

## **The Vulnerability of the Union War Effort to Naval Attacks at the Beginning of the US Civil War**

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The Confederate warship *Virginia's* short-lived triumph in March 1862 triggered a latent fear among some northerners, perhaps exemplified by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton's fit of panic. Upon hearing of the ironclad warship *Virginia's* successful sortie and apparent invulnerability against a northern fleet anchored in Hampton Roads off the southern Virginia coast, Stanton feared that the ironclad would destroy the remainder of the Union fleet there and scuttle General George McClellan's campaign against Richmond. He further feared that the ironclad would then steam up the Atlantic coast and wreak havoc upon northern ports, and he warned New York officials to block the entrances to the port. Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory hoped for this very result. *Virginia's* dubious seaworthiness and the Federal warship *Monitor* squelched Mallory's hopes and allayed Stanton's fears. Prior to *Virginia's* attack, northern nerves were upset by the *Trent* incident and the attendant possibility of British naval attacks.<sup>1</sup>

*Virginia's* failure to fulfill the Confederacy's hopes should not disguise the unease northerners felt about potential naval attacks. Northerners certainly were familiar with the effects of naval attacks: the War of 1812 was reminder enough. Was the northern war effort vulnerable to naval attacks? Was it important that the Federal navy prevented the nascent Confederate navy or the powerful British navy from attacking northern ports? The vulnerability or invulnerability of the northern war effort to naval attacks has received little attention from historians, possibly because Confederate naval attacks seemed unlikely and because the *Trent* incident ended quietly. But if the Europeans had intervened or if the Confederates had better success in building or buying a navy, the spectre of such attacks against northern cities might have become reality.

I will demonstrate that the northern war effort would have been significantly impaired by the loss of seaborne transport. The Federal military was aided by the ability to ship supplies coastwise, and the loss of coastwise shipping would have greatly hindered the Union's attempt to recapture the South. In addition, during the early months of the war, the Union needed war matériels from Europe to augment the domestic production. The most damaging aspect of any potential naval attacks might have been upon support for the war due

to disruptions in the northern economy. Northern farmers and shippers would have suffered from the inability to export grain to Europe. Northern merchants and manufacturers also would have been hurt by the disruptions in trade, and the already embattled Lincoln administration would have had to cope with political unrest stemming from the economic turbulence.

*Virginia's* potential offers some clues as to how a strong hostile fleet might have disrupted military operations. If *Virginia* had been completed earlier, it might have enabled the Confederates to drive the wooden Federal warships out of Hampton Roads, while simultaneously protecting Norfolk. *Virginia* might have scuttled the Peninsular Campaign, since by controlling the rivers flowing into the Chesapeake the Confederate ironclad would have made McClellan's logistics untenable. Although the campaign came to naught (primarily because of McClellan's timidity in the face of inferior numbers), the ultimate northern campaign against Richmond in 1864-1865 depended upon controlling the rivers to the southeast of Richmond; this control eased the logistical strain. Thus, continued Confederate naval superiority on the Virginia waters would have forced the Union army to a direct overland approach to Richmond, with fewer prospects for success.<sup>2</sup>

Confederate or European control of Chesapeake Bay would have severely strained Union logistics even for a direct overland approach to Richmond. During the winter of 1861-1862, when the Confederates blockaded the Potomac with land batteries, northern railroads were unable fully to supply Washington. In a second episode, ice blocked the Potomac in early 1864. Again, the railroads could supply only a fraction of the army's supplies.<sup>3</sup> The Quartermaster General observed:

The present [railroad] line is exposed at several points to be broken by naval expeditions, of the efficiency of which our experience in the present war gives abundant proof, as in a war with a nation having a powerful navy, our present sea and land communications would both be imperiled, and interior line of supply and of communication between the capital and the north and northeast would be of great military importance, even were the present lines fully able to meet any present demand.<sup>4</sup>

The Federal naval blockade was also vulnerable to hostile naval attacks, as many of the blockading vessels were converted merchantmen armed with a single gun. A Confederate or European naval attack on Port Royal would have disrupted the blockade. The Union navy's blockade board had recommended capturing at least one harbour on the South Atlantic coast to provide a convenient and safe haven to repair and resupply blockading vessels. The possession of Port Royal reduced the need for them to return to northern ports for resupply or repairs and increased the efficiency of the blockade.<sup>5</sup>

Union control of American waters enabled the Federal government to launch sea-borne attacks against targets such as New Orleans, Galveston, Florida, and the Carolinas. Naval power was also critical in determining control of the war's western theatre. The presence of a hostile fleet threatening the long oceanic supply line would have jeopardized the crucial morale-boosting capture of New Orleans, which fell due to the lack of adequate Confederate naval forces. The inability of the Confederates to contest Union naval power along the Mississippi made the recapture of New Orleans less feasible but, more important, reduced the potential gains from re-occupying the city.<sup>6</sup> A strong Confederate navy might

have had far-reaching effects, allowing the South to clear the mouth of the Mississippi and to contest control of its upper reaches, perhaps even attacking St. Louis.<sup>7</sup> Antebellum St. Louis had been the gateway for western foodstuffs heading South. Although the city had considerable Unionist sentiment, Confederate control might have freed up needed western foodstuffs for the lower Mississippi Valley and Confederate troops stationed in Tennessee, while denying the use of the city to support Union efforts. If the Confederates could also maintain control of the Red, Cumberland, and Tennessee rivers, their logistical problems would be further mitigated. St. Louis and Mound City (between St. Louis and Cairo) were the sites where the Union ironclads were being constructed. Finally, controlling the Mississippi up to St. Louis would also protect the nascent Confederate shipyard at Memphis, where *Arkansas* and a sister vessel were being constructed.

The North's leading Atlantic ports were also vulnerable to naval attack. Although the Confederacy was unlikely to possess enough ships to attack several northern seaports simultaneously, mobility and surprise might have created panic in all the northern ports and disrupted international trade. Another advantage of Confederate attacks upon port cities would be to draw off Union warships. While the removal of Union sea-going warships might not have significantly weakened the blockade of southern ports (since many of the sea-going Union vessels were not suitable for blockade duty), Confederate naval raids might have increased the effectiveness of its commerce raiders by reducing the number of Federal vessels hunting for them. Of course, a hostile British fleet would have been a much greater adversary.

Northern success against European navies would have been problematic. While Canada was vulnerable to northern land forces, European intervention might raise the threat of British naval attacks up the St. Lawrence River all the way to the Great Lakes. *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine* printed a lengthy report detailing the "Harbor Defences on Great Lakes and Rivers," although it might have been more accurately entitled "The Lack of Harbor Defences." New York Governor Edwin Morgan informed Thurlow Weed that "[w]hen affairs looked the worst [December 1861] I conferred with several competent engineers and purchased about 380,000 feet of timber at the yards in New York city...with a view to using it as an obstruction to vessels crossing the Narrows."<sup>8</sup> Governor Morgan was not reassured by the Federal government's preparations to defend the major ports.

Thus, even localized Confederate naval superiority, to say nothing of British naval activity, would have exerted profound effects upon the Union campaigns for several reasons. First, Confederate warships might have delayed Federal attacks down the Mississippi and through Kentucky and Tennessee, primarily because losing control of the Mississippi River and some of its tributaries would have created logistical difficulties for the Union. Moreover, the North's control of the rivers assisted its armies' advances into the Confederacy because the rivers greatly alleviated logistical difficulties; indeed, in the western theatre, more supplies were sent by water than by rail:

Col. Lewis B. Parsons, then chief quarter-master of Western River Transportation at St. Louis, reported that in the transportation of troops during 1863 the number moved by rail was 193,023, and that moved by river boat 135,909. Of subsistence, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical stores, railroads transported 153,102,100 pounds, while river boats carried more than twice that amount, 337,912,363 pounds.

One Union commissary officer reflected after the war that one "ordinary Ohio River steamer" could carry five hundred tons, enough to supply forty thousand men and eighteen thousand animals for two days.

In the West, as long as the rivers had supplied the Union armies, they had made dramatic advances. But in the fall Rosecrans's disrupted railroads and long delay to accumulate supplies and the quick defeat of Grant's advance showed the primacy of the Confederate raiding logistic strategy. This, the difficulty of living on a country of insufficient agricultural output, and the vulnerable railroads, had thwarted every Yankee invasion.<sup>9</sup>

Second, a strong Confederate fleet might have kept New Orleans and the egress to the Gulf of Mexico open through most of the summer of 1862. Thus, the dream of the Father of Waters rolling unimpeded to the sea would have been delayed. Third, a hostile fleet might have created havoc along the eastern seaboard, perhaps bringing trans-Atlantic shipping to a standstill. Fourth, the promising approach to Richmond from the southeast would have been precluded, forcing the Union army to a more direct, overland approach. While the North probably would have eventually built enough sea-going warships and river craft to contest any Confederate or European naval attacks, the delay in Union successes could have had profound political ramifications.

Aside from the military ramifications, what would have happened if a hostile fleet captured or raided a small number of northern ports: perhaps New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore?" I will concentrate on how such threats to northern port cities would have affected the movement of western grains, before briefly describing other effects.

**Table 1**  
**Value of Exports and Imports to and from Major American Ports**  
**for the Year Ending 30 June 1860**

<b>Port District</b>	<b>Value of Exports</b>	<b>Value of Imports</b>
Boston	\$ 13,530,770	\$ 39,366,560
New York	120,630,955	233,692,941
Philadelphia	5,512,755	14,626,801
Baltimore	8,804,606	9,784,773
Richmond	5,098,720	902,114
Charleston	21,179,350	1,569,570
Savannah	18,351,554	782,061
Mobile	38,670,183	1,050,310
New Orleans	107,812,580	22,922,773
Texas	5,772,158	533,153
<b>Total</b>	<b>373,189,274</b>	<b>362,166,254</b>

*Note:* Although individual ports comprised most "Port Districts," Texas and Oregon port districts were comprised of all the ports along these states' coastlines.

*Source:* United States, Department of the Treasury, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, for the Year Ending June 30, 1860* (Washington, DC, 1860), 350-351 and 522-553.

New York was the major American port, dominating the country's import trade (see table 1). While the port was also the largest exporter in terms of dollar value, its dominance of the export market was much less marked. New Orleans, with its control over raw cotton exports (half the number of bales with a value of \$96,000,000) and a dwindling though still important grain and provisions trade, rivalled New York for exports. But no port had more than one-sixth of the value of New York's imports. Moreover, the northern port's exports were varied, although cotton and grain were two of the more important. In 1859-1860, for example, New York exported \$12,500,000 worth of raw cotton and almost \$9,000,000 worth of wheat and wheat flour.<sup>11</sup> The remaining northern ports were primarily import centres, and the value of exports from Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore lagged behind several southern ports.

The internal movement of goods within the northern states was unlikely to be affected by Confederate naval attacks. The Great Lakes, railroads, canals, and rivers were largely shielded from hostile attacks (except for railroads near the military frontier, such as the Baltimore & Ohio). But if Great Britain entered the war, the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River system would be vulnerable and might even become an avenue for British attacks. Otherwise, attacks against northern ports might not have affected the supply of western foodstuffs destined for consumption in the major port towns, although such attacks might have affected coastwise movement of grains to smaller American ports. Of course, the main effect would have been to stifle the international movement of goods. The mere announcement of a Union blockade against southern ports brought the international trade at those ports to a standstill, even though it took several months for the northern blockade to become very effective; one can imagine the havoc that the spectre of a roving squadron of hostile warships might have created. For a city like New York, the loss of its foreign business would have had dire consequences. For midwestern farmers, the loss of European markets, coupled with the loss of southern consumers, might have been devastating.

Some farmers in the northwest were already reeling from the loss of their southern markets.<sup>12</sup> More than 800,000 barrels of flour and almost 3,000,000 bushels of corn were retained at New Orleans or shipped to "other coastal ports" in 1859-1860; after mid-1861, this flow almost completely ceased. Although the source of the flour and corn was not stated, most of the grain probably originated in the Old Northwest, as receipts of grain at New Orleans plummeted during the first year of the Civil War, implying that the cessation of trade between the North and South caused much of the decrease. Fortunately, Europe increased its demand for American-grown grain during 1861-1863. While Northerners crowed that "King Corn" was more important than "King Cotton," if anything, the smaller than average grain harvest in Great Britain was a blessing for the North; increased British demand dwarfed the lost southern market and ameliorated the economic dislocation. The United Kingdom imported three times as much flour and five times as much wheat and corn in 1860-1861 as in 1859-1860, and even more the next year (see table 2). In 1863 and 1864, however, these imports fell back towards the 1860 levels.<sup>13</sup> Thus, grain exports to Great Britain were important for western farmers during the early years of the war. For the year ending 30 June 1861, western farmers exported \$63,000,000 worth of wheat and flour, compared to less than \$20,000,000 for the year ending 30 June 1860. The two years ending 30 June 1862 and 1863 saw even greater earnings from the export of wheat and wheat flour. The United States Treasury Report on commerce showed that the export value of grains increased by almost \$48,000,000 between the years ending 30 June 1860 and 1861.<sup>14</sup>

**Table 2**  
**Exports of Grain from Major American Ports to Great Britain, 1860-1864**  
**(Barrels of Flour)**

Year	1860	1861	1862	1863	1864
Boston	26,829	126,846	285,705	46,123	39,586
New York	626,283	1,775,338	1,883,134	1,164,119	1,020,858
Philadelphia	64,861	192,175	361,619	121,927	77,338
Baltimore	905	127,031	75,732	46,553	24,359
New Orleans	6,333	179,427	0	0	0
Other Ports	50	160,844	66,325	100,691	95,236
Total	725,261	2,561,661	2,672,515	1,479,413	1,257,377

**Bushels of Wheat**

Boston	0	13,032	38,850	0	0
New York	4,759,246	20,541,073	21,268,961	20,471,480	15,123,990
Philadelphia	244,953	1,593,416	2,386,599	1,134,318	500,866
Baltimore	41,823	969,084	468,772	306,105	60,129
New Orleans	0	66,767	0	0	0
Other Ports	8922	2,369,998	1,591,527	1,255,307	807,958
Total	5,054,944	25,553,370	25,754,709	23,167,210	16,492,943

**Bushels of Corn**

Boston	1,050	14,100	49,516	16,088	0
New York	1,772,723	8,653,569	12,635,762	9,836,826	664,852
Philadelphia	242,111	704,447	735,566	201,368	583
Baltimore	130,602	853,200	656,724	270,074	17,256
New Orleans	140,069	1,464,267	0	0	0
Other Ports	0	15,451	6,600	10,000	0
Total	2,286,555	11,705,034	14,084,168	10,334,356	682,691

*Note:* Year ending 31 August.

*Sources:* *Hunts' Merchants' Magazine*, XLIII (1860), 482; XLV (1861), 484; XLVII (1862), 355-356; and XLIX(1863), 405.

New York was the primary American grain export centre, exporting an average of 1,600,000 barrels of flour; 10,375,000 bushels of corn; and 20,760,000 bushels of wheat per annum to Great Britain between 1861 and 1863. For New York, the increased grain export was a timely antidote to its loss of the lucrative raw cotton export trade.<sup>15</sup> New York dwarfed the other major northeastern ports in grain exports. Baltimore was not a large exporter of wheat and corn, shipping an average of just over 400,000 barrels of flour abroad per year between 1858 and 1860; in addition, some of the railroads supplying Baltimore were vulnerable to attacks by Confederate troops. Boston exported even smaller amounts of grain

than Baltimore. Although the New England port exported some 360,000 barrels of flour in 1861 to all foreign ports, this was a hefty increase from previous years. Corn exports were well below 50,000 bushels until 1861, when 65,000 bushels were exported, while wheat exports were negligible. Philadelphia's exports of flour were similar to Baltimore's; the Pennsylvania port exported over four million bushels of wheat in 1861 and 1862, and just under 1,600,000 bushels of corn for the same period.<sup>16</sup>

Because New York was the dominant grain exporting port, a naval attack against it alone would distort the international grain flow. Shipping a barrel of flour from Chicago to New York by rail was set at \$ 1.15 per barrel at a railroad convention of 1 September 1860, while shipping a barrel of flour from Chicago to Boston by rail cost \$ 1.30.<sup>17</sup> This rate would certainly escalate if New York were cut off and demand for rail transport to Boston increased. Moreover, Boston was not well-equipped to handle greater volumes of grain. Thus, while alternative ports might have been available, northern farmers would have been assessed greater transportation charges and would have received less for their grain. If the other major northeastern ports were threatened or attacked along with New York, the alternative routes through Montréal, or via St. Louis and New Orleans, might have become more attractive to western growers.

The Welland Canal connected Lakes Erie and Ontario and opened an outlet for western grain through Montréal. While shipments of grain through the Québec port were minuscule compared with New York, Canadian exports increased rapidly during 1861 and 1862 due to burgeoning European demand. During this period, Montreal's exports of wheat more than tripled, while its shipments of corn increased almost twenty-fold.<sup>18</sup> But as a port Montréal had some drawbacks. First, ice closed navigation for about five months per year. Second, even when the waterway was navigable, fog and ice floes could make the journey dangerous. Third, the city's demand for grain for consumption was smaller than that of New York, so it was not as well prepared to handle and store large volumes of grain as New York. Thus, although the port was closer to Liverpool, shippers paid higher insurance premiums from Montréal than on the New York-Liverpool route. As a result, it was less expensive to ship grain from New York.<sup>19</sup>

The southern route through St. Louis and New Orleans was another alternative. But even during peacetime there were several factors that eroded New Orleans' ability to compete for western grains. Shipping down the Mississippi River entailed higher risks than shipping across the Great Lakes. Further, New Orleans did not possess grain elevators, nor did it provide a large or stable enough local demand, so prices were more volatile. The city was also handicapped by the inability of the largest vessels to navigate the Mississippi; since there were economies of scale to ocean-going vessels, such a limitation reduced New Orleans' competitiveness. As a result, the cost of shipping from New Orleans to European ports was greater than shipping from the northeast. Finally, humid weather along the lower Mississippi led to greater spoilage. Yet even with all these disadvantages, New Orleans generally ranked second or third to New York as an exporter of flour and corn.<sup>20</sup> In addition, the Crescent City distributed large amounts of grain coastwise to Mobile and other Gulf ports.

St. Louis, too, was ill-equipped to compete with Chicago and the eastern ports for the northwest grain trade. Despite the facts that shipping via the Mississippi was liable to seasonal interruption and faced a higher rate of loss on perishables due to the slowness of transit, the river city had become complacent and continued to believe that river transport

would reign supreme. Since the city did not possess any elevators, grain was often left on the levees and exposed to the elements. Nor could grain be handled in bulk. The city was also slow to respond to the threat that railroads posed to its trade. And, of course, farmers in Michigan, Ohio and Indiana would find St. Louis a very inconvenient alternative to the Great Lakes.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, the southern route through St. Louis and the Crescent City was at a disadvantage in competing for northwest grains; however, this handicap was not large enough to preclude the possibility of a shift in the flow of grain.<sup>22</sup> If the eastern ports were threatened by a hostile naval power - and if the cost of transporting western grain across the Atlantic from these ports increased enough - the Mississippi outlet would become more attractive. If the northeast ports were plugged, the clamour to use the St. Louis/New Orleans route would have heightened, and the Lincoln administration would have been forced to redouble its effort to seize control of the entire river or to loosen its strictures upon southbound trade from St. Louis. The Confederates might have been in a position to woo the northwest by offering free trade along the Mississippi, while Federal efforts to interdict such commerce might have antagonized farmers in the region.

Northern farmers would have found their grain subjected to yet another increased levy. Even if northern ports were not directly attacked, a stronger Confederate navy, or hostile European navies, would have increased marine insurance even more than did the handful of Confederate cruisers, which succeeded in raising the "war risk" on American vessels from half of one percent at the beginning of the war to as much as 7.5 percent for voyages from New York to Pacific, South American, or East Indian ports by late 1863.<sup>23</sup> The increased cost of shipping to Europe would have depressed the price of grain in the United States, while the products the northerners imported would have increased in price. The real income of most western farmers would have been eroded.

Naval threats against northeastern ports would have led to other deleterious effects on the northern economy. Since regular international commerce would have been disrupted, prosperity would have been jeopardized. The disruption of the trans-Atlantic trade would have had myriad effects. Three that merit brief discussion are of strategic materials; weapon imports; and immigration. Early in the war, the North was faced with the potential loss of access to a key strategic material, nitre. The Union had a stark example of the ramifications of this shortage. When it failed to stockpile nitre from British India before the blockade became effective, the Confederacy was forced to establish a Nitre Corps. While the Corps succeeded in providing the South with minimal levels of this key material, the cost was perhaps five times as high as the market price in Britain.<sup>24</sup>

The *Trent* incident spurred the British government to halt nitre and finished gun powder shipments to the North. While the interruption of the trade did not result in more than a twenty percent change in the price of nitre, Alfred Chandler believes that the embargo helped spur Union leaders to pursue a conciliatory stance regarding the ship. In addition, the North began to develop a nitre industry, while erecting a tariff barrier of two cents per pound on imported nitre - nitre usually sold for eleven to fourteen cents per pound. By the end of the war, domestically-produced nitre was only modestly more costly than imports from Britain.<sup>25</sup> Still, hostile naval threats against northern ports might have resulted in a nitre shortage in the North early in 1862. Of course, the northerners might have tried to smuggle nitre through Canada in the face of hostile attacks, but costs still would have increased.



While northern manufacturers eventually produced large quantities of shoulder arms and other weapons, arming the flood of volunteers in 1861 required imports from Europe. The Federal government immediately sent agents abroad to purchase arms. In their haste, the agents displayed little discrimination and wasted a good deal of money. For European arms dealers, the war was an opportunity to reduce inventories of obsolete shoulder arms. The Federal agents purchased over 700,000 shoulder arms early in the war, many of which were inferior smooth-bore muskets.<sup>26</sup> After the first year of the conflict, though, Federal troops were largely independent of European-made weapons.

Would a disrupted northern economy have retarded immigration? Ella Lonn reports that 650,000 immigrants arrived at the northern states between 1861 and 1864. Of this total, perhaps 183,000 were males of military age. Immigration alleviated some of the Union's manpower needs during the war. Almost two-thirds of these immigrants arrived in 1863 and 1864, precisely when Union manpower needs were becoming acute. Confederate authorities claimed that Union agents in Europe were actively recruiting immigrants for military service.<sup>27</sup> Confederate attempts to import skilled foreign labour failed in the face of the Union naval blockade, unfavourable Confederate conscription policies and other deterrents; so too might have northern attempts in the face of a disrupted economy and threatened ports.

Thus, hostile naval attacks against the northern economy easily could have negated gains in the grain export business, retarded immigration, and hindered the North's efforts to clothe and equip its armies. Fears of the effects of attacks against northern ports were not misplaced. Indeed, such fears would recur in the Spanish-American war.

Although the North's ability to supply its troops with munitions, arms, and food might not have been irreparably damaged by hostile naval attacks against the major ports, the economic dislocation might have heightened dissatisfaction with the Lincoln administration. Perhaps the greatest source of latent discontent existed in the northwest. Western sectionalism existed before the Civil War, and some extremists argued for separation. New England was a particular *bete noir* and was often characterized as a hotbed of tariff-loving, temperance-preaching abolitionists. Certainly the Morrill Tariff, the excise taxes on distilled spirits and malted liquors, and the vocal abolitionists lent credence to this caricature.<sup>28</sup> Because of its abolitionist sentiments, New England was blamed for precipitating the war. In addition, many of the northwest's railroads were controlled by eastern interests. In the hands of savvy politicians, such antipathy could be transformed into an unruly force with which the Lincoln administration would have had to contend. While the antipathy may not have led to a separation of the northwest, the animosity could have contributed to war-weariness or to replacing the allegedly inept Republican administration with Democratic leadership (who would have had different war aims).

During the Civil War, additional reasons for northwestern discontent with the Republicans arose. Along with many other northerners, northwest citizens were concerned about the arbitrary arrests of critics, and Democrats were quick to seize upon the concern and accuse the Republicans of eroding civil rights.<sup>29</sup> The Morrill Tariff, passed in the absence of southern legislators, antagonized many in the northwest since it raised the prices of manufactures while eroding the purchasing power of westerners. Coupled with the economic disruption wrought by the loss of southern markets, the tariff exacerbated sectional animosity. Another source of northwestern discontent was Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Although many northwestern residents disliked slavery, they did not welcome

blacks. Indeed, many believed that freed blacks would gravitate to the southern parts of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio and compete for jobs with white workers, forcing down wages.<sup>30</sup>

**Table 3**  
**Nominal Prices and Freights for Wheat**

Month	(1) Price	(2) Freight by Rail	(3) Freight by Water	(4) Price Index
January 1859	\$0.78	\$0.42	n/a	95
March	\$1.04	\$0.42	n/a	99
May	\$1.30	\$0.30	\$0.15	97
July	\$0.90	\$0.30	\$0.15	95
September	\$0.74	\$0.30	\$0.17	91
November	\$0.90	\$0.36	\$0.25	92
January 1860	\$1.00	\$0.39	n/a	94
March	\$1.07	\$0.39	n/a	94
May	\$1.12	\$0.27	\$0.18	93
July	\$1.10	\$0.30	\$0.18	92
September	\$0.93	\$0.30	\$0.30	92
November	\$0.82	\$0.39	\$0.34	93
January 1861	\$0.80	\$0.39	n/a	92
March	\$0.80	\$0.38	n/a	90
May	\$0.98	\$0.33	\$0.21	88
July	\$0.68	\$0.32	\$0.17	83
September	\$0.73	\$0.41	\$0.30	86
November	\$0.72	\$0.59	\$0.42	92
January 1862	\$0.71	\$0.60	n/a	98
March	\$0.79	\$0.57	n/a	98
May	\$0.80	\$0.36	\$0.20	95
July	\$0.83	\$0.33	\$0.23	98
September	\$0.87	\$0.45	\$0.23	107
November	\$0.91	\$0.59	\$0.27	120

*Notes:* (1) Nominal price per bushel of No. 1 Spring wheat at Chicago; (2) Nominal railroad tariff for sixty pounds of wheat shipped from Chicago to New York; (3) Nominal shipping rate by water for sixty pounds of wheat shipped from Chicago to New York (these rates were listed only from May through November); and (4) Warren-Pearson "All Commodities" price index (1910-1914 = 100).

*Sources:* For "Price" and "Freight by Rail," Chicago Board of Trade Annual Reports (1859-1862). For "Freight by Water," United States, Bureau of Statistics, *Railway and Other Transportation Services* (Washington, DC, 1898), 50-51. For price index, G. F. Warren and F. A. Pearson, *Gold and Prices* (New York, 1935), 13.

Perhaps the greatest source of discontent in the northwest emanated from the economic woes of late 1861. Northwestern farmers were doubly squeezed during 1861-1862. For the growers of the upper Mississippi, the loss of trade with New Orleans and the lower Mississippi was a calamity. Although trade down the Mississippi had been declining in importance for northern grain growers, it was still important for many northwestern farmers.<sup>31</sup> Different parts of the northwest were hit with varying degrees of severity by the loss of the southern market. With the lack of railroads in their states, farmers in Minnesota

and Iowa were left without an alternate market. Hubert Wubben believes that western Iowa farmers without access to railroads were hard hit by the loss of the southbound river trade, and Keokuk and the southeast portion of Iowa also suffered from a lack of railroads. The level of the Mississippi could also affect the decision whether to ship grain south or east; in late 1860, a rise in the river spurred an increase in shipments southward. Dubuque and Davenport shipped significant portions of their flour to New Orleans, especially when railroad freight rates were high.<sup>32</sup> Still, Iowa's grains were gradually being directed east.

In addition, the Mississippi River offered competition to the Great Lakes and railroads, and farmers along the upper river believed that its use moderated the railroads' power. The farmers' fears were realized as soon as the Mississippi was closed, for the railroads and the Great Lakes' shippers raised freights, sparking protests throughout the midwest. The Chicago to Buffalo and New York rates typically rose as the calendar year waned, but the July to November increase in real freights was more dramatic in 1861 than in previous years (see table 3).<sup>33</sup> Data on rail rates from the farms to Chicago and Milwaukee are scanty, but Richard Cunent has discussed how monopoly power allowed railroads to charge more for the Madison-Milwaukee haul than for the Prairie du Chien-Milwaukee route. Of course, the railroads and Great Lakes' operators could claim that the increased demand for transport services fuelled the increased freight rates.<sup>34</sup> Concurrent with the rising shipping costs, real grain prices fell at Chicago (nominal prices were stagnant), reflecting the loss of the New Orleans market; thus, as 1861 ended, northwest grain growers were angry.

Economic dislocation and the perception that railroads were charging exorbitant freights were primary contributors to disaffection in the northwest, where farmers bemoaned the "unfair" railroad rates levied by eastern-dominated railroads. As Frank Klement wrote, "Freight rates were more than doubled in 1861 and further increases were added in 1862. It seemed unfair to farmers of southern Illinois that the cost of shipping a barrel of produce to New York City should increase from \$ 1.20 in July of 1861 to \$3.00 by January 15, 1862."<sup>35</sup>

The increasing cost of shipping forced farm prices down, while the Morrill Tariff and the rising shipping costs increased the price of eastern manufactures and imports to northwesterners. Even with the increased demand by Europeans, western farmers believed that they gained very little because of the increasing shipping costs. *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine* described the plight of producers of agricultural products:

The ability of the great agricultural classes to consume goods is very small, since the rise in their produce bears no proportion to the advance in the supplies they purchase... Thus in 1861 the farmer, for 1 bbl. pork, 1 bushel corn, and 1 bushel wheat could get in Cincinnati... [50 lbs. each]... of sugar and coffee and 70 yards of shirting. To obtain the same articles now [June 1863], he must give 2 bbls. pork, 20 bushel corn and 14 bushel wheat... These figures indicate how severely the rise in goods presses upon the consuming classes... It is to be borne in mind that this state of things takes place after a year of the most extraordinary exports of grain, when prices ought to have been higher. The quantity has been so great, however, in consequence of the closing of the rivers.<sup>36</sup>

**Table 4**  
**Percentage of Votes Received by Republicans, 1860 and 1862**

State	(1) 1862	(2) 1860	(3)
	% Republican	% Republican	% Difference
<b>Northwest</b>			
Illinois	46.81	51.80	-4.98
Indiana	47.80	54.62	-6.82
Iowa	57.09	56.09	+0.99
Michigan	52.62	52.53	+0.09
Minnesota	57.93	65.72	-7.79
Ohio	48.77	55.30	-6.53
Wisconsin	49.09	56.98	-7.88
Total Northwest	49.58	54.61	-5.03
<b>New England/ Mid-Atlantic</b>			
Connecticut	56.48	54.10	+2.39
Delaware	50.34	23.79	+26.56
Maine	53.54	62.24	-8.70
Massachusetts	60.59	62.97	-2.39
New Hampshire	51.50	56.91	-5.41
New Jersey	43.24	48.15	-4.91
New York	49.11	53.71	-4.61
Pennsylvania	49.59	56.26	-6.66
Rhode Island	99.45	61.37	+38.08
Vermont	88.48	75.73	+ 12.75
Total New England/ Mid-Atlantic	51.73	55.90	-4.17

*Notes:* There was no opposition for the governor's seat in Rhode Island in 1862. (1): Percentage received by Republican or Union Party candidates. For northwest states, all are local congressional races, except for Illinois, which had a statewide congressional race. For New England and mid-Atlantic states, all are gubernatorial races, except Pennsylvania (state auditor-general position). (2): Percentage received by Lincoln of total ballots cast for president. (3): (1) - (2).

*Source:* Chicago Tribune, *Almanac* (Chicago, 1863).

Even a railroad president recognized the deleterious effects of high freight rates on western farmers:

The West cannot consent to be held by the throat any longer to enrich Albany and Buffalo...The people of this State are bound to have an outlet to the East; this leaning towards Canada is a natural consequence of the apathy and indifference manifested by the State of New York touching a fair division of the spoils of the products of the prairies - 7/8 to forwarders and 1/8 to the poor devil who raises the corn. It is grievous...It is not a question of loyalty, but...one of bread and butter.<sup>37</sup>

During the period of high railroad rates, one Iowa Republican even alleged that railroad officials had convinced the authorities that Vicksburg was impregnable, hindering efforts to re-open the Mississippi. Such a charge was potentially incendiary, as midwestern farmers viewed the renewal of trade along the entire Mississippi as vital. The Lincoln administration received warnings from western officials of the dangers of delaying it.<sup>38</sup>

How was northwestern discontent reflected in the 1862 elections? Republican candidates in the North generally received lower percentages in 1862 than Lincoln did in 1860 (see table 4). In the seven northwestern states (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota), the Republican percentage fell by about five percent, although in Iowa and Michigan Republicans received slightly higher percentages in 1862 than Lincoln had in 1860. Reduced support for Republicans in the northwest was not extraordinary; in eastern states like Maine, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, the erosion in the Republican vote exceeded the aggregate percentage loss in the northwest, and the decline in New York and New Jersey was similar. While Republican support in the northwest declined more than in the ten New England and mid-Atlantic states, the difference was slight.

The Republican majority in the House of Representatives diminished after the 1862 election. After the southern states seceded in 1861, the Republicans held a healthy majority in the House, with 105 Republicans, forty-three Democrats and thirty Unionists. The 1862 elections reduced the Republicans' edge to 102 Republicans and Unionists, seventy-five Democrats, and nine Border State representatives. For the Democrats to get control of the House, they needed an additional fourteen seats (ignoring the swing effect of the Border State men). In the northwest, seven Republicans won by margins of less than one thousand votes; in six of these elections Democrats picked up forty-eight percent or more of the votes. In the populous states of Pennsylvania and New York, Republicans won an additional eight seats by fewer than a thousand votes (in five of these elections, Democrats won at least forty-eight percent of the vote). Thus, a swing of fewer than 7500 votes could have given the Democrats an additional fifteen House seats, and such a shift would have given them more seats than the Republicans/Unionists (with the Border Men holding the balance). Since there were several other close elections elsewhere in the country, a total swing of fewer than 10,000 votes would have been sufficient to give the Democrats a majority in the House.<sup>39</sup>

Although local issues affected many of the Congressional races, the overall shift in voting concerned the Republicans. But whatever the cause, the Republicans lost support in the elections of 1862. While such erosion was fickle (Republicans regained much of their support in the 1863 and 1864 elections), it points to the fragility of the Lincoln administration's hold upon the Union. Had the war's progress and the economy been worse in 1862 than actually transpired, one can only guess at the amount of erosion in support of the war. Hostile naval attacks might have exacerbated the erosion in the northwest's support for the war. Indeed, even Lincoln's supporters in Massachusetts and New York were concerned about various war measures and urged ameliorating the effects of non-intercourse restrictions and of the blockade. Edward Atkinson, a prominent textile manufacturer, convinced Lincoln to allow cotton trading with southerners to help textile mills, while New Yorkers worried about the loss of trade if the port were blockaded. By mid-December 1861, New York received news of Great Britain's anger over the *Trent* incident. The *New York Times* speculated on the possibility of a British naval attack and blockade of northern ports, and the New York Stock Exchange suffered what, in retrospect, seems a moderate downturn in the wake of the incident:

The Stock Exchange has been under much excitement to-day [December 12], incident to the return news from England in regard to the affair of the *Trent*. There were various and contradictory rumors and interpretations of the news for an hour or two after the arrival of the *Hansa* [bearing news of England's reactions], and prices at one time fell off 3/4 @ 1% on the speculative Railways, on the Street, and opened feverish at the Second Board in the afternoon. But, after the extracts from the London Press were made public, and time afforded for a calmer estimate of their weight and purport, the market took quite a spring in the opposite direction, and the decline of the morning was more than recovered.<sup>40</sup>

The market endured further turbulence as additional news of England's anger arrived:

The English news in the morning papers took the Street rather by surprise. The excitement in England, and the reported instructions to the British Minister at Washington, were construed as much more serious than the first response to the affair of the *Trent* indicated. The consequence on the Stock market was a general fall of about *three per cent.*, [italics theirs] and a depreciation in several instances of 5 @ 6%.<sup>41</sup>

The New York stock market registered a temporary dip on the news of *Virginia's* first day triumph, with the *New York Times* stoically reporting on 11 March 1862 that, "[i]n the Stock Market there was some adverse excitement early in the day [March 10], several parties being disposed to put out contracts...on the worst phase of the news from Hampton Roads." Because of the lag in the news reaching New York, the paper's headlines for the eleventh featured the results from both days, including *Monitor's* appearance.

New York faced other economic woes. Although the port had offset the loss of cotton exports with increased grain shipments, the "flight from the flag" augured ill. Many US merchant vessels switched registration to other nations as their owners were squeezed between Confederate commerce raiders and annoying Federal regulations attempting to prevent blockade running.<sup>42</sup> If these business leaders were quick to argue for weakening the war effort in the face of economic dislocation, their support in the face of even greater disruptions wrought by strong hostile navies may well have dissipated.

Therefore, the northern war effort was vulnerable to naval attacks. The Union navy's control of American waters simplified its logistics, enabling Union soldiers and sailors to capture and maintain such far-flung places as New Orleans, Galveston (if only temporarily), Norfolk, and Port Royal. In addition, Union naval superiority blockaded and besieged the remaining major southern ports of Charleston, Wilmington, Savannah, and Mobile. A strong hostile fleet might have interfered with the North's ability to maintain such successes.

Prior to the North's successful transition to war production, the Federal government's ability to supply its troops with arms and munitions was vulnerable to hostile naval attacks. The *Trent* incident and its attendant disruption of nitre shipments was a warning, but after the first year of war, northern manufacturers and mining operators were able adequately to supply Federal troops with arms, munitions, clothing, blankets, and other necessities.

Latent civilian discontent with the Lincoln administration's handling of the war was also a major threat to the northern war effort. Successful Confederate or European attacks

against even just New York threatened to disrupt the northern economy, especially its lucrative grain trade with Europe. The North was fortunate that the Confederate Navy never succeeded in contesting control of the American waters and that the European powers did not intervene. The Federal navy prevented the first contingency, while skilful diplomacy prevented the second.

## NOTES

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1. For a description of Stanton's panic, see Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles* (3 vols., Boston, 1911), I, 61-65. For Mallory's hopes and orders to the ironclad's commander, see United States, War Department, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion (ORN)* (Washington, DC, 1894-1922), series 1, VI, 780. A good description of the moods of Lincoln and his cabinet members is found in Adolph A. Hoehling, *Thunder at Hampton Roads: The U.S.S. Monitor - Its Battle with the Merrimack and Its Recent Discovery* (reprint, New York, 1993), 134-147. Although Secretary of the Navy Welles assured Lincoln and his assembled cabinet that *Virginia* was unable to attack Washington or New York, Lincoln initially ordered that the Potomac be blocked.

2. The approach from the southeast had the added advantage of threatening the main rail lines connecting Richmond to most of the rest of the Confederacy.

3. Hermon K. Murphey, "The Northern Railroads and the Civil War," *Mississippi Valley Historical Society*, V (December 1918), 324-338; *New York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, 4 March 1862; and United States, War Department, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in*

*the War of Rebellion (OR)* (Washington, DC, 1880-1900), series 3, IV, 48. While the army needed almost 450 carloads of grain and hay per day, the railroads were able to forward only twenty, largely because of the inability to ferry rail cars across the Delaware.

4. *OR*, series 3, IV, 49.

5. *Ibid.*, series 1, LUI, 67-73; and ORN, series 1, XII, 195-206.

6. For a discussion of the value of New Orleans to the Confederacy, see David G. Surdam, "Union Military Superiority and New Orleans's Economic Value to the Confederacy," *Louisiana History*, XXXVIII (Fall 1997), 389-408.

7. This line of thought was suggested by Professor Mark Thornton of Auburn University.

8. Thurlow W. Barnes, *Memoir of Thurlow Weed by His Grandson* (Boston, 1884), 412. For Great Lake defences, see *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XLVI (1862), 337-356.

9. Louis C. Hunter, *Steamboats on the Western Rivers* (Cambridge, MA, 1949), 553; Archer Jones, *Civil War Command and Strategy* (New York, 1992), 159; and Henry G. Sharpe, "The Art of Supplying Armies in the Field as Exemplified During the Civil War," in O. Espanet (ed.), *Notes on the Supply of an Army* (Kansas City, 1899), 189.

10. The smaller ports of Portland, Portsmouth, and Providence, among others, might be left unscathed.

11. United States, Department of the Treasury, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, for the Year ending June 30, 1860* (Washington, DC, 1860), 317 and 348-349.

12. Although overall receipts of grain at New

Orleans declined, the amount of flour retained in New Orleans and exported to Gulf Ports rose during the late antebellum period. For the year ending 31 August 1860, 247,231 barrels were exported from New Orleans to "Other Coastal" (primarily Gulf) ports and 579,349 barrels were retained in and around New Orleans (*New Orleans Price Current*, 1855-1860, "Annual Reports," usually found in the 1 September issue). Very little wheat was received at New Orleans during the last years of the antebellum period.

13. *Hunts ' Merchants ' Magazine*, XLIII (1860), 482; XLV (1861), 484; XLVII (1862), 355-356; and XLIX (1863), 405. *Hunt's* figures were based on the year ending August 31. The United States Bureau of Statistics used the calendar year for their export figures. United States, Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Statistics, *The Grain Trade of the United States* (Washington DC, 1900), 2057. Russia, Germany, and the US were the three primary sources supplying Britain with grain. During the 1861 and 1862 surge of imports, the US supplied much of the increase. For the four years 1861-1864, the US supplied over one-third of British grain imports.

14. United States, Bureau of Statistics, *Grain Trade* (1900), 2022; United States, Department of the Treasury, *Report* (1860), 325 and 349; and United States, Department of the Treasury, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, for the Year ending June 30, 1861* (Washington DC, 1862), 23 and 47.

15. *Hunts ' Merchants ' Magazine*, 1860-1863. For exports to all countries, see New York, *Assembly, Annual Report of the Auditor of the Canal Department* (Albany, 1882), 388. Grain export figures are quoted either for the calendar year or for the year ending 30 June. The US Treasury Department used the latter method, while the various Boards of Trade often used the calendar year. New York exported \$8,900,000 worth of raw cotton in 1858-1859 and \$12,400,000 in 1859-1860. The exports dwindled to 24,400 bales (probably worth between two and three million dollars) in 1861-1862. New York Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York* (3 vols., New York, 1859-1860), II and III.

16. *American and Commercial Advertiser* (Baltimore), "Annual Statements," 1858-1860; Boston Board of Trade, "Review of the Boston Market," 1857-1861; and Philadelphia Board of Trade,

"Annual Report," 1860-1862.

17. *Hunts ' Merchants ' Magazine*, XLIII (1860), 500. Rates from Chicago to these cities by lake also displayed a fifteen-cent differential. During the war, re-routing grain for export through Baltimore would probably have entailed even greater increases in transport charges; Baltimore was a key conduit for sending war materiel to Washington and the troops in Virginia.

18. United States, Bureau of Statistics, *Grain Trade* (1900), 1976-1978. While a small amount of western grain was shipped by the Grand Trunk Railway to Montréal, the bulk was shipped by water.

19. *Ibid.*, 1977. The rates on sailing vessels were 1.25% for New York-Liverpool and 2.25% for Montreal-Liverpool. For steamers, the rates were one percent from New York and 1.25% from Montréal. In 1872, the Chicago-Liverpool via New York rate was 2.8 cents per bushel cheaper than via Montréal on sailing vessels, and 5.7 cents cheaper via steam vessels (*ibid.*) The rates per bushel of wheat on the Chicago-Liverpool via New York route were \$0.537 by steamer and \$0.514 by sail, compared with \$0.565 by steam and \$0.571 by sail on the Chicago-Liverpool via Montréal route. The relative corn freights were similar, although the differentials between the Montréal and New York routes were slightly smaller.

20. Wyatt W. Belcher, "The Economic Rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago, 1850-1880," *Columbia Studies in Social Sciences*, DXXIX (1947), 104 and 112; and Issac Lippincott, "A History of River Improvement," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXII (1914), 630-660, esp. 643. In 1847, spoilage and damage to flour was estimated at twenty-five to fifty cents per barrel. For corn and wheat, the damage was even greater; see *DeBow's Review* III (1847), 104. *DeBow's Review*, XXIV (1858), 47-48, pointed out several disadvantages of shipping from New Orleans relative to Charleston, South Carolina; presumably these disadvantages would also hold for comparing New Orleans to New York. Howard C. Hill, "The Development of Chicago as a Center of the Meat Packing Industry," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, X (1923), 253-273, esp. 264, also lists the disadvantages of shipping via New Orleans. Finally, much of the grain exported from New Orleans went to countries other than Britain.

21. Belcher, "Economic Rivalry," 102. While



Chicago and Milwaukee spun iron webs that ensnared an ever-widening trade. St. Louis was embroiled in a controversy regarding bridging the Mississippi at Rock Island. St. Louis viewed the railroads as mere appendages to the rivers, and only later did its businessmen realize that the railroads could siphon trade from the rivers to the lakes. Chicago's system of railroads usurped much of St. Louis' former sphere of trade. See also Hill, "Development," 267.

22. In 1847, it cost \$ 1.35 to ship a barrel of flour from Cincinnati to New York, while shipping it to New Orleans would cost \$ 1.40. But the allowance for risk and damage raised the cost of shipping via New Orleans to \$1.75, and this cost did not reflect the higher trans-Atlantic shipping rate from New Orleans to Europe. See Lippincott, "History," 644.

23. New York Chamber of Commerce, *Fifth Annual Report* (New York, 1864), 217.

24. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "Du Pont, Dahlgren, and the Civil War Nitre Shortage," in *Military Analysis of the Civil War: An Anthology by the Editors of Military Affairs* (Millwood, CO, 1977), 199-206, esp. 199-200.

25. *Ibid.*, 202-203; and Hunt 'S Merchants 'Magazine, XLVIII (1863), 237. In an earlier article, *Hunt's Merchants 'Magazine*, XLVI (1862), 168-169, claimed that the government possessed ample stocks of saltpetre in late 1861. Yet the May issue (XLVI [1862], 453) reported that "[t]he stocks in the country and on the way are moderate, and we think the article will command high rates for some time to come, even if our affairs with foreign countries are amicably adjusted." Ironically, the slow pace of communication between Great Britain and British India (the source of the nitre) resulted in news of the ban reaching India almost at the same time it was rescinded by the British government.

26. James Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics. 1775-1953*, (Washington, DC, 1966), 178. Allan Nevins has suggested that if the northern agents been better organized, they might have purchased all available weapons and contracted for the entire output for the remainder of the year, thus preventing the Confederates from getting sufficient arms. See Allan Nevins, *War for the Union* (4 vols., New York, 1959-1971), I, 351.

27. Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy* (Baton Rouge, 1951), 574; and ORN, series

2, III, 753. United States, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, DC, 1975), 106, listed 709,805 immigrants for the four years ending 30 June 1865.

28. Frank L. Klement, "Middle Western Copperheadism and the Genesis of the Granger Movement," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXVIII (1952), 679-692, esp. 682. Republican attitudes about the Morrill Tariff are examined in Reinhard H. Luthin, "Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff," *American Historical Review*, XLIX (1944), 609-629. On the discontent in Indiana, see G. R. Tredway, "Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana," *Indiana Historical Collection*, XLVIII (1973).

29. Frank L. Klement, *The Copperhead Middle West* (Chicago, 1960), 21 and 36. For the best treatment of Lincoln and civil liberties, see Mark E. Neeley, Jr., *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1991).

30. United States, *Congressional Globe* (1861-1862), 169; Kenneth Stampp, "Indiana Politics during the Civil War," *Indiana Historical Collections*, XXXI (1949), 139; Emma L. Thornbrough, *Indiana in the Civil War Era. 1850-1880* (Indianapolis, 1965), 193; Tredway, "Democratic Opposition," 11; and Klement, *Copperhead Middle West*, 14.

31. Western grain producers were not the only ones affected. Western producers of livestock lost their southern market, but re-routed their products to the east; see Hill, "Development," 262; and Surdam, "Union Military Superiority," 393-396. On the importance of southern trade for Cincinnati, see Charles R. Wilson, "Cincinnati: A Southern Outpost in 1860-6 XT" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIV (1938), 473-482.

32. Dorothy J. Ernst, "Wheat Speculation in the Civil War Era: Daniel Wells and the Grain Trade, 1860-1862," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, XLVII (1963), 125-134, esp. 125; and Hubert H. Wubben, *Civil War Iowa and the Copperhead Movement* (Ames, 1980), 15, 17 and 75.

33. See also Richard N. Current, "The Civil War Era, 1848-1873." *The History of Wisconsin, Vol. 11* (Madison, 1976), 382-383; and Belcher, "Economic Rivalry," 35. Despite this, as the war dragged on freight rates fell even in nominal values. After early 1862, the rates plunged as the

northern transportation system adapted to the re-routing of goods. Emerson D. Fite, "The Agricultural Development of the West during the Civil War," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XX (1906), 259-278, esp. 269-270; and Chicago Board of Trade, "Annual Reports" (1856-1862).

34. Current, "Civil War," 242; and Belcher, "Economic Rivalry," 145.

35. Klement, *Copperhead Middle West*, 10. See also Arthur C. Cole, "The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870," in *The Centennial History of Illinois, Vol. III* (Chicago, 1922), 355, for a discussion of proposed canal building in Illinois during the Civil War; the new canals were supposed to offer competition for the railroads. Thornbrough, *Indiana*, discusses the effects of the deteriorating economy upon dissatisfaction in that state. Eugene H. Roseboom, "Southern Ohio and the Union in 1863," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* XXXIX (1952), 29-44, disputes Klement's assertion concerning the importance of economic dislocation in the rise of northwestern discontent, while Tredway, "Democratic Opposition," 12-13, attributes much of Indiana's disaffection to the economic woes of late 1861, and Richard O. Curry, "The Union as It Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of the 'Copperheads,'" *Civil War History*, XIII (1967), 25-39, addresses Copperhead sentiment in Ohio.

36. *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XLVIII (1863), 468; *Congressional Globe* (1861-1862), 169; and Cole, "Era of the Civil War," 363.

37. Klement, "Middle Western Copperheadism," 688.

38. Wubben, *Civil War Iowa*, 73. Major-General McClernand wrote to Secretary of War Stanton concerning discontent in the northwest. He believed that dire consequences would follow a Union failure to open the Mississippi: "Already are there those who are beginning to look beyond the pale of Federal authority for new guarantees for the freedom of the Mississippi River" (*OR*, series 1, XVII, part 2, 333-334). Other warnings of increasing western antipathy towards the war efforts are detailed by Stampf, "Indiana Politics," 132.

39. Chicago Tribune *Almanac* (Chicago, 1863). In Massachusetts, Republicans barely won two of their seats (by margins of twenty-four and 477 votes); a similarly tight race occurred in New Jersey, where a Republican won by 530 votes out of 18,500 votes cast.

40. *New York Times*, 13 December 1861; and Bray Hammond, *Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War* (Princeton, 1970), 158-159. See also Robert F. Futrell, "Federal Trade with the Confederate States" (Unpublished PhD thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1950), 417; and Welles, *Diary*, II, 66-67, for Atkinson's and others' fears.

41. *New York Times*, 17 December 1861.

42. Kenneth Blume, "The Flight from the Flag: The American Government, the British Caribbean, and the American Merchant Marine, 1861-1865," *Civil War History*, XXXII (1986), 44-55; and George W. Dalzell, *The Flight from the Flag: The Continuing Effect of the Civil War Upon the American Carrying Trade* (Chapel Hill, 1986), provide good discussions of the issues.