States Navy during the Cold War.

Schwartz seems to have had a restless spirit, researching tirelessly among the issues around naval and maritime strategies after he retired, working at Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) for more than 25 years. His legacy personifies the unification of practice and theory. Today he is one of the most celebrated participants in the field of maritime and naval strategy, having influenced numerous scholars, especially the editors and the authors of the book.

Developing a concise maritime strategy means subjecting it to a full analytical process, not just the single perspective of a leader and what he thinks a navy needs to do. Using the history of Project SIXTY, the book illustrates how important the structure of the Navy is to the process. Established by Admiral Zumwalt in the 1970s, Project SIXTY was an initial step towards reforming the US Navy. Without giving too much of the story away, Zumwalt challenged a group of officers to devise an action plan for the USN, analyzing its means, ends, and needs and create a strategy within 60 days. While not completely “bulletproof,” their work established reform within the naval structure, and motivated debate about maritime strategy. It also serves as an example for other nations seeking to improve aspects of their own maritime strategy.

The book presents several Cold War case studies, but rather than focusing on the past, they reflect today’s reality. We are once more living within the context of a great power struggle where competition among China, Russia and the United States is slowly increasing. Thus, it is reasonable to explore the dimensions and consequences of the Cold War Era, searching out lessons and questions that can help us to understand today’s dynamics (many resulting from the Cold War) and prepare for what is coming.

The major flaw of the book is the heterogeneity of the backgrounds and nationalities of the various contributors. There could have been more perspectives from outside the Global North—only one article offers a perspective outside the European-US case studies, presenting the challenges of India’s Naval and Maritime Power (241). This, however, does not take away from the basic quality of the work: the text flows easily and the articles present a range of interesting perspectives that encourage the reader to learn more about the processes and issues of around maritime strategy in another nations.

Professor Colin Gray (former director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Reading University) once pointed out that the problem facing those who study or are responsible for defense planning or national strategies is that no one can predict the future, nor how the wars of the future will be fought. The only thing that one can do, is study, research the sources and the good works available. There is so much to know, and yet civilian and military institutions from around the world have produced so little on the topic of maritime strategy. Initiatives like this Festschrift must not only be praised, but encouraged. I look forward to the fourth volume, further exploring the maritime strategy, issues and challenges elsewhere in the world, especially in the Global South, where there is a different dynamic involving geopolitics and international relations.

Andrea Resende
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Climatic change and global warming are determining the melting of part of the Arctic Ocean, with profound consequences, both from a geopolitical and an economic point of view. All countries bordering the Arctic Ocean are preparing a series of strategies to face a possible scenario, in which both the Northern Sea and the Western Passage will be usable for the passage of ships, and the exploitation of the natural resources present in this part of the world will be possible.

This book, edited by Timothy J. Demy, a Professor of Military Ethics at the US Naval War College, is comprised of 22 articles, and addresses concerns of American geopolitical analysts about an imminent increase in military actions around the Arctic Ocean. The first threat to US security is represented by a Russian territorial claim over the North Pole, culminating in 2007, when a Russian deep submersible, used for a research expedition, planted the Russian flag on the sea floor under the geographic North Pole. Even if this wasn't an institutional act, its propagandistic effect has raised the attention of other countries. Moreover, Russia has increased its military action in the Arctic.

Chapters 6 and 12 offer a detailed view of Russian military development including increased strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast from 14 in 2006 to 97 in 2008. The impressive number of 41 submarines and 38 ships suggests Russian naval power, along with the largest fleet of icebreakers, including six with nuclear power, nine large icebreakers and many smaller ones.

Being the largest country bordering the Arctic Ocean supports Russia's claim of sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route, that consists of the maritime passage from Kara Strait (dividing the Barents Sea from the Kara Sea) to the Bering Strait. In 2010, a Russian icebreaker travelled along the route, while in 2011, the oil tanker Tikhoonov undertook the transit. A 2013 Russian military action in the Barents Sea confirmed its leadership status in the Arctic.

China’s Arctic role, even without a border on the Arctic Ocean is generating concerns from both the United States and Russia. Chinese interests, that are well analyzed in Chapter 19, range from the need for natural resources to the possibility of opening a Polar Silk Road, that could minimize shipping time for cargos, and avoid the problematic Malacca Strait. Until now, China has just had one icebreaker, but the volume of investments in Greenland, Iceland and Russia has grown considerably in the last years.

Canada is another country with a large Arctic border, whose claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage has not been recognized by the US and Europe. The military operation NARWAL in 2013 reiterated Canada’s interests in Arctic resources, while some territorial disputes with other countries remain dormant, for example, the US—Canadian Beaufort Sea controversy, or the dispute between Canada, Denmark and Russia over Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain ridge that splits the Arctic in half.

Denmark and Norway have respectively increased the capability of their Arctic fleets, while Iceland, after receiving financial aids from Russia in 2008, has the perspective of becoming a future Arctic trans-shipment hub, under Russian influence.

In the face of all these initiatives, how is US preparing for a future opening of the Arctic front? According to many articles contained in this book,
the US situation is a disaster. After 1966, the US Navy transferred all its icebreakers to Coast Guard, and of the three icebreakers that remain, only the Polar Star and the Polar Sea are capable of handling heavy ice. Moreover, both icebreakers were built 30 years ago, and the cost to refit them, to ensure another 25 years of service, amounts to $400 million. To cover the Arctic border, the US defensive systems consists also of an aircraft/missile detection system, and of a fleet of submarines that can operate under the Arctic Ocean. According to the objective fixed in the National Security Presidential Directive 66, however, this system still appears too weak.

In Chapter 8, David Auerswald criticizes the US Navy’s inactivity on the Arctic front. He identifies three main points: first, the US is too sure of a cooperative atmosphere among the Arctic countries, based on the slow pace of militarization and on the predominant role of international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, and the UNCLOS, that have represented the legal Arctic framework since 1982; secondly, according to the Arctic geostrategic environment, the goals fixed by the US are unachievable; and finally, there is a lack of investment in the American Arctic defensive system. He suggests that a short-term solution to ensure Arctic security lies in the use of solar-powered drones. Provided with sensors, they could monitor the Arctic territories without an excessive cost. Collaboration between the Coast Guard and Navy could ensure the launch of air and sea missions, while the submarines, with their stealth characteristics, could be used to provide a large number of personnel and equipment to a specific location.

This book, which also contains three articles about historical expeditions to the North Pole, is an important document for all scholars, analysts and decision-makers interested in geopolitical and economic policies around the Arctic Ocean and in US defensive strength on this future front.

Fabrizio Martino
Pathum Thani, Thailand


During the War for American Independence what was the distance between subject and citizen? The gap between the two conditions was more than a state of political philosophy. It was the Atlantic Ocean, all 3,000 miles of it! For the Americans, it was a space that held the promise of self-determination. For the British, it was a breach that had to be bridged to retain control of a vital portion of their empire. During the Age of Sail, the attempted imposition of King George III’s will across that void would spur the most ambitious attempt to supply an invading army in hostile territory with all the accruements of war, as well as to support their movements to various theatres of battle and eventual retreat.

In an interesting examination of the American Revolution, Dillon addresses the challenges faced by the British navy in supplying and supporting the land forces of the king. He adds an intriguing facet to the historiography of the American Revolution with his contribution focusing on the underappreciated and understudied aspect of logistics at war.

At the end of the French and Indi-