too-close associations with Germans. In the end, both hypotheses—Heyerdahl as racist and Kon-Tiki as the balsa wood van of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific—are initially compelling but ultimately unconvincing.

There are several themes in the work that could have been expanded upon to form an interesting study. Unfortunately, many of these—for example, the comparison and contrast of Heyerdahl’s work with that of his great contemporaries Rachel Carson, Jacques-Yves Cousteau and Alain Bombard—are found only in passing and at the very end of the work in the final chapter. As Andersson himself correctly writes (p. 195), the “full analysis of all of Heyerdahl’s adventures still awaits its author.”

Peter J. Capelotti
Abington, Pennsylvania
This is not an account of Canadian or American fishing on the Grand Banks but rather of the enterprise of fishermen from many countries who crossed the oceans to fish in the once-teeming waters of our continental shelf. The first voyagers came from Western Europe: France, Spain and Portugal; and later from the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caribbean and even from the far Pacific. It is a pictorial history and the pictures are outstandingly comprehensive. There are photographs from the early twentieth century to the present day: pictures of ships from all the nations involved, of captains and crews and of workers ashore in fish plants. There are pictures of newsworthy events — strikes, protests, rescues and disasters along with essential maps showing fishing zones and claims.

The story is not only told in pictures: the book starts with a concise survey of the early days of the fishery from 1500 (and quite possibly earlier) to the First World War. Here, and later in the book, we learn much about the checkered history of the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, where M. Andrieux, the author, and longtime member of the Canadian Nautical Research Society, has his family roots. St. Pierre schooners, like their Newfoundland counterparts, fished using dories while larger vessels came from France and landed their catch to be dried and processed on the islands. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, steamers brought several thousand workers from metropolitan France to the islands to do this work. It was a seasonal endeavour: they would come each spring and return to France before winter set in. As the fishing gradually declined, so did the prosperity of the islands. From 1919 to 1933 came a reprieve, the period of “Prohibition” in the United States. St. Pierre and Miquelon became a depot for smugglers carrying liquor to alcohol-craving Americans. With the repeal of the Volstead Act hard times returned and many island people emigrated, some to France and some to Newfoundland or Canada.

Between the wars, fleets of fishing vessels arrived annually from Spain and Portugal as well as from France. The Portuguese had been doing this for 500 years and the others nearly as long. Italian trawlers were also seen, but the demand for salt cod was so great that Newfoundland and Canadian-caught fish continued to be exported to all southern European countries. The Grand Banks were international waters and anyone could fish in a totally unregulated way. What helped to conserve the stocks of fish, to some extent, was that fishing ceased during the winter and the worst of the spring ice season, but each annual expedition of the fleets was spoken of as a ‘campaign’. They made war on the cod and, in the end, they won since the cod have been virtually wiped out. From 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945, humans turned to fighting each other and the cod recovered. After 1945, however, new participants joined in and the assault was resumed in overwhelming force. When fishing was with handlines from dories and sailing vessels, the fishery was sustainable. Then came the steam trawler, first introduced on the Banks in 1905. Finally, after the Second World War, the stern trawler transferring its catch to factory ships and the freezer trawler that processed the fish on board (all capable of fishing in winter as well as summer) proved to be weapons that nature was unable to withstand.

Andrieux follows the development of the European national fleets between the
wars and the great expansion and technical advances of the post-war era. For a decade after 1945, catches were good and the fish were large until the decline caused largely by new participants with new ships and equipment. Before the 1950s, Russia had not engaged in transatlantic fishing, but from then on, a huge, highly organized effort created a fleet larger than that of any other nation, including trawlers, factory ships, tugs, supply ships and tankers. It was like a naval task force. In fact, the Americans were convinced their real purpose was spying and commissioned two fake trawlers to cruise among them to detect this, with what success we will never know. Other Baltic nations like Poland and East Germany as well as Bulgaria, Japan and South Korea sent ships to the area.

Besides describing the actual fishing activity, the author discusses international agreements, disputes, multilateral and bilateral diplomatic negotiations and unilateral measures. The extension of the territorial sea from three to twelve miles in 1970 and the declaration by Canada of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in 1977 were key events. Thereafter, the huge European fleets mostly disappeared. A few vessels remain: the Spanish are still there and trawlers under unlikely flags of convenience harvest the nose and tail of the Bank, just outside the 200-mile limit, for previously disregarded species like turbot. The text and the wonderful photos bring us right up to date. If you want to know what happened to the fish on the Grand Banks, never mind the scientific studies and government reports; just read this book.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia
increased volume of exports being sent coastwise to London for transshipment as well as how the town became a major whaling port in the nineteenth century.

Whitby’s seaborne trade began with alum, produced from the deposits of alum shale in the cliffs of North Yorkshire, and continued with the Dutch demand for herrings that, in turn, led to a thriving trade in salt. As the variety of cargoes offered by English merchants to their European customers increased, shipowners turned more of their voyages into highly profitable two-way traffic. A ship makes money only when it is at sea, so its activity can be traced from sources such as the financial accounts of its voyages. These details give the researcher a fascinating insight into the seafaring of that time and the hierarchical structure of the crews and shipboard apprentices.

The author clearly demonstrates how one small town became the base for one of the largest merchant fleets in England, successfully competing with Newcastle’s shipments of coal to London, and Hull’s exports of woolens to the Baltic and northern Europe. She believes that as Whitby continued to transform itself, its ships must have served the entire known world at one time or another. This claim is backed up in England’s Apprenticeship 1603-1763 (Wilson, 1971) which says that it is quite possible the town’s total seaborne tonnage grew from between 150,000 to 200,000 tons in 1660 to 340,000 tons in 1688, of which 60 percent went to Europe.

This book provides a very full picture of an early modern shipping industry. Although private shipbuilders in England had not figured conspicuously as technical innovators during the seventeenth century, Whitby’s shipyards later copied and borrowed the best features of Dutch flyboats for their ordinary working vessels. The author argues it was this commercial entrepreneurship that brought about the growth of Whitby’s shipping industry in contrast to East Anglian ports where the economy languished, depressed rather than stimulated by competition from Holland.

To explain the remarkable, if uneven, economic growth of the period covered by this book is not easy. For example, England was not only an integral part of the North Sea economy but its proximity to Europe offered it a rich harvest of economic opportunity. Whitby was eventually sidelined, however, by the rapid growth in British world-wide trade and the isolation of its harbour. The concentration of shipowning in London and the increasing size of ships meant that, although Whitby struggled on through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it never recovered its past glory.

The Rise of an Early Modern Shipping Industry is a splendid example of skillful research intelligently applied. Rosalin Barker has included a comprehensive index, a useful glossary and definitions, and a selected bibliography. Her painstaking and pioneering work with this remarkable collection of documents from the Whitby archives is an important contribution to British maritime history and an indispensable reference for readers of economic and maritime history as well as those interested in general history.

It is sometimes said that the development of information technology has made the systematic collection of historical data easier for researchers. While it is true that it has enabled historians to discern connections between apparently trivial evidence, readers of this book will enjoy the work of an author who has made sense of long-gone events by scouring the small print of local and regional maritime history resources that are peppered around the country.

Michael Clark
London, England

The 1758 British capture of Louisbourg has received much less scholarly attention than have the 1759 capture of Quebec, the 1755 defeat of Braddock near the Monongahela, or Abercomby’s 1758 defeat near the shore of Lake Champlain. This neglect is easing, however. The Louisbourg campaign is featured in two recent surveys of the Seven Years’ War, my own *The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) and Daniel Baugh’s wonderful *The Global Seven Years’ War, 1754-1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest* (Harlow, Eng.: Longman, 2011). More importantly, it has now received full coverage by two very good books, A. J. B. Johnston’s *Endgame, 1758: The Promise, the Glory, and the Despair of Louisbourg’s Last Decade* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), written predominantly but not exclusively from a French perspective and Hugh Boscawen’s *The Capture of Louisbour, 1758*, written predominantly, but not exclusively, from a British perspective.

Boscawen, a direct descendant of Edward Boscawen, the naval commander of the 1758 expedition, has treated in great detail the preparations for the campaign, the landing of the British troops, and the siege. His book is well written and exhaustively researched (although, at times, a little too reliant on British intelligence reports for the French side). Although the author thoroughly discusses the naval side of the campaign, the largest share of the book is devoted to fighting on land, where most of the action took place. His day-by-day account of General Amherst’s campaign ashore is virtually definitive, but he has also done an excellent job supplementing Johnston’s account of the French defense, particularly the acrimonious dispute between the commander of the fortified city and the commander of the small French squadron assisting in its defense. The major challenge the author faces is generating suspense. Once the British troops had completed their contested landing a few miles from the city, Louisbourg was doomed. The French had no more warships to send and the small force of Acadian irregulars and Indians sent to disrupt the siege accomplished little. The account of the landing is very dramatic but thereafter, Amherst’s inexorable advance does not make for excitement; Amherst had considerable logistical obstacles to overcome but there was little doubt he would win. (As Baugh has pointed out, there were no tropical diseases to weaken the besiegers, as would happen four years later at Havana (p.347). What was striking to me was how slow British progress was. Amherst, like Montcalm at Oswego and Fort William Henry, was competent at siege warfare, but he was even more cautious than was Montcalm. It took slightly longer from the landing to the surrender than it took for the entire 1745 siege, even though the British had many more troops in 1758, virtually all regulars, and a huge fleet (8 June-27 July 1758 versus 11 May-28 June 1745). This had important consequences. Prime Minister William Pitt had hoped that Amherst would be able to go on to Quebec once Louisbourg had been captured, but the siege took so long that this proved impossible (for reasons that are quite well explained.)

This leaves me with two questions. First, could Boscawen’s fleet have entered the harbour and destroyed the French
squadron as soon as the island battery at its entrance was virtually silenced on 25 June? Boscawen and Amherst were too timid to make the attempt. My opinion is that it would have been worth the risk of losing a few British ships of the line; on 1 June the British had 104 warships of 50 or more cannon in service compared to only 25 French (Dull, French Navy, pp.269-71). The French squadron was so important to the defense of the vulnerable seafront of the city that it quickly surrendered once the last of the French ships were captured or destroyed early on 26 July.

Second, if the city had been captured a month earlier, could the British have re-embarked their troops and gone on to take Quebec? This would have been even riskier than a naval attack on the harbour of Louisbourg because the St. Lawrence River had not yet been surveyed, but it too seems worth the risk. Quebec was weakly defended in 1758, although some troops could have been sent from Lake Champlain. A successful attack on it could have ended the war in Canada at least a year before September, 1760, when Montreal finally was captured.

The author has not speculated on these questions. What he has done is to provide a reliable and informative account of what actually did happen. Moreover, he has been well served by his publisher. The book is handsome, the copyediting is excellent, and there are half a dozen lovely maps, two dozen illustrations, a glossary, a useful bibliography, and a good index. Given all this, the book’s cost is remarkably reasonable. I recommend it highly both to scholars and to the general public.

Jonathan Dull
Hamden, Connecticut


In the Preface, Ken Brown writes, “This book focuses on the Canadian Canoe Company when it was an independent Peterborough business in the 1892-1928 period… It addresses many of the interrelated stories of other operations … There are stories about factories, international exhibitions, and making and losing money.” The author gives the reader a view of the ups and downs of the people and the businesses in the canoe industry in Peterborough, Ontario and the surrounding area of the Kawartha Lakes. It is the story of the people who applied the industrial model to the craft and heritage of the amazing vessel that is the canoe.

In presenting his sources, the author tells us that secondary sources are few and so he relies happily on the primary sources provided by the companies. Brown has a gentle sense of humour, declaring his companion in researching and writing the book to be Felix Brownscombe, secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Canoe Company, 1892-1928. The author identifies himself as an avid canoeist, whose vocation is accounting. He interprets the ledgers, journals, and accounts and through them brings the flesh and blood people to life.

In addition to building the canoes, their marketing, locally and internationally, was a major part of the business. The special role of international exhibitions and regattas is described and the associated high quality graphics in advertisements and catalogues are presented. There are examples of beautiful craft built from custom designs of fishers, racers and
recreational paddlers.

In chapters entitled “It Wasn’t All Work” and “The Shop Workers”, the people and social life built around the canoe are illustrated. The evolution of the various businesses is traced in chapters such as “The End of the Era of the Founding Partners” and “The Second Era of the Canadian Canoe Company, 1928-1961.” A major theme is the interconnectedness of the enterprises.

There are fascinating historical threads, which were a part of the attempt to industrialize production of the canoe, as were the attempts to patent design innovations in the canoe and trade-mark names. In terms of patents, like the Wright Brothers’ attempt to patent the aeroplane, their attempts failed. The ongoing legal fight to acquire and defend names like the “Canadian canoe” for the enterprise and the products had equivocal outcomes. The author shows that in later years, the largest enterprises tried to adapt by building larger vessels like skiffs, runabouts, and even a 30-foot, steam-powered launch. The work ends with some old, black and white aerial photos and maps in colour that place the historical canoe factories within Peterborough of the early twentieth century. The nemesis of the manufactured canoe was, in the author’s view, none other than the lowly, ubiquitous, cheap bicycle. A more detailed account of the disappearance of the factories; how this came to be and why there is no major canoe industry, would have been helpful.

The format of the book, being like a small coffee table book, is attractive, useful and superior, printed on fine paper with many colour plates and illustrations. The illustrations are mostly effective, including absorbing facsimiles of historical catalogues and historical maps of Peterborough. There are some miniature facsimiles of letters, invoices, catalogues, newspaper advertisements, hand-written ledgers, post cards, as well as full-page photographs showing factories and the process of manufacturing and shipping the finished canoes. The cover, being a large scale colour photograph of the Canadian Canoe crest taken from the manufacturer’s plate of a canoe, is inviting. The inside back cover is a graphic combining thumbnail photographs and a map of the canoe factory district to provide a perfect tool for would-be tourists.

Does the book work? Yes. The author gives us exactly what is advertised in the title: it is the intimate story of people and their business enterprises that took the craft and heritage of the canoe and tried to apply the industrial model.

The book omits discussion of the aboriginal art and craft of building these watercraft prior to the advent of the “carpenterized board canoe” that is the subject of the book. Rather than trying to puzzle out the connection, the author simply relegates the question to obscurity in the first sentence in the Introduction, “The invention of the all-wood, carpentered canoe in the mid-1800s is clothed in mythology” (p.13). Omitting the traditional canoe makes the subject manageable, but has the effect of placing it in a vacuum. Although the traditional canoe is ephemeral, being made entirely of natural materials, while the methods of construction are handed down orally, which makes it difficult to comment on, the complete silence is jarring. The debt should be recognized at least. Similarly a chapter linking the work with the current state of canoe-building would be illuminating.

There is little detail on the vessels themselves. Detailed drawings of a representative canoe would be helpful. The work may have had a much larger appeal had it focused more on the craft itself and its characteristics in the water.

This work belongs in libraries dedicated to the canoe industry, Canadian
economic history and Ontario and Peterborough history.

Ian Dew & Kathy Crewdson
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Kevin Brown is the Curator of the Alexander Fleming Museum at St. Mary’s Hospital, in Paddington, and the author of two previous books on aspects of medical history. Based on a number of archival and printed primary sources as well as secondary works, this book focuses on the stories of people, mainly from the British Isles, afflicted with diseases associated with sea life from 1350 to 2007. It includes information on persons in the Royal Navy, the merchant service, slave ships, English prisoners transported to Australia, European immigrants to America, health travelers, and passengers on cruise ships.

Surgeons were assigned to vessels engaged in warfare in antiquity and are mentioned in Homer’s *Iliad*. Columbus had a surgeon on board each of his three ships on his first voyage of discovery. King Henry VIII was the first British ruler to assign surgeons to naval vessels in 1513. Surgeons were impressed into the navy to meet the threat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. After that, they were accepted and recognized as a part of life at sea, even though many lacked expertise in the field of medicine.

Changes in the design of warships resulted in larger crews and more crowded living conditions on shipboard. This environment contributed to health problems as well as influencing the diet of sailors, their exposure to extremes of weather, conditions in foreign ports and periods of warfare. Surgeons struggled to cope with diseases and injuries and to discover and address the factors that caused them. Advances in medicine and technology aided them in their efforts.

Coastal voyages lasting about a week were the usual pattern of commerce until the middle of the fifteenth century. As the range of activity widened, so did the exposure to diseases. Sailors brought syphilis from the new world to the old. Special hospitals to treat this disease were established in port cities, beginning with Genoa.

This is a fascinating account of the development of medical knowledge, training and regulation, the origin and administration of naval hospitals, and the role of governments in the care and treatment of the sick and wounded over several centuries. Along the way, readers learn about a number of largely unknown persons whose experience, ideas and efforts changed many lives as well as history. In more recent times, such improvements as the United Kingdom’s adoption of the National Health Service in 1948 and the end of the Cold War, as well as advances in medicine and technology, brought changes to the old order of things. Members of the armed forces and the general public were now treated in civilian hospitals. The old naval hospitals were closed.

While a broad range of subjects are noted in Brown’s book, this reader is still in doubt about some points. To what extent did naval surgeons read and/or contribute to the medical journals of their times? If they published articles about their experiences in treating some diseases, did such work help to raise their status in the eyes of their civilian colleagues? Did naval surgeons individually or collectively attempt to bring to the attention of the authorities such problems as the periodic shortage of medical officers? Why does the book’s
index lack an entry for surgeons? It seems likely that most readers will not be concerned about such things. They will enjoy an intriguing narrative.

Harold D. Langley
Arlington, Virginia


Logistics are always on a commander’s mind and in the Second World War, the demand for supplies, men and equipment was unprecedented. This war was fought on a global scale and the lengthy supply lines required an expansion in the number of merchant vessels to compensate for the war losses and to carry men and material to the various staging stations. The Allied merchant fleets grew exponentially from the pre-war numbers.

This book is a revised edition of the 1996 book published by Naval Institute Press, although it does not identify which errors in the first edition it corrects or what new information revealed from German and Japanese sources it incorporates. It offers an extensive list, nearly 850 names, of merchant ships flying the American flag, which were lost or damaged during the Second World War. Since the first edition listed 700 ships, there is certainly new information. The list has been further expanded to include casualties caused by mines during the immediate post-war period as well as early casualties for which few details were kept. It does not count vessels under bareboat or sub-bareboat charter to the Navy or Army, since they lost their status as merchant vessels. Various sources were consulted to compile this master list and there are some useful definitions of terms concerning merchant vessels.

There is no denying that this book is a valuable resource for studying American merchant ship losses during the war. There is a small biographical record for each ship which includes the date it was sunk, the time of the attack, its position, its owner and operator, the master’s name, if armed, the year it was built, Gross Register Tonnage, its propulsion system, draft on the fatal trip, its cargo and speed when attacked. The ship description is completed with a small paragraph describing the recorded attack. Some ship bios, although obviously not all, include photographs.

Unfortunately, the book has a few weaknesses; for example, casualties are listed in chronological order, which sends the reader back to the index to find a particular vessel. The author defines his criteria for selecting various vessels, but does not indicate the range of sizes of the vessels. It is also unfortunate that he does not mention the commercial vessels under bareboat or sub-bareboat charter to the Navy or Army in a simple list like he did for the earlier war period; this would allow maritime historians a more complete picture of American commercial losses. The loss of fishing vessels is not addressed. The type of vessel is not always clear so one has to carefully read the paragraph to ascertain the type; this information could have been part of the data matrix provided. The date of the sinking is written using the American style of month, day and year, which causes confusion among those used to the British system. It is also unfortunate that the previous names of the pre-war vessels were not provided, since this would present maritime enthusiasts with additional information for tracking them.

Nevertheless, this book is a very useful tool for any maritime historian who is interested in the involvement of merchant
vessels during wartime. It is regrettable that similar works are not available for the other nations that operated merchant vessels during both world wars; such works would resolve many problems and questions that naval and maritime enthusiasts encounter when trying to ascertain commercial fleet losses.

Carl Gagnon
Ottawa, Ontario


The authors and press have produced a fascinating book about one of the leading naval commanders of the seventeenth century. De Ruyter, according to the chapters by Davies and Probst (about the view of him in England and Denmark, respectively), attracted respect from enemies and allies during and after his career. That makes him a fitting subject for a book in Karwansaray BV’s “Protagonists of History in International Perspective” series.

De Ruyter’s career spanned three continents (Europe, Africa and North America) and numerous wars in the mid-1600s. He is the Dutch equivalent of Nelson, although holding more senior rank. Given flag rank by a provincial admiralty, De Ruyter quickly found his services required as fleet commander and as a diplomat representing Dutch interests in Europe and North Africa. His death in defeat in 1676 off Sicily during the United Provinces’ dramatic conflict with France scarcely marred his national and international reputation.

The book reflects the role of the United Provinces’ near-monopolistic role in shipping goods throughout Europe, and the need to undertake naval action to protect that trade and eventually its very territory. The international array of subject matter experts has drawn on diverse collections of primary and secondary sources, reflecting the multiple aspects of De Ruyter’s career. The chapters on the Dutch republic’s naval achievements (in terms of force size and structure) by Glete and Hattendorf will prove a hearty corrective to those obsessed by the prowess of absolutist states. For those teaching about early modern Europe, this one volume provides a sound ground in Dutch maritime and naval affairs. Naval historians will find the Hattendorf description of changing Dutch tactics, and the chapter about the flag officers by Bruijn particularly interesting. Unlike Davies’ analysis of British views of De Ruyter during his naval career, Probst’s article on Danish perspectives of the admiral in Nordic wars has more of the flavour of operational history and far less about how Danes viewed him. Van Reine’s chapters on the first biography of De Ruyter and on his contemporary portraits should attract cultural historians. Rather than reading the chapters in the order assigned by the editors, it may prove more useful to read Hattendorf’s and Bruijn’s second articles earlier, and the chapter on the biographer Gerard Brandt last. Commendably, the articles appropriately support the intent of the book – the parts create a comprehensive whole, unlike some collections of essays.

Although focused on a single individual, the volume ranges sufficiently to create a picture of the United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century when it was a major European power. De Ruyter’s varied life, illustrating many aspects of Dutch ascendancy, allowed the book to start the publisher’s series. With the exception of not sailing to the East Indies, De Ruyter’s...
maritime and naval activities supported Dutch commercial and military efforts throughout the period. He epitomizes his country’s wide-ranging interests and illustrates its willingness to promote competent individuals, as opposed to only those with aristocratic lineage. In the matter of his promotion from maritime to naval service, and then to the highest rank of the latter, he exemplifies the ethos of his allies, the republican De Witt brothers. As several authors observe that alliance may have earned him the lesser command in the secondary Mediterranean theater following the Orangist coup d’état in 1672. 

The book has many positive aspects, and one large negative one. It contains sufficient maps to guide the reader through De Ruyter’s geographically widespread career. It has a lavish number of appropriate colour illustrations, which reflects the United Provinces’ importance as an artistic and publishing centre during the period. Unlike most history books, the graphic design of each page has received careful consideration. Consequently, the notes, which would have marred their appearance, appear at the end of the volume. Unfortunately, the book only has a select bibliography, which, given the wealth of sources and the otherwise costly production of the book, seems like a misguided attempt at savings. Marshaling the sources as a truly accumulated whole would not only have reflected the wide-ranging nature of De Ruyter’s life, but would have also mirrored the equally diverse activities of the Dutch. Presumably, to accommodate the illustrations and to enhance the book’s visual presence, it has triple-width margins. That feature added to the use of heavy clay-based paper (doubtless chosen to allow better reproduction of the images), makes the book heavy and awkward to hold, despite its relative brevity. Readers should consider using a table or book-rest to prevent physical discomfort.

One hopes that De Ruyter will not be the only naval figure chosen by the publisher for this series. The visual and scholastic quality of the publication, which is accessible to undergraduates and valuable to scholars, should lead anyone interested in early modern maritime and naval affairs, as well as culture to consult this fine book.

Edward M. Furgol
Silver Spring, Maryland


In recent months, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has become the focus of major international attention as the spear point of what believe to be the Beijing regime’s growing regional bellicosity. Barely veiled references abound to similarities between the PLAN and the aggressive Imperial Japanese Navy of a century ago which eventually required a world war to subdue. How good is the PLAN and how aggressively might it be employed?

Bussert and Ellerman confront these questions directly and offer fascinating answers based on exhaustive research and professional lifetimes immersed in combat systems technology. The result is a work that, however difficult its subject, is absolutely essential reading for military, diplomatic and academic communities here and abroad, and for those who simply harbour an interest in the growth of Chinese power and ambition.
As the title suggests, this is no casual Friday night read. To get the full flavour and meaning of the authors’ arguments requires some time and care. And their conclusions may well frustrate both those who see the PLAN as a coming force in global calculations and those who dismiss it as (perhaps irretrievably) second rate. The answer lies somewhere in between.

The PLAN is a force in transition from the pathetic coastal defense entity of 1949 to one possessing full, blue water power extension. Its handful of new destroyers, its growing amphibious warfare capabilities and, perhaps most disturbing, its growing submarine fleet promise the emergence of a new player on the world ocean. The Beijing regime has, practically speaking, laid claim to much of the crucial South China Sea, an area of great potential off-shore oil and a major sea lane linking oil-starved industrial China with the great Mideast fields. In pursuit of absolute security, the PLAN has even refurbished a Soviet/Russian aircraft carrier.

Yet as the authors emphasize repeatedly, the PLAN is confronted by possibly crippling restraints. First and foremost, roughly two-thirds of its surface and subsurface vessels are obsolete. Second, and perhaps of even greater importance, the PLAN has imported both its best vessels and the advanced technologies aboard them from a variety of foreign sources, creating staggering problems of systems inter-operability and integration. Far too much of their fleet and systems are of often inferior Soviet/Russian origin and require continuing good relations with Moscow to maintain. Time after time, the authors present what appear to be impressive if not astonishing advances in Chinese naval capabilities only to properly remind us of significant operational and strategic constraints.

Bussert and Ellerman conclude their tautly written and argued discussion with a consideration of the PLAN fleet in the coming century. They assume, as many others do but I do not, that the PRC will sooner or later invade and overrun Taiwan. This is a typical American view, based on the assumption that if you have a problem you solve it, if something itches, you scratch. The Chinese do not think that way; conscious of their long exercise in civilization and governance, they are a far more patient people. So long as Taipei does not foolishly seek outright independence, Beijing is perfectly prepared to wait matters out, conscious, if nothing else, of the extraordinary cost of an invasion that could well fail and would be extraordinarily bloody in any case.

The supreme achievement of this comparatively short book is that stimulates such ruminations and leads inevitably to further thought and debate. Neither authors nor readers could ask for anything more.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


Its final resting place remained a mystery for almost a century. Finally, the story behind the story of one of the most significant shipwrecks found on the Great Lakes in recent years is revealed. In so doing, Carroll recounts a double tragedy: the loss of the ship with all her crew in the Great Storm of 1913 and the plundering of the wreck by sport divers in the years after the discovery, this despite efforts to conduct a licensed archaeological investigation.

Wexford was a product of the
William Doxford and Sons yard at Sunderland, one of the dominant shipyards in northeastern England in the late nineteenth century. According to Carroll there were 128 hulls launched in the vicinity in the year that Wexford came out (p.53). None of them were intended for service on the Great Lakes. Being 250 feet between perpendiculars, the ship was too large for the St. Lawrence Canals of 1883. Instead it joined the growing fleet of British tramp steamers, spending much of the first twenty years in the South American trade. Rebuilt with a spar deck in 1883, its compound engine and length made Wexford less and less competitive on that route and in 1898 it was bought by a merchant of Dunkirk, renamed and transferred to French registry. The ship was given a second chance in 1903, when, with the enlargement of the last of the St. Lawrence Canals, it was bought by William J. Bassett of the Western Steamship Company of Collingwood, Ontario. Bassett was among the first to realize that cheap British tonnage could be profitable in certain trades on the Lakes. In the expanding grain trade from the head of Lake Superior at the beginning of the century, even vessels small enough to pass the canals could be profitably deployed. Renamed Wexford again, the twenty-year old ship began running from Fort William to the railheads at Collingwood and Goderich. The engine was replaced with a triple-expansion engine at Collingwood Shipyard shortly after arrival, but a centre-island steamer like Wexford presented an almost unique profile on the waters above Montreal.

No storm in the history of the Great Lakes has received quite as much attention as that of early November, 1913. There have been individual wrecks with greater loss of life, but never one with the loss of as much modern tonnage. The table on p. 157, prepared by the Lake Carriers Association, lists 19 losses (including six that were constructive total losses). Of those, Wexford, at 2104 gross tons, was smaller than nine of those lost, and older than all but the wooden barges. Indeed the losses included two 600-footers and three 500-footers. Among the latter was the James Carruthers, in its first season out and whose wreckage still has not been found. The Leafield (b.1892) was the only other loss from a British yard. The storm was the result of two weather systems colliding over the upper lakes and producing sustained winds upwards of 70 mph, or approaching hurricane speeds. A brief lull on the morning of November 9 prompted a number of vessels to venture out of shelter onto the open waters of Lake Huron. Among them was the Wexford.

Carroll provides a variety of perspectives on what happened that day. Throughout the volume he offers what evidence he has accumulated along with the opinions of others and leaves his readers to draw their own conclusions. He notes that Wexford had been in dry dock six times in the 10 years it had been in the Lakes, the most recent of those just weeks earlier. After going ashore in the fog, her veteran captain was “retired” and watched the storm from Collingwood. His replacement was a 24-year old son of a Lakes captain in his first command; a command that he held all of three weeks. Perhaps the weakest section of the book is a short chapter called “The Skipper’s Log,” which contains an invented diary of the captain. Its speculative nature is clearly noted, and no careful reader should confuse it with the real evidence upon which it is based. More significant are the sections that review the positions of the flotsam and jetsam and bodies which made their way ashore and the surviving notes and newspaper accounts of the subsequent inquests. When pressed, Carroll is most likely to have blamed the loss of the ship on instability caused by the volume of ice likely to have formed on the upper works of
the Wexford. The picture of the Wexford (p.88) covered in ice in December 1906 provides a hint of what would have been accumulating in the course of a white hurricane.

In August 2000, the Wexford was the subject of a sustained search by a group who had recruited legendary Great Lakes wreck hunter, Dave Trotter, for his technical skills. While they were busy “mowing the lawn” in a search grid off Goderich, a recreational fisherman running out of Grand Bend “found” an anomaly with his fish finder about ten miles out into the lake. Subsequent dives quickly confirmed it was the Wexford. With the deck lying at about 54 feet and the bottom at 85 feet, it is an excellent depth for recreational diving. Carroll devotes a chapter to the formal archaeological investigation of the wreck and overlaps with a final chapter detailing the array of objects that immediately started to go missing.

The tales are well told. There are repetitions – the pilot house and its clock comes ashore several times – but they do not seriously affect the flow of the narrative. The volume is profusely illustrated with black and white photographs. There is even a six-page centre spread with colour illustrations. A map at the beginning helps set the scene (without it one might easily get lost in the villages and townships that are set on the eastern shore of Lake Huron). One might question the placement of the map and aerial photograph of Sunderland on pages 242 and 244. There are six appendices and 32 pages of notes. The index is of the class this reviewer has come to expect of the Natural Heritage imprint of Dundurn Press and covers nine pages in three columns in reduced print.

It took the author nearly ten years to get the “wreck report” into print. The time was well spent.
Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


With the current high degree of interest in the Napoleonic period in general, and the bicentennial of the War of 1812 in particular, accounts of naval life in the Nelsonian-Regency period are of particular attraction, as so few authentic such accounts exist. The novels of Frederick Marryat, though written by an experienced sea officer, are nonetheless fiction, and few journals of real events exist written by a hand of sufficient education or frankness to make it appealing to the modern mind.

A very different fish swimming in those waters is the account written by Royal Navy officer Frederick Chamier, who served at sea through the period of the War of 1812 and thereafter, dying after a long and fortunate life in 1870. In 1831-1832, a series of nine instalments of his account appeared in the *Metropolitan Magazine*, albeit under the anonymous authorship of “a captain of the navy,” and immediately caused an uproar in the naval and literary community. Chamier was an educated gentleman, well-connected and at ease financially, and he took it upon himself to write of his experiences without deference to popular opinion or, more importantly, to the sensitivities of serving and retired naval personnel. Having participated in the ravages of the British expeditionary force in the Chesapeake Bay in 1814, which culminated in the burning of Washington’s public buildings, Chamier shocked and astonished the reading public with not only an unclouded account of the war’s destruction, but his own revulsion and disgust at having been a part of it. That this frank opinion did not sit well with other
more conventional naval writers was not surprising, but to the modern eye, Chamier presents a clear, lucid account of the realities of the war written by an articulate and perceptive observer. The same clarity applies to his descriptions of life at sea, and the unexpected difficulties and joys of a sea officer’s life.

The book as published is a condensed account, reduced from 160,000 to 50,000 words, mainly at the expense of Chamier’s accounts of his Latin American adventures and social exploits ashore. The editors have put the focus on his service in British and North American waters, and this, while understandable, deprives the reader of much fascinating material, as Chamier writes well and with perceptive irony. Organized into 13 chapters, the book follows a conventional chronological path, with Chapter 1 beginning with “Birth-schooling. I am sent to sea”, in that hyphenated style of chapter summary so beloved by nineteenth-century editors. One can get a sense of Chamier’s frankness — and what would cause outrage — by the summary of Chapter 8: “Looking for American privateers we land at Fernando de Noronha. We sail for America where we ruin, rob and burn.” Chamier’s account, often heartrending, of the destruction of civilian homes, sometimes ignoring the tearful pleading of the inhabitants, gave very little glory to the navy and the prosecution of the war. It made little difference that the British were responding in kind to American burnings and lootings committed in Canada.

Chamier’s clear-eyed loathing of the process of war ashore aside, the book’s greater attraction for the reader is the revealing, often humorous but very unselfconscious depiction of the realities of sea life. In contrast to conventional writing of the period, Chamier was quite prepared to raise an eyebrow in print at accepted sanctities in Georgian public literature: “Once, sailing from Lough Swilly to Staffa, while the wind howled and the sea foamed, I remarked that we were perilously situated off a lee shore. ‘Your Honour need not fear the Devil himself just now!’ said an Irish sailor. ‘For I’ve some of the True [Cross] round my neck — and even should the wind blow the top off Instraholl lighthouse — it could not puff us ashore!’ Next minute we were wrecked on a ledge of rocks off Enishowen head.”

Chamier’s privileged origins and gentlemanly skills benefited his career, as he had mastered the sailor’s arts sufficiently to satisfy the basic demands of the naval meritocracy, and thus could use the added push of “interest” — connections — to advance his career and prospects. His literate civility also led to a friendship with Lord Byron during an eastern Mediterranean cruise, a friendship that exposed him to both the wonders and the cruelties of Ottoman Turk society. Good birth and education, however, were no defence against the ravages of yellow fever. In the most chilling portion of Chamier’s account, he sails as a lieutenant to the Caribbean, there witnessing the appalling toll taken in officers and men alike by the dreaded “Yellow Jack.” He is struck down as well, but recovers against all odds, maintaining a theme throughout his account that Frederick Chamier was a lucky man indeed. For any reader interested in both the nature of life in the Regency navy, and a clear-eyed, refreshingly honest narrative of a naval officer caught in all the possibilities and limitations of his era, Chamier’s account of his luck and progress in a profession he loved is well worth an evening’s read by a warm fire, with a tot of good naval rum at hand.

Victor Suthren
Merrickville, Ontario

Christopher Deakes and Tom Stanley have produced a beautifully illustrated maritime history from the perspective of those individuals who actually experienced voyages to the four corners of the globe from the beginning of the steamship era (ca. 1840). Nothing is overlooked from transatlantic crossings (in both fair and foul weather) to much longer voyages to the Mediterranean, Southern Africa, India and the Far East.

The commentaries of the passengers selected from a profusion of letters, diaries, and newspaper accounts make most interesting and revealing reading. The result is that not only are we given the passengers' individual perspectives on the ports-of-call, but on every aspect of the voyages, such as the condition of the ships and the nature and quality of their fellow companions (who often came to be intensely disliked on long voyages). There are comments about the uncertain quality of the cooks' efforts in the galleys, which no matter the length of the voyage, often failed to live up to the advertised expectations of the steamship lines. Having taken some forty ocean voyages over nearly fifty years, and written about some of the steamship lines in-depth, I find the insights of passengers over the past century-and-a-half remarkably valid and worthwhile.

Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of Deakes and Stanley's book is the beautiful colour illustrations from all over the world featuring the ships, their interiors, and highlights of the ports-of-call. These serve to enrich the commentaries and narratives of the passengers to a superb degree.

*A Century of Sea Travel, Personal Accounts from the Steamship Era* will be a greatly appreciated addition to any maritime collection. My only reservation is that at £30, printed in China, it might have been priced more reasonably and therefore been made attractive to far more collectors. There is no legitimate reason why the advantages of printing books in China should not be shared with the potential maritime market.

William Flayhart III
Dover, Delaware


This work provides a complete account of the development of cruisers in the British and other navies of the Empire and Commonwealth from 1906-07 to the mid-1980s, when the last of the type left service in these fleets. It presents amazingly detailed information on the design and construction of each class of vessels. The author traces the developmental process from inception in the Admiralty’s translation of policy requirements into specifications to design, construction and adaptation through “alterations and additions” during a twenty- to thirty-year career.

The book begins with the definition of the cruiser and a survey of the world for which it was designed. The author identifies how the need for cruisers sprang from the protection of British trade across its large empire and even larger spheres of economic and political influence. Much of
the work focuses on the rapid evolution of cruisers in response to a variety of technical and political forces, stresses, and conditions. The author identifies the development of electronic technologies, especially communications, as being the greatest stimulus to cruiser development. Aviation also played an important role from until it finally led to the cruiser’s eclipse by the small aircraft carrier. The classic twentieth-century cruiser was much larger than a destroyer, considerably smaller than a battleship, with characteristics of both types. Primary functions of the cruiser ranged from fleet action to suppression of surface raiders and direct protection of trade, and, in peacetime, diplomatic missions and policing of the seas. Its most unique characteristic was the ability to stay in remote waters indefinitely. Friedman offers very minimal comment of the use of cruisers in Canadian service, since the cruiser was always an uncomfortable transplant from the first cruisers of the Canadian Naval Service, Rainbow and Niobe, to the early disposal of Aurora in the early 1920s and of Quebec and Ontario in the 1950s. The blue water fleet represented by the cruiser has always been a difficult sell with Canadian taxpayers. Australian and New Zealand cruisers receive a much fuller treatment, because there, cruisers were enthusiastically adopted from the beginning of the period. Adaptations in Indian and Pakistani service are also largely ignored. The cover shows the only coloured illustration in the work: a reproduction of a dramatic painting, “The Battle of the River Plate” showing the cruisers HMNZS Ajax and HMS Achilles in 1939.

The book’s presentation differs from the two other encyclopedic works on large ship-types in the Royal Navy by Oscar Parkes, British Battleships (1957) and Alan Raven and John Roberts, British Battleships of World War Two (1976), in that it shows each vessel as a living entity adapting to its rapidly changing environment. More than any other author, Friedman presents the ship as a combat system in which equipment for detection of the enemy and fire control are as important as the ordnance mounted. In contrast to studies that focus on the architecture of the hull and propulsion system, armour protection, and armament, he adds further dimensions: electronics and communications. He attempts the challenging task of precisely integrating accounts of rapidly changing technologies such as radar and combat information systems into his account of each class’s development over time.

There is a wealth of information on how the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s were a constraint to design. There is a detailed account of early attempts to integrate aviation in the form of a catapult for a fixed wing floatplane or seaplane. This was abandoned in the 1940s and replaced during the 1950s with one or more rotating wing or STOL/VTOL aircraft. In the last section, nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems emerge to threaten the cruiser’s survival. Because the major British shipbuilder, Vickers, had a yard in Spain and major shipbuilders competed for contracts worldwide, Friedman also opens a window on international naval history.

The author uses a close integration of text, photographs and drawings to transmit masses of technical and visual information. The densely packed text is interspersed with photographs and small plans. The layouts introducing each chapter are stunning, high resolution two-page spreads. There are many full or half-page photographs with lengthy captions. The photographs are un-retouched and therefore contain full information on masts, directors, radars, and communications antennae. For readers used to deciphering censored images, they are a revelation. There are also additional half-page plans, which are finely detailed.
The glossary and list of abbreviations contain no more than a fraction of the terms necessary to navigate the flood of abbreviations, acronyms and initials in the text and captions. The meaning of acronyms and initials for official bodies, technologies and specific equipment types is incomplete, with the result that the general reader is soon overwhelmed with undefined terms, such as “yagi” and “zareba.” Other terms, like “boffin,” are only explained in the text and thus are hard to find. In addition to a more complete glossary, a listing of weapons and electronic equipment would be helpful for the reader who is not an engineer. References to manufacturers, like Oerliken and Bofors, are often confusing when it is plain that the author clearly has a specific model of something in mind.

Additional material includes notes, bibliography, a data list, list of ships, and an index. There is an Appendix 1 but no Appendix 2, which heightens the sense that the author was overwhelmed too. The appendix is a complete chapter on the fast minelayer, which was a longstanding variant of the cruiser. The data list shows the detailed development of individual ships within classes and the list of ships gives the history and eventual disposal of each cruiser. The bibliography lists the primary sources on which the book is based, as well secondary published sources. Archival sources include constructors’ notebooks, shipbuilders’ plans and covers. The drawings are based on the plans held by the National Maritime Museum, in Greenwich, as well as the shipbuilders.

Understanding this book requires a deep grounding in electronics, communications and particularly, radar, along with recourse to a collection of dictionaries and glossaries. As a publishing endeavour by the Naval Institute Press it is a success, with fine quality work befitting that prestigious body. The book is as interesting for what it leaves out. The author offers no real statement of the book’s aims and objectives, which may be related to the fact that it is part of a larger set of works. There is little information on individuals aside from the designers and constructors on whose work the book is based. Apart from tantalizing sidelights, such as learning that the 7.5-inch gun in the Hawkins required 44 men to serve it in action, there is little about the way in which men lived in and fought the ship. There is a minimum of information on the operational histories of the ships, except as they affected the continuing modification of designs. Friedman does not draw conclusions from the detail, such as the manner in which the Royal Navy became very proficient at damage control. There is little discussion of less visible technologies, like sonar. While commenting on the abrupt end of the cruiser in British naval service in the 1980s at the time when that country gave up its last imperial pretensions, the author does not remark on the rapidly world geopolitical situation at the end in the 1980s. In the beginning of the book he does mention that the sinking of the Argentine Belgrano in 1982 during the Falklands War was a postscript that explained the passing of the classic cruiser type. There is no information, however, on the cruiser’s continued presence in the navies of America and Russia or on its future in an environment dominated by smart weapons deliverable by air, submarine and surface platforms.

Nevertheless, we enthusiastically recommend British Cruisers for those who are interested in the history of the British, Australian or New Zealand navies, and technology buffs interested in the history of radar, communications, and electronics in naval weapons systems. At US $55, the price makes it affordable and a great buy.

Ian Dew and Kathy Crewdson
Thunder Bay, Ontario

Seaforth Publishing has recently added another very fine, attractive and readable title to its maritime series “Seafarers Voices.” Nelson Cole Haley’s *Whale Hunter* is the sixth in the series of titles intended to “unveil the extraordinary and unfamiliar world of our seafaring ancestors” with abridged texts describing seafaring between 1700 and 1900.

This new edition is a version of the classic originally entitled *Whale Hunt: The Narrative of a Voyage by Nelson Cole Haley, Harpooner in the Ship Charles W. Morgan, 1849-1853* (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1948). It is abridged even further from the 1951 Travel Book Club edition published in London, and so, more properly constitutes an extract or condensed version. The original 1948 edition was based upon Haley’s manuscript account of his whaling voyage to the South Seas and around the world. Haley’s heirs gifted this manuscript, upon which all subsequent publications are based, to Mystic Seaport Museum in Mystic, Connecticut in 1944 in celebration of the museum’s 1941 acquisition of America’s sole surviving whaling vessel, the *Charles W. Morgan*. The manuscript can be read in its entirety in a digital format on the web page of the G.W. Blunt White Library, library.mysticseaport.org/.

J. Revell Carr, director of Mystic Seaport Museum, wrote in the foreword to Mystic Seaport’s 1990 edition of *Whale Hunt* that Nelson Cole Haley (1832-1900) “wrote this draft of his narrative in the 1890s,” although both the London 1951 and this current edition claim that the manuscript was written “in Hawaii around the time of his marriage in 1864.” Whenever the manuscript was written, he penned the account with the candour of a true New Bedford whaler engaged in his trade at the height of the American whaling experience and his work is considered among the most authoritative primary whaling sources ever published. It is certainly the most accessible, having been published in so many editions.

The main body of the text of this new edition is generally faithful to the complete, earlier editions, except that the first three sentences of Chapter 1 are completely fabricated. None of the biographical information in those sentences was written by Haley. All three sentences were adapted from the “Note of Introduction” in the 1948 edition but are presented here as Haley’s own words. The opening passages of the original 1948 edition text are slightly problematic as well, because portions of the opening pages of Haley’s original manuscript are missing. By comparing the digitized copy with the 1948 edition, however, one can construe his intended meaning and greatly respect the original editor’s decisions and judgment in anticipating Haley’s language.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the introduction to this new volume, written by series editor Vincent McInerney. Haley’s account is the quintessential Yankee South Seas whaling voyage, complete with descriptions of Polynesian Islanders, boats chewed up by sperm whales, stern captains, giant squid, Fijian war canoes and the whole gamut of mid-nineteenth century whaling experience. The editor of this new edition introduces the book in the context of the British Greenland whale fishery of the age of William Scoresby Jr. in the early nineteenth century. Not only does McInerney introduce the American sperm whale fishery of the 1840s and 50s through the British right whale fishery of the 18-teens, but he uses the classic engraving
“Dangers of the Whale Fishery” by William Home Lizars after James Waddell from Scoresby’s *Arctic Regions* for the image on the dust jacket. He could have chosen instead of one of a number of superb American sperm whaling prints of the period. Benjamin Russell’s 1862 *Sperm Whaling with its Varieties*, for instance, or Cornelius Hulsart’s 1835 *Capturing a Sperm Whale* would each represent Haley’s experience perfectly but for some reason McInerney chooses British sources. Scoresby, of course, is a titan in whaling history to be sure, but has no relation to American sperm whaling in the Pacific Ocean.

McInerney then expounds upon Captain James Cook’s explorations of the Pacific, quoting from a number of British whaling sources but including none of the fine source material on the vast enterprise of American whaling contemporaneous to Haley’s experience. At the very least, Alexander Starbuck’s *History of the American Whale Fishery* (Waltham, MA, 1876) would provide enough strong reference background to inform Haley’s experience in its larger context. There are a number of other contemporaneous sources including the chapter “Letters from Whalemen” in Matthew Fontaine Maury, *Explanations and Sailing Directions to Accompany the Wind and Current Charts* (Philadelphia, 1854) or even J. Ross Browne’s *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise* (New York, 1846), which apart from its fascinating but admittedly polemical main text, has a strong appendix placing the industry in the historical context of the period. Rather, the editor uses Frank Bullen’s *Cruise of the Cachalot* (New York, 1899) as a primary reference source but does not bother to actually identify the name of the real vessel which serious scholars believe to have been the ship *Splendid* of Edgartown, or to temper Bullen’s exaggerated, fictitious statements with any real establishment of fact. While there is little of substantive historical insight to be gained from the introduction to *Whale Hunter*, and one of the earlier editions would be far preferable to this excerpted one, Haley’s text itself remains an exciting first-hand description of one of the world’s great maritime enterprises.

Michael P. Dyer
New Bedford, Massachusetts


This slim volume is the second reprint of a 1977 edition (from David & Charles, Newton Abbot), but for a fascinating tale at such a very reasonable price, well worth the effort. It is fascinating from at least three viewpoints: as the story of those vital temporary harbours that allowed three armies, with all their equipment, to invade occupied France in difficult weather across open beaches on the Channel coast; for the usually unappreciated and highly complicated lengthy advance planning that went into the project; and for the format of the story as told by historian Guy Hartcup.

To deal with these comments in reverse order, unless one is a civil engineer involved in bridge building, the story should be read like Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*: never mind the complicated personalities and plot line, just enjoy the telling of the story and its clear narration. Hartcup goes into quite complicated descriptions of how the breakwaters, pier-ends and roadway interconnections were designed and installed. Engineers might be thrilled, but the casual reader just needs to gain the
impression that it was indeed complicated, and follow the solutions in general terms. The author even names most of the senior people in charge of each sub-section for resolving the technicalities, sudden problems and conflicts, as well as the actual operation of towing the two harbours across the channel, placing and maintaining them. It is a good record to have in print, but can be read briefly.

The prescience of those responsible for the eventual re-occupation of Europe is really quite astonishing. In late 1941 and early 1942, the Allies were in the midst of the desperate Battle of the Atlantic and violent Luftwaffe raids on the U.K., while the army was only on the offensive in distant North Africa. Nevertheless, a small and varied group of people in the military, government departments and construction companies were already at work, searching out answers to how, where and who would solve the major difficulties of landing a large force somewhere in Europe. Even the modestly successful evacuation at Dunkirk, and the Canadian raid and repulse at Dieppe made contributions to the decision-making. Fortunately, from the very first, Winston Churchill was interested in any progress made in resolving the difficulties. It was noted early on that a major and useful port would not likely be available for such an assault. Thus, an across-a-beach invasion was the only option, a decision made by February 1942. There was even a reasonably satisfactory plan for the provision of “spares” for the operation — in Phoenix and Gooseberry barriers, roadway sections, floats and anchors for the whole affair.

Hartcup reviews, albeit not in overwhelming detail, the problems facing a country whose access to supplies, manufacturing and technical trades was already stretched to a major degree. A shortage of steel for constructing floating and supported roadways from ship-to-shore, for example, was resolved by the use of concrete, both for breakwaters (the huge Phoenix barriers) and for the floats supporting the roads. This, in turn, led to further complications because there wasn’t enough sand of the quality normally required for high performance concrete forms. Instead, slag from mines had to be used — working very well, to the surprise of the designers and construction firms. There was almost no time for testing, nor for end-user practices, which annoyed the American participants and led, in itself, to later problems. The amazing thing in reading all this was how adaptable almost everyone was. They coped with constantly new problems, from who was to be in charge of placing and administering the harbours, to finding sites where the multitude of components could be built, launched and stored, and from resolving priorities for towing tugs, to assigning technical trades from carpenters to riggers and from handling bulk supplies to unloading personnel.

The story ends in relatively brief chapters on the actual operation of the British and American Mulberries, in the face of increasingly severe weather. Storms largely destroyed the American Mulberry A, but the project mostly proved the whole scheme and landed massive quantities of supplies from the second week of the invasion, including everything from food to 40-ton tanks to fuel oil. Interestingly, these Mulberries landed about 30 percent of everything, both troops and supplies. The rest were landed during the initial invasion of the forces and first resupply directly by LSI’s (Landing Ship, Infantry) and other ships onto the beaches, and after the seizure of one small port.

Everyone with an historical bent knows of these two Mulberry harbours, but this is an unusual close-up of the actual story, and well worth acquiring.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario

Hickey and Clark have written an elegant but small book whose secondary title, *An Illustrated History of the War of 1812*, reveals the main thrust of their work. Illustrated histories compile graphic materials depicting historical events, usually narrowly focused on a certain time period, and collections of paintings or other works that were contemporaneous with the historical events, although some may be more modern retrospective views.

A publication of a respected university press, the 194-page text is well written, but just clips the mountaintops of a wide range of events. The book’s prologue covers some of the background leading up to the War of 1812. Succeeding chapters cover the European wars in the Atlantic, the Canadian conflicts, the naval battles, the land battles, the declaration of peace via the Treaty of Ghent and finally, the authors’ views of the legacy of the war and its peace.

The text acts as a gallery wall displaying an impressive collection of maps, broadsides, documents, drawings, political cartoons, portraits and action paintings largely depicting the events covered in the book. Sixteen pages of colour plates showcase some of the most dramatic examples of these illustrations. The authors include images from some relatively obscure battles, such as a panoramic mural depicting the British raid on Pettipaug (currently Essex, Connecticut), the Battle of Sandy Creek and the carrying of the naval cable to Sackets Harbor. These historical footnotes depict the breadth of the war.

The authors largely present the history of the war from the American viewpoint; one written from the Canadian or British perspective would be quite different. “Some Americans thought that an American army might even be welcomed by the inhabitants [Canadians]. This explains why Jefferson thought that the conquest of Canada would be a mere matter of marching and why Henry Clay suggested that the Kentucky militia alone could do the job. Events, however, would prove how wrong both men were” (p.26).

*The Rockets Red Glare* is wide in breadth and shallow in depth, but does illustrate most of the important events of the War of 1812 and some of the prominent people who participated in its various aspects. That noted, some of the portraits depict how the men looked either before or after the war.

One example is the painting of a youthful Joshua Barney, although he was a mature 54-year-old naval captain by the time his flotilla defended the Chesapeake. The many excellent illustrations of the battle scenes and drawings were mostly drawn from descriptions of exploits embellished by the artist’s imagination. Since photography had not been invented at the time, this is how the public has come to picture these particular battles, but there are no data to help the reader determine which images were sketched by someone at the scene and which are totally fictional. The authors had to make some editorial decisions about which illustrations to include, but several important historical paintings are missing. Two examples would be the series of the battle of the USS *Constitution* and HMS *Java* by Nicholas Pocock and the painting of the chase of the *Constitution* by J.O. Davidson. A similar naval chase scene by Anton Otto Fisher that is included is well done, but is relatively modern in style. Also missing is Joshua Barney’s primitive drawings of row galleys.
that were designed and later built to defend the Chesapeake, and most famous of all, Michele Felice Corne’s “Constitution and Guerriere, 19 August 1812.”

The authors conclude with a one-page “suggestions for further reading” list. It is divided into the politics, the military history (both of land and at sea) and the role(s) of the Indians during the war. Once again, it is short even though many books have been published about this war of two centuries ago, but their list is good. They point out that there is no good history of the conflict from the British side, but there are some good works published from the Canadian point of view. Examples are: The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1810–1914 and/or Fortune’s River by Barry Gough; 1812: The War That Forged a Nation by Walter Borneman; In the Midst of Alarms: The Untold Story of Women and the War of 1812 by Dianne Graves; and The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History by J. Mackay Hitsman, to name but a few.

What makes this book different from all other books about the War of 1812? It contains an excellent collection of images and documents, many historical, that depict some key and some obscure events and illustrate some documents from that era. It is well written and the time-line chronology found at the end of the book offers a good summary of the war’s events. This is a good but not exhaustive resource for illustrations relating to the War of 1812.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Volume three, Weapons of Warre, is the final two-volume set in the series Archaeology of the Mary Rose. Between 2003 and 2010, the Mary Rose Trust published five volumes concerning the archaeological description and interpretation of the vessel’s various artifact assemblages as well as the ship’s conservation program. In doing so, the Trust pulled together an impressive set of experts who used every means possible to understand the sixteenth-century ship and its contents. Volume three focuses on “the armament of the ship — the very reason for its creation.” Parts one and two of the two-volume set concern the great guns of the ship, including brass, wrought iron and cast iron guns, as well as munitions and accessories while parts three and four examine hand-held weapons and the ship as a fighting machine. Each chapter consists of a brief introduction with descriptive sections detailing the variety of armaments, their distribution, and the casting and firing of specific pieces. Line drawings, photographs, and historical images help flesh out the text.

Chapter I is an historical overview the ship and its background. This chapter provides not just a history of the Mary Rose, but also a review of the primary sources that provide a framework for the archaeology. Most importantly, the authors recognize that the Mary Rose as built was not necessarily the Mary Rose that sank. While the historical documentation provides a lot of information, the archaeology exposes significant alterations between the ship’s construction and sinking that reveal much about the navy and technology of the time. The authors conclude that the vessel represented a time of transition as England moved from the medieval period to a more modern era.
The following chapters describe the variety of guns, their markings, and how they were made. These sections are very detailed but not overly scientific. Those who want a general overview can skim the text easily while those who want more information can read the detailed descriptions. Each chapter in the two-volume set is designed to lead the reader from a general historical overview to a more focused understanding of the artifact assemblage with some final conclusions and context. In Chapter 2, Alexzandra Hildred explains that the “brass” guns listed in the Anthony Roll were really bronze, as we would term them. Ten such guns were recovered. She highlights where guns were located by deck as well as providing the assumed positions of those missing or not yet recovered. Additional analysis revealed valuable information concerning the guns’ markings and construction. The chapter then analyzes the guns’ carriages and does much to place the guns in a timeline to explain how their functionality changed over time. Hildred does the same for the demi-cannon, demi-culverins, sakers, and falcons.

Due to economic limitations, a majority of the guns on the Mary Rose were wrought iron, the subject of Chapter 3. Most were breech loaders with a barrel or “hall” and a breech chamber that held the powder. The iron guns for the Mary Rose included, “port pieces,” “slings,” “fowlers,” “bases,” “hailshot pieces,” and “top pieces.” Unfortunately, there are few good historical descriptions of each gun, so identification relied on a mixture of historical documents and recovered artifacts. As in chapter two, this chapter discusses the types of guns, their morphology, their carriages, construction and placement. In addition, the research team made a replica wrought iron gun that produced impressive results.

Chapter 4 examines four cast iron guns. Although few in number, the cast iron guns represent the “most significant discovery and demonstrate how the arms industry was attempting to harness advances in technology to provide more efficient weapons and production methods. These are the earliest securely dated examples of cast iron used to form guns rather than projectiles.” (p.291) The four hailshot pieces were used over a rail on the castle decks by a single individual. As with the previous chapters, a replica was created and fired, but it proving difficult to handle, the authors suggest additional testing was necessary to see if it became more usable.

Volume I concludes with an analysis of munitions and accessories found on board the Mary Rose. Over 2,000 individual pieces of shot were recovered, of a variety of shapes and sizes. The wide selection indicated that standardized shot was not known nor was it clear which types of shot went with which type of gun. Using a variety of resources, researchers attempted to combine shot with cannon but some combinations were speculative due to missing guns and lack of real historical documentation. What does become clear is that the Mary Rose was a working ship with some shot in various stages of manufacturing. Although the gunpowder did not survive in great quantities, archaeologists recovered casks with possible residue, giving some evidence of how gunpowder was stored and the types used. The archaeologists also recovered gauges, gun drills, ladles, rammers, tampons, priming wire, horns, flasks and other tools used to work with gunpowder or with the guns.

Volume II opens with chapter 6 and a discussion of hand-held weapons. Three incendiary darts and numerous mortar fragments were recovered as well as items necessary for the lighting of such devices. Chapter 7 discusses hand-held firearms such as handguns and associated artifacts. Handguns had become increasingly popular...
through the sixteenth century and were just beginning to replace the longbow by the time the Mary Rose's sank. Unfortunately, only the stocks of various handguns have survived the centuries under water. What evidence remains, however, suggests that both older and “state of the art” forms of handguns were present on the Mary Rose, once again substantiating the ship as a vessel of transition.

Chapter 8 discusses archery. “The assemblage from the Mary Rose constitutes the only precisely dated archery assemblage surviving from any historical collection.” (p.578) The assemblage is impressive with 172 longbows, 2303 complete arrows (and thousands of fragments), four chests, 24 wrist guards, up to 18 arrow spacers, a bow string and a horn nock. Although the metal has not survived, the preservation of organic material such as wood, glue, and leather have created a unique opportunity to study such items. The discussion of the longbows and arrows is extremely detailed and interesting for the varied analyses. Most tantalizing is the association of archery equipment with human remains that suggests the remains in association with archery equipment were archers and an intensive examination of the skeletal remains supports such conclusions.

Chapter 9 examines hand-to-hand fighting with an initial discussion of staff weapons, or “weapons mounted on long hafts of wood or metal.” (p.713) Bills, pikes, darts and halberds are all represented in this group. Since few of the iron heads remain, identification of the various weapons relied on other evidence, such as size and length of shafts. Most bill heads and hafts, as well as possible pikes, were found in areas that indicated use in open areas. This last conclusion is not surprising given the weapons’ sizes. This chapter also examines edged weapons such as swords and daggers. Sword hilts, pommels and grips all add to the transitional nature of armament on the Mary Rose as older styles were giving way to newer ones. Various daggers, scabbards, sheaths, and belts were also uncovered and analyzed.

The only piece of armour positively identified on the Mary Rose is a single breastplate. There are several other items listed as possible armour, most of which are leather and/or metal straps for buckles. Nineteen fragments of chain mail were recovered, demonstrating three different types of links. Most interesting was the correlation between the small elements of armour and recovered bodies that suggest these individuals may, or may not, have worn armour.

Part four opens with “Fighting the Ship.” N.A.M Rodger contributed his expertise to understanding sixteenth-century naval warfare. The remainder of the chapter discusses the Mary Rose as a fighting ship and the authors place the ship in a long continuum of improving ship construction as well as armament. From there, the authors provide an interesting conversation regarding the last minutes of the Mary Rose and theories as to why it ultimately sank.

These volumes end with an overall reflection on the ordinance and avenues for future research. The Mary Rose was “one of the first integrated fighting machines capable of powerful standoff warfare.” They go on to state that the ship “was to define the nature of sea combat in the age of sail.” (p. 928) The artifacts recovered from the Mary Rose certainly substantiate these statements. Overall, the historical and archaeological evidence suggests that the Mary Rose was a transitional ship that moved the English fleet from its early medieval roots to incorporate the latest technology.

The last pages of volume two contain two appendices that analyze the guns’ metallurgy and gunpowder. The bibliography is extensive and reflects the enormous amount of research put into the
analysis of weaponry. Finally, a DVD is included featuring an image gallery with line drawings and images, various spreadsheets and databases, as well as three short videos. All in all, the two-set volume on weaponry provided a monumental amount of information that should prove useful to historians, archaeologists and those interested in maritime, naval, or history of technology. The sheer amount of data can be overwhelming, which is both good and bad, so readers need to be selective in what they want from these volumes. With that said, however, these volumes follow in the footsteps of the Red Bay Report, the Hollandia, and other large compendia that have become invaluable to researchers for the amount of information contained in their pages.

Amy Mitchell-Cook
Pensacola, Florida


It is impossible to write a history of Imperial Germany without taking into consideration the impact of Alfred von Tirpitz. During his years as state secretary of the Imperial Naval Office (1897-1916), Tirpitz was able to build the Imperial German Navy from an insignificant coastal defence navy to one of the mightiest battle fleets in the world. Furthermore, Tirpitz accomplished this feat despite opposition from or friction with Kaiser Wilhelm II, various chancellors and finance ministers, the Reichstag, the army, and even some fellow naval officers.

It is surprising that there are so few biographies of Tirpitz. A few early German works are little more than hagiographies or apologia for the relative inactivity of the great fleet in the First World War. English readers have been forced to compile an account of Tirpitz’s life from sources dealing with the navy or political elements, and the recent publication of Raffael Scheck’s study of Tirpitz’s post-naval political career has helped to fill a gap. Only Michael Epkenhans has published an English-language biography of Tirpitz and, at under a hundred pages, it serves as only a sketch of the Großadmiral’s life.

Enter Patrick Kelly. Long an advocate of examining Tirpitz’s career as a bureaucrat rather than a sailor, Kelly argues that there is a perfectly rational, if still illogical, explanation for Tirpitz’s behaviour. Turning to the theories of political scientist Graham Allison on the elements of political decision-making, Kelly defines Tirpitz as an example of two of Allison’s models: Organizational Behaviour Model, and especially, Bureaucratic Politics. Once Tirpitz became state secretary, all his energies were devoted to building and maintaining his political power base and achieving his goal of fleet construction. All his subsequent actions — rational or irrational — were based on that need to build and maintain. Thus, this explains both unsound naval strategic thought and careful cultivation of the elements needed to achieve success. In particular, this model helps to explain how Tirpitz could pay such careful attention to the Reichstag, treating it as if he were a cabinet minister responsible to it, even while remaining wedded to the primacy of the monarch.

Kelly’s use of such a model is daring in a field which tends to reward sound but straightforward scholarship over the application of concepts from other disciplines. Almost 40 years after Carl-Axel Gemzell tried to apply sociological principles to the study of German naval strategy, many German naval historians still
shudder at the thought of ploughing through such dense theory to mine a few precious nuggets of information. Fortunately, Kelly’s prose is light and the information is plentiful. If there is a potential flaw to the use of Allison’s models, it is that they may actually require more explanation than is given.

Kelly also writes with one eye on the thesis proposed by Volker Berghahn, that the construction of the navy was much more a domestic issue than either a military question or a foreign policy matter. Tirpitz’s repeated attempts to create a permanent construction tempo of new battleships, according to Berghahn, were merely a way of circumnavigating the budgetary powers of the Reichstag and preventing interference from the increasing strength of the Social Democrats. Kelly replies that this alliance of “rye and iron” did not exist, and that Tirpitz’s political manoeuvres were just as much aimed at stabilizing the navy from any outside influence, whether it came from the Reichstag, the Kaiser, the army, rival naval officers, or even naval pressure groups, such as the Flottenverein (Navy League).

Kelly is quick to stress that, although Tirpitz’s behaviour as state secretary seemed characteristic of a cabinet minister responsible to the Reichstag, such an interpretation did not reflect his true beliefs. He was no advocate of responsible government. Nevertheless, Tirpitz cultivated the friendship of parliamentarians, even those who remained foes of the navy, such as the Progressive Party’s leader, Eugen Richter. Tirpitz tried to keep as many of his options open as possible, and only cut his ties with fellow naval officers who dared to criticize his policies, especially in public.

Naturally, in a work of this complexity, a few minor errors have crept in. On p.340, Kelly writes that “as [Jonathan] Steinberg has suggested” in a discussion of the Haldane Mission, but the citation which follows correctly steers the reader to Arthur J. Marder instead. However, these sorts of things are few and far between, and the many photographs, especially those of the early Tirpitz, are quite welcome. Undergraduates will find *Tirpitz and the German Navy* a wealth of information; scholars will have to ponder Kelly’s intriguing method of explaining why Tirpitz, an intelligent and thoughtful man devoted to his trade, could say and do things that seemed otherwise inexplicable. This is an invaluable reference work on Tirpitz, the Imperial German Navy, and on politics in Wilhelmine Germany.

David H. Olivier
Brantford, Ontario


In the years after the First World War, the destruction and near-disappearance of Germany’s merchant marine was rapidly eclipsed by a sudden growth during the decades that followed it. By the time Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP came to power in 1933, although deeply affected by the economics of the period, Germany’s merchant navy was once again one of the world’s largest in terms of tonnage afloat. After seizing office, the Nazis would not overlook such a powerful entity, and this is the topic of Stefan Kiekel’s book: the German merchant navy during the Nazi period until 1941.

This largely overlooked period of
German merchant marine history is possibly one of the most intriguing, especially as it does not fit into existing narratives of the Nazi period. The *Gleichschaltung* (aligning with the ideology) the Nazis implemented in Germany did not, as expected, rein in the German shipping associations under Nazi supervision, but actually helped strengthen their independence and control. According to Kiekel, the shipping associations, especially the *Verband deutsche Reeder* (VDR or Association of German Ship Owners) led by John T. Essberger, were able to retain their independence thanks to Essberger's early understanding of the regime and its principles, and then exploit them later for their benefit. This is one of the main points of Kiekel's work. He argues that the economic conditions facing shipping companies in the 1930s already threatened their existence, making them willing and ready to face this challenge. In the end, Nazi leadership was never able to wrest control from the individual shippers and by the early 1940s, even companies that had fallen under state control, such as the North German Lloyd (NDL), were back in private hands.

The above is just one of many of the new conclusions that Kiekel brings to light. He highlights the role of John T. Essberger, owner of the *Essberger Tank Reederei*, arguing that without his driving force, the shippers would not have been able to achieve such significant success. Essberger was the main personality leading the reform of German shipping policy; for example, ending the privileges of large shipping companies and championing the medium-sized and tramp lines. He was able to wrest power from the giants due to what the author calls the “Funds Affair” of 1933-34 and Keikel brings events to light for the first time since the scandal occurred. HAPAG and NDL executives had been generously helping themselves to company “black funds,” at a point when the companies were already nearly bankrupt. Although not publicized at the time, the scandal nevertheless forced all involved to resign from their positions.

Most interesting for this particular reviewer is the section of the work dealing with the period of tension during 1938-39 and the first few months of the war. The German merchant navy was caught off guard during the Czechoslovakian Crisis and had war actually broken out then, more than a million GRT out of approximately 3.5 million tons would have been lost or interned. In August 1939, the war warning QWA 7 was not sent out to German merchant ships until 25 August, and on 27 August, the final warning, QWA 9, was issued ordering all ships within four-day’s sail from Germany to head for home. Direct reading of the order meant that the majority of German ships overseas, which were just a few days further from home, sailed to neutral ports. The result was that at the outbreak of war, 385 ships totalling 1.9 million GRT (or 50 percent of all German tonnage) lay in overseas ports. Eventually, more than 100 ships successfully ran the blockade and reach German ports by April 1940. Kiekel claims that the independence retained by German shippers did not help with the blockade-running effort. Although the navy ordered ships home, the masters’ initial loyalty was to the company, putting preservation of the ship and crew first. This meant more than a material loss of ships for the navy, for “on board Hamburg ships alone in September 1939 circa 11,700 highly skilled seamen were sitting in foreign ports.” (p. 242). Kiekel partially attributes the failure of the recall action to the fact that Nazi leadership wanted to maintain an image of “business as usual” for as long as possible and used the recall of shipping as a final threat to the opposing powers.

Kiekel’s work is well written and heavily documented. With over 1500
footnotes and a full bibliography of archival and secondary sources, it is a prime example of fastidious and well presented research in the field. It is a highly specialized work, as is Kiekel’s PhD dissertation, and it is not for everyone, especially the casual reader. Scholars of the field and period, however, will be most pleased with the work.

Kiekel contributes greatly to the existing knowledge on the topic, and brings to light many previously unknown events as he argues for a reinterpretation of Gleichschaltung. It is a highly valuable and groundbreaking monograph and should become one of the new standard works on the German merchant navy during the Nazi era.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


The brief reigns of Edward VI and Mary I, sandwiched as they are between the monumental reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, are often overlooked. Events relating to seafaring in that era are no exception: “for it is a period neither marked by a great maritime victory, nor associated with any famous commander.” (p.xii) This is a marked contrast to Bluff King Hal who is renowned for his love of ships, warfare, and his efforts to establish a naval bureaucracy and to his long-reigning daughter, Elizabeth, who tried to capitalize on the talents and daring of seadogs like Drake and fight the Spanish Armada. The reigns of Edward and Mary, the “little Tudors,” are regarded as the half-time interval between intense periods of naval activity. This new volume of documents from the Navy Records Society may go some way to challenging the view that this period has less to offer those interested in seafaring matters.

The Navy Records Society is renowned for its excellent volumes which bring maritime records and accounts to print. This latest edition is no exception. As is the habit in the series, the spelling is updated and standardized so it is more easily read by modern readers, although the archaic words remain. The editors have included every deleted word and passage which adds an interesting window into the authors’ deliberations in penning these documents.

Although the period is perceived as less interesting to the maritime historian, this volume demonstrates that there was more substantive activity than has generally been thought: “Yet this was a vital time for the administration of the navy, set up at the end of Henry’s reign, and it saw the apprenticeship of many who would lead the service in Elizabeth’s later years.” (p.xii) Lack of interest in the period was reflected in the coverage of the Navy Records Society and this volume begins to address this gap along with its companion volume, Elizabethan Naval Administration.

The English navy of the day was hardly at the forefront of major wars as it would be during Elizabeth’s reign. Nevertheless, there were still operations outside English waters, pursuit of pirates and roles in domestic conflicts (such as Mary’s succession coup, which demonstrates that land-based political events spilled out to sea). England was also on the periphery of larger-scale conflicts (such as Philip II’s war with the French to decide mastery of Europe). The hefty volume is divided generally into chapters on Edward’s reign, including the Scottish wars, establishments, surveys, reports, accounts
and finance. For Mary’s reign, there are chapters on the succession crisis, administration, operations, accounts, establishments and orders. Furthermore, the editors have supplied a short contextual section introducing each new chapter and theme. This, when coupled with the copious annotated footnotes, reveals the editors’ commendable breadth of knowledge of the Tudor period and maritime history.

The documents themselves will obviously be of consequence to maritime historians but their usefulness extends beyond that. The volume deals with events in Scotland and Ireland as well as England. Also the records dealing with provisioning for the fleet show us much about the rise in prices for foodstuffs and commodities during the period. Given the debasement of coinage during the era, there is much here for the economic historian to revel in.

Regrettably, there are gaps in some series of records such as the Naval Treasurer’s Accounts. When we examine these various records together, however, we can piece together a clearer — albeit still fragmented — picture. To provide a more comprehensive view, the editors have thoughtfully included documents and translations from non-British sources as well. There are an extremely detailed index, glossary, and helpful appendices. In particular, there is a useful list of short biographies of Admiralty officials, sea officers, shipwrights and military officer on naval ships. Because this will also serve the companion volume, Elizabethan Naval Administration, those included are a “who’s who” of Tudor personnel which will be a valuable reference tool for any who works in the field; so too is the list of royal ships which features dates built, dates acquired, ordnance, tonnage, builders, complements, service, and the ships’ respective fates.

Overall, the volume is invaluable for scholars as it brings primary documents from various archives into one accessible volume. The benefit of the editors’ collective knowledge will save researchers from peril when it comes to discrepancies and idiosyncrasies in the record keeping or from trying to sort out Tudor coinage. In general, The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I carries on the proud tradition of the excellent offerings of the Navy Record Society.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


James Kraska, JSD, is Howard S. Levie Professor of Operational Law and a senior associate in the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. His professional interests and endeavours afford him the opportunity to write an authoritative book on the subject of contemporary maritime piracy. It is important to situate the book in the broad discussion of maritime violence that is taking place in the media and among policy makers as well as among historians. Kraska states his basic premise at the outset (p.2) that maritime piracy “is a function of a lack of governance on land. Consequently, the most successful efforts to suppress piracy are shore-based political solutions.” Historians might be mildly dissatisfied with this premise since they usually find political motivation woven into the contexts of maritime violence, including piracy. Kraska does, however, provide his historical context in the introduction and first chapter: a brief, traditional, and nearly global review of
piracy from ancient times, including the Nordic region of Europe, North Africa, and China Seas.

Kraska employs commercial, naval, legal, and diplomatic lenses to his examination of a complex phenomenon. Maritime shippers themselves, through their international and regional professional organizations, have come up with strategies for containing costs to life and property. For example, there exists a list of best management practices for avoiding and fending off pirate attacks. It is up to the (often reluctant) states to persuade ships’ captains who fly their flags to comply with these commercial regulations. The chapter on naval strategies focuses on U.S. efforts, and discusses the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor through the Gulf of Aden, put into effect in February, 2009 to protect shipping from Somali pirate attacks. There is also brief information about the Caribbean Community, through which the signatory countries have improved their collective capabilities to chase and hold to account both airborne and maritime pirates.

Another chapter is an essay on relevant international law, including a nuanced overview of definitions of piracy since the seventeenth century. There is close coverage of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 2010, which still has not fully replaced its older counterpart from 1982. The UN Conference of the Law of the Sea, however, has adopted from the draft—both as conventional (treaty) law and as customary international law—several articles pertaining to piracy. These articles define piracy as acts on the high seas motivated by private objectives. This definition exempts all sovereign states from the capacity to commit piracy and therefore, obviates the possible use of maritime violence as a political as well as economic strategy.

Kraska deals also with diplomacy, defined here mainly as United Nations Security Council Resolutions that specifically address the Somali situation but have broader implications. The chapter on diplomacy also details the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct, a regional effort of the International Maritime Organization. A last and less idealistic topic is the international criminal prosecution of piracy. Relatively few states involved in diplomacy have, in fact, defined piracy in their domestic laws, and confusion remains in terms of responsibility for and jurisdiction over those accused of piracy.

The volume contains not only narrative and analysis, but also extensive appendices, most from the United Nations that will be valuable to policy makers, researchers, and journalists, as well as to an informed general audience. One could only wish that the alphabet soup of involved organizations could be less daunting. Historians will watch to see if the Somali situation in particular ever comes to fit into the rapidly growing body of literature on maritime violence through time. From late medieval into modern times, there are several strong examples from the Indian Ocean and China Seas that support a political view of certain piracies as a leading effort at coastal state-building. Might this in future apply to Somalia if the Shabaab or some other group exerts more control?

Patricia Risso
Albuquerque, New Mexico


In order to place this volume historiographically in the works covering
the War of 1812, it must be remembered that there has been until recently a paucity of British authors and publishers on this subject. Americans have, to a great extent, dominated the written word and while bias has been shown to lesser and greater extents, detailed and well balanced history has been lacking and has led to the currently accepted “American myth of 1812.”

Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History at King's College London, wrote the introductions to the six volumes of the Conway reprint of W.M. James The Naval History of Great Britain (London, 2002) in which he wrote that William James, the first, rather lonely, proponent of factual accuracy, despite being a “careful historian ... not afraid to utilize the evidence to ... censure other historians” had led “many to complain about a xenophobic Tory bias, particularly in the sections dealing with the United States” and perhaps hinted strongly that James' reputation should be reexamined in context. With this book Lambert goes far in putting a definitive end to the American myths.

The author's aim is explicit: to explain why two centuries of “literary battlefield” have led to victory for the Americans when by 1814 their country was insolvent, its capital destroyed, and the British had achieved their goal of preventing a successful invasion of Canada.

He starts with an economic and political overview of the years leading up to 1812, setting the stage of European war where Napoleon's advance on Russia was seen by the American administration as a certain defeat for Britain; of American internal political division; and of Britain's political leaders having difficulty believing that the young United States could possibly choose war when the chances of success were so slight and outstanding disputes had been settled or looked like they might be. Lambert is clear that he is developing a British perspective, yet his detailed reasoning of the causes leading to American political strategy is solid. He examines the election of Madison, the deep differences between Federalists and Republicans and finds reasons for their aspirations and errors. He examines the complex commercial ties and embargoes that resulted from the European war, the British, French and American trading patterns, convoy systems and privateering. He develops his narrative and analysis in a clear and unequivocal manner. His annotations are numerous and meticulous; while he acknowledges assistance from archives on both sides of the Atlantic, the majority of his references are to American sources; he is particularly grateful to Dudley and Crawford for their three volumes thus far of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History.

Lambert's naval narrative is refreshingly concise and complete. Whether he discusses single ship actions (his account of the Shannon-Chesapeake engagement is masterful) or the complexities of command experienced by Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, commander-in-chief of the Royal Navy's North America and West Indies station, the text flows towards inevitable outcomes. He is equally magnanimous of heroism and greatness of command for both protagonists, and equally blunt in his criticism of errors. He limits his theatre almost entirely to the Atlantic, with occasional mentions of the Great Lakes, USS Essex's exploits in the Pacific and American John Jacob Astor's trading with the Far East, and it is his treatment of the blockade of the United States' eastern seaboard that receives the most attention. He describes the slow build up of British fleet strength and the increasing pressure brought by amphibious actions to explain why, by 1814, the
American treasury was in desperate trouble. This ineluctably leads to the status quo at Ghent, where the originally declared casus belli of impressment of seamen from American ships by the Royal Navy was forgotten.

Lambert concludes The Challenge with intriguing insight into the literature and art of the nascent United States in the post-1812 era, examining the reasons why naval defeat turned to lasting psychological victory.

The maps and diagrams are fully sufficient to support the text, and the book includes an eight-page colour insert as well as black and white portraits of ships and naval leaders. The index is in two parts, general and ship names, a bibliography is included and there is a somewhat cryptic appendix comparing size and armament of four frigates.

The only major criticism of the work concerns the proofreading; this book gives the impression of being rushed to press in time for the bicentennial. While a surfeit of commas after the word “and” is annoying, it is outrageous that Governor General Prevost appears from the start of the book, and in the index, as Henry Prevost—it is not until page 381 that he is rightfully reborn as George.

The Challenge is a necessary addition to the libraries of all serious students of the War of 1812. Perhaps a little too detailed, too academic, for the mass market, this book will please historians for its depth and remain a major addition to the historiography of 1812.

Paul Adamthwaite
Picton, ON.


James McCarthy’s study of Captain Basil Hall affirms the adage that readers should not judge books by their covers. This cover is truly striking. It is a photomontage with the upper right corner featuring a contemplative portrait detail of the elegant, twenty-something captain. He appears to be considering some weighty matter—a scientific conundrum, a navigational problem, or perhaps an arcane astronomical puzzle. The caption under the full portrait, reproduced in the front matter (p.iii), only enhances the enigmatic quality of the painting. It explains that the current location of the canvas is unknown, and adds that no record of it is even included in any catalogues of works by its painter, a man identified only as “Raeburn.” Fortunately, any reader willing to flip to the index will find the full name and title of the artist, Sir Henry Raeburn, a leading Scottish portraitist of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. The left half of the cover, shaded to highlight the captain’s picture, is the title page of one of his more famous works, the first volume of the 1831 edition of Fragments of Voyages and Travels. At the centre of the Fragments page, also properly shadowed to avoid detracting from the portrait, is a picture of one of Hall’s ships, HMS Leander. A lower segment of the cover has a banner displaying the ambiguous title: That Curious Fellow: Captain Basil Hall, R.N. The double meaning of the word “curious” is not a slip of the vocabulary by a hasty author or a negligent editor. James McCarthy intentionally applies the word both to the man’s insatiable quest for
knowledge and his peculiar social habits. Hall was fascinated by almost all he observed and inclined to investigate much of it. He was also judged by at least one close friend, Sir Walter Scott, to be a very strange duck. The author of the *Waverley Novels* described him as “That curious fellow, who takes charge of everyone’s business without neglecting his own.” (pp.iv, 98)

Although the book cover and the title imply that this is a full-dress, naval biography, that is not the case. McCarthy is little concerned with the one-third of Hall’s life spent as an officer. The outlines of his quarter-century in the Royal Navy are included, but only in a most perfunctory fashion. He went to sea as a thirteen-year-old in 1802. Six years later he was promoted to lieutenant, and in 1816 received a coveted captaincy. Even this spare outline of his career afloat indicates he was a man with friends in power. Securing a lieutenancy in 1808 was an easy matter. Britain then needed officers to fight a world-wide war against France. Gaining a captaincy after Waterloo when the navy was undergoing a sharp reduction in force indicated how well Hall’s aristocratic background and extensive social contacts served him in his upward ascent through the naval hierarchy.

McCarthy’s primary focus in writing of the curious captain is to chronicle his transit through the two decades after he retired on a captain’s half-pay in 1826. During these years, roughly from the mid-1820s to the mid-1840s, he became one of Britain’s most popular and financially successful travel writers. Hall’s appeal was due in large measure to his keen eye for details in the exotic locales he visited. Often accompanied on his wanderings by a household that included his wife, children, and several servants, he ranged through areas little known to his Anglophone readers. His books described excursions to the mysterious Korean peninsula, Loo Choo Island (Okinawa), Ceylon, Borneo, the coasts of Chile, Peru, and Mexico, and included, uncharacteristically, a three-volume account of a year’s visit to North America. Hall illustrated his own works—enhancing his drawings by using the *camera lucida*, a gadget for projecting images on a flat surface where they could be copied accurately by an artist with his considerable talents. In addition to his impressive literary achievements, he also became one of the nation’s premier gadabouts, making friends and networking among a host of important writers, scientists, publishers, and political figures. His wide circle of acquaintances is testimony to his interpersonal skills. It included Charles Dickens, Sir John Herschel, Sir Humphrey Davy, Captain Francis Beaufort, the mysterious but discontented Styrian Countess Purgstall, and even Napoleon Bonaparte, with whom he managed to secure an interview at St. Helena on August 13, 1817.

Major sources for *That Curious Fellow* are the large corpus of unpublished letters between Hall and his correspondents and the similarly extensive scattering of unpublished letters exchanged by the multitude of the captain’s friends. The continuous use of such material allows for the unmediated transfer of thoughts, ideas, etc. from writer to reader, which is all to the good. Unfortunately, too heavy a reliance on the technique often leads to pages of indented quotations laced loosely together by the most superficial commentary. Still, despite this and other minor defects, the book contains a trove of information on British society and culture in the late Georgian era.

B. R. Burg
Phoenix, Arizona

Released during Canada’s Naval Centennial, this book looks at the relationship between the province of New Brunswick and the various naval forces which have operated in its waters for nearly 400 years. Part of a series examining aspects of the province’s military history, this brief book is divided into six chapters followed by a short bibliography.

The book begins with first permanent French settlement in the seventeenth century, although the possibility of an earlier Norse settlement is introduced. A commercial “conflict” among the French preceded a real conflict between the French and English. The Battle of the Restigouche River in June 1760 marked the beginning of the end of French colonial rule in Canada. It was followed by a few years of peace until the American War of Independence when privateers became active in the area as far as Saint John.

The second chapter deals with the War of 1812 and offers a brief aperçu of the activities of privateers from both sides operating off New Brunswick shores. The creation of the Provincial Navy designed to chase American privateers from the Bay of Fundy is also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter three covers the interesting pre-confederation period with the Fenian revolts of 1866 and the 1878 to 1882 scare with Russia over the Turkish territories. These events convinced the new Dominion of Canada to develop a proto-navy beginning with the steam corvette *Charybdis* based in Saint John, New Brunswick. British-built *Charybdis* was launched in 1859 and conducted anti-piracy patrols on the China Station before returning to England. In 1880, it was loaned to the Canadian government as a training ship until the tension with Russia relaxed. In 1882 the ship was in such a miserable state, it was returned. This unfortunate experience postponed the establishment of a national naval force for a quarter of a century and left the protection of our waters to the Royal Navy. With the creation of the Fisheries Protection Services in 1886, Britain’s withdrawal from bases at Esquimalt and Halifax in 1906, and the rise of the German naval menace, Canadian interest in a national navy surfaced. A resolution for a naval service was introduced in Parliament and passed in 1909. The Canadian Navy was born the following year.

The province’s first naval connection in the Great War was the death of a New Brunswick-born midshipman at the Battle of Coronel in 1914. Germany’s unrestricted U-boat campaign of 1917 led to the organization of a convoy system and prompted the establishment of the first Canadian naval organization in New Brunswick. Following the Great War, the creation of 16 Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) units in communities across the country including Saint John, marked the only remaining naval unit in the province.

The Second World War dominates the next chapter and highlights the Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) organization in New Brunswick under which Saint John did double-duty as a key commercial port as well as a centre for major repairs and refits. By February 1940, nearly 130 officers, men and civilians were involved in NCS work. Heavily involved in repair, Saint John’s facilities could not build new vessels as efficiently as other ports.

In May 1942, U-boats began lurking off Saint John, even landing spies
ashore. Luckily, the captains of these submarines did not happen to observe the traffic moving in and out of Saint John, which meant the city’s role as a convoy loading terminal was not reported and it German attention for the remainder of the war. Attempts by German submarines to repatriate escaped prisoners of war prompted Canadian efforts to capture them. Provincial maritime defense efforts increased throughout the war and, in late 1942, a new Direction Finder (DF) station was established off Riverview, New Brunswick, which remained active until the early 1970s. An Oceanography research station, established earlier in the century at St. Andrews, was expanded during the war and helped Allied efforts in anti-submarine warfare.

Chapter five lists the various ships built before and during the war that were named for New Brunswick communities. There is a brief overview of their careers and accomplishments, including the last remaining Flower-Class Corvette, HMCS Sackville.

The last chapter looks at the post-war period with regard to the construction of new naval vessels. Interestingly, most of the major vessels currently in use by the Canadian Navy were built in New Brunswick; for example, two replenishment ships of the Protecteur-Class built in the late 1960s, followed by Halifax-Class patrol frigates which occupied the yard until the late 1990s. A short conclusion mentions the accomplishments of the frigate HMCS Fredericton, involved in actions against pirates off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, before returning to Halifax shortly before the Navy’s 100th anniversary.

This small book is filled with 400 years of history involving the Navy and New Brunswick up to the centenary of Canada’s Navy. It is a good introduction for anyone interested in a light but informative and well written history of the navy. It is regrettable, however, that the authors did not close the circle with the story of the only provincial naval unit remaining since the Second World War, HMCS Brunswicker, or of the other vessel named for a community, HMCS Moncton (the second of that name). Nevertheless, this book is a good addition to any naval library and is certainly an example for similar work for other coastal provinces.

Carl Gagnon
Ottawa, Ontario


This book provides a wealth of information for the new or even experienced model builder of plastic kits, with much of it useful to any model builder, regardless of medium. Interestingly, the book comes out at a time when the opposing fields of plastic modelling and traditional wooden, metal, and similar model-building fields are coming closer together. The International Plastic Model Society (IPMS), once strictly “plastic only,” now accept models of non-plastic construction in its competitions, with a wooden ship section in the 2012 competition.

Printed on good quality paper with cardstock covers, sized for workbench or table while leaving room to work, it is beautifully illustrated with custom artwork prepared by A. Tooby, Roy Cross and, in a few cases, the author. It also contains countless, excellent in-process photographs in each of the sections and projects, clearly illustrating the processes and techniques involved in building and finishing plastic models. Among the skills well worth study by more traditional model builders working in wood and metal is the information
presented on painting and weathering. When well done, both of these are arts unto themselves, arts very often poorly handled by traditional model builders, but invariably well handled by plastic modellers.

Contents: a Forward by Chris Ellis, former Editor of old Airfix Magazine, followed by an Introduction by the author along with his credits and acknowledgements. These are followed by chapters on: To Begin at the Beginning; Choosing the Right Kit; How Kits are Made; Tools for the Job; Step-by-step building of a 1:72 North American F-86F Sabre; Painting; Step-by-step build 1:76 German Panzer IV F2; Decals and their Application; Step-by-step build 1:32 Aston Martin DBR9; Conversions: Step-by-step build 1:350 Trafalgar Class submarine; Figures; Step-by-step build 1:12 Yeoman of the Guard; Step-by-step build a 1:76 Diorama; Resources: Bibliography; Glossary; Index.

As editor of the old Airfix Magazine from 1965 to 1972 and from 1978 to 1982, Chris Ellis has seen the plastic kit industry grow from its very simple beginnings into a world-wide industry from the first simple kits by Frog to the huge range of manufacturers and kits of today. It was the founder of Airfix, however, who initially brought injection moulding technology to Britain in 1939, producing items such as plastic combs and household utensils, releasing its first plastic model kit of the Golden Hind in 1952. From there the industry has expanded exponentially, with improvements in the quality of kits matching the development of the technology used to produce moulds for the plastic injection industry. Today, detail only dreamt of in Ellis’s early days is readily available and supported with a huge range of photo-etched parts and injection-moulded assemblies readily available in many scales, with many of these parts now being designed for, and used by, the more traditional model builder, thereby allowing customizing and embellishment of not just plastic kits, but wooden and metal models of all types.

The chapter on Choosing the Right Kit discusses what can be a mine-field for a beginner, while providing worthwhile advice on kit selection, including scale, which can have long-term implications when displaying models. The range of subjects normally found in various scales is also covered.

How Kits are Made provides an interesting look into the creation of a kit, detailing the exhaustive research and meticulous study that has to go into the development of a new kit. In earlier times, it could easily take two years to bring a kit to the market. Now, with virtually all of the work done on computers using CAD, that time frame has been reduced. The incredible amount of research remains the same, however. Even with the advantages of modern tooling, sometimes parts that, if made exactly to scale in plastic would be too thin to be usable with earlier parts moulded slightly oversize, are now made of photo-etched metal.

It is in the sections on Tools for the Job, and the later section on painting that the book earns its place on the bench. Tooling starts off with a very simple and basic set of tools, many of which may already be in one’s home. It then goes further, providing not just a list of additional tools, but their application. This section contains countless photos illustrating the recommended approach to starting a model, assembling it, correcting the odd manufacturing flaw and finishing mould lines where parts mate; in short, it presents a wealth of information on the tricks of the trade that could take a modeller years to develop working alone.

No matter how well a model has been assembled and finished prior to painting, with all flaws eliminated, the
application of an excellent final finish is paramount. While this section discusses the transition from earlier oil-based paints to the universally accepted acrylics of today, with their ease of cleanup, it is also loaded with tricks and tools of the trade. Beyond painting there is a section on decals, the application of the myriad of identification markings and, more recently the labelling of maintenance access covers.

Building any of the six projects listed will provide ample opportunity to put the contents of the book into practise, using the step-by-step procedure as a guide. The book is highly recommended to anyone looking to start model building in plastic, or upgrade existing model building skills.

Roger Cole
Toronto, Ontario


Thomas Ostrom, a retired instructor of anthropology, geography and history at Rochester Community College in Minnesota, who served two enlistments in the Coast Guard Reserve in the 1960s, has written three previous books about Coast Guard history: *The United States Coast Guard: 1790 to the Present* (Elderberry Press, 2004), *The USCG on the Great Lakes* (Red Anvil Press, 2006) and *The United States Coast Guard in World War II: A History of Domestic and Overseas Actions* (McFarland, 2009). The present work is based almost entirely upon secondary sources (books and articles published in journals and on the internet), and the title is somewhat misleading. The author broadens his focus beyond national defense to include search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental protection, and other Coast Guard missions, as well as the Coast Guard Yard in Maryland and the Coast Guard Academy in Connecticut, arguing that they all have national security ramifications. An appendix contains information on Coast Guard Commandants. It is, in many respects, more of a history of the Coast Guard from 1915 to the present with an emphasis on national security.

The chapter titles are also misleading. “The Coast Guard: 1790 to World War I,” after about a page on the national defense history of the service from 1790 to the First World War, deals primarily with the service during the latter war. “Through” rather than “to World War I” would have been more accurate. Similarly, “The Cold War from America to Vietnam” deals extensively with Vietnam. Finally, the appendix of “Coast Guard Commandants 1990-2010” begins with a discussion on the last commandant of the 1980s, who left office in 1990.

Unfortunately, the organization of the information makes this a difficult read. Subjects are often repeated in various chapters and frequently out of order. The LORAN program, which played a major role in national defense during the Second World War, is only mentioned in passing in the discussion of the service during that war but later, in the section on the Korean War, Ostrom goes into the history and importance of this program. In following his discussion of the service in Vietnam, the reader gets confused about whether he is talking about the large vessels providing naval gunfire support offshore or the small patrol boats involved in coastal and riverine warfare. Instead of discussing a subject in one place, he discusses it rather disjointedly at various places in the book.

There are also omissions and errors. In the first chapter, Ostrom states that responsibility for the Coast Guard
moved from the Treasury to the Transportation Department in 1973, (p.12) when it was actually in 1967 (p.72). Factual errors include the incorrect location of Coast Guard Auxiliary’s 2010 National Convention as Flagstaff, Arizona, rather than in Scottsdale (Phoenix area).

He repeatedly refers to the nineteenth commandant as Admiral “Kline” when his name was “Kime.” Also confusing to readers with a Coast Guard background will be Ostrom’s use of ATN to stand for “Aids to Navigation,” when the service has long used the acronym ATON for that mission, and WOT for the “war on terror” when the armed forces generally use the acronym GWOT for the “global war on terror” and its service medal.

One of most surprising omissions is the role of Coast Guard aviators in the First World War. They are never mentioned in the chapter dealing with that war, or in the later chapter dealing with Coast Guard Aviation. During the First World War, Coast Guard aviators commanded several Naval Air Stations including the one in Ile Tudy, France, which saw more antisubmarine action than any other overseas Naval Air Station. In the appendix on commandants “to” 1990, while Ostrom provides information on most of them, the three commandants from 1974 to 1986 are only mentioned in passing.

A good copy editor could have greatly improved this book. Despite its disjointed style and numerous errors, however, Ostrom is explicit about his secondary sources, making his book a good, extended bibliographic essay on the published sources dealing with Coast Guard history from the First World War to the present. Because of that and its extensive bibliography, this book is best used as a reference rather than a readable narrative.

C. Douglas Kroll
Palm Desert, California


In 1768 King George III founded the Royal Academy, giving a focus to the development of a national art: in 1829 King George IV despatched J.M.W. Turners’ monumental Battle of Trafalgar to the new naval gallery at the Royal Naval Hospital Greenwich. In this period, Quilley argues, the sea occupied a more significant place in British art and culture than has hitherto been recognized by art historians, while the evolving representation of the sea expressed the profound changes that occurred between the rosy afterglow of the victories of the Seven Year’s War and the experience of the Napoleonic conflict, changes which saw visions of Empire and expansion replaced by one of a nation that relied on the sea as the basis of defence. At the same time, the practice of history and the aims of historical art were profoundly influenced by the Rankean turn. Where the eighteenth century valued rhetoric, the new German school demanded factual accuracy, delivered in a pared down, spare style in art and print.

This strikingly handsome book is laid out in eight linked case studies. Two chapters address the art of James Cook’s second and third voyages, which brought enlightenment Europe face to face with earlier stages of human social development. For artist William Hodges and expedition scientists Johann Reinhold and George Forster, the spectacle of a Tahitian war fleet ready for battle brought to mind the tale of Troy, while Cook ranked Pacific societies according to the quality of their watercraft. These chapters stress the difference between the second voyage, where Hodges tried to
create art, and the third, where John Webber followed Cook’s direction. The distinction between artist as observer and interpreter, and artist as recorder of coastal views would be developed in voyages inspired by Cook, those of Alexander von Humboldt, Charles Darwin and Joseph Hooker. These men harnessed the factual and analytical aspects of the art of the Cook voyages to create the scientific travel narrative.

Chapter four focuses on John Singleton Copley’s striking *Watson and the Shark* of 1778, to analyse the idea of a Black Atlantic. Placing a black sailor at the apogee of the picture made a powerful statement, but the variant readings of the image offered here ignore Copley’s *Death of Major Pierson* of 1781, where a black man takes a heroic role at the centre of a battle picture. Chapter five follows the Black Atlantic by contrasting James Northcote’s *Wreck of the Centaur* with the legal proceedings Captain Inglefield, hero of the picture, took against his wife for alleged adulterous liaisons with a black servant. Clearly, empire could be at once the making and the unmaking of Englishness. The theme of shipwreck continues in chapter six, where Northcote’s next picture, *The Loss of Halsewell East Indiaman*, provides a metaphor for national disaster. This image would be re-cast two decades later, both as a tale of heroism in Nicholas Pocock’s *The Distressful Situation of the Dutton East Indiaman*, and a visual joke in James Gillray’s print of the Foxite opposition trying to haul a French invasion barge ashore, despite the winds directed against it by Pitt the Younger. The constant satirical theme of the unpatriotic opposition supporting French invaders and British mutineers reflected the impact of total war on national consciousness, a theme that might have been developed. The national identity in which Quilley sets his marine art was changed by external danger; first American rebellion and then French Revolution built a new consciousness, one in which naval glory was a critical feature, marking out the British from other nations, nations where martial prowess and continental empire were the key indicators of success.

The evolution of the image of the sailor reflected the heightened tensions of the French Revolutionary War, when the divergent identities of the sailor as national martyr or disturbing alien were emphasised by the Great Mutiny of 1797 and the Battle of Camperdown that followed. Philippe-Jacques de Loutherbourg’s Camperdown battle piece adopted the art of the Apocalyptic Sublime to create a secular altarpiece for the nation. By this stage, imperial curiosity had been replaced by national anxiety, and de Loutherbourg complemented his representations of successive contemporary naval battles with images of exemplary battles from earlier days. In case anyone doubted the enduring link between national security and sea power, de Loutherbourg found time between the Glorious First of June and Camperdown to recreate the defeat of the Spanish Armada. In image and word the foundation myth of maritime nationhood became history. The process reached a culmination when King George IV commissioned Turner to paint *Trafalgar*, as a pair to Loutherbourg’s First of June. These mighty, evocative images would flank Sir Thomas Lawrence’s portrait of George III, which had a suitably naval background, while Lawrence’s better known George IV was flanked by images of Vittoria and Waterloo, the greatest battles fought under the Regency. By 1829, the King had tired of naval glory, dispatching both sea battles to Greenwich, where Turner’s vast allegory of the maritime nation met with little sympathy from seamen who expected pictures to show recognizable ships in realistic situations. Naval men wanted an art to show young cadets, part of the development of Nelson as...
the exemplary figure.

Consigning this masterpiece to an avowedly naval pantheon, along with the great bulk of naval art, nicely illustrates one of Quilley’s key arguments, that marine art had a greater role in British culture than hitherto recognised by art historians. The establishment of the National Gallery and the Greenwich collection at roughly the same time imposed an artificial separation that left the National Gallery with less marine art than almost any other national collection in the world. An odd Dutch marine by Ludolf Backhuysen and Turner’s Temeraire aside, naval pictures are conspicuous only by their absence. The process was complete by the mid-nineteenth century, when marine art had become a specialist genre, one that stressed realism, and thus, better suited to naval and geographical audiences. As Quilley concludes, leaving the marine at the margins of art scholarship distorts any attempt to comprehend the evolution of national identity.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


For nearly a century, Great Britain remained at the top as a world-leader shipbuilding nation. Strong domestic and European markets, naval needs, and exports abroad kept the industry busy in the transition from wood to steel ship construction. Though Great Britain’s comparative advantage inevitably receded over time, shipbuilding provided steady employment for several generations of British working people and fitful profits for companies and owners. Shipyards were mostly concentrated in Scotland on the Clyde River and in northeast England along the Tyne near Newcastle, where wages for labour were lower and industrial land relatively cheap compared to elsewhere in the country. Due to numbers and influence, shipyard workers and the unions that represented them emerged as powerful brokers in economic relations and the political scene at local, regional, and national levels. Alastair Reid, a fellow in history at Girton College, University of Cambridge, explores the scope of this phenomenon based on his interests in social movements, British trade unions, and the genesis of the Labour Party as a national political force in Great Britain.

The book attempts neither a social history of those who worked in British shipyards nor a simple description of the ships that came out of the yards as industrial products. Instead, Reid is concerned about how worker organization within shipyards, following specific modes of production and craft affiliations, gave rise to trade union leaderships that in turn had some form of popular political impact. Marxist interpretations of economic determinism and class, he feels, have needlessly discounted earlier traditional work stressing the beneficial aspects of trade unionism and essential organizational matters. In other words, the personalities who occupied key positions, as well as things as mundane as finances, were just as important as the work experience and relations with employers and the state. Reid uses a deliberately pluralist and revisionist approach to construct his argument along these lines.

The book’s 15 chapters are divided into three parts, conveniently each with its own conclusions to sum up the main points
and ideas. The first examines the organization of craft production in an industry that exhibited both throwbacks to the past and modernity. A shipyard was a collection of stratified trades that identified with the work done and collected together workers of similar training and skill. Introduction of new technology and technical improvements was accepted hesitantly, should individual companies have even had incentive to do so. In the British case, shipbuilding remained labour-intensive and wedded to existing methods of production putting a premium on skilled workers. The second part analyzes the travails of association and leadership among the boilermakers, the trade union representing the single largest number of workers in British shipbuilding. The emergence of seasoned and adept leaders—the so-called “labour aristocracy” denounced by Marxist historians—able to calculate the appropriateness of industrial action and strikes in support of demands upon employers, keep the membership happy and union financially sound, and engage employers and increasingly government representatives through war and peace on favourable terms increased effectiveness. The third part delves into the involvement of the highest officials from the boilermakers’ union in outside politics, both to advance industrial issues of immediate value to shipyard workers, such as fair wage campaigns and regulated hours of work, as well as support for a viable counterweight to conservative political machines of the time. The radicalism of these trade unionists was essentially more liberal than socialist in nature. They participated actively within the prevailing social and economic system to further the sectional interests of their members and all shipyard workers in general.

Readers of this journal will be most comfortable in the first part of the book. In fact, the discussion progressively moves away from the confines of shipyards themselves up through trade union ranks to the backside maneuverings of British progressive politics in the first half of the twentieth century. Since that is Reid’s fascination, it is not completely unexpected. Still, the first chapters present a masterful treatment of the effect of the market on British shipbuilding development, management of the labour process, and the intimate relationship between work and skill represented by groupings of individual trades in the shipyards. The basic differences between hull builders and outfitters belie the truly unique character and attitudes in trade groupings amongst similar workers, whether boilermakers, mechanical engineers, machinists, pipefitters, painters, or shipwrights. Absent from Reid’s discussion is the personal aspect of the lives of these shipyard workers, if only to provide some colour to the broad brush tapestry presented. They remain faceless, mere clogs in the industrial process behind shipbuilding and constituents of the trade unions discussed. Reid is quick to move onto the personalities who really interest him, namely Robert Knight and John Hill, the labour leaders who were drawn into progressive politics. In that sense, the book is not so much about shipbuilding or even shipyard workers as the title might suggest, but the influence of those persons from a certain background and experience trying to effect political change.

The Tide of Democracy is mostly intended for a specialized audience of an academic nature and those interested in popular British political movements. As an ancillary, it deals with the period of major British shipbuilding in steel and the trade unions that represented workers in the shipyards, mostly in Scotland and north-east England. This realization should guide
readers interested in maritime affairs when considering whether to pay the relatively high retail price for this hardcover book, await issue of a cheaper softcover, or simply go to the library.

Chris Madsen
Toronto, Ontario


Charles D. Stanton’s *Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean* seeks to fill a major void in the maritime history of the medieval Mediterranean by placing the Norman conquest of Sicily and subsequent rule of the island (1038-1194) within the strategic context of the larger Mediterranean world. His work finds its origins in a considerable body of scholarship by two other scholars; David Abulafia’s various works on the political and administrative history of the Normans, and the trailblazing nautical histories of John Pryor. These works serve as a narrative and theoretical basis for Stanton’s own original work. He introduces the work with a treatment, based heavily on Pryor, of Sicily’s strategic importance in the Mediterranean. Due to the nature of its geographic placement, the island dominated the central Mediterranean and East-West maritime routes. Under Roman and Byzantine thalassocracy Sicily served as a vital waypoint, but the Aghlabid invasion of the ninth century brought the island under Islamic rule, limiting the nautical links between Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The arrival of Norman adventurers in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily in the early eleventh century began to radically alter the maritime situation. These Norman warriors, led primarily by the Hauteville clan, conquered much of the region by stages over the course of several decades. Conquering the many port cities of southern Italy and Sicily required the use of extensive naval forces, necessitating the Hautevilles to become acquainted with naval warfare. Stanton asserts that there was a nautical learning curve for the Normans, citing in particular Robert Guiscard’s siege of Bari in 1068-1071. By his reading of the sources, Stanton argues that Guiscard imposed a palisade of ships around the entire circumference of Bari’s sea walls, which by his own estimation (and as portrayed on Map 2, p.42), would have required in excess of 400 ships (p.40). This is an absurdly literal reading of the sources. Such a naval circumvallation was militarily unnecessary, as well as impossible. Such an enormous force of ships was unavailable to Guiscard, and the only part of the city he needed to blockade was the port, which is what the sources are certainly talking about. Stanton’s overall point about a lack of Norman naval prowess in the early period is quite right, but in this specific instance his interpretation of the sources is widely off base.

The critical juncture of the work is Stanton’s treatment of the reign of Roger II (1112-1154) and its aftermath. Under Roger, the Normans exercised a clear naval strategy aimed at maintaining control of southern Italy against the efforts of the Holy Roman Empire and the Byzantines, as well as harbouring more ambitious designs on controlling the North African coastline opposite Sicily. This dominance of the critical shorelines of the Central Mediterranean gave Roger effective control of the sea lanes passing between them, meaning that most vessels transiting the region had to stop at Norman-controlled ports and pay customs duties to Roger’s agents. Roger II’s able use of naval power,
aided by highly capable adjutants, such as his admiral George of Antioch, allowed him to greatly enrich his kingdom and expand his power. His heirs, William I (1154-1166) and later William II (1166-1189), however, rather than focusing on maintaining Norman control of their immediate maritime surroundings, squandered their naval power on ambitious expeditions against the Byzantines and Egypt in the East, and raids on the Balearic Islands in the West. In Stanton’s view this external focus and the general incompetence of two successive kings diminished Sicilian control of the vital waters around Sicily, contributing to the final dissolution of Norman naval power under the last king, Tancred, and the eventual transition of the kingdom to the Hohenstaufen dynasty of Swabia in 1194.

In his conclusion Stanton proposes several major effects resulting from the rise of Norman naval power in Sicily. First, he credits the Norman seizure of the Sicily with opening trade with the East for Western Italian powers, namely Genoa and Pisa, and facilitating their eventual naval involvement in the Crusading movement in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. He certainly has a valid point here, but he is somewhat myopic in his approach. The Norman conquest of Sicily certainly aided the Genoese and Pisans, but there were a number of other economic, political, and religious forces pushing them towards the East well before the ascent of the Normans. Stanton’s last two conclusions are on more stable ground. He notes, with ample sources, that Norman control of Sicily radically altered Muslim trading patterns in North Africa in a negative fashion. He also proposes that Norman naval strategy and maritime practices laid a foundation for a resurgence of naval power in Sicily under the Hohenstaufen monarch Frederick II.

Stanton’s work is carefully researched and demonstrates a detailed knowledge of all the available sources, including Norman, Byzantine and Islamic materials. Generally speaking, his conclusions are reasonable, though he occasionally goes a bit farther than the sources allow. There are a few minor contradictions, such as his claim (p.119) that George of Antioch used the Norman fleet to force merchant vessels into Sicilian ports to pay customs duties. There is no source that suggests such, and this runs counter to his earlier (p.7), and correct, assertion that this kind of interdiction was impossible due to the limits of medieval maritime technology. What criticisms that are made here are episodic in nature, and do not detract from what is a well-researched and important contribution to medieval maritime history and the history of Sicily.

J. Mark Nicovich
Hattiesburg, Mississippi


Wise and Baron’s book addresses the operational and military history of the American response to the April 1975 Khmer Rouge seizure of the SS Mayaguez and the subsequent battle on the island of Koh Tang off the coast of Cambodia. In 1975, as the Vietnam War reached its end, and long after American ground troops had been formally removed, a series of altercations occurred including what many consider the last battle of the Vietnam War—14 hours of intense fighting off the coast of Cambodia. Much like Andrew Jackson’s heroic victory in New Orleans after the treaty of Ghent ended
the War of 1812, so did the battle on Koh Tang and the fight to rescue the Mayaguez and her crew occur after the 1973 Paris peace accords ostensibly ended direct American military involvement in Vietnam.

The book is divided into twelve sections. The first eleven focus on the history of the events in question, chronicling the actions and decisions made by the military in this operation as well as describing the equipment and hardware that helped them do their job. In fact, it is the copious background information on the operational plans as well as the aircraft (some fixed wing, but mostly rotary wing) that constitutes one of the highlights of the book. Unlike some of the previous books on the Mayaguez seizure (most notably Ralph Wetterhahn’s The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War), Wise and Baron focus on the battle plans and tactics (as well as the challenges and sacrifices) made by the men who carried out these missions. One of the interesting revelations of the book involves some of the innovation and improvisation implemented by those involved, especially the helicopter pilots. There are heroic anecdotes of offloading troops from larger (Jolly Green) helicopters onto tiny ships as well as reconnaissance missions in the military equivalent of Cessna airplanes.

The last section—which accounts for about two-thirds of the book—is the real heart of their monograph and what this reviewer sees as a large part of the real utility of the book. Wise, a former naval aviator, and Baron, an army veteran (both of whom served in Vietnam), published annotated accounts of various veterans who participated in the battle on Koh Tang and/or the rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew. The transcripts of these interviews and accounts are reprinted verbatim, placed in context by commentary before and afterwards. Supplementing this section are detailed appendices with complete lists of all the soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who served in the battle and/or rescue. The authors also included lists of all those wounded or killed in action and all the medals and accolades that were awarded to those who served.

The 14 Hour War is not the first book to address the Mayaguez seizure, nor is it the first to frame history through the personal narratives of those involved. It does, however, succinctly provide a space for the conjunction of those two subjects, successfully merging historical subject with narrative methodology. The book goes into intense detail about the circumstances that precipitated the Khmer Rouge seizure and the American response. Wise and Baron focus primarily on operational history, sometimes at the expense of political discussions inside the beltway. Allusions are made but they do not delve deeply into the decisions made by officers and politicians higher up in the chain of command. For example, President Ford’s choices and his struggle with the War Powers Act are mentioned only in passing.

Wise and Baron’s operational history juxtaposes well with those of Wetterhahn and other scholars (including this reviewer) who address different aspects of the Mayaguez seizure in more detail. An excellent asset to a maritime or military history course, the book would also be useful in a class about the Vietnam War. Though effectively the last battles of the Vietnam War, the fight on Koh Tang and the Mayaguez rescue are often ignored or passed over in the larger historical narrative. Wars are won one battle at a time but in the case of really brief wars, sometimes there is only one battle. Wise and Baron aptly tell the story surrounding this very short, 14 Hour War.

Jason Friedman
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In the nineteenth century, it was said that only a poor country could afford to send its sons to sea. Ship owners could buy a cheap vessel, equip it poorly, load it deeply, insure it as high as possible and send it to sea. If it came home at the end of the voyage, it would have been a good investment but if it went to the bottom, it would have been much better.

Richard Woodman went to sea at sixteen and spent many years on cargo-liners and with Trinity House, the general lighthouse authority. In 1981, he started writing popular naval fiction centered on the period of the American War of Independence and, together with his award-winning Nathaniel Drinkwater series set in the 1840s, he has more than two dozen novels to his credit. He is also a prolific writer of articles on maritime issues as well as books on the history of mutiny and the modern era of what he calls “the real cruel sea.” He is an Elder Brother of Trinity House, a member of the Royal Cruising Club and a keen yachtsman.

*Fiddler’s Green* is the final volume of Woodman’s ground-breaking and critically acclaimed five-book series on the development of the British Merchant Marine. At almost 500 pages, it covers the ninety-year period from 1921 during which the merchant navy faced the appalling odds of a Second World War. The author admits he found this the most difficult volume to write.

Subtitled *The Great Squandering*, the book is divided into three broad areas: the long slump of the 1920s and 30s, the Merchant Navy in the Second World War, and the decline after the 1960s when a series of short trade booms alternated with long plunges into economic depressions. Woodman believes that in the post-war climate of peace and prosperity, the global supply of food and raw materials was efficiently maintained by the nation’s merchant marine. He argues, however, that it was not long before the shipping companies carelessly allowed the value of this great national asset to be dissipated by “the dead hand of bureaucracy.” In other words, the industry was no longer run by maritime entrepreneurs, and history has shown that shipping companies run by boards of directors or committees of disinterested stockholders fare worse than those owned by a single decision maker.

Detailed accounts of sea battles during the Second World War can easily be found in existing literature. Instead, Woodman has highlighted some incidents involving merchant vessels and faithfully chronicled the causes of the demise of the post-war shipping industry which “proved particularly violent and long-lasting.” (Tenold 2006) For some of the largest ship owners, the decline in trade was unexpected (Howarth 1986), but others foresaw that diversification and autonomy was essential and adapted accordingly (Hunting 1991). Maritime economists now acknowledge that the twentieth century’s sophisticated transport system for bulk commodities was one of the great innovations in world trade. As a result of investment in integrated systems, the cost of maritime transport has grown more slowly than other costs in the world economy. (Stopford 2009).

Woodman’s painstaking research for *Fiddler’s Green* has uncovered details of these twentieth-century shipping company structures and their operations. Each chapter is followed by a comprehensive list
of notes, and a detailed six-page bibliography is included, although it is dominated by English-language books. An appendix is devoted to the development in 1941 of the 10,500-ton prefabricated Liberty class of American-built standard cargo ships to replace the massive number of vessels sunk by U-boats. Targets were greatly exceeded with the production of more than 2700 of these vessels in U.S. shipyards (and another 400 in Canadian yards) during the next four years. From then on, far fewer ship owners ordered one-off designs of ships that reflected their personal preferences or even their personalities.

Richard Woodman’s history of the British Merchant Navy is without a doubt one that everyone interested in economic or maritime history should know. This final installment is an entertaining book that is as well written and richly illustrated as the previous four. It contains many very personal stories from the more than a hundred memoirs that he received from ordinary seamen to commanders of large passenger vessels. He also quotes from many specialized authors as well as Conrad’s description of going to sea as “a useful calling,” Kipling’s “far called, our navies melt away” and from the poet Eugene O’Neill’s experience in trampsteamers as “incredibly hard, and I enjoyed every minute of it.”

General readers interested in the ins and outs of twentieth-century maritime history may wonder how they managed before without this detailed and dynamic reference source. As a record of one of the least noted but most fundamental changes to affect the United Kingdom’s global trade, Richard Woodman argues cogently that the importance of the contribution made by merchant ships and their crews, in war and peace, cannot be over-emphasized. Yet, within a generation, the British merchant fleet had all but vanished and the sailors who risked their lives, both in peace and war, were cast ashore at the metaphorical Fiddler’s Green.

Michael Clark
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Steven J. Zaloga contributes an interesting volume to Osprey Publishing’s pint-sized militarium series with his Kamikaze, Japanese Special Attack Weapons 1944-45. He explores the rough contours of a topic and strategy that remain equally captivating and puzzling (at least to a Western audience) more than five decades later. His opening lines address two important considerations when exploring this famed (or, infamous) tactic—the strategic and psychological underpinnings of kamikaze. These were desperate times, and they gave birth to desperate measures. Indeed, as Zaloga notes, even the U.S. military community gave grudging credit to the ruthless effectiveness of kamikaze attacks; they struck as much at the enemy’s gears of war as they did the psyche of the warriors themselves.

Zaloga traces the tactical roots of kamikaze to early 1944, as the tide of war swung decidedly to the Americans’ favour. Where the early days of the Pacific Theatre witnessed Japan’s imposing its will on technologically inferior foes, the United States had in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor committed itself to meeting and exceeding the capabilities of the Japanese ground, air, and land forces. The island nation,
occupied with its newfound “empire” in the Pacific, lacked the time and resources needed to keep pace with U.S. manufacturing. As plan after daring plan failed (including and especially the Imperial Japanese Navy’s push to the Philippines, and the disastrous result called the “Marianas Turkey Shoot”), the Japanese military sought a new weapon that would perhaps halt the Americans’ advance across the vast ocean. The first official “Tokko” (Special Attacks) were likely on 13 and 21-22 of September 1944 against American forces in the Philippines; however, the first such attack that is securely documented in the historical record occurred on 15 October 1944. The Japanese commanders viewed these attacks as comparable to a typhoon of 1274, which saved Japan from an attack by the Mongol fleet. This was the original “divine wind”; kamikaze is one of two pronunciations of the Japanese character for the term. It was hoped that the new “divine wind” would prove as successful at stopping invaders as the legendary typhoon.

The subsequent pages of Zaloga’s brief text outline the increasing use of, and success of, kamikaze attacks. Some specialized suicide vehicles were developed, although the strategic use of kamikaze often demanded the use of any available weapon. So while initially the lighter and more maneuverable fighter aircraft were preferred for kamikaze missions for their ability to penetrate a fleet’s outer defenses, Japan turned eventually to light and even medium bombers for such use. Japanese industry even began developing piloted bombs, as resources for producing attack aircraft dwindled. Zaloga includes engineering-type models—beautifully rendered by Ian Palmer—and other illustrations and photographs. Neither the text nor the illustrations are limited to airborne kamikaze vehicles; and, of course, this is because the tactic was employed on land, and in (and under) the water. Midget submarines, crash boats, explosive wetsuits, and lunge mines were also used by the Japanese for suicide missions. Zaloga tastefully balances technical descriptions of these with examples of their use—typically including statistics on the destructiveness of their successes.

While students and scholars alike may find something of interest and value in this text, it is (by design) quite brief. As a single reference, the work lacks the depth or breadth required for much beyond whetting an appetite for more reading. Thus the Osprey series is probably best considered as a set rather than individual works. Unlike others in the series, however, Zaloga’s Kamikaze contains a section devoted to “Further Reading.” This provides the reader a much-needed and much-appreciated roadmap to more detailed and/or scholarly sources on this fascinating subject. An obvious strength of even his brief work is its reference to both Japanese and western sources; the serious scholar will appreciate his listing several of each for further consultation. Well written and aesthetically pleasing, this is the sort of book that is easily plucked off a shelf for flipping-through. It is therefore recommended to institutions completing a set of Osprey reference works, but will be of somewhat less utility to the individual.

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