# BOOK REVIEWS

David Baird. *Northern Lights: Lighthouses of Canada.* Toronto: Lynx Images, 1999.245 pp., photographs (black and white, colour), maps, references, selected readings, index. CDN $29.95, paper; ISBN 1-894073-09-6.

Canada's coasts are dotted with a huge variety of lighthouses. From Newfoundland's iron-clad lights, to the squat wooden harbour beacons of the Maritimes and the slender concrete towers in British Columbia, more than 600 structures remain active aids to navigation. Although satellite technology and automation have made them less important to mariners, Canada's remaining lighthouses are an important element of the nations's maritime history.

David Baird's *Northern Lights: Lighthouses of Canada* is the first book to look at navigation beacons across the country. The author professes a lifelong interest in lights, beginning with a childhood friendship with the son of the Partridge Island, NB, lightkeeper. Later, as a ship's deckboy off the coast of Australia, Baird says he became "hooked" on lighthouses.

In *Northern Lights*, Baird presents photos and information about more than 200 lights across the country, gathered during fifty years of research trips. He begins with a brief historical and technical introduction to Canadian lighthouses, including types of construction, light and foghorn technology and general information about keepers and automation. The remainder of the book is divided into seven chapters dealing with lights in each province with lighthouses (excepting Manitoba, which has one major site). Baird devotes a page or two to each, with photos and general information about the history and characteristics of each lightstation.

Baird writes of the hardships of early keepers and their families. In 1906, Minnie Patterson, wife of the Cape Beale, BC keeper, made a gruelling four-hour trek to Bamfield to alert the government ship that a barque was coming ashore at the lighthouse. All the men aboard the vessels were saved. [228-229] Through Baird's photographs, the reader is introduced to seldom-seen, isolated lightstations like Bellie Isle, Newfoundland [ 39-40] and Flat Island, Québec. [161] Images of crumbling lights at Southwest Point, Québec [132] and Mohawk Island, Ontario [174] show how destaffing and abandonment has left many lighthouses to deteriorate.

Baird notes that during the past twenty-five years "Canada's lighthouses have been changed forever by automation." He acknowledges that the architectural and technical characteristics of lighthouses are "liable to frequent change" due to shifts in navigational requirements. Although Baird claims that his text describes the current state of lighthouses in Canada, there are a number of persistent factual errors in the book. For example, he consistently and incorrectly identifies fog detectors (the devices used to turn fog horns off and on automatically) as "radar-activated sensors" or "radar detectors." There is a recurring confusion about Barbier, Rénard et Turenne throughout the book. At least two dozen factual errors detract from the book's usefulness as a reference tool – construction dates of towers (the venerable Peggy's Cove light in Nova Scotia was not replaced by the current tower in 1979; it was built in 1915), and sizes of lenses are sometimes incorrect. For instance, the photo of the Inch Arran light [131] shows a small lens that could not be of the "2nd Order," as stated in the text.

Aside from a need for more careful research, the author has done a commendable job in showing a varied selection of the country's lighthouses. *Northern Lights* provides a sense of the importance of lights in Canada's maritime history, and Baird's photos are important in preserving the memory of many which are now gone.

Chris Mills
Ketch Harbour, Nova Scotia

Courtney Thompson. *Lighthouses of Atlantic Canada: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, A Pictorial Guide.* St. John, NB: Quebecor Atlantic, 2000. 128 pp photographs, maps, index, CDN $40, cloth; ISBN 0-9651786-8-4; CDN $30, paper; ISBN 0-9651786-7-6.

Although thinly populated, Atlantic Canada has some of the richest density of lighthouses in North America with over 360 surviving towers, including the continent's oldest surviving lighthouse on Sambro Island outside Halifax. The stated goal of Courtney Thompson's book is to offer a comprehensive pictorial guide to lighthouses in Atlantic Canada's four provinces. Thompson, an American, follows a formula developed with previous pictorial guides to American lighthouses. After a short historical introduction she provides colour photographs, snapshot histories, directions and location sketch maps for lights, grouped by province. She does not intend to include every lighthouse, but the 145 lights featured are representative, including almost all the large towers and many of the small harbour and range lights.

Thompson joins several other authors who have attempted to combine some history, coffee-table quality pictures and travel information for lighthouse tourists. Her book succeeds as a fine visual reference, although its text falls short of historical standards. Typical of recent pictorial guides, the historical introduction is rudimentary, certainly weaker than David Baird's 1999 book on Canadian lighthouses, *Northern Lights.* The text relies on uncited secondary sources and makes a few blunders, such as confusing the limestone " Imperial Lights" of the Great Lakes with lighthouse construction in Atlantic Canada.

The historical sketches of individual lighthouses are somewhat better, certainly an improvement on the many inaccurate profiles in another similar book, David Stephens's 1998 *Discover Nova Scotia Lighthouses.* Although there is little or no discussion of technology, builders or architecture, Thompson provides get a more detailed narrative, thanks in part to preservationists, such as the Nova Scotia Lighthouse Preservation Society, which provided research in exchange for promoting their work. But Thompson's research misses the dates of most late twentieth-century lights and makes errors in sites which hosted several generations of lighthouses, such as the mistaken claim the original 1851 Medway Head lighthouse survives near the present tower. The sketch maps are useful for tourists, although one would lead a traveller on a long drive in the wrong direction, locating the Partridge Island Light on the wrong side of Saint John harbour. It remains for someone to produce an authoritative history or at least a reliable historical reference for Canadian lighthouses, which unlike American lighthouses have never been given a historic inventory, such as the comprehensive study carried out by the US National Parks Service.

While the history is sketchy, the book's strength is the quality and scope of its photographs of lighthouse buildings — a huge number of sharp, high-quality colour photographs of almost all the major surviving lighthouses in Atlantic Canada. The photographs, taken by the author, along with former lightkeeper Chris Mills and Newfoundland preservationist Wanda Barrett, make the book a fine visual reference and outshine the photography in David Baird's volume. Seen collectively, it is clear that Atlantic Canada has a distinct lighthouse tradition. Unlike the round stonework lighthouses overwhelmingly found in the United States and Europe, Atlantic Canadians chose square and octagonal wooden towers, later evolving into octagonal concrete towers. Well suited to the resources and skills of the region, the elegant simplicity of these towers is a rugged triumph of form and function. But readers will get few clues as to the past look of these stations, since the book makes almost no use of historical images, concentrating instead on lighthouses which survive today. Those seeking beautiful scenery will be also be disappointed, as the focus of this book is the buildings themselves rather than their relation to the landscape. Harry Thurston and Wayne Barrett's 1993 book *Against Darkness and*

Thompson has digitally altered a fair number of photographs, and readers may notice the same suspiciously familiar puffy white clouds in different images. This fabrication, albeit trivial, unfortunately undermines the veracity of already fine photographs and leads one to wonder if the lighthouses themselves have been modified.

These are interesting times for publishing a visual record of so many lighthouses. The Canadian Coast Guard has neglected many historic lights and is seeking to dispose of many more, a move opposed by community groups seeking to keep lighthouses intact and public. One wonders how many lighthouses will survive for future editions of books such as this.

Dan Conlin
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Anthony Gary Brown. *Persons, Animals, Ships and Cannon in the Aubrey-Maturin Sea Novels of Patrick O'Brian.* Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland and Company, 1999 [Box 611, Jefferson, NC 28640, USA]. vii + 342 pp., bibliography. US $35, paper; ISBN 0-7864-0684-4.

A.E. Cunningham (ed.). *Patrick O'Brian: Critical Appreciations and a Bibliography*. Rev. ed.; Boston Spa, West Yorkshire: British Library, 1994, 1995. 175 pp., photo plates. *£15,* cloth; ISBN 0-7123-1070-3.

More than a year after his death, Patrick O'Brian still shows no signs of losing his position as the best loved writer of naval fiction. The "Gunroom," a web discussion group devoted to his works (www.hmssurprise.org), often clocks up more than 100 messages a day; the Smithsonian recently held a conference on his works that attracted over 150 delegates; and the Royal Naval Museum, in Portsmouth, England, has just announced it will be holding a "Patrick O'Brian Weekend" in the autumn, with a series of formal lectures and a dinner on board HMS *Victory*. Like Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes, O'Brian's heroes, Captain Jack Aubrey and Stephen Maturin, appear to have acquired historical lives of their own. The most bizarre example of this phenomenon is the way Steven Maffeo actually quotes passages from the novels as "evidence" in his recent book on naval intelligence, *Most Secret and Confidential* (London, 2000).

Why has O'Brian managed so far to outstrip his rivals in the field of naval fiction? These two books offer some interesting answers. In his short but insightful introduction to *Persons, Animals, Ships and Cannon,* Gary Brown writes that "O'Brian is also that rare thing, a genuine polymath (and that even rarer thing, a polymath with both an angelic pen and a sense of fun)." O'Brian possessed an encyclopaedic knowledge of all aspects life in the Napoleonic era, and it is this breadth and depth of knowledge that makes his fictional world both believable and endlessly fascinating.

It is so fascinating, indeed, that his readers always want to know more. It is to satisfy this quest that Gary Brown has created his dictionary – an ambitious listing, with accompanying notes, of all the characters and ships mentioned in the novels. He brings to the task an erudition that is a worthy match for O'Brian's; as a result, his book is one of those reference works that is genuinely difficult to put down, with one entry cross-referencing to another in an enthralling intellectual trail. Perhaps most interesting, Brown places fact alongside fiction, showing how O'Brian often intermingled the two – as seen, for example, in the entry on Captain Aubrey's favourite ship, the frigate HMS *Surprise,* which Brown shows in fact is an amalgam of two historical ships.

So, whether used as a companion to the novels or as a work of reference in its own right, this book is a most useful and enjoyable tool. Unpretentious and workmanlike in appearance, it has a clear, sharp typeface, paper covers and no illustrations. It also includes a useful annotated bibliography and a guide to the complex internal chronology of the novels.

Yet however distinguished his knowledge may have been of the wider aspects of late eighteenth-century life, it was for his knowledge of Nelson's Royal Navy that O'Brian was most admired. And that admiration came not

just from his readers but from the leading historians in his field, as A.E. Cunningham's *Critical Appreciations* demonstrates. Here are assembled some of the key names in modern naval scholarship, united in their admiration for a novelist. Nicholas Rodger contributes a chapter on "The Naval World ofJack Aubrey," Brian Lavery writes on "Jack Aubrey's Ships" and Richard Ollard offers a fascinating "Editor's Report" that analyses why the novels are so successful. The book also includes two short stories by O'Brian himself, "Samphire" (written in 1955) and "Simon" (1994); together with a terse, and rather grudging, essay on the writing of the novels (O'Brian was notoriously, and often ungraciously, protective of his privacy). Additionally, there are gushing tributes from two of his more famous admirers, William Waldegrave and Charlton Heston. More usefully, there is a comprehensive O'Brian bibliography and a collection of press notices that tellingly demonstrate how critics only appreciated very gradually what O'Brian was seeking to achieve. The book is handsomely produced, with a superb dust-jacket featuring one of the vivid Geoff Hunt paintings which have done so much to promote the novels in the bookshops.

Despite these riches, the book does not really hang together. Part "companion," part bibliography, part tribute, in the end it succeeds in being none of these. A useful companion would need maps, more illustrations to support the historical essays and, above all, a glossary of nautical terms – a tool for which O'Brian's non-maritime readers continually plead. To be a comprehensive bibliography, it really needs a list of key naval books, such as that supplied by Gary Brown. And as a tribute it fails because it is unfocussed – a quality quite alien to O'Brian. It is in any case out of date, since even this revised edition was published in 1995, when O'Brian had four full-length novels still to write.

Colin White
Portsmouth, UK

Pat Wastell Norris. *High Seas, High Risk: The Story of the Sudburys.* Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing, 1999. 245 pp., photographs, illustrations, index. CDN $28.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55017-208-5.

From 1955 to 1965, the heyday of deep-sea salvage on the Canadian west coast, the tugs *Sudbury* and *Sudbury Il* and Island Tug and Barge were virtually household words. Their exploits in a number of dramatic long-distance towing and salvage jobs, combined with some very good press coverage, ensured they were also well known to the world shipping community. Thirty years later they and their owner have been forgotten by all but a few old timers and enthusiasts.

This book is a largely chronological account of the two ships and their major salvage and towing projects. Intertwined is a biography of their owner, Harold Elworthy, a larger-than-life figure, without whom there would have been no story, and the succession of companies which lea up to (and followed) Island Tug. Pat Wastell Norris weaves first-hand accounts of participants and useful explanations of materials and methods into a readable, often dramatic, tale.

The author, who grew up on her father's towboat but is not a career seafarer, admits to having learned a lot from her sources, and the book is relatively free of "clangers." Her acknowledgments include a full two dozen former masters and mates, cooks and engineers, deckhands and dispatchers, who are quoted extensively. No published sources are acknowledged, and original company files apparently no longer exist.

By 1954 the numbers of surplus war-built ships going to Japan for scrap, combined with ill-found ships dropping their propellers and rudders in the Pacific, led Elworthy and his sons to make the leap from coastal towing to ocean towing and salvage, long the domain of the Dutch. They purchased the former corvette *Sudbury,* refitted it as a fully-equipped salvage vessel, and put it to work on long-distance towing.

*Sudbury's* first salvage job came in 1955, with the Greek *Makedonia,* 3000 miles out in

the Pacific with a loose propellor. The successful salvage of this Liberty ship in hideous conditions was a gamble which paid off. The author explains the significance of the *Lloyd's Open Form,* "No Cure, No Pay" contract, under which the salvor receives no compensation unless the salvage is completed successfully. Long-distance tows are usually contracted by lump sum or daily rates. Salvaging ships at sea, usually in dangerous conditions, is a high-risk, win-or-lose business. The evolution of that business to today's tendency to place the environment ahead of ship or cargo is nicely contrasted. The men who ran the tug, and its fleet mate *Sudbury II,* a purpose-built salvage vessel, used ingenuity, native wit and pure determination to learn the salvage and towing business. The author's admiration for these men and their exploits is well placed, and she generally leaves it to them to describe their experiences without unnecessary embroidery. Some quotations and some incidents do not ring completely true, but as with good wine, oft-told tales are known to improve with age.

While not a technical volume it does provide good descriptions of the equipment and methods used, as well as conditions aboard ship in hurricanes and other trying occasions. The ups and downs of the business side, and the evolution of the west coast towing industry, also form a background to this story. These exploits are well and clearly told.

While for some there may be insufficient detail of the history of specific ships, this is compensated for by the richness of descriptions by those on the scene. A few errors are inescapable: Smit and Wijsmuller did not amalgamate in the 1970s (they formed a joint venture in the 1990s to operate some tugs); the statement that "an abandoned ship is available to all" should have been clarified; and the bay in Venezuela is Amuay, not Amway.

H.B. Elworthy's chief skill was as a leader and inspirer of men. It is really hearing these men telling their stories with precision, and often modesty, that is the real reward of this book.

M.B. MacKay
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Greg Dombowsky. *Diver 's Guide: Vancouver Island South.* Surrey, BC: Heritage House, 1999. 144 pp., photographs, maps, figures CDN $14.95, paper; ISBN 1-895811-88-0.

This is the first in a planned series of practical regional guides to the premiere dive sites in British Columbia. This guide covers fifty-three sites in the southern Vancouver Island area, from the Race Rocks past Victoria and along the Saanich Peninsula to Maple Bay. Most diving areas have few detailed dive guides covering where to dive, what to see, and how to get there. The internet is filling this information gap, but guidebooks remain the key source of information for the local or tourist diver. Greg Dombowsky's is only the fourth guide covering BC dive sites. More are needed, and Dombowsky hopes to fill this gap over the next few years.

The *Guide* is broken down into five sections, with dives listed under "Shore Dives," " Boat Dives" and "Other Sites" covering the fifty-three dive sites. Each is described by attractions, land directions, diving instructions and currents, and is accompanied by a very useful hand-drawn map showing depths, site features, and hazards. Most guides lack this feature and rely on coast guard maps that do not have sufficient underwater detail for divers.

The introduction describes the key marine life of interest to divers in plain language and hand-drawn silhouettes. BC's marine life, especially the invertebrates and large mammals, are world renowned. Future guides in this series would benefit from a more complete marine life review, including a crisper introduction, better images, and a short list of marine life at each site.

The author does not label sites by difficulty on the basis that "any site can become more than a beginner diver can handle." This is a unique approach. Most dive guides rate sites and then describe the specific safety issues which can change the rating. The introduction covers the key safety issues such as currents, kelp and visibility, providing helpful hints for beginning and advanced divers. A major safety omission is the lack of information on emergency contacts, such as the Coast Guard and

RCMP. Also lacking is information on hyperbaric facilities and site-specific data, such as the nearest phone.

The book lists boat launches and dive stores in the region, but directs readers to the author's website rather than listing diving groups (clubs or societies) and other services ( charters, certification agencies and equipment manufacturers). A website is ideal to provide up-to-date contact information on the regularly-changing landscape of diving groups and services. Most divers currently rely on books and not websites in the field, and tourists will rarely have access to websites. Hence, it is strongly recommended that future guides in this series carry contact information (address, phone, fax and e-mail) for at least the key groups, such as the Underwater Council of BC, Underwater Archaeological Society of BC, the Artificial Reef Society of BC, and the charters and certification agencies in each study area.

The author favours eco-friendly dive practices, spear-fishing restraint and no artifact removal — all of which are in vogue with most divers. He errs, though, in stating that "any wreck sunk for over three years in British Columbia waters is protected by law." Wrecks which have been sunk for two years or more are now automatically protected. Nothing can be removed without a provincial permit.

This guide is a welcome informational source on diving in BC waters. I look forward to the next volumes in the series, especially if they are enhanced with the recommended additional information.

Tom Beasley
Vancouver, BC

Edward J. Marolda. *The Washington Navy Yard: An Illustrated History*. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1999. xiv + 112 pp., illustrations and photographs (black and white, colour), notes, bibliography, index. US $17.00, paper; ISBN 0-945274-41-6. Order by GPO Stock Number 008-046-00191-0.

To commemorate the bicentennial of the installation, the author has written a book that highlights the "importance of the Washington Navy Yard and its employees to the nation, the Navy and the District of Columbia." [xi] Using mainly published sources, Edward J. Marolda, the senior historian of the Naval Historical Center, presents the major activities of the yard, some of its workers and its important visitors. Interspersed with the main narrative are two-page essays by other historians associated with the Center on special aspects of the story. Such topics as the oldest buildings, John A. Dahlgren, black workers, the early days of naval aviation, presidential yachts, the Navy Museum, and the yard's historic ordnance collection provide additional information on subjects related to the main story. A well-chosen selection of photographs enhance the value of the work.

While the book is not intended to replace Taylor Peck's sesquicentennial volume, *Round Shot to Rockets* (Annapolis, 1949) in its coverage of the earlier decades of the yard, Marolda has brought together some interesting material on events of the last fifty years. A little-known fact is that for a number of years the gun factory at the yard maintained the subway system of the US Senate, for which it built cars in 1912. When the production of ordnance ended in 1961, half the buildings and land that made up the yard were transferred to the federal government's General Services Administration. That same year the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, used the old breech mechanism shop to start what later became known as the Navy Museum. Subsequently, the Combat Art Gallery (now the Navy Art Gallery) was established. The Naval History Division was moved to the yard in 1971 and renamed the Naval Historical Center. Two years later the Joint Committees on Landmarks of the US Congress designated the yard as a Historic District. In 1978, the yard's historic Tingey House became the official residence of the Chief of Naval Operations. As the twentieth century drew to a close, and real estate became increasingly expensive, the Navy Department began consolidating its Washington-area commands and activities at the Washington Navy Yard. Old buildings were reconditioned for new occupants, and the

tempo of daily activities increased. The future looked bright for this old historic site.

The author has achieved his goal of providing a brief and introductory account of the history of the Washington Navy Yard and its influence on the nation, the navy and the city.

Harold D. Langley
Arlington, Virginia

Börje Karlsson, *et al. (eds.). Sjöhistorisk Årsskrift För Aland. Vol. 11: 1998-99.* Mariehamn: Ålands Sjöfarsmuseum, 1999. 173 pp., photographs, illustrations, maps, English summaries. FIM 100 (plus FIM 40, postage and handling; payment by cheque preferred), paper; ISSN 0788-799X, ISBN 952-91-1483-4.

The *Sjöhistorisk Årsskrift for Aland* has a deserved reputation for its knowledgeable and well-researched essays covering a wide range of topics in the field of maritime history. This number is no exception, and I feel that two of the contributions should be of particular interest to both the specialist and the general reader.

*Viking* was a four-masted barque launched in 1906 and, although originally built as a training ship for the Danish Merchant Marine, would in fact spend its entire working life trading between far-flung ports with a variety of cargoes. The author, a former master mariner, had himself sailed on the vessel in 1946; in this article he gives an account of its fortunes. *Viking* sailed throughout the Great War of 1914-1918 and at various periods during the 1920s before being sold to the celebrated Gustaf Ericksson of Mariehamn, after which it was employed in the grain trade until the outbreak of war in 1939. After the war it was eventually sold and converted into a seaman's school, but it is now an hotel and restaurant in Gothenburg, Sweden.

The second article is a selection of correspondence between a young seaman, Sigvard Enros, and his sister during the 1920s. In 1925 he signed on as a carpenter on Gustav Erickson's barque *Hougomont,* but two years later decided to try his luck in Australia. Unfortunately, he was killed in a motorbike accident two years later at the age of twenty-four.

Both these articles paint a poignant, but definitely unromantic, picture of life on board the old full-riggers during the middle years of the last century and are keeping with the stimulating writing the reader has come to expect from this publication.

Peter von Busch
Karlskrona, Sweden

Joseph D. Parker. *On the Waterfront.* Bishop Auckland, Durham: Pentland Press, 2000. xiv + 272 pp., photographs. £15.75, paper; ISBN 1-85821-737-7.

Today is Easter Sunday, a day which seemed appropriate to write a review of this interesting if idiosyncratic book by a pious man who has devoted a significant portion of his adult life to working for the Missions to Seamen. Not quite autobiographical, this is an episodic, anecdotal and discursive volume that in the end tells us a good deal about a decent man but perhaps not as much as we would like about the work in which he was engaged.

Joe Parker has certainly had an interesting life. Born in Ireland in 1928 and brought up as an Anglican, he pursued a career in business before deciding to become first a lay worker and then a fully-ordained priest with the Missions to Seamen. After his ordination, he became Senior Chaplain to the Mission in Belfast. But on 21 July 1972 his entire world was thrown into chaos when his fourteen-year-old son, Stephen, tragically lost his life to a car bomb planted by the Irish Republican Army. This crushing reminder that the "troubles" in Northern Ireland spared no man finally led him after eleven years to request a transfer. He was soon sent to Vancouver, and for the final eighteen years of his active career he served seamen in British Columbia, which is the setting for the second half of his book.

Through the good times and the bad, Joe Parker comes across as a human being on a mission. The pun is deliberate. For Parker serving seamen was not merely the experience

of bringing practical services to a class of people too often ignored by society but a calling in the trust sense of the word. Working with seamen was not simply what he wanted to do but rather was something he *had* to do. It is also abundantly clear from this book that he was very good at helping his clientele. He treated seamen as genuine people with their own sets of ideas and religious beliefs, and managed to avoid the sanctimony too often associated with this type of work.

But if Parker comes across as the type of person with whom you would be privileged to spend some time, this does not mean that he has produced an exceptional book. Indeed, the volume is flawed in some fundamental ways. The anecdotal approach leads him to skip from topic to topic with little apparent reason. Sermons and letters are interspersed throughout, often to the detriment of any narrative development. And since he seldom grounds events in time, this is especially frustrating for an historian. Moreover, there is little context, and the little bit of "history" that he includes does little to rectify this problem.

Still, if the reader is prepared to work at it and to provide many of the connections that the author ignores, a picture of life in the Missions does come through, as do the characters of at least a few of the thousands of seamen to whom the Reverend Parker ministered over the years. If read as a companion to Roald Kverrndal's encyclopedic *Seamen 's Missions: Their Origin and Early Growth, A Contribution to the History of the Church Maritime* ( Pasadena, CA, 1986), the book has its uses, especially for the contemporary period. While I would have been happier if the book had been as good as Michael Hadley's minor classic, *God's Little Ships: A History of the Columbia Coast Mission* (Madeira Park, BC, 1995), *On the Waterfront* makes a contribution to our understanding of the important work of the Missions to Seamen in the modern age.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland

David Phillipson. *Roll on the Rodney! Life on the Lower Deck of Royal Navy Warships After the Second World War*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1999. 160 pp., illustrations, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. £16.99, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-1968-X.

The sub-title immediately establishes the unique territory surveyed by this slim but substantial volume. Good quality memoirs of life in the Silent Service are few enough, and those tend to focus upon wartime experiences, invariably from the "officer" perspective of the wardroom. Here finally is a thoughtful appraisal from the lower deck (that is, the non-commissioned ranks) that begins with the end of the Second World War.

The author speaks with some authority, having been conscripted into the Royal Navy for his national service. He subsequently re-enlisted, serving eleven years before transferring to the Customs and Excise service, from which he retired in 1987. Although it is never clearly stated, it appears that the author's tour in the RN spanned the years 1946-1957. Indeed, this is not memoir in the purest sense, for Phillipson's reminiscences are interspersed with anecdotes canvassed from others, although these are organized and informed by his own experience. In another departure from the conventional memoir, the discussion is thematic rather than chronological.

The focus primarily is on life in "big" ships (aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers), but a conscious effort has been made to include destroyers, frigates and shore establishments. As such, this book has something for everyone, with a number of chapters dedicated to the physical living conditions of broadside messdecks with slung hammocks and canteen messing (that is, self-cooked meals), the routines of cleaning ship and liberty (shore leave), and discipline and training. A less satisfying chapter looks at relations with officers. There is also a too-brief survey of peacetime operations, including the China and Haifa patrols. A glossary of lower-deck terms and expressions is not only instructive but entertaining. Overall, it is a comprehensive and educational introduction to peacetime naval life. And the close links

maintained throughout this period between the Royal Navy and its Commonwealth partners ( especially Canada and Australia) make it broadly representative of them as well.

Still, the juxtaposition of the various anecdotes is not always smooth. Moreover, the final image remains almost a cliché: a numbing existence of hopeless overcrowding, disease and senseless discipline through which irrepressible "Jolly Jack Tar" keeps his sense of humour. The author makes much of the RN's recruiting and retention problems, but evidently he and the many others who re-enlisted could not have been all that dissatisfied. Was the feeling of camaraderie in itself enough to relieve the other ills? This reviewer, admittedly from the biassed perspective of a serving officer in a Commonwealth navy, and from a later generation, finds the pat excuses of wardroom indifference and Admiralty conservatism a little too easy. Could it be that many of the problems were reflections of postwar British ( and Canadian and Australian) society in general, and that naval service still was better than the alternative of factory life?

One is left, then, with the question, just how representative is this book? This is not meant as criticism of the book Phillipson has written but rather points to the one he did not write. This reviewer is inclined to take *Roll on the Rodney!* at face value and to accept that the author has exercised balance in selecting and presenting his evidence. But until a rigorous scholarly analysis setting naval life in a wider context is undertaken, we will not know. And that will require more works such as this to point the way. Keep them coming!

Richard H. Gimblett
Blackburn Hamlet, Ontario

Josette Dermody Wingo. *Mother Was a Gunner's Mate: World War Two in the Waves.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. viii + 234 pp., photographs. US $15.95, paper; ISBN 1-55750-960-3.

This autobiography probably fits the term "tour de force." In gusto and vivid language it is about force eight on the Beaufort scale. And its striking form means that it takes time to read the sober and salutary stories in between the deceptively naive and jolly lines. Such effort is richly rewarded.

There have been disproportionately few naval autobiographies by women from World War 11, although their oral testimony is starting to emerge on the US Navy website. And unlike veteran WRENS, WAVES have many websites and social groupings where life stories are told by veterans in brief anecdotal form. This autobiography, therefore, is an important publication by the Naval Institute Press, which also (and impressively) published that seminal text on women at sea, Suzanne J. Stark's *Female Tars: Women aboard Ship in the Age of Sail* (Annapolis, 1996).

Josette Dermody Wingo (born 1924) joined the US Navy Women's Reserve (WAVES) in 1944, did basic training at Hunter College and gunnery school at Great Lakes, before finally becoming a gunnery instructor at Treasury Island, California. After the war she took degrees in philosophy and education, became a mother and teacher and now works with homeless families in Santa Monica.

This jaunty book shows us just two very important years in her life yet provides a group portrait of the WAVES, for it details context and climate remarkably effectively. It does not interrogate the gendered situations the women faced but rather evokes them so that today's readers can see how (oddly) natural it then felt *not to* be in combat, to routinely accept the order to pose glamorously in a Mainbocher designer uniform on a slippy torpedo in a parade, and so on. That is, the book illustrates lived behaviour rather than exploring the hegemonic constructions of naval life at that time. It is evidence from the field that can allow for subsequent theoretical investigation.

The author is (and was) astute about the gender issues that structured that world. For example, Joe, one of her gunnery instructors, yelled at her classmates: "'Crazy Broads anyway. No man for a job, teaching dumb stupid broads. Nothing but bitches and lezzies."' Rather than responding defensively,

edged *his* underlying problem when she murmured astutely, "Can we help it if you can't get sea duty?" [61] And, of course, that is one of the roots of the tension: many men like Joe felt demasculinized by being confined to land, to non-combatant status and to working with women. There is a simple fundamental binary equation: masculine/sea versus feminine/land.

Women in the navy had to conform to particular behavioural norms – no sex, no swearing, etc. Referring to the 1942 decision to allow US women to serve in the navy, Dermody says the admirals acceded to this initiative by Eleanor Roosevelt but "exacted the proviso that all Navy women would be *ladies.* Naturally, what did they expect." [97] It is at moments like this that more penetrating analysis and less easy anecdote would have been welcome. What was meant by "lady" and why did this need exist, given that there was no parallel interest in recruiting "gentlemen?" How did women handle these constraints?

The author illuminates many instances of tension around that complex and enduring issue of women's allotted place at sea. For example, she quickly learned that "every sailor we know has a buddy who has been laid up next to a Russian ship that's been held up for the captain's lying in. It's one of those stories like Lorelei and mermaids that [male] sailors tell over and over. Always it's the buddy.... never the guy who's telling the story." [103] And Dermody highlighted the changing gendered expectations about sexual activity on maritime borders when she reported a telling song the new WAVES sang during basic training. "Don't make my girl a sailor, the weeping mother said...She's always been a home girl, she's never been to sea. A man in every port is not the life she learned from me." [27]

But what these women learned – from each other and the situation, not from weeping mums – was that their war contribution was not easily made but fraught with gendered notions that were sometimes hostile and unwelcoming. They developed ways to handle a situation in which women were structurally unequal by maintaining pride and by invoking a range of defensive strategies. Interestingly, none of Dermody's gang ended up with naval husbands, but five of six did marry. None had seafaring careers after the war.

Jo Stanley
Gauxholme, UK

Mervyn Spencer Doe. *A Rough Passage.* Bishop Auckland, Durham: Pentland Press, 1999. 199 pp., illustrations, £16.00, cloth; ISBN 1-85821-728-8.

This unusual book is the autobiography of a former Royal Navy seaman cook and subsequent Fleet Air Arm air mechanic written after his recovery from a stroke at the age of sixty-eight. The first half is taken up with the account of the author's unhappy childhood in a British orphan's home. Most of the remainder covers his time as a regular in the Royal Navy between 1937 and 1946. His life after his demobilisation is covered in a few pages as a conclusion.

Read strictly as the account of a life this is a lightweight work. There is little of literary merit, and the material touching on the bulk of Doe's service in the Royal Navy is by no means unique. But read as a social commentary on England between the wars, and the straits faced by those who had suffered loss and dislocation, this is a more poignant tale. It is complete with candid admissions of the behaviour to which "respectable" people resorted and the limited horizons available to those who came of age in poorer families during the 1930s. In fact, some of its revelations about the way in which homes for orphaned or abandoned children were administered are mirrored in the same kind of admissions with which we in Canada have become all too familiar in recent years.

The treatment of the training of new recruits by a Royal Navy gearing up for war is also noteworthy, especially seen from the bottom up, as Doe did. His full year of training is well covered, as is description of life as a cook on board his first ship, HMS *Cumberland.*

The primary historical value of the book is reflected in Doe's first-hand accounts of the role of HMS *Cumberland* in the pursuit of Graf Spee in December 1939 in the South Atlantic and the ship's subsequent participation in the ill-fated incursion at Dakar in September 1940, when *Cumberland* was hit by gunfire from the French battleship *Richelieu.* His subsequent service was impacted by an attack of meningitis, which ultimately enabled him to take advantage of the need for ratings in the Fleet Air Arm. He was slated to go to East Asia on HMS *Colossus* when the Pacific War ended. He obtained his release shortly thereafter.

Though not to belittle the effort of someone recovering from the debilitating effects of a stroke, this book likely has more value in the therapeutic benefits it provided its author and his family than for either the professional or amateur student of naval history. It is hard to recommend it at its full price, though it would be worth acquiring for its glimpse into the Royal Navy of the late 1930s if a copy were found on a remainder table.

Christopher Terry
Ottawa, Ontario

R.L. Boudreau. *The Man Who Loved Schooners.* Halifax, NS: Nimbus Publishing Ltd., 2000 v + 170 pp., photographs. CDN $17.95, paper; ISBN 1-55109-319-7.

A biography written as an autobiography is unusual. Captain Robert Lewis Boudreau has chronicled, in a most convincing manner, *The Man Who Loved Schooners* as if it were the work of his later father, Captain Walter Boudreau. The result is an exciting account of a life at sea with lifesaving, shipwrecks, sinking by a U-boat and even an encounter with drug pirates. The pleasures and difficulties of schooner chartering are described factually with humour and excellent photographs.

Captain Walter was born in 1916 from a long line of sea captains. As a youth he sailed and maintained the family sloop in demanding Nova Scotian waters. When the Second World War broke out he was attending university. In May 1942 he graduated with a BA and signed on as a seaman in *Angelus,* an old square-rigged barquentine out of Louisbourg bound for Barbados with a cargo of lumber. Just before *Angelus* got underway, a USN vessel bound for St. John's became top heavy with ice and stranded on a reef off the harbour. With no heat or hot food, and in the freezing cold, aid was required. Volunteers from *Angelus* manned two dories and began the rescue. Assisted by local fishermen, twenty-six crewmen were rescued. As this review is being written, the United States Coast Guard corrected a fifty-eight-year-old oversight and awarded a Silver Lifesaving Medal to the only surviving member of the rescue team.

*Angelus* sailed for Barbados and arrived without incident, discharged its cargo and loaded barrels of rum and molasses for Canada. North of Bermuda, it encountered a German submarine, *U-415. Angelus* hove to and lowered its lifeboat. The captain of the submarine gave their latitude and longitude and ordered them clear of their ship, which was then sunk by gunfire. Ten men in a small boat were left to the merciless North Atlantic in early May. Steering west for four days they encountered a storm with snow squalls and then drifted hopelessly for days. The men were freezing and dying one by one. Finally, an American destroyer escort rescued the only two left alive and landed them in Portland, Maine. Almost unbelievably, in 1967 in Morehead City, North Carolina, Captain Boudreau met the German submarine captain, who had been sailing alone in a forty-foot sloop flying the German flag. Records indicate that *U-415* was sunk on 14 July 1944.

In 1943, after recuperating from this ghastly ordeal, Walter Boudreau undaunted again went to Louisbourg, where he signed-on to the three-masted schooner *City of New York* with a cargo of nails and lumber bound again for Barbados. When it returned to Canada with a cargo of salt from the Bahamas, his intention was confirmed to follow a life afloat. With a loan from his father, Walter bought his own schooner. Since he did not have his command qualification, he hired a captain and served as mate. They carried general cargoes (plus some

rum) to Cape Breton, Prince Edward Island, St. Pierre, Newfoundland, Labrador, Yarmouth, Boston and New York. On their last passage to Labrador, in a heavy gale their vessel ran aground and became a total loss. This was another epic, and the desperate crew finally was rescued by another schooner.

The war ended and Walter's next venture was in an old minesweeper employed in trading fish between Yarmouth and Boston. This proved unprofitable, so it was decided to take up sealing using a spotter aircraft. The aircraft crashed on the ice and sank – another total loss. Boudreau sold his share in this enterprise.

In 1949 he passed his Master's exam, went to Camden, Maine and bought a Yankee pilot schooner. Sixteen passengers could be accommodated for charter cruises on the Bras d'Or lakes. At this point he met and married his wife, his partner for fifty years. As the charter season in Bras d'Or was too short, it was decided to move the business to the Caribbean.

In 1952 Captain Boudreau moved south and advertised winter cruises in the Caribbean. With the charter-cruising business established, the Boudreau family settled in St. Lucia, where they also built a hotel. From then on a steady succession of charter schooners followed, interspersed with all the wrecks, disasters and successes that can be imagined. The most vivid experience came off the Bahamas when drug pirates tried to capture his vessel and to murder him and the crew. The vivid descriptions of hurricanes, rogue waves, the Gulf Stream, people and places, bring all the triumphs and disasters to life. Captain Robert Boudreau is to be congratulated on this appreciation of the life and times of a remarkable gentleman, his father, Captain Walter Boudreau.

Latham B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia

Richard Hough. *Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century*. London: Constable, 1999. xiii + 253 pp., photo plates, maps select bibliography, index, £18.99, cloth; ISBN 0-09-479910-5.

Richard Hough is known to many readers as a naval historian and gifted writer, two traits that combine seamlessly in his latest book, a little primer on *Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century*. In just under 300 narrow pages (with generous type and wide margins) Hough recounts the major details of thirteen naval battles between Tsushima in 1905 and the Philippines Sea in 1944. The pace is fast, the writing smooth and the final result is (even for someone knowledgeable in the field) an entertaining and informative evening's read. For the general public, which is clearly the target readership, *Naval Battles* provides a fine introduction to the nature and course of major actions by the last great battle fleets of the industrial age.

That said, it is clear from the misleading title, selection of battles, illustrations chosen and lack of references that this book was written quickly and designed to sell. It plays to Hough's strengths as an historian: all but four of the thirteen battles are British, or largely so, and the descriptions are built on the author's earlier research. Fair enough. The Pacific War from 1941 to 1945 is given much less coverage, although the balance between carrier battles and surface actions in the war against Japan is about right. Understandably, given Hough's interests (major battles between capital ships) the book ends in 1944 with the Battle of the Philippines Sea. This leaves the last fifty-five years of the twentieth century untouched. In fairness, there were not many naval battles – narrowly defined – in the last half of the twentieth century. But warships were sunk in battle with other ships between 1944 and 1999, some of them British, although admittedly they were sent to the bottom increasingly by torpedoes and missiles, not Hough's forte, by his own admission. All of this is by way of saying that the title promises more than the book delivers. One suspects that the publisher is at fault here for mis-titling the book, which could be properly described as "Naval Battles of the Early 20th Century."

*Naval Battles* is also largely bereft of " academic encumbrances" such as references to quotes or facts, and Hough makes no pretense at having mastered modern scholarship on the subject. Each chapter has its own very dated list of secondary sources, buttressed by

the stalwart *Oxford Companion to the Second World War* (1995) and references to conversations Hough has had with officers and historians over the years. The book has thirteen photos, but they do not attempt to cover the thirteen battles of the book. Rather, it is an odd collection of illustrations, chosen (one suspects given the current practice of British publishers) because they could be printed without paying for publication rights.

But it is churlish for a reviewer to nitpick at a mass-market book on a popular subject like "battles" by an historian with a facility at writing and a publisher intent on sales. *Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century* is an unpretentious and well-written primer on some of the major battles of the last industrial age fleets. Novices could do much worse.

Marc Milner
Fredericton, New Brunswick

Brian Tennyson and Roger Sarty. *Guardian of the Gulf Sydney, Cape Breton and the Atlantic Wars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. x + 495 pp., maps, notes, photographs, bibliography, index. CDN $45.00, £25.00, cloth; ISBN 0-8020-4492-1.

The authors have undertaken a monumental, and successful, task in the research on which this volume is based. The first of the thirteen numbered chapters treats Sydney's role as an "Outpost of Empire" from the close of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth. The un-paginated epilogue deals with the closing of the last military facilities there in 1991. Of the balance of the book, three chapters cover the remainder of the 1800s, three take in World War I, one concerns the period between the two World Wars, and the concluding six encompass the period from 1939 to 1945. The archival investigation for such a study was of necessity extensive, and the text is supported by copious endnotes. Primary sources for official records and ephemera range from the Beaton Institute at the University College of Cape Breton to national repositories in both Ottawa and Washington.

A few charts and maps are interspersed throughout the text, and there is a small section of glossy photographic illustrations. As might be expected, most of these photographs deal with subjects pertinent to the 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 wars. It seems a pity that there are not more sketches and photographic representations of earlier periods, but the background for the book is so well covered that one must assume there were none available.

The massive bibliography is organized not only by books and articles but also by the above-mentioned "primary sources," which comprise correspondence, diaries, private papers and other ephemera. Beyond the two and one-half pages of primary sources, the seven and one-half pages of books, and the four and one-half pages of articles, there are unpublished works and personal interviews. Another appendix lists illustration credits, and there is an index, although it is not entirely effective for locating specific data. As an example, I attempted to re-check on the code letters used to identify convoys between Sydney and the iron-mining town of Wabana on Bell Island, Newfoundland. The codes, without identification, were listed under "convoys," and "Wabana" and "Bell Island" were listed separately. There was no cross-referencing system within the index. In the end, I located the code in question by going through first the "Wabana" and then the "Bell Island" references one by one and, finally, leafing through the pages between them when I got to the appropriate time period.

There seems as well to be some discrepancy in deciding toward what readership the book should be aimed. In the earlier sections, there are quotes from historical documents framed in archaic, but perfectly acceptable, English. These are interspersed throughout with what seemed to me totally unnecessary explanatory addenda in square brackets. If one expects academics and historians to read this book, such additions are not required; the occasional [sic] is sufficient. If, on the other hand, the book is aimed at a more popular audience, this practice can be confusing and a simple paraphrase might have been preferable. In short, I did not find the book easy to read.

from either aspect.

The hardback volume is well and sturdily constructed. Despite its length (over 350 pages without the appendices) it is firmly, but flexibly bound, and the paper jacket is attractively designed, bearing reproductions of paintings front and rear, as well as a convoy assembly photograph in black and white.

As a reference volume, especially for data regarding North Atlantic convoy escorts during both world wars, this work is an essential supplement to the library of any interested maritime scholar. Certain events of particularly local significance, such as the sinking of the Newfoundland ferry *Caribou* and the escort HMCS *Shawinigan,* are treated in depth with meticulous detail. There is, however, a great lack of ease in the overall presentation. It is a straightforward chronological progression of facts and little else. On only two occasions did any lightness enter the text. The first instance involves a quotes from a Cape Breton newspaper describing attendance at a post-victory celebration at the end of World War I: "everybody and his wife and a lot of others with other people's wives." The second, the opening quote of chapter thirteen, appears mildly amusing until further reading discloses that local victory celebrations after World War II sadly culminated in riots, vandalism, and looting.

In short, while I was impressed with the research that produced this volume, and although I will find it an invaluable reference resource, I regret that this is not a book that I will wish to re-read on a regular basis, as are some others on parallel topics.

Morgiana P. Halley
Suffolk, Virginia

Hellmuth von Mücke. (J.H. Klein, Jr. trans.). *The Emden-Ayesha Adventure: German Raiders in the South Seas and Beyond, 1914.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xxviii + 189 pp., maps, photographs, tables, US $34.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-873-9.

This "Classics of Naval Literature" edition, translated by an American naval officer shortly after its publication in Germany during the First World War, was initially serialized in the US Naval Institute *Proceedings* in 1916 and 1917. This edition, with a well-written and informative introduction by Terrell D. Gottschall, brings this epic tale back into public view with all the exciting detail that made it a hit in the first place. *Kapitanleutnant* (Lieutenant Commander) Hellmuth von Mücke's story of his ten-month adventure in the South Seas, first aboard the German raider *Emden* and then on the captured three-masted schooner *Ayesha,* is reminiscent of the epic voyages of Odysseus or Bligh. The challenges were in many ways comparable, as was the compelling desire by von Mücke and his crew to return home safely after a long and dangerous journey.

Von Mücke's account is set against the backdrop of German naval action in the South Seas during the early months of the First World War. *Emden,* on which Mücke served as Executive Officer, separated from Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee's East Asia Squadron on the outbreak of war and operated independently with great success against Allied shipping in the waters of the Pacific and Indian oceans until sunk by an Australian ship in November 1914. At the time von Mücke was in charge of a small landing party that had seized and destroyed a British radio and cable station on a remote island in the Indian Ocean. To avoid capture von Mücke put his men on board the leaky weather-beaten *Aleysha* and set sail across the western Pacific for Turkish-controlled Arabia. It was a daunting undertaking that included battling storms in the Indian Ocean, narrow scrapes with Allied blockaders and hostile dealings with the Bedouins of Arabia. That von Mücke succeeded in reaching Constantinople after seven gruelling months is testimony to the man's remarkable capabilities as a commander and of the tenacity of his fifty-man crew.

Over half the book deals with the adventures of *Emden* in its lengthy trek across the waters of Southeast Asia in search of enemy targets and wartime prizes. The war at sea, at least in the beginning, was governed by civilized rules of behaviour. Commander Karl von Muller, commanding officer of *Emden,* devel-

oped a remarkable reputation for fairness and civility in all his dealings with captured ships and their crews. The latter were usually permitted to seek refuge in friendly or neutral ports. Loss of life was therefore minimal. This gentler kind of warfare stands out in sharp contrast to the latter phases, when desperation drove both sides to abandon any pretense of gentlemanly behaviour.

The Naval Institute Press has made a wise choice in deciding to publish this new edition of a classic work. It will be welcomed not only by the general reader but also by those with a particular interest in the war at sea. Von Mücke's compelling account brings alive an important chapter in the naval history of the war and will not disappoint. It will also complement much recent work on individual experiences in the war, either memoirs or diaries, which has developed into an important field within World War I history. Von Mücke's account is an important addition to that genre.

David R. Facey-Crowther
St. John's, Newfoundland

Sir Martin Gilbert (intro.). *The Straits of War: Gallipoli Remembered.* The Gallipoli Memorial Lectures, 1985-2000. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2000. xxiv + 224 pp., maps, plates, index. £20.00, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-2408-X.

The sixteen lectures brought together here by Martin Gilbert are by very diverse hands. A chapter by Archbishop Robert Runcie, for example, rubs shoulders with others by a former Master General of the Ordnance (Hugh Beach), a former Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord (Julian Oswald), a British Prime Minister (Ted Heath), two holders of the Chichele Chair of the History of War at Oxford University (Robert O'Neill and Michael Howard) and a former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Osman Olcay). The lectures were inaugurated in 1985, the seventieth anniversary of the campaign, and continued annually until 2000. They were given at Holy Trinity Church, Eltham, in south London, where a Gallipoli memorial chapel was established in 1917 and where an annual memorial service was held every year until 1984. The lectures formed part of the continued memorialization of the campaign.

As such, several lecturers took the opportunity to use their talk as a peg upon which to hang their own contemporary concerns. Dismissing Gallipoli in his opening paragraphs, Edward Heath used the occasion to argue that European integration was the best way to secure future peace in Europe. John Grigg preferred to ponder which of the two world wars was fought by the British in a more idealistic spirit. On a more mundane level, several lecturers concluded that soldiers who fought as junior officers at Gallipoli and subsequently rose to high command after 1939 had learned some painful lessons from the misconduct of their erstwhile superiors. That the higher direction of the campaign suffered from divided council and the lack of a single directing body is well-known and is repeated at some length by a number of lecturers. But Hugh Beach, speaking in the aftermath of the Falklands' campaign, wondered if even in the 1980s the British had really mastered the command-andcontrol problems of amphibious operations.

The greatest disappointment in reading these lectures is the willingness of most of the speakers to repeat uncritically the conventional wisdom. Archbishop Runcie asserted that had the fleet broken through to Constantinople, where much of the Turkish armament industry was situated, Turkey would have surrendered, and Germany would have been dealt a decisive blow. But what would have been the nature of this blow? Germany's *drang nach dem osten* through the Ottoman Empire would have been blocked, but it is doubtful if that by itself would have persuaded them to stop fighting and negotiate a peace acceptable to the Entente powers. Germany still possessed some powerful bargaining chips in the shape of Belgium and northern France which it was unwilling to surrender. How much did Churchill really learn from Gallipoli about the need for the utmost care in preparing for coming operations? Rob-

Operations Directorate in 1940. But it is also fair to point out that Gallipoli did not prevent him from rushing into the Norwegian fiasco in 1940 or the equally ill-considered campaign in the Dodecanese in 1943. Only occasionally were lecturers willing to take a more critical stance. In the penultimate lecture, delivered in 1999, Julian Oswald challenged the oft-repeated assertion that had the allies broken through, Britain would have been able to pour supplies into Russia and thereby save the Tsarist empire from the military catastrophes it suffered in 1915-1916 and the revolution that engulfed it in 1917. But in 1915 the British could not even supply their own armies, never mind provide for the needs of the Russians.

As Martin Gilbert admits in the introduction to this book, the Gallipoli campaign is one of the most intensively studied episodes of the First World War. Distinguished as many of the individual lecturers were, this collection adds little to what we already know about the conduct of the campaign or its wider significance.

David French
London, UK

Peter G. Cooksley. *The RFC/RNAS Handbook, 1914-1918.* Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2000. viii + 208 pp., photographs ( 200 black and white), diagrams, bibliography, index, tables. £19.99, hardback; ISBN 0-7509-2169-2.

Historical coverage of the First World War's aviation services has been patchy. For many years, popular perception of the air war between 1914 and 1918 held that it was dominated by fighter-to-fighter combat, carried out on the British side by a mixture of dashing aristocrats, callow ex-public schoolboys and wild, undisciplined yet phenomenally talented and courageous "colonials," mainly from Canada. While there is some degree of truth to these assertions, more recent historical research has presented a far more complex picture, suggesting that the role of army co-operation, even when carried out in comparatively primitive aircraft, was of vital importance to the prosecution of the war, particularly for the allies. Even so, the attention granted to the full range of activities of Royal Flying Corps ( RFC) and its naval equivalent, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), has been generally slight. The RNAS in particular has received little attention from historians, and its work has been largely forgotten. Peter Cooksley's book is therefore a most welcome addition to the literature on British air services before 1918.

Matters do not begin entirely promisingly, though, as the introduction claims that the RFC ceased to exist "over ninety years" ago, when it was only formed in 1912, and the odd irritating factual error or inconsistency appears every now and then. Some better proofreading would have helped, since this ought to have eliminated some of the more obvious mistakes. For instance, the reader is informed that the 56th Squadron flew SE-5s, yet only four lines later we are told that its "Camels" were unsuited for night-fighting. [ 128] Even relatively uniformed readers will be aware that the SE-5 and the " Camel" were two completely different aircraft. Since Cooksley is a highly regarded expert on military aviation, it is a fair assumption that he knows this too. His proofreaders clearly did not.

There is also the matter of the size of the chapters. Since the work in intended as a general handbook, the author has been forced to produce a whirlwind account of the significant actions of the RFC and RNAS. Considering the vast range of operations undertaken by the two air arms (even with the aircraft available between 1914 and 1918), this simply does not work, and some important history – for instance the role of the RFC and RNAS against the German Spring offensives of 1918 – is omitted. Although the book's title suggests that the RAF is not considered, Cooksley sensibly goes on to consider some of the work done by the new force after the amalgamation of the RFC and RNAS into a single service, discussing the role of the nascent strategic bomber force. While this is covered admirably, some consideration of the Battle of Amiens in August 1918, where tactical air power arguably came of age, really ought to have appeared to show just how far the air services had come

As Cooksley rightly emphasizes, the oft-forgotten point that the air services supported the work of the ground forces and the fleet, rather than engaging in independent operations. It is a pity that the book's size prevents him from expounding further on this issue.

Even taking account of these failings, there are far more good things about this book than bad. Cooksley writes well and knows his subject. He covers the use of airships and balloons; the role of women; and uniforms and insignia with great authority, and the relevant chapters are of huge value both to the general reader and those who already familiar with the subject. Above all, he makes clear that the air services were a vital auxiliary to the war on the ground and at sea. Perhaps the book's greatest strength is the manner in which it inspires the reader to find out more about the air services. For the informed student of the First World War, it provides an informative and authoritative reference on the air services, while for the general reader it is a perceptive and interesting introduction to the subject. In spite of the doubts noted above, Cooksley's book deserves commendation and a place on the bookshelf.

David Jordan
Watchfield, UK

Tony Bridgland. *Sea Killers in Disguise: The Story of the Q Ships and Decoy Ships in the First World War.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and London: Leo Cooper, 1999. xiv + 274 pp., maps, photographs, music, bibliography, index. US $34.95, CDN $53.95, cloth; ISBN I-55750-895-X. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

The theme is "merchant ships in disguise," a thread which binds two normally separate sagas together: the British "Q-ships" and their trapping of German submarines; and the Kaiser's surface raiders. The result is a single volume which gives useful outlines of both. The author truthfully tells us that he has written a "good...historically true 'yarn"' [xi] rather than a reference book, despite the claims on the dust jacket (serious works of naval history have *footnotes!).* It is indeed a good book by someone who knows how to write. The specialist may find it lacking, but it is for the most part accurate and always a good read.

The first two-thirds of the volume cover the story of the RN's Q-ships. Bridgland provides a very brief sketch of the early anti-submarine effort and takes the reader quickly through the first attacks by armed trawlers in June 1915. This brings us to what is perhaps the only serious flaw in the book: the author depends heavily on Robert Grant's *U-boats Destroyed,* published in 1964, for information on German submarine losses. Some new information has appeared during the past thirty-five years, and it is disappointing that more recent works, such as Paul Kemp's 1997 inventory, do not appear in the bibliography. This makes Bridgland's account of the sinking of *UB-4* by *Inverlyon [5]* less than authoritative – he questions the identity of the U-boat and wonders if it was indeed sunk. There is little doubt about either today.

On the other hand, the author deserves full marks for his discussion of the sinking of *U-27* by HMS *Baralong* and the suspected massacre of the German survivors. Chapter four (some thirty-five pages) is given over to *Baralong* and Lieutenant-Commander Herbert; the recounting of what happened is detailed and fair-minded to both sides. Bridgland points out that by now all eye-witnesses have "crossed the bar," and thus "we can never know the truth. Not for sure." [43] Exactly. And the same even-handed approach is used when recounting the loss of the trawler *Ethel & Millie* – its crew were taken prisoner by the submarine and never seen again. But this may have been *UC-41,* which blew up on its own mines five days later – and we now have no way of knowing for certain.

Sadly, there are a few places where the author has gotten his facts wrong. Some are trivial, such as calling HMS *Dreadnought* a battle cruiser. [21] Others are liable to mislead those readers unfamiliar with the naval side of the Great War – in particular the retelling of the fable that it was Admiral Jellicoe who prevented the introduction of convoys. [ 86-87]

The section on British Q-ships ends with

a much too brief look at the Q-ship raids on German transport of Scandinavian iron ore, and a paragraph that inconclusively sums up their contribution to the war effort. Both could have been greatly expanded to the betterment of the book. It is also a pity that there is no table listing all RN Q-ships.

Eight chapters provide an overview of the German raiders. Like the first section, they are well written and a fine introduction to the activities of *Möwe, Wolf and Seeadler.*

In short, I can heartily recommend *Sea Killers* to anyone looking for a good popular history — it is an enjoyable and informative read. Serious researchers might be disappointed, but that was not the goal of the author.

William Schleihauf
Pierrefonds, Québec

D.K. Brown. *The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922,* London: Chatham Publishing and Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 208 pp., photographs, illustrations, tables, appendices, select annotated bibliography, glossary and abbreviations, index. $59.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-315-X. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

Noted British naval architect and prolific author D.K. Brown has published the second of a projected three (or more) books tracing the history of British warship design in the first half of the twentieth century. In *The Grand Fleet,* a companion volume to his earlier *Warrior to Dreadnought,* he describes in great detail the ships that served Britain during the First World War and its immediate aftermath.

Brown's aim is to "review the design and construction of British warships." Recognizing that some solid work in this field exists, he concentrates on lesser-known technological features and warship classes. He spends considerable time on the battleships and cruisers designed just prior to the war which served as tests for modifications to wartime construction. Nevertheless, he provides almost every conceivable detail pertaining to the design, including fittings, machinery, and armament, of all classes of warships from capital ships to patrol vessels. Readers can learn exactly what made these ships tick.

Brown explores the many challenges confronting fleet designers faced with adapting their trade to new technologies (e.g., wireless) and practices (e.g., change from coal to fuel oil). He lauds the innovative genius of Sir Philip Watts, the Director of Naval Construction (1902-1912), and his wartime successor, Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt (1912-1923), for their roles in implementing building programs leading to the creation of the Grand Fleet. Theirs was a daunting task given the increasingly complex strategic situation and fluctuating naval estimates with which they were forced to plan.

Among the most interesting topics Brown elaborates on are ships' trials, especially weapons' tests. Brown skilfully describes prewar trial data and expertly shows their influence on construction design. His chapter on "Action Damage and the Experience of War" is fascinating and instructive. Although few wartime lessons could be incorporated in capital ships, many light cruisers and destroyers completed during the conflict benefited from improved sea-keeping qualities and heavier armament. On the other hand, naval aviation developed very rapidly, as did submarine design. In an excellent, succinct discussion of the growth of embarked air power, Brown argues that the Admiralty robustly promoted naval aviation at this time — notwithstanding the claims of other writers in the field. As evidence, Brown cites the surprising fact that the Grand Fleet's capital ships and cruisers alone carried 103 aircraft by war's end. He also mildly defends the notorious and ill-fated K-boats, although it is a hard sell to rehabilitate this particular class of submarine. Brown further offers a fine description of early Royal Navy minesweeping capability.

Not surprisingly given his profession, and indicative of continuing intra-service rivalry, the author clearly lays responsibility for certain deficiencies in British capital ships (e.g., shells and propellants, upper-deck layout, and turret

armour) on the shoulders of the Director of Naval Ordnance rather than the Department of Naval Construction. The title of his last chapter can serve as his conclusion and overarching principle: "The Right Ships and the Right Fleet." Brown's life-long passion for his topic shows clearly in his prose, and readers quickly learn that a ship, while first and foremost a work of architecture and engineering, is also a form of art.

This book is an extremely valuable technical reference full of basic information, statistics, tables, charts, and drawings covering ship construction, design evolution, trials, and after-action summations. *The Grand Fleet* is also heavily illustrated with many excellent and rare photographs from private collections. Brown expects much from his readers, and those who are technically proficient will benefit most from his work. At times, the information is a bit overwhelming, with the result that the work frequently has the feel of an encyclopaedia or reference manual. But that is hardly a criticism. This is an important publication.

Serge Durflinger
Gatineau, Québec

Richard Shame (ed.). *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*. Coulsdon, Surrey and Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 2001. [88] + 907 pp., tables, photographs, glossary, indexes. US $435, cloth; ISBN 0-7106-1795-7. [All information in Jane's publications is also available on CD-ROM.]

If the world's navies are, for the most part, being reduced, why is *Jane 's* as voluminous as ever? The answer is more and better photographs, and this year practically all are in colour. (Last year only the principal naval ships were illustrated by colour photos). One result is that the Canadian Coast Guard provides quite a vivid splash of red in the early pa rt of the book.

In the foreword the editor has as usual provided insightful comments on the world naval situation. As is to be expected, he does so from the point of view of a western navalist committed to the concept of the western democracies' obligation to promote and, if necessary, impose some order on the more unstable parts of the world, or at least those with a littoral accessible to naval forces. His main criticisms this year are directed at the European powers, which continue to reduce their armed forces while relying more and more on the United States to provide the leadership and the bulk of the military contribution to any joint enterprise. To make matters worse, they are not updating their communication and data-exchange systems to remain compatible with United States' forces. Whatever the limitations of the Canadian Forces, this is one area where we have remained current: during the last year a Canadian frigate was successfully integrated into a US battle group in the Indian Ocean.

The changes in the strengths of the world's fleets during the last year are not really significant.. The United States Navy has now reduced to 355 ships and may start expanding again. It remains incomparably stronger than the rest of the world combined. East Asian navies, notably the Chinese, are being increased somewhat while European fleets are being reduced. The Russian navy can only be described as being in hibernation but one day, when that country's chaotic finances are brought to some semblance of order, it will awaken.

In reviewing trends by type of warship: the number of ballistic missile-firing submarines is greatly reduced. This is in accordance with the START II agreement signed in 1993. (Actually, it is re-entry warheads that are reduced, but this requires fewer platforms). The USN has eighteen SSBNs and Russia about the same number, although many are probably not operational. Britain and France have four each and China one. All British SSNs now can fire Tomahawk missiles, and Canada is at last receiving the British-built *Victoria* (formerly *Upholder)* class diesel boats. Apart from the French *Charles de Gaulle,* only the USN continues to build large angled-deck carriers capable of operating high-performance aircraft. As each ship is completed it replaces an older vessel, maintaining a level of twelve Battle Groups. When *Ronald Reagan* is completed in

2002, no more will enter service until 2008. In surface combatants, Britain has withdrawn from the tripartite (UK, France and Italy) *Horizon* air-defence ship project which has being going nowhere since it was initiated in 1994. A new purely British design will be ordered next year and the first ship will be completed in 2007. As regards amphibious forces, the USN is building a new class of Dock Landing ships (LPD). Singapore is also building an indigenous design of this type; Canadians had an opportunity to see one when the first of class, Endurance, visited Halifax in July 2000. It is known that the Canadian Navy wants to replace the support ships *Protecteur* and *Preserver* with larger vessels that would also have a sea-lift capability. As usual, *Jane's Fighting Ships* is an enormous and comprehensive compilation of naval information.

Since this review was written, Captain Richard Sharpe has announced his retirement as editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships.* Captain Sharpe took over as editor in 1987 and has been responsible for raising the standard of accuracy and timeliness of the information in the annual, while in the forewords to each issue he has provided comprehensive analyses of the world naval situation. During his tenure colour has been introduced, first as an inserted section and eventually throughout the book. The new editor is Commodore Stephen Saunders, RN.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia

Richard Woodman. *Malta Convoys, 1940-1943.* London: John Murray Publishers, 2000. xx + 532 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. £30.00, cloth; ISBN 0-7195-5753-4.

Richard Woodman has followed his critically acclaimed *Arctic Convoys* (1994) with a companion work that closely matches its predecessor in subject and format. An impressively-detailed work, *Malta Convoys* is handsomely laid out and well supported by maps, pictures, excellent chapter notes, a massive bibliography and a detailed index.

Woodman, who is a merchant mariner with over thirty years experience that included command, clearly states in his acknowledgements that "1 was not proposing to write a purely naval history and that I would wish to emphasis the part played by the merchant service." [511] In this he has succeeded superbly. The great companies that provided the many cargo ships and crews are acknowledged, as are the impressive accomplishments of the men and ships. The balance between purely military events and the important contributions of the merchant ships is finely struck.

A most interesting result of Woodman's aim is a very detailed look into the operational level of warfare where logistics plays such an enormous part. The author's deliberate focus on the role of the merchant ships causes the issues of logistical supply and distribution to be brought to the forefront. As a result of this approach, Woodman has demonstrated a very competent grasp of the plight of a theatre commander cursed with a monumental task and hampered by resources that are clearly inadequate to the challenge presented. The greatest strength of this book rests in Woodman's descriptions of the innovative and bold operations conducted by Admirals Somerville and Cunningham in the early years of the war. The strategic implications ofa failure to supply Malta with vital war materials and desperately need domestic commodities is very clear from Woodman's presentation of the situation.

Although laid out in the format of a scholarly work, the style of writing is very uneven and generally not up to the standard expected of modern treatments of such subjects. Woodman is highly biassed in his commentary on the events, and his rhetoric on several occasions is highly overblown. The use of derogatory and denigrating comments to describe Axis operational procedures and tactics seriously undermines the value of the book. Such theatrical devices used to enliven the text indicate unwillingness or, worse, an inability to look past wartime propaganda to conduct a thorough analysis of events from the perspective of the opponent. Only in the last section of the book, where Operation Pedestal becomes the focus, does Woodman's writing come close to attain-

ing the same level of quality he achieved in *Arctic Convoys.*

Whereas Woodman's background as a merchant mariner is a definite strength in certain areas, it is a positive liability in others. During descriptions of naval and air actions Woodman generally leaves far too much to the reader to sort out without the aid of maps. The many complicated events of these battles require some kind of graphic depiction. Although I am a naval officer and very familiar with most of these engagements, I found it virtually impossible to keep a clear idea of how the events were developing from Woodman's description. A novice reader will be hopelessly lost. Likewise, a reader not thoroughly familiar with the myriad of aircraft types employed by the Italian and German air forces will have a hard time sorting out the significance of certain developments in air battles. Woodman makes no attempt to introduce these aircraft and their weapons, nor is there an annex that deals with their capabilities. A standard reference will have to be kept close at hand during reading.

There are also many errors of technical detail that detract significantly from the author's credibility. Not surprisingly, these errors involve the military aspects of the subject. Woodman significantly confuses the issue of aircraft identification by using various nonstandard abbreviations and other inaccurate name references to the same type of aircraft. In one case he makes an outright error when trying to describe the American-provided Martlet carrier fighter as the Grumann *[sic]* Hellcat. [25] The Martlet was the Grumman F-4F Wildcat, not the F-6F Hellcat. The same kind of factual errors also arise in the description of naval events. Woodman describes Admiral Cunningham's concern over a potential two-month delay in the arrival of ammunition thusly: *"Bonaventure* would not be able to replenish her low-angle ammunition until *Formidable* arrived with more in March." [130] Having already clearly established the fact that *Bonaventure* was a Dido-class anti-aircraft cruiser, the curious question of why a senior commander would worry himself over the lack of low-angle ammunition for an anti-aircraft cruiser, or why the arrival of an aircraft carrier would alleviate the situation, is never explained. A detailed knowledge of British naval ordnance is required to know that the main armament of the Dido-class cruiser was the 5.25-inch/50 high-angle anti-aircraft gun, and that the Illustrious-class aircraft carrier was armed with the 4.5-inch/45 high-angle gun. The novice reader will be completely confused by such unsupported and nonsensical declarations, which are rife in the book.

Unfortunately, many such technical and procedural errors can be found throughout. These sorts of oversights and inaccuracies make *Malta Convoys* irritating for an expert and bewildering for a novice. The great strengths of this work are at the strategic and operational levels of historical analysis. At the tactical level this work is a confused and somewhat one-side depiction of events. A reader who hopes to gain new insight into the German and Italian views of the naval war in the Mediterranean will have to look elsewhere. *Malta Convoys* would not be a good place for a student of history to begin research into this fascinating and exciting period of World War II.

Kenneth P. Hansen
Toronto, Ontario

Robert J. Mitchell, with Sewell T. Tyng and Nelson L. Drummond, Jr. (Gregory J.W. Unwin intro.). *The Capture of Attu: A World War II Battle as Told by the Men Who Fought There.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. xxii + 144 pp., index, maps. US $12.00, paper; ISBN 0-8043-9557-X.

On 11 May 1943 the first of approximately 17,000 American soldiers splashed ashore on the gloomy black beaches of the Aleutian Island of Attu. They had been told that the island, defended by a small Japanese garrison since Japan had taken it in June 1942, would require only two or three days of fighting to secure. But the Japanese garrison was somewhat larger than anticipated, and American planners had failed to account for the island's mountainous terrain or harsh sub-Arctic cli-

mate. The invaders would need almost three weeks to destroy the Japanese and would suffer over 500 killed and 3200 other casualties, many from frostbite and exposure thanks to clearly inadequate clothing and boots. Attu's bill in per capita losses would be surpassed only by Iwo Jima's stupendous bloodletting in early 1945.

Robert Mitchell was a young army lieutenant wounded in the Attu fighting. Taking advantage of his convalescence, he interviewed other Attu veterans and with the cooperation of the *Infantry Journal* in 1944 published their remembrances. The 2000 edition replicates the initial 1944 book, except for a new introduction by Professor Gregory Unwin of the Department of History at Temple University. Over seventy men, ranging from privates to captains, spoke to Mitchell, providing him with fascinating details that run the gamut of combat experience from front-line foxholes to aid stations and a supply dump. Soldier after soldier use colourful 1940s vernacular (though Mitchell edited their narratives) to describe the terror of combat, relay the sheer difficulty of fighting and living on Attu's snowy peaks, and, often with reluctant modesty, speak of their own heroic acts. Indeed, despite the horror that greeted them, including a terrifying banzai attack by the remnants of the tattered Japanese garrison on 29 May, many retained a sense of humour about their experiences.

Still, the hatred for the Asian foe comes through clearly. Many American soldiers clearly relished being able to kill the enemy, and not all of them felt bound by the provisions of the Geneva Convention or their consciences. A number of troops state that they or other men in their units deliberately killed Japanese wounded on the battlefield. Indeed, in my 1995 doctoral dissertation on the Aleutian campaign, I cite an intercepted letter written by an unidentified army lieutenant who bragged that while his men liked to bayonet injured Japanese troops, as "a gent" he opted to use his pistol to dispose of enemy wounded. Such stories certainly are not new to anyone who has read John Dower's chilling account of the war in the Pacific, but it is disturbing to hear men, especially those who fought a "good war," talk so calmly about having committed war atrocities.

There are a few problems with the volume as well. Sewell Tyng's original introduction, which essentially summarizes the battle, mistakenly claims that Japan had intended to use the Aleutians as stepping stones towards Alaska and perhaps even the continental United States. This is untrue. The Japanese military initially had planned only to hold the west Aleutians until the fall of 1942, but fearing an American riposte in the north Pacific, decided to retain their Aleutian gains. Never did Japan plan to invade the North American continent, nor did it have the resources to carry out that monumental task. Further, I found Professor Unwin's introduction short and disappointing. He focuses on Attu, with rather little explanation of how Japanese and American troops found themselves at each other's throats in such an isolated and dismal place. This book does give the reader a good glimpse into what it was like to go to war on Attu, but the roots and failed promise of the Aleutian campaign still have not been adequately explored.

Galen Roger Perras
Lennoxville, Québec

Latham B. Jenson. *Tin Hats, Oilskins and Seaboots: A Naval Journey, 1938-1945.* Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, Inc., 2000. 302 pp., over 170 line illustrations, maps, diagrams, photos, index. CDN $24.95, US $19.95, paper; ISBN 1-896941-14-1.

L.B. "Yogi" Jenson describes his experiences from 1938 to 1945 in this excellent addition to the literature of wartime memoirs. The first chapter also provides a short and crisp account of his boyhood on the prairies in the 1920s and 1930s, including a detailed discussion of his family roots in Great Britain. This builds a solid basis for his description of visits to various relatives in England before and during the war, as well as for his blunt assessment of wartime Halifax. The account of his prewar and early wartime experiences flow crisply

with candour and wry humour on every page.

Jenson brings to life the evolution of an enthusiastic young man, determined to make the sea his career, and his world in a clear and straightforward manner. The Canada he describes is very different then the one we live in. The links to Britain in the interwar period were much stronger than today, reflecting the predominance of newly-arrived Britons in the population as well as the pervasive influence of the Great War. Jensons's departure for England in 1938 (to train with the Royal Navy until 1941) ensures that a distinctly British flavour coloured his early naval career.

Jenson's training with the Royal Navy was typical for the period, but his personal schedule resulted in a remarkably interesting number of experiences at a young age. Finishing his training ashore just as the war began, he arrived in HMS *Renown* in time to search for the doomed *Graf Spee* in the fall of 1939 and to engage *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisnau* off Norway in the spring of 1940. Jenson then spent the remainder of 1940 in the RN tribal-class destroyer *Matabele,* leaving a few months before it was sunk to join the battle cruiser HMS *Hood.* He left for his Sub-Lieutenant's course shortly before that ship sank during an engagement with *Bismarck* and *Prinz Eugen.*

After completing his course, Jenson joined his first Canadian ship of the war, HMCS *Ottawa* and would not leave until it was sunk on 18 September 1942, an event that clearly ( and understandably) affected him deeply. *Ottawa's* sinking marked not only a critical moment in Jenson's life but also a shift in the book. From the beginning until that event the narrative flows smoothly and chronologically, a match for any existing memoir. After this, Jenson introduces chapters discussing the convoy system and the role of Canadians in the Battle of the Atlantic. While interesting and informative, especially for general readers, they break the flow of his memoir, which resumes with Jenson's position in the four-stacker HMCS *Niagara* as executive officer. His time there passed in relative quiet, and for once the ship did not sink when he left. Jenson's final post was as First Lieutenant ( executive officer today) of HMCS *Algonquin* a Canadian tribal-class destroyer. While waiting for *Algonquin* to be readied, Jenson briefly commanded a corvette in English waters, a good example of the diverse tasking that often fell to naval officers in the midst of the war. *Algonquin* took an active part in many offensive actions, supporting the Normandy invasion, escorting convoys to Russia and carriers to attack *Tirpitz,* and attacking German convoys along the Norwegian coast.

Jenson's wartime career was clearly active. He recounts the actions in clear and interesting prose, bringing to life a period half a century past. What makes his book particularly fascinating is how well he brings to life many aspects of wartime life, ranging from the different attitudes toward liquor in Britain and wartime Halifax to his balanced comments on the many Reserve and Voluntary Reserve officers and men in the Canadian Navy. There are many places where the chronology of events is little more than a vehicle for Jenson to comment on related activities, but this is all to the reader's benefit. The charm of the book is the way it brings a period to life through its frequent observations on all and sundry.

The best aspect of the book, however, is the many wonderful sketches Jenson drew. They bring the prose to life much better than photographs alone could ever do and make this book worth reading even for those only casually interested in the subject. The variety of the sketches is amazing: not just ships, but social cartoons and caricatures, cities and buildings, and more. The sketches alone are a worthy addition to anyone's library.

There are some minor technical errors in the book, but general readers will likely not notice, and specialists will usually find them corrected elsewhere in the book. There are no references, and a short bibliography probably would have been useful to guide general readers to other sources. But this is minor indeed. On the whole this is a very good little book, with a charm all its own. General readers will find it fascinating, and specialists should make an effort to add it to their libraries.

Doug McLean
Orleans, Ontario

W.J.R. Gardner. *Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra.* London: Macmillan and Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. xvii + 263 pp., diagrams and tables. £ 45, US $ 34.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55570-158-0.

As its title suggests, this welcome study examines the significance of Allied signals intelligence in the way the Atlantic campaign was fought. In fact, the simplicity of the title belies the scope of what is a ground-breaking and rigorous examination of the complex interplay of the many factors that determined the outcome at sea. Gardner has examined all these strands and succinctly dissects technological developments from both German and Allied strategic perspectives. The author also discusses what he calls "the economic context," by which he means the shipping and other maritime resources available to the Allies, and weighs them against the ability of the Germans to sink tonnage.

Gardner examines two phases of the campaign (1941 and mid-1942 through mid-1943) to assess the effectiveness of the U-boat offensive. He bases his analyses of these critical periods on credible numerical examination of trends. The author demonstrates that even though the number of U-boats on operations increased steadily during 1941, their "productivity" in sinking tonnage declined. The underlying reasons included the extension of the convoy system, covert assistance in the Atlantic from the United States during the second part of the year, and the constraints imposed by the Germans on operations to avoid provoking the Americans. British successes in decrypting German signal traffic in near real time is shown to be only one of several factors.

During the second phase examined, the Allies were not reading German signals until December 1942. The last half of 1942 was marked by the resumption of group attacks on convoys (which generally lasted three or four days). Because the U-boat force was continuing to grow, the number of submarines involved in convoy battles rose to fifteen or more, and in 1943 to over twenty (in two battles even to forty). But from July 1942 to January 1943 the overall operational productivity of the U-boat force declined even as its operational strength increased. Productivity improved briefly at the beginning of 1943 ( when the number of merchant ships sunk per convoy battle rose above three) but then dropped steeply. By mid-1943 the Allies, through dogged effort, had developed effective tactics and weapons and were able to employ large numbers of aircraft and escorts, particularly in critical areas. These developments gave the Allies the tactical edge, both when a submarine attempted to close on a convoy and if it tried to attack.

Jock Gardner is an historian with a background as a naval officer who specialised in anti-submarine warfare. The author of a useful guide called *Anti-Submarine Warfare* (London, 1996), he has an instinctive understanding of the tactical factors involved in anti-shipping operations and those which determined whether a convoy would be intercepted and attacked. His experience in anti-submarine warfare and his "seaman's eye" give this book particular authority. The book is full of insights, such as a clear discussion of why first locating a convoy and then successfully bringing submarines within striking range was such a difficult tactical problem for the Germans. Drawing on work by Douglas and Rohwer, the author points out that the vast majority of convoys *were never attacked at all.* Indeed, U-boats were able to attack less than *half* of the convoys intercepted (only fourteen percent were attacked between August and December 1942; the percentage increased to twenty-four between February and May 1943 but then dropped for good).

Gardner points out that Ultra could have been of tactical significance only during the two periods when the Germans mounted group attacks on convoys: 1941 and again between mid-1942 and May 1943. The author discusses the roles of Ultra and signals intelligence in general and concludes that they were only two of a number of strands contributing to eventual Allied mastery.

This is an ambitious and sweeping study. The text is buttressed by twenty-nine pages of authoritative notes, which reflect years of careful study, and an extensive bibliography

Still, one can quibble over details. It is arguable that Gardner undervalues how access to German signals enabled Allied intelligence over time to build up a comprehensive picture of German operations. There is a surprising generalisation that in the absence of effective convoys, U-boats "ran riot" off both Canada and the United States in early 1942. [ 179] In fact, Canadian coastal convoys were instituted immediately and suffered negligible losses. Ocean shipping was already being convoyed, but when the U-boat campaign opened an unusual number of independents had been routed through the Canadian area. The sharp disparity in shipping losses off Canada compared with those off the United States underlines tellingly the effectiveness of the convoy system. It is true that tonnage sunk off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia in the first two weeks of the campaign was indeed higher than that off the United States (124,000 versus 99, 000 tons), but these reflected a marked imbalance in German force concentrations. U-Boat Command initially thought that only long-range boats could reach American waters and sent fourteen submarines to operate off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia (two were soon shifted further south) and only three to US waters. Yet even during this opening phase, the much larger submarine force in the Canadian area sank only half as many ships per boat as the boats operating off the United States. U-Boat Command then shifted the concentration of force to the target-rich American coastal waters, where in subsequent months tonnage destroyed dwarfed losses off Canada (which were almost entirely unescorted independents).

But this oversimplification about what happened off North America does not detract from the value of the study. Overall, *Decoding History* is a truly satisfying and important analysis. It tackles a subject of extraordinary complexity and in a masterful fashion lays out the factors which determined the outcome. This pithy and rigorous study should be essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the Battle of the Atlantic.

Jan Drent
Victoria, BC

Denys Arthur Rayner; S.W. Roskill (ed.). Evan Davies (intro. and appendix). *Escort: The Battle of the Atlantic.* "Classics of Naval Literature" edition. London, 1955; reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. xxxvi + 258 pp., photographs, figures, appendix, index. US $34.95, CDN $53.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-696-5. Distributed in Canada by Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

Action at sea during the Second World War can quite readily be divided into five easily identified major segments: the Battle of the Atlantic, between the *Kriegsmarine's* U-boats and the Allied convoys; the major ship actions throughout the huge Pacific area between USN and Japanese heavy forces; athe USN's submarine campaign to throttle Japan; the battle for supremacy in the Mediterranean from 1940 to 1943; and "all others." The Battle of the Atlantic lasted, with few and only relatively short respites, from early September 1939 to May 1945. If lost, it could not be re-fought, as several of the Pacific battles were. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who held at least an appreciation of sea power from his earliest political days, commented that *all* depended on its outcome.

Denys Rayner's story of his almost continuous life in that battle is a good example of how it was fought, at both the broad and the personal scale, by whom and by what ships. Indeed, I would place it in the same category as Nicholas Monseratt's novel, *The Cruel Sea.* Rayner was unusual in that he was a prewar RNVR (from 1925 in Liverpool), qualified both in navigation and anti-submarine warfare. The latter specialty was not at all popular in regular naval circles: for example, Canada's navy at the outbreak of the anti-submarine war in 1939 had two A/S specialists. Rayner correctly considered that if he was to gain a ship command, highly unlikely for an RNVR, it would be in as an A/S specialist, a trade which the regular navy decried.

As soon as war broke out Rayner was appointed to administer an anti-submarine trawler group. With the rank of LCdr., he was soon senior officer of a sub-group, travelling amicably in *Loch Tulla.* A year later he was

commanding the new corvette HMS *Verbena* and enjoying many adventures. He moved on in March 1943 to the elderly destroyer *Shikari*, a rather unique appointment for an RNVR officer. Six months later he was appointed to the escort destroyer *Warwick*, and then the newer destroyer *Highlander*. Finally, for a short two-month period Rayner had the Castle-Class corvette *Pevensey Castle*, where he was again group senior officer for four Castles. It was only during this last appointment that his ships actually sank a U-boat. But then the responsibility of the other escort groups of which he had been a part had been "the safe and timely arrival" of the convoys.

This book rightly belongs in the category of classics, as the description of events is typical of many hundreds that could have been written. Rayner writes well and includes several passages on how convoys were protected, how A/S attacks were carried out, and the role of escort ships in general. This edition is enhanced for the non-naval reader by a new introduction with many footnotes by Evan Davies that explains the uniqueness of Rayner's positions, where the VRs fit in the naval system, and thus why his appointments were typical and yet unique.

Rayner was obviously good at his job and delighted at his various appointments to a wide variety of escorts. His real love was *Highlander*, and he was most unhappy in the Castle class, even though the ships were the latest word in A/S warfare; they were under-powered and a poor sea boats in his opinion. He ended the war from January 1945 on the staff at Portsmouth as an advisor on the new inshore anti-U-boat campaign that caused considerable worry in the last months.

This is as good a tale of the Battle of the Atlantic as one could find. If the reader does not hold a copy of the 1955 original, it is worth obtaining.

E.M. McKee

Arnold Hague. *The Allied Convoy System, 1939-1945: Its Organization, Defence and Operation.* St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2000. xiii + 208 pp., glossary, index, photographs, appendices. CDN $45.00; cloth. ISBN 1- 55125-033-0.

This is a "nuts and bolts" history about British-organized convoys in World War II. It does not have any descriptions of convoy battles or accounts of high-level policy discussions of command and control. Rather, it examines in some detail the things that are ignored in most accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic – the idiosyncrasies of convoy designation, rescue ships, replenishment at sea, and other such topics. Arnold Hague, the author, is a retired Royal Navy officer who for a while worked with the Naval Historical Branch under David Brown. The book began as an *aide memoire* for those following Hague who would have to answer telephone enquiries about convoys – hence the unapologetic volume of lists. For those who need sailing or arrival dates of a particular convoy, how many ships it comprised and how many were lost, this may be the book. In 208 pages, the appendices account for ninety-nine. If this might be too much of "all you did not want to know about convoys and were afraid to ask," you may want to stop with appendix 1, "Alphabetical Convoy List," which occupies six pages. Yet none cover the convoys in the St. Lawrence or other North American coastal convoys, such as Halifax-Boston, although some statistics are provided on UK coastal convoys.

The text comprises seventeen chapters, beginning with "Control of Shipping," which offers a brief (five-page) description of how the Naval Control of Shipping system worked. Many chapters have only two or three pages of text. This meets the requirements of a crib sheet for telephone enquiries, and may also be of use to the more serious researcher who needs a "nuts an bolts" question answered. Beyond that, the text is of limited use. For example, Hague asserts that "it was the Royal Navy's ability to interrupt and destroy the supply net work that limited the effectiveness of these otherwise formidable ships *[Bismarck*

etc.] *aided* [my emphasis] by a reluctance with in the German political and naval hierarchy to hazard them, thereby greatly limiting engagement of major warships." [46] Two observations may be made. First, the statement is offered without any footnote. This is unfortunate, particularly as Hague worked with the access of an official historian. Others might put the emphasis elsewhere, for example on the German reluctance to use them or the difficulty of evading the British blockade. The absence of footnotes, coupled with the lack of either a proper bibliography or some sort of "suggestions for further reading," makes it impossible to pursue this or other comments that raise an eyebrow. (The appendix on sources discusses convoy records only.) Second, the sentence clarity could have been improved with editing. The editorial deficiencies may be a problem of the publisher, Vanwell, rather than the author.

At first glance it seems curious that Vanwell, in St. Catharines, Ontario, would publish such an overtly British book. But there is a rationale, and it is the book's second strength. A number of the photographs, a good many of which are new to me, were supplied by Ken Macpherson, who is handsomely acknowledged and credited with interesting Vanwell in the project. Apart from Macpherson's photos, many have come from other private collections, including, for example, one of an alongside RAS credited to James Plomer. All the photographs have been carefully researched and have detailed captions.

The extent and range of convoy statistics and the very good photographs make this a useful reference book for specialists.

William Glover
Kingston, Ontario

Edward P. Stafford. *Little Ship Big War: The Saga of DE343.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 336 pp., photographs, bibliographic note, index. US $17.95, paper; ISBN 1-55750-890-9.

The adage that "old soldiers never die, they simply fade away" fortunately has not extended to a number of fine, older naval books. Thanks to the US Naval Institute's Bluejacket Books series, they have neither died nor faded away. Instead, these durable but relatively inexpensive paperbacks have resurrected classic titles and offered them to new readers.

When *Little Ship Big War* first appeared in 1984, it was apparent that Stafford, whose previous book about the famous carrier USS *Enterprise, Big E,* was a bestseller, had rendered a special service. In *Little Ship Big War* Stafford recounted the story of his ship, USS *Abercrombie* (DE-343) and gave voice to the experience not only of *Abercrombie* but of many other often unheralded "little ships," the destroyer escorts of World War II.

Stafford joined *Abercrombie* as a plank owner in early 1944 when it was in the process of being "born" in a shipyard in Orange, Texas. Through completion, fitting out, commissioning, a shakedown cruise and finally service in the Pacific Theatre, Stafford relates the unvarnished story of a ship and his shipmates. His account, while personal, offers insights and stories other than his own; if there is a central figure in this book, it is USS *Abercrombie.* The duties of *Abercrombie,* and the experiences of its crew, are placed in context, deftly and with skill, as Stafford relates the stories of nearby ships, near-sisters and friends aboard them as the little DE went about doing the "dirty work" of the navy in the Pacific.

Stafford offers tales of escort duty, anti-submarine warfare, rescues of downed pilots, and inshore invasion support for landing craft " hitting the beaches" at Leyte and Okinawa. He also relates the drudgery and risks of ship-to-ship refuelling, target practice, drills, and the excitement and terror of combat—particularly the dangerous kamikaze attacks on *Abercrombie* and its squadron mates. Though *Abercrombie* and the crew survived without damage, Stafford expands and adds to the value of his story by including the travails and losses of nearby DEs. Hailed by veterans of the conflict and "tin can" sailors who served in the DEs, *Little Ship Big War* is a naval classic.

The story that Stafford shares is honest, revealing and unromantic. The men who pass through its pages are revealed as real people

with flaws, faults, and mistakes along with virtues, heroism and humanity at its best. Stafford offers an officer's perspective but also carries the reader into the crew's quarters. Readers – even those of a younger generation who did not serve in the military or navy during the war – are drawn completely into the world of USS *Abercrombie* and come away understanding how this ship represents one of Stafford's early points in the book. "Every ship has its individual personality" that "derives both from the quality of her construction and equipment, and from the officers and men of her crew." [24] Thanks to Edward Stafford, this unique biography ofAbercrombie captures that personality as well as illustrates the contributions of the destroyer escorts.

Stafford carefully researched the book, drawing not only from *Abercrombie's* deck logs, action reports, war diaries, and visual signal logs but also from letters, personal journals and questionnaires answered by seventy-six former shipmates, thirty of whom also provided detailed interviews (another sixteen tape-recorded their reminiscences and sent them in). In short, Stafford did his homework and assembled from that information a book that remains a classic account of how to author a biography of a fighting ship.

The Naval Institute Press, by reissuing this classic, returns to print a book long sought by many readers. It is a worthy addition to any World War II naval library or bookshelf.

James P. Delgado
Vancouver, BC

H.S. Yoder, Jr. *Planned Invasion of Japan, 1945: The Siberian Weather Advantage.* Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1997. xvi + 161 pp., photographs, appendices, tables, maps, bibliography. US $35.00, cloth; ISBN 0-87169-223-6.

H.S. Yoder is a former naval officer who was assigned to the US Naval weather station established near Khabarovsk, Siberia in August 1945. During the Potsdam Conference, held the previous month, Soviet authorities confirmed their intention to declare war on Japan and agreed to American requests to build and man meteorological facilities at Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Yoder explains that the primary purpose of these bases was to enhance the climatological data needed to support the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands. Although the Soviets were providing the United States with weather observations from a number of Siberian locations, the author notes that the validity of these data was suspect. Hence, the Americans wished to collect this information directly.

The establishment of Khabarovsk soon after the cease fire in mid-August 1945 reflected the Allied belief that the Japanese military might revolt against their political leaders and oppose the occupation of Japan. In the event of renewed military operations, Siberian weather data had essential value.

Yoder's major contribution is to depict the experiences of the Americans who served at Khabarovsk during its short four-month existence. A central strand in that history was the tense relationship between American and Soviet authorities. From the outset the Russians made it clear that US personnel were suspected of being espionage agents. As a consequence, the Soviets demanded that all codes and ciphers used at the American station be turned over, a request firmly rebuffed by Washington. In the meantime Soviet intelligence agents closely observed their visitors. Even the simplest American request for Russian assistance often became the subject of complex negotiation and prolonged delay. Soviet suspicions, combined with the undoubted fact that hostilities with Japan were at an end, led to Moscow's request in early December 1945 that Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk be closed. By the end of that year the United States evacuated both facilities.

The author also offers many insights into the conditions of Soviet life in the Khabarovsk area at the end of World War II. He fully confirms the West's image of an exceedingly primitive Siberian economy and a people subjected to harsh political oppression. Yoder, who is a professional earth scientist, also offers considerable information on the extreme

weather conditions in the area. Nevertheless, he leavens his grim view of Siberia by expressing admiration for the perseverance of the ordinary men, women, and children who struggled to exist in a harsh social, political, and physical environment.

Readers will enjoy and learn from Yoder's personal account. But they should be aware that the Siberian weather stations can be viewed in a broader strategic perspective. There is no doubt, as Yoder points out, that the planned Allied invasions of Kyushu and Honshu stood to benefit from improved weather forecasts based on meteorological observations in Siberia. But the author does not seem to be fully aware of other US activities, occurring north of Japan's home islands, that could have been affected by the region's notoriously fickle weather. An example was an American aerial bombing campaign between 1943 and 1945 from bases in the western Aleutians that featured more than 1500 attack sorties against Japanese targets in the Kuriles. In addition, during 1944-1945 US submarines and surface ships launched offensive operations in the Kuriles and Sea of Okhotsk. And in the latter part of World War II the US Navy established a major base at Cold Bay, Alaska that trained more than 12,000 Soviet officers and men in the operation of approximately 150 amphibious, minesweeping, and patrol ships being transferred under the lend-lease program.

Bearing the American North Pacific campaign in mind, it seems to this reviewer that the American weather stations in Siberia may have had even greater military significance than Dr. Yoder suggests in his interesting book.

Dean C. Allard
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Ronald Andidora. *Iron Admirals: Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. 181 pp., maps, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US $65.00, cloth; ISBN 0-313-31266-4.

This book is a study of the careers and achievements of four twentieth-century admirals: Togo, Jellicoe, Halsey and Spruance, the last two being treated together in the same chapter. The author's relaxed and friendly style makes for a very readable and undemanding book, and the subject is what most people would still think is the very stuff of naval history – battles at sea and fleet command. Some of the major battles of the twentieth century are reviewed: Tsushima, Jutland and the main clashes of the last stages of the Pacific campaign of 1942-1945. The author makes no significant errors, and his judgements, clearly based on assiduous reading of the latest literature, command respect. His review of the Sumida/Lambert revisionist thesis on Fisher and his Dreadnought policy, for instance, is sensible and balanced. And yet this in the end is a disappointing book that falls between three stools. It is not really a battle or campaign history; it is not really a biography or series of biographies; and it is certainly not a substantial study of naval leadership.

As a series of battle or campaign histories, the book puts each in its proper setting very well. Before the Battle of Tsushima, for example, there was a debate about whether to rely on long-range gunfire from the main armament of the heavy ships on the one hand or on the "hail of fire" that a fleet in close contact firing all its main and secondary armament could deliver. This is concisely and well discussed, and Togo's success with the latter method is clearly illustrated. But because the author has quite properly decided to explain the context of each battle in this way (and he does so rather effectively) there is little room for depth in the discussion of the many battles covered. For this reason, many readers will find little that is new in this book.

Much the same can be said about it as a series of mini-biographies. The author bases his work more or less exclusively on well-known secondary sources. The result is a familiar review of some well-known admirals that are good summaries but little more.

The most serious fault is that there is in fact little real discussion about the nature of

typal naval leader, but this is not pushed very far. It may again be a consequence of the author's attempt to cover too much ground, but many opportunities for useful discussions are let slip. For instance, a review of the battle-command and leadership styles exemplified during the Russo-Japanese War cries out for an exercise in contrast and comparison between Togo, Makarov and Rozhdestvensky, who were very different in so many ways. But apart from making this rather basic point, the book shies away from the subject.

The Battle of Jutland, to give another example, would be a splendid case study of the importance of initiative in battle. The author's reference to the disastrous impetuosity of Admiral Arbuthnot (whose desire to finish off *Wiesbaden* led to his death and the loss of several armoured cruisers) [76] is followed three pages later by a brief account of Admiral Leveson's deliberate decision not to leave the line in order to prevent the German fleet slipping away for the last time that day into the concealing dusk. But so much more could have been made of this. Jellicoe quite properly comes out well from this review, but the contrast between him as a leader keen not to leave anything to chance and Nelson, that model of naval command who thought successful commanders needed to do just that, is merely touched upon.

In the discussion of Halsey and Spruance there is an interesting reference to the requirement of naval leaders to cater for the "whims of popular opinion and ambitious politicians." [133] And what a lot could have been said about that ! But sadly, in this book, little is said. The concluding chapter does not quite pull the whole thing together because it focuses on the achievements of each admiral (the outputs) rather than their qualities as leaders ( the inputs), and so another opportunity slips away.

Significantly the chapter which concentrates on comparing the impetuous, audacious Halsey with the patient, balanced, steady Spruance is the book's best on naval leadership but its weakest as biography or campaign history. As such, it rather exemplifies the book's main fault. The author's gunfire is effective but spread too widely among too many targets. For this reason Ronald Andidora has lost the chance to turn a good introductory text into something much better.

Geoffrey Till
Devizes, UK

Aldo Chircop, Andre Gerolymatos and John O. latrides. *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War: Security and Law of the Sea Issues*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan, 2000. xiv + 247 pp., maps, tables, figures, photographs, notes, index. £45.00, cloth; ISBN 0-33371897-6.

The contents of this volume are based on a conference held in 1996 in Ottawa which was triggered by the Imia-Kardak Aegean crisis between Greece and Turkey earlier that year. The book consists of two parts, the first covering the historical and security issues relating to the Aegean dispute and the second addressing the law of the sea and governance issues raised.

Edited volumes can easily suffer from incoherence. Editorial control can be too light, the contributors too independent, or the quality of their contributions too variable. Conference programmes can as easily reflect availability of participants as design. This volume exhibits some of these characteristics. It is not clear, for example, why Nachmani's piece on Greek water problems is included at all, as it bears little relationship to any of the dimensions of the Greek-Turkish stand-off. Richard Clogg's wise, insightful and typically entertaining contribution focusses heavily on Greek-Turkish differences over Cyprus rather than the Aegean. On the other hand, the book might have benefited from an article specifically concerned with air space differences. Overall, though, in terms of quality and focus this volume hangs together reasonably well.

What does detract from its credibility, however, is its one-sidedness. Judging by surnames, around half of the contributors are ethnically Greek, none Turkish. To be fair, the

tion that Turks should in future be included in the dialogue, but this only serves to highlight this volume's failure to incorporate a Turkish perspective. It might be argued that this should not matter, but where Greek-Turkish relations are concerned, sadly it does. The mutual mistrust and passion with which each side approaches the problem too frequently renders elusive either Greek or Turkish "objectivity." The "Greek" contributions to this volume occasionally confirm this observation. It is not only the language deployed that betrays Greek bias. One can also find here characteristic Greek allegations of Turkish territorial revisionism and aggrandizement (Gerolymatos, for example). Platias goes so far as to assert that Ankara "tried to raise the issue of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace in order to lay claim to Western Thrace itself." [66]

Strati's article is a good example, though not the only one, of the legalistic determinism that can characterise the Greek position on the Aegean, and it is worth citing for the ease with which it glides over its own finding that legal judgment would award neither Greece nor Turkey everything it wants. Indeed, one of the more constructive sub-plots detectable within this volume is the idea that the application of law of the sea convention in the Aegean would probably take such factors into account as uniqueness (VanderZwaag) and equity (Chircop), that it might favour negotiated dispute settlement rather than compulsory judicial decisions (McDorman), and that semi-enclosed seas are susceptible to bilateral resolution (according to Della Mea, an Italian [153], but not according to Raftopoulos, a Greek [146]) – all of which would tend to weaken the relevance of legalistic purity.

An associated theme that pops up is that Greece and Turkey might try to put aside maritime sovereignty arguments and focus instead on resource management in the Aegean, in which they have a mutual interest, as one frequently finds elsewhere in the Mediterranean (Chircop). In this case, such endeavours might even serve as confidence-building measures upon which deeper cooperation might be built (Della Mea, Katsepontes). But this brings us to the argument stressed in the conclusion (and elsewhere in this volume): that any resolution in the Aegean will require Greek and Turkish political will. And this in turn raises the question of the utility of a volume consisting largely of Greek contributors presenting largely legalistic arguments, worthy and readable though many of these articles may be.

Bill Park
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Moshe Tzalel. *From Ice-Breaker to Missile Boat: The Evolution of lsrael 's Naval Strategy*. Westport, CT; Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. xiii + 184 pp, tables, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US $59.95, cloth; ISBN 0-313-31360-1.

*From Ice-Breaker to Missile Boat* is about the evolution of a small navy from nothing to a fighting force tailored to cope with Israel's problems. It describes how fledgling students ofnaval warfare learned how to handle fighting ships while trying to decide whether they were necessary or not. It could have done with one or more maps.

Those who built the Israeli navy were a mixed bag including ex-Royal Navy officers, ex-merchant navy officers and Palyam, the sea arm of Hagana, the clandestine pre-independence force. The first ship was the ice-breaker of the title of the book, ex-USS *Northland,* the first *Eilat.* Its only action was to be rammed by a British destroyer, which suffered severe structural damage.

The navy was decreed into existence by the Israeli Defence Force General Staff on 17 March 1948 as "The Sea Service," assigned "all the missions of defence at sea." This "vague prescription left the door open...between those who saw the...navy as a flanking support for the land army – and...a blue water navy, based on surface ships and/or submarines and independent of the army generals."

The book deals with the period between 1948 and 2000. It is in three parts: "Building a Navy" (thinking about the naval role); "Reality Check, Naval Operations;" and "The Sea as a

Gateway" (blockade and gunboat diplomacy).

Politically-isolated Israel is like an island. Apart from hostile neighbours who can attack overland, it can only be reached by sea. The Director of the Nautical College in Haifa, advising President David Ben Gurion on naval matters, found no need for defence against seaborne invasion, or any need to seek battle with an enemy fleet, since no such fleets were around. Instead, he argued that the new nation needed the ability to engage single enemy vessels with torpedo boats and to convert immigrant ships to "warships." This, apparently misunderstood by IDF leaders, became " The Big Flotilla" of escort vessels and submarines.

Palyam trained seamen and escorts for immigrant ships. It wanted forces to blockade Arab nations, to protect Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), to conduct commando operations, to transport troops, and to man and defend naval bases.

The profound effect of these two vastly different concepts of maritime operations is discussed in some detail. Readers are expected to know the various names of the wars: The War of Independence, immediately after the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948; the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal; the Six-Day War of June 1967, also called the June War; The War of Attrition, immediately after the Six-Day War; and The Yom Kippur War of 1973, also known as The October War.

Experience during the wars revealed that small-boat operations were far more effective than the Big Flotilla. Battles from 1948 to 1967 showed the general ineffectiveness of the Big Flotilla, but explosive boats sank the Egyptian flagship *El Emir Farouk*. Right after the cease fire of the June War, both sides made raids. The successful Israeli amphibious "Operation Ravin" brought retaliation when the Israeli flagship *Eilat* was sunk by Styx missiles. Two months later, the submarine *Dakar* was lost with all hands while being delivered to Israel ( it was finally found in 1999). The Big Flotilla was sinking, and missiles increasingly were in. By the time of the Yom Kippur War, Israel had procured Sa'ar Fast Attack Craft, the missile version (FAC [M]) using the Gabriel missile. The opening night of that war Israel sank three FACs and a minesweeper in its first naval missile battle in history and suffered no losses, despite more than six Styx missiles being fired at its ships.

Imaginative Israeli use of the FAC (M)s during the Yom Kippur War ensured naval expansion. Sa'ars were proposed as a system to exercise control over the eastern Mediterranean, but opinion that aircraft remain the most effective platforms for anti-ship missiles prevailed. In this strategy, the attacker remains for only a short time near the target, thus lessening the chance of mis-identification because the pilot can see the target. Moreover, the aircraft can attack other targets if there is no maritime threat. (In practice, pilots are as likely as sailors to attack the wrong ship).

A good read, but pricey.

Dan Mainguy
Ottawa, Ontario

Peter J. Woolley. *Japan 's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000.* Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Reiner, 2000. xviii + 163 pp., tables, maps, selected bibliography, index. US $49.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55587-819-9.

In 1973 James Auer wrote an important book that gave an excellent account of what was in effect Japanese naval policy from the putative end of the Imperial Navy at the end of World War Two to the beginning of the 1970s, by which time the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) was well established. Aptly, he introduces this new work in which Peter Woolley takes the story forward to the end of the twentieth century. As Auer puts it, in his most generous foreword, Woolley provides "a comprehensive, balanced and rational account of the cultural, legal and political hurdles encountered by the Japanese government in growing the MSDF." The author examines the evolution of Japanese defence policy in the period since 1971 and the enlargement in the use made of the MSDF in that process. Defence policy in Japan is a subtle subject requir-

ing specialist cultural "feel" and understanding. This Woolley amply provides, giving his readers in his opening three chapters a primer in Japanese policy and politics, the *kata* (style) of the MSDF and the constitutional debate on the use of force by Japan. He then examines, in separate chapters, the debate over sea-lane defence out to 1000 miles, the despatch of the mine countermeasures flotilla to the Gulf in 1991, and the cautious adoption of a more proactive peacekeeping role. The author sums up in a final chapter entitled "Democracy, Strategy and Alliance" that argues for a close maritime alliance between he US and Japan.

The work is very much the result of the author's year as an advanced research scholar at the Naval War College in the mid-1990s, and his account is written from that point in time. It would have been better to have come clean on this and changed the title to 1971-1996, when the book effectively ends. Readers will be disappointed that there is nothing about the latest controversial revision of Japan's Defence Guidelines, quite a serious gap in a book apparently culminating in 2000. Neither is there anything about the potential anti-ballistic missile task of the new Kongo class or about Aegis ships, something that promises to have a considerable impact on the MSDF's organization and role. The structure of the book also suffers from much of it being effectively revisions of articles the author has already published. These chapters still retain much of their character as self-contained pieces, and there is a goo deal of repetition. The book should really have been subject to more editing and up-dating,

This said, however, the author has done an excellent job in analysing the evolution of what might be called the higher aspects of naval policy in Japan in the later Cold War years and the immediate post-Cold War era. He explains the difficulties caused by the all too successful cultural pacification after the Second World War, and the real problems faced by the policy makers of a sea-dependant economic superpower constitutionally unable to deploy a proper navy. He ably explains the reasons for the essential incrementalism of Japanese policy, which has continued since his study was completed. Nothing that has happened in recent years undermines his analysis in any way.

The author has deliberately eschewed operational matters, and there is therefore not much on the size and shape of the MSDF or its organization. There are useful points to be made about the nature of the MSDF as a true "self defence force" rather than a navy "proper" and its complementarity with Japan-based units of the US Navy in what can be regarded as an overall naval capability. This would have further strengthened Woolley's thesis about alliance.

Nevertheless, this slim volume is a highly significant contribution to the still limited literature on a navy of growing significance. Its gaps provide opportunities to other scholars, especially Japanese, to provide more comprehensive accounts of the continuing evolution of the MSDF. Auer and Woolley are, however, the essential starting points for any such study.

Eric Grove
Hull, UK

Commander Duk-Ki Kim. *Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geopolitical Goals, Policies and Prospects.* London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. xxiv + 261 pp., maps, tables, glossary, index, appendices, select bibliography. US $57.50, £39.50, cloth; ISBN 0-7146-4966-X.

For rip-roaring yarns of the sea, Marryat and Taffrail still reign supreme. For mastery of naval strategy in Northeast Asia few can compare to Admiral Yi Sun-sin with his turtle ships. Nevertheless, Commander Kim of the Republic of Korea Navy has written an informative book (no. 9 in the generally excellent Cass series "Naval Policy and History") with an impressive bibliography of English-language sources. The purpose of his study "is to design a co-operative maritime security structure for Northeast Asia through the application of naval arms control and disarmament measures (both structural and operational); maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation

*Asia,* however, is not the security model it envisages but rather the information it provides about maritime issues, tensions and disputes in the waters that stretch from the Straits of Malacca to the Sea of Okhotsk as seen from the differing approaches of the major naval powers involved – the United States, Russia, China and Japan. The book is intended for two audiences: one comprised of professional maritime analysts, naval officers, security analysts and defence planners, and the other consisting of academic students of East Asian political, strategic and security matters. Given the number of abbreviations (four and one-half pages of them), cypher clerks and the boffins of Bletchley Park should also be added to the target audiences. Like all books that analyse current issues, this one runs the risk of quickly becoming dated because the geo-strategic maritime environment in Northeast Asia is subject to change.

*Naval Strategy* is divided into eight chapters. In chapter one Kim discusses the concept of co-operative maritime security. In chapter two he argues that the regional naval arms build-up during the 1990s, spearheaded by China and Japan but also involving lesser naval powers like South Korea and Taiwan, created a new geo-strategic environment that has led to an increased risk of potential misunderstandings and incidents at sea as well as disputes over marine resources. This has necessitated a greater need for co-operation between countries in the protection of sea lines of communications and in the solution of environmental problems like sea pollution.

Chapter three is useful. In it Kim first investigates the basic concept and approaches taken by regional nations to territorial disputes. He then analyses the Russian-Japanese dispute over the so-called Northern Territories; the Korean-Japanese dispute over the Tok Islands; the Senkaku Islands and seabed disputes between China, Taiwan and Japan; and the Parcel and Spratly islands disputes that involve China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Chapters four and five are concerned with US and Russian maritime strategies, respectively, and point out that many of the current problems in the region stem from the vacuum left by the reduction of both countries' naval forces since the Cold War ended. In order to help protect their security interests, both nations emphasise the need for maritime co-operation.

Chapter six deals with Chinese maritime strategy. Kim argues that China's approach to co-operative maritime security is determined by two conflicting factors: the effect of naval arms control and the effect on China's standing in the world because China wants to be seen as a responsible major power. The expanding capabilities of the Chinese navy are seen by some countries, however, as a harbinger of its desire to establish hegemony over the South and East China Seas. Chapter seven looks at Japanese maritime strategy, which seemingly poses little threat and stresses co-operation. Chapter eight is the conclusion and contains, among other things, commonsense recommendations relating to information exchange and confidence-building measures that could enhance the prospects for the creation of a co-operative maritime security structure among the major maritime powers in northeast Asia.

While this study looks at the major maritime powers, a little more information concerning the maritime strategy of lesser powers, such as the two Koreas, Taiwan and Vietnam, would have been helpful. Further, greater use of Korean, Chinese and Japanese sources would have aided in clearly demonstrating that the concern for co-operative maritime security is deeply rooted in the professional writings of the officer corps of those navies and not just restricted to an English-reading elite. At the end of the sixteenth century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi's forces were defeated because of Korean maritime strategy. It would be well for naval officers interested in things Pacific to read Commander Kim's book to forestall conflict at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

A. Hamish Ion
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Charles T. Williamson. *The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti 1959-1963.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. xix + 394 pp., map, photographs, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. US $33.95; CDN $57.50; ISBN 1-55750-941-7. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catherines, ON.

This carefully-crafted book provides a sobering account of the establishment and rapid decline of the US Naval Mission to Haiti. From 1959 through mid-1963 the primarily-US Marine-staffed mission had the unheralded and ultimately unsuccessful task of training Haiti's armed forces *(Forces Armees d'Haiti)* – a predominantly ground force with limited coast guard and air corps augmentation – in small-arms infantry tactics.

Colonel Charles Williamson is well-suited to have recorded these events, having served as a junior officer with the naval mission from its inception until almost its final days. In putting together his detailed history, he relied not only upon his own memories but also the official records of the mission, now at the National Archives and Records Administration facility at College Park, Maryland. In addition, he conducted interviews with a number of his fellow officers and with several expatriate, American-trained, Haitian officers who managed to escape Haiti during the turbulent period recounted in the book.

As Williamson makes evident, daily life in Haiti during the final years of the second Eisenhower Administration and the heady days of the Kennedy era had an Alice-in-Wonderland quality that was not always understood by American decision-makers. The nation was a dictatorship ruled by the deceptively soft-spoken François "Poppa Doc" Duvalier. It was a land where the secret police – gangs of armed thugs known as the *Tonton Macoutes* – roamed freely to maintain the short-term stability of the Duvalier regime by terrorizing the local population with sudden punishments that were as brutal as they were arbitrary.

Although in April 1958 Duvalier personally had requested that the United States establish a military mission in Haiti, by the time the Marines arrived the following year he had become deeply ambivalent about their role. From the outset, he feared that his army officers were likely to plot against him. Thus, the more successful the US mission appeared to be during the initial months in training the troops of the *Forces Armees d'Haiti*, the more suspicious he became of its efforts.

During the first years of the Haitian training program, the Marines did their utmost to succeed despite the obvious lack of receptivity from the Presidential Palace. By 1962, however, it was becoming difficult to overcome the obstacles put in their path both by the evident indifference of the army leaders and the rampant paranoia of the Haitian dictator.

The final months of the mission's life were marked by the Haitian government's gradual curtailment of its training responsibilities and by a series of increasingly alarming harassments by Haitian militia *(Milice Civile)* and secret police forces directed against individual members of the mission staff and their families. When the last of the Marines left in July 1963, their mood was a mixture of frustration and disappointment that an effort that began with such high hopes had ended so disastrously.

Williamson's book provides a fascinating account of the difficulties that military forces can face when carrying out quasi-political functions in developing countries. This book should be of particular value not only for historians of the Cold War but for analysts interested in examining the peacetime roles of military forces in the emerging century.

Jeffrey G. Barlow
Manassas, Virginia

Gordon Davis. *The Maritime Helicopter Project: The Requirement for a Capable Multi-Purpose, Sea King Replacement.* Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University [www.da.ca/centre], 2000. Maritime Security Occasional Paper, No. 8. 69 pp., illustrations. CDN $10, US $8, paper; ISBN 1-896440-26-6.

Canada's need for a new shipboard aircraft is undeniable. The Sea King fleet is well beyond

its lifespan, and it costs the taxpayer (those forgotten people to whom we are ultimately responsible) more scarce defence monies to maintain this capability. Gordon Davis' occasional paper sets out to examine this long-standing requirement, with the stated aim of informing the educated public why Canada desperately needs a new maritime helicopter.

The work is divided into three sections, which explore "the policy fundamentals that underpin [DND] capital acquisitions," review " the evolution in the roles and tasks demanded of the Sea King" and provide "an experience-based list of capabilities." Simply put, Davis succeeds with the third and part of the second section, but fails with the first section.

The policy analysis in the work does not, in fact, provide us with even an accurate cursory examination as to how and why the Sea King was acquired in the first place. If Davis had researched the matter, he would have found that the late 1950s Royal Canadian Navy ( supported by the government of the day) requirements for the machine which would become Sea King included the ability to remove the ASW gear and use it as a troop-carrying aircraft from the projected general purpose frigates or other joint platforms. In essence, the RCN anticipated the multi-purpose function that would be demanded by the new world order envisioned by the Brock Report and the 1964 White Paper. Dancing through white paper after white paper and convoluted Defence Planning Guidance verbiage obscures these facts, which are really critical to the long-standing and accepted arguments for a multi-purpose helicopter.

The study is laudable in its efforts to bring out the operational employment history of the Sea King and the specific equipment capabilities necessary in a replacement. Discussions of Operation CORDON in Somalia, and the more critical COP COBRA planning in 1995, are critical to any discussion of future requirements. But castigating various governments about the lack of progress of the NSA programme needs more explanation and substantiation, even for the informed reader. We really need to understand exactly how and why the EH-101 programme was affected by the incoming government in 1994. On the whole, the study suffers from a lack of documentation. Davis would have a stronger case had he provided evidence to support his opinions, particularly with his brief mention of the possibility of a "navalized" Griffin acquisition.

In the end, it is unclear as to who actually opposes a Sea King replacement and thus needs to be convinced. If persuasion is required at the political level, experience demonstrates that some domestic factor has to act as the hook to get elected officials interested. That influence will not be exerted by those of us who write occasional papers (this reviewer included). The vital point to be remembered is that it is really a matter of getting a platform which will satisfy all of our requirements and, if it has to be built in Québec, so be it.

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Charles A. Meconis and Michael D. Wallace. *East Asian Naval Weapons Acquisitions in the 1990s: Causes, Consequences and Concerns.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. xix + 226 pp., tables, figures, maps, notes, selected bibliography, index. US $65.00, cloth; ISBN 0-275-96251-2.

The stated aim of this book is to document weapons acquisition in East Asia throughout the 1990s and to analyse the implications of the data collected through a thorough application of the latest developments in political science theory. The authors examine the relationship between weapons acquisition and armed conflict and apply their conclusions to contemporary East Asia. As such, the book provides a summary of contemporary international relations theory on issues such as arms races and the sources of armed conflict. In addition, it examines naval capabilities and potential sources of conflict within the region.

Having introduced contemporary theories about competitive arms acquisitions and established that arms races can contribute to the outbreak of armed conflict, the authors seek to discover whether a naval arms race is under-

way in East Asia. They establish that in mere numerical terms the total number of warships in the region has actually declined in the past ten years. Yet there has been an increase in the total number and distribution of modern *"destabilising"* systems such as submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious vessels and long-range, high-endurance surface ships with comprehensive anti-ship, anti-air and land attack capabilities. The authors reject the idea that these vessels might bring stability through deterrence, although this remains a debatable point. More significantly, land-based aircraft have not been included due to an apparent lack of reliable data on numbers and capabilities. This is a serious omission and undermines the value of the analysis.

The book is based upon a "scientific" analysis of data, and it is ably supported by the authors extensive research. The information gathered is relevant, comprehensive and fully referenced. But if this book is to provide more than a summary of the relevant pages of *Jane 's Fighting Ships,* the data must support the theoretical assumptions upon which their conclusions are based. In general they do, although the complexities of maritime capabilities do not lend themselves to assimilation into mathematical formulae or scientific models. The attempt to construct weapons-based quantitative arms race indices simply by adding up the tonnages of particular types of ships and numbers of weapons is a gross oversimplification of a complex subject. The tonnage of a particular ship is not a reliable indication of its capabilities and potential offensive uses. The increase in the size of a frigate or destroyer is as likely to represent improvements in living conditions and catering facilities as it is to signify an increase in offensive capability. The fact that the total tonnage of modern surface ships acquired in East Asia is increasing may be significant, but equally it may not be. The complexities of the issue are not adequately investigated here.

The book does provide a very useful overview of current naval capabilities in East Asia and of the potential for maritime conflict in the region. The authors are surely correct to discount the Russian Pacific Fleet as a major player for the foreseeable future. The US Navy is the only major outside actor in the region, and they see it largely as a stabilising force. The authors present the idea of "enduring rivalries," where a history of conflict between particular states acts as a key variable in determining conflict. They apply this theory to China-Taiwan, Japan-South Korea and, less convincingly, Singapore-Malaysia. Their conclusion that enduring rivalries can act synergistically with the competitive arms acquisition process to increase the potential for conflict is well founded although hardly surprising.

A key strength of this book is that it provides an excellent introduction into the disputes, rivalries and potential sources of naval conflict within East Asia. It also offers an introduction into the capabilities of regional navies and the performance ofparticular weapons systems that should prove of equal value to the expert and novice alike. The authors should be congratulated on the manner in which they present both theory and fact in a fashion that should be accessible to all. Their conclusion, that there is not yet a formal naval arms race throughout East Asia, but that one exists between China and Taiwan, is supported by appropriate evidence and their assessment of the possibility of both conflict and cooperation in the future was clear, relevant and well founded. Although the emphasis on "scientific" modes of analysis may not appeal to all readers, the book will be of value to anyone interested in naval capabilities, rivalries and the potential for maritime conflict in East Asia.

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Norman Friedman. *Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 384 pp., photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US $42.50, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-897-6.

This book links one of the oldest forms of conflict, war at sea, to one of the newest forms

war in space. Friedman aims to explain how the relationship between these two very different environments emerged, how the interaction changed naval warfare, and how it is likely to bring about change in the near future. The bulk of the study concentrates on the Cold War: ten of fourteen chapters are dedicated to examining the historical development of particular technologies. Each appraises the reasons these technologies were developed, how they worked, and the problems encountered in translating technical ideas into viable weapons.

Friedman explains in layman's terms how these complex systems operated and how they affected the conduct of war. It is also very interesting the way he demonstrates the dynamism of the arms race at sea between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Through a technological survey, he shows successfully that external strategic and operational challenges propelled and shaped technologies. He provides a superb insight into the dynamics of the action- reaction cycle and the causes of the qualitative arms race that was such a defining characteristic of the Cold War.

According to Friedman, the end of the Cold War has merely enhanced the utility of naval power in the "new world disorder." Sea power offers an ideal medium to protect the interests of the United States. He refers to the strategic mobility of the surface fleet, its independence from overseas bases, and the fact that it possesses its own intrinsic anti-ballistic missile defence system. Most important, however, has been the integration of space-based communications and surveillance systems with the weapons and sensors of the surface fleet through a digitised computer network. This has created an unprecedented capability for naval units to see targets, both on land and at sea, several hundred miles over the horizon, and to strike them with conventional, long-range guided missiles in real time. Friedman calls this "net-centric warfare."

In Friedman's view, net-centric warfare has given the US Navy a new lease on life. The ability to deliver distant punishment makes it impossible for the enemy to hit back and so reduces the chance of casualties. Equally important, it minimises the risk that the United States will become involved in a protracted war. Using sea and space systems, the US will be able to decide when to engage and disengage from a conflict. It is also assumed that net-centric warfare will result in a battle of such a high tempo that it will overwhelm the ability of an enemy force to resist. Friedman is confident that the superiority of net-centric warfare will be reinforced by further improvements in satellites and computers. The overall effect will be to speed up the time taken to locate a target and launch an attack against it – a capability that was obviously lacking in the hunt against mobile Scud launchers during the Gulf War.

This is an interesting book. When discussing naval power in the post-Cold War world, Friedman makes a number of very useful points. But it is unfortunate that he did not focus more on the contemporary security situation and the potential effectiveness of naval power. Significant questions arise over the vulnerability of surface vessels to new technological developments and the potential of asymmetric threats. It is also unclear how sea power can deal with terrorists like Osama bin Laden or indeed enemy states that do not possess highly-developed industrial or economic infrastructures and therefore lack targets against which attacks might be launched. Friedman also fails to consider the ineffectiveness of distant punishment delivered against Iraq over the last decade. The failure to address questions such as these weakens the persuasiveness of the argument.

Overall, this is an interesting and readable work. But it is unfortunate that so much of the study focuses on developments during the Cold War. Although this historical analysis was informative, the really interesting issues are developed too late in the book to do them justice. The volume is thoroughly researched, and even the footnotes provide a wealth of information. It is only regrettable that Friedman does not cite his sources more frequently.

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Peter T. Haydon. *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective.* Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University [www.da.ca/centre], 2000. Maritime Security Occasional Paper, No. 10. v + 139 pp., tables, notes, index, CDN $10, US $8, paper; ISBN 1896440-32-0.

This is a naval "appreciation of the situation." Peter Haydon says what he is going to say, says it, and then tells us what it is that he has said. In the process he exposes the reader to current political and strategic assessments of sea power. The footnotes alone are worth the price of admission, but what makes his brief especially worth reading is the largely successful attempt to place current thinking in context for what he calls a "medium" power.

We live in precarious times. By comparison, life was simple during the Cold War. A statement of the obvious, this is nevertheless the essential basis for discussion. Building on the work of James Cable, Colin Gray, Eric Grove, Ken Booth and Rear Admiral J.R. Hill among others, Haydon brings them down to earth with his comment that politicians (more in some countries than others, this reviewer would observe) have limited horizons. Naval staffs can neither predict the future nor "what their political masters will ask them to do." They must invariably explain requirements "in terms of 'what might happen if specific capabilities did not exist.'" [83] Moreover, they usually have to engage in crisis management. It might be suggested that this little study is designed to expand the horizons of decision-makers in the government to smooth the way for Canadian naval planners.

In the present strategic situation "there is good reason for navies to return to being multi-functional instruments of state authority over the seas." [3] Naval forces will help protect the interests of the state and preserve "a stable environment in which to trade and prosper" [30], often serving in a diplomatic role. Warships are particularly useful because they can be deployed and if necessary withdrawn much more simply than other armed forces, and they "have a symbolic value in that they are legal extensions of their parent state." In addition, "the presence of a warship is a clear signal of the interest or concern of a state...about a situation." [38; this catalogue of virtues in a naval force, clearly central to the author's thesis, appears again, *verbatim*, on 63.]. A table entitled "Naval Crisis Management Tasks" [66] provides persuasive argument for "multi purpose and combat capable naval forces rather than those constrained to 'niche' capabilities." [69] Haydon has the grace to admit that "none of this is really new."

Another table entitled "Naval Capabilities" [81] summarises the roles of major, medium and small coastal state navies. Medium powers generally play a limited part in sea control (the protection of what strategic writers insist on calling sea-lines of communication, rather than ships) and power projection. Except for Canada, which played a major part in North American strategic anti-submarine warfare during the Cold War, they play no part in strategic deterrence and "compellence" (exerting limited naval force to influence the actions of a state). They do, however, engage in diplomacy, national security and constabulary tasks, and humanitarian assistance. The limitations noted in this table notwithstanding, Haydon points out that medium-power navies today are also in a position to operate globally in coalitions, something that was not the case before the Second World War and the Cold War, and which meets the enormous need "to soften the impact of *pax Americana."* [78] This gives medium powers considerable leverage.

War can be expected in the future, whatever its form (Haydon summarises quite neatly varying opinions on this, and "soft power" receives short shrift: he cites in particular Dean Oliver and Fen Osler Hampson on the subject), and it will be conducted under unprecedented public scrutiny, thanks to modern media coverage. Information technology and the revolution in military affairs will separate the men from the boys. States that can work together in crisis management with technological compatibility, and follow a well-defined political mandate, will prosper. Inescapably, an ability to work with the US Navy will be essential.

Haydon refers frequently to "the lessons of

history," and calls upon such sages as Mahan ( with favourable mention of Jon Sumida's rehabilitation of that historian), Corbett and Liddell Hart to give a respectable perspective to his argument. This is not, however, a work based on more than cursory historical analysis. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, is by Haydon's admission a prime source for the argument he advances. There is nothing wrong with this, because Stansfield Turner is a highly credible authority whose vision, in the 1974 a rticle cited by Haydon, was prophetic. That being said, it is surprising that Haydon does not pay more attention to Canadian experience since the Second World War, or even between the wars. The RCN and RCAF during the Cold War also had "multi-functional" roles because they supported at least two peacekeeping missions – Suez in 1958 and UNEF in 1967. Indeed, the down side of sending destroyers to the Mediterranean in 1967 was that Nasser, even though the ships never got past Gibraltar, used that as a pretext for actions against UNEF. Was this a case of what Haydon calls "getting it wrong"? Off El Salvador between the wars and off Haiti after the Second World War the navy's role was again a combination of diplomacy and "compellence." And it is not clear why Haydon makes no reference to Canadian participation in the Persian Gulf War, which has been well documented in the monograph *Operation Friction*, by Richard Gimblett and Jean Morin. A possible reason is the desire to make this study more than a comment on Canadian naval policy, but he has left a wide field for others to plough.

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