and others, an appendix with scaled profiles or images of said ships would help with visualization. A similar appendix with photographs and brief information on some of the key people and places Timirev discusses would also be appreciated. Finally, Ellis has an excellent collection of rank conversion tables in the end matter, whose relocation to the front matter might aid in quicker referencing. These are relatively minor suggestions, however, and their absence is in no way detrimental to the work.

Stephen Ellis’ translation of The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Time of War and Revolution is an excellent addition to the historiography of the Imperial Russian Navy during the twilight of its existence. Timirev’s unique career prior to the First World War and positioning throughout both the war and collapse into Bolshevism offers a ground level view of the Baltic Fleet interwoven alongside encounters with multiple key figures. Ellis’ analytical end notes further bolster the usefulness of Timirev’s text, creating what is doubtless a key resource for scholars of the Baltic Fleet and naval aspects of the Russian Revolution.

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Evan Mawdsley describes the naval strategies of the US, Japan, and the UK in the run up to war in 1941. This analysis starts back in the 1920s and concludes that all three powers had confused strategies. It is a masterful paper that puts many controversial decisions into context, such as the deployment of US bombers and submarines to the Philippines only weeks before hostilities, the despatch of Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore, and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Two other chapters focus on the start of the war in the Pacific. Rear Admiral Goldrick writes about how, between the wars, the RN saw submarines as a key element in its plans to meet a possible attack on Hong Kong and Malaya by Japan. They were to help delay the enemy during what was termed the “Period before Relief” while the “Main Fleet” made its way out from the UK. The paper describes the various classes of submarine that operated as part of the RN’s China Fleet, and the sort of training undertaken. These interwar plans were never tested, however, because the China Station submarines were withdrawn to the Mediterranean in mid-1940. (Although not mentioned, two RN submarines were sent from the Mediterranean in December 1941; they arrived in area in January 1942, but one was damaged by bombing within days and the other did not operate with success). Goldrick speculates that “The submarines of the Fourth Flotilla might not have been able to stop a seaborne invasion by the Japanese, but they would not have allowed it to be a bloodless one,” (23) while conceding that the performance of the US and Dutch submarines actually present was disappointing.”

The chapter by American academic and former naval officer, Dr. Alan Zimm, is a careful analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor in terms of actual effec-
tiveness of weapons and systems versus their potential. He is interested in why new technology may not improve performance and uses Pearl Harbor as a case study. The author describes several aspects of the attack, from command and control of a multi-carrier force and a strike force of aircraft to the low effectiveness of Japanese bombs, and the high effectiveness of their level bomb aiming techniques contrasted with problems created for dive bombers by low clouds. Finally, the Japanese had underestimated the effectiveness of anti-torpedo underwater protection in American battleships. This is a detailed description attack wave by attack wave that dissects not only weapon and tactical performance but inadequate Japanese radio communications. Zimm briefly mentions how Japanese bombers and dive bombers overwhelmed Allied ships in the following months but does not compare performance in terms of bombs used, attack formations, etc. with the Pearl Harbor attack.

In “The Dominions and British Maritime Power in the Second World War,” Dr. Iain Johnston-White explores how the Dominion navies contributed to the overall British war effort. This is a complex topic; the coverage of merchant shipping is reliable but his treatment of naval aspects lacks depth. After describing how British plans for war were based on “naval dominance” the author’s focus becomes the role of shipping and its defence. The treatment of the several dominions, therefore, narrowly reflects their role in trade protection. But the war at sea was more than the defence of shipping. While the author covers the importance of shipping in maintaining imports to Australia and New Zealand, he fails to mention the operations of Australian cruisers in the Mediterranean and Middle East from 1939 to mid-1941, and then in the defence of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. (Australian destroyers in the Mediterranean are cited fleetingly.)

The treatment of South Africa is largely keyed to the strategic importance of the Cape Route to Britain while the Mediterranean was closed to shipping. The paper describes deficiencies in ship repair capability in South Africa. The role of South African naval and air forces in defending shipping is covered in general terms, but there is no clear picture of the command and control structure and of how many RN escorts worked out of Simon’s Town.

Canada’s part in providing naval and maritime forces and in shipbuilding is given considerable emphasis. The author makes the important point that mariners and marine industry expertise from Britain played key roles in the war efforts of all the Dominions. Tellingly, in November 1943 some 40% of the navigating and engineering officers in Canada’s mushrooming merchant fleet were from the UK. (90)

Iain Johnston-White summarises Canadian contributions in the Battle of the Atlantic but several of his assertions are based on careless generalizations. For example, concerning the first six months of 1942 we read “...set against the areas under RN control [Canadian forces]... fared very badly; U-boats operating west of Newfoundland near Canadian ports, as well as under Canadian air cover, took a toll of shipping well above that in the eastern Atlantic.” (95) Losses were indeed serious, but the situation was analogous to the first U-boat “Happy Time” to the west of the British Isles between July and October 1940. In both cases, U-boats were able to make individual attacks on individual targets because too many merchant ships were being permitted to steam independently instead of in convoy. In January 1942, U-boats had surged into
the western Atlantic in numbers for the first time, with only a handful left operating in the western approaches to the UK. The first wolf pack attack did not occur in mid-Atlantic until May. The U-boats off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia were able to find targets for two reasons: first because the Admiralty had been dispersing westbound convoys south of Newfoundland, and in addition, several convoys were scattered by heavy weather as late as March. The standard routing was changed to Halifax and then, later in the year, to New York. Secondly, the Admiralty had routed too many merchant ships independently and some became targets. The RCN promptly instituted coastal convoys. Virtually all of the RCN’s available escorts were committed to defending the transatlantic trade convoys along with Britain’s and a diminishing number of American escorts. Ninety-one convoys with a total of 2,712 merchant ships (an average of 452 per month) passed through the northwest Atlantic between January and June with no losses.

Professor G.H. Bennett examines the role of *Schnellboote* (motor torpedo boats roughly 35m long) in the German defence of occupied Europe. His particular focus is the D-Day landings. He argues that *Schnellboote* achieved more than has been reflected in historiography. He advances a counterfactual case that had the Germans reordered their priorities between U-boat and *Schnellboot* construction, and in general focused on coastal defence in the face of the anticipated Allied amphibious assault landings, they could have been able to inflict "sufficient casualties to give the German Army a chance of victory at the water’s edge and behind the invasion beaches." (133)

Charles Ian Hamilton’s “The Development of Combined Operations Headquarters and the Admiralty during the Second World War. Personalities and Administration” is based on extensive research and mastery of his subject. This is an analysis of how the organization of Combined Operations Headquarters evolved from a shoestring body under Lord Keyes to a multifaceted body under Commodore Mountbatten starting in July 1941, when Mountbatten “brought it up to date by about two decades” in his first six months. (144) The role of “Combined Operations” reflects what in today’s jargon is “Joint Operations”. How the British Admiralty has evolved over the centuries is Hamilton’s field of expertise. He describes the inevitable friction between Combined Operations Headquarters and the Admiralty whose officers saw Mountbatten’s organization as encroaching on their responsibilities. Over time, Combined Ops HQ influenced how certain sections of the Admiralty were structured; the Admiralty also regained control of parts of Combined Ops such as ships assigned to it. This all sounds dry and arcane, but Hamilton writes crisply with a sharp eye for personalities and does not neglect their influence on developments. This paper is a rewarding read.

Up until 1942 the corporate experience of the Australian Army along with that of the RAN and RAAF had been gained in fighting in the Middle East and Malaya. They now became important participants in General Douglas MacArthur’s South West Pacific Command and were faced with the unfamiliar new challenges of amphibious warfare to dislodge entrenched Japanese forces. Australian academic Professor Peter Dean contributes a chapter on how Australia established a training infrastructure and drew on Combined Operations developed by the British and the US Marine Corps and US Navy. He then describes Australian amphibious
assaults on Lae in 1943 and Balikpapan in 1945.

Dr. Donald Mitchener writes about naval gunfire support for the attack on the island of Iwo Jima in February-March 1945 which the Americans wanted to occupy for its airfields, being only 600 miles from Japan. The subtitle of his paper is “the Perils of Doctrinal Myopia”. Mitchener shows that the US Marine leadership, which demanded 10 days of preliminary naval gunfire bombardment based on experience in earlier amphibious assaults, was myopic in not adequately anticipating its limitations against the in-depth defence being prepared by the Japanese, and in concentrating the bulk of the bombardment against the beaches. The American naval leadership, determined to use battleships and cruisers to defend carrier groups striking Japan, insisted on only three days of bombardment. The Japanese commanding general, resigned to losing the island in the face of overwhelming American resources, was determined to inflict maximum casualties but was myopic in changing his dispositions to move pillboxes closer to the beaches where they were promptly overrun. Michener’s paper is a detailed discussion of successive steps in the planning process and includes four documentary appendices. While it sketches in available intelligence and the Japanese preparations, it concentrates on exchanges of documents among the US authorities and who said what when, rather than describing the actual bombardment and grinding capture (oddly, not even mentioning the number of casualties) and cites several after-action analyses. The Iwo Jima campaign obviously had several controversial aspects. Those familiar with the background will readily understand the significance of points being made by Mitchener, but for readers unfamiliar with the general background this paper requires careful attention.

“Naval Power, Mao Zedong, and the War in China” by Professor Francis Grice, a US academic, is about how naval forces, mostly from outside powers, influenced developments in China during the rise of the Chinese Party and into its early years in power. The author underlines that Mao Zedong did not understand the role that naval power had played. It’s interesting that 40-plus years after his death, Mao’s successors have made China a major naval power.

Professor George Monahan traces the impetus for a single authority over the US armed services through the lens of Secretary of War Colonel Henry Stimson’s wartime role and postwar writings in “Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate”. For 18 months between early 1942 and mid-1943 the US Army Air Force (USAAF) operated several squadrons of bombers configured for anti-submarine warfare. Until July 1942 the entire American production of large, land-based aircraft was going to the USAAF because of a ruling by Congress in 1920 that the Army should control land-based aircraft, and the Navy-based (including amphibious) aviation. The USAAF squadrons allocated for maritime defence were placed under US Navy operational control in March 1942 as German submarines faced little opposition while sinking large numbers of ships off the US eastern seaboard. Although these squadrons gradually built up expertise in ASW and received better radar equipment, there were ongoing disagreements between the two services about doctrine and employment of these specialized squadrons. Two titanic figures of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Henry Stimson and Admiral Ernie King became dogged protagonists. The bureaucratic
struggle over land-based ASW aircraft dragged on because there was no clear higher authority to resolve the issues. Eventually, the Army ceded its ASW aircraft to the US Navy.

The protracted wrangling became just one example of poor management of resources that convinced officials that national defence need a single department head. A House of Representatives committee started hearings on changes to the national defence organization in 1944; subsequently after further hearings and in-fighting, both houses of the US Congress passed an act in 1947 creating the US Air Force out of the USAAF and placing all three armed services under a single Secretary of Defense. Monahan argues that it was the counterproductive effects of service parochialism and the pitfalls of divided leadership during wartime as much as strategic unease early in the Cold War that lay behind the military unification debates. He tells this story in a vigorous manner and incudes George McBundy’s words in On Active Service in Peace and War (1948 which he co-authored with Stimson) about Henry Stimson’s view of “….the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church. The high priests of this Church were a group of men to whom Stimson always referred as ‘the admirals.’ These gentlemen were to him both anonymous and continuous”. (285)

The Sea and the Second World War is a collection of thought-provoking papers about disparate maritime aspects of the Second World War. Recommended.

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In 1828, the English merchant vessel Morning Star, en route from Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to the United Kingdom, when it was attacked by the pirate Benito De Soto and his crew on board the Burla Negra, a former slave vessel that had been taken over by mutineers.

After the pirates boarded, they assaulted and tortured the crew and passengers. After looting the vessel, they abandoned it with its hull pierced, intended to sink it. The captain and the mate of the Morning Star were executed by a shot in the head. Despite the bad condition the ship was in, the survivors of the ordeal managed to save the ship from sinking. A month later she sailed into the English port of Deal.

A few days after the attack on the Morning Star, the pirates attacked the American merchant ship Topaz. After seizing the ship and its cargo, De Soto had the vessel set on fire with the crew on board. In 1830 De Soto was tried, found guilty, and executed for his actions. A simple pirate’s tale you might say, but there is more to it.

The Morning Star was Quaker-owned and hired to carry sick and wounded British army casualties from Ceylon (Sri Lanka). In accordance with strict Quaker custom, Morning Star was not permitted to carry munitions or weapons of any kind. The people on board had no means of defending themselves in case the vessel came under attack.

As a hospital ship, she was to be escorted by either a Royal Navy vessel or