
This very dense and intense collection of 23 chapters/monographs (plus a final discussion chapter) touches on a wide variety of aspects of early navigation from the dawn of history to the Middle Ages, united by a single puzzle: how, when, where, and why did humans elect to go down to the sea in ships? The answers are often themselves reframed as new problems, and even where evidence is plentiful, definitive conclusions are sometimes hard to come by.

At issue here is more than just how the urge to mess around in boats came upon us, but how humanity got to where it is today, presuming a starting point in early Africa. Did we depend on rare and brief glacial-period land bridges to make the jump from one island or continent to another (especially in the Americas) or did we figure out a reliable enough way to float there to actually support a migration with all its attendant impedimenta, including enough families and supplies to make a successful breeding population? This question becomes more crucial the further back in time American settlements appear to have occurred, with new evidence pushing them back further than could be explained by a land bridge.

Since there are woefully few truly ancient (Paleolithic or even Neolithic) vessel artifacts anywhere to be had (partly because most early shorelines are now long underwater from higher modern sea levels), a great deal of the evidence has to be deductive in nature, from population distribution, to DNA and language lineage, to analysis of available resources and technology. That includes deduction based on more recent primitive boatbuilding for just how it could have been done when only stone and bone tools were available. Possibilities include hollow log and tied-frame bark canoes, rafts, bundled reed boats, skin- or clay-covered coracles, outrigger designs, and other clever ways of putting materials together without metal-dependent carpentry or fastenings. How far could each take you, in what weather and seas, in or out of sight of land, with helpful wind or currents, and what would constitute sufficient local supplies and motivation to undertake the effort? Not all, or perhaps none of these is to be taken for granted, a good example being sail itself, seemingly an obvious power source. Any Neanderthal standing up on a raft on a windy day could see that wind would move the boat, yet sails seem to have developed very late in the game, probably not until the bronze age arrived, with oars long preceding them. There may be good reasons for this, from the need to have a proper hull shape to make usefully-straight sailing possible to the requirements for and dangers of a given type of voyage. If you have to bring along enough people to defend you in a fight, for instance, you might as well use them to row.

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Sails were better suited to vessels carrying fewer, undefended people with more cargo, at least until metal and modern armament arrived. So for some cultures, sails may not have been useful enough to spend the time and resources to develop. Indeed, there even seems to be a middle period in some areas when earlier seafaring technology and skills actually declined for just this sort of reason—no need to move, so no reason to waste time on boats to do it. The greatest impetus to move occurred during the original sets of global migration, and once that was over, maritime efforts abated or became more localized. Later, when times and technologies changed, lost maritime arts had to be redeveloped.

There are a lot of sometimes surprising specifics to be sorted out, both structural and geographical, and in these 23 extended essays, you get a taste of all sorts, from often clever speculation on very early possibilities to detailed documentation of more modern craft that illuminate the parameters for earlier ones. The bulk of the papers concern maritime development in specific, local areas: Austronesia, Western and Northern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, both coasts of the Americas, and Japan. How each of these cultures arrived and took root and what part maritime development played in them is discussed in detail. Other articles focus on boat and ship construction technologies, both speculative (early on) and real (later, when artifacts and records abound). Still others take a look at coastline evolution and genetic traces across history to imagine the physical challenges of the time and who got where and when, even including a look at how myths and spiritual beliefs about the shoreline may have been integral to development of the peoples who regularly crossed its edge.

All in all, there is a huge amount of fascinating, detailed material here, so it is easy to get lost in the trees while losing touch with the forest. In the end, what is lacking—through no fault of the many accomplished authors—is a definitive picture of how humans managed to populate virtually the whole earth, often across vast stretches of ocean, without leaving a clear maritime trail of how they did it. Based solely on real artifacts from well after they got there, it seems quite impossible that they did so using only what they had later. Lots of little questions are answered here, but the really big one still remains beyond our grasp.

John Townley
Sea Cliff, New York


John Ward and Kenneth Shoesmith were marine artists who lived nearly a century apart and who illustrated very different types of ships, yet they had much in common. Both came from comparatively humble origins, both were successful, and both died very suddenly at around the age of 50, when they had become respected members of their profession and were at the height of their powers. Their work is important to us today in illustrating what ships and the nautical world were like in the past. In Ward’s case, that was the early part of the nineteenth century, while a similar
time period, ninety years later, is evoked by Shoesmith’s work.

John Ward (1798-1849) was the son of a shipmaster in Hull, Yorkshire. While that may not seem very humble, in the early 1800s a coastal or short-sea skipper did not rate very highly on the social scale outside his home town. At about the age of 13, John was apprenticed to a ship and house painter and started by literally painting ships’ timbers using a bucket of paint and a mop; yet by the age of 33 he had exhibited important oil paintings at the Royal Academy in London. Nevertheless, he remained firmly based in his home town of Hull. After completing his apprenticeship in 1819, he set up on his own and always advertised his business as painting ships, houses and signs. At the same time, he started painting marine scenes in oils and in the then new technique of watercolour. Hull shipowners, who needed canvasses depicting their ships, provided a ready market and before long Ward concentrated on artistic work, leaving his employees to paint the ships and houses.

Although not a seaman himself, Ward must have spent time in his father’s ships since he was certainly a meticulous observer of a ship’s construction and rigging and how it behaved in various conditions of wind and sea. His depictions are of the utmost accuracy and are invaluable in showing what ships were like in the era before photography. He set out to depict every type of ship that used the port of Hull, large and small, sailing ships and early paddle steamers. At a date not recorded, he must have spent time at or near Portsmouth to record every class of naval ship from first-rate to revenue cutter, besides a comprehensive selection of other warships and British merchant vessels.

Kenneth Shoesmith (1890-1939) was born in Halifax, West Yorkshire, into what his biographer, Glyn L. Evans, diplomatically calls a single-parent family, as no father is recorded on his birth certificate. His grandmother and mother kept a boarding house at Blackpool; nevertheless, he received his initial training on the well-known school ship HMS Conway, a relatively prestigious start to a sea career. Shoesmith had taken drawing lessons as a boy and continued to sketch and paint in watercolours while on the Conway and after he joined the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company as a cadet in 1908. By 1918, he was Chief Officer of SS Cardiganshire, but as soon as the war ended, he resigned in order to pursue a full time painting career. The Royal Mail Company was glad to have his services and commissioned him to produce posters (he always defined himself as a poster artist). The fact that many of his paintings were made into advertising postcards and calendars in no way detracts from their artistic merit. He also received commissions from other companies and from government departments. By 1916, Shoesmith had married Sarah Richie, the daughter of a wealthy Belfast shipowner,
and they were living comfortably in London. His success as an artist was confirmed by a commission to paint the murals in the dining room of the RMS *Queen Mary* which can be seen if you visit the ship in Long Beach, California, where she is preserved.

By the 1970s, Shoesmith had largely been forgotten so when the executors for Mrs. Sarah Shoesmith contacted the Ulster Museum in Belfast in 1975 to notify them of a bequest, a group of astounded experts, none of whom had ever heard of the artist, were able to view a large collection of paintings, sketchbooks and graphic materials of all kinds. Two years later, the museum devoted its largest gallery to a major Shoesmith exhibition (and will open another in December 2011). Glyn Evans, the author, a marine insurance underwriter, became fascinated with Shoesmith and devoted many years to researching his work. Over time, people would come across a painting, note the artist, investigate on the net and be led to Glyn Evans who has finally compiled this most attractive volume. In contrast to the booklet on Ward's work, Evans' is a riot of colour: white cruise liners in exotic ports, passengers crowded around a swimming pool, night scenes in moonlight with portholes glowing, impressionistic paintings of freighters (you can almost hear the rattle of the winches) and eastern longshoremen swinging cargo nets of cases into the hold. Mr. and Mrs. Shoesmith were often invited by the Royal Mail Line to go on cruises in such ships as the *Atlantis* and *Alcántara* to gather material for posters for the company.

On 6 April 1939 Kenneth Shoesmith died suddenly after suffering a stroke. He was just 48. Of him Glyn Evans writes: “he was definitely in the front rank of those who are content to paint what they see and know. He was direct in his methods, sound in his drawing and brilliant in his colour… for he painted with a seaman’s knowledge as well as an artist’s perception”. This most attractive book is a fitting memorial to someone who depicted ships in a way that some of us remember them, while the book on John Ward opens a window to an earlier period. Both are well worth having.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This slim volume casts light on a group of Americans who joined the Royal Navy as “sea officers” before the United States became a belligerent in the Second World War. *Passport Not Required* is an Anglo-American project and the by-product of a successful campaign spearheaded by Ronald White and Charlotte Hammond in 2001 to recognize these men with a second memorial tablet placed in the Painted Hall in Greenwich, where most of them completed their initial officer training. The authors were able to find the names of 22 Americans who were commissioned as Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) officers and these were inscribed on the new tablet. Ronald White was a retired Sussex police officer who had spent ten years in the RN; Charlotte Hammond is an assistant solicitor in Guildford; Eric Dietrich-Berryman is an American writer. The book describes how the American volunteers joined the RNVR, and then puts their wartime service within an overall context. Where possible, the authors provide notes on what happened to these self-displaced Americans after the war, although by 2001, only two of the group were still alive.
three authors were persistent in tracing family letters, oral histories, archival holdings and other sources and describe their searches in an appendix. The narrative also draws heavily on Yankee RN (1951), a vivid contemporary autobiographical account by Alex Cherry, one of the volunteers, which went through several printings.

The stories of these men are fascinating on several levels. All but three joined after March 1941, when the Lend Lease Act moved the United States closer to supporting Britain. The three exceptions were a former U.S. Army Air Force pilot and young civilian pilot who both joined the Fleet Air Arm days after the outbreak of war, and a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, who first served as a French ambulance driver and then made his way to Britain in mid-1940. At the time, American neutrality laws prohibited belligerent powers from recruiting in the United States. Because this book concentrates on individual stories, there is little detail on how actively the Royal Navy actually recruited in the United States. At that early stage of the war, neither the RN nor RCN anticipated how quickly the requirements for officers would mushroom. The narrative about what actual procedures were followed is muddled and there is confusion between the Lend Lease Act in 1941 and the earlier transfer of destroyers in September 1940 (p.41). Apparently, there was an early initiative to recruit naval pilots and the Foreign Office told Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, that experienced aviators should be sent to Ottawa where their records would be verified by the RCN (p.39). The former U.S. Army Air Force pilot was sent to the U.S. as an RNVR to try to contact Following the Lend Lease Act, there was a push from the Admiralty to find seagoing officer candidates. The Second Sea Lord (responsible for personnel issues) decided that any American volunteers should be sent to Halifax for processing because the RN had a presence there for the first 20 months of the war in the form a battleship squadron to provide protection against surface threats to convoys (p.41).

Meanwhile, the RAF was successfully attracting young American volunteers through Canada. Some 6,700 Americans joined the RAF via the RCAF before Pearl Harbor and formed three fighter “Eagle Squadrons.” The RAF got around the prohibition against recruiting in the United States thanks, initially, to the efforts of a wealthy U.S. businessman living in London, who sponsored a scheme to bring Americans to Canada where they earned their wings under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

It took persistence on the part of several of the naval volunteers to overcome bureaucratic barriers. One individual shuttled between New York City, Boston, Montreal and Ottawa for ten weeks at his own expense trying to breach procedural hurdles. After demonstrating such doggedness, it is not surprising that he eventually commanded a frigate and finished his RNVR service with the rank of Commander. While British consular officers were initially obstructive and unhelpful in the recruiting process, more senior officials grasped the propaganda advantages of influencing U.S. public opinion by publicizing Americans in British uniforms. A senior Foreign Office mandarin wrote “every American enlisting in the Armed Forces of the Crown is worth his weight in gold to us as a propagandist...” (p.42). Lord Lothian and other senior officials found ways to skirt around issues of potential loss of U.S. Citizenship by volunteers for the Royal Navy by enabling them to join the British services without taking an oath to the Crown. To obtain a passport, U.S. citizens had to certify that they would not join foreign armed services, but, since
Americans could cross into Canada without a passport, Canadian Pacific and Cunard were instructed to allow RN volunteers passage to Britain without this document, hence the title of the book.

One gets the impression that the Royal Navy tried hard to welcome the American applicants and to smooth their way. It’s interesting that the stories about several applicants include their meetings in Halifax with the urbane Rear Admiral Bonham-Carter, in command of the 3rd Battle Squadron. His staff arranged passages to Britain. Age requirements were applied flexibly depending on the applicants’ backgrounds. The official upper age for potential lieutenants was 28, but in fact, more than half of the American volunteers were older. Indeed, the very first American RNVR officer to lose his life is described as “one of the Royal Navy’s oldest lieutenants” (p.4). This was 51-year-old Bostonian John Parker, who had served in the U.S. Naval Reserve in the Great War and had eventually been commissioned as an ensign. He went down in HMS Broadwater, sunk by a U-boat in October 1941, one of the celebrated 50 former American destroyers turned over to the RN and RCN less than a year earlier. Parker had become a lieutenant RNVR only in June. His training appears to have been shorter than that of his contemporaries (who underwent about five months of courses before joining a ship), presumably because of his previous naval experience. At the other end of the scale, one volunteer joined at age 21.

The authors characterize the volunteers as predominately representatives of American “patrician nobility.” They were financially comfortable; many were socially well connected and most were from the north eastern states, generally the products of prep schools and Ivy League universities. Several men had business or investment backgrounds. Edwin Russell arrived in England with a letter of introduction to the Duchess of Baccleuth. This led to an introduction to Lady Sender-Churchill, who became his wife. Many had deep-sea yachting experience. This seagoing background would indeed prove useful. Alex Cherry, a 38-year-old New Yorker who became the navigating officer of his first ship, another ex-US destroyer, only weeks after reporting on board after five months’ of professional training, was a banker whose parents had immigrated from Latvia. He had an urge to fight and had qualified himself as a pilot. In fact, he had applied to join both the RAF and the RN but the Navy responded first. Others joined to escape failed marriages (14 of the 22 divorced at least once) or career disappointments. Three were academy graduates, two from Annapolis and one from West Point. Two of the volunteers died at sea. The American RNVR officers proved capable and adaptable: three of them eventually commanded frigates or corvettes; three others commanded British or American minor warships; and one led an Anglo-American commando unit. Two commanded fighter squadrons and one of them, after transfer to the US Army Air Corps, was shot down and became a POW. One was flushed out of the RN for alcohol abuse and subsequently discharged from the USNR for the same reason. Seven married British women. Two, including Cherry, attained the rank of Commander. Finally, there was Draper Kaufmann, a 1933Annapolis graduate who had been discharged from the US Navy because his eyesight did not meet the seagoing standard. He had an adventure-filled war, starting in 1939 when he volunteered for service in France as an ambulance driver. He subsequently became a German POW, but the American Embassy in Paris extracted him as the U.S. was a neutral at the time. Reaching Britain via Portugal, Kaufmann became a bomb disposal officer in the
RNVR. After a year of dealing with explosives buried in the rubble of bombed-out cities, Kaufmann resigned his British commission and joined the USNR, where he passed on his new expertise as an explosives specialist and later led underwater demolition teams. After the war, he switched to the USN and retired with the rank of Rear Admiral.

The amount of detail the authors were able to find about individual volunteers more than 55 years after the war varied and they do not always methodically present what they found. The reader learns that many of the American RNVR officers transferred to the American Armed Forces when the United States entered the war. Aside from the enormous differences in pay—in 1943, an RN Lieutenant was being paid $67.50 per month while his opposite number in the USN was receiving $520 (p.37)—many Americans obviously preferred serving with their fellow countrymen when it became possible. Those who transferred took the benefits of valuable training and operational experience with them.

The book includes several grainy photographs and an excellent index, but its main attraction is the wide range of war experiences that befell 22 typical junior naval officers. The narratives which sketch in background contexts are its weakest area but this is a book about individuals. Passport Not Required also includes two pages of dignified reflections by former U-boat captain Otto von Bülow, written many years after he sank HMS Veteran in September 1942. Among those who perished was one of the American RNVRs, a surgeon lieutenant, who had been an emergency room physician in London.

Passport Not Required offers a unique look at a little-known, minor aspect of Britain’s wartime navy. The adventures of 22 capable and adaptable Americans in various parts of the British and American services bring the war at sea to life. This book also tells the reader about “The Andrew’s” system of officer-development in war. There are some great stories here, including why the destroyer HMS Broadwater was well astern of her convoy in October 1941 when torpedoed and a first-person account by one of her resilient survivors.

Jan Drent
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Relatively few documentaries about commercial shipping have been made, usually because of prohibitive costs. During Britain’s long tradition of building ships, some rudimentary silent films of spectacular shipyard launches were made in the 1890s. It was not until the economic depression of the 1930s, however, that film-makers started to produce wonderfully visual and socially-conscious docudramas charting the state of shipbuilding and the plight of its workers.

The British Film Institute’s National Archive holds one of the most significant collections of the moving image in the world. As part of a recent series titled This Working Life, celebrating the nation’s socio-economic history, the BFI has remastered most of these original elements. Tales from the Shipyard is a carefully chosen collection of 24 little-known cinematic gems made between 1898 and 1974. The result is an inspiring five-hour pictorial maritime history of emotive
actually films on two riveting DVDs that include an illustrated booklet with essays and comprehensive notes, as well as a newly-commissioned piano score to accompany the silent films.

The earliest films illustrate the importance of shipbuilding to local communities. Starting with a silent one-minute scene of jubilant workers cheering a launch in 1898, they show the construction of Olympic in Belfast, the largest vessel built up to 1910, and follow a morale-boosting Royal Visit during the First World War that shows the layout of a typical Northeastern shipyard. As cameras became more manoeuverable, they focused on the hard manual labour required in industrialized shipbuilding, from the large gangs of men needed to control the massive hammer-head cranes to those who laboriously fed great sections of steel into the machines that punched holes, sheared plates and bent frames.

Although the camera may not lie, when compared with existing literature, it can sometimes mislead. The films skate over the reasons why Britain lost its competitive edge in the late 1950s, when German shipyards often delivered new ships in half the time quoted in Britain (Devine 1999). A ten-minute BP-sponsored animation explains 90 years of change in transporting oil in bulk instead of in barrels but does not explore the economic consequences of the increase in average tanker sizes from 30,000 tons in 1956 to 500,000 tons by 1973 (Lavery 2001). On a lighter note, the newly completed Queen Mary was filmed majestically sailing slowly down the shallow Clyde on its maiden voyage but its subsequent groundings in the river have been deleted (Osborne 2007).

Not covered in Tales from the Shipyard, however, are the builders who stubbornly continued to fasten their hulls together with white-hot rivets. During the Second World War, American shipbuilders not only embraced continuous welding for its advantages in strength and smoothness, but also developed prefabrication, where much of the construction was made under cover. Only in the post-war period did British yards cautiously adopt welding, and not until 1971 did they try prefabrication—ironic in a country where the weather affected production three days out of ten.

The tales that we are shown of Britain’s shipbuilding heritage are not all doom and gloom, however. A Great Ship, produced for P and O in 1962, is a colourful, upbeat 30 minutes recording the commissioning, building, launch and maiden voyage of Canberra, which had been designed for the so-called “Ten Pound Poms” emigrating to Australia. The impressive structure of the ship gradually takes shape in front of us and the launch is filmed from several perspectives as the commentator declares his unshakeable faith in the future of British sea trade.

Three films would be of special interest to both maritime and social historians: the Oscar-winning Seawards the Great Ships made in 1960, a 1967 made-for-television documentary directed by Sean Connery, The Bowler and the Bunnet, and Cinema Action’s lively campaign film UCS 1 made in 1971. In the only film he has ever directed, Connery takes the camera outside the gates of the shipyard to examine the wider lives of its workers while expressing his uncompromising views on the bowler-hatted managers and cap-wearing workers in recently-merged shipyards. UCS 1 follows the fascinating 14-month workers’ occupation of Upper Clyde Shipyards in the early 1970s. After a desperate government failed to sustain the shipbuilding industry through massive subsidies, two young Communist shop stewards skillfully resisted the closure of their yard. The film clearly shows why their charismatic leadership attracted national support for the right to work which
culminated in a state of emergency in Britain.

_Tales from the Shipyard_ is an impressive collection of thoughtfully chosen and skillfully reproduced treasures from the archives of the British Film Institute which will be of lasting interest to maritime and economic historians as well as film enthusiasts. A dominant theme of the films is the irreversible shipbuilding crisis in the 1960s, the long-gone shipyards and the iconic ships that they built, yet they also show the bustling world of those who earned their living in the yards. Despite being inevitably Anglo-centric, the suspicion is that such rare footage might never have seen the light of day again had it not been publicly released in DVD format. The BFI deserves to be strongly congratulated and supported for taking this initiative.

Michael Clark
London, England


In _Perilous Fight_, Stephen Budiansky recounts the development of the American Navy in the War of 1812 on the world’s oceans and in the halls of power in Washington, D.C. He uses personal and private letters and journals to approach the war from the point of view of both the American and British navies and to add life to the bloody encounters on the oceans and the administrative combat between London and Washington.

_Perilous Fight_ opens against the background of the American Navy, beginning with the Barbary Wars and the capture and later destruction of USS _Philadelphia_ and continuing on to the HMS _Leopard_ vs. USS _Chesapeake_ affair. These first chapters also include the diplomatic efforts originated by Jefferson and Madison to curtail British harassment of American ships and the impressment of American seamen. The author’s descriptions of the sea battles between USS _Constitution_ and HMS _Guerriere_ and the USS _United States_ and HMS _Macedonian_ are lively and accented by excerpts from journals and letters by both American and British participants. In writing of his battle with _Guerriere_, Captain Isaac Hull of USS _Constitution_ takes special note of the excellent fighting qualities of his African-American crewmen, noting that they seemed determined to outfight their white shipmates.

As well documented as the encounters at sea are, the strength of Budiansky’s work is his use of both public and private documents to develop personal characterizations of both American and British administrative officials. Perhaps the most compelling example is the reluctant US Secretary of the Navy, William Jones. By December 1812, the Navy Department under Paul Hamilton was in such a chaotic state that Hamilton was scheduled for dismissal. President Madison’s first choice for the position was William Jones of South Carolina, who had earlier refused the appointment. Jones was a successful businessman with naval experience in the Revolution, who had a dislike for public life, especially in Washington, D.C. Jones finally accepted the appointment for the good of the nation. His first act was to completely re-organize the administrative functions of his department. At the time of his appointment, Jones was living in Philadelphia with his wife, Eleanor, who remained behind. Some of Jones’s initial letters to Eleanor warn her of the political attacks he had to endure.
Perhaps Jones’ most significant contribution to the American naval effort, as examined in detail by the author, is the decision to avoid actions engaging American and British squadrons and rely on individual, sloop-of-war-type vessels to harass enemy merchant shipping. This strategy caused financial woes for the British merchants and forced the Royal Navy to disperse its vessels all over the Atlantic. As if Jones’ duties at the Navy Dept. were not enough, Madison appointed him interim Secretary of the Treasury while Albert Gallatin served as a peace commissioner. With his attention elsewhere, Jones’ private business was going bankrupt. In a telling letter to Eleanor, Jones laments having to sell his horses and carriage to satisfy his debts.

Jones’s counterpart on the other side of the Atlantic was John Wilson Croker. Appointed in 1809 as secretary to the Admiralty, Croker became a staunch defender of governmental naval policies. Writing under the pen name “Nereus,” Croker upheld naval policy and expenditures. Like Jones in America, Secretary Croker re-organized his staff, often incurring the wrath of his superiors who had appointed the staff in the first place. Croker can best be remembered for his withering directives to his commanders on station. One particular victim was Admiral John Borlase Warren, whose efforts to blockade the American coast were totally inadequate, according to Croker. Secretary Croker next turned his pen against British insurance companies and merchants who complained to the Admiralty, and eventually the King, that the Admiralty did not provide adequate protection against both regular navy and American privateer vessels. Croker arrogantly blamed the problem on the merchants themselves, who often refused to sail in convoy.

Perhaps Budiansky’s most touching chapter includes the letters and journals of American seamen imprisoned at Dartmoor Prison in England as well as the various prison hulks. Vivid descriptions of prison conditions indicate the seamen’s feelings that their country has abandoned them. They express their disgust with Reuben Beasley, the American agent for prisoners, who just does not seem to care. This is particularly evident when months after the peace treaty had been signed, the prisoners are still not re-patriated.

Stephen Budiansky’s final chapter is an excellent effort concisely summarizing the results of the naval War of 1812. He reviews the various interpretations of the outcomes by both British and American historians. He also pays particular attention to William Jones’s countervailing strategy of attacking British commerce, a lesson, Budiansky claims, that was not lost on smaller nations when they were later faced with a more powerful adversary. He also credits Jones with the eventual professionalization of the U.S. Navy. Budiansky reviews the post-war lives of America’s naval heroes, including the famous Decatur-Barron duel. William Jones recoups his finances and return to a successful career in business while Croker continues as Admiralty secretary until the 1830s.

Stephen Budiansky’s history deserves a place in any War of 1812 collection, especially if one is interested in the combined official and personal history of both naval conflicts on the high seas and the official actions in both the British and American seats of power.

Fred Hopkins
Linthicum, Maryland

The history of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador—and particularly of the island of Newfoundland—is of tremendous relevance to the larger history of the North Atlantic region. The first Europeans to venture into the New World arrived here before anywhere else, over a thousand years ago. Re-discovered by an explorer sailing under British sponsorship in 1497, and subsequently claimed in 1583 as an English possession by Humphrey Gilbert, well before there was such a thing as a “British Empire,” Newfoundlanders could be forgiven for long maintaining that they were “England’s oldest colony.” Certainly there is some justice in arguing that, during the centuries that followed, Newfoundland had powerful economic significance for those who invested in the cod fisheries in its inshore and offshore waters, so much so that several European powers struggled for centuries to assert their right to a share of those fisheries. More recently, during the Second World War and the Cold War that followed, Newfoundland’s location as the most easterly extension of the North American continent gave it great strategic value in exercising control over trans-Atlantic sea lanes. Maritime historians will therefore welcome the appearance of this comprehensive and up-to-date survey of that history.

Not that Newfoundland history has been ignored until now. Beginning more than two centuries ago, the writing of Newfoundland history has been an energetic if not always accurate industry. Some works in particular—like Daniel Woodley Prowse’s *A History of Newfoundland from the English Colonial and Foreign Records* (London, 1895)—have become classics and are still in print. In recent decades, a vigorous renewal of scholarly interest in Newfoundland history—informed not only by the many perspectives of the historical discipline but also by many other disciplines, including geography, anthropology, archaeology, economics, to name but a few—has substantially revised traditional interpretations and forced some of the once widely accepted interpretations to be abandoned. Sean Cadigan’s *Newfoundland and Labrador: A History* endeavours to pull all this together into a synthesis that is both current and readable. By and large, he succeeds.

Cadigan takes as his fundamental premise the “stark reality of the province’s fragile but unavoidable dependence on its maritime resources” (p.4). Giving commendably more attention than most of his predecessors to the aboriginal forerunners of the Europeans who eventually settled in Newfoundland, Cadigan shows that survival was not possible except for the abundance of Newfoundland’s marine resources. The fisheries drew Europeans in a massive annual ebb and flow of labour and capital, and it was the fisheries that made it possible for a tiny few to take root and become permanent residents. As the migratory population was gradually transformed into a permanent society of some size and, eventually, accorded the formal status of a colony early in the nineteenth century, the social, economic and political élites (for they were one and the same) struggled to reconcile the obvious wealth generated by the fisheries with the equally obvious poverty of the fisher society. Explanations were sought, villains were found, and the myth grew that Newfoundland had been denied its fair share of prosperity by grasping English West Country merchants.
who had long controlled the fisheries and their trades, as well as a British government that was indifferent to any needs but its own. Cadigan is fascinated by the way this fostered an optimistic confidence in landward development—whether agriculture, mineral development, and, later, forest products and manufacturing—in full denial of Newfoundland’s environmental realities. It’s been said that Newfoundland’s great dilemma is that political independence has never been compatible with economic progress, but this hasn’t stopped political leaders from the days of William Carson to the days of Joey Smallwood and Brian Peckford from trying, and usually by pumping up a Newfoundland nationalism that pits the people of the province against everyone else—England, Canada, take your pick.

It is unquestionably a fascinating tale, and Cadigan sees as a frustrating yet consistent theme the tendency to neglect the stewardship and encouragement of Newfoundland’s obvious wealth in the sea in favour of questionable projects that were capital intensive to such a degree that development was only possible by relying on foreign interests. Even today, the wealth brought in by offshore oil has tended to relegate into the background the need to nurture and protect sustainable resources such as the fish stocks. That oil money will begin to diminish in a couple of decades; will Newfoundland use the time wisely to re-invest in sustainable and proven marine resources or will the province find itself once again a “have-not” society, embittered by what might have been and seeking someone to blame?

I cannot finish without expressing the hope that the publisher will encourage Cadigan to work on a second edition. Too often—especially in the early chapters—statements were made which were inaccurate or misleading. Disregarding the success of fifteenth-century Bristol merchants at developing commercial shipping networks that stretched from Iceland to Iberia, he claims that Bristol-based shipping lacked the navigational skills for great voyages of discovery to the west (p.30). In the absence of evidence, he speculates that, in 1497, Cabot found “waters that fishers from Portugal may have already been using” (p.31). And he suggests that the Basques may have been there before Cabot as well, though the research of Selma and Michael Barkham have insisted for thirty years that this was not so. We learn that “Early colonization failed” (p.45), though the archaeological excavations at Cupid’s and Ferryland confirm the longevity and vigour of two at least of those early settlements. Cadigan also repeats the hoary and inaccurate assertion that the Mi’kmaq settled on the South Coast of Newfoundland during the seventeenth century with the encouragement of the French who allegedly desired their services “to protect their fortified fishing port” of Plaisance (p.53). Much later we learn that during the First World War, the Newfoundland Regiment “made terrible sacrifices in these battles, especially Ypres, where the Germans first used poison gas” (p.190). But the Newfoundland Regiment did not fight at the First Battle of Ypres in 1915 when gas was first used—*their* Ypres was the third battle in 1917.

These sorts of fallacies and errors are perhaps to be expected in the first iteration of a survey history, especially when an historian steps outside his own area of expertise. The publisher surely should accept some of the responsibility here for not recruiting a more rigorous reading of the original manuscript – hence the desirability of another edition so that these things can be cleaned up. If this were done, then I think Cadigan’s *Newfoundland and Labrador: A History* should enjoy a long and fruitful life.

Olaf Uwe Janzen
Corner Brook, Newfoundland

Revisionist history may be fun to write, but it is oftentimes difficult to defend. Such is the case with Anthony Cumming’s assertion that the aerial Battle of Britain in the late summer of 1940 between the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Fighter Command and the German *Luftwaffe* has been consistently over-rated as the source of England’s salvation in the Second World War. Cumming insists that the largely unscathed surface forces of the Royal Navy based at Scapa Flow, not the RAF, held the key to Britain’s survival once Hitler’s armies had occupied Western Europe and were peering across the Channel. With the Royal Navy’s formidable surface forces intact, Hitler dared not invade England, even if his airmen gained control of the skies over southern England and the Channel. In fact, Cumming continues, Fighter Command did lose that control between August 24 and September 14, 1940. Only after the prolonged, climactic battle over London the following day were the Germans at last convinced that the RAF could not be whittled down sufficiently to ensure its ultimate defeat. Yet in those promising days of late August and early September, the Germans did not invade; their naval leadership successfully argued that the British Fleet had not yet been confronted and tamed. Nor would it ever have been, Cumming believes, because, in fact, Britain’s sailors throughout the early stages of the war stood up to German aerial bombing far more effectively than has been so far acknowledged. They would have done so in the Channel, as well. Thus, despite their undoubted gallantry and sacrifice, Churchill’s “few” were not the instruments of national salvation; that role belonged to the Royal Navy swinging around the anchor chains at Scapa Flow.

There is much to debate and question here. No one has denied that Fighter Command was in desperate straits throughout the aerial battles of August-September; terms like “a near-run thing” and “narrow margin” have frequently been applied. But to move from this position to the assertion that the RAF lost control of the skies is a very big leap, indeed. It was certainly not one that Goering and his pilots made during those few intense weeks of desperate aerial combat. The point has been argued on the British side only by Wing Commander H.R. Allen, whose arguments have been widely challenged and frequently dismissed. It has also been widely appreciated that any invasion of England in the autumn of 1940 was improbable. Not only did Germany’s admirals oppose it, but so did the leadership of the *Wehrmacht*. For the generals, the Royal Navy was not the problem; a rapidly re-arming and determined British Army fighting on its own soil was.

As for the Royal Navy, Cumming himself emphasizes that the fleet had been hobbled from the first by poor signals intelligence that hindered effective movement and by deep divisions between the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet (Admiral Charles Forbes), First Sea Lord Dudley Pound, and Prime Minister Churchill. A scholar of integrity, Cumming is forced to admit that “The clash of opinions between Forbes and his ‘warlords’ was clearly shown during the invasion crisis. . . . He complained of the difficulty in making an appreciation, having been ‘kept in ignorance of the size and disposition of the Royal Air Force and Army.’” Forbes told his immediate superiors that successful resistance demanded the energetic employment of all three services, and “emphasized the importance of air power.” The C-in-C added that even with “local
control of the sea during the [recent] Norwegian campaign and minimal Norwegian resistance,” the Germans still lost ten thousand men (p.115). Had German sea forces controlled the Channel long enough to land a powerful invasion force, German arms might well have still suffered a crippling defeat. Doubtless for these reasons, Cummings records that Forbes told Churchill flatly that he would not bring the heavy ships of the Home Fleet into the Channel to oppose an invasion. And Cumming admits that aerial bombing was effective at this stage of the war against British light forces—the light cruisers and destroyers that were seeded all around the English East Coast to ward off an invasion. Unfortunately, these are not rare lapses in Cumming’s argument. In instance after instance, the reader finds the author forced to modify key points which support his revisionist views.

Finally, Cumming’s argument contains one serious omission; the possible fate of the Royal Navy in the event of a successful invasion. Cumming notes that instead of erupting in anger when Forbes said he would not bring the Home Fleet south to confront a German invasion, Churchill reacted rather benignly. It may well have been because both men appreciated that the Home Fleet constituted a powerful military chip by not being engaged. By sailing to Canadian or American waters should there be a German occupation, the fleet would keep the British spirit—and a measure of tangible British power—alive. This was a crucial consideration, especially for Churchill, in view of the enormous if not overriding importance of maintaining the Empire intact at a moment of dreadful peril.

In sum, while fresh interpretations of the past are welcome, to be compelling they must rest on evidence coherently and logically maintained. In this instance, it is beyond the power of a scholar whose obvious integrity both overrides and undercuts his argument.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


As one should never judge a book by its cover, more or less the same wisdom applies to a book’s title. *Hafenleben in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* by Christina Deggim is not about medieval harbour life in general but, as the second part of the title explains, deals with the organization of maritime trade and labour in Hamburg and Copenhagen from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. This narrows the scope of the book quite considerably and might even leave some readers feeling rather disappointed; a synthesis on medieval harbour life would be very welcome indeed! What the reader does get is a very structured, double “biography” of two important medieval ports and how they were organized.

Published in 2005 as volume 62 in the series *Schriften des Deutschen Schiffahrtsmuseum*, this book is based on Deggim’s doctoral research at the University of Hamburg completed in 2003. After previously studying legislation (*Seerecht*) aboard medieval trading vessels plying the northern waters of Europe, the author has turned her attention to the port
side of maritime trade. Namely, was there some sort of a uniform port system in existence throughout Northern Europe during the Middle Ages that made it possible for a ship’s captain or a merchant to get his ship and goods in and out of a foreign port without too much trouble?

Deggim has chosen a comparative analysis as the underlying structure of her study. She first sets out to describe the geography, historical background, legislation, public works and port facilities, ship building and ownership, and organization of merchants and labourers in both towns individually, before weighing the similarities and differences in the final chapter. The use of comparative analysis has its strong and weak points; the latter, in this case, being when do you have the right number of examples to make a solid comparison? Confronted by the overwhelming number of occasionally contradictory historical documents, even if she were to select only a small number of ports, Deggim eventually settled on two. Although Hamburg and Copenhagen are quite extraordinary medieval ports, they still provide only two examples, which is simply too meagre a base from which to draw any general conclusions about how a typical medieval seaport worked. Deggim is fully aware of this potential pitfall and goes to some length to ensure that the reader understands this. But that ambitious-sounding book title does speak somewhat against her.

As Deggim explains in the introduction, the differences between Hamburg and Copenhagen far outnumber their similarities in geographic, administrative, political and social ways. While medieval Hamburg was a free Hanseatic town connected to the North Sea by way of the River Elbe, Copenhagen was the Danish capital and royal residence. It is also ideally situated on the narrowest stretch of water, the Øresund, that connects the Baltic with the North Sea. This simple topographical fact, alone, has had some far-reaching consequences. The Danish kings not only considered the port of Copenhagen to be an invaluable source of their own income, they also wielded it as a powerful instrument for realizing their political ambitions. And with all traffic between the Baltic and the wider world eventually passing through Copenhagen, they could do so on a level of which the town council of Hamburg could only dream. Not only did the tolls paid by every ship passing through the Øresund delivered a very handsome revenue, but, by differentiating levies, the Danes were able to favour shipping by their own subjects and closest allies. At times, officials were instructed to delay or block the passage of merchant ships from less friendly or belligerent nations. The king actively stimulated Danish commerce at home and overseas and in all of these ventures Copenhagen figured as the lynch pin. It is hardly surprising to find the list of trading companies—all by royal assent—to be much longer for Copenhagen than for Hamburg. On the other hand, through various guilds, trade associations and brotherhoods, the Hamburg merchants and labourers were able to organize themselves better and displayed more initiative than their Danish counterparts, mirroring the way the German town was ruled by a council of its own inhabitants.

Despite their differences, both ports, like all others, also faced the same problems. They had to deal with the continual silting up of the harbour or ships throwing their ballast overboard, justice had to be served along the quays, local taxes and levies had to be paid in full, and goods had to be safely stowed away in warehouses. While all of this activity demanded regulation, it would
have been commercially impractical to have different sets of rules in every seaport. The best way was to look at how other ports came up with practical solutions for similar problems and then copy them, while still remaining independent and competitive. In the Middle Ages, much of this harmonising effort came from the Hanseatic League. With the rise of Dutch trade in the North Sea and the Baltic from the sixteenth century onwards, Hamburg and Copenhagen started copying Dutch maritime practices.

As an archivist working at the Staatsarchiv, Deggim surely knows her way around the archives. This makes the book very useful to researchers, presenting as it does many entries from interesting documents in both German and Danish archives. From there, enterprising historians will find it easier to dig up even more. Unfortunately, with such a wealth of primary sources at her disposal, nowhere does the author to create a vivid picture of daily harbour life.

Non-German readers will find much of interest in the final chapter, covering the comparison and a summary, which has been translated into both English and Danish. Also in the back are some 30 illustrations, many of which are maps and panoramic views of Hamburg and Copenhagen—which would have been of even greater use had they been placed right next to the geographical descriptions in the main text.

Hafenleben in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit serves as a useful reference for researchers, particularly those interested in the workings of the medieval ports of Hamburg and Copenhagen. Both ports certainly merited their own “biography” and Deggim has now handsomely bundled the two between one cover. But, as the author rightly concludes, it also leaves more comparative research into the organization of other medieval ports still to be undertaken. That long-awaited definitive study of medieval harbour life in Northern Europe has yet to be written.

Jeroen van der Vliet
Amsterdam, The Netherlands


War, arguably the most evil invention of man, portrays the enemy as subhuman and unworthy of normal human sympathy. In civilized societies, people respect the sanctity of human life, but enemy prisoners are open to abuse through rules designed to reduce status and debase. Historically, prisoner-of-war internment facilities were not always similar to those used for civilian populations. Some, such as Camp Sumter in Andersonville, Georgia, and Camp Douglas in Chicago, became infamous during the American Civil War, but few gained similar notoriety during the Revolutionary War. One of the harshest was the grim dank copper mine of Old Newgate Prison in what was then Simsbury (now East Granby), Connecticut. For the maritime nation of Great Britain, former warships, now obsolete decommissioned hulks, provided cost-effective and convenient detention centres. The Americans used only one hulk in this way and for a short time.

Distinctions were made among captured soldiers, sailors and privateers. Only those in the army and navy were generally exchanged on the basis of rank for like rank with the enemy. Privateers were often considered pirates and the likelihood of their exchange was very slim. Their best
hope was being ransomed, but this was unlikely. Instead, capture meant resignation to an unknown fate, anger, occasional defiance and a measure of tears.

The British headquarters for much of the Revolutionary War was New York City. Wallabout Bay, along the Brooklyn shore, offered a convenient place to anchor their floating prison and hospital hulks. The relentless tides washed ashore the bones of approximately twelve thousand former captives imprisoned on these vessels. The mud flats of Wallabout Bay became a dismal and miasmal open graveyard for much of the first half of the nineteenth century. The most notorious source of these bones was the British prison hulk *Jersey*.

These bones were mute, unable to tell the tale of their dismal confinement, misery and death; the horrors of their experience accompanied them to the grave. One survivor of the *Jersey* however, Thomas Dring, did provide a detailed and passionate firsthand narrative. Written in 1824, these are the remembrances of an aging man some forty years after his ordeal. It is a story of cruel atrocities committed by empowered men against helpless, weakened prisoners. It tells of callous indifference to human suffering, filth, uncontrolled disease and inhumane conditions among closely confined prisoners of war; of physical hardships, emotional stress and humiliation; of obnoxious stenches, vermin infestations, rotten food, polluted water and unsanitary living conditions causing death in vast numbers.

David Swain edited Dring’s original manuscript, but states that he did not change Dring’s story or thoughts. Swain’s extensive scholarly introduction acts as a compass for Dring’s often-rambling memoir. The memoir, a recollection of events through the cloudy prism of forty years, has some inaccuracies with regard to details and recalled facts, but Swain carefully notes these in his introduction. As primary source material, this book is a disturbing yet compelling account of Scottish and Hessian jailers, sick or wounded prisoners and the everyday onboard events. The horrors he describes succeed in portraying the horrors of life onboard the *Jersey*—of waiting for someone to die to gain their space closer to better ventilation and of avoiding bodies of the retching or recently dead to gain access to an overflowing “necessary bucket” in the dark. Dring volunteered to lower the bodies of those who had died that night into the hulk’s small boat, row it ashore and then help dig the shallow graves to set his former mates to an uneasy rest. His reward was contact with fresh earth on the shore again, if only for a short time. The smell of the American land was invigorating and, when he rowed back to the prison hulk, fellow inmates left onboard unexpectedly prized the fragrance of the remnants of mud on his shoes.

Dring’s time on board was a relatively brief two months and he was a young man of twenty-three. His motive for writing this narrative was that the fate of many on board and their hardships was starting to be doubted some forty years after the war. As with many survivors of horrors inflicted by man against man, he felt compelled to bear witness while he still had the time, to create a unique primary source document about life as a prisoner of the British on a specific hulk during the Revolutionary War. Dring’s account has some flaws and Swain is quick to point them out. Still, this is as close as one can come to finding out what life on board the *Jersey* was really like. *Recollections of Life on the Prison Ship Jersey* is a worthy library addition for any Revolutionary War/maritime history scholar.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

At last, a book that purports to cover the whole story of the development of what came to be regarded as the spearhead of Japan’s *blitzkrieg*, the equivalent of Hitler’s *panzers* in the Far East. On a very broad front, it covers the whole of the early development of Japanese naval aviation, both before and after Japan took to the air in 1907. This is followed by the start of hostilities with China and the lead-up to the period December 1941 to May 1942, when Japan ran riot in the south-west Pacific. It includes the following years when this all unravelled during the American fight-back and culminates with the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay in 1945 after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This review examines how well the author’s objective has been realized.

The publisher’s jacket notes tell us that “this book describes in considerable detail the people, events, ships and aircraft that shaped the Japanese Imperial Naval Air Services from its origins in the late 19th century to its demise in 1945.” Nineteen chapters deal with the story in strict chronological order. In fact, it does not open with the events of the 1850s and 60s, as most works on the Imperial Navy tend to do, but rather picks a much earlier starting point for chapter 1 “In the Beginning” with pre-history and the 1381 typhoon that destroyed the invading Mongol fleet. Edwards goes on to describe how various European powers sent naval missions to Japan which in turn sent their officers to train abroad and also imported a steady stream of new aircraft for testing and evaluation. As a result of the earlier Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty of 1902 (which along with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, receives little mention), Japan supported Britain, France and Russia against Germany and Austria in the Great War, although it appears this was as much due to self-interest and the opportunity to grab German possessions in the South Pacific. The book goes on to describe Japan’s sense of betrayal with the outcome of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 and its reaction to this by developing its own aircraft (as well as continuing to import European and American models for testing and licences for building).

But it was the developing war with China in the 1930s that eventually helped forge the IJN’s aircraft carriers into the *Kido Butai*, the first true Carrier Task Force, and build Mitsubishi’s A6M Zero fighter and G4M land-based attack bomber that together decimated the British, French and Dutch colonial empires and had America recoiling at the onslaught in Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines and the South Pacific Islands. The final chapters deal briefly with the reverses after Admiral Yamamoto’s six months of running riot, initially at Coral Sea and Midway in 1942, followed by defeats in the Eastern Solomons, the Philippine Sea, Leyte Gulf, Okinawa and Iwo Jima. But still Japan would not give up and resorted to the desperate attacks by the *Kamikaze* pilots, a return to the “divine wind” of the 1381 typhoon.

The problem with this chronological approach is that too much space is devoted to the very early years (“The Rise”) which takes six of the 19 chapters. Another seven chapters are devoted to the development of the China Problem, albeit one of these side-tracks into “The Mysterious Islands” with the disappearance of Amelia Earhart and another chapter becomes involved in code-breaking issues and what FDR’s
government should have known about the developing situation. This leaves only six chapters to deal with Yamamoto’s six-month blitzkrieg and the rest of the war, not really enough to do justice to the full picture in a work of this size. While the author has conducted considerable research on the development of aircraft types over the period, his coverage of the ships, the events and the people mentioned in the jacket notes is considerably less detailed. The description of events, particularly the battles, fails to incorporate much new and extensive research featured in various recent works, notably Parshall and Tully’s Shattered Sword – The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, even though this book has attracted some criticism. The strict chronological approach also results in often-unrelated parts of the story appearing adjacent to each other, sometimes within a totally unrelated sub-section or even within the same paragraph. The most notable example occurs on p. 265, where the story of Admiral Yamamoto’s assassination ends with comments on the shortage of raw materials which affected aircraft production. The story also suffers from the insertion of a large number of lists and tables into the text rather than in footnotes or the otherwise excellent appendices.

Although Edwards has painted a wider picture than the war years 1941-45 both in the length of period covered and in looking at other aspects of Japan’s aircraft industry, overall we are left with the view that an opportunity has been lost. He passes too quickly over the final years and does not fully cover the events which were crucial to Japan’s defeat and the part that various people played in it. Edwards has assembled much useful information about the development and testing of Japanese naval aircraft and the book has many photographs of the machines produced, so it will form a useful reference point for both of these aspects, but this is not the whole picture. The part that is missing is what the jacket notes seemed to promise. In that respect, there is still scope for a future work that draws in the missing elements to produce a comprehensive picture.

John Francis
Greenwich, England


Cold Front is a survey of the physical, political, economic and military implications of a potentially ice-free Arctic Ocean. The discussion leads off with a map, described as a bird’s-eye view, of the Arctic Ocean, looking down on the North Pole. Thus, from the beginning, the reader is able to grasp the range of the global area under discussion, and the expanse of land within the Arctic Ocean.

Another map, entitled The Arctic’s Natural Resources, depicts the known locations for the natural wealth of the region, identifying such resources as oil, gas, coal, iron ore, fertilizers, non-ferrous metals, furs, timber, and fish. Where these natural resources exist within the boundaries of the land, exploitation is a domestic matter. Where they exist in, or under the sea, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides coastal states with economic monopoly, albeit under complex rules. These rules govern the “continental shelf,” plus the 200-mile-wide Exclusive Economic Zone, i.e. a strip of sea beyond the coastal baselines which extends to a maximum of 350 miles, if the shelf stretches that far geologically.

Claims to the seabed overlap because states cannot agree on a single
principle for the drawing of a dividing boundary (p.35). An example is the dispute between Canada and the United States in the drawing of the line delineating their seabed claims in the coastal waters of the Beaufort Sea, north of Alaska and the Yukon. It involves two principles or methods used for drawing seabed boundary lines: one is the “sector line” drawn straight from the North Pole to the extremity of the claimant’s territory; i.e. a “meridian of longitude” and the other uses the “median line”, drawn at right angles to the run of the adjacent coastline.

Using the “sector method,” Canada draws a line from the Alaska/Yukon border, Demarcation Point (69°41’N 141°18’W), directly north. The United States, using the “median method”, draws a line from the same point of origin, Demarcation Point, in a north-easterly direction, i.e. at right angles to the run of the coast, which at that point tends in a south-easterly direction from the border between the two states. Although both claims originate at Demarcation Point, they immediately diverge; the Canadian line running north, and the American line running north-easterly, i.e. to the right of the Canadian line, thereby encroaching on the seabed Canada claims, ergo the dispute.

The author cites Jeanette Mirsky’s To The North as his favourite reference for anything concerned with arctic exploration. Originally published by The Viking Press in 1934, a new edition of Mirsky’s book was published in 1967 by the Chicago University Press. A perusal of the author’s chronology (981AD – 2030 AD), however, reveals some significant omissions. These include: 1940-42—RCMP Schooner St Roch transited the Northwest Passage from west to east; 1944—St Roch navigated the Passage again from east to west in a single season; and 1954—HMCS Labrador was the first, deep-draft vessel to navigate the passage, Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound, Prince of Wales Strait, west along the mainland coast, through Bering Strait and so into the Pacific Ocean.

Following discussions of the history, politics, economics and environment of both the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage, the author continues with a section termed “Across the Top of the World.” It includes an appreciation of a fully commercial voyage, made from the port of loading, Ulsan, South Korea, via the Bering Straits, thence eastwards along the Siberian Coast to the Ob River, there to discharge a full cargo. In ballast, the vessels next proceeded to Arkhangelsk to load a cargo for Onne, Nigeria. The vessels involved were two German-owned, Russian-commanded, heavy lift vessels. Had they been routed from Korea, via the Suez Canal, to Gibraltar, to North Cape, Norway and then to the western end of the Northeast Passage, the voyage would have taken ten days longer. As the author points out, however, the US $300,000 the owners reportedly saved by each vessel taking the arctic shortcut, does not include costs paid for the mandatory icebreaker services that, in this case, were paid by the consignee.

The extent of Arctic Sea ice, an environmental impediment to the polar mariner since man ventured forth on the sea, is gradually receding. Since 1979, space satellites have recorded the annual reduction, between March, when the extent is at its maximum, and September, when the ice is at its minimum. Over a 30-year observation period, the minimum extent has decreased by about 30 per cent. Sea ice is depicted by two diagrams: the first, a graph entitled “Average Monthly, Arctic Sea Ice Extent September 1979-2009 displays the overall picture (p.176); and the other, a bird’s eye view map from over the North Pole, displays the “Median September Ice Extent 1979-2000 and the Ice Extent September, 2007, a record year of summer
Avoiding hard predictions himself, the author asked ten specialists from among those whom he had consulted in preparing his Arctic essay the following question: “In what important way will the Arctic change by 2040?” The responders represented seven nations: Canada (1); U.S.A (2); Finland (1); Russia (1); Norway (1); Germany(1); U.K. (3). Their replies ranged widely from:

“the Arctic will be completely ice-free in summer so all three trade routes [Trans- Arctic Ocean; the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage] will be in operation and hydrocarbon exploitation, will be widespread…..” [to]

“in 2040 we shall still be looking at an incomplete jurisdictional map …. rights to areas will be addressed through diplomacy rather than military confrontation – that is, no great change from today.”

David Fairhall, a journalist by trade, has written a book that is readily readable, and well illustrated with comprehensive maps. A good read for a journey by train or plane.

Len Forrest
Ottawa, Ontario


Since the 1960s (when I was a teenager), I have been aware that the German High Seas Fleet was interned at Scapa Flow soon after the Armistice of 11 November 1918, and that the fleet was purposely scuttled by the German crews to avoid any of the ships being transferred to another nation. From the same book (*Warships of World War I* by H.M. Le Fleming), I learned that the ships were salvaged during the 1920s and 1930s.

Numerous books describe the naval actions between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet during the First World War, either by individual battles or as summaries; e.g., *Jutland* by Capt. Donald MacIntyre, *Dreadnought* by Richard Hough, or *Castles of Steel* by Robert K. Massie. There are a few books, such as *The Grand Scuttle* by Dan van de Vat, that describe the scuttling on 21 June 1919, and the reasons and mental torment suffered by the Germans for doing so. *Jutland to Junkyard*, however, is the first book that I have encountered to focus on the salvaging of the scuttled ships. It completes the story of the rise and fall of the High Seas Fleet and thus, brings closure to a 30-year period of the twentieth century.

*Jutland to Junkyard* briefly describes the formation of the High Seas Fleet in one chapter, the Battle of Jutland, as if that were the only naval battle of the whole war (one chapter), the surrender and internment of the fleet in November 1918 (one chapter), and the scuttling (one chapter plus two appendices) before getting down to the essence of the book, which is the raising of the ships from the seabed of Scapa Flow. The remaining eight chapters of the book and three appendices tell how the ships were raised, towed to the dry-dock at Rosyth, scrapped, and their metal sold.

Once sunk, the German destroyers tended to settle on an even keel or with a slight list and so it was possible to pass cables under the hulls and use two halves of a converted floating dry-dock to winch the ships back to the surface. Sometimes ships were moved at high tide until they grounded, after which the cables were winched in as the tide fell and the floating dock was partially flooded. The floating dock would be pumped out as the tide rose and the ship moved once again. Most of the
wrecks were made seaworthy enough to be towed to Rosyth for scrapping, but some had to be scrapped at Lyness in the Orkney Islands.

Most of the cruisers and battleships, however, were scuttled in such a way that they turned turtle as they went down. The Germans had thoroughly planned the scuttling, e.g., valve stems were broken off and water-tight doors were removed and thrown overboard. SMS *Hindenburg* was the only one raised in an upright condition since it had sunk in shallow water. Eleven other capital ships were raised up-side down. Air locks were attached to the bottom, men entered the ship through these and made several sections of the ship watertight not only from the outside but also from other sections. Then the job was to pump enough air into the ship to raise it. It sounds simple, but the work was slow as men had to work under high air pressure, with volatile gases inside the ship, and in inclement weather and strong tidal currents. It took a lot of extra air pressure to free a ship from the bottom, and once the hull was free, the air inside expanded as the ship rose to the surface, causing a great eruption as it broke the surface. The book seems to repeat itself unnecessarily by telling the same basic story for each ship. Three battleships and four cruisers were abandoned, being in deep water, although some metal was recovered *in situ*. Although raised in 1939, SMS *Derfflinger* was not finally broken up until after the Second World War.

The book also describes the personalities involved in the salvage efforts, both the entrepreneurs and the workers. One of note is the chief salvage officer, T. McKenzie. “Without McKenzie’s imagination and technical ability the German fleet might never had been raised” (p. 48). Post-war fluctuations in the price of scrap metal meant that the first firm involved, Cox & Danks, lost money, but the second, Metal Industries Ltd, did better. After the Second World War, pre-war scrap metal began fetching higher prices due to the lack of even trace amounts of radioactivity.

Hitler thought it inappropriate for German tugs to be engaged in the Scapa Flow salvage and forbade their involvement. What I find most interesting is the fact that although the British government put a ban on selling the salvaged armour-plate back to Germany, there is no indication that British salvors ever tested the metal for its robustness as armour-plate. In May 1916, Admiral Beatty complained in the heat of the Battle of Jutland: “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today” (*Castles of Steel*, p. 596). One might think that exposing the salvaged German plate to a metallurgical analysis and test firings might have helped improve British armour-plate.

David H. Gray
Ottawa, Ontario


The preservation of medieval documents owes much to chance. For works whose authors did not belong to an institution with an interest in corporate memory, like a house of worship or a government, the odds were long indeed. When the documents in question constitute little more than the commercial ephemera of a minority community, the survival of several thousand paper and vellum fragments verges on the miraculous. It is thus fitting that just such a
collection of records—most written in Judaeo-Arabic with a Hebrew alphabet—should have been preserved in the storeroom (geniza) of Cairo’s Ben Ezra Synagogue, where they were deposited by observant merchants who regarded the destruction of papers containing the name of God—in salutations, for instance—a sacrilege.

Drawn by his interest “in the interplay of Muslim and Jewish law, as attested in many records of the rabbinical courts found in the Geniza” (p.4), the late S.D. Goitein (1900-1985) began his pioneering work on the collation and translation of commercial and legal texts of the Cairo Geniza in the 1950s. The first fruit of this project was his invaluable A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (1983-99), which vastly enlarged our understanding of Mediterranean commerce between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. Even as he laboured to bring this magisterial, six-volume work to fruition, Goitein hoped to complete his study of the more than 450 documents bearing on the Indian Ocean trade of Jewish merchants, many of whom hailed from Mediterranean lands. His work on the India Book, as he called it, remained unfinished at his death, and the task of completing and polishing the project fell to his hand-picked successor, Mordechai A. Friedman, who has amply rewarded his master’s choice.

India Traders of the Middle Ages is divided into two sections of three chapters each. The introductory material includes an overview of the documents followed by extensive discussions of the “dramatis personae” who figure most prominently in the documents, and a chapter on “Select Studies on Shipping and Travel.” The three Indian Ocean trading families most frequently represented in the Geniza letters are those of Joseph B. David Lebdi of Leptis Magna, in Tunisia; Abraham Ben Yiju of Mahdia, Tunisia; and Madmun b. Hasan-Japheth, a Jew of Persian descent who lived in Aden, where he served as representative of merchants (wakil al-tujjar in Arabic). The career of Abraham Ben Yiju seems not atypical. He established his business in Aden before sailing to India where he lived mostly in Mangalore as a merchant and proprietor of a bronze foundry. Shortly after arriving in India, he purchased and freed an Indian slave who became his wife. His 18-year stay in India—during which he sojourned in a few other Malabari ports and travelled to Aden—ended in 1149, and he eventually settled in Cairo where he deposited in the Geniza the papers written to or by him between about 1135 and 1155.

“Select Studies on Shipping and Travel,” a 44-page contribution by Professor Friedman, offers a detailed examination of “Nakhudas—Shipowners and Captains” based on a wide range of sources, from Buzurg Ibn Shahriyar’s tenth-century Book of the Wonders of India to the work of modern scholars such as Ranabir Chakravarti and Roxani Elena Margariti. This is followed by a shorter account of “Dangers in Travel and in Shipping Goods by Land and Sea.” Friedman deals briefly with the material concerns of shipwreck—how losses were apportioned among the merchants and how goods were salvaged from sunken vessels—but his chief interest is in people’s anticipation of and response to the risks associated with seafaring.

Section II of India Traders contains more than 600 pages, describing the context and in some instances, offering translations of more than 170 documents, most of them letters, but with a smattering of memoranda, documents of power of attorney and even poetry. The documents originated in any number of communities between India and Egypt and farther west, but most were written by correspondents in India and
Aden, which had become a center of Indian Ocean trade after the Fatimid conquest of Egypt in 969. The content of the letters varies widely but taken together they flesh out our fragmented picture of the world of the early medieval merchant. Goitein and Friedman are clearly drawn to those writings that shed the clearest light on the substance and conduct of trade. Many focus on the quantities of goods sold, at what price and to whom, while also offering details about the legal and commercial mechanisms of international and, it should be noted, interfaith commerce—contracts, legal cases and merchants who may have “deviated from the right way” (p.574). The correspondents also discuss problems familiar to anyone who travels for a living today, a millennium later—plans fulfilled, last-minute changes to itineraries, unexpected windfalls and missed opportunities—and many of the letters brim with the universal concerns about the well-being of wives, children and other relatives, anxiety about not receiving expected letters and news of dramatic events ranging from shipwreck to piracy and war.

Given the scarcity of primary source materials for medieval trade, publication of India Traders of the Middle Ages is a milestone for the study of the Indian Ocean trade in particular and of medieval Eurasian trade generally. The writings testify to the vitality of the commercial networks of the Silk Road of the Sea in the centuries before the Pax Mongolica reanimated the land routes across Central Asia. Typically, Brill has priced the book well beyond the reach of any but the wealthiest scholar, but they plan to publish a more affordable two-volume paperback edition in 2011.

Lincoln Paine
Portland, Maine


In the spring of 1938, in imitation of his elder brother Otto, Rudolf Lell (born 1921 in the south German city of Nürnberg) went to sea as an employee of the Hamburg shipping company Norddeutsche Lloyd. He joined the crew of the motor vessel Coburg, a freighter that served on the Hamburg-Port Said-Singapore-Yokohama line, in the modest capacity of cleaner in the engine-room. His voyage was of short duration. In view of the quickly rising political and military tensions in Europe, on 27 August 1939, the German Navy Staff ordered all German merchantmen outside the country to either try to sail back to Germany or to seek shelter in a friendly or neutral port. The Coburg steered for the Italian port of Massaua in Eritrea on the Red Sea coast, just before the Second World War broke out on 3 September 1939. A few of Lell’s letters to his friends and family at home describe his life in this hot out-of-the-way corner of the world, where some ten German merchantmen outside the country to either try to sail back to Germany or to seek shelter in a friendly or neutral port. At first, the crews alternately stayed aboard their vessels and in a kind of mountain resort in the area. In June 1940, once Italy had entered the war and the hostilities reached Eritrea, the sailors became soldiers. In fights against English troops some sailors were killed, but the failure of the Italian military operations in Eritrea led German authorities to order the sailors to return to their ships and leave the area. For unknown reasons line—perhaps a lack of sailors due to casualties—Lell was transferred to the
motor vessel Oder. Shortly after leaving Massaua in March 1941, the ship was intercepted by the English warship HMS Shoreham. The crew scuttled their vessel themselves and escaped in the lifeboats. They reached the coast safely, but in June of that year they were captured by English troops fighting in Eritrea and interned. The German sailors were transferred to Aden and in July they were shipped to Bombay. As inmate IN 13236 (this registration number stayed with him during the rest of the war), Lell stayed in camps for interned German sailors in Deolali and Dehra Dun in northeast India. In June 1942, the approximately 1,300 German inmates of that camp—many hundreds of them came from the Dutch East Indies—were transported by train back to Bombay where they boarded the English troop transport ship Cameronia, and were taken via Kaapstad to Halifax in Canada. From there Rudolf Lell and his colleagues were sent to a camp in Petawawa, Ontario, some 100 km northwest of Ottawa. They formed part of an “army” of about 3,380 German internees held in Canada in 1943. In January 1944, Lell was transferred to a camp in Monteith, near Lake Erie, there he worked outside the camp as a farm-hand. By January 1947, Rudolf Lell was back in his parental home. He later married, had three children and died on 1 June 2002.

Within the circle of his family and among friends, Lell always told stories about his experiences during the war. In addition, he put together a photo album with descriptive texts about that part of his life. His granddaughter, the author of this book, knew about his story telling and the album, but she never interviewed him. Following the conclusion of her studies in European folklore and German philology at Würzburg University, she wrote a long essay about her father’s wartime experiences, looking at these in the wider theoretical context of her studies and asking questions like: is the photo album a reliable historical source? to what extent do Lell’s memories have a general validity? what is the role of his family as a kind of safe ‘storehouse of memories’?

The German Maritime Museum and the Universität Bremen labeled Judith Kestler’s essay as a pioneering study and gave it a place in the museum’s series of “German Maritime Studies.” And rightly so, in my opinion. In this somewhat expanded essay, the author makes use of many primary, as well as secondary, historical sources. But she also presents a convincing sketch of the complicated process by which memories from a rather close past reach us by different routes, as well as pointing out the pitfalls that will await future researchers in this rather virgin field. Meanwhile, we learn a lot of fascinating details about Rudolf Lell’s youth in a Roman Catholic environment—he worked again in that community after his return from Canada—the effects of the Nazification of Germany, and notably his life during his Eritrean period and in the Canadian internment camps. Rather fascinating reading.

Leo M. Akveld
Rotterdam, The Netherlands


Bismarck is one of the most famous warships in history and its remarkable story has spawned an ever-growing plethora of books on the topic. Despite having had an active career of little over one week in the spring of 1941, Bismarck has been the subject of some of the most in-depth and thorough naval studies ever written. With
such a massive amount of available primary sources and previous works, this reviewer can understand the challenge to write a short, yet circumspect narrative in under one hundred pages. Nevertheless, Angus Konstam is able to achieve this task quite well in his short history on the legendary battleship.

Konstam provides a basic yet sensible introduction to the topic and situates the *Bismarck* campaign in its historical context. The author explains the general commerce raiding strategy employed by the *Kriegsmarine* where U-boats and surface raiders would complement each other in attacking the British supply lanes. Most importantly, Konstam discusses *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau’s* successful sortie (Operation *Berlin*) in early 1941 that demonstrated the viability of the German strategy and allowed naval staff to plan a similar second cruise with an even more powerful battle group. Even though British bombing efforts soon reduced the available ships to just the *Bismarck* and her heavy cruiser consort, *Prinz Eugen*, the German *Seekriegsleitung* was still convinced that the operation would be successful.

The British Admiralty understood that the sea-lanes had to remain open and that *Bismarck* could not be allowed to break out and enjoy the same success as Operation *Berlin*. It was, therefore, no surprise that the British kept as close a watch as possible on *Bismarck’s* progress during its trails in the Baltic. Unfortunately, here the reader experiences the book’s first weakness regarding British Intelligence. Although Konstam mentions the ever-critical photo reconnaissance missions and ramifications of *Bismarck* being observed by the Swedish vessel, *Gotland*, he fails to mention that the British had also observed that the Germans were flying a significant amount of their own reconnaissance flights over the Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes Gap, a key indicator that an operation was imminent. In fact, F.H. Hinsley’s work on British Intelligence is missing from the bibliography completely.

The narrative accurately reviews the battle group’s move to Norway, British photo reconnaissance spotting the fleet and then confirming its departure later, which triggered Admiral Tovey to order the Home Fleet into the Atlantic. Patrolling British cruisers next spotted *Bismarck* and its escort in the Denmark Strait, thus allowing Vice Admiral Holland to intercept the fleet on the morning of May 24. The subsequent Battle of the Denmark Strait is described in some detail and Konstam continues to explain that Admiral Holland closed distance so rapidly in order to get HMS *Hood* out of the ‘zone of vulnerability’ where plunging fire from *Bismarck* could easily break through her weak deck armour (p.50-51). What he does not discuss is that modern research shows that by the time of *Hood*’s destruction, the range was short enough that *Bismarck’s* trajectory was almost flat and the final blow may very well have been through the side armour rather than the deck armour as is commonly assumed and Konstam supports.

*Bismarck’s* success against HMS *Hood* is followed by the standard narrative about the separation from *Prinz Eugen*, shaking off the shadowing British cruisers after the unsuccessful attack by aircraft from HMS *Victorious*, the eventual rediscovery by an RAF Catalina and the Swordfish torpedo strike from HMS *Ark Royal* that sealed *Bismarck’s* fate by disabling the rudders. *Bismarck’s* final battle is covered in some detail considering the length of the book. Konstam mentions *Bismarck’s* excellent gunnery despite being largely out of control and the fortunate hits by the British battleships that disabled both of the German ship’s fire control directors early in the action. Two inaccuracies that are evident are, firstly, Konstam’s statement that *Bismarck’s* Captain Lindemann was
dead by the time the action was over and secondly, his suggestion that HMS Dorsetshire’s torpedoes sunk the Bismarck (p.86). There is, however, plenty of evidence that Lindemann may well still have been alive until his ship went down, and recent research strongly suggests that German claims that Bismarck was scuttled are, indeed, true.

Although the book includes a short section on the aftermath of the battle, this reviewer finds it quite weak. Konstam discusses the survivor stories in a few paragraphs (erroneously claiming that Fourth Gunnery Officer Müllenheim-Rechberg was the only surviving officer) and then refers to Prinz Eugen’s arrival in Brest and the channel dash in even fewer paragraphs. Although the author mentions the destruction of the German supply ship network in a single sentence (p. 90), he fails to stress that this is the key to the whole campaign. The supply ships had enabled the German warships to conduct extended operations at sea and once they were mopped up by the Royal Navy (possible only and achieved largely due to Enigma decrypts), the German Seekriegsleitung could no longer launch another operation even if they had wanted to.

Nevertheless, given the size of the book and the few lapses in scholarship aside, Konstam has written a fair, short narrative of the Bismarck episode and situated it in a way that all readers will be able to understand. Although written for a general audience, the book serves as a good introduction for those unfamiliar with the Bismarck. Of final note are the selected illustrations and photographs, which complement the text nicely and will certainly not disappoint the reader.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


This is an updated, expanded and improved version of an earlier book by the same author. It was interesting to review this book only months after Canada’s failure to preserve the last of the St-Laurent class destroyers, HMCS Fraser, the second of that name. HMS Warrior provided a small aperçu of the immensity of the conservation task.

Only a few ships can claim to be revolutionary. When HMS Warrior entered service, it rendered all other warships afloat obsolete. Designed and built as a response to the French naval policy and its ship, Gloire, Warrior challenged both and demonstrated Britain’s will to retain its technological superiority and naval mastery. Key to the development of Warrior was the concentration of research on gun effects, armour, propulsion and other functions while remaining conservative in construction in case any of the innovations failed. Preserved and restored in the historic Portsmouth Dockyard, Warrior is now open to the public. Naval enthusiasts have a unique opportunity to witness this important keystone in naval history, in spite of the fact that the ship never fired in anger.

Lambert divided his book into nine chapters, each on a different topic. The first one looks at the origin of HMS Warrior and the Anglo-French naval race that led to its conception and construction. Chapter two covers the ship’s career in the Royal Navy and after, while including the transformation of the late-nineteenth-century navy into a more professional corps. Warrior was quickly left behind by the ironclad revolution that followed and put in reserve to become a floating store and
workshop. In 1927, the ship was converted into a mooring hulk for oil tankers which explains its survival. The third chapter looks to the reconstruction and preservation of Warrior as first designed. This extraordinary opportunity was an unprecedented task, and although the project was considered early in the 1960s, it wasn’t until the end of that decade that a managing trust was formed, and finally, 10 years later, the ship was given to the trust. Once monetary support and a safe working location were secured, a drawing office was established to collect information about the vessel, no matter how insignificant and unimportant it seemed. The ship was cleared of rubbish and unsightly structural accretions and the reconstruction, using some long-abandoned methods in mainstream commercial shipbuilding, began.

The following chapter deals with the hull and its armour. It is interesting to note that Warrior had watertight bulkheads, making it less vulnerable to sinking by combat action, but the main gun deck was left unprotected. Chapter five encompasses the ship’s main armament and covers the guns and the diverse modifications and approaches that marked its career. This section also looks into the organization of the magazines, the ship’s small arms and the fabrication of copies of the main armament and its carriages. The main and auxiliary machinery is the topic of the chapter six as Warrior was among the first large warships in which steam propulsion was dominant, even if sail remained vital. A brief overview of early marine stream engines places Warrior within the steam power timeline; this chapter also covers the reproduction of the ship’s engine to provide visitors with a sense of the space and working conditions of the stokers.

While both British and French navies recognized that warships would never again go into battle under sail, and despite being fitted with an engine, Warrior was still very much dependent on wind propulsion for “long” trips and the rigging is the subject of chapter seven. Warrior’s performance under sail was good but the rudder made it slow to react, a problem that was never resolved during its career. Ironically, Warrior’s sea-going career ended in mid-1883 because the wooden masts were rotten and no replacements were available. During the restoration, the ship was fitted with steel masts due to the astronomical coat of wooden ones and the durability of steel. In chapter eight, we discover the extensive research involved in recreating the many small details that composed a warship, making it a fighting, but also a living, entity. The final chapter embraces the return of Warrior as a floating museum in Portsmouth in 1987, 25 years after the trust was established, and the ongoing work of improvement. The book ends with an additional appendix with specifications and a short bibliography.

The book is a good read and is exceedingly well illustrated with images including historic and recent photographs and lithographs of several ships in addition to Warrior. There are several tables, charts, cross-sections and line drawings of the ship and comparisons with other vessels of the time. It gives a good account of the challenges faced in preserving the vessel and may explain why such projects are not often undertaken. The book does have a few negative aspects; a few photos lack captions leaving the reader to guess the purpose and location of the objects displayed, and the deck-planking design on page 105 made reading difficult. In general, however, the book is a great addition to any library and will provide useful information to novices and experts about the early steam-powered armoured navies. I regret that I did not have this book before visiting the ship years ago; I would have appreciated Warrior much more.

Carl Gagnon
Ottawa, Ontario

The author of numerous books, especially focused on the British navy in its ascendancy, Lavery has bravely sailed, with this study, into the thick historiography of the 1939-45 war. In 1805, Britain's principal bulwark against French plans to invade the British Isles was the navy. Lavery concluded correctly, that there never was in 1805 "any real prospect of the French finding another way to weaken the British seriously enough to make an invasion possible." (p.410). In 1940, the navy's role was shared principally by the Royal Air Force. The British army, it is assumed by too many naval historians, would be rapidly defeated if either Napoleon's army or Hitler's managed to make a landing and successfully break out of its established bridgeheads.

Britain may well have avoided invasion by territorial French and German ambitions elsewhere. In Napoleon's case, both Austria and Prussia proved targets too attractive in 1805, while Hitler's policy of *drang nach Osten* led him into his Russian fiasco in 1941. German efforts against Britain in 1940, by contrast with those against Russia, seemed half-hearted, though Lavery does not make this claim.

As for the 1940 invasion threat, it must have been comforting in 1973 for the British participants who tested Operation *Seelowe* at Sandhurst's Royal Military College. In that imagined exercise, the navy failed to destroy the initial German invasion force. Successful landings were made on the Sussex coast. When parachutists seized an RAF airfield in Kent meeting light resistance, a *Wehrmacht* division was successfully ferried there. As for those who attempted the Channel crossing, a quarter of the German barges employed proved unseaworthy and foundered. RAF fighters and bombers experience some successes that day and the next. Yet in two days, it lost at least a quarter of its strength. The enemy seized the port of Folkstone, but a diversionary German naval force from Norway was badly mauled before retreating. Military counterattacks were mounted by the British 42nd Division with help from Australians and New Zealanders. By the end of the second day, elements—often German divisions—were ashore. Mounting German supply shortages began to emerge as the *Kriegsmarine* absorbed serious losses. A major German reinforcement was caught in the Channel and severely damaged by a British destroyer flotilla. British divisions moved from the north and west to stem further German advances. The bulk of the 90,000 men that Hitler had managed to get ashore were forced to surrender. Only 15,000 troops managed to return safely to France abandoning the bulk of their heavy equipment. As the *Luftwaffe* was temporarily a spent force, the blitz on British cities eased, while major delays in plans to invade the Soviet Union in 1941 and to reinforce the Italians in North Africa became necessary.

It is noteworthy that Lavery made no reference to the role of the Canadian Division, which, after Dunkirk, was the best equipped land force in Britain, though not yet battle-hardened.

The uneven treatment reflects Lavery's strengths and weaknesses. His analysis of both British and French plans, forces and equipment is magisterial, as indeed it should be for someone who has studied the matter and written extensively for a generation. In contrast, when dealing
with 1940, Lavery proves well-informed when describing the British situation, but says little about the German forces. For instance, when discussing intelligence, as his focus is entirely on the British, he was ill-placed to describe the level and accuracy of German intelligence about British preparations, standard of divisional training or equipment.

Lavery was let down by his copy editor as the text contains several misspellings, the most embarrassing being blitzkrieg (pp.5, 19, 145, 352).

Julian Gwyn
Berwick, Nova Scotia


The Royal Navy may no longer be Britain’s glory, but British naval history is still one of the glories of British scholarship. The Royal Navy once had as many ships as its two chief rivals combined; Britain now produces as many first rate naval historians as any two other countries combined. Among this profusion of talent, Brian Lavery is among the most knowledgeable, wide ranging, and prolific. By coincidence, on the day after receiving the present book I saw him on the History Channel advising a team of divers about to explore the wreck of a French ship of the line on the bottom of Aboukir Bay.

Royal Tars is the first of his planned two-volume history of British sailors from the Middle Ages to the present. It is based on a combination of printed and manuscript sources, largely sailors’ memoirs. Its introductory chapter discusses “The Early Seaman, before 1642” after which the remaining six chapters cover periods of 12 to 50 years apiece, concluding in 1850. Most of the book is anecdotal, describing the recruitment (largely forcible) and shipboard life of seamen, although the anecdotes are hung on a rather cursory general history of the navy. His book thus falls between N. A. M. Rodger’s thematic The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, 1986) and the two volumes published to date of Rodgers’ chronological history of the navy, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660-1649 (London, 1997) and The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (London, 2004). The tone of Royal Tars, however, is quite different from Rodgers’ books, which severely criticize the “black legend” of life in the Royal Navy established by Samuel Johnson and others. This legend portrays the sailor’s life as virtually unrelieved misery and servitude. (Herman Melville portrayed the American Navy of his day in a somewhat similar manner in his great semi-autobiographical novel White-Jacket.) Lavery acknowledges that the sailor’s lot varied over time and was highly dependent on the captain (and to a lesser extent the other officers) of the ship on which he served. In general, however, he paints a somber picture of British sailors’ lives, even though he glorifies their great professional abilities and courage. (He unfairly treats with unreserved scorn the sailors of rival navies, particularly the French.) I am inclined to believe that Rodgers’ more nuanced appraisal has the better of the argument, but even if Rodgers’ view is too rosy, his approach is original and provocative. In contrast, Lavery’s view is so familiar that it seems rather hackneyed.

There are other ways in which Lavery’s book is less interesting than it might have been. He devotes some attention to topics like women aboard ship that have a general appeal, but could do
much more. The best parts of his book discuss shipboard life, but he jumps from one sailor’s account to another, without providing the opportunity of knowing any of them very well. His chief topic is impressment. Although his findings are useful, they are very repetitive. The average reader is liable to weary of reading repeatedly that it was difficult to find crews and that impressment was cruel and wasteful. Even Lavery’s frequent use of direct quotes is a mixed blessing; although sometimes interesting, its overuse can be distracting and even annoying. On the other hand, Lavery’s own writing is direct and clear. The books of Conway Maritime (an imprint of Anova Books) generally are beautiful and this one is no exception. It has 30 pages of illustrations, many of them in colour. There are only a few typos and it has an adequate bibliography and index.

In spite of my reservations I believe that most readers still will enjoy *Royal Tars*. The most interesting chapters of the books are those dealing with the nineteenth century, which gives promise that Lavery’s sequel will be more lively. In summary, although no masterpiece, this is an informative book on an important topic.

Jonathan Dull
Hamden, Connecticut


War is often described as long periods of intense boredom, followed by short bursts of intense excitement and fear. In Eugene Ray Martin’s book, *Fleet Ocean Tug*, life aboard a US Navy tugboat follows a similar premise. Martin’s book chronicles the highs and lows of life aboard one of these tugs during the Vietnam War.

The book opens with Martin’s account of his interest in the fleet ocean tugs he saw daily while serving in the Navy in San Diego and his eventual transfer to serve in one of these vessels for a year. Fueled by a seemingly endless supply of coffee and monotony, Martin’s time aboard a tug is best described as routine, only periodically broken up with moments of noteworthy activity. From mechanical breakdowns to fights between crewmates, even the smallest deviation from the daily grind was a welcome and interesting change of pace. While on board, Martin details daily life on the tug, including the many interactions between the crew members; many times, Martin explains, he uses only first names or titles to protect the identities of those who might have been involved in less-than-flattering situations during the course of the book. Military life often consists of routine and seemingly senseless orders, and Martin’s book highlights this perfectly, with his many accounts of the seemingly random or pointless duties he and his fellow crew had to carry out.

Between the long periods of boredom, however, the tug boat crew shared episodes of great activity. While in the early chapters Martin describes simple tasks such as towing target sleds for gunnery practice or towing disabled vessels between ports, the latter half of the book describes the tug’s multi-month Pacific voyage from San Diego to Vietnam. Martin details each leg of the tour, from the tropical port stops in Hawaii and Japan, to the treacherous storms at sea, and even to the short-lived period where the tug actually served as a gunboat off the coast of Vietnam.

This attention to detail gives Martin’s book a very real feeling, especially for small things. For example, he pays particular attention to subtle aspects such as his favorite places to eat when in port, and humorous conversations between the crew while at sea, or amusing stories involving
the many adventures he and his crew encountered while on shore. Martin’s down-to-earth narrative presents his information plainly, without embellishing details or focusing solely on the action.

_Fleet Ocean Tug_ is an excellent first-hand account of one man’s life in the service on board a Navy tug, but it is not without its minor quirks. In the preface, Martin acknowledges that it has been some time since he served so some of the details may be fuzzy. Secondly, the book does suffer from a moderate number of grammatical errors, sometimes requiring one to reread a sentence to figure out just exactly what Martin meant. Lastly, as with any book involving military terminology, there is sometimes difficulty with the alphabet soup of abbreviations for various military craft, equipment, and ranks which can leave the casual reader confused. But, these are minor issues and do not take away from the Martin’s overall narrative.

All in all, _Fleet Ocean Tug_ covers an overlooked topic and provides a unique first-person view. Eugene Ray Martin offers an extensive view of his year aboard a tug; be it boring or exciting, he accounts for every week. While some chapters do drag, the book truly offers a sense of day-to-day life in a tugboat. For navy buffs, or just those wishing to learn more about this particular aspect of naval life, _Fleet Ocean Tug_ is a solid, first-person account of a little studied area of naval history.

Aleks Adams
Pensacola, Florida


The U.S. Coast Guard is best known for heroic rescues, and less well known as the only branch of the U.S. armed forces actually charged with law enforcement. Operating within the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard has been engaged in a war on human smuggling for over half a century. Part of its law enforcement responsibilities includes dealing with undocumented migrants trying to enter the United States via the seas, mostly from three countries: Cuba, Haiti, and China. What the Coast Guard refers to as alien migrant interdiction operations (AMIO) is little known beyond the Coast Guard and those connected to these undocumented migrants. Dennis Noble chronicles this war with a focus on the Coast Guard personnel who carry out this duty.

Those looking for long discussions and analysis of U.S. immigration policy will not find them in Dennis Noble’s most recent book. Noble’s goal is to put a human face on the Coast Guard enforcers and to a lesser extent on the undocumented migrants they interdict. In the process of doing this, however, he provides a significant amount of political background to help the reader understand the additional burden of confusing policies with which Coast Guard personnel must deal in carrying out their mission. Not only does Noble provide this background of American immigration policy, but he also offers a brief discussion of Cuba, Haiti, and the People’s Republic of China. Because of the Coast Guard’s more lengthy involvement with undocumented migrants from Cuba, Noble devotes entire chapters to _Operación Pedro Pan_ in the 1960s and the Mariel boatlift of 1980.

_Operation Able Manner_ in the 1990s, interdicting undocumented migrants from Cuba and Haiti, was the Coast Guard’s largest peacetime operation since the end of the Second World War. Noble quotes one officer participant who described it as a
“war without bullets.” Eventually, seventeen U.S. Coast Guard cutters, nine U.S. Coast Guard aircraft, and five U.S. Navy ships took part in the operation.

One of the strengths of this book is that it includes the little-known story of many undocumented Chinese migrants enduring “nightmarish” journeys at sea en route to New York City. Noble provides a thorough discussion of the Golden Venture incident in 1994 off Rockaway Peninsula, Queens, New York, which brought undocumented Chinese migrants to the attention of New Yorkers as well as the national media.

Noble’s major focus is on the enforcers who must deal with the undocumented migrants at sea. Most media reports dealt with the plight of the migrants, while few reported on the enforcers, and still fewer chose to accompany the cutters and small boats as they worked closely with the arrivals. The latter articles noted that U.S. Coast Guardsmen had great sympathy for the undocumented migrants, but still carried out their mission. The real value of this book is that it captures how the Coast Guard personnel felt about this duty they were called upon to perform. To gain this information, Noble visited U.S. Coast Guard units and interviewed service people, either in person or via e-mail. Coast Guard commanding officers always pointed out the no Coast Guard personnel ever abused a migrant, in fact, their crews often sympathized with the migrants, especially those from Cuba and Haiti. The reason many people join the U.S. Coast Guard is to do search and rescue and to save people, so it was natural for the average Coast Guardsman to embrace the saving of undocumented migrants at sea.

This book has all the statistics on the number of undocumented migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard, but as Noble accurately points out, the statistics of an operation provide just the barest idea of what took place. Very few service or civilian media took time to file reports on what they observed and Coast Guard people are reluctant to call attention to what they consider “just doing their job.” Noble culled the articles available and combined them with observations from a number of participants to discover how it affected those who “just did their job.” His admiration and sympathy for his subjects is evident.

Noble is to be commended for preserving this important chapter in U. S. Coast Guard history, and doing it when almost all of the participants are still able to be interviewed. He succeeds in highlighting the difficulties surrounding interdiction of undocumented migrants at sea and puts a human face on the enforcers and the undocumented migrants whose lives are affected by these policies. With superb maps and photographs, The U.S. Coast Guard’s War on Human Smuggling is not only delightful to read but also instructive and highly informative about a much overlooked aspect of maritime history.

C. Douglas Kroll
Palm Desert, California


Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (1478-1557) lived through the first generation of the Spanish exploration and colonization of the Americas. Born in Spain, Oviedo resided for almost thirty years in the Caribbean. He knew Christopher Columbus. He had his disagreements with Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566), the famous “Protector of the
Indians” and rival historian of the sixteenth-century Spanish conquests. Oviedo organized his *General and Natural History of the Indies* into fifty books, mostly from his own interviews with eyewitnesses while living in Santo Domingo on the island of Hispaniola. Professor Glen F. Dille, of Bradley University, has translated Oviedo’s last book about the disasters and losses of Spanish sailing during the first half of the sixteenth century between Spain and the Caribbean. Dille’s translation remains true to the tone and frankness of Oviedo’s Castilian—a gift for those unable to read the book in its original language.

In 1523, Oviedo published a one-volume history of the “New World” from notes he had been accumulating since 1514. Appointed royal chronicler in 1532, Oviedo published the first part of his *History* in 1535 in Seville. This part composed the first 19 of the eventual 50 books. Oviedo finished the manuscript but the last 31 books remained unpublished until a four-volume publication, edited by José Amador de los Ríos, emerged in Madrid between 1851-1855. Seven hundred or so of these pages in Spanish are easily found on the Internet. Oviedo’s massive compilation can be read in many Spanish editions but only sections of it have ever been translated into English. In 2006, Dille translated and published some of the autobiographical portions of Oviedo’s story in *Writing from the Edge of the World: The Memoires of Darién, 1514-1527*. Now, we have Oviedo’s last book which includes the accounts of 29 shipwrecks and a defense of the entire project.

Beyond the academic context and historical provenance, the book contains delightful story-telling and adventures of amazing perseverance. Oviedo wrote with specificity. He begins most chapters with the month and year, setting the time frame. He always lets us know the leaders’ names and who the survivors were. Oviedo also places the details in specific locations—shipwrecks on the Alacranes Islands, youthful antics on ships halfway across the Atlantic (his Ocean Sea), marooned survivors on the Island of Cáliz at the mouth of Huyapari River (now the Orinoco River), nine months on the river called Marañón (today’s Amazon River), hurricanes striking the city of Santo Domingo on the island of Hispaniola in 1545. Even the nine surviving chapters that consist of one-sentence summaries contain specifics and intriguing details; such as, 30 men having to eat each other until only three survive. A Hollywood movie huckster could sell these stories. The producers of the next installment of the *Pirates of the Caribbean* films should read this book and allow Johnny Depp and Geoffrey Rush to flesh out their characters of Captain Jack Sparrow and Hector Barbosa with the details.

Oviedo had his purposes. In the conclusion to the longest chapter about these misfortunes and shipwrecks, Oviedo wrote “from all I have reported of this shipwreck you will understand how wearying and insubstantial man’s life is.” (p.79) Despite the challenges of mortality, of the almost 60 men who were on Alonso Suazo’s caravel, 17 persevered and survived. From his thoroughly sixteenth-century perspective, life for Oviedo meant survival and perseverance. Although clinging to rocks after their ship sank in a storm, the men found a canoe and searched for dry land. They eventually came to a sandbar which was 10 paces wide and 150 paces long. After five days, with no water to drink and only a few kernels of corn to eat, five turtles came ashore. For the next several days the men survived by drinking turtle blood and eating raw flesh and eggs inside the reptiles. Oviedo wrote that they drank “as if a tavern with very good wine had appeared to them . . . no liquid was ever sweeter to any people than that blood.”
Eventually, from the flotsam, the survivors built a makeshift craft and sailed to the coast of Mexico, having survived on turtles, sea lions, birds and sharks. The unimaginable bravery or desperation of successfully catching a shark with an iron-hook while wading in chest-high water captures my attention and imagination. When to their delight, they found that the shark was pregnant with 35 baby sharks inside which made “very good eating,” I applaud their perseverance and cringe at our omnivorous species (p.50).

Oviedo’s rival, las Casas, famously said that the History had almost as many lies as it had pages. Should we then only accept Dille’s translation as a ripping good yarn? Many of the details can be confirmed, but not all. The ships did sink. Many died in the wrecks and disasters. Oviedo diligently worked to interview those survivors that he could. All primary sources are compromised. That is what makes them such delightful historical reading. Oviedo’s choices of narration glorify the Spanish experience. The indigenous and weak are afterthoughts in this book. And yet, the overall conclusion of the magnum opus remains as powerful as when Oviedo experienced the conquest. He raised the warning that adventures, settlement and empire-building were dangerous, uncontrollable and not what anyone could imagine.

James B. Tueller
La’ie, Hawai’i


This work aims to prove the authors’ thesis that Project Azorian, the raising of the Soviet submarine K-129 by the CIA in 1974, was a necessary gamble. It purports to be an exposé of the workings of the Soviet Navy and the CIA. As a feat of engineering, the authors equate locating and raising K-129 with going to the moon in terms of cost and complexity. Success of the project demanded secrecy, even though it would be conducted under media observation and close scrutiny by the Soviets.

The story is riveting. It opens with the bursting of the media bubble in January 1975, when the announced project to mine manganese nodules from the ocean bed by the Glomar Explorer was exposed in the press as a cover story for the project to raise the K-129. Thereafter, the text follows the order of events from the sinking of the submarine in 1968 northwest of Hawaii to the search by both navies to the location by the U.S. Navy submarine Halibut. Once K-129 was located, then began the planning and execution of the technical project required to raise a 2,000-ton object from the Pacific Ocean bed more than 3,000 metres below the surface. The project was executed by the Hughes organization together with private subcontractors that included corporations like Lockheed, which had a long history of ingenuity in designing special equipment, such as the U2 spy plane, and Sun Shipbuilding, the builder of the Glomar Explorer that Canadians will know as the firm that prepared the tanker Manhattan for its controversial Arctic cruise through waters claimed by Canada.
The story of marshalling political support for *Azorian* at the highest level of the U.S. government is described in the words of the participants. At that level, the leadership of bodies like the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the armed forces, the CIA, the National Security Administration, and mainstream scientific bodies like the National Science Foundation, all provide input into what becomes U.S. foreign policy. In order to obtain approval from President Richard Nixon, major objections on the part of the senior U.S. Navy leaders, like Admiral Elmo Zumwalt were over ridden. Their opposing memoranda advised that the project be scrapped on the grounds of obsolete information, cost, and risks of provoking the Soviets. There is but one paragraph covering finances that traces how money, estimated at $500 million, flowed in the project, which ends with a quote from Curtis Crooke of Global Marine: “I never really understood how it worked.” (p.71)

There are portraits of the men and officers of *K-129*, particularly Captain Kobzar, the submarine’s skipper and the members of the *Project Azorian* team. There are snapshots of personalities in both chains of command, like Admiral Viktor Dygalo, Jesse Helms, Henry Kissinger, and John Graham. Others appear only as names and shadowy figures, like John Parangosky and Richard Nixon.

The text is surprisingly brief at 178 pages of widely-spaced print following 24 pages of preliminaries. The list of abbreviations is necessary as is the index for navigating the many acronyms. Following the text are eight appendices, notes, booklist, index, and biographies of the authors. The work’s strongest single feature is its illustrative material, which was assembled by film-maker Michael White. His creations are brilliant: drawings, plans, computer generated video and stills, and facsimiles of sound recordings, all transmit the scale and complexity of the engineering project.

There are many small problems like typos as well as some serious errors. In tracing the route of the Soviet submarines searching for *K-129* they write “they sailed southward to longitude 40° N.” (p.37) This is, of course, impossible; the authors have confused latitude and longitude. A crew member’s nationality is given as Jewish (p.179), a puzzling error which leads to a tangential question about the authors’ and editors’ understanding of subjects not related to the basic story. There are other questions related to the use of language, such as use of the word “proscribed” where “prescribed” clearly is intended (p. 33). The overuse of parentheses throughout unwraps the normal meaning of words and reserves them for discussion. “It is not clear who—whether at the CIA or elsewhere — came up with the idea of having Howard Hughes “sponsor” the salvage effort under the “cover” of the sea mining venture.” (p.70) The text appears padded in places where small pieces of text are repeated verbatim, often in a short space: pp.108-109, 136-137. Inclusion of the food menu on the *Glomar Explorer* perhaps falls into the same category. There are many blank pages.

The authors judge that while the project was an engineering and intelligence failure, recovering only 38 feet of the craft’s bow and none of the hoped for ICBMs and cryptographic information, they claim for the project unequivocal success in terms of the maintenance of the cover story throughout. The work is as fascinating for what it does not tell us. It mentions nothing about other CIA projects that were under way at the same time; for example, the toppling of the Allende regime in Chile, the collapse of the South Vietnamese client state during the last phase of the Vietnam War, and Watergate. These give an idea of the mind boggling power, scope, and wealth...
of the organization that was the CIA at the time.

Despite problems, *Project Azorian* succeeds in its goal of communicating to the reader the information about the project as one gambit in the geopolitical struggle as well as an amazing engineering feat. The most important evidence is contained in photographs, which are persuasive. The work is interesting on many levels. It is a close up of the world of espionage during the most dangerous period so far in human history, when at the height of the Cold War, the world staggered toward a Third World War.

As a work of scholarship, the information sources on which the book is based are highly problematic as is the method of presentation, which is to be expected in a work on espionage. Perhaps the most basic primary sources are the conversations and correspondence of major players, like Graham, Kissinger, and Dygalo. The bibliography is called a “Book list” and is divided between popular titles on the period and memoirs of retired CIA officials and naval officers on both sides.

In hindsight, the objections to the project on the part of the U.S. Navy leadership were borne out by the facts. The work raises major questions, such as, whether the CIA and the higher levels of the U.S. government operate in similar fashion today. As a publishing endeavour by the Naval Institute Press, it appears to be intended for a mass market, rather than the usual academic/professional market. The bad news is that the institute has published a work with so many obvious problems, which leaves troubling questions about the editorial and publishing processes of that prestigious body.

We recommend a borrow rather than a buy.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


If the final fate of George Armstrong Custer’s 7th Cavalry Regiment in the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876 is the enduring mystery of the American frontier, then the last decades and ultimate disappearance of the Norse Greenlanders is the greatest mystery of the many frontiers of the Scandinavian Vikings. And just as Custer’s still-unexplained final hours have allowed for fertile explorations by historians, archaeologists, Hollywood directors and, in no small measure, fans of alternative histories, a tapestry of myth has been woven around Eirik the Red and his followers. Such myths have been coloured and embellished by those who, as Kirsten Seaver writes in this incomparably brilliant new account of those intrepid sub-Arctic colonists, “prefer a homemade story to the far more interesting reality gradually revealed by research.” (p. 203)

This reviewer himself had several encounters with such homemade stories as a boy, from growing up near (and often picnicking at) Dighton Rock in southeast Massachusetts to swimming in Follins Pond on Cape Cod, where you could poke your fingers in the holes in the flat slab rocks that had been identified by the writer Frederick Pohl as mooring holes for Viking ships. This was the site of Leif Eiriksson’s Vinland and everyone knew it, especially the local tourist bureau. If you didn’t believe it, you were invited to take a drive along the nearby Saga Road, Vinland Drive, Freydis Drive, or Rune Stone Road.

Seaver is having none of it. An independent scholar, she penned the marvelous *Frozen Echo: Greenland and the*
Exploration of North America, ca. A.D. 1000-1500 (Stanford 1997), a work that, like The Last Vikings, had an uncanny ability to ask just the right questions of the growing body of historical and archaeological data being unearthed about the Norse experience in Greenland. But where Frozen Echo was as dense as a thousand-year-old hedge (and as much a joy to anyone wanting to dive deeply into the Greenland mystery), The Last Viking, at less than half the size of Echo, seems to have been very carefully and deliberately written to appeal to a wide audience. It does this skillfully, not by dumbing down any of the complexities of the question, but by reducing the many arguments and interpretations to their icy essentials.

With her native Scandinavian languages combined with a scholar’s knowledge of primary source materials and the maddening maps and charts that come down to us from the long-ago world filled with fantasy islands and other medieval chimaeras, Seaver expertly navigates the intellectual skerries strewn from Norway’s skjærgården to Iceland’s Skálholt to the fjords of Eirik’s early exploring expeditions. One of the key missions here is to counter the widely-held belief that the Norse adventure in Greenland was one characterized by its brevity and sudden disappearance. In truth, Eirik’s time was only the first few years of what would become more than five centuries of a remarkable experience where northern Europeans carved out a long-term settlement nearly as remote from Europe in space as it is now from us in time.

Our knowledge of that experience suffers from three major problems. First, the archives of the Norse Greenlanders, if they ever existed in the halls of the church at Gardar or the monasteries and convents elsewhere in the Eastern Settlement, have long since vanished. What brief written glimpses we have of these folk come from the widely-spaces moments when, as Seaver explains, they happened to trip into the history of the Icelandic chronicles.

The second problem is the remote and brief field seasons afforded to professional archaeological studies, combined with the very unprofessional attempts at excavating critical sites like the port of Herjolfsnes in the nineteenth century. These latter destroyed a vast material archive that could have, if left to the methods of twenty-first century archaeology, answered so many more questions.

The final problem is actually an opportunity for contemporary archaeologists. We simply have had no comprehensive attempts to engage in the vast maritime archaeological possibilities of these essentially maritime people, both in the shallow water areas of the Greenland and Labrador coastlines or in Greenland’s deepwater fjords. This is especially shocking given Norway’s native interest in the Greenland colony combined with that country’s expertise in sonar technology.

After providing the historical background of Eirik and his adventurous family, Seaver sorts through the history of the obsession with Vinland, the relationships of the Norse with the skrälings, the failure of the medieval Roman Catholic Church to have any real idea of where there Greenland faithful were, the greater failures of later church and state actors—especially Nidaros Archbishop Erik Valkendorf—to locate the Norse when they might still have been found alive and, finally and most critically, the arrival of the English into the North Atlantic just as the power of the Scandinavian monarchies was radically diminished by conflicts, problematic successions, and the Black Death.

About the only important question missing from Seaver’s account is the that of DNA. There is mention of Gisli Pálsson
and Agnar Helgason’s unsuccessful attempt to match the DNA of modern Greenland Inuit with the comprehensive database of modern Icelanders. But more critical to Seaver’s migration theory would be a large DNA mapping project in the scattered villages of the northern peninsula of Newfoundland. It is there that one would expect to find traces of Icelandic DNA if the Norse Greenlanders did in fact abandon their settlement around 1500 in the company of British fishing entrepreneurs.

The Last Viking is simply a tour de force by a scholar who is both nimble and wise. She is also in possession of a Viking-like courage, unafraid to challenge centuries of dogma in favour of an interpretation that makes the answer to this greatest of Atlantic mysteries seem both inescapable as it is transcendent. The shipwrecks and coastal timber camps of the seasonal and, later, emigrational, Norse Greenlanders, will be located one day. They will be discovered along the still remote and inhospitable shores that stretch from Baffin Island to Labrador and Ungava Bay. The explorer who finds them will have a copy of this magnificent book in their rucksack.

P.J. Capelotti
Abington, Pennsylvania


The Battle for the Bay: The Naval War of 1812 is the seventeenth volume in the New Brunswick Military Heritage Series highlighting the military and naval history of New Brunswick and its citizens. This volume focuses on the efforts to defend the colony and its shipping, and capture or destroy American merchant vessels and privateers during the War of 1812, in the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine. As the author notes at the outset, this is a topic usually ignored by historians of the war. Smith seeks to undo this past error by exploring the stories of three British vessels, their officers, crew and their fates. As a local history, the volume successfully ties the three tales directly to the people of New Brunswick and the protection of the colony during the war with America.

Smith begins with a general discussion of the British navy of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. He uses the reputation of Lord Nelson to embody the British navy and empire. New Brunswick is positioned on the empire’s fringe but growing in importance through the lumber trade, in particular the supplying of masts to the Royal Navy. The issues of press gangs, the failure of President Jefferson’s embargo and the occurrence of mutiny and desertion are introduced. Smith seems to contradict himself on the subject of press gangs. At first, he sides with N.A.M. Rodger’s idea that the business of impressment was rather dull and of little interest to anyone in the region (p.22). He then spends a page describing local riots, murder, beatings and general unrest arising from the press gang’s efforts to collect men (pp.22-23). With the regional focus, the sub-title The Naval War of 1812 seems somewhat inappropriate.

The main focus of the text is three vessels that plied the waters of the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine (though more often the latter than the former) during 1812 and 1813. The first of the three vessels, the Provincial Sloop Brunswicker, was the former American privateer Commodore Barry, captured by the British navy in August 1812. The colonial government outfitted and manned the sloop to serve as a protector of local British trade and a destroyer of American trade and privateers.
Smith tells all there is to know, which is limited, about this vessel and its important role in the early months of the war. Its career comes to an end as a result of the high cost of operating it, proving too much for the New Brunswick government. The story of the British schooner Bream (pronounced Brim) is told next and is by far the most interesting of the three. Smith’s description of the life and service of the vessel’s commander Lieutenant Charles Hare sets out the usual experience of the men who commanded in the navy during the era; dedicated to the service, hard working and little noticed. The final ship is the Boxer; an unseaworthy ship with an untrained crew, led by Commander Samuel Blyth, a smuggler and harsh disciplinarian, which was beaten by a better trained, manned and led American ship, the Enterprise. The extremely negative depiction of the British commander and the poor condition of ship and crew serves to undercut the impact of the defeat, even justifying it.

Throughout the three stories Smith stresses the New Brunswick connection, usually the members of the crew and the protection of the colony. The story ends with the Boxer’s defeat in September 1813 with no coverage of 1814 other than that the Royal Navy sent larger vessels to patrol the area. The attack on Maine in 1814 is mentioned in passing but the involvement of, or impact on New Brunswick is not discussed.

The book is well illustrated throughout with some images coming from private collections, thus Smith provides them with a wider audience, always a welcome addition in naval studies of this era. Diagrams also abound and help illustrate the narrative. Smith includes two appendices. The first lists the vessels captured by Bream in 1812-13. It repeats information, while adding some detail to Table 3 (p.60) which lists the prizes captured by Bream in Maine waters between March and July 1813. The information in Appendix 1 could have been placed in Table 3. The second appendix lists the items sold by the Americans from HMS Boxer and their price. While interesting it might be more relevant to list items captured and sold by the three British vessels discussed in the volume.

Smith sets the atmosphere in the region as tense and confrontational, where the violence of war dominates. He plays down the willingness of New Brunswickers and those in Maine to refrain from combat and continue trade. The region was more conflicted over how to conduct of the war, with efforts to maintain peaceful relations along the border area, including trade. Even with the invasion of Maine in late 1814, the ‘hostility’ was not as fierce as in areas such as the Niagara Peninsula, or the Chesapeake. This regional dynamic needs a higher profile in the story Smith tells.

Another concern is the use of rank titles for the British officers, in particular the various levels of admiral. Smith refers to Edward Griffith (p.98) giving Hare advice without referencing that he was a Rear-Admiral, thus the advice having greater import than coming from someone else. Captain Sir Thomas M. Hardy is incorrectly referred to as Admiral, whereas he didn’t become a rear-admiral until 1825 (p.95).

This volume accomplishes its mission even with the concerns noted in this review. It is a short text intended for the lay reader with little background in the British navy or the War of 1812. The reason an academic should have this volume on their shelf is that it will remind them of the importance that seemingly minor, often ignored stories play in understanding the complex dynamics in any region during the War of 1812.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario
Churchill’s Pirates describes the previously poorly-documented service of the Royal Naval Patrol Service (RNPS) in the Second World War. The RNPS primarily performed minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) duties using fishing trawlers and other small craft. The authors frequently emphasize that while many RNPS personnel did serve on converted fishing trawlers, a wide variety of craft, including paddle steamers and pleasure boats, were also utilized. The range of craft was matched by the range of duties assigned to the RNPS, another fact the authors repeatedly mention. Lest these comments on repetition denigrate the work, the complexity of the RNPS’ service only serves to support the author’s contention that the organization played a vital, even crucial role, in the Allied victory.

The work begins with the background of the RNPS. During the First World War, the Admiralty recruited fisherman and their trawlers to perform many of the duties of their Second World War successors. After the war, the Royal Navy established additional reserve organizations to supplement its strength in wartime with the experienced sailors. As a result of this advance work, the RNPS grew rapidly after the commencement of hostilities.

This rapid growth made for a number of birthing pains. While the Navy fitted out trawlers with weapons and equipment as quickly as possible, the vessels proved to be less than ideal for sweeping and anti-submarine (ASW) service. Purpose-built craft became available in large numbers in 1942 and by 1943-1944, the majority of the RNPS fleet was composed of recent constructions. These newer vessels included the latest sonar and radar and handled the weight of guns and other naval equipment much more successfully than the trawlers.

The bulk of the RNPS was deployed in the coastal waters surrounding the British Isles on minesweeping and ASW duty. Over 500 British-based craft swept over 160,000 German mines during the war at a significant loss in crew and ships. Perhaps the most visible success of the minesweepers was the clearance and continual re-sweeping of the lanes used by the Normandy assault fleet. The RNPOS craft in northwest European waters were also subject to the heaviest German air attack, particularly from 1939-1941. The heavy losses resulting from these attacks are a regular feature of the first several chapters. Perhaps these losses and the bravery of the crews under fire were the source of Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s steadfast support for the RNPS. This support, and the awards given by the Prime Minister to RNPS crews, led the RNPS to name themselves “Churchill’s Pirates.” One suspects that Churchill’s reaction to this title was positive.

One is struck by the international nature of the RNPS. Trawlers and sweepers for the service were built in Britain, Portugal, the United States, India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Crews were drawn from all of these nations as well as from European countries under German control. The RNPS served all over the world in auxiliary and support roles. They evacuated troops from Greece, Crete, and Tobruk; hunted submarines in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans; and ferried supplies to the British Pacific Fleet.

The men of the RNPS were not enlisted in the Royal Navy, though many trawler captains were serving line officers.
Accustomed to a less regimented, more individualistic life at sea, commanders typically did not strictly enforce naval regulations. Their crews responded by repeated serving with courage under heavy enemy air attack.

This is a popular history written in an engaging style. The depictions of the RNPOS are so compelling that one feels a small burst of excitement on the admittedly rare occasions a trawler sinks submarine. The lack of footnotes makes it impossible to identify the sources for the approximately twenty pages of block quotations. Likewise, the introduction does not explain the material used by the authors in preparing their account. When the 20 pages of quotations are added to the 80 pages of the two appendices, the length of the narrative is less than one might imagine on the first glance. The appendices are quite valuable for reference. The first gives a short summary of every RNPS vessel lost during the war, while the second lists selected awards given to the RNPOS. The short bibliography details other secondary works relevant to the RNPS. Two minor errors will be slightly galling to residents of the American Gulf Coast, the references to “Beloxi,” Mississippi and “Mobil,” Alabama on page 111. This lively account of an under-reported side of the Second World War at sea is recommended to the general reader.

Corbin Williamson
Lubbock, Texas


Over the past decade, readers of maritime history have been treated to outstanding biographies of several of the most central characters of the Nelson-era navy, including Lord Nelson himself as well as Admirals Jervis, Hood, and Howe. A contemporary of these men renowned by scholars and the public for their extraordinary efforts in the service of Britain was the much less recognizable yet hugely influential physician, Thomas Trotter. Drawing on Trotter’s own writings, author Brian Vale’s thorough knowledge of naval history, and co-author Griffith Edwards’ medical expertise, this fascinating study reveals a man of humble origins who directly impacted fundamental developments in not only the evolution of the Royal Navy, but also the anti-slavery movement and the improvement of hospitals and the surgical profession in Georgian Britain.

Organized into three main sections: Background; From Surgeon’s Mate to Physician to the Fleet; and The Newcastle Years, this biography is delivered in a style akin to a play in three acts. Indeed, the authors framed their story in such a way as to mirror a phrase used by one of Trotter’s acquaintances, who implored Trotter to write an autobiography owing to his diverse experiences in the “great theatre of life.” Biographies, of course, often employ the theatrical image. This one, however, is particularly effective in chronicling the life and times of an individual who performed in a considerable variety of roles, and made several invaluable contributions in each of those roles, throughout one of the most intense and radically changing periods in British history.

The scenes move swiftly and dramatically. Touched by the Scottish Enlightenment as a medical student in Edinburgh, Trotter then sets off on a series of nautical adventures that within five years see him survive a hurricane at sea en route from the West Indies, the bloody Battle of the Dogger Bank, convoy escorts between Liverpool and Plymouth, and a slaving
voyage on board the infamous *Brookes* out of Liverpool, all against the backdrop of the American Revolutionary War. During these years in which Trotter rises from third surgeon’s mate to full surgeon, he makes careful observations about the practical aspects of medicine at sea and begins to formulate ideas about the cause and treatment of scurvy. After a four-year interlude in which he operates his own medical practice and acquires his MD degree, Trotter returns to the Royal Navy. As ship’s surgeon, he revisits the West Indies and investigates typhus among naval seamen. Appointed second physician to the Royal Naval Hospital, Trotter continues his academic study into shipboard disease and sets out a comprehensive plan for the improvement and reform of the hospital’s administrative framework and the pay levels of physicians. Within six months, Trotter is promoted to physician to the Channel Fleet under Lord Howe, as Britain goes to war with Revolutionary France. He is witness to the Battle of the ‘Glorious First of June’ and takes advantage of the victory to successfully lobby for higher pay and status for naval surgeons. Trotter resumes his research and writings into the prevention and cure of scurvy, and is steadfast in his belief that fresh fruit and vegetables are the key to eradicating this scourge of seamen. In 1802, Trotter leaves the Navy for good, marries, and establishes a practice in Newcastle. His later years are spent as a prolific author of medical essays on such societal issues as drunkenness, mine safety, and the nervous temperament. Trotter also becomes known as an amateur poet and playwright. These scenes tell the story of a remarkably diverse life, the life of a professional and extraordinarily creative man who walked in a myriad of social circles and acted as both a visionary and a notable agent of change in his time.

Readers will find the writing very engaging with a much appreciated flow between events that is often not possible with biographies due to the limited nature of source material. Vale and Edwards were able to gather an extensive body of evidence on which to base their account of Trotter’s life, from the subject’s personal journals to ships’ muster rolls, captains’ logbooks, official dispatches, and letters from both the Board of Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board. The result is a narrative that is more or less continuous, infused with the authors’ rich sense of historical events. Their treatment of topics such as medicine at sea, the conquest of scurvy, and the shipping component of the slave trade, are especially useful. The footnotes are detailed and many, though the bibliography does not reflect the full range of primary sources consulted by the authors. It does provide a fine list of the most valuable printed primary and secondary sources available on the histories of the British navy, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century medical theory and practice, and the Atlantic slave trade.

Vale and Edwards must be commended for their excellent contribution to furthering our understanding of this period. Their well-written and superbly-researched biography of Thomas Trotter will be welcomed by scholars and students of naval history, medical history, slavery, and the Atlantic World.

Michael F. Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario


In 2010, the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA) celebrated the 150th Anniversary of its founding in 1860. It is appropriate, therefore, that this reference
work—a veritable “Who’s Who” of key players who have had a significant influence on the evolution of ship design and construction—was published in that landmark year. Many of those included in the book were members of that venerable institution or, in some cases, its American counterpart, (and junior by some 33 years) the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME).

Shipbuilding, and its associated scientific and engineering disciplines, has always been about technology. The attempts of early humans to use the sea for transportation or as a source of food from fishing were limited by the technology of the time and the materials at hand. With the development of tools, a suitable tree could be made into a dugout canoe which was a major technological advance over lashing several trees together with vines to form a raft. The ultimate development of technology in shipbuilding in the pre-industrial age were the large men-of-war such as those of the Spanish Armada, and in later years, the ships that gave Nelson his victory at Trafalgar. Nowadays, technological advances in metallurgy and engineering, coupled with powerful computers, allow complex designs to be developed. With such capabilities, naval architects now design and build monsters, such as the huge container ships which ply the oceans, as well as the somewhat short of graceful, box-like cruise ships toting tourists around the globe.

This book is much more than a series of pen portraits by contributors to the advancement of the art and science of designing and constructing ships. It is a superb overview of the history of that particular art and science. The brief, selected biographies give the reader a glimpse of how determined men, and two remarkable women, pushed the boundaries of contemporary shipbuilding technology further and further out. Equally, the biographies of the scientists and mathematicians included show how crucial the development of scientific knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals such as stability and hydrodynamics was, and still is, to advances in ship design and construction.

The book is organised into five parts which are divided, except for the first one, into fifty year segments starting at 1800; by which year the Industrial Revolution was well under way. Part 1 opens with a short portrait of Archimedes whose discoveries in mathematics, along with other essential contributions to science, such as the definition of pi ($\pi$), still are with us. There is a chronological gap of some 1700 years as the author jumps forward to the invention of logarithms, the first set of which were published in tabular form in 1617, and then covers the period up until the year 1800. The reader is introduced to master shipwrights who built great ships without any formal plans and shown how crucial advances in mathematics provided for understanding the key issues in the stability of ships—thus improving their safety.

Part 2 traces the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the shipbuilding industry and the remarkable achievements of the period as iron was developed into a useful material for ship construction and steam propulsion became viable. It was during this period that the transition from “Shipwright” to Naval Architect began and the first Chair in engineering was established at the University of Glasgow in Scotland.

The period covered by Part 3, entitled “Naval Architecture Comes of Age”, was a time of discovery and innovation in science and in engineering, when formal schools of naval architecture were established throughout the world. In this part, the mini-biographies of notable men, whose names are familiar even today,
appear. Names such as Froude, Armstrong, Palmer, Plimsoll, Kelvin, Mahan and Holland—all of whom made major contributions to, or who had significant influence on, the advancement of naval architecture.

The final two Parts deal with the twentieth century. The author made a deliberate decision in his selection of candidates to include in these sections only persons deceased by the year 2000. Thus, the final entry is that of Ben Lexcen, the legendary Australian racing yacht designer who died in 1988 at the age of 52. Other widely known notables in these parts are Sir Charles Parsons, Rudolf Diesel, Guglielmo Marconi, A. P. Møller, Henry Kaiser and Hyman Rickover.

One of the really valuable features of the book is the introductory section that precedes each Part. Here the author provides a synopsis of the relevant major events, discoveries and trends that took place during the period covered.

This really is a fascinating and absorbing book. The author recognizes that not everyone will agree with some of his choices, but the work was limited to 136 biographies which constrained the selection somewhat. I found only one selection of a person whose work and involvement I thought was only marginally relevant to the subject. It is fascinating to learn of the remarkable achievements that the people portrayed attained. Many made their mark at a relatively young age and continued to contribute throughout their productive lives. There are also delightful gems of trivia—for example, the Cunard Line’s funnel colours of red with thin black bands came about because when Samuel Cunard ordered his first four mail steamers in 1839, the engine builders supplied the funnel as well as the machinery. This colour combination was the trade mark of the Scottish engine builders and Cunard never changed it!

While this book will be of great interest to the general reader, it is aimed at a different audience and some of the terminology used would be mysterious to someone unfamiliar with ship design and construction. Nevertheless, it is an excellent reference work and a great contribution to an overlooked facet of maritime history.

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This richly illustrated book, or monograph, on the Royal Navy’s first rate ships-of-the-line continues a long line of scholarly works by the author, Rif Winfield. He is an acknowledged expert on Britain’s sailing navy and has published previous works on *The 50-Gun Ship*, as well as a compendium of all sailing vessels in the Royal Navy from the Age of the Stuarts to the end of the Napoleonic Period (he also worked with the late David Lyon on *The Sail and Steam Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy*). It is safe to say Winfield knows his way around the archives.

Perhaps a quick note on what a first rate ship-of-the-line implies. The British system of classification for the warships of the Royal Navy, from the time of King Charles I, was to describe them as first, second, third, fourth, fifth or sixth rates, all based, essentially, on the number of guns carried (originally, crew size was the factor, but this changed over time). The first three classes were ships-of-the-line; that is of sufficient size to merit placing in a battle squadron. The workhorse size was the third rate, of 74 or 64 guns, and was by far the most numerous in the fleet. The second
rates were between 80 and 90 guns. The very largest ships, the first rates, were 98 or 100 guns – late in the sailing navy period the guns numbered 110-120 or more. (Frigates were fifth and sixth rates (44, 36, 28 guns, with much variety); finally, there was the 50-gun ship, the awkward class, the subject of Winfield’s earlier book.) The number of guns per class varied over the period and was never an absolute.

It perhaps need not be emphasized that sailing ships were the most complex artefacts of the pre-industrial age. They evolved from the late-medieval and Elizabethan periods, into the square rigged behemoths of the first half of the nineteenth century, epitomised by the clipper merchant ships and the subject of this book. The cost in treasure to build these vessels was enormous, with Britain’s tremendous fleets in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries testifying to her massive economic power. The number of guns mounted in each ship often exceeded the number that individual armies commanded at some of the major engagements of the period. A squadron, or battle fleet of two or more squadrons, carried vastly more firepower than any contemporary army – with the exception of the occasional siege. Winfield’s subject is, therefore, the largest warships in the British fleet over the period from the early 1600s to the mid-1800s.

Winfield divides his book into logical sections that cover the development of the first rate from uncertain and inconsistent beginnings at the end of the Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods, to its apogee in the Napoleonic period. The nineteenth century covered the transition from the sailing navy into that of the steam, with hybrid sail and steam ships of the mid-century (included here)—indeed, a fascinating period of naval architecture when many ideas were attempted and subsequently abandoned.

The first chapters cover the Jacobean period, including the English Civil War and the Anglo-Dutch Wars— the Age of Pepys. First rates were never numerous in the Royal Navy (or any navy for that matter), with usually only a handful in existence at any one time. The size grew over the period with the first rates of the early Jacobean navy being “only” in the neighbourhood of 40-50 guns, and very much smaller than later designs. Nevertheless, among the seventeenth century first rates were included some famous names such as the Sovereign of the Seas, Royal Charles, Nasby, and Royal Sovereign. The latter became the template for future first rates constructed after the turn of the eighteenth century.

The middle chapters cover the 1700s and detail the work of the dockyards, constructors and designers who worked on these huge vessels, including the iconic Victory, of 1759 (named for the Year of Victories in the Seven Years War). The narrative covers the history of the various first rates in both peace and war. The remarkable, to modern eyes, service life of sailing ships meant that these histories were extensive. Most had lives measured in decades, often of fifty, sixty or more years. As well, the nature of employment was highly varied, from that of depot ships, troop transports, prison ships, to the more traditional function of active ships-of-the-line, and as flagships. As such, they were prominent in the engagements of the period, with, for example, Victory serving as a flagship at the Battles of Cape St Vincent, at Toulon, and, need it be added, Trafalgar. Victory also served, it must be noted, in all the other roles alluded to above, in both the pre- and post-Trafalgar years.

The final chapters take the story of the first rate to its conclusion in the mid-nineteenth century. This was a period of ferment in terms of politics and warship design, but few major power conflicts. The advent of steam involved the provision of a
single screw and associated boiler for auxiliary power purposes. The paintings from this time show the incongruous mixture of a square-rigged sailing vessel and a funnel. The book concludes with a discussion on internal arrangements, fittings and structure. There is a short afterward chapter on the fate of first rate prizes taken from enemy fleets.

The book is oversized to accommodate the many illustrations provided to enrich the accompanying text. Particularly compelling are those of builder’s models that survive in museums, most at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, but elsewhere as well. Others are of paintings that provide, albeit as a happenstance, an interesting review of the changing nature of maritime art over a 250 year period. Finally, Winfield has included many line drawings used by constructors at the Royal Dockyards. Foremost amongst these is a foldout of the *Victoria* from 1865.

This book will appeal to anyone interested in the sailing navy, as the details of the shipbuilding, dockyard organization, costs, materials, decoration, rigging and the varied histories of the great ships themselves, is fascinating. The book is wonderfully illustrated and well laid out. The research and knowledge of the author is everywhere apparent. Winfield’s writing style is engaging and easy to read: an excellent book, well worth the money.

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The rise of China has preoccupied American military planners for at least the last decade, and more so recently, as the scale and speed of its military modernisation has become apparent. This is particularly the case for China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which has shown numerous advances and now has the ability to affect American, Japanese and South Korean maritime activities in East Asia. But sea power is more than just technology, as this book well demonstrates, as it explores Chinese thinking on sea power (why a navy might be used) and the types of capabilities it possesses (how it might be used).

China appears to have adopted the tenets of sea power as formulated by the U.S. naval thinker A.T. Mahan, not least because of the maritime aspects of the burgeoning Chinese economy and the importance of its maritime commerce. The authors contend, rightly, that Mahan has often been taken out of context; while he promoted increasing the size of the U.S. Navy, it was not solely for fleet engagements, but also to encourage and maintain maritime commerce. The European army “cult of the offensive” up to and during the First World War has its parallel in this misreading of Mahan in a naval context. This is demonstrated with a tight analysis of how the “land power,” Imperial Germany, misread Mahan to its detriment as it challenged Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. In some senses, the outcome was clear, as Germany did not have the bases to gain unimpeded access to the Atlantic Ocean to get to its overseas possessions (having to pass through British-controlled waters), nor the strategic acumen to use its High Seas Fleet in the best manner to challenge the Royal Navy. This is relevant as China is also a land power whose access to the Pacific Ocean is similarly constrained, geographically, by Japan and thus the importance of Taiwan, to enable it to not only break free of the first island chain, but also limit the activities of
the United States and Japan.

China is still grappling with how to apply the concepts of sea power to its particular circumstances, as this strategic formulation provides the template for how the PLAN might be used and what capabilities it requires. Is the PLAN focused on retaking Taiwan, which entails anti-access strategies to hold the U.S. Navy at bay? Is it focused eastwards, through the first island chain to break out into the Pacific Ocean? Is it focused southwards, through the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait and into the Indian Ocean to protect its imports of raw materials to maintain China’s economic growth and the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party?

As each of these options will impact on the U.S. Navy, which has provided maritime security in East Asia and particularly, the sea lines of communication for over 60 years, the authors examine specific issues related to PLAN modernisation, namely missile and anti-missile interactions at sea, its undersea nuclear deterrent, and soft power. Any perusal of naval journals or think-tank reports over the past few years show the U.S. is very concerned over the Chinese development of anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and how they will impact on the deployment and reach of U.S. Navy carrier battlegroups. Certainly one aspect I had not considered was how land-based missile sites could provide protection to the PLAN at sea (albeit in the littoral), while being outside the range of adversary counter-strikes. While this type of capability has numerous technical issues to overcome, it could severely affect the manoeuvrability of U.S. battlegroups and their power projection capabilities. The discussion of China’s emerging undersea nuclear deterrent is considered within the framework of how the other nuclear-capable states developed their nuclear forces, focusing in detail on command and control arrangements. The issue of soft power at sea is an interesting case, as China has been conducting soft diplomacy for a considerable period, but has overlooked how naval forces can also be used in this context. The authors relate how the U.S. Navy revived goodwill toward the United States in Southeast Asia through its extensive humanitarian and disaster relief operations after the 2004 Boxing day tsunami (along with many Western countries), while China provided no military assistance whatsoever; China is now building capabilities (hospital ships) to fill this gap. The more recent PLAN operational commitment to the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden provides another example of Chinese thinking on sea power and how it can be used to further a nation’s interests.

This book is based on a thorough reading and understanding of Chinese language primary sources available in the public domain, as well as both the nuances of sea power concepts, and U.S. Navy thinking. There are many books, journal articles and reports published on the PLAN and they vary markedly in standard. This is a very well written, informed and thoughtful book; as such it is highly recommended.

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