

glimpse of Trafalgar.

The main issue with the book, however, is Jessop's choice of largely nineteenth-century sources to tell the fictional accounts and to present the historical facts. The most recent book in his bibliography is Alfred Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812* (1902). Not only is it the only book written in the twentieth century, but there are no current references that examine the era and address the shortcomings of earlier sources. This is painfully evident when he discusses manning of the navy and deals with the press gang (37-8). The present debate over the number of volunteers versus pressed men is absent, and we are left with the idea that the navy pressed all its crews, period. He also perpetuates the earlier generalization that there was high percentage of non-British men aboard, since refuted by current research.

Another problem with older sources is the errors in their recounting of events. When Jessop discusses the defeat of British frigates by American frigates early in the War of 1812, for example, he states that the USS *Constitution* had 32 guns while its opponent, HMS *Java* carried 38, a decided advantage (82). Yet a few pages later, when discussing the American frigates as a group, the *Constitution's* armament is correctly noted as 44 guns (89). The first source was M. Clark, a contemporary American writer (1813) striving to make the battle more heroic than it was. The second rating of the American frigates comes from H. Kimball who, writing a bit later (1836), got his figures correct. It is interesting to note that Jessop does not mention Sir Philip Bowes Vere Broke whose HMS *Shannon* defeated the US Frigate *Chesapeake*, 1 June 1813. In his account of the British burning President Madison's

mansion in Washington in August 1814, he erroneously refers to it as the White House, although it wasn't called that until 1901.

The factual side of each chapter is overpowered by the fiction, and without thorough analysis of the events and developments, the reader is left with little more than lists of ships, expenses, and extremely brief engagement details. There is minimal insight into the political wrangling, both within Britain and between European nations that raged throughout the era, affecting the course of the war and the Royal Navy's assignments. This drops the book into the murky void between non-fiction and historical fiction. Some less informed readers might have difficulty determining where the creative writing ends and the facts begin.

There are 17 images of nineteenth-century prints related to various events covered in the text, and 13 maps of locations relevant to the stories in various chapters, all of which are placed in the centre of the book. The useful index is extensive. As noted, the bibliography features late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources on the British navy, the French and Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812, which might be useful for students looking for a list of these sources. Anyone with prior reading or study into the events covered in the book will find nothing new here. It might possibly motivate an interested secondary school student to pursue the study of this dynamic period for the British navy and nation.

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P. Whitney Lackenbauer, et al. *China's Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada*. Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press, www.press.ucalgary.

ca, 2018. 274 pp., illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. CDN \$34.99, paper; ISBN 978-1-55238-901-0.

This collection of essays offers a detailed study of the “opportunity school” of Arctic development thought, championed by Lackenbauer and his compatriots, and contrasted with the “Conflict School,” driven by military historian David Wright and political historian Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary. These two scholars are also known as “alarmists,” who believe that Chinese grand strategists are operating counter to Canada’s Arctic interests. Commentators such as Lackenbauer and his fellow authors argue that Canada’s national interests would be complemented by Chinese cooperation, an outcome that would be characterised as attaining mutual benefit. It is in this bifurcated analytical context that Lackenbauer, et al display their evidence, and form their argument.

A statement of Arctic protection, the Ilullissat Declaration (2008), informed the international community of the willingness of Arctic nations to abide by international law, and to avoid conflict amongst themselves, at least within the Arctic. It is curious that the authors have not mentioned this in their index. The Ilullissat Declaration rendered Chinese interests in the Arctic questionable, and the motivations of the Chinese government suspect. Chapter One points out that China’s Arctic ambitions are possibly being driven into confusion as the disconnect between China’s current Arctic interests and its historical foreign policy appears to have widened. In Chapter Two, the authors argue that rising Chinese scientific, commercial, and industrial interests in the Arctic illustrate that this non-Arctic (a state whose physical borders do *not* lie within the Arctic circle) nation is

working to spread its interests and influence globally. This suggests that should China gain a foothold in the Arctic, whether in the short term or in the long term, it could act upon the foreign and domestic policies of all Arctic states. Alarmists would point out that this is a security risk, especially for nations such as Canada, which has borders within the Arctic, and very little by way of Arctic defence. For all Canada could know, China could have an installation within the Arctic archipelago. Lackenbauer and his co-authors shrug this possibility off as needlessly alarmist, and in fact, argue that Chinese presence in the Arctic means that its commercial and industrial efforts could benefit northern states to a large degree.

Chapter Three is concerned with the legal implications of trans-Arctic shipping, and possible issues of national and international sovereignty, topics that the alarmist school of thought take seriously. It offers a detailed investigation of such substantive issues as exclusive economic zones (EEZ), national and international jurisdiction, as well as a curious discussion of how the international community can balance the needs of coastal state rights with the freedom of the seas. Chapter Four follows this argument, pointing out that most Arctic resources fall within the regions claimed by Arctic nations. Sweden, however, is an Arctic nation that does *not* have any access to the Arctic Ocean, casting doubts on whether it has any right to Arctic resources beyond its current territorial boundaries.

Chapter Five argues that while the Arctic Council has little or nothing to lose by welcoming China into its ranks as an observer, it has a great deal more to lose by preventing China from gaining membership. Canada’s open perspective toward China as an observer on the Council enables Cana-

da to study Chinese foreign strategy in an almost benign manner, particularly in terms of seabound transportation and trans-boundary pollutants.

Classifying *China's Arctic Ambitions* is a difficult task. Its authors and editors weave an optimistic perspective through the tapestry of analysis within the book. They pay something more than mere lip-service to the alarmist view vis-à-vis China's relationship with Canada, but it is not enough to ensure a realistic accounting of the tensions between the two nations. What was clearly needed was a member of the alarmist school of thought in the authors' circle to point out in more detail the dangers that the book fails to address or, more frequently, addresses too lightly. That having been said, *China's Arctic Ambitions* should be a core textbook in any class which addresses Canada and the Arctic, including regional North American and North Pacific topics. Despite failing to address alarmist perspectives to this reviewer's satisfaction, it remains a book well worth reading more than once, especially in light of current Canadian-Chinese relations.

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Ron Macdonald. *Deeper into the Darkness*. Dunbeath, Scotland: Whittles Publishing, www.whittlespublishing.com, 2018. xii+240 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, glossary. US \$25.95, UK £19.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-84995-360-3.

Wreck diving requires a flexible mind and imagination from the here and now to a time and place that once was. Surrounded by the sounds of the water, the diver enters a remarkable world. Depending on its environment, a wreck either remains as it was at the time of its

demise, or deteriorates as it is subjected to organisms, currents, divulging sands, and scrap-metal hunters.

In *Deeper into the Darkness*, the last in a diving trilogy, the author again tells stories about the maritime past, dividing his book in three parts. In the first, he discusses First World War wrecks around the United Kingdom. The second part focuses on the Pacific in the Second World War. Part 3 features the latest developments. The stories are accompanied by charts and photographs of various wrecks, as well as pictures taken during the action. As a bonus, QR Codes are inserted at a number of stories on wrecks and the dives. These allow the reader to go straight to the videos on You Tube and watch the dive on the wreck. Top-notch.

The author takes issue with the desecration of ship wrecks that are war graves such as those at Jutland from the First World War, and in the South China Sea and in the Java Sea from the Second World War.

The Battle of Jutland between the navies of the United Kingdom and Germany resulted in the loss of some 25 major warships. These wrecks constitute the graves of 8,648 sailors who perished. But they do not rest in peace. In the quest for scrap metal, salvage works have been carried out on 15 of these ships. In the South China Sea and the Java Sea, Second World War naval ships, like Britain's HMS *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* and several ships from the navy of the Netherlands have illegally disappeared into the furnace of commerce, without the slightest regard for the fact that the wrecks were considered war graves by the nations involved.

According to the author, each shipwreck, each cargo, each artefact lying on the bottom of the sea today still has a legal owner. Rights of ownership are not simply lost by abandonment.