

BOOK REVIEWS

Bella Bathurst. *The Wreckers: A Story of Killing Seas, False Lights and Plundered Ships*. Boston, MA; Houghton Mifflin Co., www.hmco.com, 2005. xxv + 326 pp., illustrations, maps, bibliography, index, US \$24.00, paper; ISBN 0 61841 6773.

Bella Bathurst explores part of the dark side of British maritime history. *The Wreckers* probes deeply into the myths and realities of a little known culture — ship wreckers and plunderers who live off the spoils of wrecks. In the twenty-first century, Great Britain's coasts remain fearsome places. Shifting sands, terrible currents, hidden reefs, a ship-killing whirlpool, winter gales, disappearing coastlines, and horrible rocks are only some of the conditions with which sailors must cope. More dangerous still are the predatory people who live by these places. Scraping a bare subsistence from the land and sea, they are often skilled small boatmen who can tear apart wrecked ships like vultures at a carcass. The sea provides what is their due whether it be caviar and lace or car engines and lumber. It is all "the bounty of the sea."

Bella Bathurst is a brilliant young writer. She is a journalist and author of *The Lighthouse Stevensons*, which won the Somerset Maugham Award, and the novel *Special* (2002). In her new, well organized book, she explores the wrecking culture at several locations: the Goodwin Sands, Pentland Firth, Scilly Isles, Western Isles, Thames Estuary, Cornwall, and the Norfolk coast. At first, the reader is happy to learn about wrecking during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There are tales a-plenty to satisfy the most curious and ghoulish: drunken orgies on beaches and a woman who gnawed the ears off a corpse to get a pair of earrings. But gradually, as the confusion mounts between rights and laws and customs of the sea and between what is flotsam and jetsam, and where property rights end and begin, we discover that a more compelling inquiry is going on. Were

false lights set to lure ships to their doom? Did human scavengers murder shipwrecked sailors and passengers rather than rescue them? As the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) is introduced and the activities of its crews at different locations around the British coast are repeatedly discussed, Bathurst adds darker questions. Is wrecking still being carried on? Are lifeboat crews involved? Of course she does not find any clear answers to her questions. When does picking up anything cast ashore become theft rather than cleaning up the beach? What are the differences between scavenging and plundering? The story of the author's constant questing around Great Britain and the on-again-off-again quality of the answers she obtains give her book a unique quality that a more documented, straightforward history would lack. Indeed, Bathurst has successfully created a grey, nebulous world that seems to exist between the land and the sea, yet separate from both. Here wreckers live and wrecking continues and moral relativism holds sway. This is a great story rather than a history. The quality of "well," "perhaps," or "maybe" is what ultimately makes this book such a fine read. *The Wreckers* is recommended to a wide audience including those who know that there may not be definitive answers.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario

Tony Booth. *Cox's Navy. Salvaging the German High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow 1924-31*. Barnsley, S. Yorkshire; Pen and Sword Books Ltd., www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2005. xvi + 213 pp., photographs, maps, sources, bibliography, index. UK £19.99, cloth; ISBN 1-84415-181-6.

The scuttling of the German High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1919 and its subsequent salvage continue to command interest amongst maritime buffs. *Cox's Navy* is the third book on the subject; the first was Gerald Bowman's *The*

Man who Bought a Navy (Harrap, 1964), and then S. C. George's *Jutland to Junkyard* (Patrick Stephens, 1973). So what is new in this book? - well, a readable account with human interest stories, which captures the essence of headstrong Ernest Cox's determined attempts to raise the warships for the value of their salvaged metals.

Encouraged by forays into recovering surplus British and German military material after the First World War, Cox approached the Admiralty and offered to raise many of the German warships scuttled on 21 June, 1919. He initially bought the salvage rights to one battleship and four destroyers in 1924 for the sum of £3000, a modest price which remained confidential for decades. Using an ex-German floating dock, he was able to raise his first ship, the destroyer *V. 70*, with brute force. Literally, men winding hand-powered winches lifted the hull from the seabed, before moving it to be beached at Lyness in the Orkneys where it could be cut up for scrap.

The author describes well the dangerous and appalling working conditions - cold, windy, dirty, the stench from rotting marine growth, and frequent accidents. But with so few jobs in the Orkneys, men were willing to work under such conditions while living in huts onshore. Cox was reluctant to listen to advice, a seat-of-the-pants engineer who learned by trial and error how to use compressed air to raise the bigger ships, most of which were upside down. He was flattered to be asked by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers to address them on his salvage work in 1932.

The author digresses into areas of limited relevance- *Mary Rose*, *Lusitania*, *Exxon Valdez*, *Kursk* and post Second World War salvage. He also makes significant errors in names, dates and places. For example, it is suggested that all Cox's ships, except those scrapped at Lyness, were broken up at Rosyth. In fact, only six were, with nine broken up at Granton, five at Inverkeithing and three at Charlestown. The claim is made "In 1914 the Royal Navy was only slightly behind the Kaiser's Imperial High Seas Fleet, which was still the superior navy" (xv) - one that few if any

First World War historians would agree with. Such unnecessary errors diminish the authority of the rest of the book. There is a three-page bibliography (and a good index), but no references are cited in the text to support claims.

The author credits Cox with more technical skill than is supported by his record. Expensive mistakes were made, unnecessary risks were taken and lives were lost. Certainly his successor at Scapa, Metal Industries (to whom he had sold six raised battleships for demolition at Rosyth) and who bought him out for only £3500 in 1933, had a low opinion of Cox and his plant, most of which they soon scrapped. The 'very astute businessman' at best broke even after raising thirty-two ships in eight years at Scapa, whereas Metal Industries made huge profits from their salvage work there in the 1930s. They bought a battleship wreck from the Admiralty for only £750, which once raised and broken up yielded a profit of about £60000, equivalent to £2-3 million today. Cox, however, made money from his land scrap operations under the name Cox & Danks, before selling out to MI after the Second World War.

S.C. George's recently reprinted account of Cox's operations is more technical and has more illustrations, while Bowman brought a journalistic eye to Cox's work, but the author brings to life this impetuous entrepreneur, who captured the public's imagination at the time. If you have read the two other books, you will not find very much that is new, but if you have not, the author captures the flavour of the man and the drama of the operations, holding the reader's attention, despite the book's shortcomings.

Ian Buxton
Tynemouth, UK

Dennis Brown. *Salmon Wars: The Battle for the West Coast Salmon Fishery*. Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing [www.harbourpublishing.com], 2005. 408 pp., photographs, end notes, index. CDN/US \$ 25.00, paper; ISBN 1-55017-351-0.

In July of 1997, news of angry Canadian fishermen blockading an Alaska-bound ferry shocked many citizens of both nations. Newspaper and television commentators scrambled to explain this seemingly sudden outburst of emotion and near violence. Many were surprisingly accurate in their assessment of the immediate causes, but no one has put the incident in its broader historical context than Dennis Brown has with *Salmon Wars*. This narrative of events by one intimately involved in them navigates its way through two major issues in Canada's west coast salmon fishery.

The first is the Canada-US Pacific salmon dispute. The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty was widely hailed as a new era of cooperation between the two countries in salmon management. But almost from the beginning, a combination of enhanced escapement goals for the Fraser River and a circumstantially advantageous "cap" system for the Americans (rather than a percentage of the catch) placed Canadian fishermen at a significant disadvantage in harvesting their salmon. When Canada informed the US that the cap had been reached, the response was to shift back to a percentage of the catch. Brown argues that US violations of the treaty and decreasing catches for Canadian fishermen created intense political pressure on Canadian fisheries management. It also engendered growing anger toward American fishermen who intercepted more than their fair share of Canadian-bound salmon. As Brown weaves through the tangled morass of provincial and national politics to explain the Canadian government's Pacific Salmon Treaty stances, he portrays the United States' position as single-minded and not really subject to similar types of pressures by its stakeholders regarding the treaty. Research on the US side may have resulted in a more balanced judgment.

The second issue Brown explores is the story of the radical restructuring of the Canadian salmon fleet. After years of decreasing harvests, Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans began to study ways to maintain the long-term sustainability of British Columbia's salmon fishery. Beginning with the Pearse report and moving systematically through Don

Cruikshank's alternative plan, the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy, the Mifflin Plan, and David Anderson's conservation measures, Brown does an admirable, and inflammatory, job of negotiating the tangled web of salmon politics. Few major figures escape his critical evaluation. Brown accuses Mifflin of waging a "civil war" on Canada's fishermen, while politicians like Cruikshank and Clark, with what he sees as sensible plans, get thwarted by Ottawa.

Brown writes with the passion of an advocate and activist. He served as a fishery policy advisor to Glen Clark and in various positions for the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union. The only innocents in Brown's story are the Canadian fishermen and the communities that support them. American fishermen, especially Alaskans, bully their neighbors. The United States government is duplicitous in its dealings with Canada. His partisan approach is clear as he traces industry and union campaigns to head off government restructuring. While the book is well-researched, its approach leaves little room for alternative perspectives. What one calls an unmitigated disaster, another may consider a case study for success. Brown uses the Adams River runs as an example of the problems and possibilities of protecting this valuable resource. The missing run of 1994 and the surprising abundance of 2002 can provide any number of lessons, many of them supporting the government plans that he so dislikes.

In the end, *Salmon Wars* is an important contribution to the literature of the Pacific salmon fisheries.

Montgomery Buell
College Place, Washington

Elizabeth Kauffman Bush. *America's First Frogman - The Draper Kauffman Story*. Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, www.usnip.org, 2004. 221 pp., photographs, appendix, index. US \$28.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-098-6.

Perhaps unfairly, it's difficult to imagine today's

youth making the same sacrifices as did that same age group during the Second World War. Rather than avoiding service, most people, at all levels of society, did their best to serve in whatever capacity they could. In *America's First Frogman*, Elizabeth Bush tells the story of one such individual. He was captured by the Germans when serving as an ambulance driver in France in 1940; then commissioned into the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve where he was involved in bomb disposal; and later he went on to set up the US Navy's underwater demolition school and subsequently serve during the island hopping campaigns in the Pacific. Draper Kauffman was the author's older brother.

The Kauffman family are connected to the American "aristocracy" - George Bush, Senior, provided the foreword - but other than a surprise appearance by Wallis Simpson (later Duchess of Windsor), there is little name dropping. Nevertheless, this is no scholarly work (clues being the lack of footnotes and bibliography). It is fundamentally a published "family" history of Kauffman's war service. That's not to say it's a bad book - not at all. It is a pleasant read, well suited to sitting dockside over the summer. This reviewer picked up a few items that were hitherto unknown to him: among others, the fact that American cruisers, carriers and battleships were each to have a trained bomb disposal officer serving on board (67) - one of those places where footnotes are sorely missed. More importantly, it might just whet the reader's interest to learn more about the US Navy's underwater demolition teams (UDTs).

In addition to the number of interesting "factoids." for example, the way in which Kauffman had his UDT men marked up with paint to measure water depths, (125), the discerning reader will also be able to tease out some useful background information. Noteworthy is the very informal, ad hoc, nature of the UDTs - and their training arrangements. Enthusiasm, dedication and a certain amount of serendipity all played a part in their success. Also visible are the usual "turf wars" inherent in all large organizations - which seem to be especially pronounced in the American armed services. There was disagreement between the

Marines with responsibility for landing on Tinian and Admiral Hill, the overall commander - the result was a joint Marine/Naval reconnaissance of the beaches. Later, during the Iwo Jima landings, it was Kauffman who took responsibility for the mistaken claim that the sand on the beaches would support wheeled vehicles. In fact, Kauffman's UDT men performed superbly; it was the interpretation of the data which was faulty, and perhaps symptomatic of the lack of integration between the naval UDTs and the Marines.

Post-war, Kauffman joined the regular US Navy and went on to have a successful naval career, retiring as a Rear-Admiral in 1973. He "crossed the bar" in 1979 (? - the year of his death isn't recorded!). Unfortunately, only the barest highlights of his subsequent commands are mentioned: Superintendent, US Naval Academy, late 1960s; Commander, US Naval Forces, Philippines, 1969-1970; Commander, Naval Base, Great Lakes, 1970-1973. No doubt he had an important influence on the training and ethos of the Vietnam and post-Vietnam US Navy, but the researcher will have to look elsewhere to learn anything about it.

In short, *America's First Frogman* is a useful source of colour and background for the writer who decides to tackle a proper biography of Draper Kauffman - an American naval officer deserving of one.

William Schleihauf
Pointe des Cascades, Quebec

William S. Crooker. *Pirates of the North Atlantic*. Halifax, NS; Nimbus Publishing Ltd., www.nimbus.ns.ca, 2004. vii + 136 pp., illustrations, glossary, bibliography. CDN \$14.95, paper; ISBN 1-55109-513-0.

Much attention has been focused on tales of piracy set in the exotic location of the Caribbean, but until recently, relatively little attention has been given to piracy in the North Atlantic. Although it is not the sort of detailed scholarly analysis of piracy that Marcus Rediker provides in his account of Atlantic piracy in

Villains of All Nations, William Crooker's newest book paints a vivid picture of the rich and interesting history of piracy in Atlantic Canada. Through a selection of well researched adventure stories of some of the most "notorious, depraved, and interesting" pirates to work the east coast of North America, Crooker brings Atlantic Canadian history to life in *Pirates of the North Atlantic*.

The collection consists of a series of short essays on a mixture of infamous pirates such as William Kidd and Blackbeard, less widely known pirates such as John Phillips and Thomas Pound, and several ships and locations in Atlantic Canada associated with piracy, such as the *Saladin*, the *Mary Celeste*, and Isle Haut. *Pirates of the North Atlantic* is an engaging introduction to the major characters in Atlantic Canadian piracy. Some stories offer straightforward accounts of historical events, while others, such as his sketches of William Kidd, Black Bart, and Isle Haut, incorporate local legend and folklore. The addition of these elements underscores the effect this history of encounters with pirates has had on Atlantic Canadian culture, but never in a way which compromises the historical accuracy of the narratives themselves. When Crooker crosses over into the realm of speculation, he does so openly by posing the difficult questions which arise from the historical narratives, and does not impose his own opinion by trying to answer them.

Creating a work that is entertaining while maintaining historical accuracy is not always an easy thing for a writer to do, but Crooker manages this task quite well. When he presents facts they are well researched, but he also includes details such as local legends surrounding particular pirates which give a sense of immediacy to inhabitants of and visitors to Atlantic Canada. Such legends and speculations do not, however, creep into the narratives themselves, and instead frame the tales in a way that arouses curiosity and interest. Crooker's ability to keep the facts and the speculation separate is one of the biggest strengths of this book as it enables him to play on the romance and the wonder associated with piracy by using

it to encapsulate the well-researched accounts of the major events in the lives of these historical figures.

Pirates of the North Atlantic does not claim to take an academic approach to piracy; nonetheless, Crooker has done his research and draws on a variety of sources including academic studies by Robert Ritchie and Phillip Gosse, archival material, newspapers, and historical society holdings. The result is a collection which is very accessible, but which does not sacrifice historical integrity. One may read it simply as a collection of pirate adventures, but it also functions as a who's who of piracy in the North Atlantic. Those looking for an introduction to this area of history will find it a light and enjoyable read, but will also find the well-rounded bibliography quite helpful.

Crooker's *Pirates of the North Atlantic* is both entertaining and informative. It is not the sort of detailed academic study that specialists in the field demand, but it is a carefully researched collection that is a great introduction for those who have some interest in piracy and Atlantic Canadian history. As a contribution to maritime studies it is valuable in that it is bound to generate further interest among non-specialists and introduce the public to the exciting history of piracy in Atlantic Canada.

Heather Doody
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Peter Davies-Garner. *RMS Titanic. A Modelmaker's Manual*. London; Chatham Publishing, www.chathampublishing.com. Distributed in the US by Stackpole Books, 2005. 150 pp., photographs, illustrations, appendices including recommended reading. US \$39.95, cloth, ISBN 1-86176-227-5.

Davies-Garner, a full-time model maker and a trained architect working for architectural clients, using architectural modelling techniques, also builds ship models, essentially using architectural materials and techniques. In 2001, he was commissioned to build an eighteen-foot long model of *Titanic*, at a scale of 1:48 for

Titanic - The Exhibition, in Orlando, Florida. Despite the fact that he recognized that an accurate model of *Titanic* would probably never be built, he explains how he accomplished the project, producing what is undoubtedly the most accurate model of the liner built to date, now known as the Orlando model.

The author finalized plans he started in 1996 by studying two hundred existing *Titanic* plans at Harland & Wolff, rare material held by private collectors, various *Titanic* Associations, and wreck footage. Bringing model building and architectural skills together, Davies-Garner had the information from which to build the model. The book includes more than four hundred photographs and line drawings which, while providing a record of the plans and processes used to create the model, also contains rare photographs of *Titanic*, and of her sister ship *Olympic*. Sheer lines (profile), Half-breadth plan, Outboard profile, and the Body plan (station lines) drawings are thoughtfully provided inside the end covers, with overlaps built into the first two drawings to allow for accurately matching the bow and stern sections. Throughout the book, plans illustrate the relevant chapters so that the reader can refer to a specific plan, where needed.

There are seven pages of superb colour photographs of the model, providing a great visual representation of what *Titanic* probably looked like when she sailed on her maiden and final voyage. Well organized, the book contains the following chapters; A forward by Ken Marschall, a noted *Titanic* artist and long-time student of the ship; an introduction by the author; a short description of the loss of the *Titanic*; notes on builders' models; followed by chapters starting with the construction of the Hull, Propellers, and the Display Base; Shell Plating and the Rudder; Well Decks; Poop Deck; Forecastle Deck; B Deck; Promenade Deck; Boat Deck; Deckhouses, Officers Quarters, Lounge Roof, No. 3 Funnel Deckhouse, No. 4 Funnel Deckhouse, First Class Smoking Roof, and the Second Class Entrance Boat Deck; Funnels; The Lifeboats and Davits, 30 ft. Lifeboats, 25 ft. Cutters, 27.5 ft. Englehardt Collapsibles, and Davits; Masts, Rigging and

Flags. The construction is followed with three appendices, model kits, colour chart, and recommended reading, primarily aimed at model builders.

Construction starts with Davies-Garner discussing two approaches he uses to build his ship model hulls; the first is the well-known lift construction method, commonly called "bread and butter construction"; and then the approach used to build this hull, which he refers to as plank-on-frame construction. In fact, the approach used is modified plank-on-bulkhead where the spaces between the faces of the faired bulkheads were filled in with short lengths of wood, glued and nailed into place, as opposed to planking the hull, where lofted strakes would be installed to the outside edges of the faired bulkheads. Two heavy alloy box beams were built into the hull for support and rigidity. This approach was a logical way to build this, or any other, large ship model hull. With the hull built, it was ready for planing, sanding, filling, and priming, using the edges of the bulkheads and card templates as guides.

Following the hull fairing, shell, or hull plating took four months to complete using Styrene™ as the plating material, with rivets punched into the plates from the back of the sheet. The plating used information from the plating diagrams of *Titanic*, along with a study of photographs of the plating and rivet configuration, replicating the outward appearance of the plating on the *Titanic* beautifully. With the hull painted, it is difficult to determine whether one is looking at plating on the original vessel, or a similar area on the model. The effect achieved is a remarkable piece of modelling.

The model decks were made of maple veneer, with birch veneer glued to it at right angles for strength. Plank caulking seams, including butt joints and those around fittings, were drawn on using templates as guides for the various deck sections. Pre-fitted, when completed these deck sections were given a coat of matt varnish, then glued to the sub-decks. Construction of the many deckhouses continued using Styrene™ as the primary material, backed up where necessary with wood for strength.

Most fittings were resin cast from master patterns made for each fitting or type of fitting. In some cases pattern sections were too thin to resin cast; these fittings were built up as needed. The four funnels were constructed by wrapping thin, scored plywood around bulkheads, and then plating with Styrene™ to which rivets had been added. Everything was painted before being installed on the model. The result is an absolutely stunning model by any standard.

A minor criticism would be the lack of an index or of a glossary. While this might present a slight problem to the uninitiated, neither presents a problem to those familiar with ship or model building terminology. Otherwise, this book is highly recommended to model builders and anyone interested in *Titanic*, her construction, and her history.

N.R. Cole
Toronto, Ontario

Jonathan R. Dull. *The French Navy and the Seven Years' War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, www.nebraskapress.unl.edu, 2005. xix + 445 pp., maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US \$35, £26.95, cloth; ISBN 0-8032-1731-5.

Thirty years ago, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy 1774-1787* by Jonathan Dull (Princeton, NJ, 1975) significantly refined our understanding not only of the role played in that conflict by the French navy but also of the international dimension of the American Revolution. With *The French Navy and the Seven Years' War*, Dull pushes his study of "arms and diplomacy" further back into the eighteenth century. Like the previous work, the focus here is not an operational study of the French navy at war - events like the Minorca campaign of 1756 or the Louisbourg campaign of 1758, though discussed with clarity and insight, are covered in a matter of paragraphs. Rather, as Dull explains in his preface, French naval campaigns and operations were part and parcel of an extremely complicated array of

considerations, and of necessity he must explain how the policies, diplomatic priorities, and principal personalities of each belligerent ultimately shaped the performance of the French navy. In a sense (and with apologies to von Clausewitz), Dull shows how the French naval war was a continuation of French policy by other means.

The book, therefore, begins with an introductory chapter on European diplomatic developments in the years between the War of the Austrian Succession and the outbreak of hostilities in 1754, and closes with an epilogue that links the events of this book with those of Dull's previous work. The eight chapters of the main body cover the war year by year, with attention in each chapter given first to the European diplomatic and strategic priorities for that year in their full complexity, then to a careful delineation of the way in which these gave shape to military campaigns. Only then does Dull analyse the role played by the French navy in fulfilling war strategies, for (let there be no mistake about this) French war planners recognized from the very beginning that, crucial though it was to a successful outcome in the war, the French navy would play a supportive rather than a primary role in the French war effort. At the risk of over-simplifying, the task of the navy was to avoid losing the war; the task of winning the war fell to the army and France's allies in Europe. Thus, the challenge facing the French navy in 1757 was to forestall British success in North America long enough for France and Austria to secure military success in Europe and thereby force a peace. The French navy did its part with a remarkable performance that year, incurring almost no losses and saving Louisbourg, though this was thanks in considerable measure to inadequate resources which undermined British plans. Still, French war planners knew full well that such good fortune was unlikely to be repeated in 1758. It was therefore increasingly up to the army to bring the war to the end; whatever the navy could do, victory would depend on events in Hanover and Silesia (88-90).

Of necessity, then, analysis of the war is quite complicated, thanks to the many, many

factors that shaped and constrained decisions - myriad major and minor powers, the personalities of monarchs and statesmen, domestic concerns as well as international ones, economic as well as social factors. As readers will discover, the many parties that went to war between 1754 and 1762 were not aligned in a simple bipolar array. Instead, the Seven Years' War was really a collection of wars all fought at the same time, wars in which allies in one conflict could - and did - stand apart in others, so that each action, each decision, each campaign was governed by a sometimes confusing array of considerations and possibilities. The success with which Dull lays all this out makes this book a *tour de force*, much like his previous work. Indeed, the two works can be seen very much as companions. Yet the earlier book was much more heavily based on primary sources; this one, in contrast, is more a synthesis of secondary sources. This is not meant as a criticism, only as an observation of what is probably quite unavoidable, given the much greater breadth of what Dull sets out to explain.

Throughout, the author offers intriguing insights and assessments. One of his goals is to rehabilitate the reputation of Louis XV as a monarch whose role in directing the French war effort was far from insignificant. Indeed, Dull maintains in his preface that "Louis XV's role in the war ultimately was heroic, for he more than anyone else was the saviour of the French navy" (xii). Elsewhere, he praises La Gallisonière's defeat of Admiral Byng at Minorca, not for his skill "in handling his ships in battle but in his willingness to subordinate his concerns as a fleet commander to the greater strategic needs of his country" (54). Dull consistently praises the French navy for its performance in the face of profound difficulties; steady losses of merchant shipping as the war unfolded not only caused shortages of sailors that were exacerbated by disease but also weakened the fiscal capacity of the French government to support a protracted war. The consequences could be immediate and profound; the minister of Marine did his best in 1758 to support Louisbourg and Québec, but the

shortages of sailors forced him to send ships and reinforcements individually or in small groups, "as soon as they were ready, before their crews deserted or became ill." As a result, they were easily intercepted or diverted away from their destination (105-106).

In the end, the French war effort faced defeat, though the peace negotiated in 1762 and 1763 limited the losses suffered by France and its allies. By then, the priority of the Duc de Choiseul was to preserve "France's ability to continue to compete as a naval power" (243), thus anticipating the revival of the French navy and the war of revenge examined in Dull's earlier work. Choiseul succeeded in this endeavour in considerable measure by preserving French access to the Newfoundland fisheries. It was a priority that had undermined earlier negotiations in 1761 because of the way it became a *sine qua non*, yet one in which the king gave his foreign minister decisive support. An English diplomat observed that Choiseul's obsession with the fishery was a "*folie*" (198) and so, perhaps, it was. Still, it might have helped his readers had Dull explained that obsession more carefully - the perception of the fishery as a "nursery for seamen" and therefore, as a powerful element in naval recruitment, particularly in a war where shortages of seamen had played so critical a role in the navy's performance, is taken as a given, and not explained as carefully as it should have been.

Still, such criticism is relatively minor; it certainly does not detract from what is both an impressive and an important addition to the literature. *The French Navy and the Seven Years' War* will for years to come be an essential addition to the library of specialists and students of eighteenth-century naval (and diplomatic) history alike.

Olaf Uwe Janzen
Corner Brook, Newfoundland

Gerald L. Duskin and Ralph Segman. *If the Gods are Good. The Epic Sacrifice of the HMS Jervis Bay*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, www.usnip.org. 2004. xii + 270 pp.,

illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. US \$28.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-819-7.

HMS *Jervis Bay* is one of those great inspirational touchstones of the Royal Navy's story in the Second World War. In the waning daylight hours of 5 November, 1940, the German pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer* had penetrated the Denmark Strait through characteristic mid-Atlantic bad weather to initiate a remarkable 161-day rampage through Allied shipping channels. Few ships in RN service had the speed to both catch her and deal with her 11-inch guns.

Scheer's first victims, the thirty-six merchant ships of Convoy HX-84 out of Halifax, had only one escort. HMS *Jervis Bay* was officially designated an "armed merchant cruiser." The reality, however, was that she was an elderly converted merchant ship of some 14,000 tons, with a crew of 254, a top speed of 15 knots, an outdated fire control system and mounting seven outmoded 6-inch guns. A M C 's were a class of last resort made necessary by the lack of proper escort ships in the RN. Nonetheless, her captain, E.S. Fogarty Fegen, RN, had the right stuff and a dedicated cohesive crew. *Jervis Bay* set course straight at the enemy.

The one-sided engagement from the greater range of *Scheer's* artillery lasted only twenty-four minutes before the escort was a blazing hulk with all her guns out of action. Abandoned, she remained afloat for some time, still drawing fire for nearly two more hours before *Scheer's* captain, Theodor Krancke, was satisfied the A M C was no threat. Only sixty-five *Jervis Bay* men ultimately survived, but their sacrifice furnished precious time for the convoy to scatter into the blackening night. Thirty-one ships escaped to eventually carry their badly-needed cargoes to Blighty.

When the word got out, much was made the remarkable story of sailors valiantly doing their duty to save the convoy. Captain Fegen, who had resolutely continued to fight his ship with a nearly severed arm, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross and the incident served symbolically to hearten Allied resolve at

a most desperate time in the war. Canadians were touched as well, nowhere more so than in Saint John, New Brunswick, where *Jervis Bay* had undergone a lengthy refit in 1940 and developed an association with the city. It is formally commemorated to this day — also a fitting tribute to the presence of the ship's seventeen Canadian reservist crew members.

A fourteen-year-old newspaper seller in Philadelphia was also inspired by the accounts in the local newspapers. For Gerald L. Duskin, the *Jervis Bay's* encounter with *Admiral Scheer* became a lifelong interest, which he actively pursued during his career as an economist. He collected secondary and primary source material for over twenty years, filling a room with documentation of even the most remote facets of the *Jervis Bay/Admiral Scheer* saga. The most valuable elements he collected were interview transcripts with naval veterans, as well as merchant seamen, family members and others who had some personal involvement in the episode. After retirement, Mr Duskin fell in to a collaboration with veteran journalist Ralph Segman to organize and collate the material into a cohesive account. This would have been no small challenge, given the authors' dependence on often fragmentary information. Sadly, while the project was successfully completed, Mr Duskin did not live to see the results of his hard work in print. It is a compelling legacy.

The success of *If the Gods are Good* is that it is delivered from a personal perspective. It draws and then maintains the reader's interest by putting people ahead of tactics or technology. There were interesting characters afloat, not only the captains of the fighting ships but also among the crews of these and other ships — and Duskin and Segman have recaptured these remarkable events of humanity in dire straits very well.

We are given an historical context in both political and naval terms — perhaps almost too much of the former, as well as excessive footnotes with credible but rather dated secondary sources. But the account reaches momentum as it brings together the more direct elements and factors which led to *Scheer's* encounter with Convoy H X - 84, and it becomes electric as it turns to almost second-by-second

detail of the fighting and movement of ships which were attacked and/or escaped and of the mounting toll of death and havoc which accompanied the destruction of *Jervis Bay*. The pace continues into the immediate aftermath, as survivors fought for their lives in the cold black water — some in half-submerged rafts — and hoped against hope for unlikely rescue. Because of the inherent risks to warships and merchant ships, policy forbade stopping to pick up survivors. That *Jervis Bay* survivors lived to tell the tale was only because the mostly-Swedish crew of SS *Stureholm*; having successfully evaded the pocket battleship, voted (!) to return to the scene to try to help the men who had made their escape possible. But for their survival much of this tale could not have been told.

Despite the challenges of maintaining pace in the inevitable dénouement as individuals and ships go their way, there is much of interest in terms of where some of these pathways would lead. One example is a further, almost forgotten saga of survival against the odds, which emerged when the tanker SS *San Demetrio* was discovered near Blacksod Bay, County Mayo, Ireland, on the morning of 13 November, by a tugboat which had remarked signs of "SOS" and "HELP" all over her. Her crew had abandoned ship when *Scheer's* guns set her afire on 5 November. Two mornings later, however, sixteen survivors in one flimsy boat encountered their ship again. They were in such poor shape from two nights exposure on the stormy sea that they risked reboarding the ship, despite the evident perils of petroleum and combustion. It was another victory against the odds by a small but resourceful group of merchant seamen.

The authors have given us a well-documented account of the *Jervis Bay* saga which will probably remain definitive and it certainly deserves a place in any maritime library. It is also well written, although efforts to enliven the narrative with metaphors were occasionally a bit jarring in terms of the *gravitas* of some of the context. Nonetheless, for this reader, I was deeply moved at certain points and cannot recall any account of the war at sea furnishing such a deep sense of what it really meant in personal terms for those involved,

aside perhaps from Nicholas Monsarrat's *The Cruel Sea*. But that was fiction.

John Griffith Armstrong
Nepean, Ontario

Ray Edinger. *Fury Beach. The Four-year Odyssey of Captain John Ross and the Victory*. New York, N. Y.; Berkley Books, www.penguinputnam.com, 2003. xx + 279 pp., map, illustrations, bibliography, index. C D N \$34.50, cloth; ISBN 0-425-18845-0.

Captain Sir John Ross, R N, strides — or rather ought to stride — the history of Canada's far north in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1818, after a notable career in the Great War of 1793-1815, Ross commanded one of the first voyages sent out from London. In 1851, he was at Beechey Island when the lonely graves of Sir John Franklin's men were found. His career in between was one of the most successful of all of the explorers of the age, and he deserves to be better known

In *Fury Beach*, author Edinger concentrates on Ross's attempt to discover the North West Passage, an expedition financed by the gin-distiller Sir Felix Booth in 1829. Ross was an innovator and one of his aims was to prove the utility of steam-power in Arctic exploration. *Victory* was also one of the smallest vessels to penetrate northern waters. The engine was one of Ericsson's failures, but undeterred, Ross had reached 70° N 92° W by September where *Victory* became icebound for three years. According to Ross, the ice "haunted and vexed us... became odious to our sight ... [and] the sameness of everything weighed our spirits." The voyage was intended to last two years: Ross kept his men alive by learning from the Inuit and by eating salmon and fox. In May 1832 abandonment of *Victory* became inevitable and Ross commenced a series of portages in almost impossible conditions, taking a month to travel 300 miles northwards from Victory Harbour, on Boothia Peninsula, to Fury Beach on the coast of Somerset Island. Ross's plain statement of fact belies the courage, stamina, and feats of

endurance which he inspired in his people: they carried "2 of our boats 40 miles in advance and there make a depot of provisions, that is all we could spare which at 'A allowance would keep us alive until September We slept or rather took rest when fatigued by digging a trench in the snow, which being covered with canvas on 2 oars laid across and then snow, we crept in at the lee-end & by keeping close together prevented being frozen to death."

At Fury Beach, Ross's expedition was saved by supplies left behind after the earlier shipwreck of William Edward Parry's HMS *Fury*. The crossing of Prince Regent Inlet, however, and the passage of Lancaster Sound (which Ross had once thought was blocked by mountains) was thwarted by the onset of bad weather and the expedition was condemned to a fourth winter in the Arctic. Never lost for energy and resourcefulness, Ross supervised the building of a shelter from wood, canvas and snow which he called Somerset House, after the home of the Navy Board in London.

Remarkably, in those four years Ross lost only three men: one to scurvy and two to diseases which the deceased had brought with them. One-third of the others fell ill, but no one was abandoned: Ross's own war injuries reopened but he recovered. Ross wrote that "we ...had ceased equally to hope or to fear" but he never gave up. Despite plummeting temperatures, he wrote letters and reports to the secretary of the Admiralty and the hydrographer, not knowing if they would ever be read: "you will excuse the bad writing for my fingers are very cold and the ink has frozen several times - where I shall conclude this sheet God only knows."

In August 1833, Ross reached Baffin Bay where, by extraordinary coincidence, he found the whaler *Isabella*, the same ship which he had commanded on his 1818 expedition. Ross's return was stunning news. Not only had he been away far longer than any previous Arctic expedition - and far longer than nearly all subsequent journeys, he had lost so few men, advanced European knowledge of the Inuit including their hunting methods, diet and survival techniques, sledged as far west as King

William Island, charted several hundred miles of coast and marked the Magnetic North Pole. Subsequent expeditions might not have come to grief if they had learned from Ross.

Unfortunately, Ross's reputation remained tarnished by his earlier conclusion that Lancaster Sound was blocked by the Crocker Mountains, a mistake for which he was unfairly lampooned by that archetypal armchair critic, John Barrow. Another problem was Ross's second-in-command in 1829-1833, his nephew, James Clark Ross. In many sources, the Rosses's achievements are sometimes conflated, yet the two men were very different. While both believed in the superiority of British culture, John Ross, who had been tested in war and spent a lifetime in the Royal Navy, was the better leader. His nephew, James Clark Ross, behaved with pomposity and arrogance both towards the Inuit and the *Victory's* crew. Perhaps more typical of the Victorian era, he resented his uncle's command of the expedition and subsequently disparaged John Ross's achievements.

All these issues are touched upon in Edinger's very readable account, but since he has not drawn on the primary resources which are available in Cambridge and London, *Fury Beach* is not yet the definitive biography which John Ross's character and accomplishments deserve. His leadership alone, years in advance and in level of achievement of Scott and Shackleton in the next century merit closer study. Nevertheless, this is an important book which deserves a wide readership, and with the bicentenary of Ross's voyages approaching, it will help reinstate him as a British and Canadian hero.

Peter G. Hore
Iping, Hampshire, UK

Markus Eder. *Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy of the Seven Years War, 1755-1763*. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., www.ashgate.com, 2004. 208pp., tables, appendices, bibliography, index. US \$99.95/ £52.50, hardback; ISBN 0-7546-

3507-4.

The image of the eighteenth-century Royal Navy has long been overly influenced by the nineteenth-century writings of John Masefield, dominated by the lash and other harsh punishments supposedly routinely inflicted by tyrannical captains. Markus Eder has built on the work of Nicholas Rodger's *The Wooden World* (1986) and studies by John Byrn, Arthur Gilbert and others to refute this picture of life at sea, while at the same time firmly placing a detailed study of the naval legal system during the Seven Years' War within the broader framework of British criminal and legal historiography.

Drawing upon general and specialist works, Eder successfully shows the relevance and importance of an examination of the naval legal system in such hotly debated areas as: the size and patterns of crime and punishments; the severity of the penal code; the function of criminal law; crime and its dependence on social and economic developments; the social origins, age and gender of those involved; the conduct of eighteenth-century criminal trials; and regional variations in patterns of crime and punishment. The specifics of each theme in the naval world, and the broader implications in the larger historiography, are discussed in turn.

In this Eder succeeds remarkably well. His detailed examination of court-martial records and ship logs, for more than 250 ships on six Royal Navy stations (Home Waters, the Mediterranean, North America, the East Indies, the Leeward Islands, and Jamaica) is an impressive effort. It might have been useful, for other researchers working in this and related areas, if the author had included an appendix with a list of the names of the ships examined, with references to the records for each. This may, however, have been a space limitation imposed by the publisher rather than an omission by the author.

Eder believes that the interaction between the naval and civil legal systems show that "the navy was not a secluded organization that could act independently from the control of the civil law courts" (150). From time to time, sailors brought suits against their officers in

Assizes, which had a higher indictment rate than courts-martial for such offences as mistreatment of seamen or impressment disputes. In the same light, the author overturns previously accepted views and provides new insight into the integration of criminals and other undesirable social groups into the lower deck by magistrates. A special focus is given to the *Articles of War* of 1749, which, unlike the civil law, provided a single all-inclusive penal code for the Navy, and allowed for the system of courts-martial with all of its quirks. Eder analyses the composition and conduct of the latter and compares its inner workings to the civil assizes, concluding that the hierarchical naval courts were more elitist than trial juries. Less than one per cent of the naval population were entitled to function as judges of a court-martial (where they, unlike their civil counterparts, could also act as prosecutor at the same time). This compares to the twenty to thirty per cent of the male population who could participate as trial jurors (58-62). A naval court also had the ability to award the death penalty on a simple majority of votes, unlike its civil counterpart where unanimous decisions were required. Eder believes this was acceptable due to the longer period of consideration, often days, taken by a court-martial, and the strict control of its audience, which, unlike in the assizes, could not influence the presiding officials.

The author also confidently dives into the shark-infested waters of the ideological function of eighteenth-century British, and specifically naval law. Eder contends that the elitism of naval justice and its strict penal code did not necessarily imply that severe sentences would be awarded, by showing that conviction rates in capital cases were slightly lower, and pardon rates slightly higher, than in the assizes (78-80). Despite the introduction of the death penalty for many offences in the *Articles of War* of 1749, compared to its 1661 predecessor, there was little effect on rates of capital punishment - in some ways a mirror image of the deterrence effect of the civil "bloody code" legislation analysed by Langbein (139-141). For some important offences, particularly desertion, punishments were being liberalized via summary instead of capital treatment, no doubt in an

attempt to ease the Royal Navy's constant manning problem.

Those actively researching the social history of the navy will find Eder's discussion of regional variability in the system of naval law most interesting. The number of courts-martial, the size and composition of the court, and patterns of crime all varied from station to station, as did summary punishments. Here numerous statistical breakdowns are provided of both the types of crimes being committed, the severity of punishment, both summary and capital, and the use of mercy. Although perhaps difficult to achieve, one useful analysis not undertaken is that of the role of individual personalities serving upon courts-martial. Were some presiding officers or court presidents more likely to press for harsher sentences, or frown upon forwarding the case for consideration for mercy, in a similar fashion to the influence of individual captains on summary punishment aboard ship?

Overall, Eder falls between two extremes - he rejects the views of Rodger and others regarding the mild and informal nature of naval justice, while concluding that it was generally no more severe than the civil legal system. This concisely written work is well worth acquiring for those with an interest in legal or naval history for this period. In addition to the detailed and original research, the overview of existing historiography on British criminal and legal history and its interrelations with the world of the Royal Navy is well worth the price of an Ashgate publication.

Martin Hubley
Ottawa, Ontario

Christopher A. Ford and David A. Rosenberg.
The Admirals' Advantage: US Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War. Annapolis, MD; US Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2005. xxi + 219 pp., photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 37.50, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-282-2.

This is a careful *organizational* rather than

operational history. The authors start by explaining that "operational intelligence" is difficult to pin down with precision. They then characteristically give several definitions by others. The most straightforward is a 1948 official statement that it is intelligence "directly concerned with the operating forces...intended for use by the operating forces in the near or immediate future" and tailored for use by different levels of command. *The Admirals' Advantage* is based on a classified symposium by US naval intelligence practitioners held in 1998. The text is heavily footnoted on the symposium proceedings — which remain tantalizingly classified. Since the authors, both US Naval Reserve officers who were part of a team assigned to create a record of this event, have produced a narrative which received departmental clearance, the book reads much like an official history. There are frequent quotations of verdicts delivered by various senior American officers, (the same point is often made repeatedly by several speakers), whose functions are not always explained but are presumably familiar to US Navy intelligence insiders. The text traces the organizational evolution of operational intelligence in the US Navy with meticulous attention. For these reasons, *The Admirals' Advantage* will appeal most members of the American "intelligence community."

The book starts by tracing how the fusing of information from disparate sources in a single centre to create operational intelligence originated in the Admiralty just prior to the Spanish Civil War. The concepts were later adapted by the US Navy to help combat the German U-boat campaign. During the Cold War, new technologies were used aggressively to produce intelligence about the Soviet Navy. The authors briefly cite the impact of the US Navy Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) starting in the Fifties, information about radar transmissions gathered by satellites starting in 1960, a new system for collecting data on electronic emissions introduced in 1976, and "fingerprinting" of the acoustic signatures of individual Soviet units, particularly submarines, also starting in 1976. Computer technology was

applied to process the vast amount of data available from these sources.

The authors also trace how institutional thinking about the Soviet naval doctrine evolved. "Mirror image" thinking by US intelligence analysts initially speculated that the Soviet order of battle was designed to carry out tasks similar to those assigned to equivalent US units. Thus as recently as 1978 the official view was that the Soviet Navy was designed for offensive operations, with interdicting NATO sea lines of communication one of its most important roles in a conflict. Around this time, the authors state, the Center for Naval Analysis began challenging the official verdict. It based its views on analysis of Soviet writings and exercise patterns. In addition, new sources of signals intelligence became available which provided fresh insights. Finally, the authors make vague reference to "some very significant HUMINT (Human intelligence, i.e. information based on statements by people) penetration of senior echelons of the soviet leadership" (80). All of these inputs caused a gradual reassessment so that by 1991, the official view saw the Soviet Navy as a primarily defensive force structured to protect submarines armed with strategic long-range missiles operating in their "bastions" off the Soviet coasts. The narrative talks about various internal teams which contributed to this evolution in thinking. As in most of the rest of the book the contributions by non-American sources are ignored. Thus, the original work by Mike Mccguire, who was active at Dalhousie in the Seventies and then at the Brookings Institute in Washington, is not mentioned, while US intelligence analysts who collaborated with him and were influenced by his thinking are cited. Mccguire developed his ground-breaking theories about Soviet missions by examining the capabilities of submarine, ship and aircraft types and demonstrating that they were not optimized for offensive tasks,

The Admirals ' Advantage asserts that it was an understanding of Soviet intentions and plans which made the US Navy's "avowedly offensive" (93) maritime strategy of the Eighties feasible. The final twenty pages cover post-Cold

War developments. Here the authors stress the advantages of continued exploitation of new technologies. They re-state observations made earlier about how well US Navy intelligence specialists apparently work with their operational counterparts and stress the importance of grooming competent analysts. Overall, *The Admirals ' Advantage* comes down to an extended argument for the importance of qualified intelligence specialists. It's obvious that US intelligence successes also depended on large-scale resources, but the authors never mention how many specialists were involved in the organizations they describe. Recommended for those with a deep interest in the organizational history of operational intelligence in the US Navy.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia

James D. Frost. *Merchant Princes. Halifax's First Family of Finance, Ships and Steel.* Toronto, ON; James Lorimer & Co. Ltd., www.formac.ca, 2003. 376 pp., photographs, chronology, tables, endnotes, index. CDN \$ 40.00, cloth: ISBN 1-55028-803-2.

James Frost has written a straightforward narrative biography of the Stairs family of Halifax. *Merchant Princes* is divided into ten chapters which tell the story of the five generations of Nova Scotian Stairs from 1789 to 1973. The heart of the book is chapters three to eight which describe the lives of William J. Stairs (1819-1906) and John F. Stairs (1848-1904), father and son. This review will concentrate on the marine aspects of *Merchant Princes*.

The family firm was actually established at Halifax in 1810 by William Machin Stairs (1789-1865) when he was a mere 21 years old. Stairs' fortunes waxed and waned with the Halifax economy. He began as a general merchant selling everything from twine and lines to Bibles. In 1813, Stairs formed a partnership with Henry Austen which was initially prosperous during the War of 1812. By 1818,

however, they were near bankruptcy. Stairs was saved by the dissolution of the partnership and by the forbearance of his former employer and trans-Atlantic supplier, William Kidston. As time went on, Stairs invested in shipping, banking, and a telegraph company, as well as enlarging his core merchandising business. But he was adamantly opposed to the railway mania that swept Nova Scotia in the 1850s, feeling it would be the ruin of the colony. William Stairs's marine business network included the Halifax Packet Company, the Union Marine Insurance Company, and the Halifax-Dartmouth Steamboat Company, as well as shares in numerous vessels. He died a wealthy man, leaving an estate valued at \$240,000. Unfortunately, while we know Stairs earned a fortune, the evidence to tell us which investments were most profitable does not appear to have survived.

William's eldest son, William J. Stairs, entered the family business in 1841. While W. J. Stairs was better known for his banking career, he did establish the Dartmouth Rope Works in 1867 which became the basis for Consumers Cordage Company in 1890. Consumers, with a capitalization of three million dollars, was one of the first industrial mergers in Canada. Stairs also invested directly in the golden age of maritime shipping, holding shares in twenty-four sailing vessels between 1859 and 1908. Unfortunately, *Merchant Princes* does not provide the data necessary to determine the profitability of the family's enterprises. This is a significant shortcoming in a business biography.

Frost does an excellent job of resurrecting the reputation of John F. Stairs, W. J. Stairs's second son. Best known in the historical literature for giving Max Aitken his start in the business world, John F. Stairs became, in fact, the most successful entrepreneur in the family, and one of the most significant Canadian businessmen of his generation. He was president of several major firms, including Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Eastern Trust Company, and Royal Securities Corporation. As a Conservative politician, Stairs served in both the Nova Scotian legislature and the federal House of Commons in Ottawa. Among the causes he promoted was

Halifax as the Dominion's winter port, complete with a government subsidized steamship line. In 1899, Stairs also became involved with fellow Nova Scotians James M. Carmichael, B. F. Pearson, and Harry Crowe in attempting to establish a steel shipyard in Halifax. They enticed George B. Hunter, chairman of the British shipbuilder C. S. Hunter (later Swan, Hunter and Wigham Richardson) to visit Halifax. The British firm did express an interest in opening a yard in the Nova Scotian capital, but first they required a tonnage subsidy from the Dominion government. This political football was kicked around until Stairs's untimely death in 1904.

This attempt to revive the glories of Maritime shipbuilding during the Laurier boom was questionable at best, and not merely because a subsidy was required. Two factors that are not acknowledged in *Merchant Princes* are the higher cost of constructing vessels in Canada as opposed to Great Britain and the collapse of world shipping markets during the first decade of the twentieth century. It is significant that Carmichael approached Stairs in 1899 because at the time, the world shipping market was prosperous but, with the conclusion of the South African War, the shipbuilding market crashed. Output remained inconsistent for the rest of the decade.

The real reason why Swan, Hunter or any other British shipbuilder did not set up shop in Canada is that there was not a large enough market for steel ships in Canada at a price Canadian shipowners were willing to pay. Canadian shipyards could not compete on price with British builders when it came to Saint Lawrence River canallers, the vessel-type most in demand by Canadian shipowners. The majority of the 100 new canallers purchased between 1900 and 1914 were constructed in Great Britain. Even after the *Dry Dock Act* of 1908 led to the establishment of new British- and American-owned shipyards in Canada, a domestic shipbuilding boom did not develop. The new yards made more money from ship repair than from building new vessels. Halifax did not become a major steel shipbuilding centre for economic reasons, not because of an anti-

Maritime political conspiracy.

Taken as a whole, *Merchant Princes* is useful addition to Canadian business historiography. While maritime historians may want to see more data on the profitability of the family's marine investments, Frost's discussion of John F. Stairs's career alone is worth the price of the book.

M. Stephen Salmon
Orleans, Ontario

Iain Gordon. *Admiral of the Blue. The Life and Times of Admiral John Child Purvis (1747-1825)*. Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., www.pen-and-sword.co.uk 2005. xvi + 272 pp., illustrations, maps, plans, appendices, index. UK £19.99, cloth; ISBN 1-84415-294-4.

This naval biography portrays a man whom the author describes as a "jobbing" admiral, the type of officer without whom the Royal Navy could not have functioned in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Few people other than serious students of naval history will have heard of John Child Purvis and certainly he was no Nelson, Jervis, Hood or Cochrane, willing to disregard Admiralty orders for the chance of glory. He never sought the limelight, no portrait of him was painted, and his naval career lacked the active patronage essential for rapid promotion. He was, instead, a stickler for established naval regulations and procedures and much of this book covers the seldom-chronicled day-to-day operational duties of the navy as opposed to the disposition and manoeuvres of great battle fleets.

Existing literature supports Gordon's description of Purvis as one of the least known early-nineteenth-century admirals. Neither Rodger's *The Command of the Ocean* (2004) nor Knight's biography of Nelson, *The Pursuit of Victory* (2005), makes mention of Purvis, even though he first hoisted his flag in 1806, well within the scope of their books. Hall, however, in his book on the Peninsular War, *Wellington's Navy* (2004), praises Purvis's role

in Cadiz during the Spanish revolt of 1808 and quotes from Admiralty and War Office documents that illustrate Purvis's skill in anticipating orders from London.

The author reminds us that great sea battles were generally the culmination of months or years of endless patrolling and blockading. Purvis, in common with the great majority of sea officers, was never present at a major fleet engagement, but his ability as a fighting commander was proven in a duel between his sloop-of-war and a more heavily-armed French corvette during the War of American Independence. In command of the *Princess Royal* in 1793, Purvis was involved in action in the Mediterranean under Sir John Jervis and, during the Siege of Toulon, he was the first British officer to confront Napoleon Bonaparte. It speaks highly of Purvis's reputation that in 1797, during the final throes of the Spithead mutiny, it was he who was selected to command the *London*, the most seriously disaffected ship in the Channel Fleet. The culmination of Purvis's long naval career came when Collingwood, desperately needing dependable support for the long blockade of Cadiz, appointed him as his second-in-command in the Mediterranean Fleet. Collingwood wrote that this task could not have been left in better hands and Purvis gave him first-class support in the vital operation of saving the Spanish fleet in Cadiz from being captured by the French. In addition, in preparing the city for siege, Purvis demonstrated considerable delicacy of conduct and diplomatic skill with the Spanish administrative authorities. In May 1810, meticulous to the last, Purvis briefed his successor on every current aspect of the command, struck his flag on the *Leda* and was pulled ashore for the last time, a rich man from the accumulation of prize money. Despite Purvis's considerable contribution to the defeat of Napoleon, he never received an honour from his sovereign. He modestly wrote to his son that even without such rewards, there was self-satisfaction in knowing that you had always deserved that which may not ultimately fall to your lot.

This is the author's second book

following *Soldier of the Raj*, his biography of Admiral Purvis's younger son Richard, and inevitably contains some overlap and repetition. His main sources are the Purvis Papers in the National Maritime Museum, the reading and organisation of which took him seven years. Approximately half of this collection is listed in an appendix, although not individually referenced in the text. Few chapters contain more than five footnotes but the book does include many useful maps, tables, abbreviations and a good bibliography. Although he visited Cadiz, Gordon does not cite any Spanish primary or secondary sources, which might be questioned by the serious maritime historian. The primary audience for this book is the reader with an interest in maritime history who will appreciate how Purvis's administrative and diplomatic skills and practical experience contributed to Britain's naval success. It is well worth its modest cover price.

Gordon's gift for meticulous research, coupled with his background as a journalist of military history, captures not just the character of his subject, but also the atmosphere and spirit of the Royal Navy during arguably the most dramatic period of its long history. Wellington, himself, acknowledged that it was maritime superiority and the variety of tasks undertaken by the navy that gave him the power to maintain his army on the Iberian Peninsula. The book takes a fresh look at the workings of sea-power and the professionalism of officers like Purvis, both on and off-shore, in the years between Trafalgar and Waterloo. Gordon's contribution to maritime studies is his skill in portraying an efficient bureaucratic naval officer, making us realise that it was exactly this type of officer that the French and Spanish navies lacked, to their cost.

Michael Clark
London, England

Christopher D. Hall. *Wellington's Navy. Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807-1814*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, www.chathamublishing.com, 2004. vii + 264

pp., maps, notes, bibliography, index. US \$39.95, cloth; ISBN 1-86176-230-5.

The year 2005 marks the bicentennial of Trafalgar, an anniversary that has produced a flood of books on Nelson, his navy and the great sea battle itself. In the midst of all the celebrations, however, it is easy to overlook the fact that, by the time Trafalgar was fought in 1805, Britain had been at war with revolutionary or imperial France for a dozen years (less an eighteen-month pause for refreshment in 1801-1803). Nelson's victory ended the immediate threat of a French invasion of Britain but it did not diminish Bonaparte's power on land which continued to increase. In the two years that followed, the self-proclaimed emperor of the French defeated, in turn, Austria, Prussia and Russia and by 1807 he stood at the zenith of his power.

The Corsican *parvenu* would have remained there for a much longer time had he not, through his ruthless ambition, that same year become involved in a protracted struggle in the Iberian peninsula—an "ulcer" as he termed it—against the regular and guerilla forces of Portugal and Spain and a small but superb British army commanded by the Duke of Wellington. The land campaigns of the seven-year long Peninsular War have resulted in an outpouring of historical literature in three languages (English, Portuguese and Spanish although, for some strange reason, there are relatively very few French works) and the subject has attracted some of the more prominent military historians in the English-speaking world. Unfortunately, the naval side of this war has not received as much attention and there is no comprehensive account of the Royal Navy's involvement in this important struggle.

Wellington's Navy is Christopher Hall's attempt to correct this historical oversight, and as the author of the well-received *British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-1815* (Manchester, 1992), a complete but cogent study of the subject, Hall possesses the professional background to do so. Starting with first principles (as one should), Hall points out that possibly no other area of Europe was better

positioned to enable the Royal Navy to assist a military land campaign than the Iberian Peninsula. Surrounded on three and a half sides by water (more than 1500 miles of coastline in all), with good deep water ports on all coasts, and with navigable rivers that provided water access to the interior, Iberia was an ideal stage for intervention by a maritime power. Most of the population of both Portugal and Spain lived on or near the coasts and, while there were some good roads between major centres, much of the land communication network was primitive in the extreme. As if all this was not advantage enough, in both countries the vicious repression of the occupying French armies—which verged on outright genocide—had created a deep hatred of the invader and a widespread guerilla movement that endlessly harassed French garrisons and provided excellent intelligence. The result was that, although there were no less than 350,000 French troops in the Iberian Peninsula in 1811, they were unable to expel Wellington's much smaller force of British regulars which numbered about 45,000. Although Hall does not overstate his case and pays due attention to the land operations, it is his thesis that naval power had a profound impact on the course of those operations and, in *Wellington's Navy*, he proves that thesis beyond debate.

When considering the role of the Royal Navy in the Peninsular War, the most striking characteristic is the sheer variety of the tasks undertaken by that service. Beyond the more conventional roles such as convoy escort, logistical support for the allied armies, amphibious transport and assaults, and seaward interdiction, British sailors also manned riverine gunboats, siege batteries, and telegraph communication points, built bridges, landed supplies for guerilla bands and assisted in getting the Spanish fleet back into service. Given British command of the sea, Wellington could report to London within a matter of days (good winds permitting) whereas, hampered by guerilla activity and the need for a large escort, it could take as much as three months for the report of a French commander to reach Paris. Just as impressive as the variety of tasks are the

statistics connected with them. Between 1808 and 1814, the navy escorted 404 convoys from the British Isles to Iberian ports, a total of some 13,247 merchantman voyages and this does not count the considerable maritime traffic with North and South America, Africa and India. Not the least of the many cargoes which the navy routinely and safely escorted from Britain to the Peninsula was the specie necessary to carry on the war—£999,000 in just one six-month period in 1811-1812.

Despite this impressive record, Wellington was not always on the best of terms with the Admiralty and constantly complained about inadequate naval support. As the author makes clear, although the Duke was a great commander on land, he never seems to have understood the fundamentals of seapower (nor, for that matter, the effect of weather on maritime operations). In early 1814, for example, Wellington stated that he only needed a minimum of naval support, and defined that minimum as being secure navigation along the entire coastline of the peninsula, regular transport of money, a weekly convoy from Lisbon, two weekly convoys from Corunna and Santander, and the maintenance of a gunboat squadron on the Adour River—and that was all! Even though the navy successfully accomplished all these tasks, the Duke continued to carp. Nonetheless, Hall's conclusion and the basis for his title, is entirely accurate: "It has always been Wellington's army that has attracted the plaudits for its Peninsular achievements: Wellington's navy is every bit as deserving" (234).

Christopher Hall has made a major and important contribution to the ever-growing literature on the Peninsular War and a substantial contribution to the study of seapower in the age of the sailing navy. *Wellington's Navy* is a book that belongs in the library of serious students of both the military and maritime aspects of the Napoleonic wars. Highly recommended.

Donald E. Graves
Almonte, Ontario

Clive Harvey and Roger Cartwright. *Cruise Britannia: The Story of the British Cruise Ship*. Stroud, UK; Tempus Publishing, www.tempuspublishing.com, 2005. 224 pp., photographs, illustrations, bibliography, index. £ 17.99, paper; ISBN 0 7524 2989 2.

Janette McCutcheon. *Cunard, A Photographic History*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing, www.tempus-publishing.com, 2004. 96 pp., photographs, illustrations. £ 19.99, paper; ISBN 0 7524 3001 7.

1957 was a fateful year in the annals of the great passenger liners of the North Atlantic in that it was the first occasion when more people crossed the ocean by air than by sea. Many companies had already foreseen this event and had adapted to cruise markets in order to offset the losses that would be suffered on the North Atlantic run. Today, as Roger Cartwright and Clive Harvey tell us, the number of Britons taking part in cruises has reached 800,000 per year, a pretty impressive number, matched only by the huge numbers of Americans tourists who can be found on cruises ranging from Alaska to the Greek Isles and Australia. In their history of the British cruise ship, Cartwright and Harvey take the reader on a pleasant voyage down memory lane, while adding some keen insight into the rise of the cruise industry to the prominence it holds to this day.

This is a well researched book with a good historical footing. The authors present their story in a very readable fashion, starting with a brief overview of the era of the transatlantic passenger service. Cunard and P&O feature heavily in the opening pages and ironically, considering the histories of so many of today's cruise ships, the first cruise ship on record was an older P&O vessel, purchased by another company in attempt to corner a market in coastal cruising. By the turn of the last century, many of the major players in the shipping world were offering cruises as a means of diversion to their clients. Things reached their peak just before the stock market crash of 1929 but rebounded through the 1930s. Cartwright and Harvey move through the various

developmental aspects of the cruise industry with ease, taking special note of a number of important and diverse influences, such as the development of school cruising, the notion of one-class cruising and the important impact on the industry of the wildly popular television program, *The Love Boat*!

Perhaps the most important feature of the book is the valuable survey of the ships themselves that the authors have presented. Proceeding alphabetically through all of the known cruise ship companies past and present, they provide a wonderful glimpse into the changing face of the cruise ship. Legendary names, such as Cunard and White Star rub shoulders with lesser lights, such as Page & Moy and Thomson Cruises. Several vessels have many lives, appearing on the rosters of more than one company over the years. Many of the ships are, in their own way, just as grand and important as the great transatlantic liners, with the celebrated P&O cruise ship *Canberra* receiving pride of place on the book's cover.

The illustrations are lavish, especially a full-colour central section, with handsome photos of the ships mixed in with some exotic promotional posters from the past. There is an extensive bibliography and a short list of relevant monthly magazines with related themes. All in all, this is an excellent little book and well worth adding to the library shelves.

For 2005, the 165th anniversary of the Cunard Line, Tempus Publishing have released *Cunard, A Photographic History*, a beautiful photographic history of the storied shipping firm with text by Janette McCutcheon. While the photographs, many of which were previously unpublished are the stars of the show, McCutcheon's writing is fluid and involving, making this a nice addition to the collection of any Cunard or liner-era aficionado.

The early history of the company is examined in some detail and features a variety of excellent period sketches and photographs, as well as a copy of a menu from RMS *Hibernia* from 1843, featuring some items that might turn the stomachs of today's cruise travellers. There are also a few indications of the dangerous nature of ocean travel in the early days,

including two superb photographs of the wreck of RMS *Malta*, one of Cunard's most celebrated early disasters. Most historians devote more time to the era of Cunard's floating palaces and McCutcheon is no exception. This is an age of great ships, with *Mauretania*, *Lusitania* and *Aquitania* leading the way in conquering the North Atlantic for Cunard. Before these three came two fine vessels, *Carmania* and *Caronia*, which feature prominently in this new book, with many superb colour plates.

Cunard's contribution to the war effort is represented by some striking images of vessels in the fleet coming to tragic ends at the hands of German submarines. The important roles of *Mauretania* and *Aquitania*, which were used as troopships, merchant cruisers and hospital ships are also touched upon. *Lusitania* was lost during the war and replaced by *Imperator*, the flag ship of the Hamburg America Line under the War Reparations Act. Flying under her new flag and rechristened *Berengaria*, she led Cunard's cruise ship domination between the wars.

McCutcheon devotes some time to the careers of *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth*, the company's most popular later vessels, detailing their construction and heroic work during the Second World War. The steady decline of the industry after the war is grimly painted in a series of photos of beautiful vessels on their way to be broken up for scrap. *Queen Elizabeth* was consumed by fire in Hong Kong in 1972 but *Queen Mary* still survives, a shadow of her former glory in Long Beach, California.

The book then moves through Cunard's early days in the cruise industry and the building of *Queen Elizabeth 2* and concludes with a glimpse into the company's new star, the lavish *Queen Mary 2*. McCutcheon's passion for her subject is never in doubt and the book features a lovely dedication to not only the Cunard Line, but also to two ships which have touched her life. The quality of the photographic reproductions is quite superb and the occasional use of colour images is welcome. There is no index and sadly, no record of sources for the images, which is a pity as so many of them are so memorable. Nevertheless, this is a worthy addition to the large volume of works on the

Cunard Line and one that contributes a great deal through its images.

Richard MacMichael
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen. *Navies in Northern Waters, 1721-2000*. London, UK: Frank Cass, www.fankcass.com, 2004. x + 344 pp., notes on contributors, bibliography, index. US \$70.00, cloth; ISBN 0-7146-5541-4.

The interrelationships between naval power, economic capacity, industrial development, international law and diplomacy are essential fields of study for states attempting to establish some form of sea power. The great maritime nations have demonstrated the ability to balance these issues, while continental nations that have ventured into the race for sea power have most often failed to achieve their goals. But what of the lesser powers that do not 'fit' into either camp? How do smaller coastal states with extensive maritime areas of responsibility attend to their duties within the limits of their resources without coming into conflict with their influential neighbour states? These questions are addressed in *Navies in Northern Waters* through an examination of the history of those states bordering the North and Baltic Seas during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The results of a workshop organised by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, held in Oslo on 9-10 August 2001, have been published in this compendium of essays. The product is a fascinating collection of challenging and informative reading.

The editors maintain that historians from the dominant sea power states have written naval history primarily from their own perspective. They argue that there is a distinct lack of treatment of maritime issues by historians from non-naval superpower states (2-4). To address this shortcoming, a distinguished assembly of historians have attempted to analyse the means by which northern European coastal nations have developed their navies, merchant

fleets, trading patterns, shipbuilding industries, and managed their offshore resources.

The book is divided into five parts of significantly different length. The first contains only one essay, by Andrew Lambert, which introduces the reader to the complexities of maritime interests and their effects on the development of international law during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While an excellent essay, it is written from the perspective of Great Britain, focussing on the concept of blockade and the differing interpretations of the definition of contraband between greater and lesser sea power states. Lambert's essay is somewhat of a peculiar starting point, tending to confirm the editors' complaints about the view of naval affairs being predominantly "from above." The other perspective "from below" is not developed until later.

Part Two provides three worthy essays dealing with strategic issues in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that are written from the Dutch, Danish-Norwegian, and Swedish-Russian perspectives. Part Three moves to the early twentieth century and introduces the influence of new technologies on naval thinking, especially the advent of the torpedo and the invention of the submarine. In this section, the Nordic focus is put on hold while the Prussian, German, French, and American perspectives on the legality and applicability of new weapons to naval warfare are examined. An outstanding essay by Arne Reksund on the strategy of the *Jeune Ecole* is the highlight of this section. His treatment of the importance of attacks on trade in a war against a modern capitalist economy and the complete meaning of *guerre de course* in total war deserves a place on the standard reading lists of post-graduate and war college courses. Part Four provides two fine articles that return to the principal Nordic theme by treating the inter-war issues of disarmament, collective security, and naval limitation treaties. Tom Kristiansen and Joseph Maiolo examine the questionable applicability of treaties for guaranteeing the security of lesser maritime states. Kristiansen accuses both the Norwegian government and its people of living in a "fool's paradise" for thinking that international law,

pan-Nordic cooperation, or assurances of support by the sympathetic British could guarantee their security when entire societies were at war with each other and the definition of contraband could be practically all-encompassing (186-189). Maiolo's examination of the little-known five-power Anglo-Scandinavian naval agreement of 21 December 1938 sheds a penetrating new light on how significantly the strategic perspective on naval affairs and fleet requirements differed between London and the Nordic capitals.

Section Five deals with the Cold War and its aftermath in four essays. The transition of Norway from a minor to major coastal state, driven by her increasingly important offshore natural resources, provides an interesting case study worthy of detailed examination by advanced students. This section shows that the Scandinavian states have addressed the interplay between the demands of their constabulary, diplomatic and expeditionary obligations in several subtly different ways.

The scope of this volume is vast and, in general, it achieves the desired effect. The editors, however, have included rather a large number of essays that are only tangentially connected to the main theme at the expense of developing further subjects already introduced. A typical example is the Dutch navy. Because of the critical role played by the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, particularly in the development of the concept of neutral trade rights, an essay in the second section was obligatory. But, despite their relevance to the principal theme, the Dutch are ignored for the remainder of the book. While a number of the essays presented are of enduring worth, many readers will overlook some of them because of their inclusion in a volume that seems disconnected from their purpose; Reksund's excellent work on the *Jeune École* could be the chief victim of this unfortunate effect.

Although diluted by a rich mixture of material, the reader that picks up this very worthwhile text will be treated to far more than is promised by the title. This work shows that there are no simple answers to the strategic dilemmas faced by coastal states. Examining the

sometimes-precious situations of minor maritime powers through their eyes proves to be both instructive and highly interesting.

Ken Hansen
Toronto, Ontario

Captain Peter Hore. *The Habit of Victory: The Story of the Royal Navy 1545-1945*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson and the National Maritime Museum, 2005. vii + 450 pp., illustrations, sources, bibliography, index. CDN \$55.00, cloth; ISBN 0-283-07312-8.

This is a handsome, informal portrait of one of the great armed services of history, the Royal Navy. In a bicentennial year in which Nelson is remembered triumphantly for victory at Trafalgar (and much else), this review of the rise and difficulties of the Royal Navy recalls twelve other eras, or campaigns, aside from Trafalgar. The production is handsome, with fine illustrations from the collections of the National Maritime Museum, and a good bibliography and useful index will aid researchers and other students of naval history in the future.

Captain Hore has used the documentary files of the National Maritime Museum to his advantage. As will be seen by his chapter-by-chapter list of sources, the author has rescued many useful accounts of action and policy from near oblivion. For instance, for the First World War, he has listed D'Eyncourt's papers relating to the Admiralty land ship committee, Randall's notes on the Royal Naval Air Service, Cowan's autobiographical notes and text of "The Wheel of Fortune," and Giffard's account of the Falklands battle. In addition, we note Jordan's letters on the Dardanelles, Kembell's account of the sinking of HM submarine K17, Duffs notes on the dismissal of Jellicoe as First Sea Lord, and papers relating to *Iron Duke* when in the Grand Fleet. This is a sample of the treasures that enrich each chapter. The selection is not complete and was never intended as such, but the documents add nicely to the texture of the book. They give it vitality and interest, allowing

the author to weave his tale around them with skill and verve.

I should like to think that the story of the Royal Navy in these years was not one of the habit of victory: it was a collection of numerous hard-fought campaigns, many of them failures. But the overall result surely tempts us to think it was a habit. Just don't tell that to the gunners facing a powerful foe at Jutland or naval brigades sent ashore at Antwerp or the Dardanelles! The view from the bridge, or through the periscope, or from an aerial spotting perch high above the watery grave of battle cruisers had no allure to it. The book, however, also examines changes in technology as key to development of the Navy's power (from broadside gunnery, copper-sheathed hulls, paddlewheel steamers, iron dreadnoughts, submarines and carriers). There are side glances at the Navy's role in exploration, from Drake through Cook through Franklin. Various naval historical characters present themselves: Blake, Peps, Bligh, Nelson, Fisher, Jellicoe and Beatty, adding pen portraits of those who carried out the mission of Britannia. This, then, is a book for the general reader, but it should not be overlooked by the specialist, who will find many gold nuggets here.

The partnership of publisher and museum is welcome, and is a constant reminder of the treasures of the National Maritime Museum for naval, principally Royal Navy, history. This last point deserves underlining, and it reflects recent personal observations concerning the naval heritage of that museum. In an era when the National Maritime Museum seems to be swerving away from its naval past (by *maritime* was originally meant the intertwining links of *merchant* and *naval*, besides due coverage of both) the naval ought not to be forgotten or marginalised. The history of slavery and its abolition is of undoubted importance; so too is migration by sea and, yet again, imperial trades (though I never did find the pertinent display), or how the navy rescued many persons or put a stop to barbaric practices or enforced legitimate trade. The navy was central to the profit and power (and thus influence) of the British on and over the seas -

with distinguished benefit to mankind generally. Captain Hore's book never had the intention of keeping the National Maritime Museum on course, but it is a pleasant reminder to this reviewer that Greenwich needs to keep to one of its fundamental obligations.

Barry Gough
Victoria, British Columbia

John D. Heath and E. Arima. *Eastern Arctic Kayaks: History, Design and Techniques*. Fairbanks, Alaska: University of Alaska Press, www.uaf.edu, 2004. xi + 161 pp., maps, illustrations, photographs, glossary, references, index. US \$ 45.00, cloth; ISBN 1-889963-25-9.

For most readers, *Eastern Arctic Kayaks: History, Design and Techniques* will open a window on an unfamiliar world. Still, this book, which judiciously combines text and illustration, should prove interesting to several audiences. For historians, anthropologists and laymen fascinated by life on Earth's northern frontiers, and for craftsmen and sportsmen who help preserve the material culture and traditions of the region, *Eastern Arctic Kayaks* provides a wealth of information about a critical aspect of survival in the easternmost areas of northern North America.

The primary author is John D. Heath, a longtime and highly respected member of the kayaking community, who died in 2003. He divided the text geographically: first Greenland, then the Eastern Canadian Arctic. Both sections include general historical and technical information about kayak development and use, with emphasis on local design variations. Additionally, a significant part of the first section is devoted to kayaks preserved in western Northern Europe, some dating to the early seventeenth century.

The early 1600s, following the Danish Arctic Expedition, was the period when recreational kayaking developed in Europe. Almost immediately, Europeans began to modify the kayaks they built for their particular use and unique body characteristics; noteworthy is the

seventeenth century adaptation of the Skokloster V-bottom to accommodate greater weight. In so doing, European kayakers unknowingly continued the traditions of kayak builders in the far north, who continually modified both their designs and techniques for efficiency and safety.

While the development of kayaking in Europe is interesting, the sport of kayaking bears little resemblance to the real thing as historically practiced as part of a survival strategy in unforgiving environment. The reader is reminded that the kayak is an integral part of far northern cultural heritage, developed by hunters primarily for use in hunting — especially sea mammals — but also critical for trade, transportation and warfare. The authors' evidence suggests that kayaks originated on the Asian side of the Bering Strait. The earliest complete kayak-shaped artifact from the Chukotka coast of northern Russia has been dated at 300 BC - AD 500. The description of the eastward movement of Thule culture from northern Alaska (Birnik with Pujuk elements) will appeal to readers interested in anthropology.

Kayak designs reflected local and regional differences both in kayak use and in the priorities of native builders. In Canada (where the largest kayaks were found), the hull of the kayak was the most important element, while in Greenland, the body size of the kayaker was fundamental. Whatever the particular characteristics, however, it was essential for all kayaks to move silently — a feature underlined in sections on hunting both whale and caribou from the kayak, and to manoeuvre safely among icebergs.

The text includes detailed information about equipment and tools developed in conjunction with the kayak itself. One of the best examples is the Greenland paddle and a special article by Greg Stamer details the creation of these paddles and their unusual characteristics. For hunting, the harpoon, float and throwing stick were essential tools. As more iron was incorporated into tools, however, kayaks were modified to accommodate the added weight, particularly the flat-bottom design.

Eastern Arctic Kayaks also provides interesting insight into the social dimensions of northern kayak communities. Almost without exception, kayaks of the north were used by men. In preparation for kayaking very young children (almost always boys), were given balancing boards to help hone kayaking skills. As the child grew up, kayak rituals were woven into the fabric of life, as the authors demonstrate with poignant first-hand accounts. The routines of adulthood were unchanging: men hunted, women prepared the skins, men then stretched them, and finally women sewed the skins. Somewhat surprisingly, this arrangement was not unquestioningly accepted by all native women, but the authors do not explain further.

Kayakers had to respect the water, but not fear it. The list of kayak manoeuvres to be mastered underscores this point. Whatever the local variations, all hunters had to be able to roll with skill and dexterity. One of the great strengths of this book is the meshing of text, drawings and photographs to detail a wide variety of complex kayak manoeuvres. Another strength is the inclusion of information about *kajakanget* - anxiety or phobia in the absence of a visual reference point. Apparently experienced at some time by most kayakers, this phenomenon is also known as spatial disorientation and can manifest itself as a form of panic attack, analogous to the condition experienced by pilots and astronauts. The reader cannot help but admire the courage of those whose lives are so intimately interwoven not only with this craft and the way of life it represents, but with the intimate and lonely experience of one of Earth's harshest environments.

Not surprisingly, kayaking in the far north has declined since firearms were introduced. The process has been hastened since the 1950s with the shift to freighter canoes with outboard motors. Now, for all practical purposes, kayaking will survive because of its popularity as a sport and recreation.

While *Eastern Arctic Kayaks* includes substantial sections devoted to technical aspects of kayaking, it is filled with beautiful line drawings of kayaks of every description, detailed maps and interesting photographs spanning more

than a century. Most important, the book is a treasury of information about a unique water craft and the way of life associated with it now slipping away.

Judith Ball Bruce
Sandston, Virginia

Andrew C.A. Jampoler. *Sailors in the Holy Land. The 1848 American Expedition to the Dead Sea and the Search for Sodom and Gomorrah*. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2005. 270 pp., photographs, illustrations, maps. US \$28.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-413-2.

In April 1848, an American naval party arrived at Tiberias on the western shores of the Sea of Galilee. They boarded two metal boats incongruously named *Fanny Mason* and *Fanny Skinner*, which they had brought with them from the far side of the Atlantic. These vessels, together with a short-lived local wooden-planked boat nicknamed *Uncle Sam*, then began one of the most remarkable voyages of nineteenth-century discovery in the Holy Land.

The expedition was the brainchild of the officer in charge, Lt William Lynch. His expedition was to carry out a scientific study of the Dead Sea, to include the bathymétrie mapping of its depths and to determine the height of its surface relative to mean sea level, the latter a remarkably tedious and difficult task given the limited scientific tools available to accomplish it. In carrying out this mission, almost as an afterthought, they navigated from the Sea of Galilee to the Dead Sea via the serpentine bends of the Jordan River, mapping it as they went, all the while passing through hostile territory, truly a unique feat.

The story of the expedition is largely Lynch's story and the author is at pains to leave no aspect of this remarkable man obscure. Early on we learn that Lynch had substantial personal reasons to propose the expedition. As the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) wound down, he must have realized that opportunities for advancement in a naval service long on

officers but short on ships would be hard to realize. Later, in the turbulence of the Civil War, Lynch would reach flag officer rank, when he commanded a Confederate gunboat squadron and ultimately command all Confederate naval forces on the Mississippi River. But as he stood on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, Lynch surely must have also given some thought to his own personal life. In 1845 he had petitioned for divorce from Virginia, his wife of seventeen years, as a result of her serial adultery, including a dalliance with one of Lynch's own brothers. The next year, his only daughter, Mary Virginia, had died. All of these parts of Lynch's real-life experience must have acted as personal spurs as he penned his petition to the Secretary of the Navy to lead this uniquely American expedition to the Holy Land.

In *Sailors in the Holy Land* the author gives a detailed description of the expedition itself, its inception, Lynch's preparations for it, and then follows its progress almost day-by-day. Within this framework, Jampoler weaves the milieu of the ante-bellum US Navy and the cultural mores of the time. The result is a fascinating reconstruction of an entire seafaring culture.

The challenge that Lynch set himself and his men was enormous. Today, when one can easily make the return drive from Jerusalem to Ein Gedi—Lynch's "Camp Washington" on the western shores of the Dead Sea—in an afternoon, one is apt to forget the expedition's epic nature. In the mid-nineteenth century these regions were reached only through meticulous planning, shrewd handling of locals and good leadership. And woe to anyone who lacked these skills: poor leadership could, and often did, result in death.

Lynch and his men saw a Holy Land unlike anything the traveller sees today. Following centuries of rule by rapacious conquerors and burdened by oppressive Ottoman over-taxation, the land languished in desolation. Nineteenth-century visitors to the land bemoaned its fallen state. True, some devout travellers would stretch their imagination, not to mention their readers' credulity, by describing a land of biblical milk and honey. It was only after

Zionist settlers arrived in the late nineteenth century, however, that the land once more began to thrive as it did of old.

Although nominally under the rule of the Ottoman Empire as it journeyed down the road to its twilight years, in fact, much of the Holy Land, including the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea, lay under the control of local Arab tribes that answered to no man but their own leaders. To traverse their lands firmans issued by the Sublime Porte helped little. Instead, it was necessary to reach agreement with the local potentates, either in the form of *baksheesh*, or by hiring tribal warriors for "protection," or more often than not, both.

As opposed to other early Dead Sea explorers, or in some cases *would-be* explorers, Lynch proved to be a consummate leader. He certainly knew how to move decisively under duress. Once, when his party faced eminent danger of attack, Lynch managed to turn the situation around by capturing a menacing Arab prince, thus allowing the American party to move unharmed through the surprised leader's territory.

My only criticism of this book is minor: not all of the sites mentioned in it appear in the included maps. One would have particularly liked to have maps showing the expedition's movement between the Mediterranean and the inland waters, as well as the route of the hastily aborted trip to Damascus following the team's return from the Dead Sea survey. Well researched and well written, this book is a good read: it is informative and just plain fun. Jampoler is an accomplished writer and a meticulous researcher in complete control of his material, which he presents clearly and concisely to the reader.

Shelley Wachsmann
College Station, Texas

Arnold Kludas. *Vergnügungsreisen zur See. Eine Geschichte der deutschen Kreuzfahrt. Band 2: 1952 bis heute.* Hamburg: Convent Verlag, www.dsm.de, Schriften des Deutschen Schifffahrtsmuseums, Band 56, 2003. 224 pp,

photographs, tables, notes, bibliography, index. €49,90, cloth; ISBN 3-934613-22-5.

This volume about pleasure cruising at sea, which covers the period from 1952 to the present, is the second volume of a series which looks at German cruise ships rather than offering a general history of cruising. In the introduction, the author stresses his interest in the role of Germany in the development of the international cruising business. The book is divided into ten chapters; six of them devoted to German topics. One discusses life on board ship and the others deal with the international development of cruise ship construction and other matters in chronological order. At the end there are a couple of lists and an index consisting mainly of ship names, ship yards, ship owning companies and travel agencies. The list of references covers both volumes.

The true beginning of the German cruising business after 1945 is difficult to determine. In 1957, the first travel agency offered German clients a cruise to Scandinavia on a German-owned ship. On the other hand, in 1952, the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Italia* sailed to the West Indies under a Panamanian flag with a German crew. The problem is defining the term 'German cruisers'. The example from 1957 is typical for the postwar era, because prior to the war German ship owners had organized cruises in their own ships. Afterwards, travel agencies sold either single cabins or chartered parts of a ship. Full charters were rare in the early years and usually lasted only a cruise or two.

Once travel agencies began offering not only the cruise, but also transportation to and from the ship, it meant that people could arrive at a place nearer the cruising area rather than leaving from a German port. From the beginning this created a close connection between cruise lines and charter air lines. Thanks to this new service, it was possible to offer one- or two-week cruises in the Mediterranean or the West Indies. The ships were mostly passenger liners which were put into cruising during the slack season. In a few cases, other vessels like passenger ships carrying day tourists to the north

German island of Heligoland or car ferries on the Baltic Sea were converted for this purpose. But, due the high cost of converting them for this use, e.g. the construction of extra cabins, they were not financially successful.

The adaptation of liners for cruising was not typically German, as the authors illustrate, because up until 1960, there were no purpose-built cruise ships worldwide; instead, so-called dual purpose vessels were ordered. Cruising holidays became more and more popular after 1970 when German agencies began placing long-term full charters on Russian cruises, which offered their services on low prices. At the same time, traditional German ship-owning companies like Hapag-Lloyd or newcomers like Peter Deilmann began to cater heavily to the cruise market. Ships were now especially designed for cruising and steadily increased in size. In addition to the classic cruising areas like the Mediterranean, Canary Islands, Madeira, Scandinavia and the West Indies, new destinations like Spitsbergen or Antarctic were offered. Although regular cruise ships were sometimes used for these routes, some ships were especially constructed for extreme climates. In the 1990s the so-called "fun ships" became more popular. Unlike the traditional cruise ships, they were aimed at younger passengers, particularly families with children. Instead of formal dinners and well-organised land trips, various onboard activities were offered and the vessels constructed accordingly.

The author provides a short history of all ship-owning companies and/or travel agencies that offered their services to German customers during the period and includes a photo of each ship. Further technical details are given as well as a summary of the vessel's history until it ended up in a breaker's yard or until 2003. There are also deck plans reproduced for a few vessels. This information indicates that, financially speaking, cruising is a very risky business, as several companies went bankrupt and ships often changed ownership. On the other hand, the normal risks of seafaring are fortunately rare. The author mentions a couple of collisions, sea damage during heavy weather and groundings,

though most of the damage happened when there were no German passengers on board. Only a few incidents are reported in detail like the collision of the Russian cruise ship *Maksim Gorkiy* with an ice floe off Spitsbergen when she was chartered by Phoenix Flugreisen in 1988. The impact was so strong that the ship was in danger of sinking. All passengers were put into life boats or life rafts. Some even had to climb onto ice floes because of the danger that their vessels would be crushed by the ice. Fortunately, the arrival of Norwegian and Russian ships and helicopters ensured that after eighteen hours everybody was safely on board a rescue ship. The *Maksim Gorkiy* was also saved and later repaired. She was still in service in 2001.

In the chapter on Men, Ships and Manners, the author summarises his personal experiences over twenty-four cruises, most of them in company with his wife whom he met on his fourth cruise. A list of all his cruises including their costs is given at the end of this section. Although the author deals with many details, but it is difficult to see whether there is anything particularly typical of German cruises either with respect to the cruising area or the kind of ship, the standard of cabins, the food, the social programme on board, the land trips etc. He does not comment on social changes in the crews of cruise ships over almost half a century or their working conditions. He also does not discuss shipbuilding matters like changes of the lines of cruise ships. The book itself is produced to the high standard of this series. It is very well illustrated, several of the photos were taken by the author himself or depict him on one of his cruises. Occasionally, there is a photo that has nothing to do with cruise ships, like the one of a coastal schooner leaving the harbour of Sousse under engine (80). In spite of these omissions, this coffee table book will certainly please any lover of cruise ships.

Timm Weski
Miinchen, Germany

Roger Marsters. *Bold Privateers, Terror, Plunder and Profit on Canada's Atlantic Coast.*

Halifax, NS; Formac Publishing Company, www.formac.ca, 2004. 128 pp., photographs, maps, illustrations, bibliography, index. CDN \$34.95, paper; ISBN 0-88780-644-9.

In *Bold Privateers: Terror, Plunder and Profit on Canada's Atlantic Coast*, Roger Marsters approaches his subject through its actors, the privateers. This is the story of the individual men who undertook privateering on Canada's Atlantic coast beginning in the late seventeenth century and extending into the early nineteenth century. This approach might risk leaning toward the romantic or skimming too lightly over complex moments of history but it holds the potential to spin a wonderful yarn and keep the reader's interest. Marsters's account successfully moves through a century and a half of Atlantic Canada's extremely complicated history as a borderland between English and French possessions and then between British and American territory. He does this in a lively and engaging manner with excellent illustrations, demonstrating the important place of privateers in this region's history.

In his introduction, Marsters begins with the tale of a Halifax privateer crew applying thumbscrews to their captives, to the tune of a jig, in order to extract information. This opening caused my heart to sink, evoking the evil image of pirates, so often confused with privateers. Rather than reading such an unusual incident, I was hoping for an accessible account of the real exploits and contributions of privateers that would clearly distinguish them from pirates. Fortunately, that is what I got. Having grabbed the reader's attention, Marsters proceeded to explain why that incident was so uncharacteristic and then to outline the difference between a privateer and a pirate.

The two elements of this book that struck me as the most interesting were the choices of whose stories to tell and the illustrations. This discussion should begin with the *caveat* that this is a book meant for a general readership, hence so many illustrations. Truthfully, all historians now need illustrations as no one dares give a talk or lecture without them; we are in an utterly visual age. Marsters's

illustrations are excellent, ranging from period drawings to relevant artwork and photographs of museum pieces. I had issue, however, with the lack of credit or source information accompanying the illustrations. For paintings, it is useful to know the name of the artist and the precise year of production. Also, photographs of antiques and reproductions did not always indicate the collection to which the object(s) belonged or their dates. This sort of information is very useful to many readers, and lends weight to the inclusion of the illustration in the book.

I was most impressed with Marsters's choice of privateers to study. He chose a group of historical figures to illustrate a range of "private men of war," a shift in terminology which broadened the category of privateer and enabled the author to take a wider ranging approach to the subject. The first subject of study, Pierre Le Moynes d'Iberville, is not a typical privateer; he campaigned as much on land as at sea. He is, however, a "private man of war," and his story illustrates the nature of the conflict between English and French interests in North America in the late seventeenth century, which contextualizes the economic nature of the practice of privateering well. D'Iberville's story sets the stage for the discussion of other French privateers with very different careers, Pierre Maisonnat, Pierre Morpain and Joannis d'Olabaratz. Each man's different background and story offers more detail about privateering, such as the distinctions between its practice in the Caribbean and the North Atlantic, its impact on the enemy, and its rewards and risks for the privateers. Marsters's approach allows him to discuss the uses, strengths, and ramifications of privateering as part of naval warfare. Occasionally, such as in the chapter on Bernard-Anselme d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin, I found myself wondering when our subject was going to take to sea. His inclusion is positive, as his family's story is a fascinating one that illustrates important aspects of the complex history of the struggle for control of the Atlantic region.

Marsters leads well from one story to the next, tying the narrative together with details such as Alexander Godfrey's settling where the HMS *Blonde* had driven the *Duc de Choiseul*

aground years before, or the link in reputation of Joseph Barss Jr. and Morpain. At other times there is a bit of confusion, for example, the size of the force arrayed against Louisbourg in 1745 changes with three different accounts, (51, 57, and 67). As well as offering many fascinating and undeniably swashbuckling tales, the overlapping narratives create a picture of the eighteenth century in Acadia or Nova Scotia. Without setting out to explain the expulsion of the Acadians or the Seven Years' War, Marsters finds himself in the position of having to deal with them. At times the exploits of his subjects, from d'Iberville through to Rous and Cobb, make one's blood run cold. As well as dashing seafaring, we encounter cruelty to civilian populations caught in the crossfire. With his extensive account of events, such as the siege of Fort Beauséjour, Marsters generally handles these complex stories well. His approach of following each man's career from beginning to end lends humanity to his subjects, although at times I felt he could have dealt more with the consequences of their actions.

Even as I enjoyed these stories, I found myself wishing for footnotes. I know that journals and logbooks exist which are the basis for some accounts, but I am not certain of other sources and would very much like to know. I noticed one error: the leader of the attacks on Canso and Annapolis in 1744 was François Du Pont Duvivier, not Joseph. (54, 76) Overall, Marsters succeeds in communicating the vital role of privateering in the history of Atlantic Canada in a very engaging format. This book is not meant for the researcher or academic; it is an excellent introduction to the subject for a general reader and a worthwhile addition to the library of the enthusiast.

Anne Marie Lane Jonah
Louisbourg, Nova Scotia

James McDermott. *England the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, www.yalepress.yale.edu, 2005. xi + 421 pp., illustrations,

abbreviations, notes, bibliography, index. US \$40.00, cloth; ISBN 0300 10698 X.

England's view of itself as a uniquely gifted nation may be said to have been born during the momentous reign of the first Elizabeth, and its seminal event the advent of the Spanish Armada of 1588. Normally one might remark at this point that there isn't a schoolboy who is unaware of the dastardly Spanish and their grasp for world domination that was thwarted by the plucky English, epitomised by the gallant Drake. His iconic game of bowls above Plymouth harbour, one that was played to the finish before he set out to thrash the mighty Armada, being but one of many vignettes known to all. In this day and age, however, I suspect there are more than a few schoolboys, and schoolgirls for that matter, who haven't the faintest conception of the whole business, such is the unhappy state of history education in the modern classroom.

By way of introduction to McDermott's fine book it perhaps needs to be noted that the sixteenth century, or the Tudor era (1485 - 1603), was one of huge change throughout society, when the world started to become recognisably "modern," and no longer medieval. Much of this shift was imperceptible to those living through it, but with the perspective of over four centuries it is evident that economies, governments, diplomacy, militaries and navies were shaking off the inadequate mechanisms that had served a simpler society and were starting to adopt the trappings of a modern world. Indeed, the Royal Navy may be said to have had its start in life during the reign of Henry VIII and become an institution by the time of his redoubtable daughter, Elizabeth I.

The roots of the Anglo-Spanish War, fought over the extended period of 1585 to 1603, had roots buried deep in the reign of Elizabeth's larger-than-life father, Henry VIII. McDermott describes these beginnings in useful detail; indeed his introductory chapter is an outstanding example of the genre, with trenchant observations and a full sketch of the book. These origins can be simplified into three main areas; religion, economics and well-established

geopolitics. All played a crucial role in fanning the embers of disagreement into the flames of outright conflict. Importantly, purely personal quarrels between monarchs were no longer sufficient to mobilise the power of a state. This period saw the birth of inter-state conflict, in contrast, for example to the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) where inheritance difficulties and disputes set England against France.

In terms of religion, the English Reformation was a peculiar affair as such things go. It is extremely unlikely to have progressed and developed as it did without Henry's troubles in securing a suitable heir to his throne - Catherine of Aragon's daughter Mary, later Mary I, was quite inadequate in Henry's view. The subsequent divorce and break with Rome sowed the seeds of the later conflict with Spain. Catherine's nephew was the redoubtable Charles V who inherited a massive patrimony that included Spain, the Habsburg Austrian and German dominions, interests in Italy, and the Seventeen Provinces, or the Low Countries. Charles was not at all happy with the treatment of his aunt by the English king, an affront that might be considered to have started Spain on the path to war some fifty years later. While Henry's initial break with Rome was predicated on simple power politics, this is not to deny the essential Protestant nature of the settlement that gradually evolved over subsequent decades. Hence, the nature of the conflict between Roman Catholicism and the various Protestant forms of Christianity was established early in the piece, with the one ruler perceiving it his duty to return rebellious churches to the one true religion, and the other seeking to preserve churches that conformed to God's true word from the grasp of a corrupt Rome.

The second thread is that of economics. The sixteenth century witnessed the broadening of the known world from the ancient centrality of the Mediterranean and those benighted regions on the edge of civilisation, such as England, to one where there were seemingly no bounds. The discoveries in the New World, or rediscoveries depending on taste, in the late fifteenth century opened vast new fields to explore and exploit. The Spanish and

the Portuguese were the first off the mark with the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) whereby the Pope split the world between the two nations. Initially this was moot - potential rivals were simply not at hand, and Spain and Portugal were free to unleash the benefits of European civilisation and religion on the barbarously populated lands of the New World unhindered by rivals. The wealth of the New World quickly became the key source of Spanish prosperity, in particular, as the endowments of the Iberian Peninsula were less than extravagant. Over time, trading rivals did indeed develop as respect declined for papal grants of sovereignty among Protestant traders and freebooters from England and the Netherlands (and indeed, France). McDermott explores early expeditions dating back to the 1540s that, not to put too fine a point on it, were simply piracy - often financially supported by the Court and even the Queen herself. This long running canker between England and Spain festered for the rest of the century, albeit with varying degrees of intensity, and accounts for the second major cause of conflict.

Finally, traditional geopolitics played an important role. The key conflict in the sixteenth century was between France and Spain. England played an ineffectual role between the two giants, losing Calais to France for her troubles during Mary's brief reign and marriage to Spain's Philip II. France descended into civil war as the century wore on and the conflict shifted to England supporting the Dutch in their long struggle for independence from Philip II. The connection with the Dutch was to become traditional. The ties included religion, trade and the perennial interest in keeping the territories immediately opposite the English coast in friendly and preferably nonthreatening hands. The next century was to see conflict with the Dutch due to economic drivers alone.

McDermott's book reminds us of all these interrelated factors that paint a far more complex portrait of the period than the caricatured version that most people have. Elizabeth was no saint, and the English no champions of freedom and democracy, waging a war against Continental despotism and perfidy.

They fought for commercial gain and Protestantism. Whether the latter would have been sufficient without the former is impossible to say, but it is likely the English would have sat it out. McDermott is a good writer and the story he tells is an important updating of the classic account of Garrett Mattingly, whose *The Armada* has been the standard work for more than forty-five years. The only quibbles are small ones. McDermott provides far more detail and analysis of the period prior to the outbreak of war in 1585 and the voyage of the Armada itself. The remainder of the war is only treated cursorily - admittedly, the drama was somewhat less, but it needs fuller treatment than it receives. The second minor issue is that McDermott has left his copious quotes from English sources as written, leaving archaic spellings, syntax and grammar untouched. Quotes from Spanish or ecclesiastical sources (Latin) have been translated using modern idioms. The contrast is jarring and in the view of this reader an unnecessary conceit. The book is highly recommended.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan

Michael A. Palmer, *Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century*. Cambridge, MA and London; Harvard University Press, www.hup.harvard.edu, 2005. 374 pp., battle maps, notes, index, US\$29.95, cloth; ISBN 0-674-01681-5.

This book aims to study command at sea. The author lays out his intent in his prologue and his desire to assess the "constants" of command in naval warfare, particularly those relating to the "fog of war" and the uncertainty of combat. The best part of *Command at Sea*, almost certainly indicative of Michael Palmer's personal and lifelong interest and enthusiasm, is that dealing with the evolution of command in sail between the seventeenth and the early nineteenth century. Indeed, Palmer notes in his acknowledgments that the genesis of the book was his realization that Jervis' failure to order his fleet to wear at St

Vincent in 1797 resulted not so much from an error of judgement as the lack of an appropriate signal. Palmer's sources are largely secondary, which is fair enough in a survey of this nature, but they tend to be older publications rather than newer ones and there are some surprising omissions, such as the first volume of Nicholas Rodger's naval history of Britain, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, published in 1997, which provides an excellent distillation of recent work on naval warfare in the British context in the centuries before 1649. Nevertheless, in total, the treatment of the era of combat under sail at the tactical level is little short of masterly. Palmer's arguments to support his thesis that decentralized command is generally more effective than centralization are well supported by coherent narratives and careful analysis. All this suggests that Professor Palmer has engaged in very much a labour of love.

This would, however, have been a much better book if the author had confined himself to the age of fighting sail. This reviewer has the impression that the subject matter may have been inappropriately extended into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the result of a well-meaning publisher's request rather than the author's own desire, because *Command at Sea* has a number of fundamental problems. Firstly, the text is much less strong in the modern era, surprisingly so in view of Professor Palmer's work on the twentieth century, his publication record and his extensive experience in the US Navy's Naval Historical Center. The treatment of the nineteenth century, for example, is somewhat superficial and includes some debatable statements, such as the assertion that station keeping became more difficult in steam than it was under sail (214), which would have benefited from citation. Palmer certainly downplays the importance of the telegraph by citing the problems faced in its use by such relatively minor actors (in the context of the time) as the United States Navy and not those encountered by the United Kingdom, the dominant world power, whose Royal Navy had access, as he notes, to "most of the network of submarine cables that did exist" (215).

In this chapter, as well as the succeeding material on the twentieth century, there is a tendency to concentrate on the experience of the USN at the expense of services in other countries, although a lot more could have been said of the maritime element of the American Civil War and the Union blockade of the south. This period aside, however valid from 1942 onwards, preoccupation with the American naval experience is historically premature before at least the 1920s. Palmer cites few references to British doctrinal development between 1919 and 1939, he could say much more about the Japanese and probably gives the USN too much credit for fostering a culture of initiative and decentralization in the same period, however seminal the writing of Dudley Knox. The fact is that the operational performance of the USN in 1942-43 was patchy, at best, and a strong argument can be made that the USN underwent the same sort of battle shock and process of adjustment, albeit more rapidly (and to very good effect), as the British did in the surface actions of 1914-1918. In contrast, after the end of the First World War, the Royal Navy not only fostered a highly aggressive approach to battle - which its increasing material inferiority to its expected opponent, the Japanese, required - but this approach was manifested much more often than not right from the start of the 1939-45 conflict.

Palmer's other modern selections are also sometimes odd. It may be that his interest in the wars of sail has made him more likely to focus on actions which operated on something like the same scale, but incidents such as the *Bismarck* chase in 1941 might have cast more light on the relationship between technology and command than Matapan, and much more could have been said about the Battle of the Atlantic than the five pages which are largely a critique of Donitz rather than his opponents. The chapter on "The Cold War and Beyond" fails to address coherently the substantial developments in command and control of maritime operations in the post-1945 period and the extent to which such issues were being thought through, developed and exercised. There was no experience of actual battle in the Cold War

(although some submarine-on-submarine encounters may have approached that state), but both sides - particularly NATO - conducted repeated, substantial, complex and highly demanding maritime exercises which tested many facets of a possible hot (and "warm") war campaign and from which a great deal was learned. On the other hand, there is a curious preoccupation with the undesirable aspects of "jointery." It may be fair enough to suggest that fusing the maritime element into joint operations has resulted in a spillover of many land concepts and army-centric methods of planning and staff, not all to the benefit of navies, yet this has been but one factor acting on the development of command and control at sea since 1945 - and not wholly to the bad. In reality, the history of joint operations in the West is one of substantial, if occasionally fitful, progress.

Similarly, Palmer's analysis of the effects of technological development appears to spend more time bewailing the fact that improved communications and information systems allow higher commanders too much scope for intervention, rather than analyzing the real causes of such tendencies to intervene - which include the reality that there are times when the situational awareness of the higher command is greater than those on scene. The dilemma, as it has ever been for the remote commander, is in being sure that this is really the case and not an illusion. Perhaps Palmer is being overly circumspect and unwilling to risk giving away information to which he has had privileged access in relation to US naval operations in the last few decades. If so, the book is the poorer and the attempt to bring the subject of command at sea so far up to date should not have been made.

Another key weakness of the book may be in Palmer's tendency to focus on battle at the expense of campaign. Command at sea, perhaps even more so at sea than on land, is not just about decision making in the face of the enemy. The dynamic environment of the oceans means that, while a significant part of the naval commander's task lies in bringing about contact (or avoiding it), the major, indeed overweening challenge more often lies in the need to protect

sea communications - and this is just as much true in many situations in which naval power is being utilized to enable the projection of power on land. And, in all circumstances, there is a requirement - practically constant since the technological advances of a century ago - for immediate readiness in case of attack from unseen opponents. Even in the eighteenth century, there were always wider considerations than are sometimes apparent in this text. All his arguments in favour of decentralization - and Palmer's thesis is a compelling one in many respects - suffer from a lack of full consideration of these wider contexts of maritime warfare.

In sum, this book is a valuable analysis of command in battle under sail, but it is not the definitive study of command at sea in all its facets.

James Goldrick
Canberra, Australia

Sir Alan Peacock, DSC. *The Enigmatic Sailor. Memoirs of a Seagoing Intelligence Officer.* Caithness, Scotland; Whittles Publishing, www.whittlespublishing.com, 2003. 144 pp, maps, photographs, UK £14.95, paper; ISBN 1-904445-09-8.

When it comes to the history of the Second World War, the one area that is still an enigma for most people is that surrounding the code-breakers. Playing a vital role throughout the war, those who did this work lived in a secret world where few dared to tread. On land, code-breakers were sequestered away from the public eye. When it comes to the fleet-based code-breakers, even their fellow crew members did not know exactly what they did on board ship. Alan Peacock's *The Enigmatic Sailor* is a first step in redressing that problem. As a memoir of his life as both a sailor and a member of the intelligence community, this book provides a unique window into the life of the intelligence officer on board ship. After a quick explanation of why intelligence officers were placed with the fleet, namely, to reduce the delay in using intelligence, Peacock details the role he played

during the war in a series of chronological chapters. Starting with his joining the Royal Navy and his basic training and first deployments, Peacock examines his role in Operation Tunnel, his daily operations as a code-breaker, Arctic convoys, and the legacy left by intelligence officers.

An interesting mix of personal anecdote, historical action and reminiscence, Peacock's narrative is unique. Rather than focus on the code-breakers at Bletchley Park and the strategic relationship between intelligence and naval action, this work focuses on the operational level, explaining how code-cracking and convoy protection went hand in hand. In the process, his account provides a unique history not just of code-breaking, but of the escort operations which he experienced. Written in an easy to read style, the book is a lively read and reflects both the personality of the author and his desire to provide as accurate an account as possible. The main limitation of this work, however, rests with the interrelationship of a memoir based on the author's memory and personal documentation. By definition, any memoir provides a biased account of events since it based on the perspective of the individual who lived through them. In this case, the problem is compounded by the fact that it was written so long after the events and does not benefit from archival work to support the account. In fairness to the author, there is no way of knowing how much of the documentary record is available or how completely it was declassified.

While there is a good chance that at least some documents have been declassified, it is unlikely that a complete record is available. This does not take away from the value of Peacock's work: rather, it shows how important it is. With virtually no history written about the intelligence officers deployed with the fleet, and very few accounts detailing life for young officers in the escort fleet, Peacock has been able to open up important areas to further scrutiny. *The Enigmatic Sailor* is a must for both the advanced historian and the reader who is fascinated with naval history in general. As a starting point, it reveals the existence of the

important code-breakers and some of what they did during the war as well as life in the fleet. Of particular note are the small operations and convoy details that he brings to the reader. For example, Operation Tunnel stands out. This operation was an attempt to interfere with German shipping in the channel during 1943 which failed to achieve its end and cost the British a cruiser. There were hundreds of these small operations conducted by the fleet in the English Channel that have never received the research they so rightly deserve. Although not a detailed historical account, the book does capture the reader's interest and I believe it will encourage further reading and hopefully, research into the area. This will certainly benefit historians but also veterans of intelligence operations to whom recognition is due. This work is a must for any historian of the British Navy or more generally, of the Second World War.

Robert M. Dienesch
Tecumseh, Ontario

Douglas C. Peifer. *The Three German Navies. Dissolution, Transition and New Beginnings, 1945-1960*. Gainesville, FLA: University Press of Florida, www.upf.com, 2002. xx + 250 pages, figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index. US \$55.00, cloth; ISBN 0-8130-2553-2.

"Integrity and character are more important than the question of previous political convictions." With these words, former Kriegsmarine Admiral Bernhard Rogge, along with other flag officers such as Otto Schniewind, Gerhard Wagner, and Friedrich Ruge, laid the foundations of what was to become the West German (FRG) Bundesmarine. In the "other" Germany (GDR), Waldemar Verner created the officer cadre of what was to become the East German Volksmarine without assistance from a single former Kriegsmarine admiral, captain, or commander. The contrast was clear and is the theme of this book: after 1945, two new German navies were carved out of the ruins of another, the Kriegsmarine.

Peifer, an assistant professor at the US Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, has carefully crafted a study of this transition during the first decade or so of the post-Second World War era. The first three chapters of the book deal with the Kriegsmarine "paradigm," the defeat and surrender of Hitler's navy, and the Allies's uneven attempts to "uproot" the "vestiges" of that force. The next two chapters trace the beginnings of paramilitary naval forces in West and East Germany, concentrating on their ever increasing roles in maritime policing, civilian minesweeping, and naval intelligence as a consequence of the Cold War. The last two chapters—the meat of the book—analyze the preparations and transitions of these erstwhile paramilitary units into the navies of the FRG and the GDR. The book was made possible by the collapse of the Soviet client state after 1989 which afforded the first access by Western scholars to former East German paramilitary (PT) and Volksmarine (VA) records, now housed at the Federal Military Archive at Freiburg. As well, Peifer interviewed some of the founders of those two forces. The result is the first scholarly analysis of post-1945 German naval developments.

The immediate postwar period, the author argues, was dominated by three issues: involuntary labour assignments, denazification proceedings, and the trials of former high-ranking Kriegsmarine officers and U-boat commanders. Differences of approach quickly developed. While the French and the Soviets refused to employ Kriegsmarine personnel to clear the 600,000 mines that infested European waters, the British and the Americans readily did so by founding the German Mine Sweeping Administration in July 1945. And while the British, the French, and the Soviets initially rigorously pursued German naval disarmament, the Americans dragged their feet on this matter. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, in fact, set them on a course of promoting German rearmament.

For years, the so-called "admirals' case," that is, the trial and conviction of Grand Admirals Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz on

charges of conspiracy and crimes against peace at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), poisoned relations between defeated and victor. Few Kriegsmarine diehards realized how fortunate the two admirals were to have escaped with their lives: initially, American, British, and Soviet policy had been to summarily execute captured high-ranking Nazis. And few obviously thought through what kind of "justice" would have been meted out to captured Allied line officers had Germany won the war. In the wake of the IMT, Peifer shows, Hitler's former admirals rallied in two groups to keep alive their naval tradition: a Hamburg group around Wilhelm Meisel, former chief of the Naval War Staff, and a Bremerhaven group, the American-sponsored Naval Historical Team, that included Admirals Ruge, Schniewind, and Wagner. In time, they would become the intellectual founders of the Bundesmarine.

Naval reconstruction efforts in the two Germanys took strangely similar courses. In the East, came the Naval Forces of the National People's Army (NVA) of 1956 and then the Volksmarine of 1960 emerged from a host of paramilitary groups such as the Mecklenburg Maritime Security Police, the "Barracked Police," the Sea Police/People's Police-Sea, and finally the Border Police North. The Soviets, Peifer argues, "initiated, supervised, and assisted the process of rearmament from its inception through the official foundation of East Germany's military" (147). In the West, the Bundesmarine of 1955 likewise was the product of a plethora of civilian and paramilitary organizations: the Cuxhaven Minesweeping Group, the Bremerhaven Labor Service Unit, the Klose Group, and the Marine Border Guard. Still, Peifer suggests that none of these early auxiliary units were ever seen as, or intended to be, precursors of a future West German navy (101, 105, 113).

Two things truly distinguished the founding of the West German Bundesmarine from that of the East German Volksmarine: the Western Allies' willingness to use Kriegsmarine personnel as a founding cadre, and the heavy influence of Kriegsmarine admirals through the Meisel Circle, the Naval Historical Team, and

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's advisory office for security and defence issues (the so-called Blank Office) in solidly imbuing the Bundesmarine with the tradition of its predecessor. The actual foundation of the structure took place in 1950 in absolute secrecy at the Abbey Himmerode (*not* Himmelrod) in the Eifel by with former Wehrmacht officers such as Admirals Gladisch, Ruge, and Schulze-Hinrich as well as Generals Foertsch, Heusinger, and Speidel. They demanded (and eventually obtained) the complete "rehabilitation" of the reputation of the Wehrmacht soldier and the military equality of the Federal Republic within a future European army. Only as an afterthought did they accede to General Wolf von Baudissin's demand that the new German military be "integrated" into the democratic state (*inhere Führung*). Unfortunately, Peifer glosses over this critical meeting (175-6).

Vice Admiral Ruge and his close associates from the Naval Historical team continued to put forth the patently absurd charge that none of the admirals, and especially not Dönitz, had ever "heard of the mass murders" (174) committed by the Nazi regime in the East. Peifer might have pointed out that they did so despite knowing that Dönitz had been in the front row of invited guests at Posen (Poznan) in October 1943 where Heinrich Himmler proudly spoke on a "very grave matter," namely, the "extermination of the Jewish race"! All too often, the author provides poignant materials without analyzing their importance for future developments. More critical analysis would have made for an ever better book.

Tradition died hard in the Bundesmarine. When the new Ministry of Defence screened applicants for officer billets beginning in winter 1955, it did not feel outraged that Fritz Poske, head of the Marine Border Guard, insisted on hanging a picture of Grand Admiral Dönitz behind his desk. When this reviewer first arrived at the Federal Military Archive at Freiburg in late 1969 to undertake research, the naval archivist, a former Kriegsmarine officer, likewise interviewed him sitting in front of a large autographed picture of Dönitz. Time and full integration into NATO

and the EU, one can only surmise, has finally eroded that pathological need to stress continuity.

Holger H. Herwig
Calgary, Alberta

Helen M. Rozwadowski. *Fathoming the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, www.hup.harvard.edu, 2005. xii + 276 pp., illustrations, notes, index. US \$ 25.95, cloth; ISBN 0-674-01691-2.

The title of this well-written, academic study is somewhat misleading, since the scope is wider than an account simply of attempts to chart the topography of the deep sea floor and classify the plants and animals found there. The author evaluates the growing recognition in Britain, Europe, and America in the mid-nineteenth century that the open ocean was something more than a route of passage from shore to shore, often dangerous and always mysterious. At the same time that exploration was undertaken of the Arctic, tropical jungles, and the atmosphere, people began to see that the oceans, too, were not just empty spaces on the map. For social, economic, and scientific reasons there was a dramatic increase in the awareness of the ocean as a workplace, a stage for leisure or adventure, and as an environmental unit on an enormous three-dimensional scale.

The social history of the period is important in the analysis of these scientific advances. British amateur oceanographers multiplied in the 1840s, in part as a result of the growing habit of the middle and upper classes to seek health and restoration in the brisk air of the sea shore, and the need to find sober and intellectually improving recreation in that environment. Simultaneously, the appearance of steamships facilitated travel over and research in the deep sea, while the desire for a trans-Atlantic cable fostered organized sounding of the mid-Atlantic. Given the importance of sea routes to the survival of the British Empire, strategic considerations began to exercise their influence

as well. A mixture of intellectual curiosity, capitalist enterprise, nationalism, and imperialist ambitions on both sides of the Atlantic quickly transformed the deep sea into a new frontier filled with promise.

The author provides a dense, but for the most part lively, narration of the individuals and institutions in Britain and the United States who fostered research into the plants, animals, and topography of the deep sea, spurred on by various of these motives. After setting the background to the nineteenth-century accomplishments, she provides an account of the contribution of whalers and of organized naval exploration teams, particularly in the collection of deep soundings. Sir Francis Beaufort, Hydrographer of the Navy from 1829-1855, played a particularly important role in the development of charts and océanographie science. Two chapters deal with the development of dredging and trawling, the only effective means of obtaining samples from deep water prior to the development of submersible vehicles. Enormously energetic amateurs in the 1840s and 1850s zealously dredged British and American inshore waters, providing the scientific basis for evaluating the plants and animals in deeper water. The culmination of subsequent national efforts was the British *Challenger* expedition of 1872-76, during which a shipload of scientists collected samples from around the world, resulting in a 50-volume report. The account of private and public dredging activities is admirably thorough, but there is more detail concerning the politics of the funding and organization than most readers will be able to absorb.

The next to last chapter, "Small World," highlights the author's interest in the social history of deep sea exploration. The title, of course, refers to the microcosm of the ship at sea, in which "gentry," scientists, and sailors lived and worked in close quarters for long periods of time. By the mid-nineteenth century, social and technological changes meant that the sea was no longer simply an occupational dumping ground for "the poverty-stricken, orphaned, criminal, and insane" (178). Nevertheless, there remained stiff distinctions of

class and occupation on board ship, and a rigid hierarchy of public, working, and private space. The diversion of prime deck and cabin space to scientific purposes caused stress among the crew, and every location, action, and word were subject to public scrutiny and interpretation. The need to use crew members to operate steam winches for deepwater sounding and dredging was a particular source of tension, the latter task renamed "drudging" by those employed in the tedious work.

An "Epilogue" chapter summarizes the main points of the book, and ends with a plea for further exploration. Despite the enormous advances made in human knowledge of the ocean floor during the nineteenth century, and the extraordinary progress in the 1960s and 1970s, we still know more about the dark side of our moon than about the deep ocean waters. The recent realization that the ocean is "the engine that drives the way the world works" (xi) makes the goal of understanding its mechanisms all the more important. This book is an excellent introduction to the beginnings of the exploration in all its aspects. *Fathoming the Ocean* is well written and well produced, with informative, clear illustrations (for the most part nineteenth-century engravings and lithographs). A larger number of these charming illustrations would have been welcome. The citation notes and index are extensive and accurate.

John Peter Oleson
Victoria, British Columbia

Uwe Schnall, Ursula Feldkamp and Erik Hoops (eds.). *Deutsches Schiffsarchiv 26. 2003. Wissenschaftliches Jahrbuch de Deutschen Schiffsarchivmuseum*. Bremerhaven: Deutsches Schiffsarchivmuseum and Convent Verlag GmbH Hamburg, www.dsm.de, 2004. 309 pp., illustrations, photographs, tables, notes, English summaries. € 23, cloth; ISBN 3-934613-77-2.

The German Maritime Museum's 26th annual *Deutsches Schiffsarchiv* of 2003, dedicated to the memory of Dr. Martin Eckoldt, is a collection of various essays on a wide range of

maritime topics. As the Schiffahrtsmuseum's organ of publication, the yearbook appears to offer a platform for the various nautical-related research projects undertaken by the Museum during the year. Since the editors have, however, neither graced this book nor their web Page with a statement of purpose, this is conjectural; the only definite is that the book's one and a half dozen articles are not united by a common theme and deal with quite a multitude of different subjects.

This is both the book's strength and its weakness, for, although all articles contained in the volume are of high academic quality, they are spread so far over the maritime land- (I should say sea-) scape that while most anybody with an interest in things nautical will find an article worthy of his attention, it seems unlikely that any single person will find all the articles of interest. Just to illustrate the dilemma, the articles in this volume cover a time frame from the Romans to the present day, and range over topics as varied as the small-ship fishery in the Mediterranean to the dugout discoveries near the upper Weser river in Germany in 1938 to the use of the ship as a political metaphor in the paintings of Caspar David Friedrich. This rather eclectic mixture of topics and even scientific disciplines, all united within the covers of the Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum's annual report, is certainly too obscure to interest the lay reader in its entirety. Even the lay reader, however interested in maritime history, will definitely want to check the contents page for subjects that are of particular interest, since the individual articles are thoroughly worthy of attention. I note here especially, the article by Sabine Cibura, mentioned above, on Caspar David Friedrich's paintings, a topic with which I was unacquainted but still found of great interest and detail. A similar compliment for exhaustiveness and intellectual appeal must go to Andreas Hamann's article on the German Hapag's support of the Russian naval forces before Tsushima.

The article on Friedrich is also an excellent example of the high production value of the book as a whole. Most articles are quite lavishly illustrated, both in black and white and

colour, excellently reproduced on high-quality paper. All of the scientific articles are printed with the full complement of foot notes, and every article is followed by a précis in English and French summarizing the contents of the articles. The lengths of the précis vary strongly, and the usefulness of their content varies accordingly from essay to essay; in the larger part of cases, they are quite useful. This, at the very least, goes for the English versions; the quality of the French I am not qualified to judge. Overall, however, especially considering the price of €23, the physical qualities of the book are exceptional.

This raises the final point of language. But for the final thirty pages of the book, containing a number of presentations made at the German-Icelandic Fisheries History symposium in 2002, the entire book is written in German, and academic German at that, an occasionally tedious style. Speakers of German will find this a small obstacle, but for anybody with only a passing acquaintance with the language, it will indubitably prove hard reading.

Overall, the 2003 edition of *Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv* is a fascinating volume of greater interest to libraries than to individuals.

Tim Lanzendörfer
Wiesbaden, Germany

Bruce Taylor. *The Battlecruiser HMS Hood. An Illustrated Biography, 1916-1941*. Annapolis, MD; US Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2005. 272 pp., photographs. US \$59.95, cloth; ISBN 1-86176-216-X.

"Another *Hood* book for the collection" was my thought, when first asked to write a review for *TNM*. Like many, I've long been fascinated by this famous warship, and over the years have acquired a number of volumes telling her story. Always room for one more. It was a good omen when the package arrived a few days later (our esteemed Book Review Editor wastes no time!) and I extracted a good sized and nicely weighted book. Above the magnificent computer-generated illustration of *Hood* on the dustjacket,

the word "biography" in the title caught my eye... an interesting choice of words. A quick riffle through the pages put equal emphasis on "illustrated" - a very rich collection of photographs. A very appetizing beginning.

The author sets a challenge for himself in his introduction: "to provide a new perspective on the genre of ship biography, one that for the first time marries the technical reality and operational career of a vessel with the experience and mentality of those who breathed life into her... To provide, in short, the first integrated history of one of the great capital ships of the twentieth century..." (8). His subject: one of the best known, and best documented, warships of the Royal Navy. Beautiful, tragic *Hood* - epitome of the between-wars RN and the British Empire itself, sunk with appalling loss of life by *Bismarck* in May 1941, without touching the heavier German battleship. How much new information can there be?

As it turns out, quite a lot. Any ship aficionado will enjoy the delightful tour laid out in Chapter 2: not an inventory of rivets and frames, but how she must have looked to someone stepping on board - a detailed description of the look and feel of *Hood*. As expected, (considering the input from engineering specialist Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly) her engineering systems are thoroughly described, and it is noteworthy how much emphasis the author, rightly, places on the importance of motive power. Authors sometimes gloss over the work of the Engineering Branch, but not Taylor. Indeed, parts of this book are a paean to the engineers and stokers who kept *Hood* running, including Chief Stoker Harry Watson, the only man who served in *Hood* "all her days" (43). The book is a gold mine of information: for example, her boilers were designed for Arabian crude oil, and her fans could not provide sufficient draught to burn Western Hemisphere fuel properly (40-41). Interesting material, and the technicalities are always understandable.

The real importance of this book, however, comes from the way in which Taylor integrates the technical with the human: not just

how it was done, but what it was like to be one of the "doers," and with definite emphasis on the lower deck's perspective. Simply put, the two chapters "Routine, Work and Rest" and "Life Aboard" are superb. *Hood* was in many ways a transitional ship, and not only with regard to the evolution of the fast battleship: she was also the first to have General Messing and Central Storekeeping (116), and the impact of these schemes is neatly described. But there is much more meat in Taylor's depiction of shipboard life than just the ship's cookery - and much will have been true for the rest of the Fleet. Everything from tuberculosis to the sex lives of the crew, and many are the names of crewmen whose voices are heard (one unfortunate omission from the very complete bibliography is Christopher McKee's *Sober Men and True*, although Commander Latham Jenson's *Tin Hats, Oilskins & Seaboats* is often cited).

Some of *Hood's* officers are well known to this day, including Commander Rory O'Connor, author of *Running a Big Ship on 'Ten Commandments'*. Those days are sometimes considered *Hood's* glory days, but Taylor provides trenchant analysis of O'Connor's term as her Commander: fighting efficiency took a decided second place to appearance - and even then, things were unsatisfactory below decks. Equally good in that chapter ("Disaster and Recovery") is the author's discussion of the relationships between officers and men, as well as *Hood's* participation in the Invergordon mutiny of 1931.

When war came in 1939, *Hood* was a tired ship in need of a thorough overhaul - powerful, but in a sorry state - especially her machinery. Things would remain difficult until her demise, and Taylor honestly describes her shabby fabric and the sometimes poor morale of her crew. *Hood* was a wet ship, cold, badly ventilated and overcrowded, and there is evidence of unrest amongst the stokers in December 1940. Her final battle, 24 May 1941, is neatly summarised, but without overmuch detail. An appendix lists the roll of those lost with *Hood*.

Woven throughout the book are myriad illustrations, most of which will be new to the

reader. One is quite unusual, taken inside her conning tower. The centrepiece is a series of computer-generated images and cutaways (and fold-out plates) by Thomas Schmid: ship lovers will be entranced. Moreover, there are a handful of original colour photos taken from film shot between 1939 and autumn 1940.

Is this the final word on *Hood*? Almost. John Roberts' classic *Anatomy of the Ship* remains a must-have for anyone with an interest in naval architecture or desire to build a model of *Hood*. Thorough analysis of the fatal explosion may be found in Bill Juren's 1987 *Warship International* monograph (as mentioned by Taylor), and a detailed, scientific, survey of the wreck site has yet to be published. Nevertheless, *The Battlecruiser HMS Hood* is a superb book, that definitely raises the bar for anyone writing any ship's history, and it is unlikely to be superseded by anything further on *Hood* for a very long time to come. If you have an interest in the Royal Navy in the first half of the twentieth century, you want this book.

William Schleihauf
Pointe des Cascades, Quebec

David A. Thomas. *Battles and Honours of the Royal Navy*. Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk. 1998. 362 pp., illustrations, bibliography, index. UK £25.00, cloth; ISBN 1 -085052-623-X

Any writer or dedicated reader of naval history, unless born with a prodigious memory, requires at least a modest shelf of reference volumes. A Canadian collection should include at least Macpherson/Burgess/Barrie's *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces*, (Vanwell, 1982 or 2002), and maybe, if interested in British naval history, Manning and Walker's *British Warship Names* (Putnam, 1959), a good general volume on naval battles, a Navy List is always useful, and maybe an atlas of battle locations. This volume by David Thomas would be a most valuable addition to such a library.

It is interesting to note that an official Admiralty list of Battle Honours did not appear

until an Admiralty Fleet Order was issued in 1954. Until then, it was a somewhat haphazard acquired distinction, sometimes even selected by individual captains. In that year, six types of honours were set out in the Order: fleet or squadron actions, single ship or boat actions, major bombardments (such as Alexandria, 1882), combined operations (Dieppe, 1942), campaign awards (Korea) and area awards. And the list ranges from the Armada (1588), before a Navy Royal even existed, to the Falklands (1982). Thomas simply divides his alphabetical list of honours into a main list and a single ship and boat action list. There are many anomalies throughout, such as including in the list of single ship actions the action between a single RN ship and several enemy, or several RN ships against one enemy. For instance *Acasta* and *Ardent* vs. *Scharnhorst* (1940), and *Mary Rose* vs. seven Algerines (1669). If a purist objects to the selections, however, the argument is not with Thomas but with the bureaucrats at the Admiralty.

Apart from the obvious list of naval battles in which the Royal Navy and its predecessors were involved, the author has given a brief, highly useful synopsis of the importance of the battles themselves, the opponents and results. These range from a mere line or two to ten and a half pages for the honour for the Battle of the Atlantic, where Thomas decided to summarize four illustrative convoy battles, from Capt. Johnny Walker's HG-76 from Gibraltar to the infamous one around SC-122/HX-229 and 229A. For this honour there are eight pages devoted to naming ships awarded the honour, including many Canadian vessels - *Baddeck*, *Haida*, *Kamsack*, *Swansea* and (the oddly-spelled, presumably just in this text, *Kampuskasing*). And the list does not include the St Lawrence Battle ships such as *Raccoon*. The same few descriptions apply to his treatment of Malta Convoys.

The criteria for an honour to be included was set out as "...resulting in defeat of the enemy, or where action was inconclusive but well fought (a somewhat subjective option!), and in exceptional circumstances where outstanding efforts were made against

overwhelming odds." That is, the battle normally must have been a successful service to be an honour. Thus, for instance, the loss of Force Z - *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to the Japanese do not warrant an honour. At Lake Champlain, in 1776, the first battle against American forces resulted in five Royal Navy ships being awarded an honour for their success; in the second battle, which the Americans won a few weeks later, no honours were awarded!

There are many intriguing items that surface. Submarines rarely qualify for an honour, except as the Mediterranean area honour; the first naval medal ever awarded was for The Glorious First of June (1794). One odd honour that was not a naval battle at all, was awarded when *Shannon* landed naval guns' crews for the defence and relief of Lucknow in 1858. It is always useful when the captains of ships awarded an honour are identified - at Martinique (1809) and the Nile (1798), for instance. Thomas also provides a helpful cross-reference for battles with other names, such as The Moonlight Battle for St. Vincent. Merchant ships are included in many battle honours lists — although by no means all — again, an arbitrary decision: Cadiz in 1596 with 63 ships, the Armada with 158 ships of which only 37 were truly "naval."

The book ends with a list of officially recognized memorable dates for the Royal Marine, for they do not acquire honours, and a list of honours by Fleet Air Arm Squadron. There are fifty pages of battles for which honours were not awarded, mostly losses or actions not well pursued, as well as occasional modest victories or ones in which RN ships participated over long periods to achieve an aim, such as the destruction of the German *Tirpitz*.

On the whole, *Battles and Honours of the Royal Navy* is a very valuable reference volume. It could have been even more useful with a ship-by-ship reference, but patently, that would have made it of a monumental size and impractical.

Fraser McK.ee
Toronto, Ontario

Spencer Tucker. *Stephen Decatur. A Life Most Bold and Daring*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2005. xx + 245 pp., maps, illustrations, chronology, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. US \$32.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-999-9

Stephen Decatur had a short but glorious life, but it is not a life that will be familiar to many Canadian readers, so a summary is in order. Born in 1779, the son of a successful officer in the Continental Navy and the grandson of a French naval officer, at the age of nineteen Decatur became a midshipman in the infant navy of the republic. In 1804 he was serving as a lieutenant in the American squadron fighting the Barbary pirates when he became a national hero after leading a daring nighttime attack that destroyed the powerful frigate, *Philadelphia*, captured by the pirates after she ran aground in Tripoli harbour. Nelson is said to have termed this feat, "the most bold and daring act of the age" and it brought Decatur accelerated promotion to full captain at the age of 25, the youngest officer ever to attain that rank in the history of the USN.

In 1812, when war broke out between Britain and the United States, Decatur was commanding the frigate *United States*, and in October of that year he engaged and captured the British frigate, HMS *Macedonian*. This brought him promotion to commodore and command of a squadron consisting of his own frigate, the *Macedonian* and the sloop *Hornet*, but the increasing strength of the Royal Navy on the Atlantic coast of America caused his squadron to be blockaded in New London in June 1813. Nearly a year later, in May 1814, Decatur transferred to the frigate *President* in New York where he continued under blockade until 14 January, 1815 when he attempted to break out, only to have the misfortune to run aground off Sandy Hook. Decatur managed to get his ship free but, instead of returning to New York, opted to try for the open sea only to encounter four British warships. After a chase and battle that lasted some twelve hours, he surrendered to spare further casualties among his crew when it became apparent that escape was impossible.

When peace was established between the two nations, Decatur commanded a powerful squadron sent to the Mediterranean to enforce American demands on the Barbary pirates of Algiers and Tripoli. Returning to the United States, he held senior shore appointments until 1820 when, at the young age of 42, he was killed in a duel with a fellow naval officer. Decatur, whose career spanned three wars, can justly be regarded as one of the founding figures of the USN.

This being the case, it surprising to learn that *A Life Most Bold and Daring* is the first serious biography of this famous officer. Working under the 90,000 word limit imposed on titles in the Naval Institute's "Library of Naval Biography," however, Spencer Tucker has provided a balanced biography of Stephen Decatur. He emphasizes Decatur's many leadership qualities, including his ability to inspire his subordinates and his finely-honed seamanship and tactical skills, but does not overlook some of Decatur's faults, including the prickly sense of personal honour that led to the fatal duel, and the powerful ambition that led to the capture of the *President* when it would perhaps have been wiser for him to have turned back to New York. Tucker's text is succinct but complete and he has enhanced it with a useful technical glossary and a suggested reading list to create what will most probably become the definitive biography of Decatur for the foreseeable future.

The author has not wasted a word and neither will this reviewer who recommends *A Life Most Bold and Daring* to all those interested in the naval War of 1812 and leadership in the age of sailing navies.

Donald E. Graves
Almonte, Ontario

Vernon G.A. Upton. *Upon Their Lawful Occasions. Reflections of a Merchant Navy Officer During Peace and War*. Leicester, UK: Matador/Troubadore Publishing, www.troubadore.co.uk. 2004. xi + 444 pp., photographs, tables, indexes of ship losses,

indexes of U-Boat losses. £14.99; ISBN 1 904744 25 7

It is really quite amazing how after some sixty years first person biographies of wartime experiences are still appearing. Vernon Upton was 83 when this story of his was published. Yet it is clear, logical and straightforward, with a staggering amount of background research in support of his tale and his assessments. Although a Canadian, Upton went to sea as an apprentice seaman with a Welsh firm in 1936 and served continually in merchantmen until invalidated out as a first mate in 1944. The only exceptions were brief periods of study for mates' tickets, leaves and some hospitalization. His narrative of his own adventures tends to rely on his Discharge Book for dates, and one extensive report of a thirty-six day lifeboat journey when his ship *Start Point* was sunk in November 1942. He explains reasonably that some dates of events are inferences from what he can interpolate from that book. He also includes two several-page-long reports from friends, one covering the passage of Operation Pedestal Malta Convoy and the other, the survivor of the sinking of a British ship in the Indian Ocean when surviving boats were machine-gunned by a Japanese submarine.

His own tale is one for seamen, especially merchant seamen, as Upton goes into considerable detail about his work as a seaman and later as a midshipman and mate, without bothering to explain what all the rather unique and even obscure terms mean concerning the equipment with which he worked. With only a very modest familiarity with merchant ship operations, I had no problem and found it added to the immediacy and reality of the story that a more general method of narration would have lacked. It isn't vital to understanding what Upton was facing when one doesn't follow exactly how star sights are taken, how the topping lift on a Sampson post is fed to the lifting motor or the handling niceties of stowage of cased oil in the 'tween decks. He writes as if this were a continuous narrative of his life, which it is, for those with a real interest in that

profession. In that regard, the tale is rather unique.

Apart from the story of his own considerable adventures, he takes on two other tasks, one an assessment of the defense of merchant shipping, or rather the lack thereof, and the other, a huge research project, on all the losses of merchantmen, Allied and otherwise, in the Atlantic battle - each ship, when, where, by whom and with what casualties from a listed total crew. These latter are given in a series of tables inserted in the text in blocks according to the author's own experience in ships and convoys, so to use them for further research requires reference to his final Appendix, an index of ships. There is no index of people or places. Despite the enormous work in compiling these tables, particularly the crew losses and the U-boat and *Luftwaffe* attackers, there are remarkably few errors, and even the ones detected are understandable. These include allocating the two Canadian ships, *Lord Strathcona* and *Rose Castle*, sunk at anchor in Conception Bay, Newfoundland after loading iron ore, to convoys which, of course, they had left. This is simply a danger of taking records as published by official sources.

Throughout the story Upton is quite understandably furious, several times over, at the lack of any serious preparedness for even the most basic defence of merchant ship trade before and during the early war years. In particular, he repeatedly criticizes the navy's lack of preparation for a repeat of the 1914-1918 war not so long before, and of Churchill's unpreparedness to enforce shipping protection, in particular by over-ruling Air Marshall Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris's insistence that bombing of Germany take all precedence over protection of the convoys that supplied those bombers with building material, fuel and weapons. Throughout most of Upton's time in his ships, from the fall of 1939 until about 1944, he and his compatriots felt that they were given very little support for their highly dangerous passages, and that the severe losses of men, apart from their ships, was a penalty they alone paid for this intransigence. One could agree, as one always can, with his manipulation and

selection of percentage losses of crews. For example, he does not include men in those convoys that passed unscathed across the Atlantic battlefield - about 80 per cent of all convoys. But Upton is telling his story as he and others of his valiant ilk saw it. The problem lay not only with the lack of effective support, but also with some — a few — of the owners and masters. Some of his ships were ill found and poorly provided; some masters and senior mates were none-too-bright martinetts who did little to prepare themselves for potential dangers or even torpedoing. An interesting research assessment could be made of the severity and rapidity of losses of ships carrying very heavy cargoes of iron, steel and bulk products like ore and grain in lower holds which Upton claimed tended to ensure they sank in minutes of a torpedoing every time.

Toward the end, Upton gives a day-by-day description of his abandoning of *Start Point* and their five week journey in two boats in Atlantic winter gales. The master and first mate did not escape the ship, so by Upton's strict discipline, keeping together by the larger boat towing the smaller, and careful allocation of water and food tablets only two men died, despite several of them being badly injured. One understands therefore why he was awarded the George Medal and Lloyd's War Medal for saving the forty-two crew. By itself that part of the story is an amazing tale of survival at sea and worth the price of the book alone.

Upon Their Lawful Occasions is an excellent story of the times, and well worth its shelfspace, at a very modest cost. One feels that the author is simply clearing his yard of a matter that has been bothering him for those sixty years.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario

Ron Wallis. *The Story of Pictou's Park Ships*. Pictou, N.S.: Advocate Printing and Publishing Ltd., 2004. 180 pp., photographs, index of names. C D N \$20.00, paper: ISBN 0-9735393-0-5. 4-9.

By 1940, it had been realized that Britain was losing merchant vessels to enemy action faster than they could be replaced by UK shipyards. That fall, in order to remedy the situation, a shipbuilding commission traveled to North America to obtain assistance from the United States and Canada.

The commission's meetings with various levels of government and private enterprise resulted in the enactment of the Lend-Lease Act by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, and a major commitment from Canada to build twenty 10,000 ton cargo vessels for Britain. This figure was soon raised to twenty-six ships and, at the same time, Canada decided to build additional vessels for its own use.

The initial order was for eighty-eight 10,000 ton and five 4,700 ton vessels, three of which were to be built in Pictou, Nova Scotia, by the Pictou Foundry and Engineering Company, owned by the Ferguson brothers. This new shipyard would employ an estimated 1,500 workers. These people with their families would more than double the town's population.

Property adjacent to the Ferguson brothers' marine railway and repair slip was acquired and leveled, thereby providing sufficient fill for the ways where the 4,700 tonners would be built. At the same time, the company undertook a very basic training program, covering all aspects of steel shipbuilding.

By April 1942, three keels had been laid and the yard was waiting for the steel to lay the fourth, when the operation of the yard was turned over to the Foundation Maritime Co. Ltd. Obviously, politics were involved, but, ostensibly, the change was designed to permit the Ferguson brothers to retain their marine slip and concentrate on naval repairs and refits. Additional orders came in, raising to twenty-four the total number of vessels built at the Foundation Maritime yard, the last of which, the SS *Lome Park*, was launched on April 30, 1945. There was considerable local interest in keeping the yard going after the war, however Foundation Maritime Ltd. had no interest in doing so and the yard, buildings and equipment

were auctioned off by the War Assets Corporation in 1948.

Mr Wallis has chosen to tell the story of the Pictou-built 4,700 tonners through the chronological compilation of extracts from the *Pictou Advocate* newspaper and the *Fo 'c 'sle*, Foundation Maritime's local company newsletter. These records are interspersed with photographs, information about the vessels and reproductions of statistics and other documents.

Part 1, "Preparations for shipbuilding," covers the period from October 9, 1941 to October 1942, when the first vessel, Hull No. 1, the SS *Victoria Park* slid down the ways. It includes the construction and equipment of the new shipyard, recruiting, training and keel laying. A detailed essay, entitled "Launchings: How it is Done" is of particular interest.

Part 2. "The Hulls," begins with an indexed listing of hull numbers and the vessels' names and consists in the main of extracts from the *Fo 'c 'sle*, interspersed with brief notes on the construction, launch and completion dates of each vessel. It is liberally illustrated with photographs by R. H. Sherwood of the vessels in various stages of construction and under steam.

While Part 3, "Some of the people involved," and Part 4, an index of people mentioned in the book, will certainly be of interest to native Pictonians, of more general interest will be the extracts from the *Fo 'c 'sle* describing in detail the work of just about every trade and occupation involved in steel shipbuilding.

Although a little disjointed at times, the author's chosen method of presenting his research through a compilation of newspaper articles and clippings from company newsletters is reasonably well put together and edited.

There is an occasional problem with some of the notes which Mr Wallis has included in the text. For example, *Avondale Park*, the last British ship to be sunk in the Second World War, was torpedoed two miles south of the Isle of May, not May Island, and he confuse four inches naval guns with the old, First World War Lewis machine guns. As far as omissions are concerned, one might have expected a little more coverage of the actual working conditions in the

yard. There are, however, some clues, such as the April and May eye injury reports and the loss of 28,424 man days on account of injuries suffered during a twenty-one day period in October of that year. There is also the jolly little tale of the "Dirty Gang," a happy group of young women and girls who spent their entire shift clearing up loose pieces of asbestos and other garbage from the engine room and bilges, and climbing inside boilers to paint the tubes with Benzine dope. Some mention to the effect that Pictou's Park ships were not the first steel merchant vessels to be built in Pictou County might also have been in order. Concerns such of these do not detract from the value of Mr Wallis's contribution to Canada's nautical research. In fact, the only serious problem with *The Story of Pictou 's Park Ships* is the lack of a general index.

Robin H. Wyllie
East LaHave, Nova Scotia

CORRECTION - Volume XV, No 1, N.R.
Cole's review of Roger Chesneau - *German Pocket Battleships*. Line 11 in paragraph 3 on page 88 should read "range, they were capable of 26 knots, well suited."