BOOK REVIEWS


Most pre-twentieth-century naval historians focus upon either the sixteenth-century navy of Francis Drake or the late-eighteenth-century navy of Horatio Nelson. Few scholars concern themselves with the seventeenth-century navy of Robert Blake, one of Cromwell’s most successful Generals at Sea. John Barratt attempts to shed light upon this often under-represented, but important period of British naval history in his new work.

Barratt begins his study by providing an overview of the political situation in England in the mid-seventeenth century. His second chapter examines the social history of Cromwell’s navy. He uses the remaining six chapters of his work to discuss various wars waged upon the sea, namely, the conflict between the Commonwealth navy and the remaining Royalist squadron (1649-1650), the first and second Anglo-Dutch wars (1652-1654 and 1665-1667) and the short-lived Spanish war (1657-1658). Barratt summarizes the battles in each conflict and provides a narrative account of the reasons each war was waged.

While the book provides a passable summary of the naval conflicts during Cromwell’s reign, and serves as an overview, the work lacks in many respects. Barratt’s references are atrocious. The endnotes are sparse and hard to follow. Barratt even seems to have confused himself in many instances. Take, for example, endnote 5 in chapter two in which Barratt instructs us to “See p ??” (p. 193). Or, endnote 12 in chapter five in which the curious reader is referred only to “Mercurius Politicus.” (p. 197) Where said reference exists, we shall never know for this work is not even cited in his bibliography.

Barratt has done no original research, but instead has relied upon the works of other more reputable scholars, such as Bernard Capp and N.A.M. Rodger. When he quotes original sources, which he does with annoying regularity, Barratt acknowledges that this primary material originally appeared in another author’s secondary work. In many instances, Barratt relies upon the work of only one author to write certain chapters. When writing about the social history of Cromwell’s navy, for example, Barratt depends on (and summarizes) Capp’s work, *Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660*. While Capp’s work is good, Barratt could have utilized other studies or potentially consulted the archives to expand and improve this chapter.

Barratt is not a naval historian and this weakness shows throughout the book. He continually confuses naval terminology. In several instances he refers to various commanders having “the advantage of the wind gauge” (p. 114). Most likely, Barratt did not mean “the wind gauge.” which was sailor-speak for anemometer, but “the weather gauge.” According to Admiral W.H. Smyth’s, *The Sailor’s Word-Book*, “a vessel has the weather-gage of another when she is to windward of her.” (p. 724) Although minor, this mistake and several other terminology errors chafe at those familiar with naval history.
Despite the numerous errors and omissions in content, the book itself is beautifully presented. Hand-drawn maps accompany each description of the fleet actions fought. A useful chronology and glossary appear in the front of the work, providing the reader with an easily accessible and handy reference. Although the notes and the bibliography are lacking, the book provides a thorough index.

John Barratt has authored eight books on the English Civil War, Cromwell’s army and the major battles in which both sides were involved. His talents, most likely, rest on land and not at sea. The English navy changed both in character and in structure during Cromwell’s reign. These changes have been overlooked or ignored by many modern naval historians. More scholarship is needed around this critical period in the history of the Royal Navy. Unfortunately, Barratt’s work fails to fulfill this gap in the literature.

Kelly K. Chaves
Fredericton, New Brunswick


The various oceanic fisheries around the globe produced ninety-five million tons of fish for sale in 2004. This fish has been valued at US$ 84.9 billion. (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture,” 2006) http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/A0699e/A0699E04.htm#4.1.2) In the early modern period, dried salted cod represented the fourth most valuable export in the Western Hemisphere for the British Empire. (Stephen J. Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier* (2005), Figure 2.1.) Religious norms and faith-based dietary restrictions played historically important roles in generating enormous demand for fish, and they have helped to make commercial fishing enterprises very lucrative. On a personal note, Lenten fish fries were always popular in the Catholic church my family attended. Yet, historians have largely overlooked the ties between these cultural values and this maritime business. Brian Fagan’s *Fish on Friday* is the first systematic effort to bring together fisheries and religious histories covering ancient Rome to the English settlement of North America. Those interested in maritime history in general, and fisheries history in particular, will find much food for thought in this book.

For the most part, *Fish on Friday* is a synthesis of secondary literature. Fagan combines scholarship on religious norms and histories that have focused on the role commercial fishing operations played in Europe’s westward expansion across the Atlantic Ocean. Fagan argues that Christianity created an insatiable need for fish in the Old World, which in turn prompted Atlantic exploration and New World settlement. He writes, “Abstinence, atonement, fasting, and penance lay at the core of Christian belief; [and] from the earliest times fish had a special association with such practices.” (p. xiii) In particular, Catholic meatless holy days of obligation took up much of the year. Until the eleventh century, the demand for fish to meet these fast days was primarily met with freshwater fish. The nautical technology and preservation techniques were not yet sufficient for large-scale, deep-sea commercial fishing operations. Instead, fish
ponds came into vogue around the ninth century. Medieval monasteries fished local rivers and streams. And men fished along coastlines while women processed catches. Herring was the first saltwater fish to be commercially distributed. It was sold commercially between the tenth and eleventh centuries. (pp. 94, 103) It required, and stimulated the development of, bulk carriers. (p.95) Cod followed shortly thereafter in the twelfth century. (p.64) By the fifteenth century, Christians consumed more cod than herring. Fagan explains that “cod, dried and salted, was easier to preserve and was a more reliable catch.” (p. 164) The fact that the flesh of cod is less oily than herring made the former more susceptible to hard salt cures, which preserved catches for longer durations. Such preservation, combined with high levels of protein, made cod “one of the world’s great food fish,” and the ideal long-distance commodity in an age without refrigeration. (p.61) The demand for cod spurred English fishers to search for new cod fisheries in the Atlantic, which led them to Iceland and Newfoundland in the fifteenth century. The search for new Atlantic fishing grounds culminated in the late-sixteenth, early seventeenth century English attempts to settle New England. In this manner, cod, commercial fishing, and Christian-inspired dietary restrictions played an important role in the exploration and settlement of North America.

The crusade for more fish to feed Christian mouths further stimulated nautical innovation. Before the aforementioned bulk carriers designed to transport herring, which included the Hanse cog, medieval shipbuilders developed lapstrake hulls, which encouraged exploration and fishing in North Sea and Baltic waters. (p. 79) Dutch herring busses were “a modification of lapstrake-planked Scandinavian cargo ships…designed to fish for and process herring, carry heavy loads, operate in rough seas, and stay offshore for long periods of time.” (p. 120) Fishing on the North Sea also inspired the creation of the dogger. In Fagan’s words, doggers “were built for one purpose – to fish for cod and other species far offshore.” (p. 167) Even the famous Portuguese caravels were designed, at least in part, for deep-sea fishing in severe weather on the Atlantic Ocean. (pp. 207-208) Without the religiously inspired and insatiable European demands for fish, there would have been less pressure on shipbuilders to design new vessels. Without these vessels, Europeans would have been slower to explore and expand westward across the globe.

Fish On Friday is a cross-over book in addition to being a synthesis. There is not an extensive, historiographically-inclined introduction. The endnotes are by no means exhaustive. Chapters include Fagan’s first-hand accounts of his various experiences with the sea and fish. And there are recipes for fish and sauces throughout the book. Such characteristics make the book a quick and easy read, and there are academics who will be turned-off by this. Fagan, however, has succeeded in demonstrating the importance of cod to the formation and integration of an Atlantic World. He ably relates the historical connections between fishing and ship design. And he achieves all this in an engaging fashion that will please most readers.

Christopher P. Magra
Northridge, California
Maritime scholars have long believed that despite their subject encompassing humankind’s relationship with the seas, which cover more than 70 percent of the world’s surface, theirs was an ignored dimension of global history. Yet with very few exceptions, maritime historians have willingly divided their work into small sub-specialties, rarely attempting to see the whole of the broad maritime field with its complex interdependencies and interrelationships. This important new encyclopedia is designed to present maritime history as a distinct series of related themes cutting across the standard boundaries of academic disciplines.

The editor-in-chief is the noted maritime historian and director of the Naval War College Museum, Professor John B. Hattendorf. He led an eminent editorial board from their first and only face-to-face meeting in Oxford in 1999 throughout the eight-year development of their four-volume, million-word project. Specialized contributors were commissioned and supervised by one or more area editors who chose each of the 900 entries for its suitability within the editorial board’s overall plan for the encyclopedia.

The editorial board set out precise parameters for the articles and the area editors encouraged the contributors to develop discussions in a manner consistent with their own critical understanding of the subject matter. Since some contributors were still being commissioned for certain entries well into 2006, many of the topics are well up-to-date. Articles, varying in length from 500 to 5,000 words, typically have three parts: the narrative, end references and bibliography. Sources have been well organized by the specialized contributors and the editors cleverly guide readers who want to know more to related discussions elsewhere in the encyclopedia. For example, an entry on Coal Supply considers the trade of industrialized nations in the nineteenth century in general terms, before focusing on the theme of coal as a necessary concomitant of other trades, including steamship bunkers, merchant and naval, and overseas coaling stations. It also discusses coal exported from colonies by ships of the “Mother Country,” including from New South Wales, Australia, to the Pacific basin. The heading Shipping contains ten sub-entries including an overview of how merchant shipping developed as a “national industry” during the twentieth century from the first legislation restricting foreign shipping to the era when prestige shipping lines were heavily subsidized for non-economic reasons. It also considers national maritime policies and intent rather than mere governmental tinkering with supply and demand. Readers are then referred to other entries on flags, oil and petroleum products, finance and the shipping industry as well as wages and salaries.

The strength of this encyclopedia lies in the scope and depth of the contributors’ interpretation of particular issues. The declared aim of the editorial board is that the encyclopedia should reflect the consensus of interpretation, or lack of it, attained by current scholarship. Consequently, the style of the articles is expository rather than partisan or polemical, as would be found in a literary review or a professional journal. The entries inform the reader that a debate exists, examine the implications of the debate, and indicate where any additional information can be
found. Biographical articles are designed to be short on biographical detail but long on the subject’s significance to the field. An annotated bibliography accompanies each entry briefly citing the principal sources of information and making selective recommendations for further reading. The bibliographies, however, do not pretend to be an exhaustive listing of works and, in general, do not include out-of-print works or archival sources in archives inaccessible to most readers.

The integrated concept behind this encyclopedia means that a range of historical themes and professional information is presented in a readily accessible summary form. A certain amount of overlapping coverage of multi-faceted topics has been accepted by the editors throughout the book but they have skillfully avoided mere repetition, which would have been burdensome to readers. Beyond this, the volumes will no doubt be referred to by journalists and other writers, students to graduate level and the educated non-specialist. Although the entries are international and multi-ethnic in scope, the encyclopedia is clearly designed for an English-speaking readership since there are very few sources cited in languages other than English.

This eagerly awaited encyclopedia has covered all significant sides of controversial and unresolved questions in a fair manner, striking a judicious balance among diverse viewpoints. It is intended to be used not only by maritime historians but also by scholars in a wide variety of humanistic and social sciences. As such, it will be available as an e-reference text from Oxford’s Digital Reference Shelf. This is more than an expensive and beautifully presented reference work: it is a project worthy of Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship and education. The contributors and editors cannot be praised too highly for having so clearly succeeded in emphasizing the connections between maritime history and many related fields.

Michael Clark
London, UK


Lee Teng-Hui is well known as an advocate of representative democracy and human rights. As the first popularly elected president in Taiwanese history, Lee is remembered for the successful dismantling of the Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian regime. As mayor of Taipei, governor, and vice-president of Taiwan during the 1980s, Lee encouraged President Chiang Ching-Kuo to modify some of the harshest measures of the KMT state. When he became president in 1988, Lee continued to promote democratic reforms by expanding political participation to native Taiwanese and promoting their national interests. Richard Kagan, a noted observer of Taiwan’s political development, allows readers who are unfamiliar with East Asian history to learn about Lee’s life. Kagan’s familiarity with Chinese sources and unprecedented access to Lee offers the reader a unique set of insights that will not be found anywhere else. Kagan wanted “to go beyond a strict and traditional political analysis of Lee’s democratic reforms in order to focus specifically on the development of Lee’s character by tracing his intellectual heritage and political philosophy.” (p.2) Unfortunately, Kagan’s attempt to write an all-encompassing biography weakens his historical analysis.
Lee was born in 1923, a period when Taiwan existed as a colony of the Japanese empire. Because Lee’s schooling consisted of a Japanese curriculum during his elementary and high school years, Lee became fluent in Japanese and sought opportunities within Japanese society. His interest in Western philosophies, however, drew him toward Japanese translations of Western literature. Lee eventually adopted a philosophical outlook that incorporated Zen Buddhism, Christianity, and Western philosophers such as Thomas Carlyle. Kagan argues that because of Taiwan’s colonial status, Lee did not recognize Taiwan as an inherent part of China at an early age, which was a key element of KMT political orthodoxy. According to Kagan, Lee did not develop an affinity for Chinese culture until his mid-twenties, when Taiwan fell under KMT rule in 1945. Like his Japanese teachers, Lee respected China for its history and cultural traditions, but not as a model of an industrialized nation. For Kagan, the Japanese gave Lee “the opportunity to travel to new areas-intellectually, geographically, and imaginatively.” (pp. 40-43) Unfortunately, Kagan’s description makes Lee sound like an apologist for Japanese imperialism, a charge that Lee’s political enemies consistently used against him.

Kagan also contrasted Lee’s experiences in Taiwan with his experiences in the United States. After receiving a B. S. from Taiwan University in 1948, Lee earned a master’s degree from Iowa State University in 1953, and a Ph. D. from Cornell University in 1968. Kagan argues that Lee’s exposure to representative democracy in the United States alienated him from KMT authoritarianism towards representative democracy. Such a view, combined with Lee’s impressions of progressivism from Japan, further alienated him from the KMT hierarchy.

In 1971, Lee joined the KMT out of compulsion. He hid his democratic leanings by following the KMT party line to avoid a harsh punishment against his family. Lee used his position to improve life for the Taiwanese by fostering agricultural programs such as the fertilizer-for-seed program, a program that allowed farmers to pay for fertilizer with seeds from the previous year’s crop as an economic and social benefit to the nation.

Kagan analyzes the intellectual and philosophical evolution of Lee’s life by describing the effects of Lee’s conversion to Christianity, his interest in Western philosophers, and adherence to Zen Buddhism. Lee describes his conversion to Christianity in three phases, the first of which occurred during his childhood. Lee wanted to know, “Why are there hardworking people who cannot feed themselves three meals a day? Why are there idle people who don’t have to work in order to live a comfortable life?” Lee’s second phase involved controlling his ego during his teens. The third phase dealt with the meaning of life and death. Kagan argues that Lee sought a belief system that reconciled controlling his ego with serving people through public service. Lee’s eclectic blend of Christian dogma, Zen Buddhism, and Western philosophers satisfied this need and sustained him against the KMT.

Kagan provides an interesting appendix of declassified State Department documents that describe American diplomats’ impressions of Lee and the question of democracy in Taiwan; and a set of Cornell Daily Sun articles that highlights the arguments of student dissidents who advocated Taiwanese sovereignty. Finally, the appendix includes a brief essay by Lee about his philosophy of life.

Finally, Kagan discusses America’s ambivalent attitude toward Taiwan’s existence. Current U.S. policy is based on the implementation of the 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué. Although the communiqué re-established bilateral relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese asserted a “one-China” policy, in that Taiwan should be considered an “integral” part of China. Kagan argues that, “the consequences of this bilateral…understanding were that Taiwan was stripped of its international sovereignty, and any sentiment within U.S. policy circles for Taiwan to become an independent country was discouraged.” (pp.130-32) American ambivalence toward Taiwan affected Lee’s presidency when he challenged the William Clinton administration’s adherence to the Two Chinas policy. Lee challenged Chinese and American policymakers by placing Taiwanese sovereignty at the center of diplomatic discussions by avoiding a direct conflict with China while stressing how Taiwan’s existence affected their national security interests.

In sum, Kagan does a fair job of introducing Lee’s life and philosophy to Western readers who are not familiar with them. He also summarizes the schizophrenic foreign policy that the U.S. uses to placate China and Taiwan. Kagan should have written two books, however. One book should focus on Lee’s life that corresponds to rigorous historical scholarship. The second book should place Lee’s struggles against the KMT and U.S. against the broader backdrop of post-Cold War challenges for East Asia.

Terrance Rucker
Washington, DC


Aden was the preeminent port of the western Indian Ocean under Zurayid (ca. 476-569 AH/1083-1173 CE) and Ayyubid (569-626/1173-1228) rule in Yemen and a port of call for shipping from all points of the compass: Egypt and the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, India, and East Africa. Located on the southwest coast of the Arabian Peninsula, 100 miles east of the Bab al-Mandab, Aden is ideally situated to monitor shipping between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. A barren promontory about five miles from east to west and three miles from north to south, its peninsula is an arid, inhospitable place. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, its inhabitants lived east of a ring of volcanic mountains in an area known as the Crater, which opens to a pair of shallow bays separated by Sira Island. Aden’s primary anchorage was Sira Bay (Front Bay) north of the island; to the south lay Huqqat (Holkat) Bay. (The more enclosed harbour developed by the British in the nineteenth century lies west of the peninsula, but played virtually no role in this period.)

Written by an assistant professor of Middle Eastern and South Asian studies at Emory University, this fascinating and scrupulously researched book explores the life of medieval Aden from a variety of perspectives: geographical, institutional, and ethno-religious. Margariti draws on three bodies of sources: the correspondence of Jewish merchants from the Cairo Geniza (a synagogue attic where papers containing the divine name were stored, only to be discovered in the nineteenth century); two Arabic accounts, by the Central Asian traveler Ibn al-Mujawir who visited ca. 626/1228, and by the Adeni scholar Abu Makhrama (870-947/1465-1570); and a handful of official documents from the Rasulid dynasty that succeeded the
Ayyubid. Her reading and discussion of the Geniza documents does much to amplify the pioneering work on Jewish merchants in the India trade pioneered by S.D. Goitein, and especially to clarify the complex and interconnected roles of the sedentary merchants at Aden who often served as representatives and agents of itinerant merchants whose travels could carry them from Egypt to India and beyond.

Sparse though the record is, Margariti draws an intimate and lively portrait of the port and its people. She helpfully traces Aden’s ties with its immediate hinterland upon which the port relied for basic necessities like food and water, as well as its industries like weaving, brick-making and glassmaking, and shipbuilding, which thrived despite the fact that many of the materials and even some of the shipwrights had to be imported from as far away as India. Margariti is a companionable and clear-eyed guide to Aden’s various residential and commercial districts, its forts, customs house and warehouses, the two-storied merchants’ houses near the waterfront and the humble palm-frond dwellings in which most of its people lived, and the beaches where cargoes were landed. She leaves few subjects unexamined, from the elaborate systems built to store drinking water to the nearby town of Lakhaba “with the zonot [prostitutes], fellow revelers, and a beardless youth” who serves drink—a refuge for “upstanding Adenis” only a day’s journey from “the city’s proprieties.” (pp. 62-63)

To the extent that the sources allow, Margariti details the working of Aden’s commercial institutions, especially its customs house, its government officials, Muslim and Jewish merchants, and the more numerous, though less historically visible, people who kept the town, its trade and its ships moving. Her appraisal of the commercial conditions that obtained there covers the varied systems and rates of taxation, and the heterogeneous commercial networks that transcended confessional boundaries to a greater degree than in the Mediterranean or Europe of the time. While Aden served many ports from the Persian Gulf to Sri Lanka and East Africa, the Geniza letters document the close collaboration between Muslims, Jews and Hindus in Aden and India and Egypt, to which the port was bound by commercial and political ties. Most notable of the interfaith partnerships Margariti explores is that between the Zurayid governor Bilal b. Jarir and Madmun b. Japheth, “perhaps the most powerful man in the Jewish communities of the Indian Ocean world.” (p.188)

UNC Press could have better served both the author and her readers by providing better and more detailed maps, which are inadequate for a book covering such a relatively unknown corner of the world. But this is a minor shortcoming. In its depth of detail and graceful writing, Roxani Eleni Margariti’s Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade sets a high standard for port and Indian Ocean studies, and one looks forward to more illuminating work on these important subjects from her.

Lincoln Paine
Portland, Maine


This wonderful book combines a history of cruisers – warships designed to raid or protect merchant vessels and to serve as scouts for battle fleets – combined with 52 watercolour paintings and 27 pencil
sketches by the well-known marine artist, Ian Marshall. It focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, culminating in the first twelve months of the First World War, when, after the destruction of the German cruiser fleet, the task of raiding merchant shipping was taken over by submarines.

The concept of cruisers had a long history, although the term originally described not a ship but a function, i.e. the task performed by any vessel assigned to independent service away from the fleet. This work had been done for many years by frigates because, while smaller and less powerful than line-of-battle ships, they were faster and therefore, able to range far afield and fight or flee on their own. Their role was distinctly secondary, however, because maritime supremacy belonged to the navy that could put to sea a superior fleet of line-of-battle ships or their successors, battleships, and defeat its opponent in open battle.

Although this view continued to dominate naval thinking until the middle of the twentieth century, despite the experience of the First World War, it was modified in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was a period of profound and rapid technological change in naval warship design and gunnery, as well as strategic thinking. While the rapid transition from wooden sailing vessels to ironclad, then steel-hulled steamships, the size and speed of which kept escalating, and the shift from smooth-bore to rifled guns with enormously greater firepower strengthened the faith in battleships, the growing political polarization of Europe meant that Britain increasingly felt obliged to keep most of its fleet in home waters to guard against the rapidly growing German navy.

This meant that a new approach had to be taken to patrolling the seas, protecting British and imperial shipping – which comprised more than 40 percent of global merchant shipping – and, in the event of war, maintaining a blockade of enemy ports. That new approach was foreshadowed in the American Civil War, in which a handful of armed Confederate steamships did enormous damage to Union maritime commerce, bringing it almost to a standstill. After losing 260 ships and finding its seaborne commerce effectively immobilized, the Union Navy designed a new type of warship – the Wampanoag class. Fast steam sloops intended to catch raiders and intercept blockade runners, these vessels were described by the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, as “ocean cruisers.”

Although these vessels did not come into service until after the end of the Civil War, the American experience did not pass unobserved in Europe, and the steel-hulled protected cruiser, as a warship type, was evolved to protect commercial shipping, although it was widely thought that merchant ships could also be armed and used for this purpose. French naval planners led the way, seeing in cruisers a possible means of offsetting overwhelming British superiority in capital ships. Russia, however, anticipating war with Britain in the 1880s, took the lead in actually building cruisers. By the closing years of the century, all of the major naval powers were building cruisers and, perhaps inevitably, they were regularly increasing in size, speed, thickness of protective armour, and firepower.

What were now called battle cruisers were intended not only to protect commerce, help with blockades, and engage in distant raiding expeditions, but also to assist in fleet actions. Only about two dozen of these vessels were built, mostly by Britain and Germany, and while they eclipsed all existing cruisers, their use needed to be carefully considered. Such was not always the case and, as Marshall rightly observes, their use by the British at
Jutland, the only great naval battle of the First World War, involved appalling and avoidable losses.

For the most part, however, the story of cruisers in the First World War is a brief, albeit exciting one. The war began with a flurry of cruiser activity, as the British set out to neutralize the two German cruiser squadrons that were abroad in August 1914. When this was fairly quickly achieved, the last German cruiser being destroyed in July 1915, the British concentrated on their blockade of Germany, while watching for any attempted break-out by the German Grand Fleet, and Germany, rightly recognizing Britain’s dependence on imports, continued to raid its commerce with its new submarine technology. The effectiveness of the British blockade, combined with an ultimately successful anti-submarine campaign, played a decisive role in the final outcome of the war.

Although this book claims to offer “a fresh account of this complicated story” (p.vii) of cruisers from their earliest conception and design to their brief experience in the First World War, it really does not add anything to what informed readers will already know. This is hardly surprising, because Marshall has relied on existing publications, which he readily acknowledges and lists in his bibliography. Nonetheless, he describes the evolution of cruiser technology and design simply and clearly and provides a readable brief summary of the history of cruisers, particularly their experience in 1914-15, which will be welcomed by the non-specialist reader.

By far the primary value of this book, however, lies in Marshall’s wonderful paintings and drawings of cruisers ranging from Ministero Zenteno at Valparaiso in 1897 to the K/MS Admiral Graf Spee at Montevideo in 1939. This is a great coffee-table book and those lucky enough to have a copy may be sorely tempted to cut out at least some of the pages for framing and mounting on their study walls.

Brian Tennyson
Bridgewater, Nova Scotia


The fledgling government of the Confederate States of America began with many problems, not the least of which was the ability to defend its borders from seaborne attack or interdiction. This included an almost total lack of naval vessels, trained officers, and crews. At the very least, the issue raised questions about the ability of the new nation to sustain itself. Jefferson Davis and his cabinet placed the burden of rectifying this need on Stephen Mallory, the Confederacy’s Secretary of the Navy. Mallory became both mastermind and the chief executive for innovative responses to what most observers believed to be an impossible task. Appreciating that the South could never match the infrastructure of the Union, Mallory created his own far-flung naval construction and training program.

An integral part of this effort was the creation of the Confederate Naval Academy, centered upon the training ship CSS Patrick Henry, which inducted its first class in July 1863. One of the freshmen cadets was Hubbard T. Minor, who transferred to the navy from the 42nd Tennessee Infantry Regiment. Minor, like all of the cadets, was required to keep a diary. His is one of only two known to exist.
today. The rarity of this document makes *Confederate Naval Cadet* worthy of attention. The academy required its cadets, after five months of instruction, to rotate to operational units. Minor was dispatched to the Savannah Squadron. His career in the war is not unique, but is certainly rare, and his ability to describe what he observed provides the reader with a clear, concise view. The diary enlightens the reader on the methods employed by the naval academy and the actions of a single cadet. This alone is worthwhile reading.

The editor, however, gives readers much more of value. The book also contains a description of the academy, biographical sketches of the instructors, and Minor’s duties and actions aboard the ironclad CSS Savannah. Minor saw action at Drewry’s Bluff, in the raid on the USS Water Witch, in which that vessel was lost. He also participated in actions at Fort McAllister, the evacuation of Savannah, and the withdrawal of Confederate forces north toward Richmond.

Rather than using simple footnotes to identify points of clarification, the editor has chosen to insert explanatory information where needed in the diary and at other points in the narrative, but in a manner that does not interrupt the flow of Minor’s diary. This additional text information is inserted in a smaller font, allowing the reader to choose to follow the story as written by the author or to delve into well-written analysis. Also enhancing the volume is the inclusion of numerous illustrations, diagrams and maps. Most diarists during the Civil War mentioned people who were commonly known at the time, but did not often elaborate on the individuals. The editor chose the illustrations with care. There are images of important people associated with the narrative as well as the inclusion of many period and modern maps, images of several naval vessels and modern photographs of existing sites like the views of Drewry’s Bluff and Fort McAllister which all add to the power of Minor’s writing.

The book also contains eight appendices that researchers and casual readers alike will find informative. Most are copies of previously-published material, but all assist the reader in defining Minor’s experiences. The appendices include a list of regulations of the school ship CSS Patrick Henry, an article published in 1916 concerning the naval academy, a report on the Johnson’s Island expedition published in the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, the initial report of Lieutenant Commander Austin Pendergast, the commander of the USS Water Witch (also published in the ORN), a list of the officers assigned to the CSS Savannah through December 1864, the report of Commander Brent of the C.S. Navy, concerning operations during the evacuation of the City of Savannah, an account of the gold and silver of the Confederate treasury, and an article about Confederate naval cadets that appeared in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*.

Gary D. Joiner  Shreveport, Louisiana


It is twenty-five years since the Falklands War and perhaps a good time for a new book about it, especially one that relies strongly on first-hand accounts by participants. The author calls this book “the
untold story” and even though quite a number of books have already been written on the subject, none dealt specifically with the RFA’s crucial and indispensable role in the campaign.

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary is a unique institution. Although civilian, crewed by unionized personnel, it performs functions that in most other navies are carried out by commissioned naval ships. These include combat refueling and replenishment and landing ships. Although the last named are termed “logistic” they are, in fact, at the fore in any amphibious operation. In the Falklands, the Sir Galahad, was lost at Bluff Cove and the Sir Tristram so damaged it had to be returned the UK on a heavy lift ship for eventual rebuilding. Two other Auxiliary vessels were hit by Argentinean bombs at San Carlos but were patched up and continued to be operational. In the book, all these events are recounted by people who were in the ships at the time. Similarly, the participation of all the twenty-two RFA ships in the fleet is described not only in the narrative but by the first-hand accounts of captains and crew members. These stories sometimes overlap, so we learn about the same occasions from different points of view.

The various chapters describe the swiftly improvised preparations for loading and deployment of the ships that were already in or near home waters and the recall of other RFAs from as far away as the Indian Ocean, Belize, Vancouver and Chile. In the last case, the oiler Tidepool had already been sold to Chile and was actually there when the conflict broke out. Its return for the duration of the war is one of the more interesting episodes. The story moves on to Ascension Island and the vast rearrangement of stores that was found necessary, then the passages to the war zone, the recovery of South Georgia, the sea phase of the conflict, the San Carlos landings, the landings at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove and the end of hostilities and the arrival at Port Stanley - RFA Sir Percivale being the first ship in.

In addition to the Navy and RFA, nearly fifty merchant ships were taken up from trade for a variety of purposes, the most important being troop transport and replenishment. The RFAs and the merchant ships that would take part in the landings were armed with old 40mm guns and carried army detachments with “blowpipe” shoulder-launched missiles. The latter proved surprisingly effective against low flying attacks at San Carlos. Many of the merchant ships had Royal Navy liaison officers on board but the RFA also had to provide liaison officers. These served on the merchant tankers that had been modified to conduct under-way replenishment, a job with which their regular crews were quite unfamiliar but was the RFA’s specialty.

Another aspect of the campaign was the problem posed by the anti-submarine nuclear weapons carried by some ships in Admiral Woodward’s fleet. By treaty, they could not be carried into waters around the Falklands. They could not be unloaded at Ascension, nor could they be sent back to Britain as they had to be kept handy in case the Soviet Union decided to heat up the Cold War. The solution was to transfer them to the four RFAs that had dedicated magazines for such weapons (Regent, Resource, Fort Austin, Fort Grange); but these ships were needed for the supply of other ammunition and stores to the warships. This resulted in a lot of transferring of these heavy weapons back and forth as ships needed to enter and leave the zone. Perhaps this has been revealed in official accounts but it was never mentioned at the time nor was the public aware that nuclear weapons were carried by the task force.
The last chapter of the book deals with the lessons learned. The RFA had performed magnificently and fulfilled every task asked of it. Every ship was continuously employed to good effect and new records were set for continuous replenishment operations as well as for volumes of fuel, dry stores and ammunition. Post-war analysis resulted in important changes. The RFA now comes directly under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief Fleet. As well as carrying or having facilities for naval helicopter detachments as in the past, all new ships are armed with defensive weapons. Because of this they have been de-registered as merchant ships which places certain restrictions on their entry into foreign ports.

The appendices are comprehensive and useful, particularly the chronology of the war which helps sort out the descriptions of events by people from different ships. Criticisms of the book are minor and not due to the author. For instance, the publisher’s computer, knowing that Plymouth (the ship) should be in italics, always puts Plymouth (the naval base) in italics also. The strength of the book is in its first-hand accounts which give a true picture of what it was like in the South Atlantic from April to June 1982.

Charles Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This is a remarkable biography of a very important book, one that has endured for well over a century despite massive abuse, criticism, and allegations of irrelevance. Professor Strachan’s purpose in writing this innovative study was to explain the origins, evolution, and forms of Clausewitz’s thought. Between the insightful introduction and the sharp if brief conclusion, the reader will find a remarkable interpretation of what Clausewitz meant, how his thoughts evolved, and how he wrestled with history, experience and theory to produce the most profound book ever written on the subject of war. Strachan achieves his objectives to an impressive degree. In so doing, he warns that those who have simplified *On War* have done the great disservice of producing selective and self-serving judgments that have “lost the richness of a text whose range continues to astonish.”

The volume’s introduction, which could stand alone as an interpretative article on the application of *On War*, effectively summarizes the use and misuse of Clausewitz in the 160 years after its publication, 1832-34. Hitler found his instrumental purposes for *On War*, as did generations of officers from the heirs of Clausewitz in the Prusso-German armies to the American officers who sought to rescue the U.S. army from the consequences of its debacle in Vietnam. Along the way, one encounters such persons as Lenin, Trotsky, and Khrushchev. Truly, there must be something for everyone in *On War*. Strachan effectively suggests what and why that might be.

The volume does not confine itself merely to another interpretation of Clausewitz’s most important contributions to understanding war. The first chapter places the book in its historical, theoretical, and bibliographic setting. The second explains the relationship between Clausewitz’s experience and the evolution of his ideas and writings, of which *On War* is but a part. Chapters Three and Four set
forth Strachan’s view of the main elements of Clausewitz’s thought on the nature and theory of war. The texts of the latter two chapters effectively weave the complex and divided treatment of many important topics into interpretative wholes, allowing the reader to see conceptual relationships that might otherwise remain too separate for a full understanding of Clausewitz’s thought.

While the basic sources of the volume are naturally the standard texts in German (Hahlweg’s authoritative sixteenth edition of 1952) and in English (the Paret/Howard translation of 1976), Strachan has ranged widely in Clausewitz’s other writings to provide context and clarification. The brief bibliographic essay at the end is of great use, though readers not thoroughly grounded in the diversity of Clausewitz’s writings could profit from a formal bibliography.

Strachan’s explanation of the tension between Clausewitz the historian and Clausewitz the theoretician is innovative and highly useful in understanding both the structure of On War and the substance of many passages. Here, Strachan’s use of Clausewitz’s other writings and his correspondence, as well as his experience, finds its full fruition in resolving many of the seeming contradictions in the text. This is one of the book’s greatest strengths.

In using and commenting on the Paret/Howard translation, Strachan raises an important problem for which there is no current solution and of which he merely scratches the surface. That problem, which he mentions at least nineteen times in the end notes, is the presence of obviously mistaken or very tendentious translations that have the potential seriously to distort Clausewitz’s meaning. In a particularly troublesome case, Strachan notes (p.109) that Paret and Howard consistently use “operation” and “operational” when Clausewitz apparently intentionally declined to do so. Strachan is correct in implying that the English translation excessively relies on these current “buzz” words, which are useful for modern military writers, but only at the cost of precision in understanding the German original. He is onto something here and careful readers should take Strachan’s caution seriously. By this reviewer’s count, the Paret/Howard version uses these terms more than 350 times and the original German a mere dozen or so, at most. In this, as in other cases, Strachan’s study suggests where further work would be rewarding, but this should by no means be taken as a rejection of the magnificent work of Paret and Howard.

Strachan provides a fruitful discussion of many difficult issues in On War for which a final conclusion may not be as clear or simple as one would desire. Here he has successfully attempted to explain what Clausewitz thought, not what interpretations might be useful in today’s applications, which all too often seek bottom lines rather than understanding. Topics in this category include, but are not limited to: the role of the Enlightenment and Romanticism in Clausewitz’s philosophy; the places of Hegel and Kant in his patterns of thought; the relationship between Clausewitz and Jomini, the issues of state policy and domestic politics; the reciprocal relationship between tactics and strategy; small and guerrilla wars; absolute and limited war; and the trinity. This list could go on.

Strachan does not fail to point out some of the weaknesses in Clausewitz’s masterpiece. These include its unfinished state, its Euro-centricity, its failure to deal with technology, its difficult language, and its avoidance of naval warfare and economic issues. As Strachan argues, some of On War’s weaknesses are really its strengths. Its “unfinished nature” he sees as a “source not of frustration, but joy.” Its dialectic method encourages the ongoing
questioning of its conclusions and methods. The book thus defies a single enduring interpretation.

There is, as Strachan notes, no real substitute for reading all of *On War*, not just the snippets used to buttress current theories. This reviewer’s recommendation for those interested in Clausewitz is to read this first, and then engage *On War* in its entirety. Almost any reader, no matter how steeped in *On War*, could profit from this superb study.

Daniel Hughes
Montgomery, Alabama


The clash between the German High Seas Fleet and British Grand Fleet on 31 May 1916 continues to be of interest to amateur and professional naval historians alike. In some ways indecisive – the balance of power in the North Sea remained unchanged after the battle – the fight between these huge fleets of majestic dreadnoughts still fires the imagination, and the myriad lost opportunities continue to invite further analysis. Sutherland and Canwell, living in an area (East Anglia) where there are plenty of Jutland reminders, have taken up the challenge, claiming to have written a “detailed analysis of the battle.” (p. x)

In actual fact, the book is a routine narration of the battle, clearly aimed at the general reader: no footnotes. Of the ten chapters, spread across some 190 pages, only four describe the battle itself. The opening chapter is what you would expect – setting the stage by recounting the Anglo-German naval race and the first part of the war. It will also put off any knowledgeable reader as it is chock full of errors that should have been caught very early on. On the very first page, it claims that the “High Seas Fleet was not to put to sea again” until the surrender in 1918: patently false, and contradicted on page 185! Other silly mistakes follow: apparently the Royal Navy had predreadnoughts with 11-inch guns (p. 7); HMS *Dreadnought* was “following the example of the Americans” (p. 8); the *Queen Elizabeth’s* were armed with 13.5-inch guns. (p.10) There are a number of others: the manuscript would have been much improved by being read over by someone with knowledge of the Great War at sea.

The description of the battle itself is decent, but not outstanding – it would have been much easier to follow had there been some track charts included. The photos of major ships and personalities are a good selection.

With regard to the analysis that the authors tout, it’s very sparse indeed. Signals were of key importance: yet in the earlier summary of the Dogger Bank action, there is no mention of the signalling cock-up that allowed Hipper’s battle cruisers to get away; and the “detailed analysis” of the 5th Battle Squadron not turning to follow Beatty at the start of the action consists of the words “by continuing on the course and not following Beatty he had made a dreadful mistake.” No explanation of why the 5th BS missed the turn or the signals snafu at the bottom of it. Even the 360º circle made by *Lion* at about 7 p.m. is reduced to being described as “some odd turns” (p.118). Not what this reviewer considers detailed analysis of what was to be a key item in the ensuing post-First World War controversy.

A nice touch is the inclusion of some first-person accounts and the Official Reports and Despatches. The former includes Rudyard Kipling’s series extracted
from the Daily Telegraph, but because he used fictitious names for the vessels involved, it’s well nigh useless, other than as a jolly good read.

The authors’ conclusions as to who won the battle are in accord with most historians: the British were left in control of the North Sea. The concluding chapter summarizes the Jutland Controversy (decently, but not especially well-researched: the Admiralty Narrative of the Battle of Jutland wasn’t “probably prepared by the Dewar brothers” (p.191) but was in fact an expurgated version of the suppressed Admiralty Narrative, written by Alfred and Kenneth Dewar). Two appendices bring the book to a close: the first, the Order of Battle of both fleets, ought to have included the forty pages of ship history/class descriptions carried in Chapter Two.

The bibliography is disappointing. No primary sources are cited (not even the published papers of Jellicoe and Beatty), and the list of secondary ones is routine, and misses out the recent book by John Brooks Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland (2005) which contains some insightful analysis of what went wrong for the British during the action.

Sadly, the authors have fallen short of their goal. The Battle of Jutland is a pedestrian narrative, there is negligible analysis of the key events of the action, and the many small errors don’t inspire confidence in the more important details. In the book’s favour, the writing is fast paced, the account itself is adequate, and the price isn’t bad. Not a bad book for someone who knows nothing about Jutland; but not worth bothering about for anyone who already has a decent volume already on their shelves.

William Schleihauf
Pointe des Cascades, Quebec