diplomacy but rather Bainbridge’s extraordinary gaffe (which Goodin mentions only as an afterthought) that allowed the dey to humiliate the United States by using the George Washington as a transport for his tribute of exotic animals and slaves to the Sultan in Constantinople. Goodin makes other questionable interpretations, such as asserting that Cathcart’s personal diplomacy with the bashaw, and his efforts to engage in private trade, “eroded hope in a lasting peace,” as opposed to the Barbary regime’s capacity for tribute payments; suggesting that Jefferson welcomed war with Tripoli in 1801 as a way to put the United States on a par with Britain and France; or claiming that Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison had little foreknowledge about using Ahmet Karamanli, the deposed brother of the Bashaw of Tripoli, to attempt “regime change,” when in fact they knew all about those plans.

In From Captives to Consuls, Goodin has discovered interesting and previously unknown biographical information about Richard O’Brien, James Leander Cathcart, and James Riley. He demonstrates how they perceived and reacted to the Barbary world as slaves and as diplomats, and how they portrayed that world to Americans. On their return to America, each tried to network themselves into economic betterment and higher stations. Using their lives as an interpretive vehicle, Goodin makes provocative and insightful points about the early republic.

Frederick C. Leiner
Baltimore, Maryland


Professor Harlaftis, the preeminent historian of modern Greek shipping, has produced an ambitious comparative study of the most successful Greek shipping family of the nineteenth century, the Vigliano brothers, and of Aristotle Onassis, the most famous shipowner of the post-1945 era. Onassis was a celebrity before he married the widow of an American president, while the three Vigliano brothers were major players in opening the Russian Black Sea grain trade to world markets. Creating Global Shipping argues that these four Greek shipowners were in large part responsible for the development of modern bulk shipping as a multinational business. The author draws on a vast range of archival sources from Imperial Russian court records, the Vigliano Brothers’ accounts in the Bank of England and the Aristotle Onassis papers held by his private foundation in Greece. Harlaftis appears to be the first scholar to have had access to the Onassis records. Thus buttressed, she makes her argument forcefully but there are qualifications to this thesis that are not discussed.

The book is divided into two roughly equal parts, with an introductory chapter and a conclusion. Chapters two through five analyse the careers of the three Vigliano brothers, Marino (1804-1896), Panagi (1814-1902), and Andrea (1827-1887). Aristotle Onassis’ business activities are the subject of chapters six through nine.

All three Vigliano brothers began as ship’s captains with the eldest, Marino (Mari), commanding a small coasting vessel in the Sea of Azov in the early 1820s. After he established himself as a successful grain trader and shipown-
er at the port of Taganrog, his younger siblings followed him into the family business. The establishment of a London office by Panagi in the 1850s was a strategic masterstroke that allowed the Vigliano brothers to expand geographically and to transform their business into an integrated shipping empire. They now offered vessel and cargo brokerage services as well as financial services to their clients while at the same time expanding into steamships.

The Vigliano network’s success helped to create problems of its own. In December 1881, Mari was among a group of Taganrog merchants who were arrested by the Russian authorities for smuggling, tax fraud, and forgery. Eventually, after appeal, he was acquitted of all criminal charges and merely fined a rather insubstantial sum. More importantly, the senior Vigliano escaped being exiled to Siberia. Harlaftis puts the prosecution down to the xenophobia of the new Tsar Alexander III. This, despite the fact that the expert witnesses used by the government came from competing Black Sea ports which does hint at the possibility that intra-regional rivalries may have been involved as well.

Onassis began his adult life as a refugee from the Greco-Turkish War fleeing Smyrna for Athens in 1922. The next year, after emigrating to Buenos Aires, he used his position as the local agent for his family’s Greek-based tobacco business to begin to learn the shipping business. Onassis purchased his first two ships from the Canadian government at Depression-era prices in 1931. Following the well developed strategy of older Greek shipowners, he continued to acquire second hand tramps throughout the 1930s.

While Onassis was developing his shipping business during 1930s, he was also learning the ropes by developing contacts with London Greek, and Norwegian shipowners. He further expanded his knowledge and his network by ordering his first new vessels, a series of tankers from a Swedish shipyard. In 1939 he began moving his vessels to the Panamanian registry. Thus, before moving to New York in 1942, Onassis had already established himself as an ambitious young shipowner. His first big break came post-war when he was able to finance the purchase of ten Liberty ships handled through the National City Bank (NCB). Secondly, he introduced a level of opaqueness not seen before by flagging out the ships to the Honduran and Panamanian registries while they were owned by a Panamanian company whose stock was owned by another Panamanian company. This type of ownership model became Onassis’ preferred method of shipping investment. Not only did it obscure the beneficial ownership of each vessel, it protected his own personal liability. The acquisition of T-2 tankers from the U.S. government presented a thornier problem because these ships were too strategically valuable to be sold outright to foreigners. The solution arranged by a prominent Washington law firm and a helpful retired Congressman, allowed Onassis to control five separate U.S. companies which purchased twenty-three vessels, (including fourteen tankers), from the U.S. government. The financing was done through Wall Street banks and insurance companies. The author claims, quoting the CEO of the NCB, that Onassis “invented” (244-245) the ship loan. While this may have been true for the NCB, shipping loans backed by mortgage bonds had been standard practice in the U.S. since before the start of the twentieth century. American banks had been financing foreign steamship companies for many years before Onassis arrived in New
York. Regardless of the parentage of his financing, Onassis made spectacular profits from these purchases which led him to begin ordering new tankers from American, European, British and Japanese yards.

But being a prosperous foreigner in the United States during the Cold War drew unwanted attention. In the highly charged atmosphere of the McCarthy era, Onassis (and several of his fellow Greek shipowners) made the mistake of not appearing to be American citizens. Most of the shipowners were not, but their companies were. After an investigation by the FBI, Onassis settled for a face-saving fine and moved his operations to Monte Carlo. His ships were now super tankers of ever larger size. His fleet operated as part of a virtually stateless network. The ownership structure of his fleet was now more elaborate than earlier but with the same purpose, that of protecting each ship from the liability of its fleet mates while obscuring the true ownership. Onassis, himself, seemed to have no fixed abode but spent much of his time on his yacht.

Harlaftis has provided an insightful analysis of the development of ship owning from the 1820s through to the end of the post-Second World War boom. The key to success for Greek shipowners was a combination of family management tied to networks of trust. The Vigliano brothers developed trusted networks with a legion of shipowners, agents, bankers, and shipbuilders based in the centre of world commerce, London. Panagi Vigliano created the prototype for the Greek London office which was followed by a host of Greek shipowners in the twentieth century. The problem of succession, however, remained unsolved. Onassis' contributed to the evolution of shipping management on two fronts. First, he devised an ownership structure that was extremely opaque to protect himself and his investment. Secondly, he helped broaden the financial base for shipping. Creating Global Shipping is a significant work that opens the door to further research in the business history of shipping.

M. Stephen Salmon Orleans, Ontario


Consuls and Captives is part of a series entitled ‘Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe’, and in this book Erica Heinsen-Roach analyses the roles of Dutch consuls in Algiers, Tunis, and Salé during the early-modern period to make the argument that the idea that Maghrib Corsairs did not respect European law and diplomacy and therefore, European nations could not make treaties with them is far too reductive. This book rotates around three related concepts. First, the roles of consuls as opposed to ambassadors in European-Maghribi diplomacy. Second, the differences between the Dutch and Maghrabi perceptions of these roles. Third, how geopolitical changes over the seventeenth century altered the first two. Consuls and Captives looks primarily at the roles of the Dutch consuls in first Algiers and Tunis, and then Salé, and their roles in releasing and ransoming Dutch sailors enslaved by corsairs. Discussions of other English, French and even Danish and Swedish efforts provide context when needed, but the