BOOK REVIEWS

Thomas A. Adams and James R. Smith. *The Royal Fleet Auxiliary. A Century of Service.* London: Chatham Publishing, www.chathampublishing.com, 2005. 192 pp., illustrations, appendices, index. UK £19.99, cloth; ISBN 1-86176-259-3. (Distributed in Canada by Vanwell Publishing Ltd.)

Why produce a book about a largely unsung part of Britain's maritime organisation at this time? The answer to the question is set out not only in the introduction but also in the foreword (by HRH Prince Andrew), the preface and dedications to this work: 3 August 2005, marked the centenary of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA).

It is not always appreciated that after the change from sail to steam and wood to iron, Britain's nineteenth-century naval supremacy would not have been possible without a network of supply bases and coaling stations around the world. The fleet had to return to these depots to replenish and particularly, to refuel. But these bases required a world-wide logistics operation to ensure the Navy's *materiel* was available wherever the fleet was based. The civilian-manned support ships were collectively known as "fleet auxiliaries" and following an 1864 Order in Council, flew the Blue Ensign, though it was not until an Admiralty Circular of 3 August, 1905, that the title "Royal Fleet Auxiliary" was adopted for Admiralty-owned but civilian-manned ships and with chartered merchant ships given the title "Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries". This arrangement developed slowly through the First World War, the inter-war years, and the early part of the Second World War, but it was the war over the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean from 1942 to 1945 that saw the rapid development of the Fleet Train and the ability to re-supply while at sea. In this respect, the Royal Navy followed the lead of its American counterpart. During the post-Suez era, when Britain gave up many of its overseas bases, the need to refuel and resupply the fleet remained, together with the challenge of operating the increasingly sophisticated support ships and, now, helicopters needed to accomplish the mission.

This book tells the story of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's ships, crews, organization and methods in six chapters proceeded by a general introduction. It chronicles the principal events from 1905 in a year-by-year and month-by-month format, incorporating frequent data panels and making extensive use of half-tone illustrations. There is a separate section of 16 pages of colour photographs. The book concludes with a fleet list giving the years in service, the class type and role of each vessel. Six appendices cover wrecks, losses and casualties; Royal Fleet Auxiliary medals and battle honours; sea flags; colour schemes; ships' badges and funnel badges; and pennant numbers. There is also a detailed index.

In adopting this approach, the authors have achieved a concise chronological record and readily accessible reference book on this neglected branch of Britain's maritime heritage. While this is not the first work

on the topic, the previous major work by E.E,.Sigwart, also titled *The Royal Fleet Auxiliary,* was published in the 1960s and therefore, does not deal with post-Suez developments, the Falklands and the end of the Cold War, as well the increasingly important contribution by helicopters.

The strength of Adams's and Smith's work is that they have brought the topic up to date and yet still managed to compress all the data they assembled into a relatively few, extremely well illustrated pages of dates, facts and information. It is this approach, however, which results in the main problem with the work. It is a dry read and lacks analysis of the information the authors have presented. The jacket tells us that both men are professional authors, as well as having served on various Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, so their views would have been interesting, although admittedly such analysis would perhaps have doubled the size of the book.

The brevity and format of this book and the lack of other up-to-date alternatives will undoubtedly make it a key reference work on the topic, but those hoping to comprehend more fully the factors which shaped the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in the various stages of its history will need to look elsewhere.

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John Barratt. *Armada 1588*. Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2005. ix + 182 pp., maps, illustrations, notes, appendices, glossary, bibliography, index. UK £16.99, cloth; ISBN 1-84415-323-1.

The clash between the Spanish Armada and Queen Elizabeth I's fleet in 1588 continues to generate great interest. The precise reasons for Spain's failure and the English navy's roll in the defensive victory are still hotly debated. It is not surprising then, that writers are still keen to wade into the fray over four hundred years after this battle was waged.

John Barratt's *Armada 1588* is a new book which explores this epic encounter. To examine the critical events, Barratt adopts an interesting format of providing the reader with a daily log that also details the weather and wind speed on each day. Daily developments are supplemented by contemporary commentary from Spanish and English participants. This provides a great deal of colour to the account.

Because this book is intended for a general audience, there are no footnotes or endnotes. It is, therefore, difficult to know the sources for the quotations and information. It also makes it hard to evaluate the claim that both the series (Campaign Chronicles) and this book are based on Athe latest historical and archaeological evidence.@ There is little support for this. That is not to say there isn't "cutting edge" research available. For instance, the revised edition of Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker's *The Spanish Armada* (1999) includes unpublished information from the Streedagh Strand archaeological team on artillery and gun carriages from three wrecks off Ireland. They have also incorporated information from Alan Ereira's award- winning documentary,

"Armada." (Martin and Parker, p. xiii) While Barratt gives Martin and Parker's book a hearty endorsement, he lists the earlier edition (1988), which does not contain the latest research, in his bibliography. Although Barratt's bibliography lists some of the standard books in the field, it is a far from comprehensive examination of the extant literature. We can appreciate why one could not cover the many works on the Spanish Armada, particularly the large number released in 1988 for the 400th anniversary. Barratt rightly states that "A full bibliography of all the hundreds of books and articles that have been written dealing with various aspects of the Armada Campaign would fill a book in their own right." (p.177) Yet, it is not clear if the books listed in his bibliography are the sum total of his research. If so, he has neglected articles entirely. There is a wealth of information in journals which shed light on specific aspects of the Anglo-Spanish engagement of 1588. This seems to be a major weakness of the book.

We must applaud the author for the inclusion of some noteworthy topics. In one of the most interesting sections, Barratt discusses differing English and Spanish attitudes to health care and Aveterans' issues." This has been done elsewhere more thoroughly, but it is an important subject that often gets left out of many standard accounts. Writers are normally anxious to credit Britain's more modern use of gunnery, tactics and shipbuilding techniques but Philip rarely gets credit for caring for his seamen. The "losers" were treated far better than the "winners." (p.140-1) Barratt also takes issue with some of Elizabeth's sea dogs' search for Spanish plunder which detracted from the defence of England in 1588. Such episodes are frequently glossed over or omitted in the heroic portrayals of Drake and his fellows but Barratt is frank. There are other interesting Asidebars@ in the book as well, including one on the other Armadas: most people wrongly assume that 1588 was the end of the story when, in reality, the war between England and Spain lurched on for almost two more decades until 1604.

Arguably, the most interesting part of the book comprises Barratt's own perspectives in the closing section of the book. Here he ventures more into argument rather than narrative as he tackles the issue of culpability. He emphatically absolves the naval novice, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, from the Armada debacle and places the blame squarely on the Spanish king, Philip II. Few would argue with Barratt's assessment that Philip's ill-informed influence on the "enterprise of England" had fatal consequences. Barratt's comments, however, show his lack of appreciation for the passionate religiosity of the sixteenth century: "Philip's assumption that the Almighty would provide the necessary miracle to bring about victory, was a clear abdication of responsibility and a refusal to face reality." (p.146) Philip II saw himself as the champion of the Catholic Reformation as well as his Spanish empire. He was a zealous Iberian Catholic imbued with his own sense of mission to save the "One True Faith." Barratt does not appreciate that, for Philip, this was his responsibility and his reality.

Overall, *Armada 1588* is a fairly balanced

introduction to the topic. The book is brimming with maps, illustrations, glossary, biographical notes on some of leading combatants, as well as other appendices which are helpful for a non-specialist. In the bewildering jungle of Armada books, Barratt's offering is a good place to begin one's study.

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Cleophas Belvin. *The Forgotten Labrador. Kegashka to Blanc-Sablon*. Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen's University Press, www.mqup.ca, 2006. xxvii + 198 pp., photographs, map, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. CDN $39.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-7735-3151-2.

This descriptive history of the little-studied communities along the north shore of Quebec between Kegashka and Blanc-Sablon implies a two-fold thesis. Firstly, the people of European descent developed communities in a borderland between New France (later the British colony of Quebec), and the British fisheries settlements in Newfoundland and Labrador. Secondly, local settlers, both francophone and anglophone, who came to refer to their area as the "coast," made their own culture and economy based on the exploitation of coastal marine resources.

Belvin's history begins with a discussion of the local environment and ecology. The coast's short summers and long winters meant that, while terrestrial resources such as fur-bearing animals for trapping and large game animals for hunting were abundant, the bounty of the area lay in the sea. Seals, salmon and cod were the most important species for commercial purposes. Prehistoric peoples and the Inuit depended on coastal marine resources. The Innu, however, built a culture on hunting in the interior, depending on hunting caribou, but also fresh-water fishing and trapping small animals for furs. The fur trade attracted the interest of sixteenth-century migratory Breton and Basque fishers or whalers. Under the seigneurial system of New France, a few Quebec-based traders developed sealing and salmon posts along the coast. War with the British in 1758 led to the destruction or abandonment of these posts. The British regime in Quebec assigned rights to the posts to English merchants at Quebec who carried on the seal hunt, salmon fishery and related trade much as had the French before them. Although the governor of Newfoundland, Hugh Palliser, tried to limit colonial control and property rights on the coast, the *Quebec Act* of 1775 confirmed Quebec's jurisdiction. Privateering during the American Revolution, and subsequent illegal trade by American fishers in the area, saw the coast returned to administration by Newfoundland, which had the only naval force that could effectively police the region.

The British returned control over the coast to Lower Canada in 1825. This development was not as significant as the bankruptcy of the latest commercial interest in the area, the Labrador New Concern, which collapsed in 1928 because of a series of failed seal hunts. The bankruptcy opened the coast to permanent settlement by anglophones from Newfoundland, the Orkneys, and the

English West Country, and francophone settlers from other parts of Lower Canada. Throughout the nineteenth century, settlers established sealing, fisheries, trapping, and related activities such as berry-picking by women and children. People lived in isolation with few medical and educational facilities, visited occasionally by schooners from Halifax or Quebec. Continued American intrusions in the area forced the governments of Quebec and Canada to become more interested in the region. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, settlers from Newfoundland eventually outnumbered the francophone population of the coast as they continued to come searching for salmon and cod. Throughout the early twentieth century, church missions provided more services to the coast, and the Quebec and Canadian governments expanded mail and transportation services and imposed fisheries regulations. The second half of the twentieth century brought expanded public services, municipal government and regional cooperation, but also fisheries industrialization, resource depletion and the consequent undermining of the basis of coasters' distinctive life.

Belvin pursues description at the expense of analysis. Introduced as the precursors of European settlement, aboriginal people disappear from the narrative with the appearance of the French and English, although the Innu continued to live in the region and influence settlers. As well, Belvin mentions numerous failures in seal and fish catches as a problem for the people of the coast, but provides an inadequate explanation for their occurrence. He hints that increased fishing effort might be a factor, but more usually suggests that "irregularities in the inshore cod fishery were due mainly to variable climactic [*sic*] conditions." (p.110) Belvin notes that one of the most important developments in more intense fishing effort, the cod trap, was designed by William Whiteley in 1865 at Bonne-Espérance on the coast. He further describes a process of fisheries modernization in the 1960s and 1970s that was similar to developments throughout Atlantic Canada. Canadian and international scholarship on fisheries modernization and the intensification of fishing effort had grown rapidly since the early 1990s, but Belvin does not take it into account by maintaining an older view that the cod fishery suffered from changes in ocean temperatures, federal fisheries policies and foreign over fishing.

Finally, *The Forgotten Labrador* is too provincial in its view of the coast. The book raises issues that demand a more regional approach. For example, there was little interest by the Quebec or Canadian governments in providing better medical services until Wilfred Grenfell began to advocate for it in conjunction with his work on the Newfoundland side of the coast. Local telecommunications, particularly television, followed initial access to broadcast services from the Newfoundland and Labrador side of the border. Local interest in Quebec language laws among francophone coasters appears to have been prompted by local resentment of the anglophone descendants of settlers from Newfoundland. Quebeçois nationalism may well have undermined the local culture of the forgotten Labrador as much

as did the depletion of marine resources in the area.

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Claude Berube and John Rodgaard. *A Call To the Sea (Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution)*. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, Inc., www.booksintl.com, 2006. xvi+200 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US $22.95, paper; ISBN 13-978-1-57488-966-3.

Popular histories of the sea usually offer readers the most riveting accounts of naval battles. Claude Berube and John Rodgaard's *A Call to the Sea* does not break from this trend. This biography of one of America's most peripatetic naval commanders, Captain Charles Stewart (1778-1869), delivers a *tour de force* of action. Those interested in sea-borne military tactics will find this book a stimulating read. Those looking for a critical evaluation of Stewart and the U.S. Navy will be disappointed, however.

Berube and Rodgaard provide a detailed narrative of Stewart's life. On the personal side of the story, the authors relate Stewart's family background, his marriage and divorce, the birth of his children, and his death. The naval commander's private business life is discussed only in a cursory fashion. One would like to know more about the precise manner by which Stewart financed his wife's extravagant lifestyle and their family's multiple homes. As far as his professional career, the authors cover Stewart's initial experience as a cabin boy on Philadelphia merchant vessels, his first commission as a lieutenant in 1798, his military service in the Quasi-War with France, the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812, and his rise through the ranks to his ultimate promotion in 1862 to rear admiral on the retired list. Stewart commanded a total of seven warships, including the USS *Constitution*, and carried the American flag through the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. Berube and Rodgaard provide first-rate accounts of the naval engagements in which Stewart actively participated. Readers interested in popular naval biography will not soon forget the authors' description of Stewart commanding *Syren* in the Mediterranean during the Barbary Wars, or his simultaneous actions on board the *Constitution* against both *Cyane* and *Levant*. The authors are very good writers.

Berube and Rodgaard portray Stewart as nothing less than a naval hero. The authors lavish unabashed praise on Stewart and tend to exaggerate the truth at times. Knowing readers familiar with the rich maritime histories of northern seaports such as Newport, Boston, and New York City will raise an eyebrow when they read that the city where Stewart was born and raised was "the greatest English-speaking city outside of London, England." (p.2) We are also told that "Stewart would have stood out from his contemporaries, including Stephen Decatur." (p.12) Yet, the authors do not critically evaluate Stewart's command decisions. His orders to run the USS *Constellation* aground off Norfolk,

Virginia without so much as firing a shot at any British warships during the War of 1812 surely deserved more explanation than: "He did this to prevent the larger British ships from following, gambling that the British lacked the detailed knowledge of Hampton Roads and that they would not risk grounding as well." (p.68) Similarly, Berube and Rodgaard do not critically evaluate Stewart's leadership ability. We are told that Stewart was "the consummate naval commander." (p.260) The fact that enlisted men deserted from, and died on, vessels under his command is never systematically investigated in any way. And, if Stewart's tactical abilities were so unique as to place him above sea lions such as Decatur, then an explanation is needed as to why his last active duty put him in charge of a naval yard. Was this simply a matter of age? Moreover, the several times Stewart was brought before a court martial are explained away as the mere machinations of self-interested political enemies. Were there, dare I ask, chinks in this hero's armour?

Serious scholars interested in the history of the U.S. Navy will be left wanting more out of *A Call to the Sea*. The authors have conducted some research into primary materials such as memoirs and naval records. Citation is sporadic, however. In addition, the book relies heavily on secondary works, and these works are not consistently the most up-to-date, authoritative pieces of scholarship. Moreover, a stronger effort could have been made to situate Stewart's life within a wider context. Academic readers will be left to draw their own conclusions as to the larger significance of Stewart's accomplishments in terms of the early American navy. Such readers will find Christopher McKee's *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession* more rigorous and conclusive on this score.

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John Brooks. *Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland. The Question of Fire Control*. (Cass Series Naval Policy and History). New York, N.Y.: Routledge, www.routledge.com, (Taylor & Francis Group) 2006. xiv + 321 pp., figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index. US $ 75.00, cloth; ISBN 0-714-65702-6.

In his foreword to this book, Dr. Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History, King's College, University of London, concluded: "History is a debate without end." (p. xii) His Ph.D. student, John Brooks, is a retired computer engineer who returned to academia. His dissertation is the basis for this book which focuses on the process of the development of a big gun fire control system for British battleships and battlecruisers during the first decades of the twentieth century. There were competing systems, those of Frederick Dreyer and Arthur Pollen. The ultimate test of any system was perceived to be the battle of Jutland, 31 May-1 June, 1916. The Grand Fleet of Britain under the command of Admiral John Jellicoe met the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. Admiral David Beatty commanded the Grand Fleet's battlecruisers and a squadron of the latest, most powerful

dreadnoughts. In the opening phase of the battle, the German battlecruisers, known as the Scouting Force, confronted Beatty late on the afternoon of 31 May.

Brooks is most interested in this early stage of the battle, called the Run to the South. German gunnery was far superior. The powerful British dreadnoughts with Beatty were late entering action in this phase. Three British battlecruisers blew up before the main fleets met very late in the day. British gunnery was better at that time but when the Germans attacked with torpedoes, Jellicoe turned away. That action ended the main phase of the battle. The Germans escaped to their base and immediately declared victory. In fact, they had sustained extensive and debilitating damage, not made public. British reports were subdued, confused, and delayed. Ultimately, there was no question that Jutland was a strategic British victory. Nothing had changed; the Grand Fleet, despite ship losses heavier than those sustained by Germany, still had clear superiority and dominated the North Sea.

Since Jutland was not another victory by annihilation for the Royal Navy like Trafalgar, assumptions might be made that the Dreyer fire control system which was adopted failed. Did that mean that Pollen's competing system could have resulted in a better outcome? There is a debate.

In fact the there has been almost continuous controversy about battle performance at Jutland, including the quality of the fire control systems on both sides, virtually from the moment the last shots were fired in the night of 31 May-1 June 1916. The great Julian Corbett, Britain's official naval historian of the First World War, was the victim of political pressure and delays in preparing his history. By that time, Beatty was First Sea Lord, and the volume about Jutland did not appear until 1923, shortly after the death of Corbett. The leading naval officer-scholar of the 1920s to thirties, Herbert Richmond, favoured the Pollen fire control system. The new generation of scholars of the Royal Navy of the 1940s to sixties, Arthur J. Marder and Stephen Roskill, also discussed these issues. Indeed, Marder issued a second edition of his volume on Jutland. In the 1970s to eighties Jon Tetsura Sumida joined the debate, focusing on fiscal matters. Admiral Sir John Fisher was made First Sea Lord of the Admiralty in 1904 with a mandate to reduce naval costs. For him, the battlecruiser was the answer, the best ship type to provide maximum striking power most economically. Interestingly, Fisher, popularly renowned as the father of the dreadnought battleship, in fact opposed the type but was forced to accept it in order to get his battlecruisers.

In addition, Sumida has dealt extensively with the Pollen fire control system. In his view, the Pollen system was superior to the Dreyer system. In 1925, an Admiralty investigative commission awarded Pollen £30,000 because of plagiarism and other factors related to his system. That might be seen as vindication.

That is a brief background to John Brooks enthusiastic entry into the fire control debate. In the Dreyer/Pollen controversy, he argues the Dreyer system was superior, especially under the conditions at Jutland. With the Pollen

system, "they would have hit even later and less often than was actually the case." (p. 288) Brooks insists that British failures were due to tactical and training faults, ultimately traced to Beatty. During the Race to the South and subsequently, Beatty committed several tactical errors, especially related to signalling, communication, leadership, and command. Beatty-bashing is ubiquitous.

In *Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland,* Brooks spends the first six of nine chapters presenting details, sometimes in excruciating detail, about gun fire control in modern navies. Extensive, even excessive, use is made of direct quotes. There follows a long chapter reviewing the battle of Jutland, especially that first phase prior to the confrontation of the two main battle fleets. Brooks's research is impressive – there are almost 1200 footnotes in total, located at the end of each chapter.

Brooks rightly presents complicating factors. For example, Dreyer was "in-house," a rising, impressive officer of the Royal Navy and, ultimately, Jellicoe's flag captain in HMS *Iron Duke*. Conflict of interest appears to abound. But Pollen was a private businessman, aggressively pursuing profits. He was dealing with the Royal Navy, sometimes with great frustration on their part, and with other navies. Brooks insisted that the subsequent award of £ 30,000 was not vindication. Dreyer also had grounds for compensation.

In addition to excessive detail and reliance on long quotations, a serious gap is obvious. No mention is made of fiscal and budget factors. Surely Admiralty considerations in the choice of Dreyer's less complicated, more mechanical system compared to the more electric and complex Pollen system, were influenced by cost factors?

So, the debate continues and Brooks successfully furthers it. History thrives on debate, and we all look forward to the next stage.

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R. Thomas Campbell (ed.). *Confederate Naval Cadet: The Diary and Letters of Midshipman Hubbard T. Minor, with a History of the Confederate Naval Academy*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Incorporated Publishers, www.mcfarlandpub.com, 2007. viii + 216 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US $ 39.95, paper; ISBN-0-7864-2645-4. (1-800-253-2187)

Perhaps one of the reasons why the Confederate navy accomplished so much with so little in the four short years of its existence during the American Civil War lay in the breadth of its own expectations as a nascent world naval power ready to take its place in history. A poem from a Southern magazine of the period expresses it perfectly:

> See yonder bright flag as it floats on the breeze;
> It is feared by its foes, though young on the seas;
> Like a bird on the ocean, 'tis met all alone,
> But a deed of dishonor it never has known.
> In defending its rights much blood

has been shed,
As an emblem of this, see its borders all red.
Then look at the center, the blue and the white --
The assurance our cause is true, just, and right.
O, long may it float o'er the ocean's dark breast,
Till the sun, moon, and stars sink forever to rest;
And its gallant defenders forever prove true;
With this wish, flag of freedom, I'll bid thee adieu!
With this wish, flag of freedom, I'll bid thee adieu!

[printed in *The Civil War In Song And Story* by Frank Moore, 1889. (p. 91) Earlier editions (New York, 1866, 1867) issued under the title: *Anecdotes, poetry and incidents of the war.*]

It was noble sentiments like this and the full intent of making a navy as good as any nation's on earth that caused the Confederate government to not only fund and organize ships and the crews to man them, but also to found a naval academy intended to serve the same purpose as the still-young U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, which many of the first Confederate naval officers themselves had attended. A world-class navy is only as good as its officer corps, which requires training in everything from seamanship to gunnery to foreign languages, history, and diplomacy. Those ideals were behind the Academy at Annapolis, and equally provided the fundaments for the Confederate Naval Academy set up in Richmond on the James River aboard the school ship CSS *Patrick Henry*. This book encapsulates a history of that academy from beginning to end, following it along the way with the thread of the diary and letters of one of its cadets, Hubbard T. Minor.

The U.S. Naval Academy formed at Annapolis in 1845 had many obstacles to overcome, some budgetary, some political, some social. But the Confederate version faced a far greater challenge, total war going on around it and no time to lose. Its cadets had to mix scholarship and theoretical training with active service duty at the guns in action aboard ship. Editor R. Thomas Campbell devotes the first half of the book to the background of the organization and participants in the academy, both its teachers and its students, giving a good overview of what was happening and who was doing it. One of the first things a reader with any knowledge of the Confederate Navy will note is the intimate atmosphere surrounding the whole operation. In such a small force, everybody knew everybody, with lots of marriages and relations tying one participant to the next. Hubbard T. Minor was one of three related Minors in the CSN, and it's often hard to keep track of which ship each person had just stepped off of as they pass through the narrative. For instance, as "Capt. Kell" appears briefly at one supper along with "cousin Bob Minor," one realizes that he was the first lieutenant on the CSS *Alabama*, and the man was wounded on the CSS *Virginia* in the first battle of the ironclads. There are many more similar instances of wonderful recognition, as famous officers pass through, almost in cameo roles. For CSN fans, this collection definitely offers uniquely wonderful, insouciant celebrity snapshots.

The bulk of the book is comprised of the diaries themselves, which are full of the details of everyday life that make you feel like you are right in the middle of the situation. Young Minor's attentions alternate between itching to go fight (which he does, with considerable bloodshed in the storming of the USS *Water Witch*) and pining away in the throes of love and courtship of a damsel in town, whom he would later come back to marry after the war was over. The midshipman had a way of getting himself into trouble, either by delinquency or by being a little too pushy and insistent, so his difficulties often provoke a smile even as he presents them with great seriousness. That doesn't apply to his incredible hardships at the end, suffering from bloody dysentery while in desperate retreat from Union forces at the war's end. Finally, following his papers which end with the war, various appendices and notes flesh out the incidents surrounding the cadet's personal narrative.

All in all, this little book (just over 200 pages in length) condenses the scene and the story into a priceless jewel of a window upon the heart of the hopes and dreams of the Confederate Navy, surrounded with supporting historical background so as to not miss any of the players mentioned therein.

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Annalies Corbin. *The Life and Times of the Steamboat* Red Cloud *or How Merchants, Mounties, and the Missouri Transformed the West*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, www.tamu.edu/press, 2006. xvii + 145 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US $19.95, paper; ISBN 1-58544-516-9.

In this clearly written and richly illustrated study, Annalies Corbin endeavours both to recover the history of the steamboat *Red Cloud* and to recapture the commercial and expansionist activities of settlers along the upper Missouri River in the nineteenth century. With a focus "on identifying and understanding an often-forgotten past" (p. xvi), she examines the intertwined histories of the region's merchant communities, government agencies and transportation systems, all through the lens of the maritime historian.

Corbin's main achievement lies in her retelling the familiar story of westward expansion from an unfamiliar perspective. Rather than emphasize the centrality of wagon trails and railroads, she presents the Missouri River as the principal "corridor of expansion" (p. xvi), and contends "the key to gaining access to the deepest parts of the interior of North America was to understand and ultimately to conquer the Mississippi-Missouri river system." (p.7) Although land transportation plays a vital role in her story, and the histories of the region's main wagon lines and railroads are delicately woven into her narrative, she grants riverine concerns primacy.

Why this maritime perspective?

According to Corbin, a detailed study of the *Red Cloud* and its history reveals the importance of steamboat navigation of the Missouri River to the commercial development of the American-Canadian

West. The *Red Cloud* was linked to the growth of the region's most prominent nineteenth-century trading centre, Fort Benton, and one of its most influential merchant firms, Isaac G. Baker and Company. As Fort Benton transitioned from a fur-trade post to a gold rush boomtown to an inland entrepôt, the commercial activities of its citizens expanded. These activities included importation and exportation, wholesale and retail, finance, and the provisioning and small-scale administration of the Canadian North-West Mounted Police. Central to all of these developments was the extension of steamboat navigation into the upper reaches of the Missouri River.

Corbin's scope is sweeping. She proposes at once a detailed study of one steamboat and a complex narrative of the territorial and commercial expansion of the United States and Canada. Her emphasis on the Missouri River reveals a project of great promise and potential. The extent to which she succeeds in convincing the reader of the importance of the Missouri is limited, however, by the length of her study: she attempts this rather ambitious project in only 108 pages, and the total is lessened when the numerous maps, tables and illustrations (59 in all) are accounted for. Although she presents the reader with a wealth of information, she does not allow herself the space to develop her ideas or to advance new historical analysis. She does not engage in any sustained way with broader historical debates about nineteenth-century transportation, westward expansion and economic development. Only once – in the preface – does she challenge "previous research concerning western transportation" (p.xv), but she provides no citation and offers no thorough critique of any arguments, ideas or evidence.

Corbin draws heavily upon primary source material standard to historical analysis, including business records, personal papers, government documents (both American and Canadian) and newspapers. Her use and analysis of these sources is for the most part sound, but tentative. Many have been combed over by historians and come from the secondary sources she references. What new evidence she presents is used to reinforce previous scholarship rather than advance original ideas. This results in a number of missed opportunities.

For instance, Corbin's analysis of the role that the *Red Cloud* played in the movement of people and goods is surprisingly limited, given the ship's prominence in her narrative. She presents information concerning the *Red Cloud* in one of two ways. First, she provides tables that list cargo manifests of each voyage to and from Fort Benton as they appeared in the *Benton Weekly Record*. These tables indicate which firms participated in the steamboat trade, the quantities traded, and, to a lesser extent, what was traded. But the tables ultimately have limited value, as Corbin does not integrate them into her analysis. Second, she comments on arrival and departure dates, the quantity of goods and number of passengers per voyage, and descriptions of goods received and shipped. Although she provides detailed descriptions of the ship's history, she offers only summary conclusions as to the importance of the *Red Cloud* to changing patterns of trade and transportation. Nor does she fully demonstrate how the

history of the *Red Cloud* complicates our understanding of important changes in other areas of economic life in the region, such as production, consumption, finance, and ideology.

Despite these problems, Corbin's work is a valuable addition to the under-studied riverine history of the American-Canadian West and is accessible to a wide audience of academic and non-academic readers. It raises important questions that demand further research and provides a fresh perspective from which to find answers to those questions. Although our understanding of the frontier has expanded considerably in recent decades, research on the West's major rivers has not. More studies like Corbin's are needed if we are to understand better the economic developments that reshaped the North American continent in the nineteenth century.

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James D.G. Davidson, *Admiral Lord St. Vincent: Saint or Tyrant? The Life of Sir John Jervis, Nelson's Patron*. Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2006. 230 pp., illustrations, maps, bibliography, appendix, index. UK £19.99, €29.15, cloth; ISBN 1-84415-386-X.

The timing of this book is indeed appropriate. Inundated with both popular and academic works celebrating and scrutinizing the Royal Navy's now legendary victory at Trafalgar and the exploits of its hero Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson in recognition of the battle's two hundredth anniversary in 2005, readers have also been treated of late to several fine biographies of commanders whose names are not as synonymous with the great naval engagements of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras as that of the iconic vice-admiral. Recent assessments of such contemporaries of Nelson as Admirals Cochrane, Collingwood and Keith offer refreshing perspectives to a period of British naval history that some thought was exhausted. Retired Royal Navy officer James Davidson makes a similar contribution in his study of Sir John Jervis, later Admiral Lord St Vincent.

Readers of Davidson's book will undoubtedly agree that Jervis's story warrants at least as much, if not more, attention than that of any one of Nelson's "Band of Brothers." Not only did Jervis serve with distinction during a colourful career at sea spanning over fifty years at the end of which he attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, but he also presided over the Admiralty as a reforming First Lord during a tumultuous period when corruption, mutiny and nepotism weakened the Royal Navy and Napoleon threatened England with invasion. Moreover, it was Jervis's early recognition of Nelson's tactical brilliance along with his continued patronage, which essentially positioned Nelson to earn his victories in the famous battles of the Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar.

As with any respectable biography, the complexity of its subject is revealed early. The title itself, though a false dichotomy posing the question of whether Jervis was a "saint" or a "tyrant," does capture the conflicting nature of how

his contemporaries regarded him. Davidson's hope, that readers will arrive in due course at a positive assessment of Jervis, does not interfere with his giving a balanced portrayal. For example, the replacement of an entrenched system of promotion based on nepotism with one approaching a meritocracy was one of Jervis's chief objectives as First Lord, though Davidson repeatedly reminds us that Jervis possessed extremely influential patrons of his own, including his mother's cousin, Admiral Lord Anson, and Anson's close friend, Admiral Sir Charles Saunders. As far as rewarding merit, Davidson inserts some doubt as to whether Jervis deserved full credit for perhaps two of his most notable victories. His first major success at sea, as captain of the *Foudroyant* in 1782, came largely as a result of the tactical sense of a midshipman who suggested Jervis take the helm opposite to the one intended, thereby avoiding heavy casualties and dealing the enemy ship its fatal blow. Furthermore, Jervis's most famous triumph, at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1797, which secured him his peerage as the Earl of St. Vincent, was largely due to Nelson's independent action in breaking the line and causing the Spanish fleet to fall into disarray.

As Davidson convincingly argues, what Jervis did not have as a tactician he made up for as a strategist. His skill in recognizing and harnessing talent and creating the right opportunities for those with it (such as Nelson) to thrive made him indispensable to the Royal Navy. A fierce proponent of traditional naval discipline in which obedience to the navy and the nation came before all else, Jervis' unbending resolve proved instrumental in making the Mediterranean and Channel Fleets models of discipline and efficiency as they maintained close blockades of Spain and France respectively during a high time of mutinous sentiment and the constant threat of invasion. Though he was utterly tactless and responsible for lowered morale in the short-term, Jervis made many lasting reforms as First Lord. These included placing the royal dockyards under the complete control of the Admiralty, instituting a Commission of Naval Enquiry aimed at rooting out corruption and inefficiency, and improving sailors' welfare in the form of higher standards of shipboard health and hygiene, as well as enhanced pensions.

Some significant problems do arise in this book. Davidson employs direct quotations much too often. Chapter seven is especially tedious, as an onslaught of 22 lengthy quotations in less than twenty pages gives the appearance of a lightly edited collection of letters rather than a thorough analysis. The book is well researched in terms of Jervis's published letters, speeches and orders, but offers no new primary material. Finally, Davidson misses a golden opportunity to write the definitive modern biography of Jervis by foregoing the use of citations and refusing to incorporate nearly the entire body of excellent recent scholarship to appear on the Royal Navy for the period 1793 to 1815. Of the 15 sources included in the bibliography, just two date from inside the last half-century. A glaring omission is the superb DNB entry for Jervis.

There are also a few minor quibbles. Canadian readers will be annoyed by the careless spellings of

"Arcadia" (p.13) and "Louisberg"(p.16), and somewhat dismayed at the absence of a map detailing the northeastern part of North America, especially since Jervis participated in General Wolfe's spectacular victory at Quebec and General Amherst's recovery of Newfoundland in the final battle of the Seven Years' War in North America. The appendix consists of a table of rates, of peripheral value when the inclusion of a time-line highlighting Jervis's record of service would have been far more practical.

Despite the above-mentioned disappointments, the book is informative, well written, comfortably paced and exhibits a carefully selected set of illustrations. Particularly for the non-specialist, the author succeeds in creating a strong appreciation for Sir John Jervis as both an admiral and First Lord during a momentous period in the histories of both the Royal Navy and the British nation.

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Peter Doepgen. *De Washingtoner Konferenz, das Deutsche Reich und die Reichsmarine Deutsche Marinepolitik 1921 biz 1935*. [Deutsche Maritime Studien/German Maritime Studies, vol. 2]. Bremen: Hauschild Verlag/ Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum, www,hauschild-werbedruck.de, 2005. 277 pp., notes, bibliography. € 32.00, cloth; ISBN 3-89757-313-X.

This book was written as a doctoral thesis under the supervision of Prof. Michael Salewski of Kiel University and accepted as such in 2001. It concerns a most crucial period in the history of Germany as a State and of the German Navy—the *Reichsmarine,* as it was called at the time—in particular. By accepting the terms of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (signed 28 June 1920), Germany lost its *Wehrhoheit,* the right to determine the size and composition of its armed forces as a fully sovereign state. The terms of the treaty were particularly severe regarding the size and composition of the navy. All more modern ships which had survived the self-destruction of the main body of the *Hochseeflotte* at Scapa Flow (21 June 1920) where it had been interned after the Armistice of November 1918, had to be surrendered to the former enemy powers or scrapped.

The German navy was denied the employment of aircraft and submarines. Its strength was limited to six battleships of the 'pre-dreadnought' category, six light cruisers and 24 destroyers or torpedo boats. The number of personnel was limited to 15,000 men, who had to serve as volunteers for a long period (25 years for officers and senior NCOs, 12 years for other ranks). A maximum size was fixed for units to be built to replace existing ships. In this respect, the most inconvenient regulation was the one limiting the size of new replacements for battleships to 10,000 tons, as it was impossible to build a "dreadnought" of this tonnage. Germany was also obliged to adhere to a limit on the age of ships before they could be replaced: twenty years for battleships and cruisers, fifteen for torpedo vessels. In this way, the *Reichsmarine* was reduced to a second or third rank navy capable of nothing much

more than coastal defence and 'showing the flag'.

The story Doepgen tells us with a wealth of detail (derived from extensive study of the relevant records both from Germany and elsewhere and an impressive number of literary sources) is essentially the struggle to free the German navy from the restrictions outlined above. It is interesting to note that in this struggle the German government and the leadership of the German navy did not always see eye to eye. As Doepgen points out, it should not be overlooked that in the early 1920s, the reputation of the German navy within the country itself was at a rather low ebb: the battle fleet had rarely been in action, the submarine offensive had failed, and the lower deck of the navy had provided the impetus for the revolution which swept away the Old Order. So there was ample reason to question the value of a strong German navy no longer fettered by the Versailles *Diktat*. Later on, in the summer of 1927, there arose an awkward situation when it came to light that the "ransport Department" of the Naval Command was engaging in activities aimed at acquiring weaponry forbidden in the Versailles Treaty. This "Lohmann affair" even led to the retirement of Defence Minister Gessler and Admiral Zenker, commander-in-chief of the navy. The aim of the naval leadership always remained to get rid of the Versailles restrictions and so restore to Germany the navy she needed. Their strategy involved trying to gain acceptance for Germany as a signatory of the various international naval arms limitation treaties that were concluded in the 'twenties and early 'thirties, notably the Washington Treaty (1922) – the first strategic arms limitation treaty of modern time – and the London Treaty (1930). In this way, Germany would gain access to the exclusive and limited circle of major naval powers. She would have to adhere to quantitative and qualitative restrictions as regards number and size of ships, *et cetera,* but they would be much less severe than those she had had to accept at Versailles. How important this was for the German naval leadership is best illustrated by a remark made by the German Rear-Admiral von Freyberg to the British Admiral Kelly during disarmament talks in Geneva (1929). Von Freyberg referred to the German plans to build *Panzerschiffe,* ships of (officially) 10,000 tons, more heavily armed than a cruiser and faster than a battleship (the famous 'pocket battleships' of the Second World War). He maintained that there was an easy way to get Germany to shelve the *Panzerschiff* project: to invite her to join the Washington Treaty. The successive failure of all such German efforts to be recognized as a naval power of the first rank was mainly due to French opposition. During the 1930s, however, the *Marineleitung* saw this dream become a reality in a "backdoor" manner. The first milestone marking this process was the recognition by the British Empire, the US, France and Italy of Germany's right to organize its armed forces with the same independence as other states. This occurred during international disarmament negotiations at Lausanne on 11 December 1932, restoring the *Wehrhoheit* principle, even before Hitler rose to power. As a result, Germany was part of the naval agreement of 18 June 18 1935, between the British

Empire and Germany. This conceded to the latter country a naval strength of 35 percent of that of the Empire navies. As for submarines, Germany was allowed a tonnage of 45 percent of that of the Empire; this could be changed to 100 percent if certain emergencies occurred. As we can see this treaty indeed implied restrictions, but at least for the time being these were for practical purposes meaningless because Germany was given a free hand to build as large a fleet as her shipbuilding capacities permitted and with the types of ship she wanted.

Doepgen presents a clear picture of the sometimes complicated processes he has studied and thereby broadens the view of everybody interested in this period of German history. This does not mean, however, that the book is easy to read and to use as a tool for one's further studies, even for someone who is *au courant* with German. What one particularly misses is a chronological table of the many events described or referred to and an index. The book appears to be remarkably free of factual errors. I disagree, however, with the statement that the *Panzerschiffe* were not larger than Versailles allowed.(p.10) The firm of naval constructors domiciled in the Netherlands which played a not unimportant role in the "secret rearmament" of the *Reichsmarine* was not called *Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepvaart* but *Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw*. (p.126)

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den Helder, Netherlands

Larrie D. Ferreiro. *Ships and Science: The Birth of Naval Architecture and the Scientific Revolution, 1600-1800*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, www.mitpress.mit.edu, 2006. 432 pp., illustrations, bibliography, index. US $45.00/£29.95, cloth; ISBN -10:0-262-06259-3 ISBN-13:978-0-262-06259-6

Naval architecture is remarkable for having no single, easily accessible volume available for students interested in the history of the subject. Perhaps, this is because like shipwrights, who for thousands of years built ships without knowing any science, historians have studied maritime and naval activities without knowing very much about how ships move through the sea. They see no need to know. Yet, ship science — ship theory, the author calls it — is required to predict in advance the performance of ships after they are built. This is a challenging, important book, and deserves a wider audience than just naval architects interested in the origins of their profession; historians, students of sea power, naval officers and seafarers should read it too.

Larrie Ferreiro is well qualified to write it. He holds degrees in both naval architecture (a master's degree from University College, London) and history (a doctorate in the history of science and technology from Imperial College, London). Indeed, his PhD thesis forms the basis for this work. He has also worked as a naval architect designing ships for the British, American and French navies and the US Coast Guard. This self-contained work is the first of the author's planned two-part history of naval architecture from its beginnings to the

present day. This volume covers the birth of naval architecture during the Scientific Revolution from the early seventeenth century, when men began to expand on Archimedes' fundamental theorems, which became integrated into rational mechanics and began to play a role in naval architecture, until the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars stifled much government-sponsored research at the end of the eighteenth century. The author's aim is to explain how and why naval architecture developed and was subsequently used by constructors. His most important thesis is that the same men who expanded differential and integral calculus and explored planetary orbits, tides and vibrating strings developed naval architecture. Just as the men who explored ballistics were not artillerists, those who developed ship theory were not shipbuilders. What united these men was their interest in rational mechanics. Ferreiro also argues that much of the work of developing ship theory was carried out under the auspices of navies whose administrators were interested in improving ship design and construction in order to control their constructors and expenses and to counterbalance superior numbers in the British navy. Why Europe's largest navy was disinterested in the development of ship theory is another sub-theme in this complex story.

The author introduces the main theme by presenting the central figure in the development of naval architecture, Pierre Bouguer, and his book, *Traité du navire* (Treatise of the Ship), in the introduction. Bouguer was a French mathematician and astronomer, not a constructor. He never built a ship in his life. Yet, he wrote the first true synthesis of naval architecture while on a ten-year geodesic mission in the Peruvian Andes to measure the figure of the earth. Bouguer's book contained no practical instructions for how to build a ship, but explained for the first time how to predict the characteristics and performance of a ship *before it was built.* The account of Bouguer and his book, which appeared in 1746, sets the stage for the six substantive chapters that follow. First, the author describes the changing naval and maritime situation in Europe, which acted as a catalyst for the development of and need for naval architecture as part of ship design. He then moves on in chapters two, three and four, to define and discuss the three major elements of ship theory that emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: manoeuvering and sail theory, ship resistance and hydrodynamics, and stability theory, including the concept of the metacentre, which naval architects still use today. Chapter five introduces and discusses several major authors whose works affected the development of naval architecture during the period: Paul Hoste, a French Jesuit mathematics professor and author of the first modern work on naval tactics, Leonhard Euler, a Swiss mathematician who wrote in Latin while in Saint Petersburg, Henri Duhamel du Monceau, founder of the French school of naval constructors in 1741, Jorge Juan y Santacilia, a Spanish explorer and spy, who wrote a mathematical treatise on solid mechanics and fluid mechanics, Fredrik Henrik af Chapman, the first naval architect whose text book became perhaps the best known work on naval architecture although it was originally written in Swedish. In this last case, the

author makes good use of the work of the CNRS's own Dan Harris's biography of Chapman. Chapter six describes the process of professionalization of naval constructors that, Ferrerio argues, was the true legacy of this period, and the leap of naval architecture across the English Channel to the British engineers at work at the beginning of the nineteenth century following the destruction of French science during the French Revolution.

Ferrerio's book is a demanding read, with its fair share of mathematical diagrams and equations, but the reader's patience and diligence will be rewarded. One of the book's great strengths lies in the author's ability to analyze each scientist's work succinctly, to identify where and how they got their mathematics wrong, yet, to explain the importance of each man's contribution to the whole. His explanations of theory appear to be clear and thorough without being unnecessarily technical. Although this reviewer has forgotten just about all of his high school trigonometry and an early university course in differential calculus, the fascination of the subject does come across. This authoritative, engaging book leaves one looking forward to tackling the sequel.

James Pritchard
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William Henry Flayhart III. *Counterpoint to Trafalgar. The Anglo-Russian Invasion of Naples, 1805-1806*. Gainesville, FLA: University Press of Florida, www.upf.com, 2004. xi + 298 pages, illustrations, maps, tables, notes, bibliography, index. US $24.95, paper, ISBN 0-8130-2795-0. (Originally published 1992, University of South Carolina Press.)

The bicentenary of the battle of Trafalgar was commemorated in Britain by no fewer than 20,000 separate events, 2,000 of them on 21 October 2005. It is unlikely that any thought was given to Admiral Villeneuve's objective in sailing for the Mediterranean, that is, to destroy the British and Russian fleets there, or at least prevent the Anglo-Russian invasion of Naples, which in fact took place by the end of November. The battle of Trafalgar was significant, therefore, in preventing French mastery of the Mediterranean and Napoleonic expansion there, more than, as popularly supposed, ending the threat to Britain itself. We must be grateful for this re-issue of Professor Flayhart's previously well received book, identical in every way to the original edition, including misprints, but with the addition of a foreword and an expanded preface.

Overshadowed by Nelson's titanic victory and by Napoleon's success at Ulm and overwhelming triumph at Austerlitz, the invasion of Naples, a side-show which ended in the ignominious withdrawal of the allied forces about ten weeks after their landing, has received little attention. Flayhart's accomplishment is to have provided the standard account of a minor episode which ultimately had major consequences, contributing to British naval mastery and the confounding of the French Emperor. The book is elegantly produced, the text clearly written and distills much research and analysis.

Flayhart sets the stage with an account of the establishment of the Third Coalition that made Britain and Russia allies despite their rivalry in the Mediterranean, and the plans for the joint expedition to Naples. Britain had held on to Malta despite Russian interests there, and Russia had troops in the Ionian Islands. British opposition to a Russian presence in the Mediterranean remained a constant preoccupation until the First World War. Despite good will, there were problems in cooperation between the allies, the Russians being short of supplies and the Neapolitan government (the supposed beneficiary of the exercise), being a considerable hindrance. An especially difficult problem was that of delays in communications, particularly with London, which were sometimes the fault of the London government. These very same communication problems had contributed to the collapse of a previous British Mediterranean adventure, that at Corsica in 1796. The Russians were far from their main bases in the Black Sea. Extensive bickering ended when Alexander I of Russia, having shared the loss at Austerlitz with his Austrian ally, ordered his troops to return to the Ionian Islands, while the Neapolitan government could not decide on resistance to Napoleon. Rather than return to Malta, General Sir James Craig, the hero of this account, withdrew his troops to Sicily, which thereafter became a British base. Trafalgar opened the door for the Anglo-Russian expedition to Naples, and then Austerlitz made it irrelevant.

The book is based on admirably extensive research in the British Library and a broad range of official papers in the British National Archives. One publication in French is listed, all other French sources are in translation. No Italian or Russian materials were consulted. A number of well-known and applicable Russian sources were published before 1914, and others since 1960. Most of these are in French and some are listed in Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (1994), pp. 263 ff., and 286, which also lists some relevant, comparatively recent Russian monographs. Flayhart is a little unfair to the head of the Neapolitan army, "an incompetent general," Damas, in failing to mention his forename, and in not having consulted the *Mémoires du comte Roger de Damas* (1914). Charles Auriol, *La France, Angleterre et Naples de 1803 à 1806* (1904-5), might have been consulted to advantage. "Russian Ambassador M. Tatishchev" was in fact Minister Dmitri Tatishchev.

The most valuable section of the book is the final chapter taking the story forward. Russia became a French ally in July 1807. The Ionian islands fell into French hands and then became a British protectorate. Exasperation with the Neapolitan royal family caused the British administration of Sir William Bentinck to exile the queen and establish a constitution in 1812 that had reverberations later in the century. The British presence in Sicily helped to handicap French attempts to regain any naval significance in the Mediterranean. Sir John Stuart was able to land troops from Sicily back in Naples, where Joseph Bonaparte had become king. On 4 July 1806, they handily defeated a regular French army and then withdrew. These

successes helped promote uprisings in Calabria against French rule that took years to put down and demanded the permanent presence of French forces. This, in turn, contributed to the eventual British decision to support Spanish guerrilla warfare and to land British forces in Spain. Some veterans of Craig's and Stuart's army contributed to Wellington's campaigns. Later Bentinck was able to move towards northern Italy. All of these elements in the overthrow of Napoleon stemmed from the Anglo-Russian invasion of Naples, itself the fruit of Nelson's victory, as we are reminded by W. H. Flayhart's illuminating study.

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Jack Friend. *West Wind, Flood Tide. The Battle of Mobile Bay*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, www.usni.org, 2004. xiv + 310 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US $ 29.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-292-X.

Micro studies have always found enthusiasts within the field of military history, and *West Wind, Flood Tide. The Battle of Mobile Bay* by Jack Friend fits into this tradition exceedingly well. The book meticulously describes two years of plans, delays and personal successes and failures leading up to the most decisive naval battle of the American Civil War. In 1862, U.S. Captain David G. Farragut was ordered to lead a Union fleet up the Mississippi and capture New Orleans, lend support to the attack on Vicksburg and finally, to secure Mobile, Alabama. After almost effortlessly completing the first two parts of his mission, for which he was promoted admiral, Farragut found himself holed up in Pensacola, outside Mobile Bay, for almost two years, begging for additional army and armoured warship support, before he could finally conclude his mission. Meanwhile on land, the Union advance had come to a standstill at the gates of Atlanta and Richmond and "if the Confederacy could deny the North a further military triumph" before the next presidential election, Abraham Lincoln was bound to lose his presidency and "the South was certain to achieve its independence, not on the battlefield, but by a negotiated peace." If Farragut had not been able to seal off the port of Mobile, which represented one of the main lifelines of the Confederate military effort on land, North America today would present quite a different picture.

Against the backdrop of rising strategic and political stakes, Jack Friend slowly unveils the drama of Mobile Bay, minute by minute as it sometimes seems, reciting copiously from hundreds of letters and eye-witness accounts. With the tension and frustrations on both sides steadily mounting, it is almost a relief when Farragut finally engages his formidable opponent, Admiral Franklin Buchanan, veteran commander of the CSS *Virignia* at the battle of Hampton Roads two years earlier, who was defending the bay with four Confederate ironclads, the most modern warships of their time. The four hours of the actual battle cover sixty pages of the book. After the initial disaster, when the US monitor *Tecumseh* struck a mine, Farragut saws no option

but to take the lead and enter the bay straight through the minefield. (Apparently, the legendary words "Damn the torpedoes" were never uttered.) In the ensuing battle, Buchanan with CSS *Tennessee*, single-handedly wrought havoc in the Union fleet, before finally being forced to surrender. We are spared none of the desperate moments, gallant behaviour nor horror which, in the end, earned the Union forces an expensive victory, at a price which allowed the Confederates to hold their heads up high in defeat. Human loss on the Union side ran into the hundreds, against little more than thirty on the Confederate side.

Like many Civil War episodes, the story is one without villains and each side is equally praised for its acts of heroism and self-sacrifice. Jack Friend's sense of historical drama is infectious, and gives his book the flavour of a television documentary; his poetic inclination spurs him to sprinkle his narrative with citations from Homer. Most satisfying is the way he allows us to follow the careers of the main characters after the battle. His traditional approach in focussing on personalities and action, however, also leaves many aspects of the American Civil War navies untouched, for which I was glad to have Sondhaus's *Navies in Modern World History* by my side. Nonetheless, I am sure that for Civil War enthusiasts this volume will provide a rewarding experience.

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E. Kay Gibson. *Brutality on Trial: "Hellfire" Pedersen, "Fighting" Hansen, and the Seaman's Act of 1915*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006, xix+225 pp., illustrations, appendices, glossary, index, endnotes, bibliography. US $34.95, cloth; ISBN 0-8130-2992-0.

In *Brutality on Trial: "Hellfire" Pedersen, "Fighting" Hansen, and the Seaman's Act of 1915*, author E. Kay Gibson attempts to supply a corrective to the romantic vision of the waning days of sail. For Gibson, wife of acclaimed maritime historian Charles Dana Gibson, the first few decades of the twentieth century represented a time when bucko mates and bully captains continued to harass their crews, in open violation of federal statutes. While others lament the passing of ships with billowing white canvas sails rather than belching smokestacks, Gibson reminds us that those glorious ships were often hellish workplaces, coated in the blood of their crews. What makes this era different from preceding ones, when corporal punishment was regularly meted out on board American sailing ships, was that sailors, armed with new laws and supported by a progressive government, were starting to fight back—and win—against the capricious and arbitrary will of their officers.

In this slim volume, many years in the making, Gibson details the abuses aboard two particular American vessels, the *Puako* and the *Rolph*, with by far the greatest emphasis on the former ship. Utilizing an impressive array of primary source documents— from periodicals to consular dispatches and from courtroom

testimony to legal documents— Gibson attempts to recreate the brutal world that was the American merchant marine. Aboard the *Puako*, the master, Adolph Pedersen and his two sons, Dolph and Leonard, meted out terrible punishment to their multinational and multiethnic crew during the tumultuous war year of 1917. None escaped the wrath of the Pedersens, enduring daily beatings with belaying pins, knuckle dusters, and a novel torture known as "the water treatment," where cold bilge water was continually pumped onto the captive sailors. The abuse was so severe that two members of the crew jumped overboard and committed suicide rather than face such continued mistreatment. To protect themselves, the Pedersens forced the remaining crewmembers to sign statements that they were conspiring to commit mutiny, and that the punishments they received were warranted. When the San Francisco-based ship, which had been ferrying lumber from the Pacific Northwest to South Africa, put in at Cape Town, the aggrieved seamen called on local authorities to intervene. Citing the *Seaman's Act* of 1915, the authorities seized the Pedersens and transported them for trial to New York City. Here, in what Gibson describes as a sensational trial, the men were acquitted of murder. Convicted of various other charges, however, the trio was sentenced to prison terms of various lengths. Curiously, upon his release, the elder Pedersen was again placed in charge of another ship, which, like the *Puako* before her, was owned by a shipping company controlled by the mayor of San Francisco.

While the case of the *Puako* is treated in great detail, fewer than twenty pages of *Brutality on Trial* are devoted to "Fighting" Hansen and the *Rolph*. The story, however, is much the same. A demon of a mate, with a well-known reputation for hard drinking and hard fighting, Hansen was arrested by American officials in South America after they received complaints from numerous sailors about the treatment they had received at his hands. Hansen had previously been convicted of murder, and the beatings he administered on the *Rolph* left one crewmember blind and another deaf. Like the Pedersens before him, Hansen was tried and convicted of assault and other charges, and sentenced to prison in a case that was interpreted as a landmark victory for non-licensed maritime workers.

Gibson is careful to provide some context: wartime demands on American shipping meant that fewer berths were occupied by skilled mariners and that this, in turn, meant that ships' officers worked with untrained crews who often needed "hands-on training." Gibson also states that the Pedersens were fearful for their lives, and believed that their ship had been targeted by German saboteurs who were determined to sink the vessel and kill the officers. While this does much to explain the mindset of Pedersen— and to some extent Hansen— it, of course, does not excuse the brutality that these crews encountered. Nor does it address the fact that such treatment was *de rigeur* on American sailing ships for the better part of American maritime history. These sailors, the progeny of Jack Tar, were merely experiencing the same treatment that their predecessors had suffered for generations. What makes these cases different was that the vicious cycle of

abuse that had marked the maritime workplace since time immemorial was finally starting to change. Armed with the *Seaman's Act* of 1915, and various other pieces of progressive era legislation, the common sailor and waterfront labourer was finally able to stand up for himself.

While Gibson provides an illuminating view into the world of the American merchant marine during the Progressive Era, this book leaves much to be desired. For one, Gibson gets lost in her sources. For pages on end, the reader is subject to dry courtroom testimony or verbatim excerpts from consular correspondence, much of which is repetitive and superfluous, and little of which is interpreted by a trained historian's eye. Worse, Gibson fails to provide sufficient historical context about the world in which maritime workers lived, the boarding houses, bawdy houses, crimps, shipping agents, blood money, and other unsavory aspects of maritime employment markets. Also absent is a discussion of the context of progressive measures, such as the great strength of organized labour on the Pacific Coast, with its attempts to unionize these men, thereby allowing them to better protect themselves against these abuses. Aside from some tantalizing references concerning the International Workers of the World and the political agency of men such as Andrew Furuseth, there is little here to suggest that there was any such movement. In fact, much of *Brutality on Trial* is presented devoid of any context, with the author assuming a good deal of knowledge on the part of the reader. Had the milieu of the maritime workplace been more widely explored, one would have gained a much fuller insight into issues and epoch Gibson is trying to represent. On its own, alas, this is but a compendium of two incidents that are unremarkable except in their resolution.

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Maura Hanrahan. *Domino. The Eskimo Coast Disaster*. St. John's, NL: Flanker Press, www.flankerpress.com, 2006. 221 pp., maps, illustrations, appendices, index. CDN $16.95, paper; ISBN 1-894463-80-3..

The story of the 1885 super-storm that wrecked the Labrador shore still figures in that region's oral history. Nor has it slipped from formal history because of its crippling effect on the mercantile-based economy of the time, which relied on the Labrador fishery, and, in the long term, its influence on the governance of

Newfoundland. The interwoven stories of ship girls, English crewmen, livyer families, Newfoundland fishing fleet families, merchant dynasties, and the famous Bartletts of Brigus, are all woven into this creative work of historical fiction. Clouds gather and winds quicken from the outset and an uneasiness prevails as one wonders who is doomed and who will survive among this complex cast.

Throughout the nineteenth century, hundreds of fishing vessels arrived on the south-central Labrador coast each summer to fish for cod. The fleet came from Britain and New England but mainly from Newfoundland ports. It comprised tens of thousands of people —

men, women, and children – who spent fishing seasons on the coast living in wood or sod houses whose ruins still dot that shore. Some of these families stayed in south-central Labrador, forming the bulk of today's population base. Conditions on board fishing vessels were of the worst kind, but life in damp and crowded hovels was the even more terrible setting that caused Dr. Wilfred Grenfell to found The Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen, which offered medical and social services to a poor and undernourished people.

Well suited as curriculum material for secondary level or even literacy programs, in a style that is fresh and never cumbersome, *Domino* is intent on describing the strictures of a resource-based economy, the class self-consciousness of the time, and the rich ethnohistory of the region. Hanrahan's presentation of attenuated lives on a bleak and stone-grey shoreline are incredibly evocative and form the clothesline from which flap well-ordered and well-researched historic details.

Not only should this volume become curriculum material, but it is accessible to any reader both in price (under $20.00) and in concept and readability. Newfoundland and Labrador's past is emerging through a growing body of similar writings, which all demonstrate that its culture and history are unique and distinct – there's nothing like them in Canada. *Domino* is history without the ten-dollar words, and the presentation of individual experience over cramped structural analysis and theorizing. The photographs that portray key historical figures and elements of the fishing life are well chosen, although the women don't appear nearly as fish-begrimed and down-trodden as I imagine them. There are twenty-seven short chapters over 188 pages that move through several main characters and across many settings in time and space. The rollicking pace from character to character and from place to place at moments reads like a compilation of short stories and one wonders whether the far-flung thematic net could have been drawn in part way to focus on fewer characters and to develop one or two histories over many. Hanrahan may have made a strategic decision in this respect, however, for the movement of the chapters invokes that of vessel caught in an ever-increasing wind.

Marianne P. Stopp
Wakefield, Quebec

Donald R. Hickey. *Don't Give up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*. Toronto: Robin Bass Studio, www.rbstudiobooks.com, 2006. xxix+430 pp., illustrations, maps, chronology, appendices, endnotes, index. CDN $39.95, cloth; ISBN 1-896941-45-1 (Canada).

Donald R. Hickey, professor of history at Wayne State College in Nebraska, is a distinguished scholar of the period of the early American republic and probably the leading American authority on the War of 1812. Hickey's book, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (1989), remains a

standard treatment of the war. In his latest book, Hickey examines myths of the War of 1812 and, through this vehicle, discusses the latest scholarship on what is certainly one of the most confusing, least understood, and generally ignored conflicts in American, Canadian, and British history. Unlike many American studies of the war, Hickey has endeavoured to give proper recognition to the role played in the conflict by the British, Canadians, and Native Americans.

The War of 1812 was indeed a strange conflict. It was certainly not a war sought by Great Britain, locked in a life-or-death struggle with France. Americans were sharply divided over the war. New England, the part of the country that should have been most concerned about the chief causes of the war — free trade and sailors' rights— in fact, opposed the conflict. Americans expected the war to be short and victorious, ending with Canada part of the United States. It did not happen, but this "Second War for Independence" had far reaching effects, including the creation of Canadian nationalism.

In his discussion of myths, Hickey begins by identifying three individuals he considers to be the chief early mythmakers of the war and who set much of what was to come in motion. They were British naval historian William James (*The Naval History of Great Britain* and other books), Benson J. Lossing (*The Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*), and Henry Adams' (*History of the United States of America*). In his prologue, Hickey discusses key events of the period and problems confronting Britain and the United States, and he provides a brief overview of the war. Chapters 1 through 6 treat various aspects of the war, including the myths and controversies, while the Epilogue deals with the war's legacy. Hickey has also included a detailed chronology of the war. Several appendices treat popular songs associated with the War of 1812, shipwrecks and rebuilt ships from the war, and the origin of the term, "War of 1812." Numerous period illustrations and excellent maps contribute greatly to the text.

The scholar and novice alike will find in this book a gold mine of useful information. In the body of the book, questions in bold type pose such queries as: Did the British incite the Indians? When did the British declare war? When was the first land battle? Who shot British Major-General Isaac Brock? Why did General Hull surrender Detroit? Did the British dine in the White House? Who were the best American generals? Who were the worst American generals? Hickey also evaluates the effectiveness of different weapons systems, including naval ordnance, rifles, and Congreve rockets. Hickey also appraises the roles played in the war by women, African Americans, and Indians.

While the War of 1812 seems small indeed next to most other American wars, nonetheless, it had important and lasting effects. For both the United States and Canada, it shaped national development for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The war had an especially important impact on Canada, creating both Canadian heroes and Canadian nationalism, as well as fear of

American expansionary policies, thus helping to insure that Canada would not become part of the United States. The Indians were the major losers in the war. The end of their way of life was inevitable but the war greatly speeded up this process and the takeover of their lands. The British realized that to retain the loyalty of Canadians, they would have to reverse their traditional policy of protecting the Indians. As Hickey makes clear, this "Second War for Independence" also confirmed American nationhood. It marked the birth of U.S. naval power, led to the acquisition of part of Spanish West Florida, and brought a new respect for the United States in Europe. It also speeded up manufacturing and industrialization.

This book deserves the highest praise and certainly belongs in every academic library. An easy read, it is that rare work that is at once scholarly and immensely entertaining. It is also unusual in that one can both read it as a narrative account that proceeds more or less chronologically and employ it as a handy reference source for specific topics and issues.

Spencer C. Tucker
Lexington, Virginia

Roger Jordan. *The World's Merchant Fleets 1939. The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 1999. xvi + 624 pp., illustrations, index. US $ 59.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-959-2. Distributed in Canada by Vanwell Publishing Ltd.

"The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." This is a quote from Winston Churchill. At the peak of hostilities, German U-boats sank over one hundred merchant ships each month. By the end of the war, total losses numbered about 2600. The main battlefield was the North Atlantic, but in the South Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, merchant vessels also fell victim to the Axis forces. Merchant mariners endured everything the enemy could throw at them: bombs, torpedoes, mines and gunfire, and, for those captured, imprisonment, mistreatment, torture and execution. In order to get as much cargo across the sea as possible, safety regulations for labour and cargo were eased or disregarded. These circumstances diminished the chance of survival for the pawns in this conflict — approximately 60,000 Allied mariners died in service.

Roger Jordan's comprehensive book, *The World's Merchant Fleets 1939*, contains details of ocean-going merchant vessels at the end of 1939 and their wartime fates. The book has two parts. In the first part – The World's Merchant Fleets - the information is divided by country and shipping company. Data is given for each ship: dimensions of the vessel, year of construction, name of builder, tonnage, propulsion, speed, and number of passengers. More than three hundred black and white photographs give a well-balanced representation of the merchant fleets in this era. The second part of the book – Losses -- contains data on the fates of some 3,000 ships that were

lost to all causes between 1 January1939 and 31 December 1945. Types of losses are distinguished as between those resulting from marine hazards and enemy action during the Second World War and also the Spanish Civil War, including losses after 1945 as a result of striking mines. This information is provided in alphabetical order by cause.

Jordan's book is not prosaic. It contains hundreds of pages of neatly organized data. One would expect to find at least some statistics, but alas this is not the case. It would have elevated data to information and added value to this already rich book. Without a doubt, this solid product of painstaking, laborious research is a valuable contribution to the maritime history of the twentieth century. The reader should be warned, however. In the first part of his book, the author focuses on the merchant fleet, as it existed at the beginning of the war in 1939. As a result, only the wartime fates of some of the merchant vessels are covered. There is no mention of the vessels that came into service after 1939. For example, none of the very great number of cargo ships built under the Liberty and Victory programs during the war is mentioned. The book, in the end, has an unfinished feel about it. As a maritime historian with a keen interest in merchant shipping in the Second World War, I would certainly like to see these gaps filled in the same excellent manner in which the author has compiled the information presented in the present volume.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands

John R. H. Kimball. *Disasters Etc.: The Maritime World of Marblehead 1815-1865.* Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. Randall Publisher, www.perpublisher.com, 2005. x + 191 pp., photographs, illustrations, maps, references, index. US$ 25.00, cloth; ISBN 1-931807-36-1.

Marblehead is a small coastal town north of Boston, between Salem and Gloucester, Massachusetts. The Naumkeag first peoples, then, from 1629, the English, used the harbour as a fishing port. It is probably best known to the maritime world for its inhabitants' reliance on the Atlantic fishing economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and for their involvement in the American Revolutionary War both in the Continental Navy and privateering.

John Kimball's book about Marblehead is a useful addition to the existing literature towns of the North Shore. This is not a break-through history, but an account of a time between wars when Marblehead focused on fishing and trade. It is nicely laid out and illustrated and filled with interesting quotes and long passages from many journals, newspapers, and other sources. The book, however, suffers from too much quotation, giving the impression of a cut-and-paste assemblage. It would be an enjoyable read for someone casually interested in Marblehead's maritime past. I imagine this is the targeted audience, especially people who come to Marblehead for recreation.

Historians who want to study the North Shore or that period in New England's history probably will find Kimball's book useful, but difficult. He

does offer quotes from and citations of some primary sources that one might want to explore. Much of the text, however, is derived from several standard maritime histories of the Northeast. Kimball also seems to accept as true passages in late-nineteenth-century publications about things that happened generations before those passages were written.

Tracing Kimball's precise sources is a quite frustrating exercise. For example, the reader might see something in quotes and think it is a primary account, only to find it comes from a twentieth century author. The text is often vague in its references, such as "a writer describes," so that the reader must work through the citations to get any useful information. The citations are cumbersomely arranged. Grouped at the end of each chapter, they are a mix of long explanatory notes of up to a half page in length and abbreviated references that might only give the author's last name and a page number.

Kimball's past profession as an attorney who specialized in financial matters shows in his more than casual interest in the financial dealings and recourses to litigation of the fishermen and maritime traders. I think this is his strongest addition to the literature. Kimball succeeds in explaining some of the intricacies of the financial and legal arrangements and practices. His explanation of the system of letters of credit for the Asian trade (pp. 72-3) is a noble effort, but I think might have worked better with a simpler example.

The story about Marblehead in *Disasters Etc*. is a good one and those with a casual interest will enjoy it. I think it could have used more editing to correct tense changes in mid-paragraph, to eliminate many unnecessary quotations, and to bring some of the long end-notes into the text. Historians will find the book useful mostly for leads to some primary sources.

Warren Riess
Bristol, Maine

John Lambert . *Anatomy of the Ship. The Fairmile "D" Motor Torpedo Boat*. London, UK: Conway Maritime Press, www.conwaymaritime.com 2005. 120 pp., photographs, illustrations. UK £25.00, cloth; ISBN 1-84486-006-X. (Originally published in 1985).

This book, a re-issuing of the 1985 printing, was researched, written and illustrated with superb draughtsmanship by John Lambert. Long known for his outstanding work regarding smaller calibre weaponry and the smaller vessel types to which those weapons are most suited, Lambert is also the author of *Allied Coastal Forces,* Volumes I and II.

Nonetheless, what Lambert initially felt would be a relatively simple research project with some time on the drawing board turned into anything but. On commencing his research, he discovered that there was little readily available in the way of material. He turned that sparse start into a superb job of research, documentation, a photographic record, and outstanding draughting recording the details of the type. In total, this book provides a comprehensive look at the Fairmile "D," its development and use, from its design

to its final form when the last "D" in service, (then classed as a Fast Patrol Boat) paid off at HMS *Hornet*, Gosport, Hampshire, on 5 September 1956.

This volume follows the standard format used in the Anatomy of the Ship series and starts with the usual dust jacket notation that "This highly acclaimed series aims to provide the finest documentation of individual ships and ship types ever published." It continues: "The drawings are accurate, visually exciting and totally comprehensive, offering ship buffs, historians and modelmakers a novel insight into the technicalities of each type covered."

While the dust jacket states that the book is "Complete with a 1/75 Scale Fold-out Plan," this is a misnomer; there are no foldout plans as normally understood by readers familiar with them. A starboard profile and a plan view are reproduced on the back of the extremely stiff and multi-folded dust jacket; a very poor substitute for a fold-out, at best.

Contents include a Forward and Acknowledgments, followed by an Introduction to the Fairmile "D" which includes: charts covering the particulars of the type, which was generally known as a "dog-boat"; comparative performance data for all Fairmile types; scantlings for them; particulars regarding builders of the Fairmile types A, B, C, D, F, H, with the type series number ranges; and an excellent section on armament. A listing of the completion dates and fates by boat number follows this. Particulars of the range of weapons used on the boats are provided, as are details regarding machinery, including variations by boat number. A section containing 28 pages of extremely well-produced photographs follows, including many dating to the beginning of the construction of these vessels. These photos include framing and an engine-room mockup photo. There is also a wealth of information contained in the operational photographs of numerous boats, most taken under wartime conditions, including close-up details shots that will be invaluable to model builders. The book is rounded out with 68 pages of Lambert's superb draughting covering everything one would want to know about the vessel type.

The Fairmile "D" was developed at the Admiralty as a "long" boat when William John Holt, then head of the boat section of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, in essence, spliced a destroyer-type bow onto a fast motorboat stern. It was intended as a deterrent to the formidable German S-boats (from *Schnellboote*, but always called E-boats by the allies), which were more efficient and more heavily armed. The E-boats' powerful Mercedes-Benz lightweight diesel engines of over 2,000 hp had the advantage of a less volatile fuel than the petrol (gasoline) carried by their opponents. They were also better armed. In fact, it was not until the release of the QF (quick firing) 6 pounder 7hundredweight Mark II gun that the Fairmile "D" could finally outgun the E-boat. By then, the "D" was fitted with four Packard 4M-2500 engines with each developing 1250 maximum brake horsepower producing 34.5 knots on an 85-ton hull (as designed). Tank-tested in the Admiralty Experiment Tank at Haslar at the end of 1939, the "D" did not take its final shape until March 1941. It was built in small boatyards across the country

from kits supplied by a central store facility at Brentford. This approach allowed modifications to the design as required, prior to shipment.

As published, four drawings, including the all-important lines drawing, and five excellent photographs cross gutters, making the drawings virtually useless to many of the targeted readership, including model builders. The five photographs would have been of more use as fold-outs. If true two-page fold-outs can't be provided, as is done by other publishers and some magazines, the drawings on either side of the gutters should at least have generous overlaps to allow for copying and accurate re-aligning the sections to allow study of the complete drawings without the inconvenience of the gutter.

Despite this ongoing complaint with the Anatomy series regarding the use of fold-out plans, this is a superb account of the history and development of the Fairmile "D" written by an outstanding researcher well qualified to handle all aspects of the project.

Roger Cole
Toronto, Ontario

John G. Langley. *Steam Lion: A Biography of Samuel Cunard*. Halifax, N.S.: Nimbus Publishing Ltd., www.nimbus.ca, 2006. 169 pp., illustrations. CDN $29.95, cloth; 978-1-55109-623-0.

"The foundation had been laid for a company that would capture the imagination of the world." (p.16)
"Samuel Cunard, the Steam Lion, led by example—and in so doing left us with an example to emulate." (p.135).
One of the most successful international businessmen of the nineteenth century came from Halifax. His impact on the transporting of goods and people around the world has long since been forgotten, particularly as aircraft have replaced ships as the way to get to Europe and other parts of the globe.

The person is, of course, Samuel Cunard. John G. Langley's new biography of this famous entrepreneur is a concise account of the man who changed the way and speed with which transportation and communication took place in the 1800s. The author deals first with the arrival of Cunard's parents in Nova Scotia, Samuel's early years, and then moves to a detailed examination of his commercial accomplishments, illustrating how his judgment and foresight played an important role in the development of the Canadian economy.

Samuel Cunard's forefathers were German Quakers, who, led by William Penn, settled in present-day Pennsylvania in the United States. Desiring to remain under British rule at the end of the American Revolution, these settlers became part of a new wave of immigrants to Nova Scotia and other parts of British North America known as the Loyalists. It was in Halifax that Samuel Cunard was born in 1787.

Langley pays special attention to Cunard's strong work ethic, an asset that was undoubtedly acquired from his father. The author points to this as the reason for his emergence as a prominent maritime merchant in the city. He notes the

important contribution made by the Cunards in developing the local economy in Nova Scotia and abroad. Initially, spurred on by the Napoleonic wars and the need to get troops and supplies to the European battlefield, Cunard's father, Abraham, founded A. Cunard & Son. Although this operation was later disbanded, and replaced by S. Cunard & Son, the experience and knowledge gained during these early years proved extremely useful and beneficial, broadening the movement of a varied number of products from all over the world. Halifax became an important port of call, moving goods of all types from spirits to coffee. This flow of imports, combined with an extensive collection of waterfront real estate, laid the groundwork for the business success gained by Samuel Cunard throughout his career.

Langley also discusses Cunard's specific advances, particularly as they applied to the use of steam-powered ships to link Halifax with Boston, as well as with several ports in Britain. Later, New York was also included, giving local merchants, as well as passengers, an additional point of access to the crucial American market. Cunard's most important accomplishment, however, is still the carrying of mail, passengers and goods from Britain to Halifax, and then on to other parts of Nova Scotia, central Canada, and the United States. The profits from this initiative made Cunard extremely wealthy for his time, and assured him a role in the developing economies of the British North American colonies which became part of Canada in 1867. Cunard's other interests, in addition to his fleet of vessels, included coal mining, whaling, banking, and the construction of several canals around the expanding colonies

The volume is also effective in probing Cunard's personal life, which was dealt a severe blow by the death of his wife, Susan, who died giving birth to their ninth child. As a widower and single parent, he certainly must have been grateful for the support and help extended to him by his mother-in-law for housekeeping and parental responsibilities. Samuel's obligations in early life were the education of his younger brothers and sisters. This certainly aided in the development of his ability to juggle conflicting priorities between work and family.

Langley reveals that Cunard's later business life was not all that prosperous, indicating that the appearance of wealth is not always an accurate depiction of one's actual financial situation, particularly when the repayment of debts is involved. Cunard owed money to a variety of creditors in the 1830s which came to the point where his ability to travel abroad was strictly regulated until these loans were addressed.

The author also discusses Cunard's final years which were spent in England as a member of the British aristocracy and as a trusted advisor to the British Government on colonial affairs. Cunard's death in 1865, two years before Confederation, marked a new era in the ever-evolving economic and political focus of Canada, one which has not been all that kind to the seafaring spirit of Atlantic Canada.

If the volume has any particular

flaws, it may be its inability to appeal to an audience fixated on the here and now, as opposed to the past century. Nevertheless, it is always the past that determines the future. This book should not be overlooked. It gives us an important examination into one of our provinces' most famous sons and his extensive milestones.

William Dubinsky
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones (ed.). *The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys. A Naval Staff History*. London: Routledge, www.routledge.com, 2007. xviii + 154 pp., maps, illustrations, sources, appendices, index. UK £65.00, cloth; ISBN 978-0-415-39095-8.

The attempts to sustain Malta in 1941 and 1942 resulted in some of the most memorable naval operations of the Second World War. In turn, British air and sea forces based on Malta threatened German and Italian supply lines to North Africa where the land operations swung back and forth. This also had its effect on the convoys, for the success of Rommel's army could, at times, reduce the amount of aerial protection given the convoys.

This volume is a facsimile reproduction of the naval staff history, *Selected Convoys (Mediterranean), 1941-1942,* containing a detailed examination of the seven major operations during this period. It is part of the publisher's series "Naval Staff Histories," now edited by Dr Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones of the Naval Historical Office, who contributes a preface setting the subject in context. The publication originated as "Battle Summaries," compiled by Commander J. Owen of the Historical Section, and issued in 1944 and 1945. These were revised after the war by Commander L. J. Pitcairn-Jones and issued in 1957 with a "Restricted" classification for use within the navy. The revisions included use of additional confidential information and some (very limited) use of Italian and German sources. The editor informs us that Pitcairn-Jones had access to the special intelligence, commonly referred to as "Ultra," but this still could not be divulged in the mid-1950s and, as this is a facsimile reproduction, there is no mention of it in the text. The editor has, whenever possible, translated the file references in the original to the current file numbers in the National Archives (formerly Public Record Office). This is extremely useful to anyone wanting to conduct more detailed research in the original documents, although there are some cases where no trace of the original could be found.

The convoys studied in individual chapters are, for the most part, well known to naval historians by their code names. "Excess" (January), "Substance" (July) and "Halberd" (September) took place in 1941. The 1942 operations were "M.G.1" (March), "Harpoon" and "Vigorous" (June), and "Pedestal" (August). "Pedestal," with its iconic memory of the battered oiler *Ohio*, finally arriving with its precious cargo after an epic struggle, receives the most detailed treatment. The majority of the Italian and German attempts to stop the convoys

came from the air, supplemented at times by motor torpedo boats and submarines which, in the case of Pedestal," could be very effective. "M.G.1" was the only convoy that involved surface action with the Italian fleet, when Rear-Admiral Vian's light cruisers and destroyers held off a strong Italian surface force centered on the battleship *Littorio.* Nevertheless, the constant threat of the Italian fleet had a strong influence on other operations, and in the case of "Vigorous," forced the convoy to return to Alexandria without reaching Malta.

The study ends with a thoughtful chapter of comment and reflections including a comparison with the Arctic convoys. The realities of geography made convoying particularly hazardous because convoys from the west had to run the gauntlet of the relatively narrow passage between Sicily and Cape Bon, and ships from the east ran through the area between Crete and Cyrenaica, dubbed "bomb alley." The British managed to keep Malta supplied–barely–but the cost was high. The three 1941 operations described brought 29 ships to Malta with the loss of one sunk and two damaged, but the navy lost a cruiser and a destroyer and had other ships damaged, including the battleship *Nelson* and the precious aircraft carrier *Illustrious*. The latter was lucky to survive and remained out of service until near the end of the year. The year 1942 was even more arduous and there was the loss of an aircraft carrier (*Eagle*), two cruisers, an anti-aircraft cruiser and nine destroyers, plus twenty of the sixty supply ships that originally sailed for Malta with another ten forced to turn back.

In recent years, the boundaries of naval history and its understanding have been greatly expanded and enriched by non-combat studies involving the administrative, technological and financial dimensions of the subject. This book is an old fashioned, narrative history of operations, the end result of all that planning and preparation. Official publications can be dry and hard to get through. This, given the subject, is certainly not, and the text is supplemented by excellent maps and diagrams, the former in full colour. The focus is obviously on British operations. The few citations related to the Italian side and attempts to reconcile British and Italian accounts refer rather vaguely to the "Italian Official History" or "Italian sources" without specific references to file, volume or page numbers. The names of Italian commanders rarely appear and ships smaller than cruisers, such as destroyers, are not always mentioned by name. Details on the German forces involved are even more scant. One learns nothing of the identification of the Luftwaffe units involved, the relative strength and availability of aircraft, or any cooperation (or its lack) with the Italian air and naval forces. There are estimates of the number of bombers attacking, but no figures given for their fighter escorts. A full account of the enemy side, however, was not the intention of the authors of the staff study. Their work was originally an "in house" account of British operations. For a study of the campaign in all its aspects, one would now consult works like Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, *The Naval War in*

the Mediterranean, 1940-1943 (London: Chatham, 1998).

This book can be enjoyed both by historians and naval buffs, but the high price will likely deter many who would like to acquire it. Furthermore, my copy had the covers (not very sturdy but technically "hard") bound upside down. Considering the price, one would expect more care from the publisher. Routledge has published many excellent naval titles but at prices that turn aside most. In this case, the colour maps obviously add to the expense, but given that this is a facsimile copy, the editorial cost to the publisher was far less. When will the publishers learn that there is a market outside of libraries for publications like this, given reasonable pricing?

Paul G. Halpern
Tallahassee, Florida

Frank G. Martin. *Fifty Years A Shipbuilder*. Stanhope, UK: The Memoir Club, www.thememoirclub.co.uk. 2006. xvii + 457 pp., illustrations, appendices, index. UK£19.50, paper; ISBN 1-84104-156-4.

When an author writes a personal account of his life and publishes it in the form of a vanity press, we may ponder why this outlet was chosen. The possible answers to that ponder need not trouble the reader of this book, Martin's autobiographical memoir is an interesting, detailed and almost compelling account of his working life in the shipping world. That life spans a little more than the fifty years stated in the title, though not all of it was actually spent building ships. Five years after his start in 1947, in the post-war world of the seriously-outdated Scottish shipbuilding industry, Martin leaves to follow the call of the sea. He spends most of the next decade in the engine rooms of a variety of ships, becoming thoroughly familiar with marine diesel engine propulsion and a fair number of the modern world's oceanic routes. After a couple of years back in a Scottish shipyard and in Birkenhead, he moves to Eire to become naval architect to the Verolme Cork Dockyard. Martin spent his final shipbuilding years as a globetrotting marine consultant.

The author considers the post war period covered by his personal monograph as something of a record of the decline and virtual collapse of the British shipbuilding industry. He explains some of the contributing factors to this failure at various junctures through the book. The Dutch owners of the Irish shipyard where he spent the bulk of his career hired him at the onset of their greenfield operations. He was made redundant when the doors of the yard were finally closed after twenty-five years of trading. Martin does not let these depressing facts permeate his narrative. His attention to minute detail, technical explanations, ship statistics, and the people he dealt with at all levels suggest a meticulous mind and good journal keeping.

The book resonates with carefully documented first-hand information about a wide number of marine construction and operational initiatives. Martin puts you in the shipyard, taking you from the design office to the launch ways with the easy familiarity of someone who is completely

comfortable and familiar with the entire shipbuilding process. He explains in easily understood, but non-simplistic terms, how modern ships are constructed. In a similar manner, his chronological progression through his educational and working life is well laid out, tempered by humour and personal asides. He intrudes by adding occasional chapters dealing with nautical but divergent topics. They may perhaps add interest, but they halt the flow, and at the same time, do not always seem germane. There is a wealth of useful data in his descriptions of the progress in the advancement of ship design and the advent of new forms of seaborne transport.

As someone who worked in the same field during much of the same period, albeit on the opposite side of the Atlantic, there was a great deal of nostalgia contained between the covers of this book. We, too, have experienced the decline and virtual collapse of the Canadian shipbuilding industry post-war for some similar and for some different reasons. Unlike Britain, Canada's large and diverse shipbuilding industry was, to a great extent, a child of the Second World War, a pioneer industry dominating world-wide nautical trade. It could be posited, however, that British shipbuilding was declining a decade or more before the war and bowing to more progressive yards elsewhere.

Martin's opinions and comments regarding the interface between governmental and naval customers and the shipbuilder are cogent and well taken. There is money to be made from the owners of these government vessels, but the governmental bureaucracy is far more difficult to deal with than a commercial ship owner. There is a great deal to be learned from Martin's very personal observations of the last half of twentieth century in Scottish and Irish shipbuilding.

The excellent photographic illustrations throughout the text serve the writer very well but one has to refer to the appendix to read the long, clear and detailed explanations. The Index seems brief, and perhaps the inclusion of a few line drawings would have enhanced the written descriptions. But these are minor quibbles about a book which admirably fills a niche in an often overlooked area of modern marine history.

David A. Walker
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Kit Mayers. *North-east Passage to Muscovy, Stephen Borough and the First Tudor Explorations*. London: Sutton Publishing, www.suttonpublishing.co.uk, 2005. xiii + 241 pp., maps, illustrations, appendices, notes, references, index. UK £20.00, cloth; ISBN: 0-7509-4069-7

The *North-East Passage to Muscovy* is the story of the sixteenth-century mariner and explorer, Stephen Borough. This is a well-organized and readable book where the author eloquently makes the case that, although almost nothing is known about Borough as a character, his deeds live on, and these alone are sufficient to put him in the pantheon of great Tudor sea captains from Devon.

The three-ship expedition from the Thames to the Arctic in 1553 is best

known as Willoughby and Chancellor's. Two ships and their crews, including "the Admirall of the fleete" Sir Hugh Willoughby, were lost and their gruesome, frozen corpses not found until the next spring. Only Richard Chancellor, "the Pilot Major of the fleete," returned in the 160-ton ship *Edward Bonventura*. Borough was the master of Chancellor's ship and it was his seamanship, Mayers speculates, that saved the *Edward Bonaventura* from disaster under sail and enabled the explorers to winter successfully in the White Sea. Borough went on to complete many voyages in an attempt to find the North-east Passage, and to trade with Russia.

On his first voyage, Borough found Scots living as far north as the islands of Vardø, thus hinting at even earlier and unrecorded voyages to the north. On his second voyage in 1556-57, in the tiny, ten-man pinnace *Serchthrift*, Borough reached the furthest east of any western European, sailing on until he was stopped by a "monstrous heape of ice." He reached 70º 25´ East, measuring his position with instruments so primitive to the modern sailor that no one would cross the Bristol Channel with them, never mind the Arctic Ocean. Yet his measurement has been confirmed by modern methods as being accurate to the minute.

Kit Mayers is well qualified to write this book, having sailed around the world in the Whitbread Race, under the command of Chay Blythe, in a boat little larger than those used by Borough. Mayers was also a member of the first Greenpeace expedition to the Antarctic, and was director of laboratories with the Grenfell Mission in Newfoundland. Thus, he has good cause to understand the cold and sea conditions which Borough endured in his attempts to find a north-east passage around the top of Russia.

On their return to the Thames, Chancellor's and Borough's voyage was, at first, judged a failure: it did not bring back the gold, silk and spices expected by its backers. During the winter of 1553-4, however, Chancellor had visited the court of Ivan the Terrible, and this led to the foundation of the Muscovy Company, the first successful joint-stock trading company. Moreover, Borough's dozen or more voyages, spanning a quarter of a century, put England at the forefront of European seafaring and navigation, and laid the foundation of Britain's great commercial empire.

Mayers' account raises some fascinating questions.

In the sixteenth century, the eponymous Borough was a lonely farmhouse on the periphery of Northam, itself no more than a cluster of hamlets around a church on an estuary in North Devon. There, for generations previous, a farming and fishing community had survived on little more than a subsistence economy. Borough's family was clearly not significant enough even to have a proper surname. Nonetheless, at age 27, he was appointed master of the largest of the three ships in an expedition to find a new sea route to the East. Stephen Borough was not just a single spark of genius, but the member of a dynasty: his uncle, John Aborough, spied for Henry VIII; his brother, William, was Controller of Queen Elizabeth's navy; his son, Christopher, explored Persia; and his son-in-law, John Vassall, was one of the

founders of Virginia and may also have been the owner, or even the builder, of the *Mayflower*.

Borough attributed his successful voyages to the grace of God, which is a fine contemporary explanation, but this does not satisfy a more secular age. One can still visit Northam and Borough, which are little changed from Borough's day, apart from the ugly rash of holiday homes in the surrounding countryside and the rush of modern traffic. The bend where the rivers Taw and Torridge meet below Appledore is also unchanged since, presumably, young Borough first messed about in boats there over four hundred years ago. The size of the craft swinging in the tide or sitting on the mud, if not the material of their plastic hulls, would be familiar to Stephen Borough too.

So, how many good harvests were needed before the Borough dynasty could cease its subsistence living, who married into the family to augment its gene pool, what inspired schoolmaster came to the village to teach Stephen, so the God's grace could take effect? And what then drove Borough (and the other members of his family) from the safety and obscurity of North Devon to seek his fortune upon the seas?

There other good qualities about Mayers' book: it is well-indexed and includes comprehensive notes and references. One of the eleven appendices. contains the ordinances of the 1553 expedition, which might be a yardstick for all voyages of exploration.

In passing, Mayers reveals one of the first uses of the name "Royal Navy" on Stephen Borough's monument on the wall of St Mary's church, Chatham. It records that at his death in 1584, he was "one of the fowre pricipall masters in ordenarie of the Queens majestie's royall Navy," a use which predates Charles II's by several years.

This is another fine volume from Sutton, at a mercifully modest price, which deserves a place in the library of anyone interested in Arctic exploration.

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Evan McHugh. *1606 An Epic Adventure*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd., www.unswpress.com.au, 2006. 232 pp., illustrations, maps, glossary, references, index. AU $34.95, paper: ISBN 0-86840-866-2.

The press release for Evan McHugh's latest book, *1606: An Epic Adventure*, claims that McHugh, an Australian journalist for the Sydney *Sunday Telegraph*, is known for his ability to "tell a good story and draw out the human drama." This statement may be true for his previous books, with subjects that run the gamut from Outback heroes to shipwrecks to personal memoirs, but it is unfortunately untrue for his latest work.

In *1606*, McHugh attempts to cover the exploration and mapping of the continent of Australia from the first sighting of Cape York, located in far northwest Queensland, by Dutch explorer Willem Janszoon in 1606 until Matthew Flinders, a lieutenant in the Royal Navy, mapped the continent from 1801-3. The book mentions all European explorers who charted portions of Australia until a complete map of the continent came into

existence in the early nineteenth century.

Written for a popular market, McHugh tries to draw comparisons between the past and the present. For example, he tries to refute the early explorers' opinions that Australia was little more than a dry and barren land. To do this, he informs the reader about the future profitability of the crocodile skin industry, bauxite mining and mud crab meat exports. (p. 10) McHugh's comparisons are interesting and certainly alert the reader to the uniqueness of Australia, which held very few goods that early European adventurers deemed valuable.

McHugh's book is about the exploration of Australia and not its colonization. While he mentions Arthur Phillip, the first governor of New South Wales, and the commodore of the First Fleet of convicts to arrive in Australia in 1788, he mistakenly claims that Phillip had been "a retired naval captain." (p. 191) Phillip had never retired from the Royal Navy, but by the end of the American Revolutionary War, he, like so many other low-ranking post captains, had resigned himself to the fate of collecting half-pay for the remainder of his life. Several other minor factual errors occur throughout the book, but are not glaring enough to detract from the work.

One of the more prominent problems of *1606* lies with McHugh's source material. The most current work that he references is Richard O'Neill's *Patrick O'Brian's Navy*, published in 2003. Indeed, the two secondary sources on general Australian history that the author uses as his base of knowledge, namely, Ernest Scott's *Australian Discovery*, published in 1929, and Ida Lee's *Early Explorers in Australia*, published in 1925, are outdated to say the least. More current works, like Stuart Macintyre's critically acclaimed general history of Australia, published in 1999 and later revised in 2004, would have provided McHugh with a better grasp of current academic debates surrounding the issues he is trying to address.

Yet the most prominent problem of *1606* rests with its very writing. The book is poorly written and suffers from verbose prose. McHugh quotes excessively from the explorers' journals. Often, such excerpts take up whole pages with little or no analysis following the quotations. Much of Cook's journal regarding his first visit to Australia in 1770 is reproduced in its entirety. While journal entries are fascinating reading, long quotations seldom enhance the quality of a secondary historical work.

1606 does little to advance scholarly knowledge of maritime history. Written for a popular market, the book lacks a thesis and is merely a rehashing of published explorers' journals with no scholarly analysis. Released in 2006 to coincide with the four-hundredth anniversary of Janszoon's sighting of Cape York, one could have wished that the public had received a better-researched and better-written book about this momentous occasion. The only saving grace of *1606* lies in one of its most annoying habits: the continual quotation of the explorers' journals. By reading these lengthy quotations, hopefully, the public will recognize that this time in history is, in fact, exciting and has merely been treated unskillfully by Evan McHugh.

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Constantine Pleshakov. *Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic voyage to the Battle of Tsushima*. New York; Basic Books, www.basicbooks.com, 2002. Xx +396 pp., maps, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. CDN$26.95, paper; ISBN 0-465-05792-6.

The culmination of the short and nasty war between Russia and Japan in 1904-5 was the despatch of a large and unwieldy armada of obsolete or untried ships from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan. Arriving in May 1905, the voyage of some 18,000 miles took approximately eight months, including lengthy layovers in Madagascar and French Indo-China. It was a forlorn mission ordered by a deluded Tsar Nicholas II. He hoped to reverse a deteriorating strategic situation involving the costly Japanese siege and eventual capture of Port Arthur which ran its course to the end of 1904, together with the destruction of the generally well-handled but unlucky Russian naval squadron it sheltered. Once victorious, the efficient Imperial Japanese Navy, commanded by Vice-Admiral Heihachiro Togo, the AJapanese Nelson,@ gained secure command of lines of sea communication from Japan to Korea and Manchuria in support of land armies, pushing back but not destroying Russian forces north of Mukden. By this time, the fleet was en route but Nicholas would not hear of its recall.

Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky, named to command the ill-fated Russian naval relief expedition, harboured no illusions. Russia's Baltic fleet had already been stripped of its best ships, captains and crews to form the original Port Arthur squadron. The ineffectual remnants of what would be a Second Pacific Squadron were powerful in numbers only, hampered by corruption, politics, pessimism, bureaucratic incompetence and indiscipline. Simply getting his ships to the straits of Tsushima by May 1905 was a considerable accomplishment for the admiral, but his fleet was virtually smashed and scattered in a matter of hours by the experienced Japanese. Already blooded by their engagements with the more seasoned Russians they had fought off Port Arthur in 1904, Japan had lots of time to restore and refit their ships and crews before Rozhestvensky's arrival. It was an unprecedented and unnecessary symbolic tragedy that played no real part in deciding the war, other than dashing the vain hopes of the tsar. Nonetheless, the Japanese victory was proclaimed another Trafalgar, even though the hard little war was closer to a draw than is generally accepted, with the exhausted Japanese trading bodies for territory. The Japanese secretly asked the United States president to broker a peace but Russia, with a growing army still in the field, refused to pay an indemnity to their financially strapped enemy.

Scholarly study of the war has been a challenge for westerners lacking knowledge of either Russian or Japanese. In addition, versions of events through the eyes of pre-Soviet emigrés have clashed with Soviet secrecy and propaganda agendas. Access to Russian archives by outsiders had been almost impossible in the Soviet era and, as Constantine Pleshakov tells it, is still not without its challenges today. Nonetheless,

he has surmounted these obstacles to provide a rich, well-paced in-depth account of the journey to Tsushima and its aftermath through the eyes of the mostly Russian *dramatis personae*.

Professor Pleshakov served as a member and director of the geopolitics department at the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences (1985 -1996) and has held numerous fellowships and positions abroad, including an appointment as Karl Lowenstein fellow at Amherst College. Prolific as both a historian and a novelist, he has a number of prize-winning works to his credit.

This particular volume adds very significantly to our knowledge of the ill-fated expedition and the major and minor players. As well, we are given some background regarding British, French and German perceptions. Primary sources include the State Archives of the Russian Federation (Moscow), including the Tsar's diaries, the Russian State Naval Archives (St. Petersburg) and the Russian State Military History Archives), as well as the Bakmeteff Archive (of Russian and East European Culture, Columbia University, New York). Dr. Pleshakov also explored significant Admiralty, Foreign Office and Cabinet sources at the PRO, as Britain, Japan's new, but still nominally neutral, ally monitored developments. As well, he makes extensive use of contemporary published Russian-language sources, many of which are not known in the West. The research is impressive and the narrative flow quite compelling.

The work is divided into three parts: ARace@concerns the decision to send the reinforcement squadron and the overwhelming difficulties in marshalling and mounting the operation; and ALingering@ addresses the painfully sluggish voyages of various fleet elements by varying routes, accompanied by spy scares in the Baltic, firings at British fishing craft, RN monitorings, logistics, intelligence and diplomatic issues, dealings with obdurate French neutral allies. There were also prolonged delays in unhealthy climes after the Tsar insistently burdened Rozhestvensky with additional useless reinforcements, including a Third Pacific Squadron. Lastly, there is ABattle@ and its aftermath, including the disciplinary trials and later lives of some of the surviving officers.

Pleshakov varies the pace between the elevated, the interestingly picayune and the farcical but he accentuates the Russians concerned from a remarkably interesting and perceptive human dimension. The profile of the iconic but also complex and hot-tempered Admiral Rozhestvensky is particularly insightful, even to the extent of his long-time affair with the wife of the heroic Admiral Makharov (shades of Peirse and Auchinleck!) and another requited passion for Natalia Sivers, a nurse aboard *Orel*, the fleet's hospital ship. Yet he also maintained a loving correspondence with his wife. Intelligent, brave and enigmatic, he was a tragic figure of biblical proportions, capable of great things but not the impossible. His staff purchased many pairs of binoculars due to their admiral's penchant for violently throwing those in hand overboard every time some miscreant captain failed to handle his ship properly. But he was also loyal and generous to his subordinates, when deserved, and particularly those in Japanese captivity and on trial.

Pleshakov is a must for any required reading list for the Russo-Japanese war. The tale is well told and it adds important information, especially about the Russians. Nonetheless, it does adhere to prevalent themes of Russian writings on the war, which magnify the clumsiness of the corrupt Tsarist Russian bear and the power and efficiency of the enemy — also pleasing to the view contemporary Japanese wanted to present of themselves, despite their also being vulnerable to error, risk and uncertainty.

There are a few difficulties in terms of the book's context and interpretation. As Pleshakov concedes, it is neither a history of the war nor of the naval war, but his attention to these wider aspects in the text is far too cursory and dismissive. Important work is absent from the bibliography, for example, observations on the naval war from Sir Julian Corbett, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Fred T. Jane. A particularly unfortunate omission from the secondary sources is Denis and Peggy Warner's *The Tide at Sunrise* (1974), still quite possibly the most reliable and comprehensive study of the war. This alone would have been more than enough to have given Pleshakov what he needed to comprehend events from the Japanese perspective. These sources suggest that the Russian Afleet in being@ strategy at Port Arthur, with occasional jabs to underscore their threat to Japanese lines of communication, was the rational choice — not seeking a decisive full-blown sea engagement. That it was not destroyed by the Imperial Navy threatened the prestige and reputation of Togo's navy. Instead, the army had to do the job for them: a costly and lengthy siege against the fortress, depriving the main armies of the resources which might have permitted the destruction of the Russian forces in central Manchuria. (When the Russians had no choice but to sortie into the Yellow Sea, Togo's fleet noted some rather good gunnery prior to their chance disabling of the Russian flagship.) In the happy event for the Japanese, the tsar sent poor Rozhestvensky's hapless leftovers and Togo had his Trafalgar. Ironically, however, the supposedly decisive sea battle more closely resembled Spanish Admiral Pascal Cervera's gallant sortie against the Americans from Santiago de Cuba a few years earlier in the face of superior American speed and firepower or, more ironically still, the kamikaze sortie of *Yamato* in 1945. Had he considered this literature, Dr Pleshakov might have been less inclined to call Tsushima one of the Atop five naval battles of human history.@ (p. xvii)

John Griffith Armstrong
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Tom Pocock. *Breaking the Chains. The Royal Navy's War on White Slavery*. Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, www.navalinstitute.org, 2006. viii + 216 pp., illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. CDN$ 38.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-048-X.

Although overtly focusing on the repression of white slavery in the early nineteenth-century Mediterranean, this book is largely about naval warfare, with the struggle for Greek independence as a prominent sub-theme. This reviewer can

only judge the book as a contribution to the debate on white slavery, for which Tom Pocock's central revisionist thesis is that British policy was more haphazard and faction-ridden than has usually been stated. This is a useful corrective, as is the reminder that it was not the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 that specifically targeted white slavery, but the 1818 Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. Nevertheless, Pocock may push his revisionism a bit too far, as there was arguably a strong underlying British determination to "pacify" the Mediterranean after the Napoleonic Wars.

The Duke of Wellington emerges as the villain of Pocock's story, constantly frustrating the abolitionist intentions of the eccentric and amiable Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, supported by the French diplomat Hyde de Neuville. Despite the negative attitude of the British delegation in 1814, Smith managed to sneak himself into the Congress of Vienna to plead his cause, and he founded the quixotic Knights Liberators of the Slaves in Africa. A fascinating aspect of Smith's campaign was his attraction to Islam, and his invocation of the humanitarian principles of the Qur'an in a well-meaning attempt to persuade Muslim leaders to give up servitude. Indeed, the material on Smith in this book is the most novel and useful for the historian of the abolition of white Christian slavery. Subsequent chapters treat naval campaigns against the Barbary States, covering ground that is already well known, albeit including technical details of interest to naval historians. In the second half of the book, the theme of slavery almost disappears, although there is some interesting material on Egyptian slaving as part of repressing the movement for Greek independence. Pocock even fails to mention that when the French took Algiers in 1830, they freed the remaining white Christian slaves, but not the black Animist or Muslim slaves.

The book suffers most conspicuously from the author's poor knowledge of general Islamic and Mediterranean history. There are some glaring howlers, such as the assertion that Morocco at one time formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and that the latter's origins went back to the first century of Islam. The author initially declares that the Ottomans did not take Greeks as slaves, but then notes, correctly, that Greek Chiot rebels were enslaved on a large scale. That said, Pocock has no grasp of the long unhappiness with slavery in Islam that Smith was trying to exploit. In common with much that is written on this topic, there is a deafening silence in his book on the enslavement of Muslims by Christians, which persisted into the nineteenth century. This neglected theme has been wonderfully treated in the writings of the Italian historian Salvatore Bono, but his works are not included in Pocock's bibliography. Indeed, it was partly to prevent the continuing enslavement of Muslims that Britain refused to allow the Knights of St John to return Malta at the end of the Napoleonic wars, a factor ignored by Pocock in his discussion of this strategic island. Similarly, he frequently uses the word "pirate," whereas the slavers of the Mediterranean, both Christian and Muslim, were almost always corsairs or privateers, operating under the authorization of letters of marque.

Overall, this is a book that hovers uncertainly on the boundary between scholarly and popular history. The garish dust-jacket features a famous painting by Delacroix, yet suggests an unfortunate anti-Islamic bias. The book is very lightly annotated, and even citations from primary sources are not always referenced. Archival sources do not figure prominently, and the index leaves much to be desired. There is only one map, the scale of which is too small to indicate places that are repeatedly mentioned in the text. The bibliography is skimpy, and, with one exception, restricted to works in English. That said, Sir Sidney Smith's quirky campaign to reform and abolish Islamic slavery is a truly engaging and useful element in this book, harking back to the author's earlier biography of this interesting figure. Unfortunately, the death of Tom Pocock in May 2007 makes a revised edition of this book unlikely.

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Kenneth Rawson. *Ever the Apprentice. The Memoirs of a Perpetual Learner*. Stanhope, UK; The Memoir Club, www.thememoirclub.co.uk 2006. xv + 222 pp., illustrations, index. UK £14.95, paper; ISBN 1-84104-155-6.

This is a memoir of intellectual endeavour and deep love of the sea and ships. It recalls a vibrant life during a period of many now-forgotten changes in society and gives an insider's view of developments in naval and merchant shipping design in the second half of the twentieth century.

On leaving school, Kenneth Rawson won a scholarship to the Royal Naval Engineering College in Devonport, the body responsible for the design of all Royal Navy warships. His long career included five years as the Professor of Naval Architecture at University College London, the first Head of Forward Design at the Ministry of Defence, where he assessed the viability of outline designs for surface ships from both the Royal Navy and the public, secondment to Lloyds Register of Shipping to research merchant ship design and finally, Chief Naval Architect of the British Ministry of Defence. He is the co-author of the standard textbook on naval architecture, *Basic Ship Theory*.

In the late 1970s, a prominent group in the private shipbuilding industry claimed that for the past century, naval designers had failed to see that pushing a sponge in the bath broadside on made smaller waves than pushing it narrow side on. They insisted publicly that the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors' traditional long, thin design for the Type 23 coastal frigate was wrong and pressed the Navy to develop the small, so-called "short fat ship." It fell to Rawson to convince the public that these claims were a complete myth, but a surprising lack of support from the Admiralty led to him resigning from the Ministry of Defence. The controversy took eleven years of expensive and time-consuming litigation before being resolved in his favour. At University College London, Rawson studied hydroelasticity, the response of an

elastic structure to forces imposed in water. This coincided with the disappearance in the Pacific in 1980 of a new design of bulk carrier, the four-year-old 170,000 ton *Derbyshire*. It was the largest British merchant marine casualty and this was followed by hull damage to several sister ships. In 1990, a research team at UCL pinpointed dynamic stresses in areas not examined by Lloyds Register that could have caused such fatigue. The author explains his opposition to the use of aluminium in the construction of the Type 21 frigate, one of which caught on fire during the invasion of the Falklands. Rawson was chairman of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects when, in December 1987, *Herald of Free*

Enterprise capsized and sank off Zeebrugge in a little over three minutes. For the first time, the RINA took a leading role in the subsequent inquiries and, for ten years, it campaigned for improved safety for roll-on roll-off ferries.

There are many memoirs about shipping careers and war experiences, but Rawson ranges widely as he examines many aspects of his life and the lessons he has drawn from it. In fact, the overall theme of this illuminating treatise is one of life-long learning and chapters are dedicated to academic, political and general learning as well as places of learning. Approximately one third of the book is devoted to the author's strong family life, but the writing comes alive when it turns to naval architecture and his life in ship construction and he includes brief descriptions of some esoteric technical matters which will not be familiar to all readers. Rawson has successfully used his own papers as sources, supplemented by an excellent memory of events as they happened.

The book's contribution to maritime history is the light it throws on prominent naval events during the last half of the twentieth century whose background was never disclosed to the general public. It will be of interest to both general readers and maritime historians, although the latter might be frustrated by the index as it refers mainly to people rather than to events or ships' names. In the penultimate chapter, Rawson asks rhetorically "so what did I learn?" It is clear that the strength of his family life has overcome any setbacks he faced in his professional career. Not every reader will share all his views, but his cogent and often biased conclusions on a host of subjects make compelling reading.

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Nicholas Tracy (ed.). *Sea Power and the Control of Trade. Belligerant Rights from the Russian War to the Beira Patrol, 1854-1970.* Published for the Navy Records Society, Vol. 149. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, www.ashgate.com, 2005. xxxix +557 pp., list of documents and sources, index, ship index, gazeteer. US $ 165.00, cloth; ISBN 0-7546-5367-6.

Many readers will be at least passingly familiar with the Navy Records Society and its objective of "…printing

unpublished manuscripts and rare works of naval interest." The Society was established in 1893 and this reviewer fondly recalls consulting of number of previous volumes in this series on naval signalling for a paper for Barry Hunt at RMC – quite a while ago now!

The title is appropriately descriptive of the period covered in this eclectic collection of documents that have been compiled to illuminate the legal and diplomatic challenges associated with denial of the fruits of maritime trade to an enemy power. The period from the Crimean War to the Beira Patrol (anti-Rhodesia initiative after Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965) was one of considerable ferment regarding this question. In particular, there was a growing demand to regularize warfare in general, with the humane view of minimizing its inherent brutality and "civilizing" the process. The creation of the Red Cross, for instance, is an example of this trend and was epitomised by the various Hague conferences in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It need not be noted that the proponents laboured in vain, as the tale of the twentieth century attests, but the motivation was surely honourable enough.

The issue of belligerent rights with respect to seaborne trade has, of course, a history that long pre-dated the period under consideration. Indeed, every Canadian is presumably familiar with the putative *causus belli* between Great Britain and the United States in the War of 1812 – high handed Royal Navy interference with American trade and the kidnapping of honest sailors; or, the just recovery of desperately-needed deserters offered illegal shelter, and the interdiction of trade providing succour to an implacable enemy, depending on perspective. More generally, the British dominance of the sea in the Napoleonic period was widely perceived as decisive in the event, as was its absence in the preceding American Revolutionary War, and again its presence in the Seven Years War. Throughout this period, and before, there was a developing set of "rules" that were often ignored by the participants when inconvenient, but the notion of setting limits by which the conflict was to be conducted was accepted as essential. The period immediately after the Napoleonic Wars was one of peace and the issue lay dormant in consequence. By mid-century, however, a series of conflicts erupted, mostly short-term in duration, such as the Crimean War and the American Civil War, and the issue of belligerent rights gained prominence, particularly with respect to differing perspectives between Britain and France (Crimean War) and Britain and the United States (US Civil War).

The volume is divided into four parts. The first covers the last fifty years of the nineteenth century; the second touches on The Hague Conventions and the First World War; the third discusses the post-war period and the considerable Anglo-American strife on these issues in the 1920s; and the final part covers the Second World War and into the 1970's. There is a document index, very helpful, a general index and a ship index. At the conclusion of the volume is a list of all The Navy Society's publications since 1893, noting which are still available from the publisher (quite a few are).

The volume contains extracts from a wide range of sources pertinent to the issue, including the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, Cabinet, Colonial Office, the Ministry of Transport and others. The documents include Cabinet minutes, memoranda, notes, policy papers, and various items of correspondence. In addition it includes the texts from the Hague Convention and documents such as the Declaration of London concerning the laws of naval war (1909). There is much on the perennially fascinating topic of prizes ("…dreams of riches beyond avarice…" in the minds of many a naval officer), particularly as this freebooting aspect of naval warfare, subject to such obvious abuse, was at odds with the growing bureaucratization of war. As well, there is an interesting item (no. 45) in the volume from a member of the Canadian naval staff in Ottawa to Admiral Domvile, Director of Naval Intelligence in 1927. At issue was the question of blockade and neutral rights as they might apply to the United States – the American position, unremarkably, was in contravention to the views held by Great Britain – and how this made the Canadian circumstance untenable. In the event of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States over this issue, Canada would clearly have to stand aside. The inconsistencies in American policy were touched upon in a refreshingly frank manner, but the "realities" of the matter made for great difficulties for Canada. Indeed.

There are also a number of helpful essays at the book's introduction as well as for each part. These situate the documents and provide necessary context. These essays are essential to the volumes purpose and are well done by the editor

It is difficult to assess a book such as this. Without question it is for the specialist and the historian. It is absolutely not for the general reader. Of course, it has no pretensions in this regard. In my view, the book achieves its aim admirably. There is much useful background material here that will materially assist the seeker of knowledge as to the use of sea power in controlling sea- borne trade. And, importantly, it is not that expensive despite its clearly limited audience. Each Navy Records Society volume is included in the annual subscription of £30 – volumes still available can be acquired through the Society office on application. Well worth the money if you are in the market for the subject at hand. On that basis, I can recommend this volume as well as the Society in general terms.

Ian Yeates,
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Dan Van der Vat. *The Great Scuttle. The Sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1919.* Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd., www.birlinn.co.uk, 2007. 240 pp., map, photographs, sources, index. UK £ 7.99, paper; ISBN 978-1-84341-038-6. (Originally published 1982.)

Dan van der Vat relates the events leading to the June 1919 scuttling of the German warships interned at Scapa Flow. He describes how two men, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Grossadmiral von Tirpitz, built up the Imperial German Navy into the world's second largest fleet. Britain,

alerted to the German threat and determined to maintain its naval supremacy, abandoned its traditional isolation and sought rapprochement with France and Russia. Van der Vat believes that the expansion of the Kriegsmarine was a colossal geo-political and strategic error and one of the main causes of the First World War.

When war broke out, the Kaiser adopted a risk-averse policy, described as being willing to wound but afraid to strike. The Kriegsmarine's hope of reducing the Grand Fleet by attrition to a level where they could risk a pitched battle was never realized. Their resultant inactivity was a leading cause of the mutiny in October 1918, when Communist-dominated Soldiers and Workers Councils seized control of the fleet.

The Armistice provided for the surrender of the German submarine fleet, but the Allied political leaders decided that German surface vessels should be interned at Scapa, overruling the admirals who had warned that the Kriegsmarine might scuttle them. The acquiescence of the Soldiers and Workers Council was achieved by a threat to seize the island of Heligoland if the fleet was not ready to sail by 18 November. Rear-Admiral Ludwig von Reuter, who had led a cruiser squadron with some distinction at Jutland, was given the unenviable task of leading the fleet into internment. He succeeded in restoring the officers' control over seamanship, although the mutineers continued to behave as an undisciplined rabble. At 1.30 pm on 19 November, Reuter led nine battleships, five battlecruisers, eight cruisers and fifty destroyers, their firing pieces removed and their magazines empty, out of Wilhelmshaven. One destroyer wandered into a minefield and was sunk.

On the morning of November 21, Admiral Beatty took the Grand Fleet, 250 allied warships, to sea to meet Reuter's force and escort it into the Firth of Forth. He ordered that the German ensign be hauled down at sunset, not to be rehoisted without permission. Between 22 and 27 November the German ships sailed to Scapa under RN escort.

They were guarded by a squadron of British capital ships and a destroyer flotilla. Relations were correct but distant and the RN handled all communications between Scapa and Wilhelmshaven. Merchant ships brought provisions from Germany and, under British pressure, the crew level was progressively reduced from 20,000 in November 1918, to 4,700 in December, and to 1,700 a few days before the scuttling. By March 1919, the determined Reuter had succeeded in gaining the upper hand over the Soldiers and Workers Council, forcing the repatriation of the most egregious troublemakers.

Reuter had begun detailed planning to scuttle by May. Cut off from the outside world, he got most of his news from old British newspapers. On 20 June, he read a misleading report in *The Times* of 17 June that the Allies had given Germany five days to accept their peace proposals, leading him to believe that hostilities would resume on the following day. He did not know that the Armistice had been extended to 23 June and that the Reichstag had voted to accept the Allied proposals. On the morning of 21 June the guarding squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Fremantle, left Scapa for a two-

day exercise. On his squadron's return, Fremantle had been authorized to seize control of the ships under the terms of the Peace Treaty. Once he had left the anchorage, Reuter sent the order to scuttle. At 12:16, the battleship *Friedrich der Grosse* sank, followed by fifty-two of the seventy-four interned ships, the remainder being beached. Alerted to the situation, Fremantle returned to Scapa at full speed. In the confusion, nine German sailors were shot. Reuter and the remainder of his crews were repatriated later in 1919, when he was received as a hero.

Criticism of Fremantle seems misplaced. The Admiralty had recognized that seaborne escorts could not easily thwart a determined scuttling operation. Van der Vat agrees with the naval historian Arthur Marder that Reuter had ordered the scuttling on his own initiative. Given the total lack of communication between him and his government, no other deduction is credible. The publicly embarrassed Admiralty was privately relieved that the scuttling had solved the contentious problem of the ships' future for they had no desire to see them transferred to the French or Italian navies.

Van der Vat tells his story masterfully. Writing in the late 1970s, he was able to interview local eyewitnesses of the scuttling and German crew members. He makes some errors, noting that the interned ships had been undefeated in battle, yet concedes that the Kriegsmarine had lost the actions of the Heligoland Bight and the Dogger Bank, and had been strategically defeated at Jutland. Lloyd George did not force the Admiralty to introduce convoy in April 1917

The author concludes with an account of the determined entrepreneurs who, by 1939, had succeeded in raising forty-five of the scuttled ships, including all five battlecruisers and seven battleships. In 1928, the battlecruiser *Moltke*, which was being towed keel-up to be broken up at Rosyth, came uncomfortably close to colliding with the northern buttress of the Forth Bridge. For many years afterwards, irrepressible local wits called this incident Reuter's Revenge!

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