BOOK REVIEWS


Even as the Second World War ground onwards, Germany continued to develop and produce new weapons systems that were bold technological leaps. Anti-ship radio-controlled glide bombs were one such innovative weapon. Unfortunately, like others, they were introduced too late—not until mid-1943—and in insufficient numbers to become more than a nuisance for the Allies. Indeed, by that time in the war, the Allies not only had forewarning through signals and other intelligence about the new weapons, but proved adept at developing jamming devices within months to counter the threat. All this is the subject of *Warriors and Wizards,* a very readable and thorough treatment of the story from both the German and Allied perspectives. The author, Martin (Marty) Bollinger, is a seasoned business strategy consultant with years of experience working with large aerospace and defense firms. This background has served him well in understanding how the new German anti-ship systems and Allied countermeasures worked. Bollinger was able to trace individuals with direct experience of glide bomb attacks and countermeasures plus family members of others from both sides. These personal insights supplement the author’s extensive use of archival sources and both published and unpublished material. This new book demonstrates the same Bollinger hallmark of exhaustive research as his *Stalin’s Slave Ships: Kolyma, The Gulag Fleet and the Role of the West* (2003). While arguably on niche topics, both books cover fresh territory and are exemplary models of investigative work.

There were two types of German radio-controlled glide bombs. Both used the same radio guidance system manufactured by Telefunken, then, as now, a leader in the electronics field. Since the bombs were guided by an observer in the launch aircraft, both systems required adequate visibility. The Germans tried attacks in moonlight and planned to use illumination flares for an attack on Plymouth, but these experimental tactics proved unsuccessful. Both glide bombs were developed under programs sponsored by the German Air Ministry starting in 1939 and 1940. One was a large armour-piercing bomb carrying 320 kilogrammes of explosive. This became known as the “Fritz-X” and was basically a gravity weapon which could be adjusted for range and azimuth using radio signals to its vertical and horizontal tail fins. The second weapon was a rocket-powered mini-aircraft, the Hs 293-A. With a range of up to 9.7 nautical miles depending on launch altitude, this was a stand-off system intended for attacking light-skinned warships and merchant ships. It was seen as a potent anti-convoy weapon and carried a 300kg warhead. After release from the carrying aircraft, a rocket motor accelerated the weapon to its maximum speed and then cut...
out. The Hs 293-A coasted on, steered by radio to its target by an observer in the nose of the launch aircraft.

Both systems were initially developed by innovative scientists in their 40s: Otto Kramer for the Fritz-X and Herbert Wagner for the Hs 293-A. Not surprisingly, both were brought to the U.S. after the war where they continued their work in defence-related research and development. Indeed, Wagner was flown by the Americans to Maryland as early as 18 May 1945, just ten days after the German unconditional surrender.

The glide bombs were first used in August 1943. The last attacks were one year later; by then attrition of both aircrews and aircraft had taken such a severe toll that the Germans no longer had the capacity to launch further strikes. The Luftwaffe never had more than five squadrons (about 200 aircraft) of the specially modified bombers which carried the glide bombs. Although the original concept was one of attacking convoys in the Atlantic, the majority of the attacks were made on Allied formations in the Mediterranean. The bombers had to penetrate layered Allied defences over amphibious assaults and robustly defended convoys (Bollinger cites strikes against a convoy in the Mediterranean of 26 merchant ships escorted by 19 warships and against a convoy in the Bay of Biscay of 24 merchant ships protected by 12 warships including a Canadian anti-aircraft cruiser). Those attacking aircraft which reached the Allied concentrations then had to remain in visual contact with the individual target ships until the bomb hit. The author has analysed the 118 anti-ship missions flown by 903 bombers between July 1943 and August 1944 and is careful to differentiate between confirmed and probable glide-bomb damage. The number of ships sunk or discarded due to heavy damage ranges from 17 to 24; the number damaged but repaired ranges from 14 to 21. About one in three of the missiles that reached the target area did not function properly. About 11 percent of the bombs that were successfully guided hit their targets. The RCN suffered two dramatic glide-bomb hits. The new destroyer Athabaskan was hit in the Bay of Biscay in one of the very first anti-ship strikes in August 1943. Within minutes, the sloop HMS Egret in the same formation became the first ship to be sunk by a glider bomb and was vaporized after being hit in her magazine, sinking within 40 seconds. The second damaging strike against a Canadian warship fell on the frigate Matane off Brest in July 1944, almost one year later.

Bollinger covers Allied countermeasures fully. It is striking that the Americans had deployed two experimental jammers to the Mediterranean by mid-October 1943, only four months after the first glide-bomb attacks. By early 1944, the British were widely fitting a jammer and the National Research Council of Canada was developing one which went from concept to production in eight weeks or less. Bollinger found that records concerning fittings of countermeasures systems are fragmentary, but he estimates that during the landings in Normandy and on the Riviera in 1944, the Allies possibly had 90 to 100 ships in theatre with such systems. The aggressive manner in which countermeasures were developed makes it obvious that the new threat was given high priority and that the Allies by this stage of the war had developed the capacity to react quickly to new operational challenges. Understanding just how the German radio guidance functioned was the key to developing effective jamming. When two U.S. destroyer escorts made accurate recordings of guidance signals in November, the chain of command reacted swiftly: the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean reported the information to other Allied commands on the very next day. (p.93)

One of the features of this book
which makes it an interesting read is the author’s focus on various individuals on both sides who played key roles in developing and countering the glide bombs. Among these characters is Dr. H. F. Mayer, a senior official with one of the branches of the Siemens company, whose work made him familiar with what was happening in many areas of industrial research and development in Germany. While traveling in Norway on business during the first months of the war, Mayer, an anti-Fascist, contacted the British to offer intelligence on German technical research. Mayer eventually passed on what became known as the “Oslo Report” including material on glide-bomb research. The scientist who coordinated scientific intelligence gathering for Churchill during the war called the Oslo report “probably the best single report [on German science research] received from any source during the war.” (p.202)

Ironically, at the time, most British analysts discounted the information it contained about glide-bomb developments. Dr. Mayer’s political views resulted in his being sent to Dachau in 1943 but he survived and worked in the United States for several years after the war before resuming his career with Siemens in Germany. Then there is the story of an energetic 23-year-old RNVR lieutenant, John Field. In the Mediterranean in early 1944 to fit jammers in British warships, Field was the right man in the right place at the right time. How the German control frequencies were modulated was not yet known, but Field, while waiting for production jammers to arrive from the U.K., successfully monitored the modulated glide-bomb control frequencies during attacks on the Anzio beachhead and then constructed a simple jammer which he fitted in 11 warships. An intact glide bomb subsequently recovered from the beach at Anzio was first analysed in Field’s laboratory and then sent to the U.K. Field transferred to the Royal Navy after the war and retired as a captain.

Bollinger’s text is buttressed by useful supportive tables, diagrams and clear maps. There are several arresting aerial photographs of warships under attack by glide bombs including Athabaskan, and the battleships HMS Warspite and Roma, the Italian flagship sunk with heavy loss of life when she was unexpectedly attacked by her former German ally. Warriors and Wizards is a rewarding examination of how glider bombs are developed and employed by the Germans and how the Allies quickly developed countermeasures. Based on through research and eyewitness accounts, Warriors and Wizards provides complete coverage of a little known subject.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Ships have scoured the oceans of the world hunting whales for centuries. It is a practice deeply ingrained in many seafaring cultures and one that is hotly debated in society today. The Whaling Expedition of the Ulysses, 1937-38, a firsthand report written by Lt. (J.G.) Quentin R. Walsh of the United States Coastguard, was composed during a period of time when whaling stood at a crossroads, pulled in one direction by emerging modern technology and in another by rising environmental concerns. This edition of Walsh’s groundbreaking report on the activities of the whaling factory ship Ulysses, edited by P.J. Capelotti for the University Press of Florida’s “New Perspectives on Maritime History and
Nautical Archaeology” series, offers unique insight into the world and techniques of twentieth-century whaling, as well as a wealth of accessible information on the whales and whalers themselves.

Lt. Walsh’s original report was comprised of three separate documents: a short history of whaling in the United States up to the twentieth century, an account of the origins and voyage of the Ulysses, and lastly, a section containing scientific information on the different types of pelagic whales hunted during the expedition. Capelotti, assistant professor of Anthropology at Penn State University-Abington, skillfully organized this three-part work into a single volume. This reorganization creates a stronger sense of cohesion within the work without compromising its integrity.

The Whaling Expedition is written in clear, clean, and straightforward prose. While Walsh’s writing style does not contain the thrills and frills of a bestselling novel, indeed he recounts the number of accidents and near disasters aboard the vessel in the same simple, enumerative way he describes the ship’s engines or a whale’s innards, it does have its benefits. Such clear language renders heavily detailed scientific information and whale-hunting techniques accessible to even the most uninitiated of readers.

This is a useful and important book for readers and researchers in many different fields. Walsh’s account of the expedition provides information on whale populations and behaviour in the early twentieth century that would interest environmentalists, scientists, and historians alike. An individual interested in environmental causes can see in Walsh’s work the origin of conservation laws pertaining to whaling, how they were enforced, and to what degree they were successful. For the reader who is searching for straightforward scientific information on whales, Walsh’s report is a veritable goldmine. Walsh systematically catalogues the number of whales captured, their location, and their sizes. He describes in great detail how the pelagic whales hunted by the Ulysses travel, care for their young, eat, and carry out their many other life-sustaining processes. Walsh reads like an expert on whale anatomy, physiology, and behaviour. Of interest to the historian, maritime or otherwise, are Walsh’s vivid descriptions of the ship’s crew, officers, and owners. He depicts the day-to-day workings of a twentieth-century factory ship in living detail. He describes how specific types of whales were hunted and processed by factory ships. Walsh also chronicles the Ulysses’ relationship with the governments of various countries involved in whaling expeditions, and the questionable dealings that would allow a ship constructed in Norway and manned mostly by Norwegians, to sail under the United States flag.

The Whaling Expedition of the Ulysses, 1937-38 is a well written, accessible, and highly informative work of historical nonfiction. While Capelotti’s artful editing of Lt. Walsh’s original report produces a useful volume for professionals in a wide range of fields, the benefits of this work are not solely for experts. The writing style employed by Walsh ensures that his report can also be enjoyed by a general audience. The detailed, insightful, and scientific nature of The Whaling Expedition of the Ulysses, 1937-38 makes it a wonderful addition to the canon of maritime history.

Mark Hodge
Bonifay, Florida

The Great Wall at Sea is a well-organized, highly credible analysis of the evolution of the modern Chinese Navy (the PLAN). Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including contemporary Chinese media articles, Bernard Cole lays out the history of the PLAN’s remarkable transformation from a coastal defence organization to a “blue water” navy. Cole introduces his work by explaining the change in the way the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership views its ocean frontiers. He does this with a quote from a contemporary Chinese strategist, “[T]he ocean is not only the basic space for human survival, but also an important theater for international political struggle...The better people control the sea, the greater they have the sea territorial rights [which have] become inseparable from a country’s sovereignty.” (p.xxiv) Cole’s thesis is that the combination of rights, sovereignty, and a requirement for sea control form the strategic rationale for the new Chinese Navy. But this is as much about economics as it is about maritime security.

China’s precarious energy situation and dependence on imports to sustain its expanding industrial economy are made absolutely clear, as are the implications of a slow-down in the flow of imported energy and raw materials. Because energy lies at the heart of continued economic growth, any reduction in the flow or availability of energy is totally unacceptable to the CCP leadership — it would result in chaos. Because China imports over half its oil, most of which comes by sea, sources of supply must be guaranteed as must the security of the transit routes. This is part of the new navy’s job. The other part is to be the defender of Chinese sovereignty at sea. The growing naval slice of China’s defense budget attests to the political importance placed on these functions.

Conceptually, Chinese sovereignty at sea does not conform strictly to the constraints of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea; rather, it is based on a perception of marine areas of strategic importance. The South China Sea is the most important of the three areas (the other two being the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea) because of sea-bed resources and because it is the major transit route for imports. China’s claim to ownership of so much of the South China Sea is hotly contested even in the face of China’s somewhat belligerent “no negotiation” approach to dispute settlement — in fact, China is seen as a regional bully. The East China Sea situation is driven by the Taiwan problem and by Chinese claims to economic sovereignty over a large ocean area also claimed by Japan. That the Chinese claim extends almost to the Ryukyu Island chain is a source of deep concern for Japan, as is the adoption of the “Second Island Chain Strategy” for the defence of China over an ocean area extending out to those islands. A somewhat similar resource dispute exists in the Yellow Sea, but there is a better record of amicable dispute settlement there than in the other areas.

With the strategic rationale for the PLAN established, Cole explains the actual evolution of the navy in its organization, training, and equipment. The point of departure for this remarkable, 20-year transformation was a small coastal defence navy constrained by communist doctrine to be a seaward extension of the army. Hence, the change could not begin without the full support of the CCP leadership. The PLAN is organized fairly traditionally into three fleets corresponding to the three areas of

War, in general, provides a boost for new developments and ideas. Take, for example, shipbuilding during the Second World War, and the programs under which the famous Liberty and Victory ships were built. Less well known is the contribution to the war effort by the newly developed destroyer escorts and their crews. In the first years of the Second World War, the need for a new kind of vessel came to light, one that would support the destroyers. President Roosevelt was one of the first proponents of these small vessels, about 300 feet long, designed for a maximum speed of 24 knots. Designed particularly for convoy escort duty, destroyer escorts were equipped with radar and sonar, armed with guns, cannons, torpedo tubes and such anti-submarine weapons as depth charges and “hedgehogs.” Each destroyer escort had a crew of about 200 men, most of them teenagers, who all received a short training before they were sent out to sea and battle. In all, 563 destroyer escorts were built at an average cost of five million dollars apiece. Sixteen of the ships were sunk or damaged beyond repair. On the other hand, destroyer escorts contributed to the war effort by knocking out 70 enemy submarines.

The author states that U-boats slaughtered Allied vessels and their sailors on the Atlantic Ocean with great effectiveness — “some twenty-eight hundred ships were sunk in only the first six months following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.” This claim is somewhat over the top. German submarines sank about that number during the entire war. The book contains a number of literary hiccups. A few
examples: Adolph Hitler instead of Adolf Hitler; the Allies were “wining” the war. On several occasions the author misspells the name of one of the most memorable battlefields of the Second World War, giving us Iowa Jima instead of Iwo Jima. (p.236)

Cross shies away from using navy jargon; by doing so he may estrange his book from readers with a navy or a maritime background. On the other hand, this is a small niche subject in naval history. In modern day society not a lot of people are interested in the contribution of less than 600 navy vessels of a particular type in a conflict over half a century ago. The author does not make clear for whom he writes or what his intended audience is.

Cross has made good use of personal documents, diaries, photographs and official records. He interviewed 91 veterans who served on 56 destroyer escorts. Their stories offer a good insight into the boring daily life on patrol and in convoys, then the sudden outburst of violence, encounters with enemy submarines, surface vessels and kamikaze attacks. Colourful, realistic, and gruesome at times, Shepherds of the Sea achieves its goal of clarifying the important role played by the destroyer escorts and their crews in the largest military conflict in the twentieth century.

Although the title gives an indication what this book is about, one of the interviewed veterans put it as follows: “A ship is a ship … it’s the people aboard that make the difference.” This book contains some unique information. Although poorly edited, it is a valuable contribution to maritime history in general as well as American history in particular.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands


From October 1793 to November 1797, William Robert Broughton, in command of His Majesty’s Sloop Providence and accompanying schooner, performed a voyage, the principal outcome of which was a hydrographic survey of Japanese waters from the southernmost of the Ryukyu Islands as far north as Simushir in the Kuriles, and of the western coasts of Hokkaido and Sakhalin, the coasts of the Russian territory washed by the Gulf of Tartary and the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula. During the course of the long voyage from England to these remote shores, opportunity was taken to make surveys of Gough Island in the South Atlantic, Port Stephens on the coast of New South Wales and Drakes Bay on the coast of California. Broughton’s 1795-1798 journal of the expedition has been edited by Andrew David and published with an introduction by Barry Gough by the Hakluyt Society as number 22 of its Third Series.

On the evening of 17 May 1797, Providence was wrecked on Providence Reef (now Yae Bishi, or Yae Bise, 八重干瀬) close to Ikema and Miyako Islands, south of Okinawa. All the ship’s company survived, and after taking them to Macau in the schooner, Broughton resumed the task of completing the survey in that vessel.

A survey of the coasts of North East Asia was not the initial object of Broughton’s expedition. When Providence sailed from the Nore at the mouth of the Thames in April 1794, Broughton’s expectation, in accordance with his
instructions, was that he would either meet up with George Vancouver in HMS Discovery in Hawaii or on the North West Coast of America and assist him in the final part of his mission to carry out a survey of the coast of Chile southward of Chiloe Island. If he missed meeting Vancouver, Broughton was to survey the entire western coast of South America. It is unclear just why the British government was prepared to assign a valuable sloop-of-war and her hand-picked crew (for Providence was crewed by volunteers) to a mission of this nature at a time when every ship was required for the ongoing war with revolutionary France. Perhaps it was seen as important to take advantage of the opportunity against the eventuality of a future outbreak of hostilities with Spain, when charts would be needed for naval operations against Spanish America. If Broughton’s original instructions had survived, they might have shed more light on this question, and also on his decision to survey the coasts of North East Asia instead. Although David and Gough, over a period of two decades, “ransacked every possible file of naval and state papers, and of those who conducted or implemented policy,” their search was without success. When Providence reached Monterey in June 1796, Broughton received a letter left there by Vancouver from which he understood (wrongly, as it happened) that he intended to complete the South American survey in the Discovery on his own. In council with his officers, Broughton then took the decision to sail west across the Pacific to complete the discoveries left unfinished by James Cook, as recommended by James King in his account of Cook’s final voyage and by Daines Barrington in his influential Polar Tracts of 1781.

British hopes for establishing commercial relations with Japan in the 1780s and early 1790s were given urgency by the knowledge that there was similar interest in Russia. British fur traders to the North West Coast had hoped to find a market there, and George Lord Macartney, who led Britain’s first embassy to China in 1792-1793, was expected to finish his business there and proceed to Japan to open relations with that country but was prevented from doing so by the outbreak of war with France. The Russian Empress, Catherine II, planned to send an expedition to the North Pacific in 1787 under the command of Grigory I. Mulovsky, an officer trained in the British navy who also, like Cook, had worked on a North Sea collier, but the outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire and subsequently with Sweden caused that expedition to be abandoned. Many of the aims of the projected Mulovsky expedition were later carried out by an expedition commanded by Adam von Krusenstern during 1803-1806, who generously acknowledged Broughton’s priority, to the extent of naming the harbour on Simushir after him.

There is no surviving journal or ship’s log covering the voyage from the time Broughton was appointed to command the Providence on 3 October 1793 to her departure from Tahiti on 20 June 1796, so for this period in the present edition, Broughton’s published Voyage of 1804 has been used. Broughton concluded that work with the modest aspiration that, though his journal “may furnish little amusement to the general reader,” if it was considered by the “scientific and geographical part of the world” to have added to “the stock of nautical information” and communicated “a more extensive knowledge of the globe,” he would consider his exertions to have been “amply rewarded.” In fact, it was considered at the time to be of sufficient interest to be brought out in a German edition published in Weimar in 1805 and a French edition in Paris in 1807.

The present edition, with its copious annotations by Andrew David and
introduction setting the context of the expedition by Barry Gough, meets the high standards expected from Hakluyt Society publications (although a number of errors in the place names on the maps illustrating the text required the insertion of an errata slip). Modern place names are given according to Admiralty Sailing Directions, but in the case of the Chinese and Japanese toponyms, this has resulted in a mixture of transcription systems. The scholarly convention (not followed in this edition) of writing the Sino-Japanese characters after the transcriptions has the advantage of avoiding any confusion: the Hakluyt Society may wish to review its editorial norms in this respect for future publications.

Robert J. King
Canberra, Australia


The names of four young Canadian midshipmen, Malcolm Cann, Victor Hatheway, William Palmer and Arthur Silver, grace Halifax harbour's Sailors Memorial as the first of many members of the newly embodied Royal Canadian Navy who would die at sea in the service of their country. They came from among the 19 members of the very first class of graduates from the new Royal Naval College of Canada. With only the unready *Niobe* and *Rainbow* on either coast in service at the outset of the Great War and a general shortage of trained personnel, this graduating class of midshipmen, who had had a subsequent training cruise and additional communications courses under their belts, were ready for service at sea at once. Two of them, Palmer and Silver, were personally selected on the basis of their class standing by Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, commanding the Royal Navy's North American and West Indies station. Hatheway and Cann's names were drawn by lot from among the other eligible Canadian midshipmen in Halifax who had so far reported. Not long after they went aboard the admiral's flagship, HMS *Good Hope*, with a squadron southward bound in search of German surface raiders. Ultimately, this voyage would lead to a search into the Pacific Ocean for the elusive but very battle-ready German East Asiatic Squadron, initially based in Tsingtao, China, and commanded by Vice-Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee. Cradock was unlucky enough to find him but did not hesitate to engage, despite the inferiority of his squadron to such modern, armoured cruisers as SMS *Sharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. At Coronel, off the coast of Chile, on 1 November 1914, *Good Hope* was the first of two cruisers smashed by the heavier German gunnery and she went down with all hands in a very short time. Only two smaller ships escaped. The Canadian midshipmen were not yet even 20 years old.

The engagement is long enshrined in the naval lore, as is the subsequent destruction of the equally gallant squadron under Von Spee, surprised by fast, powerful battle cruisers off Port Stanley in the Falklands Islands. But the young Canadians (understandably) are not mentioned in these accounts and even Gilbert Tucker's first official history of the Canadian Naval Service only briefly remarks the incident. It is not known, however, as this is written, if the long-awaited new official history of the RCN's early years will provide more information. In the event, Bryan Elson has already done the job and with considerable grace and aplomb. He is a knowledgeable professional naval officer, well grounded in history and also author of *Nelson's Yankee*.
Captain: the life of Boston loyalist Sir Benjamin Hallowell. (reviewed in this journal, vol. XIX, no.3, pp.353-4) Elson, who began his naval career as a cadet at the Royal Roads Military College in British Columbia, has filled executive appointments at sea and understands how things “work” aboard ship. Ashore, he was also a most highly regarded base commander at CFB Halifax.

While the narrative path to Coronel is well travelled by the secondary sources, Elson skillfully and insightfully engages them as a template to provide the unique Canadian context which ultimately carried the young midshipmen into the gunroom mess of HMS Good Hope. From there is some account of their travels and duties up until the ship went to quarters (action stations) and battle commenced on 1 November 1914. This was not an easy task. Despite very limited primary sources, pictures and family papers, Elson makes the most of his material much abetted by his sound understanding and instincts. Thus, he has been able to reach back credibly beyond the mere names carved in in the memorial to add some life to them, in terms of family, town, character and education. He is also able to follow them through more primary sources as they are accepted into the new Canadian naval college. We get a very interesting sense of college life, requirements, studies, people and some of the fun times. Two years later, when they graduate—and finally draw pay—we follow them across the Atlantic (SS Tunisian) to Chatham Dockyard, where all 19 graduates report aboard the cruiser HMS Berwick for practical training at sea. As a fellow midshipman reported, they lived in the ship for a year, where they were “a very happy, a very lively gunroom.”

Back in Canada a year later, the future was less bright and Elson takes us through the Borden/Laurier policy controversies over the future of the RCN and the organizational/financial stasis which had set in. Still, by the onset of the First World War, they had the benefit of a communications course which provided skills in the newly developed wireless telegraph technology, enabling rapid communications between ships and stations ashore. Thus, when the hand-picked four went off with Rear-Admiral Cradock to join his ageing flagship, he got the RCN's best and brightest and most ready.

Elson's account of the complex larger events that brought British and German squadrons to Coronel is wide ranging for a small book, but, with the benefit of his own take, very engaging and accessible. There are a number of well chosen and appropriate maps, drawings and photos. It is not really fair to lament the lack of research footnotes but one must; it is disappointing to other historians or students, but small publishers often have little choice in the ongoing struggles to control expenses and still publish wanted books. Still, there are a few interesting notes to offer interesting explanation, enhancement or expansion.

This reviewer particularly appreciated the author's capacity to engage the human element as much as possible and it gives his subjects life and flesh. I needed to be reminded, for example, that the German and British navies actually liked each other socially and professionally at the time and that the latter found their own Russian and French allies a touch distasteful by comparison. Von Spee and Cradock were even personal friends. Elson describes the ironic example of two very welcoming RN squadron visits which took place at Von Spee's Tsingtao base and Kiel Week, the world’s largest regatta, the latter on the very eve of the war. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot in Sarajevo while Kiel was still in full sway and the RN quickly and quietly exchanged good wishes to their friends and glumly set sail home to
Service in submarines has always been considered hazardous duty and this book reinforces that view. Even in the twenty-first century we have been reminded of the hazardous nature of submarine service with the sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea on 12 August 2000 with the loss of the lives of all 118 of her sailors. Closer to home was the fire in HMCS Chicoutimi in October 2004 with loss of life even though the submarine survived. This book deals exclusively with British submarine losses, from the first to the last (no British submarine has been lost since 1971).

The submarine arm of the Royal Navy was created in 1901 when the British Government ordered five submarines of the Holland type (named for its inventor John P. Holland) from a British shipbuilder. An order for a larger, improved design, designated the “A” class, quickly followed the Holland order. A1, the lead vessel of the class, was launched in July 1902. Two years later, while participating in major naval exercises off Portsmouth, she collided with the passenger liner Berwick Castle and sank, taking her crew with her. This is the starting point of Beneath the Waves.

The book is divided into five logically arranged parts: The Early Years; The Great War; Between The Wars; The Second World War; and, 1945-1971, and is profusely illustrated with some remarkable photographs. Each submarine loss, and the circumstances surrounding the loss, is described—most in considerable detail. The author has used the official records as well as contemporary reports from survivors and witnesses to give an accurate narrative of each event. Given that the Royal Navy has lost 173 submarines, this must have been an immense research task. That the narrative flows in an engaging and readable way is a tribute to the skill of the author.

The early submarines were primitive, even by the standards of their...
day. The A-class had gasoline engines and fuel leakage was a common, and very dangerous, problem. Fuel explosions were not unknown and the second submarine to be lost was the victim of two explosions while dived at sea. Yet, despite this and other technical issues, five of the eight submarine losses prior to the onset of the First World War, were the result of collisions with surface vessels.

The majority of British submarine losses in the First World War were to enemy mines. Given the almost indiscriminate use of sea mines by both sides in the conflict, and the lack of up-to-date intelligence on the location of the enemy fields, this is not surprising. Several subs were sunk by German U-boats while the victim was on the surface. One was the victim of “friendly fire.” HM Submarine D3, while running on the surface off the French coast, was mistakenly bombed and sunk by a French airship on 12 March 1918. The Commanding Officer of D3 was Lieutenant William Maitland-Dougall, Royal Canadian Navy, from Quamichan, near Duncan, BC. He was the first Canadian to command a submarine and is only Canadian submarine commanding officer to be lost in action.

The period between the wars saw 14 submarines lost; again, collision with surface ships was a dominant cause. Among those sunk were four of the largest submarines ever built prior to the age of nuclear propulsion—two of the notorious K-class of steam-driven vessels and two of the monster M-class. Just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Thetis sank in Liverpool Bay on sea trials and her ordeal made headline news for many days.

As in the First World War, a significant number of the losses in the Second World War were caused by mines. The majority of British submarines were deployed to the Mediterranean, and this is where the bulk of the losses occurred. The anti-submarine forces of the Italian Navy also inflicted important losses.

The final section of the book deals with the four submarines lost since 1945. On 16 June 1955, in an incident tragically similar to the loss of the Russian submarine Kursk, hydrogen-peroxide-based fuel used for the experimental torpedoes embarked in HMS Sidon exploded while the submarine was alongside her depot ship in Portland harbour. Among those killed was Petty Officer L. D. “Verne” Mcleod, Royal Canadian Navy, from Goderich, Ontario. He was one of six Canadians then serving in Sidon.

A key theme that emerges is the courage, spirit and strength of character of individual submariners. Not all losses of submarines, even in wartime, necessarily meant there were no survivors. There are many tales of heroism and self-sacrifice in the face of daunting odds which are simply amazing.

Once or twice there is passing mention of some measure that was introduced following a loss for improved safety and prevention of similar incidents in the future. It would have been useful to have included, as an appendix perhaps, a listing of such measures, since there are many, including several to reduce the risks of collision while the submarine is surfaced. Also, the author is not a submariner and he makes the odd minor technical error. Neither of these observations, however, detract from the value of this book as a good general history of the subject.

A. J. Michael Young
Ottawa, Ontario

*Rocks Ahead* is a collection of 30 accounts of disasters at sea around Newfoundland and Labrador, depicting survival at sea and how people have overcome both the weather and terrain. The coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador are no stranger to shipwrecks, as this book illustrates, due to the harsh weather conditions in the winter and the extensive seafaring that occurred from the eighteenth to the twentieth century.

If survivors made it back to land, local individuals took them in. While being cared for, the sailors told their story that was spread from place to place. These tales generated a wealth of documentation that scholars used to narrate the disastrous events. Author Frank Galgay uses telegrams, newspapers and books generated by the shipwreck survivors to recreate past events. As opposed to just presenting the primary sources, Galgay includes the personal sources of each shipwreck.

Each narrative begins with a quick introduction to the area where the shipwreck occurred and suggests how and why the ship sailed into dangerous waters, thus putting the reader at the scene of the shipwreck. The author describes in great detail the actions of the crew and how those that survived pulled together to reach land. While each story is connected by the common thread of shipwreck, each one is still unique. The accounts range from vessels that were trapped in ice to ships sunk by German U-boats in the Second World War. While the stories move chronologically through time, the lack of cohesiveness makes for a choppy presentation of the material. Each tale averages seven pages of length but some end without any type of conclusion or discussion of the shipwreck. The author’s incorporation of illustrations and pictures allows the reader to imagine the scene of wreck and the types of vessels that sank. In some cases, pictures of the crew or captain create an excellent way for the reader to connect with the stories of survival.

Lacking a preface for the author to state his purpose, the book seems to have originated out of a love for the area and the untold stories of the men who risked and sacrificed their lives. Galgay preserves the experiences of those men as a part of the seafaring community in which he resides. *Rocks Ahead* is for a popular audience looking for an exciting narrative about shipwrecks around Newfoundland and Labrador. The author cites his sources when necessary and the bibliography allows for further reading or a starting point for additional research.

As an author or co-author of 15 books on Newfoundland pertaining to history, education, and folklore, Galgay is an authority on his subject. He is a prominent citizen of St. John’s, having been a teacher, a principal, and a superintendent of education before his retirement.

The types of documents Galgay uses are excellent primary sources and his ability to interpret newspapers and telegrams to describe the scene of a shipwreck proves his in-depth knowledge of the area and its seafaring culture. This book is a great narrative of shipwrecks and will be valuable to those looking for thrilling accounts of man’s survival in the harshest conditions. The author’s presentation of the material will suit the needs of a non-professional audience. This book does, however, contribute several
new accounts that are now preserved in the modern era for others to read. It not only provides great entertainment for readers, but leaves them with a better understanding of what it meant to be a sailor in the North Atlantic.

Daniel Haddock
Pensacola, Florida


Piracy is defined as theft at sea and pirates can be either individual mariners or a fleet organized by political or religiously motivated states. It is still rife today in the seas around the Horn of Africa, where currently some 20 ships and 400 mariners are being held hostage.

The author, Molly Greene, trained as an Ottoman historian and is professor of history and Hellenic studies at Princeton University. She is the author of A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Princeton) and has written “The Mediterranean Basin in Europe 1450 to 1879” in Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World as well as “Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century” in Past and Present (2002). Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants is her most recent book and is part of the series Princeton Modern Greek Studies.

Historians of the Great Age of Exploration, when an international maritime order that was to dominate commercial shipping for the next 500 years was forged, have largely concentrated on the effects of piracy in the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Recent research, however, has found that many of the oldest shipwrecks in the Mediterranean—often called the sea that was left behind—show signs of piratical attack. This book takes a fresh look at the quarrel in the Mediterranean during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between the Catholic pirates of Malta—the Knights of Saint John—and their victims, the Greek merchants. Although the latter were Christian subjects of Muslim Ottomans, to a certain extent they operated on their own initiative and were motivated as much by economic need as by religion.

Hakluyt was reported to have described how, in the sixteenth century, English sailors seized by the Spanish were forced to renounce their religion or face the Inquisition and how Algerian pirates made merchants pay bribes when their vessels entered Turkish waters. (Mancall, 2007) While some historians have argued that, by the seventeenth century, the popes had become political nonentities who supported the Catholic monarchs in their wars against Muslims and Protestants (Urban, 2007), others have portrayed Malta and Genoa as fighting a bloodless war over seemingly banal incidents. (Kirk, 2005) But perhaps the clearest commercial indication of the extent of piracy in the Mediterranean is that between 1620 and 1660, maritime insurance rates there increased from 14 percent to 60 percent, after which the attacks waned and Europe entered its own golden age of piracy.

Documents uncovered by Molly Greene in the archives of Malta’s pirate court have opened up a hitherto neglected aspect of the early modern world, namely the replacement of the Phoenicians as leading Mediterranean traders by the centrally-placed Greeks, with their market economy. Her detailed study of one group of Ottoman merchants and its conflicts with Catholic power contradicts the commonly held views that the Mediterranean Sea was a
battleground for Christians and Muslims and that the Knights of Malta were a throwback to the Crusades. Greene found evidence that those confrontations were more complex than previously thought and that, in spite of high levels of religious antagonism, the pirate court could, at least in theory, offer redress to Christian victims. Similarly, the Catholic pirates did not operate outside the law as they not only participated in the negotiations of legality but even encouraged aggrieved Greek merchants and captains to appeal to Rome itself.

Although Ottoman diplomacy in Europe may still be under-explored, this book fills a void in English-language scholarship. Greene has delved into the archives of Malta’s pirate court and carried out research in the Vatican Library in Rome—whose riches she believes have only just begun to be explored—and the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library in Minnesota. The book features a useful introduction that outlines the contents of each of the seven chapters and includes a 12-page bibliography which is dominated by a wide range of European published sources. While it is not a book about politics, its focus on Muslim-on-Christian violence prominent in the Mediterranean Sea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brings Catholic piracy into a broader context. The author sheds new light on both commerce and the struggle for power in a volatile age and uncovers many of the disputes that surrounded the conduct at sea of individual pirates and merchants.

This study is a work of astonishing competence, filled with big ideas supported by carefully interpreted primary research. It re-examines the role of Greek traders and the Knights of Malta and questions the conventional view of the Mediterranean as a religious frontier, where the main combatants avoided main-fleet clashes and instead encouraged conflict among Muslim corsairs, European pirates, commerce raiders and local predators. The author’s conclusion is that, despite being ultimately frustrated by the secular princes of Catholic Europe, the Greeks were not without other resources in the Mediterranean.

While Molly Greene has aimed this entertaining book primarily at the maritime historian (and she takes the word “maritime” in the title very seriously), it is written in a style that would also appeal to the general reader of history. It adds substantially to our understanding of those who lived, worked and thieved their way around the Mediterranean Sea in the early modern period.

Michael Clark
London, England


Richard Harding has been writing important books about the British Royal Navy for twenty years. His latest work is an impressive addition to his publications. From his first book, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (Royal Historical Society, 1991), through a new essay about Admiral Edward Vernon (Precursors of Nelson, 2000), to the present work, Harding has almost single-handedly rewritten Britain’s naval history of the fifth decade of the eighteenth century.

The author is currently professor of organizational history and head of the department of leadership and development at the University of Westminster. He is also currently chairman of the Society for Nautical Research.

Great Britain’s involvement in the

Richard Harding
The war of 1739-1748 has generally been neglected. Standing between the great victories of the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) and the even greater ones of the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763), it has been dismissed as inconclusive in result and incompetently managed. Harding questions all that.

The war posed a unique set of problems and challenges for British politicians, statesmen, soldiers, and sailors. They had to overcome the twin threats of domestic crisis culminating in the rebellion of 1745 and of French invasion. Yet, far from being incompetent, these people handled both crises and learned a great deal about the conduct of global warfare. Indeed, according to the author, the decisions they made and the actions they took during the 1740s prepared the way for British success during the great Anglo-French struggle in the subsequent decade. Harding argues that some of the key factors that made Great Britain the greatest naval power during the next 150 years lie in this war.

For nearly a century before 1739, Britons had come to expect the navy to protect their island kingdom and its maritime trade and to project its power overseas. A quick victory over Spain was thought to be axiomatic following the declaration of war in October 1739, but such did not occur. Indeed, after nine years of war, Britain had neither conquered Spain’s empire nor even budged Spanish pretentions to exclude all foreigners from its colonial trade. The Anglo-Spanish War had quickly morphed into a general European war (The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748) and British statesmen found themselves caught up in the complexities of a continental war against France in which they were unable to influence French policy. Historians have attributed this state of affairs to the incompetence of the said statesmen, their failure to employ the navy effectively, and the cowardice of naval officers. Harding sets out to reinterpret the events of the war and revise the old explanations of its outcome. Like many recent scholars of eighteenth-century British history, his success lies in locating the war in the twin contexts of domestic politics, including those of the court, and of international diplomacy, which reveal the men involved to be far from incompetent bunglers and rather successful in working their way towards solving several challenging problems. In ten well-researched, well-written chapters, the author identifies and analyses the domestic political problems that swiftly arose to destabilize Sir Robert Walpole’s influence. Although he had been chancellor of the Exchequer and first lord of the Treasury for over 18 years and the king’s favorite servant, events at court and in parliament conspired against him. Opposed to war with Spain because he feared it would bring several nations of Europe against Great Britain, Walpole’s relations with his war-seeking colleagues became strained. Belief in the city and in parliament in the overwhelming power of the Royal Navy and of Spanish intransigence was insurmountable. After Britain declared war on Spain, the effort to man the fleet to send the largest naval expedition overseas to the West Indies created other domestic problems. Defeat in the West Indies and changes in Europe led to Walpole’s fall from office in February 1742, the rise of the Duke of Newcastle and his brother Henry Pelham, and an increasing commitment to Europe. It was not easy to stay out of the continent and fight a maritime war as later navalist historians have argued, especially when the King of England was also Elector of Hanover. Austria was viewed as
necessary to check French hegemony and
diplomatic failure compounded the effect
of naval defeat. During 1742 and 1744,
well before any declaration of war
between Great Britain and France, the
British were deeply committed to military
operations on the continent and in the
Mediterranean. The war against Spain
slipped into the background. Moreover,
the lack of navy success made it difficult
for supporters of maritime war in the
cabinet and parliamentary opposition to explain how a naval war might be won.
The defeat of the British army at
Fontenoy early in 1745 and the Jacobite
uprising in Scotland in August made such
considerations irrelevant as troops were withdrawn from Europe and rushed to
northern Britain. By 1746, both the army
and the navy were revealed as weak reeds
on which to build a war-winning policy.
Neither was capable of advancing British
interests sufficiently to achieve peace.
The naval victories in 1747 over the
French at the First and Second Battles of
Cape Finisterre had very little impact
outside the navy. Beyond revealing that
new leaders and new captains were
reforming the navy, these successes did
not affect the peace negotiations that were
already underway. Indeed, the overall
lesson of the War of the Austrian
Succession revealed there were clear
limits to naval power.

Working with archival collections
of the many private papers from the
period, Harding convincingly reveals the
interconnectedness of domestic and
foreign policy during the war and their
effect on the navy, which suffered from a
host of its own problems. Figures and
tables showing the disposition of ships
and of seamen required on station,
gether with many maps considerably
enhance understanding the challenges to
the navy throughout the war. This major
contribution to the rewriting of
eighteenth-century British history
bringing together the political and
operational conduct of the war is a must
read for anyone interested in the history
of the Royal Navy in the Age of Sail.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario

Eric Hoops, (ed.). *Deutsches
Schiffahrtsarchiv* 31, 2008. Bremerhaven:
Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum and
448 pp., illustrations, tables, notes, German
with English and French summaries. Euro €

The 2008 edition of the *Deutsches
Schiffahrtsarchiv* (German Maritime
Archive) is a sizeable and interesting
collection of articles on varying nautical
topics. The book covers a wide range of
subjects and time periods and there is
something relevant for readers with interests
ranging from art history to economic
history. All articles are fully documented,
illustrated, and demonstrate thorough, high-
quality research. Non-specialists will also
find the volume a compelling read, as the
articles are engagingly written and
accessible, even though they are
academically geared.

One of the many positive aspects of
the volume is the effort it makes to
encompass all fields connected to maritime
history. Those interested in nautical art will
find Lars Scholl and Rüdiger von Ancken’s
contribution, a biography of marine painter
Geo Walters (1866-1943), a fascinating read
as the artist was a successful amateur
painter who also held a limited master’s
certificate. Included is a fair selection of his
works, demonstrating his focus on small
shipping along the Elbe. Furthermore, in
terms of art, Hans-Walter Kehlwohl
provides an analysis of Friedrich
Kallmorgen whose painting “Rafts on the Vistula” is a source for the history of log rafts and logging around the Vistula River.

Recent trends in history are included as well. The volume contains no fewer than six articles on climate history and/or polar exploration. Gerd Wegner’s “Meteorological and Oceanographic Observations from ‘Greenland Expeditions’” is of great interest. It examines the logs of northern whaling expeditions as a source for examining historical weather. These logs indicate that the ship’s officers were keen observers, some even logging and classifying different snowflake sizes. Walter Lenz writes a brief account of oceanographer Wilhelm Brennecke’s pioneering success in being able to chart deep ocean currents during his 1906-07 voyage aboard the survey vessel Planet. There is also an article by Jochen Haas who argues that it is possible to use early medieval chronicles to reconstruct period weather in a general form.

The core of the volume is a selection of excellent research-based articles that again cover a wide range of nautical topics and issues. Hartmut Nölldeke contributes a biography of Manfred Nahm, MD (1867-1933), who was a doctor in the Kaiserliche Marine from 1892-1914. Nölldeke focuses on the primary sources written by Dr. Nahm during his two-year voyage aboard SMS Möwe in the South Pacific in 1898-99. It is a rich account of the doctor’s observations and his tasks as doctor on such a long voyage. Dr. Nahm was critical where appropriate and the author posits that much of what was learned by this previously-unknown naval doctor would be of great benefit to the future voyages to the Pacific by an ever expanding colonial fleet.

Another article is Christian Ostersehlte’s examination of the sinking of the RMS Titanic as the turning point regarding the “lifeboat question.” The author argues that much of the problem regarding lifeboats is that up until the turn of the century, ships boats had been carried only for transportation of crews, saving lives had always been secondary. A historic first came after the 1883 sinking of the HAPAG liner Cimbra, which led to the loss of 437 lives, as the Hamburg Maritime Court ruled that from then on all ships were required to carry sufficient lifeboats for all persons aboard. The German decision was unique, however, in that it was the only example of maritime law moving in that direction. Ostersehlte writes that the argument for enough lifeboats was made null by the sinking of the Oregon in 1896 where surrounding vessels took off all passengers before the ship went down. It was not until the loss of RMS Titanic that the argument for enough lifeboats for all persons finally won global agreement and is evidenced by the sudden “lifeboat explosion” seen in small German shipyards like Lürssen, Abeking & Rasmussen, etc.

Harald Focke’s contribution is a detailed article on the postwar profitability of the North German Lloyd’s (NDL) transatlantic passenger liners. NDL had, of course, been one of the key players in the North Atlantic passenger service before the Second World War and the company’s decision to get back into the trade was a risky and bold move. Focke writes that the height of the postwar NDL passenger service came when the former troop transport Pasteur was purchased in 1957 and became TS Bremen. In the early 1960s, for a short period, the liner was actually successful while aviation was increasingly undercutting the service. Although NDL did not officially record a loss until 1967, its profits in 1965 and 1966, the author writes, would have been much greater had NDL liners like Bremen broken even. Interestingly, what eventually saved the now merged HAPAG-NDL in the early 1970s was shutting down its liner service, pulling
the *Europa* from Caribbean cruises and focusing instead on employing the vessel on expensive, high-class European cruises.

As a whole volume, the book is an excellent collection of nautical scholarship. One of its few negative aspects is that its strength in breadth is also its weakness. The book makes a significant and laudable effort to be all encompassing. As a result, there is no specific theme that overarches the work, aside from the fact that it is all nautical history. Readers who do not have a greatly varying interest in all things nautical, the volume may not be for them. The other fact that needs to be mentioned is that the book is written in German. The publisher has included English and French summaries to accompany each article, but readers will find that the majority of these are lacking in depth, length and often do not cover the author’s tone or argument at all. The summaries are basic and do not do the articles justice.

Overall, as an edited scholarly collection on nautical history, the volume is an excellent source that not only presents compelling arguments but also demonstrates some of the new and cutting edge scholarship on a variety of topic as well as highlighting many of the recent trends in nautical research.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


Sixty-five years after the end of the Second World War, we are receiving an odd assortment of books on that wide-ranging story. Everything from highly technical examinations of minor or short-lived weapons (such as the German’s “flying bombs” of 1943, subject of a review in this present issue), “feet-of-clay” assessments of some leaders, to specialized memoirs such as this story of an individual USN seaman over his three-and-a-half years in the Navy in the Mediterranean and Pacific.

Houston Jones came from a dirt poor farm in North Carolina, enrolled in September 1942, served largely in three small ships during the battles at Anzio in early 1944 and in the Pacific in mid-1945 at Okinawa and around Japan until early 1946. Like the Canadian navy, the USN forbade the keeping of a diary, so, ingeniously, he simply kept highly extensive “notes,” which, with recent careful research access to most of his vessels’ deck logs, form the basis of his narrative. And extensive is the operational word once he goes on active service.

Despite his modest beginnings, Jones attended a college in Carolina and, on joining the USNR, qualified as a sonarman. The brief biographical notes on the cover sets the tone for his story. It reveals that Dr. Jones “has served as a history professor... and as director of the North Carolina Department of Archives and History.” His subsequent background shows in the way the story is told, so his carefully crafted, almost day-by-day tale is not quite as surprising as it might be. The two major portions of his story are the four chapters describing his *SC-525*’s anti-submarine patrol and convoy escorting in connection with the bloody Anzio battle, and then the weakly opposed assault on the south of France, Operation Dragoon. The submarine chaser was essentially the same as Canadian Fairmile motor launches, so his duties as the sole sonarman in a small crew were demanding. In fact off Anzio he was quite badly hurt in an accident involving the foc’s’le winch in a storm, which injured his hands and required a couple of months in
hospital in Italy. Even so, he continues the ship’s story during his absence. In the later tale of minesweeping around the Japanese home islands, in which he served in vessel somewhat larger than the submarine chases, he describes their efforts considerably more quickly, as the Japanese soon surrendered and the sweeping was only highly dangerous from the mines themselves. For the uninitiated there is a good description of that perilous trade, and the losses suffered from the lethal and often unpredictable quarry.

This tale is a detailed view of a seaman’s life, and therein lies its only problem. The story could have benefited from the hand of a somewhat ruthless editor. When his ship escorts a convoy from North Africa to Anzio, or Corsica to the South of France, almost all the other companion escorts are listed as well. When Jones goes on leave and tours around Italian villages, he give us the names of all those that go with him. When he attends a church service we get the minister’s name and in most cases, the topic of his sermon, whether or not it was connected with the day’s events. Wider events, especially off Anzio, in the sinking or shelling of various merchantmen and warships are covered faithfully, presumably from notes in the deck logs. One gets the impression that the author is setting down for the record, at a very individual level, a major and very vital part of his and his companions’ lives, which it was.

Jones’ war is a microcosm of a thousand seamen’s wars, in a dozen navies, and therein lies its value in recording history. It’s local war as seen by a participant at “the sharp end.” Sometimes the larger histories fail to give a picture of what it was really like from day to day. This tale accomplishes that.

F. M. McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Port management is a much neglected subject in maritime history and Kai Kähler tries to fill the gap in our knowledge for the port of Hamburg between 1910 and 1970. During the whole period local politicians, particularly Social-Democrats, used the port as an instrument to stimulate economic growth, enlarge employment and increase the welfare of Hamburg. A public organization (Kaiverwaltung, i.e., quay company) was responsible for loading and unloading all ships with general cargo (or non-bulk cargo) at the public quays. It operated on a not-for-profit basis. The city constructed the quays and storage facilities and warehouses, but it also supplied the cranes, and employed the workers. Hamburg’s involvement in the transhipment of goods, therefore, went much further than in other continental ports such as Antwerp and Rotterdam. The focus of this dissertation is on the institutional involvement of the city of Hamburg in the handling of general cargo and the discussion about how to organize it: through public or private enterprise? Kähler hypothesises that the containerisation issue was only a catalyst in the privatization of the quay company in the early 1970s. The discussion itself is much older. When the public budget started to show a deficit from the 1900s, the search for a more efficient organization began. The book analyses this protracted discussion from 1910 until 1970 in five chronological chapters.
The second chapter starts with the suggestion made in 1910 by Albert Ballin, director of the Hamburg-America Line (or HAPAG), to privatize the handling of general cargo by the quay company. This would guarantee the most efficient management of the port. He expressed his opinion after the city had proposed to raise the port dues in order to cover the deficit in the public budget. Shipping companies naturally protested because it would make the port of Hamburg too expensive in comparison with its main rivals. They stated that the fundamental problem was mismanagement and lack of entrepreneurial spirit in the quay company. Although the city was unwilling to privatize the company, it did allow shipping companies, such as HAL from 1888, to handle their own general cargo. In the next period, non-shipping companies were also allowed to load and unload ships.

During the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), the discussion about the best way to manage the port became almost “chronic,” says Kähler. One reason for this was the worsening competitive position of the port of Hamburg in comparison to Antwerp and Rotterdam. While port revenues declined, expenses for maintenance, modernisation of quays and cranes steadily rose. At the same time, after 1918, wages for workers increased. Raising port dues was an obvious solution, but not without negative effects on the costs of cargo-handling in Hamburg. In 1931, it resulted in a general reform to give the management of the port, while still in public hands, a more commercial orientation.

Under the Nazis (1933-1945), a period discussed in chapter four, the management of the port underwent several changes in line with the economic principles of the National-Socialists. This included a tighter public control of the port by centralizing the private companies and workers. During the war, the Allies bombed the port of Hamburg about 40 times, destroying large parts of the port.

Chapter five covers the period 1945-1960. Immediately after the war, the British Army took control of the port of Hamburg. Within a few weeks the mines had been cleared and the first Allied ships arrived. The management of the port was handed over to the Hamburg Port Authority and for the first time in its history, the port was politically separated from the city. When Hamburg regained its autonomy, this organization was dissolved and politicians resumed control over the port.

In the post-war period Hamburg faced several new challenges. The creation of the European Economic Community (1957) led to a shift towards the Benelux ports. Hamburg politicians feared that their port would be marginalized because of its location on the fringes of Western Europe. At the same time, port industrialization became a driving force for port expansion, initiated by Rotterdam and its Europoort Plan. Traditional port activities, such as handling goods (certainly general cargo), became less important. To remain competitive, Hamburg needed to expand its port to attract new industries. In the 1960s, the arrival of container ships further increased the pressure on the Hamburg authorities to adapt their organization. The huge investment required for handling containers was beyond public means. In 1970, Hamburg decided to privatize the quay company. Thereafter, Hamburg invested in the infrastructure, while private companies invested in the superstructure.

Although Kähler’s perspective is essentially institutional, his bibliography surprisingly lacks references to similar works, such as H. Stevens’ comparative study on the institutional position of seaports (English translation 1999). Port management is also not as neglected as Kähler says. There are dissertations on the management of other European ports (e.g.
De Goey (1990) and Brolsma (2004) on Rotterdam; Seberechts (2001) on Antwerp), although not all are available in German or English. Nevertheless, this highly-detailed and descriptive dissertation convincingly demonstrates that the discussion, public or private, has a long history indeed in Hamburg and that containerization did not start it. Furthermore, Kähler succeeds in blending institutional, political, economic and technological matters that affected the history of port management. His dissertation, based on interviews, primary and secondary sources, is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of port management in one of the largest and most important European ports.

Ferry de Goey
Rotterdam, The Netherlands


As a result of technical innovations, photography in the last decade of the nineteenth century became an adult art form for capturing daily life: the light-weight camera came onto the market as did more tolerant negative material and better lenses. The static photographs from earlier years—the real world had to stand still or it would otherwise end up as a hazy reproduction—were transformed into more dynamic ones. This development holds good for maritime photography as well. Traditionally, ships, shipping activities and seafaring people were pet subjects of painters and other draughtsmen, but photographers, too, found these themes appealing. In the beginning, these men made their photos from the solid shore, where they could make the most of a camera-support; their subjects were port views, ships at anchor, sailors at work on the deck of their ship, or quay-labourers, as well as inshore shipping disasters. Some took photos that are still famous today; who doesn’t know the dramatic images that members of the Gibson family of Cornwall, England, made of sailing ships and steamers stranded beneath high cliffs along the rocky coast of their county? Taking photographs aboard an unstable platform like a rolling and pitching deck on the open sea was quite impossible with the means available at that time, but after the turn of the century, the new tools of their trade finally enabled photographers to go to sea. A new phenomenon in the shipping world formed an extra incentive to do so: the appearance of the luxurious passenger ships enjoying their heyday between the two world wars. They brought along a new type of photographer, he worked exclusively aboard these vessels under German, Italian, English and other flags. In Germany they were called Bordfotograf, and Hanns Tschira was one of them.

Tschira was born in 1899 in Mühlhausen, a German town in the Alsace (since 1918, French). There his father earned his money as a portrait and press photographer until his death in 1914. A year later, Hanns took over his business, directly after finishing school. Despite his success, in 1926 he decided to trim his sails to the wind and to apply for the position of on-board-photographer with Norddeutscher Lloyd in Bremen. In that capacity, he made a number of long trips to the Far East and more than 150 transatlantic crossings to North- and South-American and Caribbean ports. Tschira found the themes for his photos firstly among the passengers and their daily doings in the luxurious scenery aboard the “floating palaces” of those days, but also among the ship’s crew, the landscapes and places of interest the
passengers visited during their excursions and in the ever-changing moods of the sea. Tschira’s photos illustrated the brochures of the Norddeutscher Lloyd, the menu-cards used aboard their ships and many articles in (inter)national magazines; they were very popular with the public.

In 1939, the first signs of a new war in Europe meant the end of Tschira’s seafaring life. He left the ship he was working on, the Bremen, on 18 September in Murmansk and travelled overland back home. As much as possible shying away from the effects of the war and moving with his archive and his equipment from one place to another, he kept working as a portrait and press photographer, and he continued to do so after 1945. Hanns Tschira died in 1957. His photographic legacy comprises some 200,000 negatives, 50,000 of which have a maritime character and the Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum has acquired these for their collection.

The pictures in this book give a good impression of Tschira’s work, but they led me to a tentative conclusion. The photos have the character that one expects: technically perfect and reflecting all aspects of the life aboard the passenger ships of the interbellum. But they are also a little bit dutiful, they lack the quality of the work of a contemporary colleague of Tschira, Hans Engelmeyer; his cut-outs and his exposure make his photos (covering the same subjects as Tschira’s) much more the work of an artist.(see S. & K.-P. Kiedel, Fernweh bilder. Hans Engelmeyer. Bordphotograph auf Passagierschiffen des Norddeutschen Lloyd 1930 bis 1939. Hamburg/Bremerhaven 1989).

Leo M. Akveld
Rotterdam, The Netherlands


It is a rare event for two books on a similar topic to appear simultaneously, especially in the narrow world of eighteenth-century naval administrative history. Fortunately, while these two studies have some overlap, they are quite different in approach and focus, enough so that interested scholars will need to peruse both to gain a real understanding of the care and feeding of the Royal Navy.

Janet MacDonald provides an exhaustive study of what the Board of Victualling was, who staffed it, its procedures and practices, and assesses all aspects from the point of view of competence or incompetence. Of the two books, hers would be more on the “micro management” approach. She does deliver mild rebukes to previous historians for not crediting the unsung forces of procurement and supply of such essentials as food. While that does have merit, given that the small number of historians of the eighteenth-century navy were first attracted by great leaders, battles and tactics, then by the building and repair of the ships and dockyards, it seems a natural progression to more narrow studies of particular administrative units in this generation. Her contention (p.111) that the Victualling Board was of equal status with the Navy...
Board is hard to accept, however. Such studies as this are very welcome. As MacDonald points out, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the RN expanded from under 20,000 men to almost 150,000, and over 800 ships, deployed worldwide. Given the administrative resources of the time (handfuls of clerks working with quill pens and an abacus) and ponderous communications, it was a gargantuan task to provide constant streams of sustenance in unprecedented amounts. The seven commissioners of the Victualling oversaw the London office, staffed by 76 in 1788, rising to 166 in 1815, plus the staff at the various yards. As with most boards, political connections were central to appointments, and the position was held until death or voluntary retirement. After some scandal in 1809, three commissioners were replaced, which indicated a fresh approach to competence assessment. The board would receive notice of anticipated manpower numbers from the Admiralty and so could plan in advance for contracts. Tenders would be accepted from suppliers, and delivery arranged to the yards, where inspections would assure good quality. This part of the task was carried out with success, and MacDonald is at pains to remove the dated Victorian view that the food was rotten because of corruption in the administration.

The main area of incompetence (and the Knight/Wilcox book agrees) was in accounting. Parliamentary committees focussed on this in the early 1800s, and discovered that accounts were decades in arrears. Ships on foreign stations, and indeed the foreign stations themselves, did not have their accounts cleared for decades after the events. Sometimes records had been lost, but, often, the clerical staff was so overburdened with current business that delving into old reports was impossible. A similar situation has been noted elsewhere in the Navy Board. Nonetheless, the Board of Revision report condemned the whole operation, tactfully blaming the system and not the individuals. MacDonald feels some of the problems arose from the inability of the board to prioritize its tasks. Short term problems were handled well, but longer term issues were pushed aside (such as the old accounts) until they became unmanageable. The whole board often handled trivial matters instead of passing them to subordinates. The political appointees handled daily business well enough, but there was no vision for large issues.

Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox have approached the subject with a different focus. For them, the key to success in victualling was the mobilization and use of numerous contractors, who supplied the food and drink, hence their subtitle of “The Contractor State.” In essence, and this is a bold claim, the British war effort rested not just on brave warriors and plentiful ships, but on the marshalling of the British economy to supply military needs. There were indeed some government meat-packing facilities, but civilian contractors provided the bulk of all supplies. This was not a unique custom for, as some earlier historians have noted, the building of ships followed the same path: the royal yards built all first rate ships, and those below, the 74s and frigates, were mostly done in merchant yards. It has long been believed that this civilian resource, unavailable to other countries, was crucial to Britain’s success.

Who were these suppliers? They came in all sizes, some even working on commission in certain commodities. Most fell into either large concerns who held major contracts for the duration of hostilities, or smaller men, such as bakers, who might supply small orders for biscuit on occasion. Prompt delivery and quality assessment were prime factors in longevity
of relationships with the Navy. There are numerous examples of suppliers who were penalized, reprimanded and struck off the list for shoddy quality. In agreement with MacDonald, these authors emphasize that quality of food was a major priority, and those nauseating stories of rotting meat and weevil infested bread should be relegated to the rubbish heap of Victorian myths.

The Victualling Board valued ongoing contracts with established and reliable suppliers. This even extended to price adjustments if unforeseeable events caused sudden shortages which pushed up prices. Contractors could request modest increases to cover such eventualities, and many were granted. Surprisingly there seems to have been little political influence in these decisions, as the politicians were careful not to get involved.

One chapter amidst the overview of the whole operation focuses on the career of an obscure contractor, Zephaniah Job of Cornwall, described as a “merchant, smuggler, banker and contractor.” He might not have been typical, but he certainly qualifies as a Dickensian character before his time. Moving from school teacher, to fishing agent, to smuggling and privateering, he eventually became a contractor to the RN. While fairly small scale, he did leave an estate of over £10,000. Obviously there were thousands like him all over the country, and it was the mobilization of such men that seems to have wafted Britain on to success in the wars.

Both of these books are highly recommended. They agree that the basic tasks of providing food and drink were accomplished very well. They agree that longer term issues, like accounts, were neglected, and several Parliamentary investigations highlighted major problems. Office purchase and the charging of “fees” were phased out, and a newer ethos of public service began to creep in. In a way, the reforms of the Victualling Board presaged the change in general attitudes to how Britain would be governed in the nineteenth century. The MacDonald book is a fine example of academic research and analysis, though it will appeal most strongly to those interested in administrative history. The Knight-Wilcox version does deal with the Victualling Board as necessary, but on the whole takes a larger overview, and thus may be more appealing to the less specialized reader. Sadly, high prices will be daunting in both cases.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario


“A Narrative of the Life and Actions of Captain Cook must principally consist of the voyages and discoveries he made, and the difficulties and dangers to which he was exposed… His public transactions are the things that mark the man, that display his mind and character…” So wrote Andrew Kippis, Cook’s first biographer. By his deeds shall he be known. Kippis was blind to the role that personality and character have to bear on a man’s achievements. He passed up many an opportunity to tell of Cook’s personal life. John C. Beaglehole, the editor of Cook’s journals of his three voyages and his eminent biographer, lifted the curtain on Cook’s past, but found the details slim and difficult to put together. He put it this way: “everybody knows Cook’s name; yet … extraordinarily little is known about him. He is an exceptionally difficult man to get inside.” Small wonder: he was a Yorkshireman, a private fellow who oftimes seemed distracted when in conversation,
and of simple past and bearing. He was, besides dedicated and ambitious, educated by the Quakers, and trained in mathematics and navigation. By his deeds he shall be known is no small accomplishment. Manners maketh the man.

Jerry Lockett’s desire is to describe James Cook’s early years in the Royal Navy and to give due attention to his many years service in the waters of what is now called Atlantic Canada, notably Nova Scotia and Newfoundland but also the St. Lawrence both river and gulf. This is not a new mission. Beaglehole attended to it in his biography of Cook. Victor Suthren gave it commendable coverage in his *To Go Upon Discovery: James Cook and Canada, from 1758 to 1779* (Dundurn, 2000). Monographic studies, notably W.H. Whiteley, “James Cook and British Policy in the Newfoundland Fisheries, 1763-7,” *Canadian Historical Review*, 54 (1973), discuss the political and commercial implications of the Newfoundland surveys. Andrew David, in the hydrographic records, Taunton, has listed Cook’s charts and drawings. Lockett, if familiar with Suthren, Whiteley and David, does not include them in his bibliography. But the main features of Cook’s work in North American waters are nicely outlined. The writing is clear and direct. A drawing by Cook of Halifax naval yard and another of Halifax Harbour are welcome additions to the public’s quest for more visual details of Cook in Nova Scotia at a critical time. I found fascinating the appendix that has as its subject not one but three James Cooks. That there were three is the sort of detail that niggling archivists love to unload on the unsuspecting inquirer, and here we have all the details. Another appendix is on Cook and the chart publishers, and it is refreshing to read that Cook himself held chart merchants in low regard: many poor-quality charts were based on flimsy data. Chartmakers were afraid to state on charts the origin or reliability of the survey or surveys upon which they were based. “They say it hurts the sale of the work,” the master mariner noted bitterly. Cook was equally critical of other mariners. “I have known [seamen] lay down the line of a Coast they have never seen,” he wrote, “and put down soundings where they have never sounded, and after all are so found of their performances as to pass’d [sic] the whole thing off as sterling under the Title of a Survey Plan etc.” When you put this together with St Martin’s Lane map seller Thomas Jeffreys’ caustic remark of 1755 that “the generality of mariners seem to know of no quality in observing latitudes, farther than to find the place where they are bound to; and when they come in sight of land, lay the quadrant aside, as an instrument no longer of use, and sail by direction of the coast” it gives pause. It puts into doubt many charts produced before James Cook’s time and it makes all the more significant the more detailed work that came towards the close of the eighteenth century when George Vancouver and William Robert Broughton were making their great surveys in the North Pacific Ocean.

Barry Gough
Victoria, British Columbia


The geographical topic and chronological timeframe of *The Spanish Experience in
Taiwan, 1626-1642 may surprise some readers. Without too much effort, however, readers will quickly remember that the Spanish explorations, conquests and colonization spread across the Pacific Ocean from Mexico into the Mariana and Philippine Islands beginning in 1521, with Manila becoming a crucial entrepôt for trade between the Americas and mainland Asia. José Eugenio Borao Mateo, a professor of Spanish language and culture at National Taiwan University, has written a delightful book that reminds us that the Spanish experience in the islands of Southeast Asia included not only the Philippine archipelago, but also the beautiful island of Formosa, now Taiwan. The Spanish Empire did not last long, being displaced by the Dutch and later the Qing Dynasty, but like Warren L. Cook’s 1973 book, *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819*, this book establishes another “flood tide” of Spanish colonization that reached beyond what most remember today.

Tonio Andrade has also examined this very interesting imperial history, taking on the three main colonizing powers in Taiwan. His 2009 book *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century* points the interested reader to a wealth of sources and secondary histories. The beneficial fruits of globalization call for celebration when so much good history is easily available for immediate access. The similarly quick global reach of *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan* does not diminish the clear evidence of long years of archival research. The author organized the primary sources into a two-volume set published in 2001 and 2002, entitled *Spaniards in Taiwan*. Materials from the printed primary sources have already emerged on the Internet, especially the navigation maps made by Spanish and Dutch sailors and the drawings produced as the Europeans encountered the indigenous Austronesian-speaking peoples. These earlier volumes of primary sources are profitably cited as SIT in the endnotes for the 2010 book.

The identification and use of primary sources in the book illustrate the valuable history being presented. In six chapters, the story of the Dutch-Spanish rivalry in the South China Sea sets the foundation for Spanish entry into Taiwan, the encounter with the indigenous people and the founding on the northeast coast of the island the “embryonic” city of San Salvador. The Manila Galleon sailed past Formosa every year on its way to Acapulco. Chinese merchants commissioned boats to sail south to Manila, also passing by the island. After formal relations between warring Japanese daimyo and the Imperial government of China were broken off in 1549, extra-legal Japanese and Chinese sailors met on Taiwan. Borao examines how the many groups recognized the opportunities of an island located between so many conflicts. The strategic value of Taiwan was not the only reason for its importance in the seventeenth century; sulfur mines, bonga (a red dye), liana, and deerskins from Taiwan were of continued interest on the maritime trade routes. Tobacco, a New World plant, was common enough in 1628 that when a young man visited his future wife’s home, he discreetly received some from her. Tobacco bundles, leaves and sticks became so popular that ships coming from Manila to re-supply the Spanish troops in the fort of San Salvador on Taiwan between 1634 and 1642 brought over 1,000 kilograms for the soldiers. Missionaries also accompanied the soldiers and trade goods, baptizing the islanders and looking to springboard into China. And yet, the Dutch prevailed over the Spanish, so that by 1642 the Spanish King ordered the withdrawal from Taiwan. Eventually in the 1660s, the resurgent Qing Dynasty reincorporated rebels and pirates on Taiwan,
like the famous Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), into a Chinese world.

Many of the most important documents are excerpted in the monograph within the 22 annexes printed after the conclusion. Of interest, the annexes include the description by a Dominican priest who accompanied the 1626 fleet from Manila to Taiwan. Jacinto Esquivel, the Dominican, described “the initial acceptance of the missionary work by the native” in a later 1632 document, writing “they are still afraid and suspicious of us.” (Annex 10, p.220) Esquivel also reported to his superiors that Spanish authorities acknowledged the illegal nature of a specific violent house-burning and purportedly were prepared to pay the natives 4,000 pesos, but six years later had only paid the victims 400 pesos. In another annex, Borao includes his own research about the Spanish fortress of Quelang begun in 1626, which was originally published in the catalog of an exhibition at the Taipei Museum of History in 2006. The primary sources, tables of data, maps and translated articles strengthen the overall publication, making the book a boon to students of the Spanish colonial era in the Pacific Ocean.

Borao explains his indebtedness to Professor Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, Professor of History at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain and former faculty member at the Universitat Autònoma of Barcelona, where Borao received his PhD. Ucelay-Da Cal advised Borao to study universal problems, no matter if about few or many people – extremely good advice in historical study, especially in an age of globalization and growing importance of world history. Unfortunately, Borao uses the labels of Renaissance and Baroque throughout his chapters in ways that decontextualize them to mere labels that occlude historical analysis. How so? The early Spanish conquests and colonization in the Western Pacific, especially in the Philippines, occurred in the early- to mid-sixteenth century. Borao identifies this as the Renaissance, a murky period in European history, and less easily applied to global events. Later Spanish failures and losses in Taiwan are referred to in the books as Baroque, matching up with survival, martyrdom and excess but easier understood as after the Renaissance, the loss of idealism and naïveté.

Borao has the skills, placement and interest to have written what is already an award-winning book. The book was deservedly recognized by the Golden Tripod Awards of Taiwan, being named the Best Humanities Book of 2009. The author clearly engages the Spanish and Dutch documents with natural fluency. And his expertise with written Chinese documents emerges in almost every citation. Finally, his history more than crosses borders of language and time. Scholars from Taiwan, the Philippines, mainland China, Singapore, Japan, the Americas and Europe are thanked in this book. Our era of globalization allows Borao to write a worthy book about that first global era in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

James B. Tueller
La‘ie, Hawai‘i


A list of those people who played a prominent role in the age of sail would include John Paul Jones, Horatio Nelson and maybe, Black Beard. Likewise, in naming the important players in the American Revolution, George Washington, Paul Revere, Benedict Arnold or Lord
Cornwallis would stand out. The obscure name of John Barry would not likely appear on many lists. All but forgotten in the histories, only the odd statue in a quiet park marks his name and deeds. Yet at the time, John Barry’s name was well known in both colonial and British circles. By the time of the American Revolution, Barry was already a skilled captain with a good reputation. During the war, he was one of the most aggressive and successful officers of the Continental Navy. Author Tim McGrath’s ambitious and skillful biography of John Barry has revived the name of one of America’s forgotten and unsung heroes of the Revolutionary War, returning it to its rightful place of importance in American history.

To be clear, this was a most daunting task. Not only are records from the period generally rather sketchy, but John Barry himself was a man of few words, both humble and unassuming. Where others might have trumpeted their deeds, “Silent” John downplayed his significance at the time. The combination of lost records and a quiet nature has conspired to make the biography of John Barry difficult to piece together. The author has done an incredible research job, providing as rich and complete a record as possible of the life of this enigmatic sea captain. McGrath also brings his love of sailing and a strong knowledge of the field to the book, producing a very readable and enjoyable description of the life and times of John Barry.

The author should be commended for combining what amounts to three different historical tales into one book. The biography recounts the life of John Barry, born on Good Friday 1745 to a poor farming family in County Wexford, Ireland, through his death on September 12, 1803 as a Commodore in the fledgling United States Navy. The author succeeds in presenting Barry as a person who feels familiar to us despite the distance created by time. He has dreams and passions and strives to be the best at his trade. He falls in love, marries and experiences all the highs and lows of life, like the death of his first wife and the political backstabbing within the leadership of the Continental Navy, only to rise above these issues and overcome them. He is a fascinating “every man” who would be recognizable today.

This is also a story about one of the most impressive captains of the period. As the captain of a merchant ship, John Barry was widely respected for his accomplishments. These included not just successful voyages without loss, but the fastest twenty-four hours at sea while captain of the Black Prince. He earned the respect of his peers and colleagues as shown by his election to the Sea Captains Club in 1769, recognition that announced his arrival as an accomplished gentleman and captain. Finally, it is the story of one of the most successful American naval officers of his day. He played a pivotal role in preparing the continental Navy for war with the British. He captured both the first and last prize of the American Revolutionary War. He also demonstrated his skills and aggressiveness in countless battles at sea and on land. It was John Barry who played a key role in keeping George Washington and his men supplied at Valley Forge. His battles on the Delaware River in February and March 1778 are examples of his consummate skill as a captain. His running battle and victory over HMS Unicorn and Experiment in September 1778 and the famous battle of 28 May 1781 when Barry attacked and defeated HMS Atlanta and Trepassey make it clear why he was both widely respected by Americans and dreaded by the British.

McGrath also gives the reader a unique window into revolutionary America. While Berry is the focus of the work, his life is intimately interwoven with
the American Revolution. He owned slaves, as many did during the period, but set conditions for their freedom at his death. He sailed under the restrictive Acts of Trade and Navigation which limited where he could take his cargo. He was a merchant captain during the period of the Townshend Acts which raised the ire of the colonies, and he participated in the discussions within the Captain’s Club about politics, economics and independence. Barry’s fortunes suffered, as did everyone else’s, during the period of the Stamp Act when the colonial economy took a downward turn. He was at the State House on 27 December 1773, when a boisterous crowd debated the resolutions against the Tea Act. As a captain, he was in the thick of things during the political turmoil of 1774 with the HMS Gaspée incident, the Boston Massacre, and the Boston Port Act. He was sympathetic with the Suffolk Resolves and took an “active” role in securing the passing of the Constitution. Barry met the key leaders, shared the anguish and frustration over British actions and took up the sword to fight for independence.

Tim McGrath has provided a fascinating look into Revolutionary America and the life of one of the most important but least-known characters of the period, one who should rightly be called the father of the United States Navy. For anyone interested in the age of sail, Tim McGrath’s book is a must-read. The story is engaging and beautifully written, with a real passion for the subject. Students of early American history or naval history should also add this book to their collection, not just because of the quality of the biography, but because of its feel for the era, the sense of life in colonial America as popular rage and pressure was building towards revolution. It is also a must for anyone who loves biography. John Barry was man who lived his convictions and who stood up for what he believed in. McGrath has given us a story of a life well lived.

Robert M. Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


Alone at Sea, written from primary and secondary sources, is about American history, a seaport, the people who lived there, and their way of life pursuing a dangerous occupation that created many widows and a few orphans. The book is also about the Gloucester dory, a small flat-bottomed, two-man, slope-sided vessel that could be rowed forward or backwards and propelled with a removable mast and sail. From this floating platform men fished upon an unforgiving yet bountiful ocean. These dories were released when the schooner mother ships reached the fishing grounds. Dorymates rowed away to lay buoy-connected fishing lines that contained hundreds of baited hooks down to the seabed. Each dory routinely carried four barrels of trawl, each containing 500 hooks on the approximately one mile of trawl line and baited with 2,000 hooks. When the “hove to” skipper located some distance away signaled, they hauled in a catch of hundreds of wildly thrashing fish, some needing to be stunned. Their scaly prizes nearly swamped the craft. They then either rowed back to the schooner or were picked up as the schooner sailed to retrieve the dorymen. Once alongside, dory crews hoisted their catch onto the deck of the mother ship, later to be split, cleaned and salted by these same men. It was difficult,
but this work was also a practical proving ground. Successful dorymen were the source of fishing boat captains, those men who had displayed both skill and toughness on the fishing grounds. The next rung on the leadership ladder gave men the opportunity to demonstrate that they could handle a complex vessel in various weather conditions, find fish, and maintain the respect of those serving under them.

Historically, competition shaped the prominence of Gloucester as a fishing port. During the early years of America, Marblehead and ports in eastern Maine (then the Eastern Province of Massachusetts) were the nation’s fishing capitals. Gloucester slowly emerged as the largest and most lucrative fishing port, but then the market and price for fish shifted to Boston, leading to an intrastate economic battle. This was partly the result of changing technology for the preservation of fish, from dried salted cod, to fresh iced fish and finally to fish preserved by a rapid onboard deep-freezing process invented by Gloucester entrepreneur Clarence Birdseye. There was also an ever-changing market that went from economic booms to multiple recessions to depressions. Wars also affected both supply and demand, especially the Civil War and the First World War. Meatless religious holy days, variations in the tastes of the consumers in a rapidly expanding country with faster means of transportation (rail, paved road and air) all complicated the marketing of product and the gyrations of profits from fishing. The rise of onshore processing plants and labour unions also affected this cottage industry, transforming it into an economic battlefield where neighbours were pitted against neighbours in a very close-knit society.

Gloucester had a competitive relationship with Canadian fisheries on many levels. Many of Gloucester’s immigrants hailed from the Maritime Provinces. As the fishing grounds periodically became depleted of fish stocks, the banks off the Canadian provinces, very familiar to these immigrants, became increasingly valuable and a source of economic and diplomatic tension. Ever-changing federal importation tariffs and fierce competition for dwindling resources and markets put the contiguous nations at odds, resulting in what some have called the “Cod Wars.” There were times when Canadians refused to sell fresh bait and marine supplies to the Yankees or, if they did, it was at exorbitant prices. Yet, when there was trouble at sea, both sides were quick to come to each other’s aid, brothers in the face of adversity.

During the prohibition years in the United States, Canadians became the major suppliers of and profiteers from the banned alcoholic beverages. Because fishing boats were plentiful, innocent-looking and could land almost anywhere, they were commonly used to smuggle liquor past law-enforcement agents. Gloucester thus became a significant smuggling port. The local population’s attitude toward the “demon liquor” stretched from staunch abolition to tolerance to frank, open drunkenness. Finally, there was the quasi-romantic and colourful competition at sea, the International Fishing Schooner races between Gloucester and Canadian vessels. “[It initially was] a true fisherman’s race. No one argued about gear or tactics on the race course; nor were the vessels newly designed for competition: They were two salt-bankers that had been quickly scrubbed down and painted up, but they still carried their banks’ sails. Great honor fell to their two crafts and their crews. Lunenburg and Gloucester had done themselves proud . . . .” (p.274) Their reward was a cup, a small cash prize, but especially bragging rights. To this day, the Canadian ten-cent coin carries the image of the Bluenose that ultimately triumphed in these races — although the result is still disputed by some
diehard Gloucester fishermen.

The book’s title is somewhat of a misnomer. Labour-intensive and physically exhausting, dory fishing did not become important until after the Civil War and it dwindled to almost insignificance by the beginning of the twentieth century, as more productive (and also more destructive) methods of harvesting fish were devised and pure sailing vessels became obsolete. At times, Morris possesses the breezy narrative style of well-known Gloucester historians. In addition, he furnishes considerable scholarship and detail giving the book both credence and a readable cadence. His description of the hardships of the doryman and particularly the great international schooner races are very well written.

In summary, Alone at Sea is an excellent book about a way of life, the many people of various nationalities who worked in Gloucester over approximately three hundred years and how the history of the region and world affected the fishing industry. It also features three useful appendices: a glossary of Gloucester and/or fishing industry terms; a timeline of fish landing focused on types of fish and totals; and most moving, the timeline of the rise and fall of the Gloucester fleet, vessels lost, men lost at sea and widows and children left behind. Morris’s book is of value to anyone interested in the history of the fishing industry, especially as it relates to the port of Gloucester.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Mountbatten of Burma: what are we to make of the man? A great grandson of Queen Victoria, he was born His Serene Highness Prince Louis of Battenberg, or in the proper German, Ludwig von Battenberg. Lord Louis Mountbatten entered the Navy following his father and brother, serving in both world wars, commanding a ship and destroyer flotilla in the second of them. During that conflict, he was promoted to the rank of admiral and served as a theater commander. After the war, he went even further, serving as the last viceroy of India, receiving a peerage title of his own, promotion to the rank of admiral of the fleet and serving as first sea lord, before becoming the first chief of the defence staff in the newly created Ministry of Defence. His nephew, Prince Philip, married Queen Elisabeth II and the dynastic name of the royal family may or may not be Windsor-Mountbatten. All the while, he was a media darling on both sides of the Atlantic.

The issue with Mountbatten is: was he a man of substance or a vain, incompetent, social butterfly who achieved high rank and responsibility because of his family background? His ships were damaged severely four times, and his record in command of Combined Operations was controversial due to the disastrous Dieppe Raid. Adrian Smith explores the basic issue of Mountbatten’s competence in this account, which is the first in a multi-volume biography. His study ends in 1943, when Mountbatten takes up command of South East Asia Command, hence the sub-title: Apprentice War Lord. Smith teaches at the University of Southampton, where Mountbatten’s papers are stored. He has also published other books on British political, military, and social history. This background shows. He offers his readers an impressive and detailed study that is also an interesting read. Smith hits the right balance for a biographer by being both sympathetic and detached. He shows that Mountbatten was a competent, dedicated, and ambitious naval professional at a time
when professionalism was still looked down upon in his social class. He managed the officers and men under his command with skill. He was a charming individual, made friends easily, and was loyal to those who served with him, but his vanity and ambition often rubbed people the wrong way. He was more than willing to use his family connections, which succeeded in the short term, but often had long-term ramifications for his reputation.

Mountbatten’s most controversial actions came during his tenure at Combined Operations when he authorized the attack on Dieppe. Mountbatten was not promoted beyond his professional competence, as others have argued, but he was responsible for many of the things that went wrong. Smith rejects Mountbatten’s argument that the raid taught lessons that paid dividends on D-Day. This raid was a disaster for a number of reasons. Many of those were not of Mountbatten’s making. To be blunt, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was just not that good, but this hardly absolves him of responsibility for this disaster. Smith shows that he pushed the operation forward without authorization from the Chiefs of Staff Committee or British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, as Brian Loring Villa has argued, and a lot of good planning never got done before this project took off. Mountbatten also often tinkered and manipulated journalistic and historical coverage of his career, and Smith includes long sections on historiographical battles.

This book is an engaging read that provides a balanced, understanding view of a man that often hit and missed big. The next volume in the biography has much to live up to.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
Newport, Rhode Island


Dr. Murdoch has produced the seminal study of Scottish naval activity in the early modern period. Through his use of sources in the U.K. and on the continent, he has created a nuanced account that will serve as the springboard for further research.

The book’s seven chapters follow a chronological approach that spans two hundred years. It is as much a legal study as it is an historical one. Many of the references come from Scottish and European court records, indicating the complexity of naval operations in the period. As the author points out, economic warfare or guerre de course was often as valuable to the state as fleet operations or guerre d’escadre in determining the outcome of a war’s maritime element. (Indeed, people have tended to forget that Mahan’s emphasis on fleet operations was his first step to strangle enemy trade and open the way for seaborne attack.) The book specifically addresses operations and their outcomes, and the legal cases associated with them, as opposed to the theories discussed by David Loades in his studies of the English Royal Navy. The first three chapters carry the reader to 1618, the following four deal with the Thirty Years’ War, British civil wars, the three Anglo-Dutch Wars, two wars against France, and some conflicts that have escaped most historians. Intriguingly, the author cites trade ties as one of the reasons for few Scottish privateers in the French wars, while not giving any explanation (other than profit) as to how the Scots maritime community overcame its close economic and religious ties with the Dutch when it
mounted major privateering operations against them. The author rightly observes that monarchical absence after 1603 and continued reliance on a hereditary Lord High Admiral prevented the development of a naval administration required for a more robust national naval policy.

Murdoch’s explanation of letters of reprisal (chapter two) should serve as a mandatory source for all interested in international relations, as well as maritime and legal affairs in the early modern period. In a masterful explanation of an obscure, but important element of maritime history, he performs a signal service in defining the concept with illustrations of its use as means of redress, the development of international law, and how reprisals could impact foreign relations. Likewise, his discussion of piracy in chapter three provides international and domestic contexts, as well as dealing with purely criminal piracy.

The book benefits from a number of auxiliary supports. For instance, it contains a bibliography featuring continental as well as British sources. In addition, there are a number of germane illustrations. Sixteen appendixes (covering more than an eighth of the book) provide details on regular naval vessels, Scottish privateers, prizes taken by them, and ships lost by the Scots. These alone establish the book as the springboard for researchers. The absence of maps of the areas of operations is regrettable.

The chief weakness of the book is its failure to scrutinize why the Scots failed to create a battle fleet in the 1520s-1550s and the 1640s. The conclusion’s assertion that, in the post-1660 period, Scotland fielded all of the naval forces it needed begs the question. To prevent enemy attacks and to sustain the country’s own offensives required a puissant naval power or luck. In the earlier period, the absence of both meant that the English or French pursued their own plans with little Scottish opposition; while in the 1640s, good fortune generally provided the country with the advantages it needed at sea. In early modern naval affairs, unlike military ones, resources mattered. Did Scotland lack the physical resources (timber and iron, for example), and the infrastructure (such as large shipyards and a robust metal-working industry) that explicitly prevented the establishment of a fleet? (Scandinavian demand for Scottish shipwrights clearly indicates the problem was not technical.) While, the author correctly observes that Scotland was a small, poor country, similar status did not inhibit the creation of substantial naval forces by the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or Sweden.

In the conclusion, the author discusses the possibility of further research. The obvious lines of approach deal with the material culture of naval warfare, by which I mean the design and construction of ships and their artillery, as well of shipboard life, using not only written sources, but also the information provided by underwater archaeology. In addition, the conditions of service (such as pay, food and post-deployment support) of the officers and enlisted personnel could benefit from further study. One should also investigate whether Scotland created any theoretical documents similar to those written by English authors. Finally, references occur in the discussion of colonial projects in the 1620s. As Loades has shown, similar activity in England was a vital component of the country’s naval development. (One should recall that even Prussia had at least one West African post.) Were the 1620’s projects isolated efforts, or were there others that helped propel Scottish imperial development after 1707?

While seemingly a highly specialised study, several audiences will find the book worth examining. Other than Scottish historians, they include historians
of maritime law, and students of early modern northern Europe (including England and Ireland), and economics. The prose and format may limit its appeal to an academic audience.

Murdoch’s book overturns the assumption that the Scots had no idea of naval warfare. He proves they had an exceptionally good appreciation of how economic warfare/privateering could support Scotland’s war aims, and he shows how its courts played a role in advancing international maritime law.

Edward M. Furgol
Silver Spring, Maryland


Vincent McInerney has edited two essays by John Newton, “Thoughts on the African Slave Trade” and “A Memoir of my Infidel Days as a Slaving Captain,” and published them as Slaver Captain, the third volume of the “Seafarers’ Voices” collection by Seaforth Publishing. A devout clergyman in eighteenth-century England, John Newton is primarily known as the author of the famous hymn “Amazing Grace.” What most people do not realize is that Newton spent his early years as a seaman working aboard slave ships, eventually captaining his own ship and conducting business ventures in the lucrative slave trade. Although Newton’s narrative is written after he became an abolitionist, he not only provides his peers with a glimpse into his spiritual journey to commit himself to God, but he also describes life aboard a slave ship during the eighteenth century and offers a first-hand perspective on the slave trade.

The book is divided into the two essays, which were written at different times. The first, “Thoughts on the African Slave Trade” (1788) reveals how Newton felt about the slave trade in his later years. He wrote it one year after the “Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade” was formed to evaluate the Atlantic slave trade, and while he was not one of the effort’s leaders, Newton’s narrative served a testimony to the evils of slavery and the trade. Although the theme of the essay is a moral one, it offers an insight into the workings of a slaving vessel from the conditions in which the slaves were kept, to their daily treatment and food rations, and how they were acquired along the shores of Africa. He also tugs at the readers’ heartstrings when he describes various examples of cruelty, such as the woman who attempted suicide after one of the white crewmembers, tired of listening to her baby cry, threw the infant overboard. To historians and the interested reader, these descriptive passages are invaluable first-hand accounts of the harsh reality of the slave trade.

The second essay, “A Memoir of my Infidel Days as a Slaving Captain,” is mainly about how Newton became a strong Christian and a clergyman. While recounting his hardships and close encounters with death, Newton accepts his successful perseverance as a revelation that God intended him for a specific purpose. Although vague on Newton’s actual involvement in the slave trade, what comes through the writing are examples of seafaring superstitions and the sailor’s tendency to find religious meaning behind events.

What makes Newton’s narrative unique is the description of his own misfortunes and enslavement while on the African coast. While many people think of eighteenth-century Africans as weak, easily-exploited people who succumbed to the white man’s greed, Newton’s story shows otherwise. He spent fifteen months as the
“slave” of his employer’s African wife, nearly dying of illness and starvation. This encounter illustrates the danger along the African coast not only for the African slaves, but for white men as well, and probably served his readers as a vivid example of the horrors of slavery.

*Slaver Captain* begins with an introduction by the editor, Vincent McInerney, who served in the British Merchant Marine and spent ten years as an editor for the BBC. He has published, edited and written sea stories for many years, including *Writing for Radio*. McInerney lays out the historical context for *Slaver Captain*, helping the reader understand John Newton as a man and highlighting some facts about the nature of the “triangular trade.” Considering the heavy, religious nature of Newton’s writing, it would have been beneficial for McInerney to discuss the abolitionist movement in England and the Church of England’s feeling on the slave trade in general. Considering the heavy, religious nature of Newton’s writing, it would have been beneficial for McInerney to discuss the abolitionist movement in England and the Church of England’s feeling on the slave trade in general. It would also have been interesting to learn more about the shift in English attitudes from accepting the dealing in human cargo as a lucrative business to regarding it as morally wrong. This book will appeal to a broad audience and the readable style makes it appropriate for undergraduates as well as graduate students interested in life aboard a slave ship. Its true value for scholars, however, lies in the way Newton’s transformed attitude towards slavery illustrates changing moral opinions about the slave trade in late-eighteenth-century England, leading to its eventual abolition in 1833.

Sarah Linden
Pensacola, Florida


This book presents 14 of the 18 papers given at a 2006 workshop held at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. The purpose of the workshop was to begin a comparative study of how two related disciplines, civil and naval architecture, have historically created and described the shapes used in the course of their work. In the words of the preface, “both [disciplines] aspire to create complex, multi-functional objects, though for different sets of functional requirements and operational environments.” (p.xiv) The workshop arose, in part, out of discussions around a thought-provoking 2004 article by Eric Reith entitled “From Words to Technical Practices: Moulds and Naval Architecture in the Middle Ages,” in which he looked for similarities in the vocabularies of naval and terrestrial architecture. This work is reproduced as Appendix A, and is in some ways one of the more interesting articles in the volume. Although he finds similar practices between the two disciplines of naval and civil architecture, such as the use of markings to indicate the adjacencies and assembly sequences of discreet parts, he cautions against a too-quick assumption that similarity is direct evidence of shared practice, concluding that “terrestrial workshops and the shipyards rely well and truly on two totally different technical and socio-economic worlds.” (p.363) This cautionary note about drawing causal conclusions based on overt similarity is also echoed in Ulrich Alertz’s article “Naval Architecture Digitalized: Introducing Arithmetic and Geometry Into Late Medieval Shipwrightry,” where he says
“the naval architect’s work differed in parts quite substantially from civil architecture and engineering. These trades were . . . not necessarily capable of exchanging their trade rules.” (p.275)

The main question posed by the workshop was how much the two disciplines had in common. To explore this, the presenters were given several tasks: 1) collect and document the main sources that addressed shape-creation knowledge in each of the disciplines; 2) classify the types of knowledge used by each discipline in a way that would facilitate comparison; 3) explore the milestone points at which knowledge may have been exchanged between the disciplines; 4) outline changes in the styles and methods of each discipline from antiquity to c. 1700; 5) compare each discipline’s methods of designing and constructing complex shapes; 6) compare each discipline’s shape representation tools and methods; 7) describe the terminologies of each discipline; and 8) explore these ideas through case studies.

The results are deeply interesting and quite complex. Maritime historians familiar with pre-eighteenth century conventions of the moulding and shaping of hull forms will find much of interest here, such as a distinction between the definition of a hull being primarily transverse (determined by a master frame) or longitudinal (driven by drawings). Anyone who has ever lofted a set of hull lines will appreciate the chapters on Late Gothic Vault Geometry and the calculation and layout of column entasis. The methods outlined for the latter resemble nothing so much as the procedures for developing tapered spars or using a parabolic curve to make a deck crown pattern. In an article entitled “Boat and Boat House: The Conceptional (sic) Origins of Clinker Boats and Boat-Shaped Halls of the Fourth to Eleventh Centuries in Scandinavia,” noted Danish maritime archaeologist Ole Crumlin-Pederson explores the commonly-stated belief that Gothic arches and the roof structures of medieval churches were inspired by the frames of ships. Distinguishing between the shell-first and skeleton-first methods of hull construction, he concludes that the similarity is coincidental only, notwithstanding that both ship hulls and vaults have ribs. Such examples as have been found archaeologically of boats serving as roofs for buildings therefore represent adaptive re-use of hulls and not an original design intention, if for no other reason than that the lapstrake hulls of the clinker tradition would be wrong-way up when the boat was used as a roof and therefore greatly prone to leakage.

Even if they represent contemporaneous parallel practice as opposed to interdisciplinary knowledge exchange, there are many similarities in the ways in which the two architectures create and transmit shape knowledge. Some of the most interesting articles deal with actual practices in stonemasonry and shipbuilding. There are clearly similarities in the skills and knowledge of the masters of each discipline in the eras before the modern tendencies of specialization and professional differentiation separated naval architects from shipbuilders and architects from builders. Whether on a building site or in a shipyard, there was clearly a tremendous body of skill and practice brought to bear on the creation of complex three-dimensional objects.

It is, perhaps, an unavoidable consequence of a scholarly gathering in which disciplinary experts are brought together in an inter-disciplinary setting that most of the papers should be written mainly from the perspective of the author’s own specialty. A summary of, for example, the current state of knowledge of Mediterranean shipbuilding practices is useful, but leaves the reader to make the interdisciplinary comparisons for themselves. Only rarely do
the papers rise above their own subject matter to fully engage the interdisciplinary and comparative approach that was the premise of the workshop. As the editors state in their preface, however, one of the purposes of the gathering was to “lay certain foundations” for further study, and that they have certainly done. It is to be hoped that this volume will inspire further interdisciplinary exploration.

John Summers
Peterborough, Ontario


The end of the First World War briefly found Britain as the largest naval power with as many capital ships as the United States, Japan, France and Italy combined. Within twenty years, however, Admiral Jacky Fisher’s long-predicted second naval war was raging above and below every ocean and major sea, involving thousands of vessels, tens of thousands of aircraft, and millions of men and women.

Published by the prestigious Naval Institute Press, this book is the product of an unprecedented collaboration by an international team of naval historians. The project’s co-editors are Vincent P. O’Hara, who holds a history degree from the University of California and has authored three other books, W. David Dickson, an expert on Japanese naval doctrine and carrier design, and Richard Worth, a freelance writer and historian who specializes in warship design. The contributing authors are John Jordan on the French *Marine Nationale*, Trent Hone on the United States Navy, Enrico Cernuschi on the Italian *Regia Marina*, Peter Schenk on the German *Kriegsmarine*, David Wragg on the Royal Navy, Mark Peattie on the Japanese *Teikoku Kaigun*, and Stephen McLaughlin on the Soviet Russian *Voennomorskoï Flot SSSR*.

Amongst the subjects covered by this book is Britain’s fear that the 1922 Washington naval treaty would threaten British naval supremacy outside Europe. Others have pointed out that it was political considerations in America and financial constraints in Japan and Britain which brought this renewed naval competition to a halt until, in 1933, Germany pledged to rebuild its armed forces. (Lavery 2007) Although few battleships were built up 1936, naval strength was maintained by modernization programs and an arms race was sparked between Italy and France. In June 1940, Italy declared war on Britain, despite this not being the foe its fleet was designed to fight. Following Germany’s conquest of France, the Royal Navy had the distasteful task of neutralizing the *Marine Nationale* which by then had, uniquely, been an Allied Force, independent and finally, allied again. (Grove 2005) Although supplying Russia was a major commitment for the British home fleet, its Arctic convoys were as much a political gesture as a real logistical link. (Barnett 1991)

This excellent book explains how the seven main navies developed between the two world wars. Whereas First World War battle fleets were not given important offensive tasks, they dominated in the Second World War. By then, the Royal Navy included Commonwealth vessels, but the most rapid naval expansion was that of the United States. By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. Navy had become the most powerful in the world and it did not stop there. According to Roger Knight, by June 1945, the US had added...
dramatically to its fleet some 10 battleships, 18 large aircraft carriers and scores of smaller naval vessels as well as launching 56 million tons of rapidly-built merchant shipping.

Each of the authors is fluent in the source language of his research area, although not necessarily a subject of that country. They draw on their expertise to analyze how their chosen country organized its navy, planned, operated, fought and trained its personnel. All seven chapters follow a parallel structure, delivering a concise, point-by-point evaluation on the topic: I Backstory, history and mission, II Organization, command structure and doctrine, III Materiel, ships, aviation, weapon systems and infrastructure, and IV Recapitulation, wartime evolution, and summary and assessment. The three appendices cover guns and torpedoes, comparative ranks, and conversions and abbreviations. Comprehensive notes and an exhaustive bibliography are also provided. Finally, there are clear and informative tables and maps liberally scattered throughout the book.

While the consistent pattern of chapters helps readers to compare and contrast each of the fleets, the authors have carefully retained their individual styles. In contrast to some previous English-language naval histories that have been written from an American or British perspective, these authors tease readers with brief asides on other combatants. For example, the failure of the German U-boat campaign was blamed on over-optimistic expectations after the success achieved in the initial actions. Also, the Japanese Navy believed that, while facing the United States fleet was not the war for which it had planned, its shipbuilding quality would overcome American quantity. Perhaps more surprising is Stalin’s response that quantity had a quality all its own.

On Seas Contested is a comprehensive study of the inner workings of the great fleets written in an accessible style. The editors have retrieved data from many different sources and in various languages and thus the book contains rarely encountered information. The book’s multinational orientation delivers a fresh view that will be of great value as a reference source. It should be on the shelves of specialists in naval and military history as well as those generally interested in the hows and whys of the major navies in the Second World War. Mark Peattie’s intelligently-reasoned chapter on the Imperial Japanese Navy alone would justify the cover price of the book.

Michael Clark
London, England


“Where angels fear to tread…” is an expression that springs to mind when contemplating government procurement. Aaron Plamondon has, therefore, embarked on a difficult subject that arouses passions on all sides of the argument. The topic in question is the Canadian government’s replacement of the Sea King helicopter, a program that commenced in the 1980s and remains to be completed as I write this review.

Government procurement, government programs of any stripe for that matter, is by definition a political matter. Politicians make the decisions. Vested interests have, well, vested interests. The interplay between the two is “political.” If anything good comes out of the exercise at
day’s end, it is a wonder. Often good does come out of it, but one can be forgiven if it comes as a pleasant surprise to an observer in the process. Caught in the middle — that is, between the political side of the equation and that of vested interests — is the professional bureaucracy, or in this case the professionals in the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Forces have long, bitter experience in muddled procurement programs. In Canadian terms, the struggle is over price, performance, local economic stimulus, and political point-scoring. The recent acquisition of the C17 transport aircraft is a rare exception in which need trumped “industrial offsets” and “local procurement,” and an off-the-shelf acquisition was accomplished rapidly and effectively. Perhaps that acquisition can serve as one, fairly unusual, extreme in the procurement experience in Canada. The Sea King acquisition can, perhaps, serve as the other. The immense length of time involved in the project, its unsatisfactory outcome in the minds of many, and its staggering cost make it an exemplar of how not to conduct procurement initiatives. Is this a reflection on those involved at a professional level? Absolutely not. The blame for this lamentable outcome rests entirely at the feet of the political class and their dependents on the corporate welfare rolls.

Plamondon’s story is, by nature, controversial. He is not describing a circumstance or incident from long ago; he is describing a project that is still ongoing and in which the participants are still very active. Nor does Plamondon mince words. In his view, forcefully expressed in the book’s preface (p.x), the Sea King replacement program “…could be the most poorly executed military procurement ever undertaken — anywhere.” Strong words.

Is this fair? A review is not the place to discuss the merits of an argument, but rather, the merits of the book in question. Nevertheless, anyone who has had much experience in procurement projects — at any level — will be grateful for Plamondon’s tilt at this particular windmill. One does not like to be unfair when considering the issue, since the problems with government procurement in general, and military procurement in particular, are fraught with the same issues in every country. No nation runs a pure, competitive, completely disinterested process, solely designed to secure value for money or the best piece of kit available. Trade-offs abound by the very nature of the enterprise, and hence, compromise is part of the equation. All this conceded, a neutral observer can only read in disbelief the tale that Plamondon ably sketches over a period approaching three decades. He has performed a valuable service in telling the story of the Sea King replacement project. Albeit, it seems doubtful in the extreme that materially different outcomes can be anticipated in the future despite this woeful tale. Politics are politics.

The book is organized into a series of chapters that start with a discussion on the procurement process, and how it has evolved over the past fifty years or so. This alone provides a useful review. Space is then accorded to the Canadian Navy’s experience with the Sea King procurement itself in the 1960s, and the operational experience with this helicopter in succeeding decades. Thereafter, the process for securing the Sea King’s replacement is the subject, and the bulk, of the book.

The genesis of what became the New Shipbourne Aircraft project was in 1975. Air Force planners noted that it was appropriate to consider a long-term replacement for the Sea King, in concert with the New Patrol Frigate program also under consideration at the time. The notion that the helicopter and frigate team was the fundamental naval unit was well entrenched within Canadian Navy doctrine following
the abandonment of fixed-wing aircraft and associated aircraft carriers with the scrapping of HMCS Bonaventure in 1970. It is now 2011 and the Sea King remains in active service — if the adjective “active” is appropriate for an aircraft that needs 15 or more hours of maintenance for a single hour of flying. It is a sobering, depressing story.

Plamondon’s narrative is dense, full of military jargon and the no less exotic jargon of government procurement. The book is not helped by the relatively small font used by the publisher. It is not an easy read. But Plamondon’s is an important story, and a superb but depressing example of a fundamentally misguided process resulting in unacceptable delays, costs and the acquisition of a fleet of second-rate aircraft. No doubt the Sikorsky Cyclone will do.

The procurement process stands condemned as unwieldy, ludicrously complex, and fundamentally inadequate. Something needs to give or the equation linking value for tax dollars, decent military equipment, and timeliness will remain disastrous. Public support is needed for the massive expenditures associated with major capital equipment programs for the Canadian Forces, and the present system is appalling. No question, this is an important story. For this reason alone the book is worth buying, reading, pondering, and yes, wading through. It could be the catalyst to developing a system that is, perhaps, a little more rational in an absolute sense, as well as providing at least a nod towards economy. I’m not hopeful.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


In this book, Reed, a superb miniaturist, presents a look at the creation of an extremely realistic waterline model of HMS Caesar 1944. It was the sixth ship of eight “Ca” class War Emergency Destroyers, based on the pre-war “J” class destroyers, and simplified for quick construction. Armed with 4 x 4.5 inch guns, they retained the 8 x 21 inch torpedo battery introduced in the “Z” class of ships and were also fitted with 2 x 40mm Bofors, 6 x 20mm Oerlikons, 2 depth charge racks and 4 depth charge throwers.

HMS Caesar, built by John Brown of Clydebank, was laid down 3 April 1943, launched 14 February 1944, and completed on 5 October 1944, joining the Home Fleet in November. It escorted the carrier HMS Pursuer when the latter launched air attacks on German shipping off Tromso, Norway, in November 1944, then joined the Russian-bound Convoy JW62 in December, arriving at Kola Inlet on the 7th, returning to Loch Ewe on the 19th with Convoy RA52. Caesar continued to serve in the Home Fleet until transferred to the Atlantic in 1945 for convoy defence in the Western Approaches.

In June 1945, Caesar escorted the cruiser HMS Jamaica carrying the King and Queen to the Channel Islands, then sailed 15 July for Colombo to join the Eastern Fleet, arriving 7 August. Caesar returned to Plymouth 28 May 1946, where it was paid off and placed in reserve until taken in hand for the modernization of its class in November 1957. Returned to active service in 1960, Caesar left for the Far East to become the 8th Destroyer Squadron leader. Its duties there included four years of
extensive patrol work, including during the Indonesian confrontation. After returning to Portsmouth in 1965, Caesar was placed on the disposal list and arrived in Blyth for scrapping on 6 January 1967.

The last remaining sistership to Caesar and the last surviving British wartime-built destroyer is HMS Cavalier. On permanent display in dry-dock at Chatham Historic Dockyard, it is a designated war memorial to the 142 Royal Navy destroyers sunk during the Second World War.

The book contains an introduction, a history of HMS Caesar and chapters on the workshop, tools and materials, and paints used by the author. These are followed by sections on building the model of HMS Caesar to a scale where 1 inch represents 16 feet, and establishing the model as a miniature, even though it is 21.18 inches long. Following sections cover the building of the hull and decks, bridge, funnel, mast, and armament including the 4.5 inch guns, Hazemayer Bofors, Oerlikons and torpedo tubes, followed by the building of the boats and rafts, depth charges, searchlights and ventilators. A chapter explains the carving and finishing of the sea, along with the final assembly. This is followed by a superb photographic gallery of twentieth-century warship models built by Reed and a section on material and tool sources, ending with a bibliography.

Reed does not follow a rigid step-by-step format in this book as he has in previous books, instead he switches between the multitude of fittings and components required for the model, thus alleviating some of the boredom involved when working on highly repetitive tasks. The book is written as a photographic essay, lavishly illustrated with over 190 photographs taken by Reed throughout Caesar's building process, with clearly written captions alongside the photographs.

In addition, there are 41 photos in the gallery section of Reed's models of: HMS Belfast, Cossack, Hood, Penelope (1/32 scale), Lapwing, Black Prince, King George V, Onslow, Dorsetshire, Iron Duke, Edinburgh, Penelope (1/16 scale), Dreadnought, Canada and Dido. Larger vessels were modelled at 1/32 scale; others are at 1/16 inch scale. This shows a remarkable body of work of his twentieth-century vessels. Reed also builds Navy Board (dockyard) models, period, and sailing man-of-war ship models, all documented in his other books.

Reed's workshop is small and simple, with a combination of hand and smaller machine tools, many being specifically designed for model builders. As he has in his other books, he discusses many well-known model building techniques and also introduces some innovative ideas in this work.

His research commenced by collecting material on HMS Caesar, with plans at 1 inch representing 16 feet for the ship, and larger scales for major components, all from John Lambert Plans. These were supported with a copy of Warship # 32, HMS Cavalier and the Ca Class Destroyers by Antony Preston. Reed also visited HMS Cavalier at Chatham where many photos were taken, bearing in mind that changes made to Cavalier may not have applied to Caesar.

Space does not allow for a discussion of the various techniques used to build the model; to anyone interested in building a modern warship, many of them would be useful, whether it's a miniature or one at a larger scale. Materials used include a variety of woods for major components, a variety of card and paper stock, plastics in sheets and rods, wire and metals, including photo-etched, adhesives, sealers and paints.

An outstanding book written by a master, beautifully produced and illustrated with detail photos and crisp, clear text — it
is well worth the price, if only for Reed's models beautifully presented in the Gallery section where, if crew members were visible, many could be photos of the original vessels.

N. Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


Illustrating the trials and tribulations faced by U.S. Marine and Navy prisoners of war who were detained over a ten-year period during the Vietnam War, The Battle Behind Bars draws on Stuart Rochester’s well-known book, published in 2007, Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973. In it, Rochester took an extensive look at hundreds of POW accounts throughout the Vietnam War. This small, fully-illustrated book not only provides a general overview of what the POWs faced, but also highlights individual cases of prisoner treatment, response, and unification during their incarceration.

The author pulls together many valuable resources, including several previous studies of prisoners, and creates a flowing narrative across his selected themes of prisoner life and hardship. Though his resources were not cross-referenced against other POW accounts in other wars, or from other branches of the military, or even from other countries, Rochester manages to achieve his intended goal of revealing the hardships of this trying time for many Marines and sailors. The book could have benefited from better scanned or digitized images of maps and newspaper clippings since one image appears to have undergone scanner distortions during its digitization process, and another montage of newspaper clippings is illegible due to the background colour of the page on which it is printed.

Particularly appealing is the way the book captures the reality of being a prisoner of war in a style that is easily comprehended by a wide audience of readers, both young and old. Without being overly graphic or emotional, the author nevertheless allows readers to perceive the hardships prisoners faced, especially when they sustained injuries during combat. As an introduction to the subject of Marine and naval POWs during the Vietnam War, it excels in informing those who might have little prior knowledge.

The images of individual POWs, common daily tools, propaganda, and day-to-day life pull the reader into the text. Although the photographs extend the book’s impact, there are occasional disconnects where the images used do not accurately correspond to the story; for example, a photograph of one POW illustrating the personal story of another. This, however, does not prevent the book from being extremely informative.

Overall, this book offers a great overview of what happened to American Marines and naval personnel taken prisoner during the Vietnam War. It ranges from individual stories of captivity, to resistance, punishment, coping, and finally, to relief and release. Rochester presents an accessible starting point for readers of all ages who hope to learn more about an unfortunate chapter in recent American military history or begin their own research project. Researchers and professionals will find The Battle Behind Bars a good example of how to compile a POW study without exploiting either violence or sentiment. Stuart I. Rochester served with
the Pentagon's Historical Office from 1987 and was the chief historian at the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2008 until his death the following year at 63 years of age.

Eric Swanson
Pensacola, Florida


The “Seafarers’ Voices” series by Seaforth Publishing is an extremely valuable one for scholars and general readers interested in the social history of maritime Europe. Seamen’s voices and perceptions of their challenges afloat and ashore have frequently been lost in the mists of time. Even when seamen penned accounts which have survived to our own day, they are not always easily accessible to a non-academic readership.

A Privateer’s Voyage Round the World is the second book in the series, a version of an account penned by Captain George Shelvocke of his circumnavigation in the early eighteenth century. Although it is almost 300 years on, Shelvocke still has much to tell modern-day readers about adventure, exploration, combat, and interpersonal tensions on land and at sea.

As a British privateer, Shelvocke and his men engaged in some questionable and aggressive actions throughout their three-year voyage which commenced in 1719: “the protagonist treads a fine line between the legality of privateering and the criminality of the pirate.” (pp.1-2) This was the norm for those engaged in such activities. It was a necessity for privateers to take prizes in order to compensate their backers for the costs of outfitting the voyage and also to pay the crew who sailed for shares in any prizes taken. This usually gave rise to some “overzealous” plundering.

As with all privateers who may need to minimize their missteps, we must weigh Shelvocke’s words carefully; he was surely aware of the highly questionable nature of some of his dealings and actions, being an ex-naval officer and doubtless acquainted with maritime law. More than once, he informs his reader that he “was not of a revengeful disposition...and that the laws of my country would restrain me if I were, as I acted by my king’s commission, whose orders strictly forbid all acts of inhumanity...” (p.158) His insistence that he was obliged to please his mutinous crew and keep them loyal by obtaining a steady diet of plunder suggests he anticipated having to formulate a defence once back in England. Such justifications are reminiscent of depositions for piracy cases in the High Court of the Admiralty where most deponents (of all ranks) claimed they were innocent men swept up in events engineered by ruthless crewmates: “In his eagerness to present himself as much-maligned, but honourable and fair in his dealings with others, we glimpse an ideal of a gentleman-explorer...which sits uneasily with the reality of the privateering life...” (p.15).

If we are to give credence to this account, Shelvocke’s men are constantly on the verge of mutiny. Shipboard tensions were typical on long, hazardous voyages such as a circumnavigation. Privateers were notorious for their lack of discipline at the best of times. Even by the standards of his day, however, Shelvocke was having a very hard time governing his men. Shelvocke feared for his life constantly and even the common men rejected his leadership, claiming to be “their own masters, and servants to none.” (p.106) This is arguably the most interesting aspect of his account: Shelvocke’s efforts to encourage and cajole the men to certain actions while also trying
to assert his authority over them. This constant “pull-haul” makes for some engaging reading.

A seemingly minor shipboard incident was later immortalized in the literary canon: this voyage was the genesis of Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner’s dealings with the troublesome albatross. One of Shelvocke’s officers, Simon Hately, was disturbed by a black albatross following them; after a few days, he determined that it was an evil omen and shot it. In the late eighteenth century, the poet Wordsworth read Shelvocke’s account and suggested Coleridge could make something of this incident in his own work.

Over half of the account was trimmed — from 90,000 words to 40,000 — for this edition, and most of the pruning was done at the expense of long descriptions of plants, animals and people in exotic lands. Nonetheless, this version still contains a considerable number of Shelvocke’s descriptions of what he encountered. The editor claims this emphasis may have been Shelvocke’s attempt to be seen as a scientific observer rather than a privateer. While this may be true, it was also very common for those keeping shipboard accounts to include such information, although perhaps not to the extent Shelvocke did in the original. It may have been a way to engage readers who enjoyed travel literature as a means of increasing the marketability of the original volume.

Shelvocke’s retelling of a “long, fatiguing and unfortunate voyage…[which had]…a great variety of inexpressible troubles and hardships, both by sea and land” (p.193) is readable and important for a number of reasons and we will hopefully see many more such volumes in this series. There is, however, some questionable commentary by the editor, Victor McInerney, such as the comparison of eighteenth-century privateering to “a lesser form of total war.” (p.5) McInerney also makes reference to a competing account by one of Shelvocke’s men, William Betagh, captain of the marines. Their memoirs, like their personalities, are at odds, although McInerney does not explore this adequately. It would have been helpful to examine their points of convergence in more detail in the introduction and in notes in the text. Betagh’s criticisms of Shelvocke would no doubt shed light on why the men were so quick to challenge his leadership.

Overall, this is a telling commentary about shipboard relations on an eventful eighteenth-century privateering voyage.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


No academic publishing institution has so brilliantly served the fields of maritime and naval history as well as the Naval Records Society. Its publications over the last century represent a stellar collection of invaluable treasure troves to scholars all over the world. The latest volume, entitled Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919-1939, edited by Michael Simpson, is number 155 in the Navy Records Society series and represents a highly enlightening addition to the published records.

Interestingly the initial relationship between the naval authorities in the United Kingdom and the United States in the period immediately following the First World War was highly distrustful. No small degree of uncertainty about the future, let alone the immediate potential for a harmful rivalry, clearly existed in the minds of
leading naval authorities on both sides.

For its part, the Royal Navy distrusted potential American expansionist aims in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. These concerns were justified since the Royal Navy had a single battleship, HMS *Australia*, in the South Pacific and a minor presence in the Caribbean, while the United States possessed an ominous force in the Caribbean, and a mighty fleet stretching from San Diego to the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa and the Philippines. In British naval eyes it appeared an easy move on the part of the United States after 1919 to extend its domination over most of the Pacific Ocean. Forces far superior to those of the Royal Navy could easily be brought to bear almost anywhere.

The negotiations leading up to the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty seemed almost unbelievable to many naval authorities on both sides of the Atlantic.

The dispatches and commentaries are highly revealing about the depth and nature of the existing mistrust between the two powers. The remarkable developments that neutralized this uneasiness and ultimately resulted in the Anglo-American Alliance between 1919 and 1939 are well documented in this volume, which superbly reveals the twists and turns in diplomacy and the evolution of a unique level of mutual trust.

Anglo-American Naval Relations 1919-1939 represents an invaluable addition to the official documents published by the Navy Records Society. Michael Simpson is to be commended for producing an outstanding chronicle of the events unfolding between 1919-1939. The reader will find it difficult to put down. The volume is recommended without reservation as a superb acquisition to any naval history library.

William Henry Flayhart III
Dover, Delaware


Hans Van Tilburg’s *A Civil War Gunboat in Pacific Waters* provides an in-depth examination of the USS *Saginaw* and its significance within the larger context of United States history. In doing so, Van Tilburg brings to light the important roles the *Saginaw* fulfilled in the Pacific in the mid-nineteenth century. Often viewed as a backwater to the Atlantic, Van Tilburg illuminates the importance of the Pacific world to national and international events. The *Saginaw* monitored American efforts in China, patrolled for Confederate activity during the Civil War, participated in the opening of the Alaska territory and protected American shipping from California to Panama. *A Civil War Gunboat* is not just about the *Saginaw* but instead, situates the vessel in the broader sweep of United States and transpacific history.

Unlike many histories of individual ships, Van Tilburg’s work does not end with the vessel’s demise and a brief overview of surviving crew. He continues his analysis with the archaeological investigations of the ship’s remains. In 1870, the *Saginaw* ran aground on a reef, leaving 93 men to survive on the tiny, remote Kure Atoll. At that point the book becomes a survival narrative of how the men endured 68 days, exposed to the elements. Thanks to the heroic efforts of five volunteers, news of the wreck set about the launch of two rescue vessels. But, the story does not end there. In 2003, divers with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration discovered the ship’s remains, scattered and covered in the reef along the atoll. Enduring harsh conditions, the researchers made most of
their limited time to record the ship’s remains and to preserve this significant, though understudied, aspect of our maritime past.

Van Tilburg presents a lot of information in a readable format, available to all levels of scholarship or interest. He expertly weaves the Saginaw’s story into a much larger framework that exposes the realities of an American presence, or lack thereof, in the Pacific. He also provides a solid basis for understanding American history in the Pacific theatre, an area often overlooked in traditional scholarship. Van Tilburg draws from a variety of primary and secondary sources, leaving no stone unturned. Not surprisingly, much of his primary research relies on material found in the National Archives and Records Administration and Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies. His in-depth research creates a fine balance between the variety of personal and official papers, and the numerous available secondary sources.

Anyone interested in maritime history, the Civil War, western expansion, the Pacific World or military history in general will find A Civil War Gunboat useful and interesting. Rather than summarizing one vessel’s history, Van Tilburg weaves together the issues of politics and trade that highlight the limitations of America’s presence in the Pacific. Upper-level undergraduate and graduate students will find this book useful in the classroom. Professionals, as well as anyone interested in this period of history, should read Van Tilburg’s engaging and informative work.

Hans Van Tilburg is the maritime heritage coordinator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. He is also the author of Chinese Junks on the Pacific: Views From a Different Deck and co-editor of Maritime Archaeology: A

Reader of Substantive and Theoretical Contributions.

Amy Mitchell-Cook
Pensacola, Florida