

tive power for those middle years. Nevertheless, the original requirement for small but quiet and smooth craft kept the demand and experimentation going in the outskirts of the transportation industry. Solar energy appeared and the first solar-powered engine was on trial in 1976 in England, followed by growing interest in Japan, Germany and the U.S. Recently, in the 2000s, fuel cells have appeared as a source. The ability to generate significant electric-drive power has led to wider experimentation, plus the use of such low-cost power to supplement fuel-driven motors even in larger ocean ships, where fuel costs have become a measure of profitability, have encouraged an increase in experimentation and demand. This is traced carefully in the middle chapters. Countries like the Netherlands and Switzerland have entered the field.

For anyone interested in this specific motive power on water, or in further research in this field, Desmond's careful inclusion throughout of the names of companies in the business, the inventors and developers, the list and locations of surely all firms working in the field even now, the multiple options for electric power application, will prove a great resource. This general and careful overview of this engine power in sea craft will be at the least a highly valuable reference guide.

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Stephen Ellis, translator. *The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Time of War and Revolution 1914-1918: The Recollections of Admiral S. N. Timirev*. Barnsley, South Yorks: Seaforth Publishing, [www.seaforthpublishing.com](http://www.seaforthpublishing.com), 2020. 238 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, appendices, notes, index. UK £25.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-5267-7702-7.

This work represents the first English translation of Imperial Russian Rear Admiral Sergei Nikolaevich Timirev's memoir regarding his service throughout the First World War and Russian Revolution. Completed by Timirev in 1922 while serving as a ship captain in Shanghai, this account offers a rare firsthand account of the Imperial Russian Baltic fleet at both the ground and command level during key points in Russian History. Given the diaspora of loyal White Russian forces after the Revolution and subsequent purges, primary sources regarding the early naval actions of the First World War through the upheaval of Revolution from a non-Bolshevik perspective were essentially non-existent for decades until the Russian-language publication of Timirev's text in 1961. Doubtlessly important, this work remained largely unavailable to scholars who lacked the ability to read it in its original Russian. Translator Stephen Ellis's magnificent efforts have solved this dilemma, bringing Timirev's words forth in an excellent translation, complete with helpful endnotes, appendices, and a translator's commentary.

The work begins with a collection of introductory elements, such as Ellis' translation preface, the original Russian language publication's 1961 biography of Timirev, three personal photographs, and a map of the Baltic area. Timirev's memoir is then put on display as he wrote it, with bulleted key point summaries at the start of each chapter for quick reference and the translator's historical notations done as endnotes. As a whole, the work is divided into two parts—before and after the February 1917 Revolution. The first section's seven chapters cover Timirev's experiences from 10 July 1914 through the end of February 1917. His firsthand accounts of the clumsy and chaotic nature

of the Baltic Fleet, the personalities of staff officers and unit commanders, the decisive nature of Admiral Essen in the early days, and the spike of Germanophobia which cost several good officers their positions, all provide excellent insight into the early war situation faced by the Russian Forces. Timirev's assignment to a naval staff position occurred at a key point in history, allowing him to give accounts of operational planning, the purchasing of former Russian ships from Japan, and the struggles in the aftermath of the death of Admiral Essen. Likewise, his transfer to command of the cruiser *Baian* in mid-1916 placed him on the front lines of the war, experiencing air raids, mining operations, and the rumblings of change as Admiral Nepenin took control of the fleet and became "drunk with power" (72). Timirev was coincidentally on leave in Petrograd at the end of February 1917, which also gave him the Baltic Fleet's first eyewitness view of the collapse of protest into Revolution. His decision to cut his leave short to report back to command just as the tinderbox was lit proved a fateful respite.

The second half of the memoir carries us from 28 February 1917—the start of the Revolution—through Timirev's 15 January 1918 notification of discharge without pension by the Bolshevik government. This in itself is a fascinating section, detailing the slow disintegration of the Baltic Fleet from rear echelon bases up to the front-line vessels from the view of an officer powerless to stop it. The execution of Nepenin and other officers, the rise of the committees, and visits from key figures such as Alexander Kerensky and Pavel Lebedev in the early days of 1917 are all well documented, with Timirev stating that within two months of February 28, "everything necessary to destroy the fighting capacity of the fleet had already

been done" (101). The further indoctrination of younger enlisted men by Bolshevik 'universities' is shown to sow distrust amongst once-close crews, with fear of counter-revolutionary claims replacing camaraderie. This paranoia and dissent would aid the Germans in their successful seizure of the base at Riga and in the Battle of Moon Sound, forcing the Baltic Fleet back as the Bolsheviks carried out their coup. Timirev's decision to be discharged rather than serve under the new Bolshevik regime is understandable, with the final insult of being denied a well-earned pension softened slightly by his story of the *Baian*'s committee nervously granting his request to keep the flag from his promotion to Cruiser Brigade Commander. In spite of the collapse of all he had known, Timirev clearly still had pride in his beloved and "very proper ship" (168).

The end matter of the work is a combination of additional primary materials and commentary by Ellis, consisting of the translation of a report on the January 1915 grounding of the cruiser *Riurik*, three obituaries for Admiral Timirev, a 25-page translator's commentary, and end notes. Ellis' commentary section in itself is impressive, detailing not only his translation choices, but Baltic geography, Imperial Russian naval structure, ranks, and officer backgrounds. The scandalous affair between Timirev's wife with his friend Admiral Kolchak concludes the section, documenting its 'representation' in modern nationalistic productions compared to the reality of the situation. The post-war fates of Timirev, his wife, and son are included, adding an underlying level of personal background information to an already striking war memoir.

In terms of possible improvements, very few come to mind. Given Timirev's references to both his own vessel

and others, an appendix with scaled profiles or images of said ships would help with visualization. A similar appendix with photographs and brief information on some of the key people and places Timirev discusses would also be appreciated. Finally, Ellis has an excellent collection of rank conversion tables in the end matter, whose relocation to the front matter might aid in quicker referencing. These are relatively minor suggestions, however, and their absence is in no way detrimental to the work.

Stephen Ellis' translation of *The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Time of War and Revolution* is an excellent addition to the historiography of the Imperial Russian Navy during the twilight of its existence. Timirev's unique career prior to the First World War and positioning throughout both the war and collapse into Bolshevism offers a ground level view of the Baltic Fleet interwoven alongside encounters with multiple key figures. Ellis' analytical endnotes further bolster the usefulness of Timirev's text, creating what is doubtlessly a key resource for scholars of the Baltic Fleet and naval aspects of the Russian Revolution.

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Marcus Faulkner and Alessio Patalano (eds). *The Sea and the Second World War: Maritime Aspects of a Global Conflict*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, [www.kentuckypress.com](http://www.kentuckypress.com), 2019. 326 pp., tables index. US \$50.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-9496-6804-9.

The authors of the ten papers in this collection are experts in their subject areas. Two have been associated with universities in Australia, and four each with British and American universities. Their topics are indeed diverse.

Evan Mawdsley describes the naval strategies of the US, Japan, and the UK in the run up to war in 1941. This analysis starts back in the 1920s and concludes that all three powers had confused strategies. It is a masterful paper that puts many controversial decisions into context, such as the deployment of US bombers and submarines to the Philippines only weeks before hostilities, the despatch of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to Singapore, and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Two other chapters focus on the start of the war in the Pacific. Rear Admiral Goldrick writes about how, between the wars, the RN saw submarines as a key element in its plans to meet a possible attack on Hong Kong and Malaya by Japan. They were to help delay the enemy during what was termed the "Period before Relief" while the "Main Fleet" made its way out from the UK. The paper describes the various classes of submarine that operated as part of the RN's China Fleet, and the sort of training undertaken. These interwar plans were never tested, however, because the China Station submarines were withdrawn to the Mediterranean in mid-1940. (Although not mentioned, two RN submarines were sent from the Mediterranean in December 1941; they arrived in area in January 1942, but one was damaged by bombing within days and the other one did not operate with success). Goldrick speculates that "The submarines of the Fourth Flotilla might not have been able to stop a seaborne invasion by the Japanese, but they would not have allowed it to be a bloodless one," (23) while conceding that the performance of the US and Dutch submarines actually present was "disappointing."

The chapter by American academic and former naval officer, Dr. Alan Zimm, is a careful analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor in terms of actual effec-