the US situation is a disaster. After 1966, the US Navy transferred all its icebreakers to Coast Guard, and of the three icebreakers that remain, only the *Polar Star* and the *Polar Sea* are capable of handling heavy ice. Moreover, both icebreakers were built 30 years ago, and the cost to refit them, to ensure another 25 years of service, amounts to $400 million. To cover the Arctic border, the US defensive systems consists also of an aircraft/missile detection system, and of a fleet of submarines that can operate under the Arctic Ocean. According to the objective fixed in the National Security Presidential Directive 66, however, this system still appears too weak.

In Chapter 8, David Auerswald criticizes the US Navy’s inactivity on the Arctic front. He identifies three main points: first, the US is too sure of a cooperative atmosphere among the Arctic countries, based on the slow pace of militarization and on the predominant role of international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, and the UNCLOS, that have represented the legal Arctic framework since 1982; secondly, according to the Arctic geostrategic environment, the goals fixed by the US are unachievable; and finally, there is a lack of investment in the American Arctic defensive system. He suggests that a short-term solution to ensure Arctic security lies in the use of solar-powered drones. Provided with sensors, they could monitor the Arctic territories without an excessive cost. Collaboration between the Coast Guard and Navy could ensure the launch of air and sea missions, while the submarines, with their stealth characteristics, could be used to provide a large number of personnel and equipment to a specific location.

This book, which also contains three articles about historical expedi-

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| During the War for American Independence what was the distance between subject and citizen? The gap between the two conditions was more than a state of political philosophy. It was the Atlantic Ocean, all 3,000 miles of it! For the Americans, it was a space that held the promise of self-determination. For the British, it was a breach that had to be bridged to retain control of a vital portion of their empire. During the Age of Sail, the attempted imposition of King George III’s will across that void would spur the most ambitious attempt to supply an invading army in hostile territory with all the accoutrements of war, as well as to support their movements to various theatres of battle and eventual retreat.

| In an interesting examination of the American Revolution, Dillon addresses the challenges faced by the British navy in supplying and supporting the land forces of the king. He adds an intriguing facet to the historiography of the American Revolution with his contribution focusing on the underappreciated and understudied aspect of logistics at war. |

| At the end of the French and Indi- |
an War, also known as the Seven Years’ War, the British Navy stood ascendant upon the seas. This victory was costly, however, and required rapid demobilization and new sources of funding to balance the books in London. Demobilization was easy, simply releasing thousands upon thousands of sailors back to their homes and civilian pursuits and placing ships in ordinary. To generate revenue, Parliament passed numerous taxes that were resented by the colonial population who had to pay them but had no direct participation in their creation. The seeds of revolution were planted thousands of miles from where they grew. When war broke out, the British navy was still the largest in the world, but it was a shadow of its former self.

The British army in the colonies soon found itself without a source of local supplies. Americans, who had assisted their imperial cousins in so many other wars where France was the enemy, now withheld their succour. As British and Hessian forces rapidly increased in British North America, the demand for war material increased concomitantly. At first, the army and navy competed for civilian supply ships, raising prices for shipping. This issue was ultimately resolved when the naval bureaucracy, which was more fit for the assignment, took over the task. Now, the burdensome charge of supplying an army and navy at war was laid solely upon the naval administration.

There are many issues regarding supply ships. First, the internal competition that created conflict between the army and navy. Ships were critical in moving food and war material to the colonies in support of both services. The underdeveloped colonies did not have the infrastructure to support tens of thousands of troops, and numerous hulls were converted to barracks for troops or warehouses for storage. This (mis)use of a limited resource kept it from its intended purpose, supply. Thus the availability of transportation vessels fell, limiting the tonnage available for the actual movement of desperately needed supplies and personnel. Many of these issues led to rising costs.

As the French, Spanish and Dutch entered the war against Britain, not all necessarily supporting the Americans, the British had to use their forces and resources to protect home waters, Gibraltar, the Caribbean, and other imperial possessions. These considerations, again, limited the number of vessels available for North American duty. Dillon adequately expresses the multiple factors that went into the calculus of setting a hierarchy of importance for supply and convoy decisions. Additionally, he delves into the naval and sometimes combined command of various campaigns and expeditions, illuminating the successes and limits of their capacity.

The text is well footnoted; there is a healthy bibliography and index. The bibliography can be plumbed for those who wish to do deeper research into the issue. Maps are appropriate and effective when viewed in concert with the content. Considering that the Atlantic was the logistical hurdle being bridged, and home waters as well as Gibraltar and the Caribbean are given account, an overall map would have been helpful to visualize and appreciate the logistic quandaries in guarding and provisioning those regions in conjunction with British North America.

As an American, this reviewer found it easy to discern some British bias. John Paul Jones was not a privateer; he was a duly commissioned officer in the Navy of the United States. There are some geographic errors, placing Charleston in Georgia and Nantuck-
et Roads—is there a Nantucket Roads?—in Boston harbour, but these are minor. They could have been eliminated with better editing, as in some instances, the geography is correct, and in others, not. Minor quibbles for an otherwise fine monograph that synthesizes both original research and information from many secondary sources.

All at Sea, which is number 43 in the Helion From Reason to Revolution 1721-1815 series that examines the changing nature of warfare during the period, should be of interest to any military or maritime historian. A distinctive study on the war as well as the logistical battles adds a creative perspective and appreciation to what the British navy and army had to contend with to fight an American rebellion cum worldwide conflict.

Michael Tuttle
Clarksville, Tennessee


As the title suggests, Mark Jessop explores the British navy's role in Britain's struggle against Napoleonic France and its allies in the first 15 years of the nineteenth century. The navy's primary role of protecting the island nation, its colonies and trade justified the idea that it was the senior service, dominating the army in terms of national importance. The cover image, an isolated Napoleon standing at the stern of HMS Bell坚持phon in 1815, with the surrounding water of Plymouth Sound packed with boat loads of civilians straining to get a glimpse of the beaten enemy, symbolizes the navy's deliverance of Britain from the threat of foreign dominance. The title and the cover augur well, but the book fails to deliver.

Jessop begins by touching on the Battle of Copenhagen (1807) and the subsequent collapse of the Northern Alliance, the change of government in England, the Treaty of Amiens’ short peace, and the six Navy Board commissions to examine corruption within the dockyards and supply chain. He moves to Napoleon's political and military machinations on the continent, followed by a return to war, the great increase of British ships-of-war and seamen, the Trafalgar campaign, and the naval tensions in the Baltic. The long blockade of the French and Spanish fleets after Trafalgar, the trade war between Britain and France and its allies, the war with America in 1812, the British condemnation of the slave trade, and the effects on Britain at the end of two decades of war round out the topics covered within the book. Most of these elements have their own chapter.

The author begins and ends each chapter with a fictional conversation, or series of fictionalized events, that serve to introduce and cradle the factual elements of the topic under discussion. The fictional characters are there to provide the reader with a sense of the emotional experience of people who lived through the circumstances, without any insight into the larger picture. They dominate the chapters. For example, the Battle of Trafalgar chapter follows “a rather large amateur poet and his even larger wife” (39) through their visit to Plymouth, as he attempts to write an epic poem on the victory and death of Nelson. The reader is not only given the description of the poet, his wife, and the events in their day, but many lines of rather poor poetry. There is only a