BOOK REVIEWS


Until now, James Fitzjames, appointed commander in Sir John Franklin’s HMS Erebus in 1845, has been a shadowy historical figure. William Battersby has produced an intriguing biography by drawing on contemporary letters and accounts. He started with only sketchy facts about his subject and discovered that aspects of Fitzjames’ life had been deliberately obfuscated. By profession a British financial advisor, the author was educated as an archaeologist and applied his academic background in meticulous research to construct an engaging picture of the people in Fitzjames’ life. William Battersby has managed to uncover a wealth of detail about his subject including his financial means. His narrative, rich with contemporary observations and the backgrounds of individuals, gives Fitzjames’ associations with others both afloat and ashore a sense of immediacy. This well-written book is a bravura example of what might be termed forensic history and a rewarding read for anyone interested in the social history of the Royal Navy in the first decades after the Napoleonic wars, and of the landed gentry of the time. Recent painstaking work by Ralph Lloyd-Jones published in the journal Polar Record has also cast new light on the crews of the Franklin expedition. While Franklin’s ships and any undiscovered records have thus far eluded successive searches using modern technology, a clearer picture of the backgrounds of the doomed officers and ratings has emerged thanks to Battersby and other researchers.

James Fitzjames was born in Rio de Janeiro in 1813. He was the illegitimate son of Sir James Gambier, a well-connected British ambassador. Battersby uses contemporary letters to sketch the “exotic and sub-tropical life” (p.27) enjoyed by the exiled Portuguese court and the ambassador. By trawling through bank records, the author also discovered that Sir James had serious money problems. When Gambier returned to England in 1815, family connections were used to place his little son with Robert and Louisa Conningham. It was a truly fortuitous arrangement for the little boy who had been baptized James Fitzjames. The Conninghams lived comfortably in an estate in Hertfordshire within a day-trip’s distance from London. They valued education and young James, brought up as a full member of the family, was tutored along with their son William, who was two years younger and became a staunch lifelong friend. At the age of 12, James was taken on as a “volunteer” by one of the Gambier family in command of a frigate. This was the first rung on James’ climb up the naval rank ladder to become an officer. He needed to accumulate sufficient time afloat to qualify for advancement and, due to various circumstances, this proved a challenge. The story of how Robert Conningham who, despite lacking connections, was willing to go to bat for his

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protégé is an interesting sidelight. James was ingenious in exploiting opportunities to make his record of sea time look better than it actually was. Fitzjames was better educated than most of his contemporaries and apparently knew at least two foreign languages when he joined his first ship, a faculty which proved useful for his captains during visits in both South America and the Mediterranean. After six years of service, James had to appear before a board of three commanding officers to be examined in seamanship, navigation and discipline.

Britons were energetically expanding imperial influence around the globe. At home, the industrial revolution was humming, making Britain pre-eminent technologically. These strands were combined in the Euphrates Expedition in 1835-36, a quasi-government venture aimed at developing a new route to India and returning for passengers, mail and high value goods. This was to be achieved by operating paddle steamers on the rivers of what is now Iraq, and eventually linking the upper Euphrates to the Mediterranean, first by rail and later by canal. Fitzjames, now qualified as a Mate, joined this ambitious expedition. Iron-hulled steamers in sections were shipped out to the coast of what is now Syria and moved overland along with their massive boilers and engines to the river system. The challenges to be overcome included attacks by hostile tribesmen, disease and the hazards of using an unknown river route. An adventuresome young German couple, improbably traveling in the Middle East for their honeymoon, joined the expedition as far as India. Battersby tells a compelling story of this exotic episode in Fitzjames’ life. The expedition carried out mapping surveys for which Fitzjames was given a crash course in mathematics. Interestingly, it also carried out magnetic surveys. In Franklin Tragic Hero of Polar Navigation (2009), Andrew Lambert has described the contemporary scientific fixation on geomagnetism. It was thought that precise navigation could be facilitated if the difference between magnetic north (or south) as recorded by a compass with the true directional bearing and the dip of a magnetic needle were accurately shown on charts and maps. James Fitzjames would be responsible for making the magnetic observations during Franklin’s 1845 polar voyage.

On his return from his Mesopotamian adventures (which concluded with a 1,000-mile trek across the desert carrying mail), Fitzjames became a lieutenant and in 1838, completed the new gunnery officer’s course in HMS Excellent in Portsmouth. The Royal Navy had established a school of gunnery in 1830 to improve professional standards for officers and men. James Fitzjames was a member of the first officers’ course with instruction in the theoretical aspects of gunnery included in their syllabus. Fitzjames’ next two appointments were as gunnery officer aboard large ships of the line. A nascent Egypt was on the move against its recent overlord, the Ottoman Empire. The major powers were attempting to restrict Egypt from completely enfeebling the Ottoman Empire. Fitzjames was in the fleet flagship in 1839-40 during a blockade of Beirut and during an opposed landing in Egypt. He next went out to China, again as the gunnery officer of the fleet flagship, in time for the “Opium War” in which Britain used overwhelming force to impose trade arrangements on the Chinese empire. James Fitzjames emerges from contemporary letters and other accounts as a gregarious and high-spirited officer with a bent for theatrical impersonations. A naval colleague and close friend observed how Fitzjames was able to cultivate senior officers. Battersby characterizes him as being “ambitious, determined and [someone who] lived off his wits” (p.46).
Eventually, Fitzjames’ career was favoured by patronage from Sir John Barrow who, as the second lord of the Admiralty, was the senior official responsible for naval administration. Sir John—who was in office for an astonishing period of nearly forty years—occupied this position throughout Fitzjames’ career and became legendary as a promoter of British global exploration. James had first befriended John Barrow, one of Sir John’s sons, in 1838. They became regular correspondents and Battersby cites a “Dear Jim” letter from John Barrow. The author discovered through this correspondence, that in late 1841, when his ship was in Singapore, Fitzjames was able to help George Barrow, another of the second sea lord’s sons, to overcome an undisclosed crisis. James achieved this by advancing money to George, at the time the local colonial secretary. Fitzjames was promptly promoted to the rank of captain and given command of a warship in the Indian Ocean. When he returned to England in late 1844, another polar expedition was being planned and Sir John Barrow intended that Fitzjames would have a prominent role and possibly even lead it. Until Battersby’s relentless research had uncovered the patronage link with the second sea lord, earlier writers had been at a loss to explain why Fitzjames evidential had influential backing. Eventually, Sir John Franklin was appointed to command the expedition, one of the stout veteran ships, HMS Erebus, being strengthened and equipped with a removable screw and railway locomotive engines. Command of her sister vessel, HMS Terror went to Captain Francis Crozier, a veteran of four major polar expeditions recently returned from the Antarctic. Fitzjames became commander in Erebus. Aged 33 that year, he was a far more flamboyant figure than Franklin, who was 60 years old on sailing in May 1845 and Crozier, aged 49. By today’s standards, it’s striking that the officers were not formally appointed to the expedition which would sail in May 1845 until the beginning of March. Battersby covers the preparations for sailing and takes the story as far as July 1845, when Franklin’s ships were last seen by whalers in Baffin Bay.

Dundurn Press has produced an attractive book enhanced by several well-chosen illustrations on glossy paper along with maps which fully cover Fitzjames’ activities in Mesopotamia and China. The Franklin mystery continues to fascinate. In *James Fitzjames: The Mystery Man of the Franklin Expedition* William Battersby has produced an engaging three-dimensional picture of a determined naval officer during a dynamic period of technological transition when the Royal Navy was used to support an assertive British foreign policy as well as carrying out expeditions intended to expand geographic knowledge and scientific research. Highly recommended.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


In the late-eighteenth century, five maritime powers—France, Great Britain, Russia, Spain and the United States—claimed rights variously to visit, study, trade with or exert dominion over the northwest coast and its indigenous peoples. Some of these rights were contested among the powers, some not. This volume sheds light on the most acute and historically significant of their rivalries, the dispute between Spain and
Britain which became known as the Nootka Crisis. The late Freeman Tovell has translated Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra’s 1792 account of his negotiation with George Vancouver, an unsuccessful attempt, as it turned out, to resolve the dispute.

The translation is preceded by a thorough introduction by Tovell, with Robin Inglis and Iris Engstrand, which summarizes previous research on the subject. Spanish anxiety over Russian and British encroachment on the hegemony Spain assumed over the Pacific and its shores led to three reconnaissance voyages, in 1774, 1775 and 1779. Each expedition included acts of possession in the name of Spain at various points along the unsettled coast north of San Francisco. In 1775 Bodega y Quadra carried out the requisite ceremonies as far north as 58°, so that in Spanish eyes, sovereignty had been established over most of the west coast of the Americas by the time the first Briton, James Cook, arrived at Nootka in 1778.

One of the most significant results of Cook’s visit was the realization that a lucrative trade in sea otter pelts could be undertaken between the northwest coasts and China. In the following decade, this led to a flourishing commerce conducted almost entirely by British and American ships, with the Mowachaht people at Nootka one among many important sources of pelts. In 1788, Chief Maquinna permitted trader John Meares to erect a building at the summer village of Yuquot, dubbed by Cook “Friendly Cove”. This action became a key element in Britain’s competing claim to sovereignty. The clash came in 1789, when a Spanish force sent to occupy Nootka encountered British fur traders (though no surviving building) at Friendly Cove, and after an initially friendly interaction, Commander, Esteban José Martínez confiscated the vessels of Meares’ colleague James Colnett, and shipped their officers and crew as prisoners to New Spain.

The story of the Nootka Crisis, of the path followed by Spain and Britain towards increased armament and potential war, of the inevitable involvement of other European powers, and of the Conventions which, after repeated negotiation, eventually defused the affair, have been well told elsewhere. It is a tale of mutual misunderstanding, differing conceptions of colonial rights and methods of claiming them, poor translation and interpretation, poor communication within each of the camps themselves, apparent agreements couched in intentionally ambiguous language, suspicion on the part of each nation about the other’s motives, and sometimes grotesque posturing on the basis of a wounded sense of dignity.

What the new volume adds to our understanding of the whole affair is a direct line for readers of English into Bodega y Quadra’s thinking, so far as he wished his superiors to know, of one of the Commissioners tasked with the detailed implementation, two years after its signing, of the first Convention. Bodega y Quadra’s account describes a fascinating example of extreme diplomacy: high-toned rhetoric, flowery if sincere protestations of eternal friendship, but underneath it all an unyielding conviction of being uniquely in the right and the occasional glimmer of mutual suspicion. It is by no means an easy story to reconstruct without an intimate knowledge of the sources, Spanish, British and American. Aside from attracting the general reader, this translation will broaden the range of scholars who can easily access the documentary evidence for the tangled series of events in question.

One might quibble about the odd detail. The translation sometimes falls foul of false friends, for example: “The entire anchorage has the best proportions” (p.127). The context makes it clear that size and dimension are not at issue; instead, the
The least well-known of the four officers, William Leahy made an important connection early in his naval career. As the commander of a message-carrying gunboat stationed in Washington, DC during the First World War, Leahy established a close friendship with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt. Leahy was impressed with Roosevelt’s knowledge of ship-handling while the future president gained an appreciation for Leahy’s loyalty. After rising to become the chief of naval operations, Leahy was sent by Roosevelt to serve as the American ambassador to Vichy France. In July 1942, the president recalled Leahy to active service and the admiral served as the president’s chief military advisor for the remainder of the war. In this role, Leahy demonstrated a talent for diplomacy and for loyally carrying out the directives of a president with whom he often disagreed on political issues. Borneman emphasizes the growth in Leahy’s responsibilities as Roosevelt’s health faded as the president delegated more and more to the admiral.

One of the many choices that shaped Ernest King’s career was his decision to pursue flight training in the late 1920s, thus making him eligible to command aircraft carriers and other aviation units. Borneman highlights a break in King’s command of the aircraft tender USS *Wright* in 1928, when King directed the salvage work to recover the downed submarine USS *S-4*. This episode, in which King grasped a special high-profile assignment, illustrates King’s focus on planning his career, as well as his commitment to finishing assignments, since King was offered but refused other opportunities during the difficult salvage efforts. After being appointed chief of naval operations in 1942, King worked hard to develop a close working relationship, though not friendship, with the Army chief of staff, General George Marshall.
William Halsey’s early career in destroyers gave him a reputation as an aggressive officer who practiced innovative tactics for torpedo attacks on battleships. Like King, Halsey completed the naval aviator course in order to command an aircraft carrier during the interwar period. During the war, Halsey rose to national prominence for his role in early carrier raids and his command of the South Pacific Area. This prominence led both Nimitz and King to reduce the severity of the findings of two boards of inquiry, convened after Halsey twice led his fleet through Pacific typhoons. The chapters on Halsey allow the author to contrast the admiral’s aggressive style with that of his wartime counterpart, Raymond Spruance, who was known for his detailed advance planning.

Throughout his career, Chester Nimitz proved to be an effective teacher, able to offer criticism while still expressing confidence in his subordinates. The young officer became one of the Navy’s first experts in submarine diesel engines, giving him an appreciation for the role of submarines he utilized as commander of the Pacific Fleet. In describing Nimitz’s wartime service, Borneman draws heavily on Potter’s biography of Nimitz (Borneman relies on secondary sources throughout the work). The author highlights Nimitz’s relationship with King, especially the gradual growth in King’s trust of Nimitz’s judgment. Borneman also emphasizes Nimitz’s abiding commitment to prevent disagreements within the military from becoming public knowledge.

On a more personal level, Borneman sees Leahy and Nimitz as having the most loving marriages, a clear contrast to King’s distant wartime relationship with his wife. The Admirals is written in an engaging style and Borneman has an excellent eye for compelling stories. This book would serve well as a survey of the early-twentieth century U.S. Navy and is recommended to a general audience.

Corbin Williamson
Columbus, Ohio


Daniel Lescallier (1743-1822) was a man of sweeping theory and exact detail. An Anglophile and excellent linguist, he was sent abroad by the French government to gather reconnaissance on the secrets of British success at sea in 1789. He happily went about his task, deploying his considerable charm to gain entrance to the (rather public) secrets of the British Establishment. While the dockyards and arsenals were theoretically out of bounds to foreign interlopers, Lescallier had little difficulty gaining access to private warehouses and factories and, having made acquaintances, was usually able to charm his way into places where he should not have been. When this tactic failed, he could always inspect the men-of-war at anchor. It could be argued from this that one of the principal qualities of eighteenth-century Britain was its confidence and openness; alternatively, it might be postulated that few institutions were both as private (and out-of-bounds) and public (and intended for display) as the ship-of-the-line.

Lescallier’s writings covered Britain, Sweden and Russia. His research in England, which included reports, memoranda, diagrams, tables and sketches, was submitted for the top echelon of the
French military system and so can be taken as direct evidence of the techniques and technologies that he saw at Portsmouth, Gosport, London and Sheffield. His journey to Russia, which took him through the Baltic, might be seen in a rather different light. His accounts of his escapes and escapades in the Tzarist domains perhaps fall within the genre of travel writing, and as was often the case with this literary type, there must be some doubt as to the veracity of the narratives and the reliability of the descriptions. This tends to conform to certain well-known conventions (encounter with overbearing officialdom; travails due to unique geographical conditions; semi-comical escape; etc.).

Lescallier’s descriptions of British mechanical and engineering successes in general, and the Royal Navy in particular, are rather more precise. He provided a great deal of information on the provision of wood for the fleet, with a mass of detail on its cutting, transportation, and storage; he reflected that the French system, driven by numerous private and regional interest groups, could not match the efficiency of its rival across la Manche. Margaret Bradley’s study makes use of the testimonies of other visitors to Albion’s shores, and these writings, with Lescallier’s output, provide a great deal of information on diving bells; the steps necessary for the manufacture of high-quality rope; the construction of permanent and temporary dry docks (London had dozens of ad hoc dry docks along the banks of the Thames; these were old ships whose hulls had been covered with mud and adapted to serve this purpose); the various methods for the sheathing of hulls; the handsome buildings of Portsmouth and Gosport, constructed from bricks (something of a rarity, by inference) and Portland stone.

The thread linking all of these observations was Lescallier’s dismay that “a revolution in the mechanical arts” was taking place in England; the causes and symptoms of this transformation were numerous. His observations were always intelligent. He noted, for instance, that in the Royal Navy civilians were treated with the same respect as officers and military personnel; this ethos of égalité, he argued, was one of the sources of British achievement but its transplantation to France, where hierarchies were firmly entrenched and overstaffing was endemic, would be extremely problematic. This observation seems particularly valuable and prescient in light of the success of the revolutionary armies, although the spirit of the Marseillais proved difficult to transplant to the navy.

Margaret Bradley has done an excellent job in bringing Lescallier’s writings to life, translating and organizing them in a very readable way. Her prose is extremely clear and, given the technical nature of much of the subject matter, contributes significantly to the accessibility and success of the study. The academic context is excellent; although a bit more might have been said about Lescallier in terms of the process of technology transfer. Some account might have been made of the literary genre of travel writing and its conventions. This reviewer was not quite sure whether, in the end, Dr. Bradley believed that Lescallier was indeed a spy or whether some more ambiguous status should be conferred on him. These are, of course, only small gripes.

Lescallier’s writings, taken with Dr. Bradley’s insightful analysis of them, invite a few general conclusions. The first is to underline that the impetus for reform in ancien régime France lay in the perception of British superiority; specifically, it was based on the idea that the Bourbon and Napoleonic regimes enjoyed such geographic and demographic advantages over Georgian Britain that Paris, rather than London, should have been dictating terms in
years such as 1763. Lescallier was a pessimist who believed that Paris’ attempts to implement reform in Toulon or Cherbourg simply made things worse. From the perspective of 2012 it is difficult not to reflect on the fact that Britain was once not just the workshop of the world but its armoury and laboratory as well. Lescallier invites us to think about the Georgian formula for success; it is obvious that part of this formula lay in the balance between private interest and the public good, but this thought inevitably leads to the question of why Britons were so industrious and inventive and why and how these invaluable characteristics and qualities have been misplaced. Finally, at a moment in which a dirigiste French Président and a neo-liberal British prime minister are confronting the phenomenon of national crisis and decline in very different ways, it seems possible to conclude that recurring political characteristics or structures do indeed exist. Daniel Lescallier may still have something to say to us.

Phillip Williams
Valladolid, Spain


With the exception of RMS Titanic, perhaps no historic vessel has been written about as extensively as USS Monitor, the iconic Union ironclad famous for its battle with the Confederate ironclad Virginia at Hampton Roads, Virginia, in 1862. The engagement, relatively early in the American Civil War and resulting in a stalemate, nevertheless was a turning point for naval architecture and warfare, at once rendering wooden-hulled, sail-powered navies virtually obsolete. Within a year of the battle, both ironclads suffered ignominious ends; Virginia being scuttled and burned to prevent it falling into Union hands, and Monitor sinking in an Atlantic storm while under tow. While the history of Monitor and of the Battle of Hampton Roads has been researched, written, re-written, and examined ad nauseum over the years, in USS Monitor: A Historic Ship Completes Its Final Voyage, John Broadwater brings a new dimension to the story. Focusing on the discovery and archaeological documentation of the Monitor wrecksite, and on the recovery of parts of the unique vessel, Broadwater takes the reader along on the last leg of Monitor’s journey from warship to shipwreck to National Marine Sanctuary and museum exhibit. In the process, Broadwater produces a history and a memoir that is a fitting final tribute to Monitor’s place in American naval history and in our shared maritime heritage.

USS Monitor is divided into nine chapters with prologue and epilogue that detail the search for and discovery of the wrecksite, the recovery and conservation of sections of the ship, as well as the development of the nation’s first National Marine Sanctuary at the site of the ironclad’s final resting place, with a bit of history to set the context for Monitor’s importance. The beginning sections are set up in a way that transports the reader in time, with the prologue describing the author’s first personal contact with the shipwreck and setting the tone for the rest of the book in a casual, first-person narrative that is engaging and entertaining. Chapter One describes the loss of Monitor off Cape Hatteras while being towed south in anticipation of further combat, including the dramatic efforts of the tow vessel to try to save the ironclad. The convoluted tale of Monitor’s discovery is presented in Chapter Two, beginning just after World War II and
culminating in the wreck’s positive identification in 1973. Chapter Three is the requisite history chapter, explaining the evolution of naval technology and the race between the North and South to construct an ironclad warship, the momentous battle, and short subsequent lives of Monitor and Virginia. The development of the United States’ first National Marine Sanctuary, conceived as a way to protect Monitor’s gravesite, is the focus of Chapter Four, presenting the story of the official designation, the development of guiding research plans, and an overview of investigations to the shipwreck. Chapter Five describes the evolution of Monitor management strategies, including the controversy surrounding opening the site to recreational divers and their resulting contributions to research and management. The decision to recover portions of Monitor, including her propeller, is discussed in Chapter Six, as well as the extensive cooperation of U.S. Navy divers in these efforts. The recovery story continues in Chapter Seven with the raising of the ironclad’s machinery and in Chapter Eight with the retrieval of the famous revolving turret. Chapter Nine describes the excavation of sediments from inside the turret once it was secured for conservation at the Mariner’s Museum in Virginia, with descriptions of the artefacts encountered, including the remains of two of Monitor’s crewmen. The Epilogue concludes the book with a short discussion of Monitor’s place in history and plans for the exhibition of the turret and other recovered items.

Broadwater’s narrative of his work on Monitor through several decades presents a facet of the ironclad’s life that few know. Although Monitor’s story while afloat is familiar, specifics of the ship’s discovery, investigation, and recovery are not as well-known. In particular, the importance of Navy divers in every step of diving operations is detailed, and the reader comes to understand the author’s appreciation of and respect for their abilities. In fact, perhaps the most significant contribution of this volume is the sharing of Broadwater’s very personal connection with USS Monitor. While relatively unusual in the genre of history books, the first-person style enables Broadwater to reveal to each reader his thoughts, fears, revelations, humour, growing understanding, and sense of wonder regarding this most meaningful of shipwrecks. Sidebars present relevant nuggets of information and additional facts, while lavish and colourful photographs, illustrations and tables make the book as suitable for the coffee table as for the library. Extensive notes and references will lead those interested to sources for additional research. Other than a few insignificant typographical errors, I can find little to criticize. USS Monitor: A Historic Ship Completes Its Final Voyage is an interesting and illuminating read, and will prove a useful and unique reference for anyone interested in Civil War history, naval technology, underwater archaeology, or cultural heritage management, or for anyone who wants a glimpse into the challenges and triumphs of historic shipwreck investigation.

Della Scott-Ireton
Pensacola, Florida


Naval Leadership and Management 1650-1950 is an edited collection of papers presented at the September 2009 conference, Officers and Seamen:
Management in Naval and Maritime History, held at Exeter University in the U.K. to mark the occasion of Professor Michael Duffy’s retirement. Roger Knight’s appreciation of Michael Duffy traces his 40-year academic career, touching on who influenced him and who he, in turn, nurtured. In keeping with the theme of the collection, he highlights Duffy’s interest in and promotion of the study of maritime and naval leadership. Duffy’s publications demonstrate the broad sweep of the man’s pen and the great debt those of us interested in maritime and naval history owe to him. All but two of the 12 contributors (including one of the editors) were either Duffy’s peers at Exeter University, or his students. It is a remarkable tribute to a peer and mentor.

To see this collection as merely a means of honouring an esteemed colleague and teacher, however, would fail to appreciate its importance. Richard Harding’s masterful introduction both summarizes and contextualizes each paper within the historiography of maritime and naval leadership. As he states, the “essays” through their broad range, depth of analysis and use of the archives, “illustrate just how rich and important (the) field...is” (p.24).

The book is divided into four sections based on specific themes within the broader subject. Section one looks at the ‘hero’ and leadership study. Peter Ward examines Admiral Peter Rainer’s eleven years in command of the East Indies Station, 1794-1805. He describes the clash between the local commander meeting the needs arising on station versus following the regulations and rules of the bureaucrats of the Naval Board thousands of miles away in London. Rainer’s skill at taking care of his squadron and his sailors while accomplishing his assigned tasks is a dynamic case study of effective management of resources and navigation of the organizational system. Richard Harding’s article juxtaposes the eighteenth century’s focus on the naval hero, the individual, versus the need to have a trained body of senior and junior officers creating a functional command network, plus the realization of the importance of context in determining which approach is the superior form of leadership.

The second section touches on organizational friction, the area of tensions between levels of leadership aboard ship. Gareth Cole thoroughly describes the changing relationship between the Royal Artillerymen who served afloat and the officers of the Royal Navy between 1792 and 1815. It is a story of the Admiralty tightening its control over the people who come onboard their domain making for a more efficient and orderly command structure. Britt Zerbe provides an insightful look at the relationship between Marine and Royal Navy officers from 1755 to 1797, a decisive period in the development of the place of marines aboard ship. The issue of class and the tension between the two groups is palpable in this essay. Going beyond the leadership aspect of the collection, Zerbe’s article adds to our overall knowledge about marines aboard ships, an area often overlooked in other histories of the British Navy.

The third section deals with the use of power in the navy and touches on the transport agent at Portsmouth and Southampton, 1795-1797 in a paper by Roger Morriss while Mike Farquharson-Roberts addresses the officers and the Invergordon mutiny. Morriss tells the story of Captain Daniel Woodriff (a name familiar to many of us), the agent for transports at Portsmouth and Southampton. Far from the sea scenes of discharged broadsides and tempest, Woodriff and his fellow agents played a critical role keeping the British fleet afloat and ready to fight. Morriss leaves us with a sense that a well-run and financed organization is essential for maritime influence. Farquharson-Roberts
demonstrates what happens when the organization is decimated by funding cuts and the imposition of management systems designed to survey and remove officers rather than nurture them. He examines the years between the end of the First World War and the 1937 Invergordon mutiny. If Morriss’s paper reveals how it ought to work, Farquharson-Roberts’ is the antithesis; what not to do in managing people to create good leaders. Both have relevance to our current times.

A third paper by David J. Starkey deals with the use of incentives among privateering crews to keep them on task. Relying on a variety of sources, he describes how ship masters and owners used different payment schemes (pay and profit sharing in prizes), and insurance offerings for being injured, disabled, or even killed during the voyage, to entice sailors to join a privateer’s crew and stay with it for the entire voyage. Such an apparently ideal system, we learn, is still fraught with tensions between the vessel owners and employed sailors. Contracts outlining profit sharing could be more complex than originally explained to the sailors, ignored by one side, or read in differing ways resulting in riots, work stoppages or court cases. The article reminds us that privateer ships were just like any other workplace where reimbursement for work and owners’ profit goals often clashed.

Where the first three sections deal with the period 1689 to 1932, the fourth covers 1850 to 1939. The topic is the introduction of new training and management techniques to shape officers for the new (technologically advanced and bureaucratic) navy. Oliver Walton describes the development of new systems to handle discipline in the British Navy that evolved during the second half of the nineteenth century. A series of Naval Discipline Acts between 1860-66 and the shift from unlimited to time-limited volunteer service lead to the creation of a systematic approach to problem behaviours which replaced the individual take on discipline and punishment of the naval officers of the earlier era. While this reduced instances of individual tyranny over sailors, it did produce the problem of rigid adherence to systematic procedure when a more personal touch would have been appropriate. Mary Jones examines the clash of the old independent-oriented leadership with a peacetime-fostered hierarchical system of management. She traces the development in three phases from 1860 through to the Battle of Jutland in 1916. The outcome is judged to be a disaster for the corporate approach of the new system. The final essay by Elinor Romans addresses the training of midshipmen in the inter-war years. Romans proposes that this training was to instill the “qualities...of...seamanship, leadership and gentlemanliness” (p.173). Academic course work, service afloat and a limited form of mentorship (though Romans does not use this term) appear to be the positive elements in the training. An absence of tactical and strategic training and a reduction of “boat work” are seen as shortcomings, but she concludes that these did not appear to impede the good performance of British naval officers during peace and war.

While the title offers both “naval” and “maritime” as the subject areas for leadership and management study, only one of the ten articles deals with a non-British naval focus. Starkey’s work on privateering is the only one that falls outside the navy focus (in a way, not that far). This probably reflects a need for more research in the non-naval side of maritime management and leadership. While the title indicates a time span of 1650 to 1950, the essays are tipped heavily to the long eighteenth century. The only
The strengths of this book are the quality of these papers and the promotion of the study of leadership aboard ship. Each address the influence of developments on sailors (and others found afloat, i.e. marines and artillery men) and the evolution of management ideas over time. This is the other side of naval and maritime history from the big battles, the heroes who make it all happen and the grand movement of fleets, but, it is at the heart of how well a ship is worked and the nature of life afloat. If the well-earned praise in the opening appreciation brings a tear to the honouree’s eye, it is the high quality of this collection that will draw it down his cheek.

Thomas Malcolmson
North York, Ontario


Kevin Dougherty offers a concise overview of Union coastal operations and their strategic importance during the Civil War. He focuses on the cooperation between the army and navy to secure key points along the Confederate coast line. The Navy Board or Blockade Board, convened in June 1861 by Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, outlined a strategy very much in line with what the author refers to as the elements of operational design. Rather than a haphazard series of attacks, the tactics employed to implement the naval blockade were well planned and ahead of their time. This work offers the perspective that the nascent Navy Board, with no prescribed military doctrine, laid the groundwork for modern joint operations. Union triumphs generally outweighed a series of shortcomings, and Dougherty summarizes each incursion along with their effect on the overall broad strategy.

Among the components essential to large operations are decisive points. The reader is directed to Carl von Clausewitz’s “center of gravity” concept as “the point at which all our energies should be projected (p.185).” The centre of gravity for the U.S. Navy was to stop the Confederacy’s ability to engage in foreign commerce. This would not be easy with over 3,500 miles of coastline to guard. The Navy board identified ten anchorages with access to rail and water routes inland. Union coastal strategy targeted Norfolk, Virginia; New Bern and Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Fernandina, Jacksonville, and Pensacola, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; and
New Orleans, Louisiana. Each succession of captured ports established lines of operations to coordinate naval activities, another reference to modern military tenet. While these direct attacks did a great deal in bolstering the blockade, the indirect implications for the Confederate war effort were just as profound.

The ripple effects of the early successful Union invasions were tremendous. Confederate coastal forces were forced to move inland after the capture of Port Royal, South Carolina, in November 1861, allowing for a relatively easy takeover of Fernandina and Jacksonville by amphibious assault. Forts Jackson and St. Philip capitulated without a direct assault once Commodore David Farragut’s fleet sailed past and secured New Orleans. Pensacola was abandoned without a fight by Confederate forces after a mere Union feint on Mobile, Alabama. General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was indirectly affected as well, especially after the capture of New Bern and its vital railroad junction. Confederate strategy shifted in the wake of the Union momentum along their shoreline, and they reinforced at optimum areas of defense. Dougherty purports that at this point Federal operations achieved operational reach, which resulted in culmination or “the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender (p.194).”

Battles at Galveston and Charleston were examples of this culmination. Galveston became the only port retaken by the Confederacy due to poor Union defenses, while Charleston would never be taken by amphibious assault. Charleston became an obsession for Welles who believed it could be taken with a fleet of monitors. Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont disagreed, and pointed out that, at that point in the war, the capture of the “cradle of secession” would do little to increase the integrity of the blockade—stick to end states and objectives.

Despite mostly sound tactics, the author points to a number of shortcomings, which were to be expected in coordinating such large scale operations. One, of course, was inter-service cooperation. The efforts to take Fort Fisher illustrate just how crucial this was. The first attempt failed due to a volatile relationship between Major General Benjamin Butler and Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter. The second attack was successful after Butler was replaced by Major General Alfred Terry. Another criticism is that many of the successful assaults were not exploited to their full potential. In many instances, occupying forces did not move to contain vital junctions that were in easy reach. One can easily understand these deficiencies given the lack of any formal training for amphibious operations and the shifting priorities of the war effort.

Dougherty does a superb job in demonstrating how the Navy Board unwittingly pioneered many of the basic policies of modern day military coalitions. The book is supplemented with short biographies, both military and civilian, of key Federal and Confederate leaders. This is a great starting point for the novice, as well as a review, and perhaps a new perspective, for the more seasoned Civil War naval enthusiast. Academicians may quibble with the scant use of primary sources and the rehashing of some old arguments. Nonetheless, Dougherty gives the Federal naval blockade and its planners their due, and helps to synthesize what can appear to be a haphazard series of events.

William Whyte
Nazareth, Pennsylvania

Up until the later Middle Ages, the seas around England’s coasts were an insurmountable barrier to the exchange of goods and to the pursuit of war. This fundamental insularity affected not only the development of the population, but it also limited England’s subsequent relationship to Europe.

Richard Gorski is the Philip Nicholas Memorial Lecturer in Maritime History at Hull University and assistant director of the university’s Maritime Historical Studies Centre. He recently published his research into the administration of nineteenth-century merchant shipping and is currently teaching widely, editing and reviewing. Gorski’s research into the role of the sea in medieval England from 1200 to 1500 required specialist technologies and, in October 2008, he brought together eight academics, a mix of maritime historians and early-career scholars, to address a conference on economic and maritime history at Rye, West Sussex, site of one of the ancient Cinque Ports.

Roles of the Sea in Medieval England is another of an ad-hoc series from Boydell Press on the theme of England’s relation towards the sea in the Middle Ages, some of which have been reviewed in this journal. It contains various edited conference papers covering subjects such as the roles of the sea, ship design and construction, the relation of the Cinque Ports to the Crown and to each other, piracy, and the Anglo-Hanseatic league—topics that Gorski believes have, until now, been unjustly neglected by maritime historians.

A common objective of each chapter is to show how the seas were zones of opportunity and to consider how England found a role for the sea to contribute to the maritime historiography of the fourteenth century. The predominant sea powers of Northern Europe at the time were the Flemings, the Hanseatic League and the King of Norway. Although the feudal rights of English kings straddled the English Channel, their position was weakened because such naval force as was available to them was provided at the discretion of the semi-autonomous Cinque Ports who could be called upon to supply naval services for the King’s use. This was a maritime confederation in Kent and Sussex dating from at least the twelfth century that remained a formidable maritime power until Tudor times.

The chapters also examine the extent to which England was able exploit the sea around its coast and include a social history of English seamen in the fifteenth century and the development of an early modern navy alongside a medieval shipping industry. Equally important is the clear explanation of why the seas were not only barriers, but also often served as highways of communication, exchange and transport as well as generating wealth and being an intrinsic aspect of warfare and piracy. They also demonstrate the sophisticated, but not infallible, contemporary methods of raising money for ships, men and materiel for war before England possessed a permanent navy. In addition, they discuss the role of local communities in the archipelago, its neighbouring islands and the intervening seas, together with chapters on language contact, the Vikings, Anglo-Saxons, nautical travel in the Old English Exodus and East Anglia.

Gorski makes the point that, as a subject area with its own institutional basis and a significant critical mass, maritime history is relatively young. Not all readers will agree with his claim that because
maritime historians share a common interest in the oceans and their impact on the historical process, they have not suffered the same identity crises that have afflicted other niche specialists. On the contrary, they may feel that the authors of these essays have shown that maritime history benefits when it is further broken down into its most persistent and important thematic priorities.

Mindful that England’s maritime frontiers raised serious issues of jurisdiction and security, this book explores many key roles performed by the sea. Foremost among them is war, the infrastructure, logistics and politics. The personnel of English seaborne expeditions are also assessed, most notably for the period of the Hundred Years War.

Focusing on a region much smaller than the “Atlantic world,” and thus more coherent, Gorski equates the role of the sea with the uses to which it was put by past societies. The result is a book that encourages scholars to consider how England’s insularity affected its relationship with the sea in the later middle-ages and influenced the formation of a collective English identity.

Roles of the Sea in Medieval England raises many serious issues of jurisdiction and security. Despite being rather expensive, it deserves to be on the shelves of anyone with an interest in early naval history, the origins of European trade, the building of empires and exploration, the histories of navigation and cartography, and the origins of seaborne and oceanic migration.

Michael Clark
London, England


A sizeable volume, the Dictionary of British Naval Battles provides a detailed list of naval engagements in which British naval vessels were involved. Grainger has made an impressive attempt to make the volume as comprehensively British as possible, including the component nations of the British Isles prior to the 1707 union, as well as the naval forces of the British Empire and Commonwealth until 1945. He admits that flexible definitions of “British” and “naval” limits were required. To this end, the Dictionary does not include battles involving British privateers, ships sunk by aircraft outside of a larger battle, or sinking of merchant vessels by submarines.

The sheer number of engagements that Grainger has included is impressive and indicates the depth of the research. Battles are organized alphabetically in four main categories, albeit all in the same listing. First, and most extensive, are the battles listed by the name of the ship involved. If multiple ships are involved, the engagement is listed by the name of the vessel that is lowest alphabetically. The second group are geographic areas, with subsequent engagements arranged chronologically. The third category is battles that are best known by a popular or official nickname such as Holmes’ Bonfire or the Battle of Jutland. The final category is engagements that were fought by British squadrons and identified as such; for example, two engagements fought during the English Civil War by Blake’s Squadron. Despite this rather complex system of organization, individual conflicts are easily found, thanks to a comprehensive index.

This is a handy, quick-reference guide for anybody interested in the operational history of the Royal Navy, and is most useful when a quick synopsis of a battle or engagement is required. Although
the author does not provide in-depth discussion of any of the battles, references are always provided to secondary or primary sources if more information is needed. Although costly, *The Dictionary of British Naval Battles* is highly recommended.

Sam McLean
Greenwich, England


Ancient history is, or should be, of abiding interest to all who have any concern with where we came from and the roots of the society in which we live. Yet it is, for most historians let alone ordinary individuals, dare I say, a *tabula rasa*. No doubt the rationale for disinterest in the ancient world is that it is remote and of no immediate relevance in today’s robustly practical age. What lessons from a period so long ago can be of any use in our current lives, plagued as we are, to narrow the discussion, with a bewildering array of challenges in the geopolitical sphere alone?

John Hale, a classics professor at the University of Louisville, has sought to answer the question of the relevance of ancient history to our modern world and has succeeded brilliantly. Hale is also a marine archaeologist, who has spent a significant proportion of his career searching for ancient warships in the waters of Greece and the Mediterranean. This has included significant work on establishing the mechanics of how the trireme was propelled by its banks of oarsmen, as well as related work on Viking longships.

This book, his first, was triggered by an offhand comment made by the great ancient historian, Donald Kagan, back in Hale’s undergraduate days at Yale in 1969. Kagan challenged him to look at Athenian history “from the vantage point of a rower’s bench.” Hale was, and is, a rower and his interest in how the Athenian navy affected the city and all its accomplishments, has proven a lifelong quest. We are the beneficiaries of his erudition.

The rower’s approach Hale adopted is, indeed, unique since the story of Athens from the days of the Persian Wars (490-480s B.C.) to its ultimate eclipse at the hands of the Macedonians in the 320s BC is well-trodden ground. At the start of this period, Athens and Sparta dominated the Greek world and led the resistance to Persia. The battle of Thermopylae, the great Spartan delaying tactic, provided the space for the Athenian triumph of Salamis at sea. The next year at Plataea, the Persians were finally defeated and Greek independence restored. It was an astonishing outcome given the imbalance in strength between the two protagonists. Key was the Athenian navy, which destroyed the Persian navy at Salamis and permitted the harrying of their army back across the Hellespont. Thereafter, conflict with Persia and the creation of an Athenian Empire dominated the following decades until the disastrous Peloponnesian War of the 431–404 B.C., which witnessed the great city’s eclipse.

Hale’s thesis is that the effort involved in creating Athens’ navy was central to its political development. The democracy that evolved in the Greek city states is the root of our own democratic traditions. The injustices endemic to those city states may, however, mar their claim to a modern definition of democracy, which included elements such as the narrow definition of “citizens” with votes, the institution of slavery and the uneven treatment of outsiders. Such modern inequities acknowledged, the Greek city
states, Athens paramount among them, used the democratically determined approval and support of its citizens for the first time in the world’s history to manage the huge cost of the navy, as well as its manning and leadership. Naval power, in the decades after the Persian wars, allowed Athens to create and maintain its empire and dominance over its sister Greek city states. The apogee was clearly in the first decades after the triumph over Persia, and the seeds of eclipse planted as an outcome of Athens’ defeat at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Alexander the Great and his Macedonian successors finished the job.

I have two observations. First, despite being of naval background myself, the notion that the navy was responsible for democracy, while congenial, is overstated. It rather reminds me of Arthur Herman’s To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World and Peter Padfield’s Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World, which posits similar influence to the good works of the Royal Navy. Fundamentally, the identification of a single factor leading to something as diffuse and complex as democracy is not entirely convincing.

Second, the chief difficulty for any historian of the classical world is the matter of sources. These are very limited with little likelihood of additional literary material coming to light (never say never!). Persian sources are particularly thin, and much Greek is very narrow in terms of perspective. Hale, however, reminds us all that archaeology is continually filling in gaps and providing additional material. His personal effort at finding the wreck of a trireme somewhere in the Aegean is a case in point. While this ambition is still to be realized, he has gleaned much from the seabed in recent decades. One hopes that Hale’s efforts are rewarded with the finding of his own Holy Grail.

So what are the lessons that Hale gleans from his examination of the Athenian navy? Perhaps the two most salient for our own time are the matters of hubris and financial over-extension. We today are equally prone to both fatal tendencies, but they can be mitigated with due respect and consultation with citizens, hopefully providing optimal solutions to modern troubles. This was not easy to accomplish in the Athens of Pericles, and it is no easier today.

I unreservedly recommend this book. Hale has successfully, energetically and vividly told the story of Athens at its peak and the development of its form of democracy. Perhaps the story’s emphasis on the role of the navy in this is somewhat overstated, but the argument is well done and compelling. His book is well worth acquiring.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


David Hobbs has written a comprehensive history of the British Pacific Fleet’s (BPF) service from 1944 through 1946. Adding to previous works on the BPF by Nicholas Sarantakes (Allies Against the Rising Sun), Peter Smith (Task Force 57), and John Winton (The Forgotten Fleet), Hobbs leaves few stones unturned in his account of British naval power in the last stages of the Second World War in the Pacific. As the war against Germany required fewer and fewer naval resources, the Royal Navy sent a task force of aircraft carriers and escorts to assist the vast American carrier forces operating in the Pacific in 1945.
Beginning with the Royal Navy’s pre-war and wartime background in carrier operations, Hobbs emphasizes the role of American aircraft and American aircraft carriers in the development of British naval aviation. Turning to the fleet itself, the work covers the early air strikes against targets in Southeast Asia and the training these strikes provided for the British, who lacked the U.S. Navy’s years of experience in long-range carrier warfare. As the fleet moved from the Indian Ocean to Australia to prepare for operations off Okinawa, the British faced significant logistical challenges. Lacking the Americans’ purpose-built supply ships, the British had to adapt existing merchant ships for supply service. These modifications were necessary if the BPF was to follow American practice, whereby carriers remained at sea and in operation for weeks at a time. Hobbs also emphasizes the critical support role played by Australia in providing dry docks and airfields to support the BPF’s operations.

Even after logistical hurdles were cleared, the BPF was still small by American standards. Whereas an American force of four aircraft carriers typically carried around 320 aircraft, the four-carrier-strong BPF only carried 220. Throughout the work, the reader is impressed by the BPF’s dependence on others for help. American submarines provided rescue services for downed British pilots, the Royal Air Force flew emergency parts from Australia to forward operating bases in the Admiralty Islands, and the U.S. Navy provided warship repair and replenishment services to supplement British arrangements.

During the invasion of Okinawa in the summer of 1945, the BPF supported American operations on the island by attacking nearby Japanese airfields. The author demonstrates that American naval commanders gradually grew more accustomed to operating with the British, with the result that by July the BPF was operating as another American carrier group under direct American control. After Japan’s surrender, the BPF played a major role in repatriating Allied prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians interned by the Japanese from captivity to their homes, especially Australia. This section provides a clear historical analysis of the role of naval power during the transition from war to peace time.

Hobbs effectively uses secondary and primary sources in constructing his narrative. In particular, the author benefited from David Brown’s research in U.S. Navy archives as well as after-action reports, intelligence reports, and POW interrogations. This allows the reader to view the narrative through different lenses both during combat and after. The use of USN liaison officer reports provides a running American commentary on the BPF’s operations. Clear maps help orient the reader throughout the text, while plentiful photographs, primarily from the author’s personal connection, illustrate all aspects of the BPF’s operations. Numerous appendices provide statistical data on the BPF, though many footnotes are explanatory rather than providing citation information.

Hobbs clearly situates the BPF within the realm of Anglo-American naval relations during the Second World War, though he might have commented on the BPF’s implications for the broader alliance between the two nations. Surprisingly, the bibliography does not include the most recent major work on the BPF, Nicholas Sarantakes’ 2009 *Allies Against the Rising Sun*. In conclusion, the author argues that the significance of the BPF was in the development of the Royal Navy, rather than the actual outcome of the war in the Pacific. The fleet provided the Royal Navy with extensive experience in long-range strike
warfare from aircraft carriers, the model for Cold War naval power projection.

Corbin Williamson
Columbus, Ohio


This year’s issue of the important annual *Warship* contains the mixture of articles on naval subjects, modern as well as historic, we have come to expect. In the previous two issues, Conrad Waters contributed articles on modern air defense escorts (2010) and amphibious assault ships (2011). This year he deals with submarines with non-nuclear air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. These originated with German Second World War developments using concentrated hydrogen peroxide while the U.K. built two experimental units of this type in the post-war period. The Germans were also working on closed-cycle diesels which the Soviet Union adopted for some small submarines; but with the U.S. development of nuclear propulsion, the American, Russian, French and British navies abandoned other air-independent forms. Nuclear power is not, however, the choice of smaller navies and research on AIP continued. There are now three basic systems; the Sterling Cycle (Swedish), the MESMA developed in France, principally for export, which can be added to existing boats, and the German Siemens system. Many minor navies have acquired one or other of these types and others intend to, but not Canada. It should be noted that the endurance of these systems is a matter of weeks rather than virtually unlimited, as in nuclear submarines.

The French *Marine Nationale* features quite prominently in this year’s issue with four separate items. The editor describes two naval auxiliaries completed in the early 1930s. *Jules Verne* was a small depot ship intended to support coastal submarines and, later, amphibious craft, while *Le Gladiateur* was a net-layer and could also lay mines. The latter was scuttled at Toulon in November 1942 along with the rest of the French fleet there when the Germans occupied the port, but *Jules Verne* survived the war. One of the main articles in the issue is the detailed description of the design and service of the battleship *Gaulois* of the *Charlemagne* class, completed in 1899. In the 2010 issue, author Philippe Caresse offered a similar treatment of the slightly-later battleship *Suffren*. Both ships were torpedoed and sunk by German U-boats during the First World War. A third article, by John Spenser, *Conduite du Tir* Part 2, 1900-1913, follows Part 1, published in *Warship* 2010, which covered French developments in naval fire control equipment to 1900. While the *Marine Nationale* in 1900 was ahead of the field in many ways and continued to be second to none in its accuracy and rate of fire, it was quite astonished at the ranges at which British and German ships engaged each other in the wartime encounters of the Falklands and the Dogger Bank in 1914 and 1915. Neither the elevation of the guns nor the instrumentation was designed for such long-range fire. During and after the war, there was much catching up to do. In yet another *Marine Nationale* item entitled “The Limits of Naval Power,” Colin Jones examines the ineffective French naval operations during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71.

Last year, Stephen McLaughlin described the very early Russian ironclads of the “Pervenets” class and this year he deals with the “Uragan” class of American-type monitors from the same era. There is much detail and many photographs of these
ten little ironclads which were soon obsolete but endured in subsidiary roles. Other articles describing ship classes are on the Japanese “Kongo” class battlecruisers by Hans Lengerer, and the nineteenth-century British second-class cruisers of the “Talbot” class by Keith McBride; but Warship does not concern itself solely with large and important ships. Mark Briggs tells the story of the little torpedo boat TB 191, purchased by the Australian colony of Tasmania in 1884 to defend the approaches to Hobart from a possible raid by a foreign cruiser; an example of local initiative.

Mike Williams revisits the Battle of Leyte Gulf from the point of view of the Japanese light cruiser Yahagi which survived this battle only to be lost with the Yamato on 7 April 1945, the last sortie of the Imperial Japanese navy. Another loss described is of the Italian armoured cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi in the Adriatic. It was torpedoed by the small Austrian submarine Ub 4 on 18 July 1915. The wreck of the Garibaldi has been found and photographed.

On the technical side, a group of authors (Johnston, Newman and Buxton) has looked into the British industrial infrastructure behind the building of the Dreadnought fleet in the ten years from 1906 to 1916, describing the principal firms, their capabilities and locations. As D. K. Brown has described elsewhere, much of this was dismantled in the 1920s and 30s compounding the difficulty of preparing for the second conflict of 1939-45.

In addition to these articles, there are the usual sections of Warship Notes (short items) reviews of the naval books of the year and a photo gallery. All items in the book are comprehensively researched and illustrated with outstanding photographs, diagrams and plans, especially the major articles. This makes the information presented much more interesting and valuable than the list of subjects indicates and there is something to appeal to a wide variety of historians and other enthusiasts.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Our understanding of the pre-First World War Royal Navy has been significantly revised over the past quarter-century. Authors such as Jon Sumida, Andrew Gordon, and John Brooks have all contributed to this change, but the most revisionist-minded of the historians of this period is Nicholas Lambert. In his previous work, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, Lambert argued that the famous Dreadnought revolution was all a mistake— if Sir John Fisher had been able to remain in charge of the Admiralty, or had been succeeded by a trustworthy protégé, the Royal Navy would have placed greater emphasis in constructing battle cruisers and submarines instead of dreadnought battleships. The navy’s focus would have been on coastal defence and trade protection instead of the creation of a powerful battle fleet.

Lambert’s newest work seeks both to reinforce that idea and expand on it. Planning Armageddon is essentially two books in one. The first details pre-war planning within the Admiralty, arguing that Fisher’s goal was to win a war against Germany by economic strangulation, to implement a total blockade of maritime trade between the German Empire and the rest of the world. Thus, pre-war naval planning under Fisher had nothing to do
with what we think of in traditional naval planning terms—where to attack, what kind of battle fleet to construct, and so on—and everything to do with trade statistics and the flow of goods and commerce. In essence, pre-war naval planning under Fisher was another of his revolutions—win the war at sea without ever having to fire a shot. To a navy and a public more in tune with the exploits of Nelson and other great British fighting admirals, this would have been unthinkable.

The second book goes far beyond naval affairs and is a scathing analysis of the British Cabinet during the first two years of the war. Lambert details how, because of the conflicting policies and concerns of various competing factions within the government—the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office—the navy’s pre-war planning was abandoned. Instead, for nearly two years, naval strategy vacillated between blockade and diversionary attacks in the Baltic or, as eventually attempted, the Dardanelles. This section is probably the more impressive of the two, requiring Lambert to juggle several topics at once.

Lambert’s research is impressive, but suffers from one weakness not of his making. Many crucial documents were destroyed by the British government and are, therefore, unavailable to confirm or refute Lambert’s conclusions. In a number of places, he is forced to infer the contents of a key memorandum based on correspondence about it. It is plausible, but not necessarily conclusive.

His portrayal of Winston Churchill is uneven—sometimes, Churchill is the dynamic driving force behind significant changes in Admiralty and government policy; at other times, Churchill is the pliable puppet of others who would seek to advance their own projects. This seems most apparent when Lambert delves into questions of mining the North Sea and the German ports.

Lambert is far more critical of the Prime Minister, Henry H. Asquith. He depicts Asquith as a man who never met a decision he wanted to make; given enough time, most problems would sort themselves out without the Prime Minister having to choose sides. This may have been a positive in the pre-war Cabinet with its obvious internal divisions, but it was far more dangerous when the Admiralty, Foreign Office, and Board of Trade pursued opposite and even contradictory policies. (At one point, it was even proposed that the blockade of Germany be loosened to allow only luxury goods to be traded with Germany; the hope was that German spending would go towards these frivolities instead of the war effort.)

Again, Lambert is far more positive in his view of Fisher. In effect, Lambert argues that Fisher and a few others created a master plan for war against Germany that promised total victory with no need for a ‘Continental Commitment’. Had this plan been implemented, there would not have been a New Army, the Somme, or the need for conscription. What Lambert ignores, or is unable to explain effectively, is Fisher’s plan in late 1914 to construct the three light-draft battle cruisers *Courageous*, *Furious*, and *Glorious*. If Fisher was not interested in any Baltic invasion schemes, as Lambert asserts, what purpose would these warships serve?

Ultimately, Lambert’s thesis is highly compelling but not always convincing. This book is going to spark a lot of discussion, and it is certainly to be hoped that it is the first word, not the last, on the subject. Students of the Royal Navy, of British political and economic history, and of international law would all be well-served by reading this book. Lambert’s depth of research makes it a treasure-trove to be mined thoroughly. He has produced another work that scholars, regardless of
whether they agree with or dispute Lambert’s conclusions, will need to have at hand for many years to come.

Finally, a personal note: while it can be a gratifying experience to see your own work mentioned favourably in a book, that experience quickly becomes humbling when you realize your name has been spelled wrong in the citation. (p.514, note 30)

David H. Olivier
Brantford, Ontario


Dr. Paul Lee’s background as a nuclear physicist and computer engineer portends the style of the book that he wrote and self-published in 2008 (with yearly revisions in 2009, 2010 and 2011). His work is a collection of carefully documented details and suppositions related to the steamer *California* and the RMS *Titanic*.

This book is one of dozens published on or around the one hundredth anniversary of the loss of *Titanic*, but is clearly unique. The others discuss the deficiencies of the vessel, its lack of safety precautions, and the poor judgment of the officers who allowed the ship to steam at 20 knots through an ice field, the events of its sinking, and those who lost their lives. Still others examine individual stories of those few who were saved, and the hero vessel, the SS *Carpathia* that picked up survivors in lifeboats and returned them to the United States. Other vessels came upon the horrendous scene too late to help. Lee’s book concentrates upon the actions or inactions of SS *California*, the vessel that was believed to be close to the sinking *Titanic*, but either ignored the distress signals or was very slow to respond.

On the night of Sunday, 14 April 1912, the *California* was steaming from London to Boston when ice was encountered. At 2221 (ship time) Captain Stanley Lord ordered the *California* to cut its engines, not an unusual procedure when encountering ice. *California* came to rest at the edge of an ice field that was believed to stretch about 30 miles north to south. Previous shipping had warned about its existence and extent. Lord had his wireless operator send out the message that *California* was stopped and surrounded by ice, a precaution for other vessels in the area. The information was transmitted at 2300 ship’s time.

Captain Lord, aware that *Titanic* was in the vicinity, retired after a seventeen-hour day. He did not know the ill-fated ocean liner’s exact position. An officer of the watch and an apprentice saw low-lying rockets to the SSE of *California* after midnight. Around that time, they received an SOS indicating that *Titanic* was in distress and its position was to the SSW. *Titanic*’s SOS position and *California*’s stop position could not both be correct. Subsequent boards of inquiry determined that *California*’s reported position was inaccurate. Sextant position determinations are good, but not nearly as precise as those from modern GPS instruments. American and British officials concluded that *California* was likely the “Mystery Ship” reportedly seen within five miles of the sinking *Titanic*. It became “The Indifferent Stranger” that did not respond to the unfolding disaster as required by maritime law, but receded into the darkness. As a result, Captain Lord was asked to resign his commission from the Leyland Steamship Line. *Titanic*’s wreckage was found 73 years later, 13 miles to the east of the
transmitted co-ordinates, on a line SSE of where the *Californian* claimed to be.

Many lives were needlessly lost, but Lee wanted to know how this could have happened. Was the captain of the *Californian* incompetent or so overbearing toward his crew that they were afraid to countermand his story of the events? Were the distress rockets that *Titanic* fired as visible at sea as claimed? Was the *Californian*’s radioman not on duty as claimed? Was the *Californian* not underway in the ice field as claimed? Was the captain of *Californian* a coward, a liar or simply confused by so many stories about the disaster that his memory became compromised?

The story of the *Californian* received attention from reporters during the American and British inquiries, but very little from historians or those who have written more popular accounts of the *Titanic* disaster. Lee’s book has compensated for this deficiency in a thorough way with transcripts of testimony by the *Californian*’s captain, officers and crew, technical illustrations, maps and charts, appendices, notes, and a bibliography including websites for the reader who might like additional background information. The author’s skillful and scholarly narrative relates many official records, related documents, testimonies of the people involved, plus some maritime-related physics that might account for the events at sea on that night. All this information produces a deluge. Somewhat like the flood that engulfed *Titanic*, the abundance of post-disaster legal and emotional debris makes it difficult to discern the crucial facts from the fiction of the case.

The usually thorough Lee did not mention the 1995 article by Fergus Wood published in *The Journal of Coastal Research* about the special astronomical circumstances that occurred on 4 January 1912 where the earth and moon were in close proximity and the earth and the sun was near their perihelion thus creating abnormally high tides. These tides, in turn, freed grounded icebergs that greatly augmented the ice fields in the Atlantic that spring. He also failed to discuss the springtime optical illusions or mirages that form when warm air flows over an extremely cold sea that can distort the sighting of distant objects, the likely atmospheric conditions of that fateful April night. This is a meticulous and highly detailed work, but it is inconclusive. It is a book for *Titanic* aficionados, a reference book for those who still want to probe one more event that occurred during this disaster that has captured the imagination of so many.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


This award-winning book is about sailing ships, illustrations of ships and the vast spaces of the world’s distant oceans. From the mid-fifteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, European sailors drove their ships across the Atlantic Ocean to the New World and beyond, and in so doing, unwittingly began the process of globalization that preoccupies so many of today’s pundits.

Searching for riches in many forms, European explorers seized exotic commodities, kidnapped peoples, forced them into slavery, and also integrated markets where none had existed before. Such a topic is truly worthy of much study and serious thought. Though this book cannot be said to reflect either, it does reveal the author’s hard work and
commitment historical research and to artistic excellence. The illustrations are the raison d’être of this book.

Gordon Miller is a distinguished marine artist whose work, extending over several decades, may be found in the Anthropology Museum of the University of British Columbia, the Vancouver Marine Museum, of which he was chief designer, and the Museum of Civilization in Ottawa/Gatineau. He has also illustrated articles in the Canadian Geographic Magazine and National Geographic Magazine. He is committed to illustrating historic ships accurately. The book’s focus, then, is on the more than 90 coloured illustrations that grace its pages. Miller has selected ships from before the great age of exploration, beginning with the Norse voyages, moving through the northern European vessels of the Hanseatic League, before examining the ships and voyages of late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century explorers: Vasco da Gama, Christopher Columbus and John Cabot. Aiming for authenticity above all, Miller clearly loves all ships whether large or small.

Voyages to the New World is very idiosyncratic. There are representative images of early voyages to America but, despite trying to include something for everyone, the author’s emphasis is on Pacific Ocean voyages, particularly those venturing to the northwest coast of North America. Paintings of the Dutch, English and Spanish searches for Terra Australis Incognita are presented, as are those of Cook off Hawaii and Nootka Sound and La Pérouse off southeastern Alaska. The greatest number of paintings, however, feature Spanish, English, Russian and American vessels off the west coast of North America. Drake’s circumnavigation of the globe is represented by four paintings, but pride of place must go to those illustrating the explorations of the Spanish who, operating from their naval establishment at San Blas, Mexico, founded San Diego, Monterey, San Francisco and Nootka, and pushed up to Alaska. Beginning in 1767, and for thirty years afterwards, Spanish-built ships sailed north along the coast of America in response to news that the Russians had expanded across the Pacific and were building fur trading posts down the American northwest coast. Here, the author’s paintings and exploration narratives come into their own, whether they be the “Santiago on the Columbia River bar,” the “Malespina expedition in Yakutat Bay,” or the charming “Santa Saturina and longboat in the Guemes Channel.” Although the British refused to recognize many Spanish claims, Miller still illustrates their ships and activities on the northwest coast. Some American ships are also depicted, including the Adventure, being launched in Clayquot Sound in 1792. The appearance of the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Beaver in 1836, the first steam-powered vessel on the northwest coast, ended sail’s monopoly, but the last commercial sailing ship left the Strait of Juan de Fuca only 110 years later. Miller painted both.

Voyages to the New World and Beyond is intended for a specialized audience, but it is a bit of a puzzle to know which one. The author’s narrative which accompanies the paintings touches on the great themes of maritime history: the development of new technology, the risks and challenges of sailing unknown waters, the rise and fall of European empires, life at sea, and the discovery of new lands, peoples and products, but it contains few insights or new knowledge for scholars, particularly as it lacks any scholarly apparatus. There is, however, a useful appendix of plans for 21 historical vessels illustrated in this book which indicates the author’s concern for accuracy. Miller either copied original plans, if they existed, or used recent research by historians and naval architects;
where there were no plans, he developed them from known dimensions using formulae followed by contemporary shipwrights. Nevertheless, the book is presented without notes or references of any kind. It reveals the artist’s personal interest in the history of the opening the northwest coast of America and his commitment to carefully rendering the ships involved. It will attract anyone living on the Pacific west coast or having an interest in its history during the age of sail. The book ought also to appeal to anyone interested in the career of an excellent marine artist. With more than 90 very well executed, dynamic coloured illustrations, it is well worth the price of $55.00.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario


*Captain’s Wife* is the seventh in a series of seafaring memoirs published in Great Britain that cover the years 1700 to 1900, and the first by an American woman, Abby Jane Morrell. Her memoir was first published in 1833 by Harper in New York City. The original manuscript was much longer than the current version which has been abridged and edited by Vincent McInerny. Abby’s husband also wrote an account of their voyage but hers was more truthful and realistic.

As the daughter of a sea captain, Abby Jane Morrell was well acquainted with the ocean and the long absences of her father and husband, who were away for months and years at a time. Married in 1824, her husband, Benjamin took two long seal-hunting voyages during the first five years of their marriage. In 1829, at the age twenty, Abby decided to leave her young son and accompany her husband to the South Seas in his ship, the *Antarctic*, despite his strong initial opposition. She was away for two years. During the long days at sea with little to do, she kept a journal of her observations of the native people, their customs, the countries and islands they visited, the geography, history, flora and fauna, and of the condition of the sailors who composed the ship’s crew. She deplored their lack of education and training and recommended improvements that would ultimately benefit ship handling, U.S. commerce, and the sailors themselves. She originally intended her journal to be a mere narrative account of the voyage, yet she could not help but plead for the welfare of the seamen whom she observed daily; she wanted to be remembered for that above all else.

The *Antarctic* left New York City in July 1829, bound for the south coast of New Zealand where they hoped to find seals, the commercial reason for the voyage. On the way, Abby witnessed the crossing the line ceremony and a burial at sea. Once at their destination, they encountered natives who looked threatening but were peaceful. When the ship docked in Manila, the American consul there, who held “improper attentions” toward Abby, forbade her from going with the ship as it went out for several months to reconnoiter the nearby islands searching for *bêche-de-mer*. Frightened and alone, she, nevertheless, was able to travel around the city and described the Philippine economy, religion, and inhabitants. Once the *Antarctic* returned, she was permitted to go on board. The ship sailed to Massacre Island, where the crew hoped to avenge an attack by natives who had captured and tortured one of the sailors. Abby watched the battle on deck and praised the courage and bravery of the men who fought the
cannibals.

As the ship made its way home via Singapore, Madagascar, Saint Helena (where Abby visited Napoleon’s grave), the Azores, Liberia, Bordeaux and finally, New York City, she continued her commentary on history, geography, science, notable individuals, conchology, and even the aurora borealis. She was the first American woman to visit many of these places.

Abby Jane was a woman of her time. She was intelligent, educated, well read, devoutly religious, intrepid, and tolerant, as well as very adventurous. Throughout the long voyage, she put her trust in God and praised the missionaries for their work with the native population. She asserted that women should go out as missionaries with their husbands, as they would have a civilizing influence on the natives. Somewhat of an historian, she gave a thumb-nail history of the United States Navy up to that time, and predicted that the United States, along with France, England and Russia, would be a great naval power.

The two years at sea had its impact on Abby Jane Morrell. She grew to love the ocean in all its complexity; she expressed interest in living in the South Pacific and spreading the Gospel there; she felt that she was more rational now; and she expressed confidence in what women could do in “the business of life.” Submitting her manuscript for publication through an intermediary was evidence of her self confidence, marking her, in effect, as a bit of a feminist. Strangely enough, she only once mentioned that she missed her son, while she delighted in being a good companion to her husband whom she praised for his honour and courage. She wrote that she would not have given up this voyage to stay at home.

*Captain’s Wife* gives the reader a woman’s perspective on life at sea aboard a schooner when conditions under sail were uncomfortable and, at times, dangerous. Fortunately, Abby overcame seasickness and was only ill with a fever once. She did not mention her living quarters or the food aboard ship, subjects that might have interested readers. This small volume joins Basil Greenhill’s path breaking work, *Women Under Sail: Letters and Journals concerning Eight Women traveling or working in Sailing Vessels between 1829 and 1949* and recently published accounts of women aboard whalers in the nineteenth century.

Evelyn M. Cherpak
Portsmouth, Rhode Island


At the time of the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar in 2005, it was reported that since the battle in 1805, there had been an average of six books a year, every year, about just that battle and the protagonists. It is highly likely that average has been well exceeded by books covering the Battle of the Atlantic in the 65 years since that titanic struggle ended. There have been official histories, some in several volumes, detailed analyses, equipment assessments, personal histories and so on. Certainly, there have been dozens of books published about the four main combatants—Britain, the United States, Canada and Germany, plus others that focus on weaponry as well as the contributions of Italy, France, the Netherlands, Norway and other countries, not to mention such famous novels as *The Cruel Sea* and movies like *Das Boot*.

This major work by Ed Offley, an
American, covers ground that has been covered often before, even by CNRS members, but probably in more detail and with more extensively researched background than many. Essentially, he has concentrated on the few months in mid-spring of 1943, when in just over a month and a half, the convoy battles changed from major defeats in March-April to almost total victory by late May. Offley’s first two introduce the conditions of the war by early March, in particular, the major problems in the “air gap” in mid-Atlantic. He describes in considerable detail Allied meetings to settle the command arrangements, the convoy defensive escort group system—British and American (with but a passing reference to Canada except for Rear-Admiral Leonard Murray’s forces in Halifax and Newfoundland)—and Admiral Dönitz’s tightly-structured staff in the outskirts of Berlin, with its continuous plotting and radio signals back and forth to his 50-odd U-boats concentrated in his North Atlantic “wolf packs” in north-south lines in that air gap.

The rest of the book is taken up with the details of five major convoy battles: three east-bound badly mauled convoys, SC-122 and HX-229 and HX-229A, escorted by British Groups B-5 and B-7 with some USN support by Coast Guard cutters. Those three convoys lost 22 merchant ships in return for a single U-boat sunk. Offley then concentrates on convoy ONS-5 westbound in late April, again with the RN’s B-7 close escort, but importantly, now aided by two new RN Support Groups, EG-1 and -3. Although that convoy had 13 ships sunk, air cover was more frequent and the escorts had improved centimetric radar resulting in six U-boats sunk and two seriously damaged. It was at least closer to a drawn battle. Offley correctly notes that in the “tonnage war,” tonnage of ships sunk versus new construction and U-boats sunk, this was, for Dönitz, an unacceptable rate.

Then, more briefly, in a penultimate chapter, he covers the closely fought battle around eastbound convoy SC-130 that lost no ships and cost the Kriegsmarine four U-boats. Shortly after, as dozens of U-boats were sunk in the area, Dönitz appreciated his U-boats had lost their control of the situation in mid-Atlantic. Offley fully attributes this to a quite sudden coming together of a complicated combination of improved air support from more very long range A/S bombers, the introduction of the first escort carriers with aircraft carrying “Fido” acoustic-homing torpedoes, more and better Allied radar and direction-finding in the escort forces, and the arrival of the Support Groups. He notes, as well, the rising tendency for less experienced U-boat COs to inflate sinkings, for too long persuading the BdU staff that the battle was worth the candle.

As a description of those tumultuous days, this history is hard to beat. Its 333 pages devoted to those five convoy passages are dense with small detail—narrative quotes from captains, naval and merchant seamen, reports of proceedings, and signal traffic, individual attacks and improving capabilities in the defences. For instance, in the defence of ONS-5, the author tells us there were 46 U-boats in four groups hunting the convoy; 7 ships in EG B-7 and another 10 in the two support groups sent to help. There were 77 attacks on U-boats, 45 U-boat attacks on either the convoy or its escorts, and 9 U-boats lost in the battle, on the way out or heading home. The description of the air-gap problem, of refuelling at sea in often dreadful weather, the conundrum of rescuing survivors for morale and humanitarian reason versus hunting the attacker as required by tactical instructions, and the arguments between USN’s Fleet Admiral Ernie King and Roosevelt about provision of VLR aircraft are clear and often fascinating.

Offley supplies the backgrounds for
David MacIntyre and Peter Gretton, who commanded B-5 and B-7, as well as the COs of many of the escort ships, of Dönitz’s staff, and of seamen and gunners in merchant ships and escorts. It is here that I found myself a bit overwhelmed with detail as the story progressed. The German name of every wolf pack is translated into English or explained; the origins of every U-boat commander are included; VLR aircraft numbers and captains are given in full, every time. It really would have moved the tale along to have given some initial examples, and then got on with it. Offley’s American background shows, with USN terms applied to RN escorts, which, for a Canadian or a Brit grates a bit—“K-guns” are always used for depth-charge throwers, “flank speed” for full ahead, “Union Jack” for the merchantmen’s red ensign and others. As well, the text could have stood a careful review by an RN (or RCN) expert: the German T-5 torpedo was not “wake homing” (p.182) but propeller cavitation homing; the ASCO, Asdic Control Officer, was not the actual operator of the sets (p.236); and throwers could not be “angled 30° ahead” (p.325). A few descriptions are certainly questionable: a periscope “feather” detected at seven miles (p.290)?

Nevertheless, Turning the Tide is a masterful telling of a vital few months in the five-and-a-half-year battle. It definitely belongs with the dozen other books on essentially the same subject. The problems are laid out, the struggle at sea carefully detailed, and the results assessed and analyzed. The tables of the actual convoy arrangements and lists of ships will be useful as references.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Since the early years of the seventeenth century, figureheads have been a nearly universal feature of all except the smallest sailing warships and merchant ships. That includes ships built of iron and steel: any Tall Ship built today can be expected to have a figurehead. The essential requirements are that a bowsprit must be fitted and the ship must have a raked or clipper bow or timbers that give a similar line ahead of a vertical stem. Figureheads on ships with vertical or ram bows, even with a bowsprit, never look right. In those cases, a medallion or coat of arms is appropriate and a good example is the shield that used to grace the bow of the iron corvette HMS Canada that is (or used to be) on display at the Maritime Museum of British Columbia in Victoria, BC. It is the Canadian coat of arms of the day (the early 1880s).

David Pulvertaft is a rear-admiral RN who has made the most comprehensive study yet of the figureheads of ships of the Royal Navy and has collated the information in this attractive book. He has included only information that is known beyond doubt and which comes from reliable sources. Firstly, some figureheads still exist (remarkably about 200 of them!) Secondly, there are those that no longer exist but were previously catalogued, described and photographed or otherwise illustrated, some while still in place on the ship. The third body of evidence is comprised of the detailed designs submitted by figurehead carvers, together with the asking price for the job, which have been preserved in the archives of the Admiralty and are now in the collection of the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich.
Sometimes more than one design was proposed and annotations by officials show what was approved and fitted to the ship on completion. The final way in which we can know what the figureheads were like is by studying the superbly detailed seventeenth- and eighteenth-century models made when a new design was prepared for Admiralty approval. The carvings on these models are intricately detailed and, in the case of large ships like first-rates, can be very complicated. While there is no guarantee the full-sized figurehead was exactly like that on the model, it would have been very close.

The early chapters deal with the ship carver’s task and with those artists, well known in their time, who achieved success and repeat orders from the Admiralty. The business and the skills were often handed down through several generations. The Hellyers of Portsmouth were a typical example: they worked both in the dockyard itself and in their own workshops. Then a chapter covers sixteenth- and seventeenth-century figureheads and another shows eighteenth-century examples. Much of the evidence for the earlier ones comes from the models, with carvers’ submissions becoming more numerous in the later period. But the bulk of the book is devoted to the nineteenth century, for which a great amount of information is available; so much so that different chapters are devoted to figureheads of royalty, famous people, beasts, birds, mythology and several other categories. The last Royal Navy ship afloat and in commission to bear a figurehead was the steel sloop HMS *Espeigle*, launched in 1900 and not sold until 1923.

The illustrations are, of course, the heart of the book and its raison d’être. There is a colour section showing preserved figureheads among which I discovered an old friend; the image of Admiral Nelson from my training ship *Conway*, ex-HMS *Nile*, launched in 1839. This is a replacement, in fact a second replacement, carved in 1938. Figureheads are carved from wood and, if exposed to the elements must, in time, rot. But when a ship was broken up at the end of its life, the figurehead, if in good condition, was usually removed and many were thus saved, at least for a time. Those housed indoors in museums or at naval establishments will, if maintained, last for a very long time. An example of this is the figurehead of HMS *Imaum*, a 76-gun ship built at Bombay and launched in 1826, which is on display at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic in Halifax.

The last section of the book is the figurehead directory, listing existing figureheads and models with their present location, as well as those that have been recorded but since destroyed. The designs submitted by carvers, with museum or archival reference numbers, are all listed. In many cases, the entries show the sequence of figurehead proposals and those actually made, including replacements. This book will undoubtedly become the standard reference for anyone who might need information on Royal Navy figureheads. It is also an attractive addition to anyone’s naval bookshelf.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


In 1982, after decades of hypothesizing, John Morrison, John Coates and Frank Welsh set up the Trireme Trust, their goal being to design a trireme that looked like the original Greek battleships. What they
managed to do was build a floating theory (McGrail 1993:4), the *Olympias*, and then try it out over five seasons. It immediately led to plenty of debate about Greek seafaring, and still does.

One needs to be thoroughly familiar with classical ships, seafaring and archaeology, however, to make the most of this book. There is no introductory chapter where the major questions and theories are outlined (like whether the ship had three levels of rowers or not, what its top speed would be and whether this is important, and how much space was allotted for each rower). For this information, one should read some of the earlier literature about the ship.

The present book consists of six parts, almost equal in size, beginning with a report of the last two seasons of sea trials, since the reports of previous seasons had already been published. Publication of the original report on the 1992 trials was delayed because it was too ambitious for the time available. As there are numerous variables involved in sailing the *Olympias*, it proved difficult to compare one year’s experience with another. For example, there were fewer rowers in 1992, but due to additional training and coaching, Paul Lipke, part of the American sister organization of the Trireme Trust, claims “his” crew performed better than the larger crews of previous years. Many of the trireme rowers were recruited in the United States. Lipke also comments on the accuracy of data collection at the earlier trials. He concludes by emphasizing that rowing a trireme involves not only a technical approach, but a large percentage of effort devoted to communication and training.

The sea trials of 1994, the last series, were previously published privately and are republished here as a short overview. Andrew Taylor’s paper adds valuable insight on the 1994 trials, showing that even a relatively old ship with an inexperienced crew can execute trials that generate new food for thought.

Part two discusses proposals for a revised design: what would we do differently now that we know how it works? J. Timothy Shaw suggests several changes in trireme design based on the *Olympias*’ performance and other information gathered elsewhere, for example, from ancient reliefs. These designs show different configurations from those tried in the *Olympias*, in some cases giving rowers 98 centimetres of space instead of 88.8 cm, increasing their performance significantly. John Coates describes how a second trireme (re)construction would look: in just ten pages he describes the success of the *Olympias* and how to move on.

The third part of the book brings together critiques by six different authors on the *Olympias* itself. Some are positive about the whole endeavour, others reject it. The editors deserve praise for allowing both fans and adversaries of the *Olympias* to present their ideas. The most outspoken criticism comes from Alex Tilley, while the other papers in this chapter are simply friendly comments. Over time, even Tilley’s opinion has partly converged with that of the Trireme Trust. Basically the iconographic and literary sources leave room for discussion: if reliefs had been painted, would they show the details we now lack? We certainly cannot use missing paint as support for a hypothesis. Even if there were physical remains (which there are not), this would probably not end the debate. In the heat of discussion, we sometimes lose sight of the relative value of collected data. The *Olympias* project is invaluable, however, and in many respects, the founders have crossed uncharted territory.

In part four, different performance and operational aspects of ancient triremes in general are discussed, followed, in part
five, by an overview of construction and maintenance. The *Olympias* was certainly not a failed (re)construction: it has taught us valuable things about ancient Greek seafaring—although a Mark Two ship would likely be different. The final chapter of the book consists of three papers under the title “recent research.” They could have been placed elsewhere in the book, but this way, they serve to underscore the never ending quality of the tiremes’ story, something for which we should thank Coates and Morrison.

Although this collection of 31 papers is called the final report, we have not seen the last of the *Olympias* or of modern tiremes in general. The book addresses a multitude of research questions, which may be the biggest success of the Trireme Trust’s work. But, while it serves the “in-crowd” and feeds discussions with more data, the book does not resolve every issue about tiremes. More questions still remain to be answered and despite the enormous effort that has gone into the *Olympias* project, it is just a start. It is hoped that there will be more chances to build another “floating theory” because it just is not good enough to compare the *Olympias* with itself.

Roeland Paardekooper
Eindhoven, the Netherlands


The U-boat onslaught during the Second World War has captivated historians and a general readership since its very beginning. Successful U-boat commanders quickly became highly popular heroic figures, known as “aces” of the maritime war. It is no surprise, then, that the most successful ace, Otto Kretschmer, would receive a great amount of literary attention.

Terence Robertson was one of the first to document Kretschmer’s career and, by the author’s own admission, it was not an easy task. Kretschmer consented to the book only after Robertson was able to convince him that he was not looking to write a “hero story.” The result is highly captivating and a fine biography of Germany’s most successful U-boat commander during the Second World War.

One of the many high points of the work is the great insight it provides into the life of Otto Kretschmer. The reader quickly learns that Kretschmer was a quiet, reserved and intelligent officer who was well liked and respected. He was quite different from his fellow U-boat skippers, and certainly not an archetypical “Nazi” officer. Like other renowned German aces, such as Prien and Schepke, Kretschmer was a pre-war U-boat commander and a pioneer in that branch of the navy. Years of experience shaped these officers, but it was Kretschmer who stood out, at one point acknowledged by Karl Dönitz, commander of the U-boats, as “the best of my pupils” (p.114).

The reader quickly understands why Kretschmer was such a successful U-boat commander. His encouraging and human, yet tough and disciplined command style broke many barriers. The prime example of this was Kretschmer showing calmness in the face of danger by reading a book during a particularly heavy depth-charge attack. It was only afterwards that one of his officers noticed the book was upside down; Kretschmer had only been pretending to read. It is through stories such as these that Robertson provides a vivid image of life under Kretschmer’s command.

A pioneer in U-boat tactics, Kretschmer was the first commander who dared to attempt a surface attack at night.
He was not only successful, but from then on, his ploy became the key manoeuvre used against Allied shipping. Skill with this effective tactic, combined with the fact that he rarely signalled and was thus not located by Allied high-frequency radio detection (DF), enabled Kretschmer to soon surpass the other U-boat commanders in terms of tonnage sunk. Although his career lasted only until his capture in March 1941, his record was never broken.

Robertson’s work can also be praised for its balanced view of Kretschmer, as he does not shy away from darker moments of the submariner’s career. As a prisoner of war, Kretschmer sat on the infamous, and illegal, court-martial (the German officers called it a council of honour) of the first officer of U-570, who had surrendered to aircraft after being bombed and consequently captured. This ended with the officer being allowed to redeem himself by escaping and scuttling the boat, but he was shot and killed while attempting to escape from a Home Guard patrol. The U-570 affair would haunt Kretschmer for some time and held back his release until 1947, but he accepted this, providing another glimpse of the man he was.

Kretschmer was captured in early 1941 when his U-boat was sunk and so spent the majority of the war in POW camps. Robertson dedicates a significant portion of the work to this period, including the U-570 incident mentioned above, and Kretschmer’s time in Canada at the Bowmanville camp. Robertson does an excellent job of describing Kretschmer’s life as a POW including his one escape attempt.

One of the few aspects of the book that left this reviewer relatively uneasy was the conversations featured throughout the book. It often felt like a novel and I was left wondering how true to the real events the conversations were. They occur frequently, but it is unclear whether they are from an existing transcript, from the author’s actual interviews with Kretschmer, or if Robertson has taken some liberties. Nevertheless, this does not detract much from the work in general.

Overall, The Golden Horseshoe is a fine chronicle of the wartime career of Otto Kretschmer. It has endured to the present day, now into its third edition, and is every bit as valid today as when it was first published. It is also highly accessible and a pleasure to read, for a general audience and historians alike. Historian Jürgen Rohwer wrote in the introduction, “Terence Robertson’s well researched and vivid biography of U-boat captain Otto Kretschmer was first published in 1955. We must be grateful that Greenhill Books have decided to reprint this fine book after so many years.” (p.xiv). This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


Coastal Passenger Liners of the British Isles provides a good overview of the history of the liners that served British travelers from the origin of the steam ship to the extinction of the coastal liner service. Along with a general transportation history, it also provides stories of specific incidents that happened during various trips from transporting passengers to football games to the liners’ role during the Second World War. In the last chapter of the book, Robins does a good job of describing how the passenger liners slowly died out. While there are technically still boats that carry...
people from one part of the U.K. to another, as Robins maintains, they do not have the same aura as the old liners whose sole purpose was to transport passengers, not cars.

Robins includes excerpts from various primary sources throughout his text, especially newspapers, which help tell the story of one hundred years of passenger liner service along the coasts of Great Britain. For example, his account of northern steamers features an excerpt from The Illustrated London News from 9 April 1853 which describes how dangerous travelling on a steamer could be. He has also made excellent use of reputable secondary sources.

The book is well organized, telling a broad story in roughly chronological order, but also including chapters that give depth to the bigger picture. These chapters highlight specific subjects, such as the steamer lines that carried passengers from the west coast of England and Wales to Ireland and back. The collision of Mary Hough with Castilian and Africa in 1881 is described by means of a great primary source, the records of the Board of Trade inquiry. From this report we learn details such as the time the incidents occurred, how many crew members there were on board the ships, how fast the ships were going, and what courses the ships were following. Such first-hand material helps explain the incident better than any secondary source could do and adds to the book.

Despite being well researched and organized, the text was occasionally a little dry to read. Sometimes, fact follows fact with no breathing room between them and little attempt at analysis or a smooth transition between the blunt facts. To be fair, how much of an opinion could the author have had on the history of steamships that serviced the British Isles? Robins’ nostalgia for those glorious times is evident at the end of the book: “Gone for ever is the smell of hot oil and steam emanating from the engine room ventilators, and, strangely, gone too is that characteristic smell aboard all the old steamers, that smell of stale beer and tobacco smoke mixed tantalizingly with the smells of fresh food being prepared in the galley.”

The author, Nick Robins, is a geologist by profession not a historian, so that may be why I felt less connected to this book than I would have if the author had brought more analysis to bear. Moreover, he does not connect his subject to the larger historical context of what was going on in the world at the time of the events he describes. Passenger ship enthusiasts will likely appreciate the book and consider it a great buy. It is a good resource for anyone interested in British passenger liners, which is, after all, what the author had in mind when he set out to write the book.

Chris Wallace
Pensacola, Florida


America’s privateers in the War of 1812 had a significant impact on Britain’s trade-based economy, causing insurance rates to rise, intercepting merchant ships and their cargoes and forcing the Royal Navy, reluctantly, to divert warships for escort of convoys sailing the Atlantic. Investors found financing privateer vessels with private capital an attractive venture. Privateering also provided ordinary seamen with an opportunity to reap prize rewards, roughly the nineteenth-century equivalent of winning a lottery.

Objective data indicate that
America’s letter of marque “fleet” had a greater effect upon British shipping than did the nascent United States Navy. The number of privateer ships of various sizes from all American ports exceeded five hundred during the course of the war. In aggregate, privateers greatly outnumbered and outgunned the American Navy. They seized approximately five times as many enemy ships, thus affecting the outcome of the war, a conflict that ended largely in a stalemate.

Rutstein’s *The Privateering Stroke* focuses upon a small portion of this privateer fleet from the town of Salem, on the north shore of Massachusetts, as being representative of the impact of privateering upon similar communities. Salem was the home of Nathaniel Bowditch, the famed mathematician and ocean navigator, the seafaring Crowninshield merchant family and, later, Nathaniel Hawthorne, the great American author and “Surveyor for the District of Salem and Beverly and Inspector of Revenue for the Port of Salem.” Nestled between two historic fishing communities, Marblehead and Gloucester, Salem was largely a mercantile port and its citizens were attuned, therefore, to the risks of taking on financial ventures. During the war, the town commissioned 43 privateers to patrol the coast of Massachusetts, including its eastern “District of Maine,” looking for smugglers and prowling the Atlantic beyond.

Rutstein presents evidence that, as in any business venture, timing, luck and marketing led many investors to profitability, particularly those who exploited wartime shortages in war-torn communities. For some, money was made, for others privateering led to financial ruin.

Rutstein divides his publication into several sections he calls “books,” which group privateer ships largely by size and chronology. These “books” form a literary-sandwich, but the “bread,” a very well written introduction and an astute conclusion are the best parts of his work. The books contain insightful quotes from Faye Kert’s *Prize and Prejudice* which noted that the War of 1812 was “declared by the unprepared and fought by the unwilling, for reasons which remain unexplained,” (p.25) and “economic pressure—not decisive military or fleet actions—finally brought the war to an end.” (p. vi)

This work includes an abundance of primary source data about 1812 privateer ships regarding captains, crews, seizures, prize values, dispositions of captures, recaptures and/or destructions of vessels. Of particular interest are Rutstein’s accounts of the treatment of privateers as prisoners of war, by far the largest number of maritime captives held by the British during this three-year conflict. There are numerous graphs and tables to help a reader interpret the data. Its glossary contains a few uncommon terms such as: supercargo—an officer responsible for all economic aspects of a vessel such as the buying and selling of cargo; surety—a person who posts a bond vulnerable to forfeit if the privateer breaks the law; running ship—a very fast vessel permitted to sail without a convoy; cartel—a vessel used for the exchange of prisoners and not subject to capture; and shaving mill or picaroon—a number of meanings, but mostly a small open privateer boat primarily used to capture smugglers and for minor commerce raiding. Two Salem picaroons are remarkable for their curious names, *Castigator* and *Black Vomit*.

The author dwells upon the history of two Salem privateer vessels, *America* and *Fame*. (Rutstein is the captain of a modern representational schooner *Fame*, that captured the first prize of the War.) The historiography concerning these two ships is presented well. His descriptions of personal acts of heroism, human weakness, magnanimity, avarice and all-too-often tragedy are also well done. Unfortunately, sometimes the narrative becomes tedious and is replete with annoying redundancies. There
are minor errors that might have been avoided if a publishing house’s professional editor had read this book critically.

_The Privateer Stroke_ is not comprehensive or as scholarly as Jerome Garitee’s well-known _The Republic’s Private Navy_ (1977). Garitee focuses upon the business and legal aspects of privateering with an emphasis upon ship procurement, refitting as a quasi-warship, finances, insurance, equipment and the complex prize distribution system as it related to the admiralty courts and subsequent auctions. _The Privateer Stroke_ also falls short of George Coggleshall’s classic 1856 book, _The History of the American Privateers_, but Rutstein’s work is valuable because of its unique data specific to Salem and Massachusetts’s North Shore during the War of 1812. An unanswered question is how the experience of Salem’s privateers (a small and, arguably, not a representative sample) correlates with those in other communities that had similar fleets. This perhaps will be a topic for a subsequent book by Rutstein or another author.

In summary, Rutstein’s _The Privateering Stroke_, although narrow in scope, is a worthy addition to one’s collection of material related to privateering and the War of 1812.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


_From Forecastle to Cabin_ is the eighth volume in Seaforth Publishing’s Seafarers’ Voices series, a reprint collection of nautical accounts by a cast of writers ranging from a

seventeenth-century Protestant galley slave to a memoir of life at sea by a Victorian-era whaling captain’s wife. In his introduction to this new edition of Samuel Samuels’ 1877 autobiography, editor Vincent McInerney notes that the original text has been reduced by almost half. Most of the material eliminated, he explains, involves the technical details of operating sailing ships, and has little interest for modern-day armchair sailors. As uncomfortable as it is to muddle through any heavily redacted book while wondering always what material has been dispatched to the trash bin, the editor’s judgment is in all likelihood correct. Large numbers of nineteenth-century maritime authors felt compelled to expound at length on the workings of sailing ships for the landsmen who presumably made up the bulk of their readership. The descriptions are often lengthy, tedious, difficult to understand, not especially enlightening, and easily forgotten.

McInerney’s lightly-annotated introduction, comprising about ten percent of the slim, octavo-sized volume, is particularly useful. It provides valuable context for Samuels’ multitudinous adventures afloat, and sufficient background information on ships, trans-oceanic trade, sailors’ lives, and the vicissitudes of seafaring to provide a decent understanding of a long-past maritime world without bogging down in unnecessary detail. Samuels wrote only of his first three decades at sea, ending his narrative in 1863 when he gave up command of the famous Liverpool packet, _Dreadnaught_. Editor McInerney provides a happy dénouement to the story. In his later years, the captain held at least three more commands, spent some years racing yachts, and served in an executive capacity for several large corporations.

This book is a quintessential nautical yarn. It begins with a wicked
stepmother and a boy who runs off to sea, where he faces danger, privation, mutiny, and pirates, among other hazards, but through dint of hard work, talent, and an indomitable will, achieves success and renown. On the surface, the narrative line seems suited to the stories of Captain Marryat or his imitators, but this purports to be a work of a different sort. According to author Samuels, he took to writing neither to glorify the nautical life nor to trumpet his own triumphs over adversity. His purpose was to destroy deeply-held romantic notions of the sailors’ life by exposing its brutality, barbarousness, and cruelty. His was not the first book to attempt the task, and Samuels’ depictions of shipboard life include a full measure of the miseries inflicted on sailors. Still, if the good captain’s intent was to dissuade youngsters from going to sea, as he suggests in a few paragraphs on the concluding pages of his book, his effort in all likelihood was not successful. Instead of providing a negative aura for the seafaring life, Samuels celebrates the romance of the sea. Hardship and wretchedness serve only as foils for his victories over storms, treacherous shoals, crimps, commercial competitors, and a score of additional adversaries. Heroics and white-knuckle adventures inform every chapter, greatly diminishing the impact of his eye-witness reports of men being beaten senseless for minor infractions or washed overboard by thunderous waves. In one hair-raising incident, Samuels and a friend rescue a Christian lady held prisoner in a Turkish seraglio. In another, he has a truly terrifying escape from a murderous gang of Manila cut-throats. And so it goes.

Even the difficult times Samuels had as a lad on board his first ships were mitigated by the friendships he made with older, wiser, and stronger mariners. There is no doubt that these relationships were built on reciprocal love of man and boy. French Peter, his first mentor and protector, once offered to take the twelve lashes about to be administered to his young “sea chum,” and on other occasions provided him with clothes, hats, and shoes. No hint of physical intimacy between the boy and his adult partners intrudes into the narrative, but none could be expected in a respectable nineteenth-century memoir. The youth was palpably distressed when the relationships ended, one with an accidental separation from French Peter after a brawl in a waterfront tavern and the other with the agonizing death of his beloved Jack.

The officers Samuels encountered during the early years of his career were for the most part decent chaps. Their examples provide backdrops for accounts of his own command experiences. As he tells it, he did a brilliant job on the quarterdeck, combining expert seamanship with firm but fair treatment of his crews. He worked them hard, he explains, but never hesitated to order an extra grog ration when deserved nor did he skimp on serving out the plum duff.

The Dreadnaught ’s widely-hailed captain was as skilled with a pen as he was when managing a ship in a raging storm. From Forecastle to Cabin is a nautical page-turner that may be completed in an evening. It is a splendid read.

B. R. Burg
Phoenix, Arizona


Many of the most famous Elizabethan sea dogs defy easy categorization as they were often explorers, privateers, naval captains and not above acts of piracy. Sir Walter
Raleigh is a case in point. Raleigh was a favorite of Queen Elizabeth I until his secret marriage to Bess Throckmorton, one of Elizabeth’s ladies-in-waiting, in 1591. Eventually, Raleigh would regain some of the Queen’s affection. He was not so fortunate with her successor, James I. Raleigh’s ultimate fall from grace with the king culminated in his execution in 1618. Whatever else he may have been, Raleigh seems an unlikely traitor. Author Paul Sellin attempts to retrace Raleigh’s controversial last voyage and explore Jacobean politics in an effort to understand why Raleigh met such a tragic end.

The daring Sir Walter was no stranger to exploration and colonization in the New World. King James I became convinced that Raleigh ignored his orders and was intent on renewing hostilities with Spain during his last voyage. There has been great speculation about the nature of Raleigh’s exploration and if he did discover a gold mine. To this end, Sellin made two trips to Venezuela to retrace Raleigh’s travels as outlined in The Discoverie of Guiana (1596). Sellin has included a number of maps, surveys, recent photographs and links to YouTube videos so the reader can see the regions under discussion. The author tests Raleigh’s words about everything from his descriptions of the various bodies of water, depths, distances, dates, tides, currents, weather—against his own experiences: “If Raleigh’s veracity be the key to investigating such a cold case as his seemed to be, then safest to start with the darkest view possible and question everything.” (p.26) While it is evident that Sellin wants to vindicate Raleigh, he amasses enough evidence to suggest that even some of the more incredible descriptions in Raleigh’s account were accurate. The intrepid Professor Sellin may even have identified Raleigh’s mine.

The author asserts that Raleigh deliberately camouflaged his locations and the timing of his discoveries to ensure only he could return for the prospective riches. Doubtless Sellin is correct; explorers often falsified some of the details of their accounts for public consumption lest they give away valuable information. Even with the imprecision of navigation at the time, it would be impossible for a veteran seafarer such as Raleigh to have such inaccurate notions of distance and time; Raleigh’s “errors” really constituted an effective web of systematic non- and dis-information, all designed to prevent outsiders and interlopers from ever locating the “mine” on Cerro Redondo.” (p.221)

It is apparent that Sellin admires Raleigh as a leader. He argues that the Discoverie shows Raleigh had excellent man-management skills and judgement, as well as possessing the ruthlessness and confidence necessary to command such perilous undertakings. Sellin obviously wants to establish Sir Walter Raleigh as a reliable and insightful observer when it comes to people and customs as well as the other details of his voyage.

Raleigh possessed such self-confidence that he felt comfortable criticizing Alexander the Great’s decisions. He would need this assurance in order to weather repeated issues during the voyage, whether it was the dangers of crocodiles and giant mosquitoes, an attack by natives using poisoned arrows (which caused the flesh to drop off the bones of the unfortunate victims), not to mention the predictable problems of dwindling provisions and the onset of sickness. While Sellin assumes the seamen on the expedition gave their blind loyalty, this is not borne out by the evidence: a suicide on Raleigh’s ship in 1618 as well as worries about an impending mutiny suggest otherwise.

Sellin’s efforts to track down and cross-reference extant primary sources are laudable, especially his use of continental
documents. His use of surveyors’ maps and modern marine charts add yet another dimension. For example, he argues that a surveyor’s map from 1732 confirms there were rich gold and silver deposits in the region where Raleigh said there were. The author concludes that the information contained in the Discoverie is “undisputable” and that Walter Raleigh’s conduct and character are “fundamentally admirable.” (p.215) This being said, Raleigh must have been the victim of some nefarious plot that was hatched in London before the “extraordinary, formidable man” returned. (p.233) The prime mover was the King’s favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, who, Sellin argues, conspired with Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden to eradicate Raleigh and recover his mine for themselves.

Sellin mourns a talented man who was “murdered.” He also bemoans a missed opportunity for England. Sellin paints Raleigh as a visionary whose geopolitical strategy would have curbed Spanish wealth and empire-building by establishing an English presence in the Orinoco basin. Yet, regrettably for England, Raleigh’s grand vision could not be grasped by Elizabeth I nor James I.

Sellin’s book is engaging and incredibly readable. This retired professor’s expertise in languages and literature is evident; his prose is predictably full of literary allusions interspersed with wonderful turns of phrase and emotives like “Bah!” and “POOH!” Although readers may not be as convinced of Raleigh’s complete innocence nor Buckingham’s guilt as Sellin is, we certainly admire his passion. Few academics’ research includes trips to the jungle. Treasure, Treason and the Tower is a wonderful tour of Raleigh’s and Sellin’s travels in Venezuela and the treacherous world of Tudor-Stuart court politics.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


The Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War attracted many foreign volunteers to their side. One of those was Frank G. Tinker, a 1933 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, who became an ace pilot in that conflict. Five Down, No Glory is a comprehensive biography of Frank Tinker, a unique personality who wrote a first-hand account of the air war over Spain.

Born in Arkansas, Tinker enlisted in the U.S. Navy after graduation from high school. After a year of duty, he successfully completed a course of study at the Naval Academy Preparatory School and enrolled in the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. He graduated and was commissioned in 1933. Tinker had his heart set on flying but economy measures prevented him from immediately becoming a naval aviator. Through a quirk in the law at that time, the U.S. Army Air Corps was able to offer him (as well as other Annapolis graduates) a commission and pilot training at Randolph Field in Texas. Tinker jumped at the opportunity and transferred to the Army Air Corps. By the time he completed his training, the billets for Naval Aviation opened up and Tinker was able to rejoin the U.S. Navy. There was just one catch—he first had to go through naval pilot training at Pensacola, Florida. Finally, after completing that course, Tinker was able to go to sea.

The chaotic beginning of Tinker’s American military career was a harbinger of what was to come. His Navy career was short: court-martialed once for fighting, Tinker resigned his commission rather than face a second court-martial for public
He signed on as a seaman on various oil tankers, got married and separated from his new bride, and returned to Arkansas. By then, the Spanish Civil War had broken out and the pro-government (“Republican”) forces needed qualified pilots. Tinker contacted the Spanish government, was accepted as a mercenary pilot, and under a false name on his passport, went to Spain.

It was in Spain that Tinker achieved fame. Flying for the Republican Air Force, Tinker found his niche. In Spanish skies, he shot down eight enemy aircraft, including two ME-109s of Nazi Germany’s Condor Legion—German fliers sent to Spain to assist the pro-Franco, anti-Republican forces. (In just a few years, many Canadian and American pilots would shoot down ME-109s, but Tinker was the first North American pilot to do so.) He also led a squadron of Russian volunteer pilots against the pro-Franco forces—the only Naval Academy graduate to command a squadron of Soviet pilots! Tinker terminated his contract in 1937, returned to the U.S., wrote various articles on the Spanish air war, did odd jobs, paddled down the Mississippi River in a canoe, and wrote a book, Some Still Live, which was also serialized in the Saturday Evening Post. Some Still Live is an invaluable memoir of air combat and was reprinted as recently as 1992. Tinker tried to return to Spain, and later, travel to China but the U.S. Government stymied these attempts. His record in Spain, fighting for the allegedly “pro-Communist” side, worked against him.

Frank Tinker was found in a Little Rock, Arkansas, hotel room dead from a .22 calibre gunshot wound. This has been the subject of intense speculation since he was not a suicidal type, and moreover, had a loaded .45 pistol with him at his death. Some writers have intimated Tinker was murdered for some unknown reason. Authors Smith and Hall posit a plausible scenario: Tinker was drinking with some people in his hotel room; one of the drinking buddies was horsing around, grabbed the pistol, and accidentally shot Tinker; the drinking buddies fled the hotel. The hotel’s telephones were not working that day and Tinker was unable to ask for assistance. The American ace pilot of the Spanish Civil War went into shock and bled to death.

Like Tinker, this book has had a tortuous history. Historian Richard K. Smith completed the manuscript in 1983. Thereafter, he lost interest in the subject and the book languished for twenty years. Shortly before his death in 2003, Smith gave the manuscript to his friend Cargill Hall, saying, “Maybe you can get it published.” Hall had to wait another six years for his own retirement before he could devote attention to Smith’s old text, and then had to fill in some gaps caused by unavoidably lost pages. The positive side to the delay was that Hall was able to take advantage of the many sources developed since 1983 and made major revisions to certain chapters. The writing is smooth and there is no indication of any stylistic differences between Smith’s original efforts and Hall’s additions. The book is extremely detailed and moves at a fast pace. The author Ernest Hemingway makes several appearances throughout the narrative. The result is a well-written, comprehensive biography of a major aviator in the Spanish Civil War. It is not, however, a maritime-oriented work. Although Tinker had a naval education and some service, his fame rests on his piloting skills and his record in the Spanish Civil War. Therefore, Five Down, No Glory is primarily recommended for the aircraft enthusiast or historian.

In many ways, Frank Tinker resembles Jake Holman, the protagonist of Richard McKenna’s novel, The Sand Pebbles. The fictional Holman was brilliant
with machinery but could never quite fit in with his shipmates; Tinker was a superb pilot who could never quite fit into society. An earlier article on Tinker called him, “Rebel of ’33”; another article by this reviewer called Tinker “The Lost Pilot.” Both titles are apt. Frank Tinker has not been forgotten, nor his still-not-understood death. In June of each year, local people gather at Tinker’s grave to honour his memory. The headstone carries this unsettling inscription: “¿Quien Sabe?”—Spanish for “Who Knows?”

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


For a long time, Britain consisted of two separate kingdoms, Scotland and England. Early in King Edgar’s reign (959-75), a notion of Englishness was created following his circumnavigation of the four surrounding seas. In 1598, Richard Hakluyt described Edgar as a maritime king and “the true and soveraigne Monarch of all the British Ocean.” Social historians argue that these waters were the sine qua non of maritime enterprise, and this ocean-girt insularity defined the identity of the inhabitants both geographically and culturally.

Sebastian Sobiecki is professor of Medieval English Literature and Culture at Rijksuniversiteit in Groningen in the Netherlands where he specializes in comparative medieval and early modern literature. He is also interested in maritime, mercantile and legal writing and is currently preparing the first volume of a new edition of Richard Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations. In 2008, Professor Sobiecki brought together a group of ten academics to contribute to a conference in Leeds on the Sea and Englishness in the Middle Ages under the subtitle “Britain isn’t an entity, it’s an argument.” It was here that participants discussed the idea of a book to encourage scholars working on pre- and post-Conquest literature to consider the relationship between the sea and the formation of a collective English identity.

Each of the academics is an authority in medieval economic and maritime history and the introductory chapter probes the humble beginnings of King Edgar’s legendary title to the island-studded seas around the British Isles. Subsequent chapters analyze the continuities and disruptions in the sea’s influence on English identity through narratives of migration. These cover the literary origins of Englishness as well as Welsh and English views of the sea in the Vie de St. Edmund and Waldef. Also discussed is the role of local communities in the entire archipelago, its neighbouring islands, Ireland and the intervening seas, together with chapters on language contact, the Vikings, Anglo-Saxons, nautical travel in the Old English Exodus and East Anglia.

Sobiecki argues that well into the fifteenth century, the sea defined Englishness even though the Atlantic was a contested region. Rivalries between monarchs opened up production and trade, but England’s King Henry VII failed to persuade his merchants to replicate the earlier exploratory voyages by Bristol merchants. The Portuguese, on the other hand, understood and exploited the patterns of the seas and their currents because they saw the ocean as an opportunity rather than an obstacle. Peter Unwin has written that the biggest change resulting from the convulsions of the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI and Mary was the creation of a
sense amongst the English that their country was different from its continental neighbours.

Social change in Britain during the late sixteenth century was a series of localised social dramas which ranged from often-undirected religious excitement to a concern for a national identity. Historian Norman Davies has argued that the Reformation “drove a wedge down the Channel” for which there was no historical precedent. In 1629, the livelihood of up to 50,000 people in England was wholly dependent on unstable foreign markets. (Wrightson 2003) The turning point came in the seventeenth century when the Dutch began to compete with England in the cloth trade, and this slowly forced Britain to revolutionize economically and socially. (Wilson 1971)

A dominant theme of this book is that the notion of the Englishness of the sea was not only evident in the earliest written records of the Anglo-Saxon era but also in Welsh and English views of the sea in the Vie de St Edmund and Waldef and even until Victorian times. While ocean battles and heroism created vivid images of maritime history, it was the sea that formed an Anglo-British identity. It linked the nation to Europe and the rest of the world as England’s role gradually acquired a psychological significance as a line of demarcation.

During much of the nineteenth century, England’s relationship with the sea was central to two projects relating to national identity—British colonization and the consolidation of the political union of Scotland and Ireland with England. With its many references to literary origins of insular identity, this is a book that would interest both maritime and social historians. It would also be an excellent resource for readers of general history as it contains a very comprehensive index with an excellent bibliography and an intelligent choice of primary sources including German, French, Italian and seventeenth-century Latin documents.

The image of the sea and its early mastery by the English as a seafaring migratory people is important to Sobiecki’s extraordinary project. The book covers a considerable chronological scope and some twenty-first century readers may find that the strong focus on Englishness throughout this book seems strange. Perhaps, though, the last word on the effect of national identity should be left to Robert Louis Stevenson. He wrote in 1878 that “we should consider ourselves unworthy of our descent if we did not share the arrogance of our progenitors that the sea is English”—but of course, Stevenson was Scottish.

Michael Clark
London, England


This work is a biography of Irvin Gillis, an enigmatic man who was in turn, a naval officer, spy, arms dealer, and ultimately, a successful book dealer, librarian and scholar. It covers the early days of the formation of the U.S. naval intelligence service in Japan and China. The book follows Gillis’ journey from Lake Erie in 1875 to Japan and China, beginning in the crucial period before the Russo-Japanese war, and his gradual transition into a civilian at home in the upheaval of 1930s China until his death and burial in 1948 in what was then Peking. Publication of this book has taken many twists and turns. It
was produced over many years by a team of people, beginning with Bruce Swanson, whose credentials include “China specialist for forty-three years, fluent in Mandarin” and lecturer at Annapolis. Following Swanson’s untimely death, three others stepped in to finish the work: Vance Morrison, former defence attaché to the People’s Republic of China; Don MacDowell, rear admiral (ret.) of the U.S. Naval Security Group Command; and Nancy Tomasko, librarian and editor of the East Asian Library Journal.

Gillis’ story begins before his birth with a look at his family life and forebears that include a grandfather, who was a military hero of the War of 1812. Taken prisoner at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, he escaped, was recaptured, and held thereafter in the secure citadel fortress at Halifax. His father was an officer of the U.S. Navy, so Gillis spent his childhood among dry docks and other machinery. We become acquainted with him as a cadet, small in stature, struggling to learn the academic as well as practical aspects of becoming a naval officer at the U.S. Naval Academy. The syllabus in 1895 was rigorous and had a critical role in forming the young officer, enabling him to perform his role as an intelligence officer later in his career. Courses consisted of mathematics, English and modern languages, history, and law. Early in his career, we see a man who is competent, courageous, and capable of acting both alone and as a crew member. During the Spanish-American War, he stamped himself as a man of action when he swam to a floating enemy torpedo and disarmed it. As a young officer with the Pacific Fleet in the Philippines, and later based on Shanghai, Lieutenant Gillis is unusual, being equally at home as an engineering officer as he was as a deck officer.

Gillis’ career takes a major leap when he is selected to travel to Tokyo in an intelligence function, specifically to observe and report on the impending war between Japan and Russia. The Battle of Tsushima was highly anticipated in that it presented the first major opportunity in decades to test weapons and tactics. The author details Gillis’ attempts to get on board a Japanese warship. From there he became the U.S. naval attaché in Peking and attempted to collect intelligence in an ever more chaotic world. Increasingly he drifted into the commercial sphere, selling warships and possibly strategic products for other firms, such as, Dow Chemical. Retiring, finally, in 1919 after serving as naval attaché in Peking during the First World War, Gillis worked for Bethlehem Steel and the Electric Boat Company selling American warships to successive Chinese governments. Through Gillis we have a front row seat to the major historical events of the first half of the twentieth century: the Russo-Japanese War; the formation of the Nationalist government; the Communist revolution and civil war; the Japanese invasion; and the Second World War and its aftermath.

This biography is as close to the “official” U.S. Navy story on Irvin Gillis as can be. Through his actions and dealings and, later in life, through his writings, we have a clear picture of a free thinking westerner, not given to mincing words whether arguing for changes in the Gest library’s classification and indexing schemes or pronouncing on politicians who, in his opinion, do not understand the Far East. After studying his career from capable sea-going officer to intelligence collector and analyst, arms dealer, buyer of priceless books, and scholar, the reader is left wondering what other secrets he took with him. Gillis’ transition to resident and even citizen of China is remarkable. There are accounts of his dealings with such historical characters as Alfred Mahan, William Taft, and Theodore Roosevelt in political affairs.
and the Canadian engineer Guion Gest and librarian, Dr. Nancy Swann in the development of the Gest Chinese Research Library at McGill University.

The editors supplement Swanson’s original text with a chapter on what was to be the longest phase of his life as a civilian in China, living close to the imperial palace from 1919 until his death. As a book dealer and bibliographer, this portion of Gillis’ life is marked by dedication, passion, and a huge amount of effort in the day-to-day work of bibliography, indexing, acquisition, and shipping the priceless books of Chinese literature and science to McGill University. The turbulent 1930s were fraught with outright personal danger for Gillis and his wife, Zhao Yubin, a time of civil war arrest under the Japanese occupation. Through it all, he maintains a lively and developing interest in the vital technical issues of indexing and classification, all the while arguing for changes in the library.

The book is splendidly presented and includes a marketing piece complete with the “future endorsements” of serving high-ranking naval officers. It is printed on fine, non- acid paper. Photographs and two maps help us follow his travels in his attempts to learn not only what the successive Chinese governments were doing in naval matters, but also what the other major would-be colonial powers, Japan, Britain, Germany, and Russia were doing.

Appendices include an essay entitled “Gillis, Mahan, and the Age of Navalism,” which further helps situate him in the currents of history and geopolitics and helps the modern reader to understand the dynamic of wealth-creation operating in U.S. foreign policy. There is his record of naval service, the Gillis family tree, the course of instruction he received at Annapolis, and the Romanization system. There are also illuminating notes, a bibliography, and index.

There are a few minor problems in style, maybe occasioned by the attempts of the editors to complete Bruce Swanson’s prose; for example, an odd usage of the world “imperialist” in reference to China, that was in the process of being dismembered at that moment (p.1); possibly “evaluation” should be “evolution” (p.6). There are a few puzzling errors, such as a missed decimal in giving the weight of the revolutionary HMS Dreadnought, which is described as “a 1,800 ton battleship” (p.110). This is curious, since it is so obviously incorrect and should read 18,000 tons. Whenever such errors occur, they always raise the question: what other problems exist?

We are left with a profound sense of gratitude to people like Gillis, Gest, and Swann, and others like the leadership of the McGill University libraries, as well as senior administrators, including Gen. Sir Arthur W. Currie, principal and vice-chancellor, for their perspicacity in seeing that we would need their library in order to understand China. The three modern editors are also to be thanked for bringing Gillis’ story to light. His dedication and passion, especially in his later years working under virtual arrest in Peking with little food and no fuel for heat in winter are awe-inspiring. The Gest Chinese Research Library, although it was subsequently moved to Princeton, is a major historical factor contributing to McGill University’s status as the pre-eminent academic institution in Canada.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the book is its coverage of the early history of naval relations between major powers in the waters around China; an area that is increasingly the theatre of action with many of the same actors: America, China, Japan, and Russia. Those who like mysteries or intelligence gathering and analysis, will find this book fascinating reading. Anyone interested in naval affairs
at this juncture in world affairs would do well to read this book as a way of throwing into relief the events of today. We enthusiastically recommend a buy for scholarly and personal libraries in naval, military, political and library studies.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


This book is part of a new Osprey series and looks at the “duel” in the English Channel between the German Schellboot (S-Boats) and various British Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) and Motor Gun Boats (MGB). It is aimed at a general readership and provides an account of this often overlooked aspect of the Battle of the Atlantic by means of seven unequal chapters and a very concise bibliography. It features many good colour plates of boats and weapons that will be useful for the modelers, as well as full-colour recreations of scenes and a number of black and white photographs; some of which have often been seen before. There are no line drawings of the various craft so modelers will have to look to another source to assist their work.

The first chapter offers a short overview of both English and German MTBs leading up to the Second World War while the second chapter looks at their design and development; Germany produced their first S-Boats after 1931 and these proved the basis for all future S-Boat development. The author spends more time describing the development of the British MTBs but it is to be expected as Britain developed a greater range of small boats than Germany. The British types were grouped into four categories: MTB, MGB, Motor Launches (ML) and air-sea rescue launches (ASRL). Unfortunately, the mixture of metric and imperial measurements when describing the characteristics of the vessels makes comparisons difficult.

The next chapter looks at the technical specifications of the various vessels and begins with the S-Boats but inconsistent descriptions for the armament is confusing. Next come the German R-Boats which were relatively fast vessels that performed various tasks such as convoy escort, sub-chasing, mine laying, minesweeping and air-sea rescue work. There are interesting data in this chapter but again, it is inconsistent and one-sided. For example, German torpedoes merit one full page versus six lines for two types of British torpedoes. The strategic situation follows for both sides regarding the employment of torpedo-boats; interestingly, both sides were targeting the opponent’s shipping with their MTBs. The MTBs had insufficient protection against heavier warships but they could battle each other. The author then looks at the combatants beginning with the national organization of the S-Bootwaffe and the British Coastal Forces. The flotillas of both nations were not permanently located at any specific port and were often supported by tenders. Both used the torpedoes against large targets and guns or machine-guns against their counterparts.

The next subsection covers the tactics employed by both sides. Most of the actions occurred at night using only a few formations. Typically, the boats cruised at around 25 knots until the enemy was spotted, then they reduced speed to 9 knots for an approach. Once on site, the engines were cut and the crew waited until the enemy vessels crossed in front. Following an attack with guns and machines-guns, the
MTB would speed up to avoid retribution while generating a smokescreen. British MGBs often joined the MTBs to conduct an attack or pursue the S-Boots.

The major engagements in the English Channel are described in the following chapter which is divided into the first combats in 1939-40, the build-up of 1941, the success of the S-Boats in 1942 in Operation Cerberus, the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe raids, the turning of the tide in 1943, the defeat of the S-Boats in 1944 with the exception of Exercise Tiger and the final actions in 1945. As expected, this chapter on the actual duels is the longest.

A brief statistical analysis of the forces of both sides follows, featuring tables of MTB’s lost on both sides according to month and year. What would have been interesting was statistics about the numbers of ships sunk by the MTBs during the war as well as tables showing the new construction of these vessels by month. These data would improve the reader’s understanding of the MTB situation.

The conclusion presents the “kills” expected in the previous chapter but they are generic and are not broken down. It discusses the immediate post-war future of MTBs but it doesn’t indicate which boats were better. A very light bibliography is provided comprised of mostly recent titles.

In general, this book is a light, occasionally unequal, treatment of smaller torpedo boats, and will appeal to those interested in relative strengths of S-Boats and MTBs. There is little mention of German R-Boats and the larger British MTBs, such as the Fairmile-Ds, thus limiting its scope. This book is handy, if the reader has a sound background to support it.

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The field of maritime history has been indelibly influenced by numerous exceptional scholars whose work collectively stretches back well over a century. For those of us who study humankind’s relationship with the seas, oceans and waterways of the world, the names of these pivotal figures are undoubtedly familiar. Mahan and Morison, followed by Braudel, Davis and Parry gave rise to more recent major contributors including Broeze, Fischer, Rediker, Rodger and Vickers. John Hattendorf also occupies this select list, for his labours to enrich maritime history these past four decades have been nothing short of outstanding. His latest effort resurrects the stature and work of Lawrence C. Wroth—a pioneer in the study of maritime history, whose invaluable works on the histories of cartography and navigation shaped the way generations of scholars thought and wrote about the art and science behind the movement of ships.

Originally appearing in 1937 and 1947 respectively, Wroth’s landmark works The Way of a Ship and Some American Contributions to the Art of Navigation have been revised and reprinted in this single volume marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of the first publication. The John Carter Brown Library, where Wroth served as librarian between 1923 and 1957, is home to the original manuscripts and collections that formed the basis for his bibliographic essays appearing in these works. Wroth’s review and synthesis of the literature on the history of navigation in The Way of a Ship is organized into five main chapters, which together examine subjects such as the voyages of the Ancient World,
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the problem of position-finding, longitude and dead reckoning, and the contents of the most important navigation manuals to appear since the late fifteenth century. Excerpts from key primary documents dealing with the mariner’s astrolabe, Hadley’s Quadrant, Mercator’s Chart, and the practice of tacking are found in the four appendices. This is followed by Wroth’s Some American Contributions to the Art of Navigation; its eleven chapters chronicling the major developments in sailing and seamanship produced by the loosely defined, albeit admitted by the author, “American” navigators, which conveniently includes those of Spanish, French and English origin including the founder of New France, Samuel de Champlain! Essays on advances in cartography and other navigational aids for English North American colonies such as Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, as well as the Chesapeake as a separate region, in combination with those on the post-Revolutionary War production of maritime atlases and one on the much less known study into the Gulf Stream, remain eminently useful for those interested in early modern era navigation, primarily in North American waters.

A prolific writer, Wroth’s prose invited interest and appreciation from both the specialist and the recreational historian. This accomplishment of making the complex field of navigational science widely accessible is, of course, no minor feat. Hattendorf is to be congratulated for preserving the readability of the writing while working from Wroth’s notes and the manuscript corrections appearing on his unfinished revision of the 1950s. Hattendorf expertly incorporates some of the more contemporary literature on various subjects within the original footnotes and his preface highlights a few recent publications relating to navigation science and even to Wroth himself. This said, it is often wished that Hattendorf had made more of his expanded notations, not only to underline the enduring effect Wroth had on the scholarship that followed, but also to provide readers with an even more helpful resource to aid in their research. For example, Wroth’s essay on “Longitude and Dead Reckoning” would communicate with the present-day researcher more effectively if the enormously popular and well-received Longitude (1995) by Dava Sobel had been mentioned in a footnote. Similarly, the addition of indispensable works by R.A. Skelton, Norman Thrower and R.V. Tooley would enhance the list of suggested readings.

An attractive volume, it is bound in navy blue cloth with its title and striking cover image of Hans Staden’s 1557 woodcut of a ship’s crew using the astrolabe and the cross-staff stamped in gold. Clean and well-proportioned, this new edition is furnished with numerous high quality reprints of title pages, charts and illustrations from the collections of the John Carter Brown Library. Wroth is owed a tremendous debt by those of us who continue our attempts to understand and explain how ships and their cargoes have gradually traversed the seas with increasing certainty and safety since the world of the Phoenicians. Maritime historians will be grateful to the John Carter Brown Library and John Hattendorf for their efforts in revising and reprinting these foundational works.

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