

# The Ports of Halifax and Saint John and the American Civil War

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## "Running the Blockade"

Now landed safe in Halifax, the dangers we have passed  
Enhanced all our pleasures — too dear alas! to last  
From ladies' hearts and shopmen's arts, resistance is not made —  
We'll spend our gold, like Timon of old, while "Running the Blockade"  
So fill our glass to every lass, of every hue and shade  
Who takes her stand, for Dixie's land  
And Running the Blockade.

The economic and political history of the Canadian Maritimes during the 1860s is dominated by the question of Confederation and evolving strategies of adjustment and survival. The economic determinism of much historical writing views union with Canada in 1867 as a "gamble" by the ambivalent political and commercial elites of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to retain the economic vitality of the 1850s. Railways, both the proposed Western Extension of the European and North American from Saint John to the American border, and the long-sought Intercolonial Railroad to Canada East, were central to the political debates of 1864-1867.'

Imperial political and strategic factors, according to both contemporary and later observers, also played a role in the Confederation process. The American Civil War led to deteriorating relations between the US government on one hand, and Britain and its colonies on the other, that eventually helped abrogate the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty. Northern hostility towards Britain's perceived sympathy for the Confederacy; the British role in Confederate supply; and a series of border incidents, such as the St. Alban's raid of 1864, stirred Yankee enmity towards John Bull. The result was an invasion scare in the Canadas that affected both the political marketing and timing of Confederation.'

The Civil War, in addition to helping to revive the colonial militia, had a lasting physical impact on the harbours of Saint John and Halifax. The New Brunswick port, its defences long neglected, was provided with new batteries to be manned by volunteer artillery companies. Halifax, its historic citadel obsolete in the age of the ironclad and rifled artillery, was reinforced with new forts, batteries and rifled ordinance, eventually becoming one of the most heavily-defended harbours in the British Empire.'

Recent scholarship perpetuates a tendency to categorize the Civil War simply as background or a causal factor in establishing Canada's federal union, with the resultant political marginalization and economic underdevelopment of the Maritime provinces. The emphasis on social history also has led us away from understanding the war's overall significance to Maritimers in the 1860s. This paper offers an alternate perspective: that the Civil War, in the context of the Maritimes, is worth reexamining in its own right.'

Both Saint John and Halifax were involved with or influenced by three international incidents that compromised Anglo-American relations in the region: the *Trent* crisis of 1861-1862; the *Chesapeake* highjacking of 1863; and the cruise of the Confederate raider CSS *Tallahassee* and its famous escape from Halifax harbour in 1864. The most serious, the *Trent* affair, which involved the seizure of two Confederate envoys from a British packet by the United States Navy (USN), almost led to war. Even as the crisis was resolved by diplomacy, thousands of Imperial troops, together with munitions and supplies, were rushed to Canada overland through New Brunswick in Britain's last reinforcement of North America prior to withdrawing its major garrisons in 1871.<sup>5</sup>

Once war broke out, there was considerable discussion in political, newspaper and business circles of the conflict's impact on colonial trade, shipping and overall prosperity. As Maritime public opinion seemed to shift in favour of the Confederacy after Bull Run and the *Trent* incident, a hostile North was prone to exaggerate evidence of blockade running and other colonial involvement in supplying the Confederacy. A New York journal, for example, described New Brunswick's chief port as little more than "a group of huts, many of them inhabited by rogues who have made a few pennies since the war broke out by lending their names to blockade runners." The US consul at Saint John regretted that smuggling was "by no means inconsistent with the Bluenose mentality." Likewise, the popular history of Halifax portrays the city as a nest of Confederate sympathizers and blockade runners exploiting Nova Scotia's historic links with the West Indies, the linchpin in blockade running into Southern ports on the Atlantic.'

This essay, seeking to clarify the Civil War's impact on the two ports, poses three questions. First, how did the conflict influence trade, shipbuilding and shipping? Second, what role did Saint John and Halifax play in Confederate supply, both in a general sense and more directly through blockade running? Third, how often were the ports visited by the Union Navy and with what results? The chief sources are the contemporary press, dispatches from the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick governors to the Colonial Office, US Consular dispatches and the published records of the Union and Confederate navies.'

### **Trade, Shipbuilding and Shipping**

Disruptions from the American crisis initially were thought to have caused a decline in trade in the Maritimes. While Nova Scotia's commerce was more dispersed geographically than that of its neighbours, a large minority of exports went to the US. Governor Arthur H. Gordon reported that when he arrived in New Brunswick in 1861, commerce was stagnant and tariff-dependent colonial revenues had declined. Nova Scotia fish, gypsum and plaster exporters feared the permanent loss of Southern markets. The fall in American imports in 1861-1862 prompted the Nova Scotia government to consider raising tariffs to counter sagging revenues.'

The possibility of Southern independence led to discussions of how to reorient British North American trade. One opinion held that Northern high-tariff Republicans, once Congress was abandoned by free-trade Southerners, were unlikely to renew the Reciprocity Treaty, thus injuring Maritime prosperity. Others saw opportunity. The Halifax *Morning Journal*, for example, predicted that a genuinely independent Confederacy would open its markets and coasting trade to colonial shipping (the Reciprocity Treaty placed restrictions on Maritime coasting vessels). The South, moreover, was not a seafaring society; its planters would require shipping to carry cotton and other products to customers around the world. In the words of another Nova Scotia journal, the South represented a market of ten to twelve million and both Bluenoses and Southerners "have been hewing wood and drawing water for the Yankees long enough."<sup>9</sup>

Despite fears of a commercial depression, the American crisis generated a continued demand for colonial staples, accompanied by rising freight rates. No other American and Imperial conditions brought renewed opportunities for the shipbuilding and shipowning sectors. A New Brunswick merchant wrote in 1864 that "vessels have been a very good property in the last few years...as our Yankee neighbours are still trying to conquer their Southern brothers but do not accomplish anything but the destruction of property." During the 1860s, as more new New Brunswick vessels were purchased locally, the percentage constructed for transfer or sale, principally to Britain, fell.<sup>10</sup>

Although naval warfare was entering the era of the coal-burning vessel, Britain's North American colonies remained preeminent manufacturers of wooden bulk carriers driven by the wind. The three Maritime colonies launched over 260 vessels during the first year of the Southern secession crisis; in 1865 (the war ended in April) nearly 600 vessels were launched in the region. Most of the nearly 1000 vessels on the books in New Brunswick, where the timber trade was the dynamic sector, specialized in deep-sea, long-haul voyages. The colony's square riggers, either sold abroad or operated out of Saint John or other regional ports, were found in every ocean in the world. Nova Scotia's ocean-going fleet, in contrast, was based in outport communities such as Yarmouth and Windsor. The merchants of Halifax, nonetheless, controlled most of the colony's trade."

By 1864, Confederate raiders had begun to drive hundreds of Northern vessels into the safety of foreign registry. By war's end, Confederate privateers and commerce raiders, such as CSS *Alabama*, burned or captured scores of Northern merchantmen. More important, cruisers like the *Alabama*, by driving up insurance and freight rates, acted as deterrents to Union shipowners and shippers. Historians argue that the Confederate threat effectively crippled the American merchant marine, which gave further competitive advantages to neutral haulers based in the neighbouring British colonies. This "flight from the flag" benefited a number of Maritime merchants and captains, who suddenly became the part, fictional or true owners of American merchant vessels. Most Yankee craft transferred to the British flag were deep-sea vessels (coasters generally were regarded as safer investments), yet vessels ranged in size from fishing boats to ships worth tens of thousands of dollars. This shift had a negative impact on the state of Maine, which registered fewer than 150 new craft between 1861 and 1864.<sup>12</sup>

The naval blockade (discussed below) and other specific Northern policies were regarded as interfering with the trading rights of neutrals like Britain and its colonies. The highly publicized, if ineffectual, scuttling of old New England whalers to block Charleston

harbour was viewed by many as an outrage against international trading rights. In an attempt to control the flow of Northern exports through neutral countries and on to the Confederacy, the US in 1864 required shippers to post bonds to guarantee that cargo exported, for example, from New York, would not end up in enemy hands. Prior to this, Washington banned the export of anthracite coal (ideal for blockade-runners); arms and munitions; and horses, mules and other livestock. The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to refuse clearance to vessels "laden with a cargo destined for a foreign or domestic port if there was reason to suspect that the rail terminus for the freight or part of it was in Confederate territory." Under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, the Maritimes imported large amounts of salted meat, grain, flour and other breadstuffs potentially useful for feeding armies in the field if re-exported through the West Indies. This early American assertion of extraterritoriality prompted concerns among Maritime importers and the Saint John Chamber of Commerce.<sup>13</sup>

Despite initial uncertainties and restrictions, the Civil War brought prosperity to most sectors of the Maritimes' economy. Exports from Nova Scotia to the US, including fish and coal, doubled in value from 1861 to war's end. Fishermen, farmers, miners, lumbermen, and mercantile and transportation interests involved with staple production benefited from the rapid industrialization of the Northern states after 1861. New Brunswick's timber and shipbuilding sectors, dependent on exports, continued to expand. Loss of legal access to Southern markets was more than offset by growing Northern demand for Maritime products as well as commodities transshipped via Saint John and Halifax. As the North captured and reopened various Southern ports, there were expanded opportunities for Maritime shippers and shipowners."

### **The Blockade and Confederate Supply**

During the early years of the war, a number of unresolved issues surrounded the Northern blockade of Confederate ports proclaimed in April 1861. First, foreign observers asked, was it legal? Second, could the USN actually enforce a blockade from the Chesapeake to Texas? These questions were related because a blockade, to be valid under international law, had not only to be proclaimed but also enforced. In 1861, ninety percent of blockade runners, mostly small sailing craft, succeeded. As late as 1863, when the Confederate government announced that its naval forces had temporarily neutralized the Union blockade of Charleston, journals in the Maritimes suggested that normal trade would resume between Nova Scotia and South Carolina. Finally, would Britain and France, in order to secure badly needed cotton, break the American naval screen to enter Southern ports? The uncertainty in 1861, and the weakness of Union interdiction as late as 1862, led shipowners and merchants to continue business as usual with ports in the Confederacy. In 1864, Halifax's *Acadian Recorder*, no fan of the Union government, described local involvement in Confederate supply as "mercenary aid to a fratricidal war, which, without outside intervention, would have long ago ended."<sup>15</sup>

Southern demand for munitions, arms, medicine, foodstuffs and luxury items was high, as was world demand for Confederate exports, such as cotton and naval stores (turpentine, pitch and tar increased in value by 1000% during the war). In the fall of 1861, for example, the *Volga* of Saint John cleared for a port in Union-held Maryland,

but returned having visited Cherrystone, Virginia. A number of less fortunate New Brunswick and Nova Scotia sailing vessels fell into the hands of the USN. Saint John saddler Henry Horton invested his life savings in the Maine schooner *Adelso*, which was chartered to a Boston firm to carry naval stores from Confederate North Carolina. The American captain reached Cape Fear, entered Wilmington, secured the cargo and cleared for open sea without meeting blockaders. As the *Adelso* sailed north for Halifax, however, it encountered heavy weather and was forced into Newport, Rhode Island, where both vessel and cargo were seized by Federal authorities for violation of the blockade, condemned in prize court and sold at public auction.'

Saint John figured in Northern headlines and diplomatic correspondence in mid-1861 due to the visit of the British-registered *Alliance*, which anchored at Carleton under South Carolina's palmetto flag. Rumoured to be captained by a former slaver, the vessel was said to belong to Fraser, Trenholm and Co., a branch of the Southern company that dominated Confederate supply. It cleared officially for Havana carrying fish, wine, quicksilver, sheet and pig iron. As the US Consul feared, the *Alliance* ran the blockade off North Carolina. When Union troops captured Beaufort, NC the following year, the vessel was made a prize."

Halifax's involvement with blockade running was largely indirect: supplying Bermuda and the Bahamas with clothing, boots, shoes, tools, pig iron and other commodities. Most goods and supplies came from the Northern States, Britain or Europe. One exception was in 1863, when the Confederate agent at Bermuda bought several tons of twine for fixing field ammunition in Halifax. In 1861, it was reported, Bluenosers believed "that the Reciprocity Treaty guaranteed them access to all American ports," the war notwithstanding. In this spirit, local capitalists such as S.F. Barss risked schooners and cargoes in voyages to the Carolinas and Georgia. A number of the smaller Nova Scotia sailing vessels that ventured into Southern waters in 1861 carried only ballast. The schooner *Emery* took pork and salt to Savannah, escaped from blockaders during a gale, and returned to Halifax in November 1861. Earlier, three other schooners, two of them consigned to the firm B. Wier and Co., had reached Halifax from North Carolina. Wier and Co., which would develop important links with Confederate supply, owned the brigantine *Gold Hunter*, which loaded blockade goods at Halifax in September 1861. The Halifax-based schooner *Fairplay* successfully delivered fish and New Brunswick timber to South Carolina in the spring of 1862; the *Mary Jane*, registered in Halifax but owned in Pictou, was less fortunate. Attempting to bring salt and coffee from Nassau to Wilmington, it was seized off New Inlet, near Cape Fear, in April 1863.<sup>18</sup>

As the USN increased the size and efficiency of its North Atlantic blockade squadron, a number of Maritime vessels, or craft with cargo consigned to Maritime firms, were stopped and searched on the high seas. The aggressiveness of American naval commanders, the relative forbearance of the Royal Navy (RN) and the judgments of American prize courts further soured British North American opinion of the Union war effort. In 1862 a Halifax firm protested to Vice Admiral A. Milne, the RN's commander in the Western hemisphere, following an incident in which the USS *Rhode Island* endangered a vessel, crew and cargo in the Gulf of Florida. Even more controversial was the case of the *Isabella Thompson*, a 140-ton schooner built in St. Martins, New Brunswick. In 1863 the schooner was returning to Halifax from the Bahamas with a load

of turpentine and cotton after unloading fish and lumber at Nassau. Both the owner and the consignees, B. Wier and Co., protested to the Nova Scotia and Imperial authorities when the vessel and its cargo were taken as prizes to New York. The affair of the *Will o' the Wisp* also reached official notice. This Yarmouth vessel carried freight consigned to Halifax mercantile firms Salter and Twinning and J.G.A. Creighton and Co. to Matamoros, the Mexican port near Brownsville, Texas. As the cargo (gunpowder and percussion caps in casks labelled "fish") was being landed in lighters, the USN pounced on the schooner, leaving the Halifax supercargo stranded on shore.<sup>19</sup>

Another wartime development was transferring Southern vessels, or Northern vessels intended for Confederate supply, to British registry. There was plenty of money to be made hauling freight to and from blockade-running bases in the West Indies. The schooner *Kate Hale* of Charleston, carrying turpentine and resin, reached Saint John in the fall of 1861 without being troubled by the USN. A Colonial Office dispatch in January 1861, in the midst of the Secession crisis, had instructed local officials to allow American vessels with "unusual or unknown flags" to enter harbour but to avoid recognizing them as anything other than American. The Saint John Controller of Customs, who had a fair knowledge of international law, refused a request by a member of the firm W. and R. Wright to register the schooner in New Brunswick. Saint John businessman Andre Cushing, an American by birth, informed the Union authorities of the vessel's suspicious circumstances. Built at Baltimore, the schooner had been commissioned as a privateer (*Dixie*) early in the war. Months before its arrival in New Brunswick it had returned to Charleston with three Union prizes to its credit. At Saint John the vessel was renamed *Success*. After much official consternation and press speculation, it cleared for the Bahamas loaded with pig iron, quinine, butter, fish and oakum. *Success* later was captured on the coast of South Carolina.<sup>20</sup>

As blockade running became better organized, adapted or specially-constructed steamships carried more Confederate supplies, as well as Southern exports such as cotton, tobacco and naval stores. Fast, manoeuvrable and low-silhouetted, these largely British-built craft were the logical market response to the tightening Union naval screen. The classic Civil War blockade runner, such as Fraser, Trenholm and Co.'s *Bat*, burned high-grade Welsh coal, which left less of a smoke trail; was painted in camouflage fashion; and depended on high tides and moonless nights to dash over sand bars under the very noses of Union piquet vessels. Decks were relatively free of masts and other obstructions, length-to-beam ratios were high and engines and boilers were protected from shot and shell. A single round trip could pay for both vessel and cargo; a series of successful voyages would bring impressive profits for owners, captains and crew. British insurance companies provided loss coverage for these voyages. Nassau, on New Providence Island, and Bermuda were the two most important connections between blockade running and the Maritimes. Wilmington, NC, was less than 700 miles from St. George's, Bermuda.<sup>21</sup>

Aside from salt fish, the Maritimes had few export commodities of interest to the Confederates or the supply system based in Bermuda, the Bahamas and Cuba. There was some speculation in Halifax in "blockade goods," but not in any significant volumes. Halifax, and especially Saint John, were too distant from the Carolinas and the Caribbean to become major entrepôts of the illegal trade. The local fleets, moreover, did not include ocean-going steamers. Halifax, a stop for packets and the occasional cargo steamer, and

seasonal base for the RN, had coal at Cunard's wharf and elsewhere. The port also had repair facilities for the modern steamers that came to dominate blockade running by 1864. The Chebucto Marine Railway, on the Dartmouth waterfront, had been developed by an American engineer prior to the war. It had three cradles, one capable of pulling out vessels of 1500 tons; its clients included the RN. The work could be as basic as scraping and painting fouled hulls or as complex as repairing boilers and engines. Saint John, in contrast, lacked a marine railway. One of the first blockade-running steamers to put in at Halifax was the *Edward Hawkins*, which docked in February 1863 with 1500 bales of cotton. Its masts had been shot away by the USN. The craftsmen at the Dartmouth works would service well-known runners such as *City of Petersburg* (sixteen successful trips), *Little Hattie* (ten successful trips) and *Will o' the Wisp* (six successful trips).<sup>22</sup>

Because of strong sympathies among the business and professional classes for the Confederacy, smuggling for the South took on an aura of glamour and respectability. For example, when one steamer suspected to be headed for the South left Saint John, it was cheered by a crowd on the wharf. The sidewheeler in question, *Ella*, recently registered in New Brunswick, actually was owned by the Confederate government. On other occasions Judge Mortimer Jackson, the consul in Halifax, reported that "disciples of Jefferson Davis" cheered vessels arrived from the blockade and jeered visiting warships of the USN. The Halifax press in particular printed glowing accounts of the fine lines, trim handling abilities, gallant officers and free-spending crews of visiting blockade runners in 1864 and 1865. When the slightly-battered *Robert E. Lee* steamed into Halifax in late 1863, Confederate partisans were overjoyed. According to the American consul, they gave the rebel flag three cheers and Abe Lincoln "three groans." Formerly the *Giraffe*, this swift vessel was now a Confederate transport with twenty-one successful missions to its name. Coming out of Wilmington it had encountered enemy fire. Its Nova Scotia layover had two purposes. The first was to deliver cotton, turpentine and tobacco to Wier and Co., the firm which had become the Confederate government's quasi-official agent in the colony. The second was to land John Wilkinson and a party of Confederate operatives destined for a clandestine mission in Canada West. Like many other colourful runners that visited Halifax, the *Lee's* luck ran out after leaving the Maritimes. Its capture meant heavy losses to local merchants who had speculated in blockade goods.<sup>23</sup>

By the middle of the war some of the more famous of the new class of British-built blockade runners were calling at Halifax. One was the Anglo-Confederate Trading Company's *Banshee*, a steel-hulled steamer built "from the keel up" for the smuggling trade. *Harriet Pinckney* (built in Middlesborough, 1862) discharged 600 bales of cotton at the wharf of Wier and Co. in July 1863 (cotton was the South's chief export to Halifax during the war). Owned by the Confederate government, the *Pinckney* technically was not a runner but a consort that shipped cargo between Britain and the West Indies. That year the Maritimes welcomed as well the *General Banks*, also known as *Scotia* (formerly a mail packet in the Irish Sea). Seized for smuggling near Charleston in 1862, it was condemned and sold to interests in Boston. According to consul Howard, by the time it arrived in Saint John it had been purchased by Bahamian capitalists. At Halifax *General Banks*, now rechristened *Fannie and Jennie*, took on valuable freight and departed for a neutral port, only to return because of mechanical problems (the USN was also in the neighbourhood). The vessel eventually departed Nova Scotia waters and made at least two

successful dashes past the blockade. The 500-ton *A.D. Vance* (or *Advance*) first reached Halifax in April 1864 from Nassau. Capable of eighteen knots, the former *Lord Clyde* was owned by the State of North Carolina. Considered one of the most beautiful of the war's runners, it also was one of the most profitable, completing over thirty trips past the Union Navy. When it steamed into Halifax, workers along the waterfront cheered.'

A number of runners came to Saint John for minor repairs or changes in registry. The aptly-named 350-ton sidewheeler *Saint John*, rebuilt in Georgia in the late 1850s, was captured by the Union Navy in early 1863. Purchased at auction by Yankee businessmen, it was registered to a New Brunswicker as *Spaulding*. Despite Consul Howard's judgment that the "old, dingy-looking craft" was slow, *Spaulding* later made it safely into Charleston harbour for cotton. Other Northern steamers, *NanNan* and *Flushing*, were registered in Saint John for similar purposes, despite assurances by the owners that they were destined for legitimate West Indies trade. *NanNan* managed to elude the blockade eleven times before being nabbed off Georgia in 1864. Also involved in the feeder trade, which to the US consul was as immoral as actual smuggling, were the steamers *Laura* and *Flora*. The latter (formerly the blockade runner *Rouen*) steamed to Cuba and attempted unsuccessfully to pierce the blockade off Galveston. The screw steamer *Douro*, captured leaving Wilmington in March 1863, was condemned as a prize and sold at auction. Later that year it showed up at Saint John, under the same name, for flour, spirits and dry goods. *Douro* would be destroyed by the blockade squadron off Cape Fear.<sup>25</sup>

In both ports American consuls, who enjoyed telegraphic links with the State and Navy Departments, were vigilant about suspected violations of neutrality and visits by blockade runners and their consorts. Consul J.Q. Howard in 1862, and again during the summer of 1863, boasted that no vessel clearing Saint John had succeeded in evading the blockade. He also proposed to the State Department that he buy large amounts of gunpowder to keep it from speculators and rebels. According to Howard, the unofficial representative of the Confederacy in New Brunswick was William H. Turlington, formerly of North Carolina, suspected of being financed by the Confederate agent at Bermuda.<sup>26</sup>

Judge Jackson, in Halifax, was so dedicated to the Union cause that he hired informers out of his own pocket to watch the waterfront. Telegraph connections with Washington provided the USN with descriptions of suspected smugglers, such as the British steamer *Sunbeam*, captured off New Inlet, NC, in 1862. The voyage of the *Princess Royal* was even less secretive. This iron-hulled propeller steamer, owned by Fraser, Trenholm and Co. of Liverpool, touched at Halifax in 1863, loaded with munitions, gunpowder, steam engines and six artillery pieces. The press gave detailed reports of the interesting visitor, which was run aground near Charleston by the USN. The fate of the Confederate navy vessel *Condor*, a lead-coloured steamer recently launched at Glasgow, was slightly different. It cleared Halifax in September 1864, carrying Rose O'Neal Greenhow, the celebrated rebel spy, and a Confederate diplomat. Consul Jackson filed his usual report with Washington. In sight of Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the Cape Fear River, *Condor* evaded the waiting gunboat but grounded on the bar. Months later the abandoned hulk was destroyed by Confederate shore guns.<sup>27</sup>

In the late summer of 1864, following the arrival and escape of the raider CSS *Tallahassee*, the Confederate agent at Bermuda, Major Norman Walker, reached Halifax



on the runner *Falcon*. Before departing for England, Walker penned a letter recommending the Nova Scotia port as an alternate base for the supply effort. The head of Fraser, Trenholm and Co., based in Liverpool, opined that Halifax, its coaling and repair facilities notwithstanding, was not "a practical place to carry on trade from." Yet increasing numbers of British and Southern smugglers dropped anchor at Halifax over the next months, partly because of yellow fever in Bermuda and the Bahamas. Rather than tie up shipping and cargoes in extended quarantine at Wilmington, captains brought their vessels north. The *Helen*, which had landed cotton and tobacco, departed for North Carolina (it would return for repairs, which were completed by December). *Owl*, owned by Fraser, Trenholm and Co., cleared with a large crew of 100 men.<sup>28</sup>

Both the Halifax press and the US consul (who had been temporarily assisted by an American government detective) recorded the comings and goings of vessels involved in Confederate supply. Among the August and September arrivals were *North Heath*, *Falcon*, *Old Dominion*, *Little Hattie*, *Colonel Lamb*, *City of Petersburg*, *Annie*, *Armstrong*, *Askalon*, *Caroline*, *Constance* and *Ptarmigan*. When the Fathers of Confederation arrived in Halifax to promote British North American union, several celebrated runners rode at anchor or were tied up at wharves. Although these and other steamers were described as blockade runners, many were in ballast, delivering cotton from Confederate stockpiles in the Caribbean or merely seeking coal. *City of Petersburg* and *Annie*, for example, brought over 1200 bales of cotton. Some, such as *Colonel Lamb* or Crenshaw and Co.'s *Armstrong*, which carried provisions for the Confederate Subsistence Bureau, had steamed from England. Others, such as the 280-ton *Ptarmigan*, were chartered to the Confederate Navy. Most were owned by firms such as Alexander Collie and Co. By this point the business was monopolized by large joint-stock companies. The fifty principal blockade runners represented a capital investment of several million pounds. Local firms acting as consignees included B. Wier and Co. and G.C. Harvey. Despite Northern suspicions that ports such as Halifax were funnelling anus to the rebels, the Confederates actually were well supplied with ammunition and weapons. What they desperately needed was food, clothing, boots, medicine and dry goods.<sup>29</sup>

Press reports of the behaviour of blockade-running crews were generally favourable, influenced no doubt by the general pro-Confederate and pro-British public opinion. Halifax's hospitality was repaid in kind. The master of *Florie*, who had his vessel's hull reinforced and engine overhauled at the Dartmouth marine works, treated a party of local notables to a pleasure cruise. The *Acadian Recorder* and other journals described the business as "profitable and exciting." The captains, who were British or Southerners, were well rewarded for successful voyages. Pilots and engineers also stood to make small fortunes, and by 1864 firemen could command up to \$300 per round trip and ABs \$100-150. A portion of wages was paid in advance and each crew member was permitted to ship small amounts of cotton, turpentine or other Southern exports. George Page, captain of *Old Dominion*, explained to a Nova Scotia Vice-Admiralty Court that the real danger for runners was not naval gunfire but running aground on sand bars. While few Maritimers appear to have served in this highly-specialized fleet, when masters paid out large disbursements to their crews, the Halifax economy benefited."

Saint John and Halifax appear to have been involved only on the fringes of the Confederate supply effort, most of which was channelled through the West Indies, Cuba

or Mexico. Stephen Wise has determined that blockade-running steamers made less than a dozen round trips between North Carolina and Nova Scotia, and that none succeeded in direct trips to or from South Carolina. The Richmond authorities did not concur with Norman Walker's favourable assessment of the potential of Halifax as a linchpin in Confederate supply. Secretary of the Navy S.R. Mallory was of the opinion that steamers should use Bermuda rather than Nova Scotia on the grounds that Halifax offered less cargo and that the trip used more coal and brought greater risks of capture and accident. This theory was proven on many occasions, such as when the brand-new 325-ton *Bat*, twice as fast as the average gunboat, was captured and taken to prize court in Boston, *Annie* was destroyed off North Carolina, or *Old Dominion* was chased back to Nova Scotia after being raked by shrapnel.<sup>31</sup>

Although Nova Scotia trade with the Caribbean increased during the war years, this was part of a long-term trend. Total tonnage clearing all Nova Scotia ports for the US during the 1860s surpassed that headed for the British West Indies by six- or seven-fold. Similarly, New Brunswick's trade with the West Indies was a drop in the bucket compared to its commercial links with the Northern states. Joseph Howe explained in a speech at Detroit in 1865 that for every ton of freight sent from British North America to the South, fifty tons were shipped to the North. Half the vessels clearing Nova Scotia ports sailed to the US and almost as many of the vessels entering the colony came from America. As Overholtzer noted, "the arrival of a single ship from the South," together with rumours of large profits from blockade running, captured more attention "than the arrival of a hundred ships from Boston." Many Halifax merchants, already involved in the West Indies trade, contended "that their commercial future lay with the Confederacy."

Colonial merchants in reality stood to benefit more from prolonged hostilities between North and South than from an independent Confederacy. Halifax's sugar and molasses trade is a good example. In peacetime, Boston and New York merchants imported these products directly from the West Indies. During the war, however, the threat of rebel sea raiders encouraged re-export through Nova Scotia in British-registered vessels. This pattern helped Halifax become "a more important distribution center for West Indies products" after 1865."

Greater fortunes were to be made in the general carrying trade and commercial ties with the North than in risky blockade-running. Nearly half of all vessels entering New Brunswick ports came from the US and one-third or more of clearances from the "timber colony" were for American harbours, although there is evidence of New Brunswick merchants sending blockade goods to Bermuda and the Bahamas. Thus, despite supposed anti-Yankee public opinion in New Brunswick by late 1861, Saint John's business class both profited from and assisted in the Union war effort. The pro-Union *Globe*, which had no interest in whitewashing pro-Confederate activity, reported in 1864 that local merchants had refused to risk significant capital in direct blockade running.<sup>34</sup>

### **The United States Navy in Maritime Waters**

Union naval forces, searching for "rebel" blockade-runners, appeared off the south shore of Nova Scotia and the Halifax approaches by 1863. In the decades prior to the Civil War, the USN had visited the Maritimes largely in connection with fisheries patrols. In

1861-1862 and much of 1863, New England's northeastern maritime flank was not a priority for Washington, however much local opinion in Maine feared British invasion during the *Trent* scare. In the early part of the war Northern shipyards were busy turning out vessels for the blockade and general operations in the Southern theatre, including freshwater duties. But the Maritime colonies were important for four reasons. First, there was the RN and its seasonal base in Halifax, which guarded the gateway to the Canadas and kept communications open with Newfoundland and the Caribbean. Second, Halifax was astride the Great Circle route, the chief North Atlantic artery for Philadelphia, New York and Boston. Third, the inshore and bank fisheries of Britain's colonies were regarded as part of the birthright of New England fishermen, thousands of whom made the annual trek to these waters. Finally, there was a growing export trade in Nova Scotia coal, carried by American colliers, to the industrializing North. Combined with the threat of rebel privateers and commerce raiders beginning in 1861, these were all good reasons for the USN to be familiar with the Gulf of Maine, Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia's south shore and the Gulf of St. Lawrence.<sup>35</sup>

Wartime developments brought unprecedented numbers of American sloops, gunboats and frigates into Maritime waters. Gunboats, for example, became more visible following the destructive cruise in New England waters of the *Tacony-Archer* in the summer of 1863 and the forceable seizure of a revenue cutter from Portland, Maine. More warships hunted the highjacked steamer *Chesapeake* in late 1863 as it cruised from Grand Manan to Saint John, Cape Sable, Petite Riviere and eventual (illegal) recapture by the USS *Ella and Annie (Malvern)* at Sambro near Halifax. The third major incident to attract the USN was John Taylor Wood's celebrated foray in the raider *Tallahassee* during the summer of 1864. In each instance, American warships entered Saint John and/or Halifax for coal, supplies, intelligence or to confer with the local authorities. These responses tended to be *ad hoc*, reactive affairs, the crews hastily organized and the vessels putting to sea before ordnance, repairs and modifications were fully complete. In his diary, the Union Secretary of the Navy described commanders who hunted unsuccessfully for the *Tallahassee* as "feeble and inefficient," and suspected several of drunkenness and disloyalty.<sup>36</sup>

Less understood is the Northern effort to keep tabs on blockade runners entering or exiting Nova Scotia waters. This increased presence coincided with British recognition that the USN, historically little more than a thorn in the side, was expanding at an alarming rate. The RN, although outnumbered six to one off the Atlantic coast, was still confident of its local superiority in early 1862. During the *Trent* crisis, Vice Admiral Milne had planned to destroy Brother Jonathan's limited number of first-class warships, break the feeble Union blockade, and impose a Royal Navy blockade, War-of-1812-style, on the enemy's ports. By 1864 Lord Lyons, the British representative at Washington, expressed alarm at the USN's new professionalism and the size, speed and firepower of its new ships. Because of these concerns, the RN kept a low profile *vis-a-vis* the US.<sup>37</sup>

Tracking and intercepting blockade runners presented a number of difficulties, the chief being that most sailed under protection of the British flag and the RN. Another was logistics. The closest major American port and coaling station was Portland, ME. Britain's policy of neutrality found little understanding among a Northern populace that viewed the former imperialist aggressor as aiding rebels and slave owners. Public opinion in the

North placed politicians, diplomats and naval commanders under intense pressure to follow the lead of Commodore Wilkes of *San Jacinto* and "braid John Bull's beard." British policy was that as long as its merchantmen were not caught in the act of running the blockade, they were guilty of no breach of American law. Britain expected its subjects captured as smugglers to be given their liberty at the first reasonable opportunity and protested when zealous American captains chased merchant vessels into colonial waters in the Caribbean.

The chief concern in the Maritimes for the Department of the Navy was Halifax, although at least one runner, *Flamingo*, visited the busy port of Pictou. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles in 1864 noted bitterly that most new blockade runners were built in Britain and manned partly or entirely by British crews; he also claimed that British capitalists accumulated great wealth from smuggling. Charts issued to Union blockaders marked the "Halifax line" running from Cape Fear northeasterly along the Carolina coast and on to Nova Scotia. Welles believed that "the advantages of those triangular depots of blockade runners and rebel supplies — the ports of Halifax, Bermuda and Nassau, ports which will always be in sympathy with the rebels — has induced them to engage in trade." Newspaper clippings, telegraphic dispatches from the consuls in Saint John and Halifax, and rumour led Welles to believe that the Maritime colonies were worth watching. If the region was not deeply implicated in the war's roughly eight thousand blockade violations, its shipping links with the Caribbean and popular sympathy for the Confederacy worried the Union government and the USN. The cruise of the *Tallahassee* (which burned or bonded over thirty Northern merchant vessels on its first raid) and its successful refuelling at Halifax and return to Fort Fisher was another important factor in increasing the American naval presence in the Gulf of Maine and waters off the Maritimes in general.<sup>38</sup>

By the summer of 1864, when Southern quarantine regulations made Halifax the temporary base for a number of blockade runners, the USN was a more frequent sight on the coasts of Nova Scotia. Washington expected its naval commanders to exhibit greater professionalism than displayed during the *Tallahassee affair*. Nonetheless, because of British complicity in building or equipping Confederate raiders and smugglers, officers of the USN tended to regard all blockade runners as "rebels," even when they were owned and registered in Britain or its colonies. One of the vessels to place Halifax under surveillance in 1864 was USS *Vanderbilt*, which in 1863 had tracked CSS *Alabama* to South Africa and captured *Peterof* off St. Thomas. Another, following in the wake of the *Tallahassee*, was USS *San Jacinto*, the vessel that almost started a war *in* 1861 by stopping the British steamer *Trent*.<sup>39</sup>

Halifax's anti-Yankee press growled when American gunboats lurked at the entrance to the harbour. Northern gunboats, it complained, had been extended generous privileges, while John Taylor Wood's *Tallahassee* had been ordered from port in less than forty-eight hours. To prevent breaches of international law and port regulations at Halifax following the *Tallahassee* raid, Vice Admiral Sir James Hope stationed a corvette off Herring Cove. One month later the Nova Scotia government reminded visiting warships that they could not communicate from beyond the three-mile limit by small boat (the Americans were keeping patrol vessels under steam, ready for action). Foreign naval vessels could communicate with shore only if they anchored in "the proper part of the harbour," under Fort George (the Citadel)."

Earlier that year, the colony's administrator, Lieutenant-General Hastings-Doyle (who doubled as commander of British ground forces in the region), reflecting on the *Trent* and *Chesapeake* incidents, suggested to Vice Admiral Hope that Halifax deserved a year-round naval presence in order to enforce neutrality and sovereignty. During Christmas week of 1863 the harbour, barren of British warships, had been visited by five USN vessels following the seizure of the highjacked *Chesapeake* by USS *Ella and Annie*. The admiral of the squadron had responded by sending a corvette north to Nova Scotia in early 1864. Hastings-Doyle's concern had been raised by the US consul's allegation that a visiting paddlewheeler was to be fitted out at nearby Ketch Harbour as a rebel privateer. The Nova Scotia government investigated but dismissed this rumour; the steamer *Will o' the Wisp* was a smuggler. Hastings-Doyle's successor, R.G. MacDonnell, also requested that the RN beef up its year-round presence at Halifax. With American gunboats near the harbour mouth and along the south shore, he complained, it was difficult to distinguish between surveillance and the actions "of a hostile belligerent power blockading an enemy's ports."<sup>41</sup>

The consuls and the Navy Department, despite British assurances of neutrality, continued to worry about commerce raiders being outfitted by rebel agents. Jackson had good reason to keep the State and Navy Departments posted on the movements of the barque-rigged steamer *Mary*, which entered Liverpool, NS in May 1864. Formerly the *Alexandra*, this vessel had been constructed on behalf of Fraser, Trenholm and Co. in Britain in 1863. Before it could be converted into a gunboat, *Alexandra* was impounded by the British government. Following months of litigation it was released, ending up in the hands of a Confederate agent. The Nova Scotia authorities, following American protests, requested a naval officer to inspect the steamer; he reported that *Mary* was too slow for a fighting ship. C.K. Prioleau, head of Fraser, Trenholm and Co. in Britain, wrote that it required new boilers. After major repairs at Halifax (apparently supervised by a Confederate officer), *Mary* steamed to Bermuda. In the wake of this visit, the Nova Scotia government published the Imperial edict forbidding the sale or dismantling of belligerent vessels in neutral ports.<sup>42</sup>

American naval visitors generated few positive press acknowledgments. Journalists took great pains to describe slovenly appearance and lax discipline on Yankee gunboats and attempts by crewmen to desert. Haligonians were not accustomed to a "democratic" navy (eighty percent of USN officers were volunteers). Pro-Southern waterfront denizens also registered their views. The captain of the gunboat USS *Howquah*, on a fisheries protection cruise in 1863, was surprised that even upper class Haligonians were contemptuous of his presence. USS *Yantic*, which reached the Nova Scotia capital in November 1864, was greeted with taunts and remarks that were "anything but complimentary." Yet by 1864 the naval and civil authorities, forbidden from recognizing the Confederate Navy, were extending formal and informal courtesies to the USN, such as entertaining its visiting officers.<sup>43</sup>

The American naval pressure lasted only as long as the final stages of blockade running in the Atlantic. The price of cotton, the key determinant in blockade running, had begun to decline after the Battle of Mobile Bay and the fall of Atlanta in 1864. By early 1865, with the storming of Fort Fisher, the mountains of supplies at Bermuda and Nassau, and the dozens of state-of-the-art blockade runners, suddenly became obsolete. When

Charleston fell a short time later, Halifax was monitored only because it was a minor stopping place for Confederate refugees, diplomats and spies, or possibly a last-minute privateer or commerce raider. The consul and his telegraph sufficed. *Old Dominion*, re-entering the port with cotton at Christmas 1864, was one of the last runners to steam north on active service.<sup>44</sup>

## Conclusion

The Maritimes, at best on the periphery of Confederate supply from 1861 to 1865, were too distant from the Gulf of Mexico, where ports such as Galveston remained open in early 1865, to continue to be involved in blockade running. Yet in both the popular and official consciousness, Halifax and to a lesser extent Saint John were thought to have significantly assisted the Confederate cause. William Seward's son and assistant in the State Department, Frederick William Seward, in the final weeks of the war wrote that Nova Scotia, although not a base for hostile raids on American citizens and property, had functioned as a "naval station" for smugglers, "a rendezvous for piratical cruisers" and a "postal dispatch station" for the Confederates. Halifax commercial interests, such as B. Wier and Co., G.C. Harvey, Alexander Keith, S.F. Barss and others, were "willing agents and abettors of the enemies of the United States."

The memory of these connections lingered because of the ongoing dispute between Britain and the US over the *Alabama* Claims. The arrival of former blockade-running steamers at Halifax in 1865, carrying individuals such as John Taylor Wood and John N. Maffit of the Confederate States Navy, also did little to win Northern goodwill, especially in the wake of Lincoln's assassination, which was thought to have a Canadian connection. Among the stragglers were *City of Petersburg*, *Secret*, *Virginia*, *Druid*, *Chicora*, *Letter B (Colonel Lamb)*, *Lark*, *Foam (Owl)*, *Ptarmigan* and *Rothsay Castle*.<sup>46</sup>

Blockade runners, including some of the war's best-known and most profitable, did visit ports in the Maritimes and local merchants did help the Confederate supply effort. Trade with the West Indies was an indirect form of economic assistance to the rebel states. Yet the American government, its consuls and the press exaggerated the overall significance of these links. Northern concern with British and colonial succour of the Confederacy masked an underlying continuity: that the staples-exporting economies of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were interwoven with those of the northeastern US. Over half of the workforce in each colony was in the agricultural or extractive sectors; the chief value-added component of manufacturing was shipbuilding. Although in 1865 Nova Scotia was more tied to the West Indies than was New Brunswick (with 22.3% of the former's exports going to the Caribbean), the North took two-fifths of its exports and supplied almost a third of total imports. Saint John's minor connection with Confederate supply is supported by trade returns: in 1865 the entire West Indies was responsible for 1.7% of New Brunswick's imports and less than one percent of exports. The North provided two-fifths of its imports (flour, manufactured goods) and purchased one-third of its exports.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, although Halifax (and the Nova Scotian outports) were involved with Confederate supply through the West Indies, most of this was completely legal. And, as the above statistics suggest, this activity was dwarfed by overall trade with the North. The

presence of up to fifty steam-powered blockade runners or consorts at Halifax and Saint John indicates that these ports were directly involved in the "War of the Rebellion." Overall that involvement, however, tended to support the victors.

## NOTES

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1. Donald Creighton, *The Road to Confederation: The Emergence of Canada, 1863-1867* (Toronto, 1964); W.L. Morton, *The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 1857-1873* (Toronto, 1977); Phillip Buckner and John Read (eds.), *The Atlantic Provinces to Confederation* (Toronto, 1994); Ralph C. Nelson, *et al.*, "Canadian Confederation as a Case Study in Community Formation," in Ged Martin (ed.), *The Causes of Canadian Confederation* (Fredericton, 1990), 50-85; D.C. Masters, *The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (Toronto, 1957); and Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owsram, *A History of the Canadian Economy* (Toronto, 1991), chapter 10.

2. E.D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (2 vols., New York, 1925); Robin Winks, *Canada and the United States: the Civil War Years* (New Haven, 1960; reprint, New York, 1988). Diplomatic issues are covered in Brian Jenkins, *Britain and the War for the Union* (2 vols., Montréal, 1980); D.P. Crook, *The North, the South and the Powers, 1861-65* (Toronto, 1972); and Frank Owsley, *King Cotton: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (Chicago, 1957).

3. Stuart MacKinnon, "The Imperial Fortresses in Canada: Halifax and Esquimaux, 1871-1906" (Unpublished PhD thesis, Dalhousie University, 1965); and J.B. Johnson, *Defending Halifax: Ordnance, 1825-1906* (Ottawa, 1981).

4. The "new" historiography of the Maritimes is too voluminous to describe here. Readers are

referred to Buckner and Read (eds.), *Atlantic Provinces*, and to the superb journal of the Atlantic region, *Acadiensis* (1971-).

5. Mason Phillip Smith, *Confederates Downeast: Confederate Operations in and Around Maine* (Portland, ME, 1985); Harry Arthur Thurston, *Tallahassee Skipper* (Yarmouth, 1981); G.H. Warren, *Fountains of Discontent: The Trent Affair and the Freedom of the Seas* (Boston, 1981); and Norman B. Ferris, *The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis* (Knoxville, 1977). J.H. Thompson and S.J. Randall, *Canada and the United States* (Montréal, 1994), 34-37, make no mention of the *Chesapeake* or *Tallahassee* affairs. The steamer *Chesapeake* was seized off Cape Cod, in the name of the Confederacy, by British subjects. It was pursued into Nova Scotia waters by the US Navy.

6. Saint John *Freeman*, Aug. 2, 1862; United States, Department of State, Consular Dispatches (USCD), Saint John. 12 November 1862; and Thomas Raddall, *Halifax: Warden of the North* (Toronto, 1949).

7. The United States Consular Dispatches (Halifax) are on microfilm at the Killam Library, Dalhousie University. The USCD (Saint John) are on microfilm at the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick (PANB). The official naval records are available as *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies* (30 vols., Washington, DC, 1894-1922). Aside from Winks, *Canada and the United States*, no author has pursued these themes. The standard unpublished sources for the period are Harry A. Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War" (Unpublished MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 1965); and Gertrude Gunn, "New Brunswick Opinion on the American Civil War" (Unpublished MA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1956).

8. Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS), Colonial Office (CO) 188/138, Gordon to

Newcastle, 31 December 1862; PANS, Record Group (RG) 1/126, Mulgrave to Newcastle, 20 March 1862; *Halifax Reporter*, 4 July 1862 and 10 June 1865; *Nova Scotian*, 30 June 1861; and Saint John *Telegraph*, 5 May 1864 and 19 December 1865.

9. *Nova Scotian*, 2 September 1861; *Halifax Journal*, 12 February, 10 March, and 19 September 1862; *Halifax Express*, 5 August 1864; and *Pictou Colonial Standard*, 6 August 1861.

10. PANS, Manuscript Group (MG) 1/247, Harrison Papers, W.H. Harrison to Edward Harrison, 25 March 1864; and Norrie and Owram. *History*, chapter 4.

11. S.A. Saunders, *The Economic History of the Maritimes* (Fredericton, 1984); Eric W. Sager with Gerald E. Panting, *Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914* (Montréal, 1990), chapter 5; Sager, *Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914* (Montréal, 1989), chapter 9.

12. Howard P. Nash, *A Naval History of the Civil War* (New York, 1972), chapter 15; Chester G. Hearn, *Gray Raiders of the Sea: How Eight Confederate Warships Destroyed the Union's High Seas Commerce* (Camden, ME, 1992); George W. Dalzell, *The Flight from the Flag* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1940); Kenneth Blume, "The Flight from the Flag: The American Government, the British Caribbean and the American Merchant Marine, 1861-65," *Civil War History*, XXXII (March 1986), 44-55; US, Department of State, *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (Foreign Relations of the United States), 1864* (Washington, DC, 1865), "American Vessels Transferred to Foreign Registry, 1863;" and Roger F. Duncan, *Coastal Maine: A Maritime History* (New York, 1992), 327. The rebel commerce raider threat hurt Maine shipbuilders. Nearly ninety vessels built in that state were captured or destroyed during the war. See also, "Maine," in P. Faust (ed.), *Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War* (New York, 1986), 469.

13. *Halifax Sun*, 10 January 1862; *Halifax Evening Express*, 20 January 1862; *Carleton Sentinel*, 18 January 1862; CO 188/140, A. Smithers and Co. to Hiram Barney, 19 January 1864; Saint John Chamber of Commerce to A. Gordon, 28 March

1864; USCD (Saint John), 6 February 1863; *Halifax Chronicle*, 22 September 1864; and Winks. *Canada and the United States*, 137-139.

14. Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War," chapter 2; and John Niven, *Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy* (New York, 1973).

15. The operational side of the North Atlantic blockade is discussed in Robert Browning, Jr., *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War* (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1993). See also Stephen Wise, *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988). For reaction to the blockade, see *Halifax Sun*, 10 January 1862; *Halifax Express*, 21 February 1862 and 9 February 1863; *Halifax Journal*, 30 June 1862; *Halifax Chronicle*, 24 September 1861; *Acadian Recorder*, 7 February 1863; and Saint John *Telegraph*, 4 July 1864. The quote is from *Acadian Recorder*, 27 August 1864.

16. CO 188/135, Gordon to Newcastle, 16 December 1861; and CO 188/136, W. Smith to Gordon, 20 March 1862.

17. *Halifax Reporter*, 27 June, 15 August, and 5 and 17 September 1861; USCD (Saint John), 9 August 1861; *War of the Rebellion*, series I, VI, 96-98, 201, 224-225, and 726; VII, 282; United States Navy, *Civil War Naval Chronology* (Washington, DC, 1971), II, 56, and IV, 42.

18. Frank E. Vandiver, *Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda* (Austin, TX, 1947), 79-80; *Halifax Express*, 23 August, 16 and 27 September, 23 October and 25 November 1861, and 9 April 1862; USCD (Halifax), 9 November 1861; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, VI, 210, and XII, 543; *Halifax Sun*, 18 November 1861; *Acadian Recorder*, 12 October 1861; *Halifax Reporter*, 5 and 17 September 1861; *Halifax Chronicle*, 14 April 1863; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, II, 56, and IV, 42. The capture of Hatteras Inlet by Union forces in August 1861 shut off an important haven for small blockade-runners.

19. *Halifax Reporter*, 25 June 1863; *Halifax Sun*, 26 June 1863; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1861*, 284-285, and 1864, part 2, 385-386;



Stuart W. Bernath, "British Neutrality and the Civil War Prize Cases," *Civil War History*, XV (December 1969), 320-331; PANS, RG5, series GP Misc. A, IV, Petition re: Seizure of the *Will o' the Wisp*, 18 August 1862; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, II, 10 and 68, and IV, 11. Matamoras, in neutral Mexico, was forty miles up the Rio Grande.

20. CO 188/135. Gordon to Newcastle, 23 December 1861, and W. Smith to Gordon, 21 December 1861; CO 188/136, Gordon to Newcastle. 20 January 1862. For the Wrights, see Richard Rice, "The Wrights of Saint John: A Study of Shipbuilding and Shipowning in the Maritimes, 1839-1855," in David MacMillan (ed.), *Canadian Business History: Selected Studies, 1493-1971* (Toronto, 1972), 317-337; PANB, RS 348 A, W. Smith to Captain Moody, 11 January 1862, and Gordon to Smith, 22 March 1862; USCD (Saint John). 13 December 1861. Howard also warned Washington of the departure of the schooner *Judah*, with two Southern pilots and a load of quicksilver, tin and lead, for the South. This vessel, intended for a privateer, was destroyed by a Union raid on Pensacola: Charlton A. Tebeau, *A History of Florida* (Miami, 1971), 207.

21. Wise, *Lifeline*; Browning, Jr., *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear*, 251; James D. Bulloch, *The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe* (2 vols., New York, 1959); Thomas Taylor, *Running the Blockade* (London, 1896); Kevin Foster, "Builders vs. Blockaders: The Evolution of the Blockade-Running Steamship," in Clark Reynolds (ed.), *Global Crossroads and the American Seas* (Missoula, MT, 1988), 85-90.

22. USCD (Halifax), 21 February 1863.

23. USCD (Saint John), 30 November 1863; Saint John *Globe*, 3 March 1864; USCD (Halifax), 9 July 1863. For public opinion in Halifax and Saint John, see Francis I.W. Jones, "Treason and Piracy in Civil War Halifax: The Second Chesapeake Affair," *Dalhousie Review*, LXXI (Winter 1991-1992), 472-487; Greg Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow: The Maritimes and the American Civil War" (unpublished manuscript, 1996). On the *Robert E. Lee*, see Halifax *Reporter*, 13 October 1863; *Acadian Recorder*, 17 October 1863; Halifax *Citizen*, 7 November 1863; USCD (Halifax), 13 October 1863; Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War," 60; Vandiver, *Con-*

*federate Blockade Running*, 73-75; J.R. Wilkinson, *The Narrative of a Blockade Runner* (New York, 1877); 169-176; Oscar Kinchen, *Confederate Operations in Canada and the North* (North Quincy, 1970), 26-27; Winks, *Canada and the United States*, 145-154; Jim Dan Hill, *Seadogs of the Sixties* (Minneapolis. 1935), chapter 4.

24. On the *Harriet Pinckney*, see Saint John *Globe*, 9 July and 27 November 1863; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1864*, part 2, 509-519 and 610-614; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, IX, 311; Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War," 6-66; and Peter Barton, "The First Blockade Runner and 'Another Alabama': Some Tees and Hartlepool Ships that Worried the Union," *Mariner's Mirror*, LXXXI (February 1995), 45-64. On the *General Banks*, see Saint John *Globe*, 2 July 1863; USCD (Halifax), 9 and 27 June, and 21 July 1863; USCD (Saint John), 15 April 1863; Halifax *Sun*, 5 June 1863; Halifax *Reporter*, 27 June 1863; Liverpool *Transcript*, 9 July 1863; Wise, *Lifeline*; PANS, Shipping Registers, Halifax (micro. 2424), 26 June 1863; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, VI, 211; and Edward Sloan to Author, 11 October 1995. I am indebted to Mr. Sloan, of Greenville, SC, for research that suggests that John Fergusson of Charleston may have been involved in the ownership of *Fannie and Jennie*. The NS Shipping Register shows a transfer to Benjamin Weir and Levi Hart of Weir and Co. On *A.D. Vance*, see USCD (Halifax), 27 April 1864; Halifax *Citizen*, 28 April 1864; Halifax *British Colonist*, 12 September 1863; Halifax *Sun*, 29 April and 6 May 1864; Halifax *Reporter*, 21 May 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series I, X, 453-454; and Wise, *Lifeline*, 106 and 157-158.

25. USCD (Saint John), 4 July, 31 August, 14 September and 8 December 1863, and 26 August 1864; Wise, *Lifeline*, appendix; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, III, 49, 145 and 147, and IV, 10 and 84; Saint John *Globe*, 21 April, 23 May. 11 September and 20 October 1863, and 11 January and 20 October 1864; Halifax *Journal*, 4 February 1864; Halifax *Express*, 5 September 1864; and Saint John *Telegraph*, 21 July 1864. *Laura Jane*, registered in Saint John, was also captured in 1864. *War of the Rebellion*, series I, IX, 128, and X, 604; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1864*, part I; Saint John *Globe*, 29 July 1864; and Char-

lottetown *Ross's Weekly*, 21 August 1863.

26. USCD (Saint John), 13 December 1861, and 4 July, 31 August and 8 December 1863; *War of the Rebellion*, series I, IV, 782, and VI, 96-98, 259 and 489; and Winks, *Canada and the United States*, 66.

27. *Saint John Globe*, 13 October 1862, and 13 August and 4 September 1863; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1862*, 404; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, II, 99; Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War," 70-71; USCD (Halifax), 5 September 1862 and 24 July 1863, and 26 September 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, X, 496, and XIII, 507; Winks, *Canada and the United States*; *Halifax Journal*, 14 and 17 October 1864; Wise, *Lifeline, 196-197*; J.D. Horan, *Confederate Agent: A Discovery in History* (New York, 1954), 111-112; and *Nova Scotian*, 31 October 1864.

28. USCD (Halifax), 8, 23 and 31 August 1864; *Halifax Sun*, 24 August 1864; *Halifax Journal*, 14 September 1864; C.K. Prioleau to Lieutenant J.R. Hamilton, 2 September 1864, Fraser, Trenholm and Co. Papers (originals in possession of Ethel Nepveux).

29. USCD (Halifax), 29 March, 23 and 30 August and 9, 12, 13 and 17 September 1864; *Halifax Sun*, 29 April 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, X, 416, 427 and 562-563; Dwight F. Henderson (ed.), *The Private Journal of Georgiana Gholson Walker, 1862-1865* (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1963), 110-112; *Halifax Reporter*, 13 September and 29 November 1864; *Halifax Chronicle*, 6 October 1864; and Wise, *Lifeline*, chapter 7.

30. *Saint John Globe*, 26 September 1864; *Halifax Chronicle*, 6 August, 24 September and 20 October 1864; *Halifax Express*, 29 August, 12 and 21 October, and 2 November 1864; *Nova Scotian*, 22 October 1864; *Halifax Sun*, 26 Sept 1864 and 24 March 1865; Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapter 9; *Acadian Recorder*, 27 August 1864; USCD (Halifax), 24 October 1864; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, VI, 189; and PANS, RG 40/23 Vice-Admiralty Court Records, Steamship *City of Petersburg*, 1864.

31. Wise, *Lifeline*, 148 and appendix, 5-8, 19 and

22; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, X, 741-742; Stuart L. Bernath, *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, 1970); *New York Times*, 18 October and 8 December 1864; *Halifax Express*, 21 and 26 October 1864; Ethel Nepveux, *George Alfred Trenholm and the Company that Went to War* (Charleston, 1994), 51; and Browning, Jr., *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear*.

32. Sager with Panting, *Maritime Capital*, 103-105; J.A. Chisholm (ed.), *The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe* (2 vols., Halifax, 1909), II, 450-453; and Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War," 52.

33. Overholtzer, Jr., "Nova Scotia and the United States Civil War," 52.; and Masters, *Reciprocity Treaty*, 105.

34. *Halifax Chronicle*, 17 October 1861; Nelson, et al., "Canadian Confederation;" Saunders, *Economic History*; Jim Cogle, *Canadian Blood, Canadian Soil: The Story of Canada's Contribution to the American Civil War* (Saint John, 1994), 9-10; Gunn, "New Brunswick Opinion;" and *Saint John Globe*, 4 July 1861. In March 1865, during the last weeks of the war, the schooner *Halatia* of Saint John, bound for Matamoros, Mexico, was found abandoned at sea with musket percussion caps hidden in the legal cargo: *Halifax Express*, 27 March 1865.

35. The Federal and Maine state authorities did embark on a program of coastal and river defence expansion and modernization; see Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapter 1. For the USN, see Kenneth J. Hagan, *The People's Navy: The Making of American Seapower* (New York, 1991); and Nash, *Naval History*.

36. Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow;" Winks, *Canada and the United States*; Smith, *Confederates Downeast*; Jones, "Treason and Piracy;" and Thurston, *Tallahassee Skipper*. The crew of the prize vessel *Clarence*, nabbed by CSS *Florida*, had captured on its northward cruise the Northern barque *Tacony*, then the schooner *Archer*. At Portland, ME, the raiders, before their capture, had cut out and destroyed the Revenue cutter *Caleb Cushing*; see Smith, *Confederates Downeast*. The *Chesapeake* pursuit had included a frigate, two

sloops and three gunboats; it is well described in Howard K. Beale (ed.), *The Diary of Gideon Welles* (2 vols., New York, 1960), II, 119. Vessels hunting for Tallahassee included *Dacota*, *Grand Gulf*, *Susquehanna*, *Pontoosuc*, *Yantic*, *Iosco* and *!no*. The last-named, a sailing vessel disguised as a merchantman, cruised fishing banks off Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador attempting to entrap rebel raiders; *War of the Rebellion*, series I, III, 178; and Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapter 8.

37. Kenneth Bourne, "British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-62," *English Historical Review*, LXXVI (October 1961), 600-632; Richard Basoco, et al. (eds.), "A British View of the Union Navy, 1864: A Report Addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Washington," *American Neptune*, XXVII (January 1967), 30-45.

38. *New York Times*, 8 Dec 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series I, III, 471, and X, 416; Beale (ed.), *Diary of Gideon Welles*, II, 185; and Don Higginbottom, "A Raider Refuels: Diplomatic Repercussions," *Civil War History*, XXXII (September 1986), 208-228. *Flamingo* was a new triple-stacker purchased in Britain for the Confederate government by James D. Bulloch.

39. *Halifax Citizen*, 4 October 1864; *Halifax Sun*, 22 November 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, III, 156-160, 176 and 299, and XI, 90. Other post-Tallahassee visitors included USS *Tallapoosa*, *Shawmut*, *Florida*, *Massasoit*, *Susquehanna* and *Maumee*, see Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapter 8.

40. *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, III, 294-296; PANS, RG1/137, R.G. MacDonnell to E. Cardwell, 3 October 1864; and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1864*, part 2, 717.

41. PANS, RG1/137, Hastings-Doyle to Hope, 29 March 1864; Hastings-Doyle to Newcastle, 17 and 21 March 1864; and R.G. MacDonnell to E. Cardwell, 29 September 1864; USCD (Halifax), 22 January 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, X, 461; Jones, "Treason and Piracy;" Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapters 6-7.

42. Bulloch, *Secret Service*, I, 330-332 and 351-353, and II, 176 and 354; Jenkins, *Britain and the War*, II, 199, 252, 281, 297, 303, 323 and 330; *Halifax Reporter*, 5 November 1863; PANS, RG1/137, MacDonnell to Cardwell, 15 and 29 September 1864; *War of the Rebellion*, series 1, X, 601; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1864*, part 1, 738; Charles Kuhn Prioleau to Lieutenant J.R. Hamilton, 29 July 1864, Fraser, Trenholm and Co. Papers (photocopy supplied by Ethel Nepveux); Nepveux, *George Alfred Trenholm*; and USCD (Halifax), 9 September 1864. At Nassau the American consul managed to have *Mary* libelled.

43. *War of the Rebellion*, series I, III, 320-321; and Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapter 6.

44. Rod Gragg, *Confederate Goliath: The Battle for Fort Fisher* (New York, 1991); Wise, *Lifeline*; *Halifax Sun*, 14 November 1864; *Halifax Reporter*, 22 December 1864; *Halifax Express*, 21 December 1864; and *Halifax Chronicle*, 26 January 1865.

45. Seward to J.H. Burnley, 14 March 1865, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1865*, part 2, 96.

46. Winks, *Canada and the United States*; Marquis, "In Armageddon's Shadow," chapter 10; and Thurston, *Tallahassee Skipper*.

47. Norrie and Ooram, *History*, chapter 10.