

Port Cities in the French Wars: The Responses of Merchants in Bordeaux, Hamburg and Livorno to Napoleon's Continental Blockade, 1806-1813

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It is striking that nineteenth-century western European merchants have been studied much less than those of the *ancien régime*. Instead, social and economic historians of the period have devoted their attention to industrialists and bankers. This historiographic lapse makes it difficult to appreciate if and when merchants began to decline in importance relative to other groups in port cities. Implicitly, the turning point seems to have come during the French wars — that is, between 1793 and 1815. Most historians assume that European port cities and maritime commerce suffered enormously during this era and that structural changes in regional economies prevented maritime merchants from re-establishing their previous social and economic hegemony after the Restoration.¹ Recent studies of the economic effects of this period have hardly altered this concept of maritime economies.² Indeed, their interpretation is even more negative when it is applied to territories annexed by Napoleon, where scholars concentrate on the French exploitation of local resources, even if they acknowledge some positive effects upon the future institutional development of the country.³ In such negative visions, there is no place for nuances. The ruin of merchants' fortunes is assumed implicitly, without asking what strategies for commercial survival may have existed. A more focused analysis of mercantile responses to the continental blockade suggests, however, that merchants were much more able than other professionals, such as artisans, shopkeepers, and longshoremen, to surmount difficulties and prohibitions, not only because of the inefficiency of the French regime but also because they were used to adapting constantly to market changes and could draw on an international commercial network.

Merchants had in fact developed effective ways to continue to trade in previous wars, and were as eager as ever to respond to the demand of continental customers, even if the authorities considered their behaviour illegal. This comparative study based upon three port cities will evaluate the success of the different strategies adopted by international traders. I will analyse the most important means by which continental merchants attempted to cope with Napoleon's efforts to enforce his legislation against British commerce after the Berlin decree. Bordeaux — the major eighteenth-century French port — will be compared with two other cities which fell to Napoleon — Livorno, in Tuscany, and Hamburg — major ports in the Mediterranean and northern Europe, respectively. After the decline of Marseille and Amsterdam they became for some years the most important ports in their areas. This prosperity lasted until 1806-1807.

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After the defeat of Prussian armies at Jena and Auerstadt, Napoleon announced a blockade of the British Isles on 21 November 1806. A few days earlier, French troops had occupied the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. While the blockade might seem pretentious when his own fleet had almost been destroyed at Trafalgar, Napoleon was perhaps aiming above all to close the continent to all imports from Britain, rather than to affect British overseas navigation. Since fifteen years of war had proven the impossibility of ending the conflict with a final, decisive battle, Napoleon returned to one of the old projects of the French Convention: a plan to weaken British credit through a commercial war, which would force the realm to make peace.

From 1806 until the end of his European hegemony, Napoleon tried to enforce the Berlin decree throughout the continent. During this time, neutral trade, as it had previously been practised in Hamburg or Livorno, was no longer tolerated. For a better understanding of developments, it is necessary to take a step backward and briefly analyse European trade patterns after the outbreak of war in February 1793, since the situation merchants in continental ports had to face in 1806 was decisively affected by their experiences during the previous decade.

Trade Patterns in War

After the outbreak of the maritime war, the situation varied enormously according to the status of the port. As in most eighteenth-century wars, both belligerents forbade direct trade with the enemy and used privateers to attack the opponent's commerce. Because England prohibited neutral vessels from carrying French property, French cargoes had to appear to belong to neutral merchants. As well, French ships had to sail under neutral flags. But neutrals played a much more active role than simply legitimising papers and cargoes: trade with colonies, reserved in peacetime to vessels belonging to the mother countries, was opened to neutrals to ensure sufficient supplies of vital goods. All data concerning neutral European ports confirm the great expansion of overseas trade.

In contrast, French ports like Bordeaux had to face the damaging consequences of maritime war and experienced the problems connected to the loss of St. Domingue after the slave revolt. Neutral European ports considerably increased their trade during this period. In the Mediterranean, for example, Tuscany had recovered its neutrality at the beginning of 1795 and was able to preserve it; as a result, Livorno replaced blockaded Marseille and Genoa as the region's primary commercial port.

On the shores of the North Sea, Hamburg became the main continental port after Amsterdam was occupied by the French in 1795. During the 1790s, the quantity of sugar and coffee imported into Hamburg more than doubled. Before the French Revolution, half of Hamburg's imports came from France.⁴ Within a few years, this situation had drastically changed: by 1795, Hamburg imported more sugar and coffee from Britain than it had from France five years earlier.⁵ The prosperity of European neutral ports is striking; Hamburg's duties on imports and exports increased three-fold between 1793 and 1799; within ten years, the number of poor people receiving assistance was reduced by half.⁶

European neutrals were not the only ones to gain enormously from the situation: the United States also emerged as a maritime power. American foreign commerce grew from \$20 million in 1792 to \$94 million in 1801, and US merchants were particularly

active in the rich West Indies trade.⁷ They re-exported increasing quantities to almost every part of Europe. For French ports in particular, this neutral shipping was vital to the maintenance of international trade. But European neutral ports were provisioned by American ships as well; in 1799, for example, 192 entered the port of Hamburg.⁸

During the 1790s, neutral trade was not particularly hampered by the belligerents. While it is true that a quasi-war between France and the US led to the seizure of over 300 American ships, and that Britain hindered neutral navigation whenever its trade laws were violated, as a whole the decade was a golden age for neutral trade.

The situation changed rapidly after the 1803 rupture of the Peace of Amiens. On the one hand, Britain reconsidered the status of the neutrals, who were accused of being a serious challenge to British colonial interests and supporting enemy trade. The *Essex* decision of 1805, in which an American ship was condemned for trading through Barcelona, Salem and Havana, was the first in a long series of seizures.⁹ On the other hand, France enacted more severe commercial legislation against Britain. From 1803 French merchants were required to prove the non-British origin of all imports. Meanwhile, Napoleon attempted to force the rest of Europe to adopt similar measures. Between 1803 and 1805, Napoleon tried to attack British interests by closing the Elbe, Weser and Ems rivers to British traffic. This proved to be useless, as Hanseatic merchants shifted their trade to neighbouring neutral ports, such as Tønning, in the case of Hamburg.¹⁰

Only after the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806 did an effective closure of the North Sea and the Baltic seem possible. During 1807, Russia, Prussia and Austria accepted the Berlin decree. Copenhagen, which was bombarded by the Royal Navy in September, shifted to Napoleon's side. Portugal, which had been reluctant to accept the decree, was occupied. Spain was forced to adopt measures against British trade, and all major Italian ports were either occupied by French troops or controlled by their allies. Under such favourable circumstances, France adopted new measures. In response to the British orders-in-council of November 1807, which put the whole continent under blockade and obliged all ships to stop in England and pay duties, Napoleon declared that any ship coming from England would be seized.¹¹

As there was no room left for neutral trade, President Jefferson imposed an embargo upon American shipping and closed US ports to European vessels. By 1807, both Livorno and Hamburg were occupied by French troops and were annexed to the Napoleonic Empire in 1808 and 1810, respectively. If they did not want to cease their activities, their merchants had to find new ways of keeping trade alive.

Merchants and Trade in Napoleonic Europe

The cessation of neutral trade by the end of 1807 proved tragic for French ports. Whereas in 1807 forty-three percent of vessels entering Bordeaux were foreign, the next year only two percent were non-domestic.¹² By that time, hardly any French ships ventured on to international sea routes. The situation was parlous, as many residents of French ports were unemployed and signs of misery were increasingly evident. The Napoleonic regime could not afford to tolerate this situation. Yet there was a fundamental ambiguity in its attitude toward merchants. On the one hand, Napoleon believed that commercial maritime interests ought to be sacrificed in economic war against Britain. On the other, France's whole

institutional system was based upon a consensus of notables, a majority of whom, at least in port cities, were merchants. The regime therefore had to make some concessions and permit a limited trade in order to preserve some consensus.

From the spring of 1808 Napoleon tried to reinvigorate trade in French ports by introducing a system of licences.¹³ To maintain a commercial war against Britain, shipping was subjected to strict regulation. There was a remarkable disparity in licences between old and annexed ports. Even though Livorno had been attached to the Empire in 1808, it did not receive any licences of the *ancien système* in 1809-1810. Bordeaux, though, got more than a third of the total and became the most privileged port in the Empire. The same was true for the different types of licences for European trade created after 1810. Bordeaux merchants could buy twice as many as Livorno traders, and four times as many as those of Hamburg. Trade with the US, which had been re-established in 1810, was almost entirely reserved for French ports: Bordeaux received 620 navigation permits, while Hamburg was granted only five and Livorno just one.¹⁴

Even if they enjoyed a privileged existence, Bordeaux merchants were not disposed to submit to strict control or limitations, and therefore often abused the trade opportunities they obtained. False declarations concerning cargoes seem to have been quite common. For example, in 1813 the commercial house of Clamageran declared to customs agents a shipment of wine that was three times the size and seven times the value of the real cargo.¹⁵ They inflated the declaration because their licence obliged their exports to be as valuable as their imports. Apparently Clamageran risked little, as police and custom controls in Bordeaux were rather weak.

But licences were costly and bureaucratically demanding. Merchants complained about the insufficient number, the excessive time between their requests and the actual granting of the permit, and the inadequacy of the trade permitted compared to real market conditions.¹⁶ It is not surprising that, wherever possible, traders tried to find other means to keep trade active. Corruption, smuggling and shifting the flow of merchandise toward regions where control was less efficient were their most important responses.

Merchants engaged in massive bribery of customs officers, consuls and any authorities charged with enforcing prohibitive legislation, especially outside of old France, where only a handful were delegated to enforce laws against trade. In the first half of 1807, for example, when French troops occupied Hamburg, the city's senate and chamber of commerce spent about 1.5 million francs to persuade the authorities to ignore trade on the Elbe.¹⁷ The American consul in Hamburg reported that, according to his French colleague, means might be found to facilitate the entry of vessels that had stopped in England: "the secret of this, as of most of their measures [i.e., of French authorities in Hamburg], is that the austerity of the agents must be softened by pecuniary motives."¹⁸

Corruption worked well for continental merchants, and during 1807 about 1500 small boats entered Hamburg from Tønning with colonial produce and English manufactures, both of which were prohibited.¹⁹ Tønning was at the time one of the major neutral staple centres in the north. Between 11 March and 6 June 1807, 281 ships left London for Tønning: in that year, thirty percent of all British re-exports were directed to Denmark. Americans also were active in Danish ports.²⁰ Once the merchandise reached Denmark, its redistribution was entirely in the hands of Hamburg merchants, who were extremely successful in reorganising the flows. In 1807, the net profit of Robert Sloman,

a Hamburg merchant of British origin who had settled in Tønning during the first blockade of the Elbe in 1803, amounted to the substantial sum of £45,000.²¹

Smuggling constituted another means of circumventing trade restrictions. Smugglers were well organised and generally received widespread protection from the local populace.²² The permeability of the Rhine and the Spanish borders is well known, but there was another form of fraud practised both in Hamburg and Livorno. The walls of both towns were customs borders: between 1808 and 1810, Livorno was a sort of free port, where goods could be stored free of duty. It was therefore tempting for merchants to import merchandise fraudulently into the French Empire without paying the heavy duties levied on colonial produce. By the same token, Hamburg was about a fifteen-minute walk from Altona, Denmark, which was swollen with colonial goods. In both Livorno and Hamburg, thousands of people crossed the customs line daily, transporting small amounts of goods. In total, the quantities of contraband were substantial. In August 1810, customs agents seized 9300 kilograms of colonial goods at the gate between Hamburg and Altona.²³ Moreover, this quantity seems to have represented at most five percent of the quantity smuggled. Re-export was not a problem: an inquiry into the bribery of Bourienne, the French consul in Hamburg, revealed that from 1807 to 1810 he had signed passports granting the free circulation of about 100 million francs worth of imports annually.²⁴ According to the French customs director in Hamburg, in 1810 about one inhabitant in six subsisted on the income from this fraud.²⁵ At a time when port activity was heavily reduced, deceit permitted much of the population to survive. The main profits, however, went to the merchants who organised these exchanges.

In both Livorno and Hamburg this sort of fraud ceased at the end of 1810 — in the former because of the end of its free port status and in the German port because of extremely tight enforcement of French legislation. Smuggling was thereafter more discreet. Merchants let the goods flow into the North Sea or along the Tyrrhenian coast. But in general it was less risky to introduce them along continental borders. Spain, Naples and the Baltic states were relatively open, and some Bordeaux, Livorno and Hamburg merchants were able to carve out places on these diverted trade routes.²⁶

To facilitate commerce, merchant houses also exploited international networks to obtain important information and to organise alternative trade flows. Livorno merchants, for example, learned about the alteration in the port's duty-free status on 1 October 1810, only a week after the decision was made in Paris. Since the official proclamation of the new system did not occur until one month later, merchants had a few weeks to prepare and were able to forestall the worst consequences.²⁷

Quite often, merchants sent one of their associates abroad. Many Hamburgers could be found in Altona, the Baltic ports or in Göteborg, another major centre of smuggling.²⁸ And it is quite striking that the destinations of passports demanded by Bordeaux merchants between 1806 and 1813 follow the new trade routes: the Baltic was particularly frequented in 1809-1810, when the Royal Navy escorted hundreds of American and British ships through the area. The US was the main destination of Bordeaux merchants before the Embargo of December 1807, and again from 1810 until the outbreak of the Anglo-American war in June 1812.²⁹

The French government was unable to match the resources and ingenuity of merchants determined to flout embargoes, and there were too few customs agents to

enforce the commercial laws; what agents could be found were badly paid and thus unreliable. In a report to his superior, Livorno's chief of police asked how he could possibly prevent a customs officer, who at a salary of forty francs a month earned just enough to survive, from refusing 200 or 300 francs to close his eyes for half an hour while smugglers transferred their merchandise? The Customs Director estimated that two-thirds of his men were bribed, adding that their numbers were inadequate anyway.³⁰ In 1811, the Livorno police was reduced to twenty-two men, in order to afford their salary.³¹

Increasingly repressive measures, such as the Fontainebleau decree of October 1810 condemning armed smugglers to death, were hardly able to deter the real organizers of smuggling. If some smugglers were arrested, the bulk remained at liberty. And the merchants who stood behind all these activities were almost never arrested.

There was also reluctance by juries to prosecute the rich and most influential merchants, who were often their relatives. This was particularly evident in Bordeaux and Livorno, where the city administration was largely entrusted to Tuscans. In Hamburg, by contrast, all important places were given to French functionaries, who proceeded energetically against local interests. But the proximity of the border, the importance of Hanseatic harbours in northern European commerce, and the extension of merchant networks permitted trade, even in Hamburg, to continue to flow.

Conclusion

In Bordeaux, Hamburg and Livorno, travellers and contemporary observers unanimously painted pictures of misery. Many thousands in fact were unemployed because of trade stagnation, and port populations noticeably decreased. Most historians have taken the view that port cities suffered greatly because of the continental blockade. That said, there has been some research in recent decades that has indirectly questioned this conclusion, at least for merchants. Authors such as François Crouzet and Paul Butel have challenged the orthodoxy that the entire revolutionary and Napoleonic era was marked by a protracted crisis, arguing instead that there were distinct phases in Bordeaux's maritime trade.³² The chronology they constructed, at once more accurate and more nuanced, called implicitly for a reassessment of the consequences of the blockade upon the mercantile community. In addition, a few monographs have shown the vitality and relative success of individual merchants.³³ Yet no major study has analysed the success responses of the merchants in one or several ports to the blockade. For inland cities, however, the historiography has begun to shift. For example, Louis Bergeron and Jean-Pierre Hirsch have revealed the dynamism of bankers, merchants and industrialists in Paris and Lille; according to these scholars, the Napoleonic era did not represent a break in the development of French capitalism.³⁴ Could their conclusions apply equally to seaport merchants?

By concentrating on the years of the continental blockade it has been possible to show that seaport merchants developed strategies to keep trade flowing.³⁵ They possessed both the skills and the will to surmount the legal obstacles designed to stifle their trade. Merchants played a central role in the organisation of the huge smuggling trade of those years, a function which seems to have been only partially revealed by existing studies.³⁶ The success of illegal trade was a measure of Napoleon's ability — or inability — to implement his legislation, a task that was particularly difficult in time of war.³⁷

Seaport merchants demonstrated a resolute and persistent capacity to adapt during the Napoleonic era. After 1815, changes in international trade were again to tax their abilities. Efforts to enliven old trade patterns during the Restoration were linked with an increasing attention to new commercial areas. With the independence of Haiti, France lost its most important colony. Although Bordeaux merchants were no longer conveniently placed to direct the flow of colonial goods between the West Indies and Europe, they converted successfully to non-colonial goods. In the 1820s, the Bordeaux wine trade was so profitable that it would have been unwise to substitute other products.³⁸

Hamburg merchants, on the other hand, managed to enter the overseas trades. The independence of South America opened a new commercial area in which German merchants were particularly active. Hamburg was conscious of the importance of the free staple trade and refused until 1888 to enter the *Zollverein*, or German custom union.

Recent studies have confirmed the vitality of Livorno merchants in the first half of the nineteenth century.³⁹ The Tuscan port was still a major staple centre in the Mediterranean, even if it had lost the dominant position it enjoyed in the eighteenth century. The port was particularly important in the cereal trade.⁴⁰

Based on our observations of the period 1806-1815, we can also advance an hypothesis concerning the following years. It seems that the transmission of entrepreneurial talent to the new generation was apparently not interrupted during the French Wars. If so, the argument about merchant decadence and socio-economic decline in the nineteenth century, which persists because scholars have shown little interest in testing it, needs re-examination.⁴¹

NOTES

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1. About Bordeaux, François Crouzet, "La ruine du grand commerce," in François-Georges Pariset (éd.), *Bordeaux au XVIIIe s/éc/e* (Bordeaux, 1968), 510, remarks that "le XIX^e siècle ne fut plus l'âge du sucre, du café et du vin, mais celui du charbon, du fer et du coton...La Révolution et la guerre n'ont fait que précipiter et aggraver un déclin inévitable par suite des changements de structure de l'économie mondiale." For Livorno, David G. Lo Romer, *Merchants and Reform in Livorno, 1814-1868* (Berkeley, 1987), 19, states that "both contemporary observers and recent studies agree that Livorno's commercial situation changed radically in the period following the wars of the French Revolution and the restoration of the grand ducal government in Tuscany."

2. Erik Aerts and François Crouzet (eds.), *Economie Effects of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars* (Leuven, 1990). See also the articles in *Revue économique*, XL, (1989), special number entitled "Révolution de 1789. Guerres et croissance économique."

3. For an excellent synthesis, see Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London, 1991). For Tuscany, see Ivan Tognarini (éd.), *La Toscana nell'età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica* (Naples, 1985).

4. Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), F¹² 566-595, 2nd annexed document to an anonymous *Mémoire* presented by the three Hanseatic towns, 30 June 1807. See also Pierre Jeannin, "Die Hansestädte im europäischen Handel des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, hXXXIX (1971), 41-73.

5. Ernst Baasch, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Hamburg und Amerika," in *Hamburgische Festschrift zur*

- Erinnerung an die Entdeckung Amerikas** (2 vols., Hamburg, 1892), I, 74. See also Walther Vogel, "Die Hansestädte und die Kontinentalsperre," **Pfingstblätter des hansischen Geschichtsvereins**, IX (1913), 5.
6. Richard Ehrenberg, **Grosse Vermögen. Das Haus Parish in Hamburg** (Jena, 1905), 148; and Mary E. Lindemann, "Unterschichten und Sozialpolitik in Hamburg, 1799-1814," in Arno Herzig, Dieter Langewiesche and Arnold Sywottek (eds.), **Arbeiter in Hamburg. Unterschichten, Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung seit dem ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert** (Hamburg, 1983), 61-70, esp. 62-65.
7. Emory R. Johnson, *et al.*, **History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States** (1915; reprint, 2 vols., New York, 1964), II, 20.
8. Baasch, "Beitrage," 67-68.
9. Bradford Perkins, "Sir William Scott and the Essex," **William and Mary Quarterly**, Third Series, XIII (1956), 169-183.
10. François Crouzet, **L'économie britannique et le blocus continental, 1806-1813** (1958; reprint, Paris, 1987), 128-136.
11. Eli F. Heckscher, **77th Continental System. An Economic Interpretation** (Oxford, 1922); and W. E. Lingelbach, "L'Angleterre et le commerce des neutres à l'époque napoléonienne et depuis," **Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes**, XVIII (1918), 129-155.
12. Paul Butel, "Crise et mutation du commerce à Bordeaux sous le Consulat et l'Empire," **Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine**, XVII (1970), 546-549.
13. The most complete study of the licence system is still Frank Edgar Melvin, **Napoleon's Navigation System: A Study of Trade Control during the Continental Blockade** (1919; reprint, New York, 1970).
14. AN, F¹²* 265.
15. Archives départementales de la Gironde, Bordeaux, 14 J 11, Clamageran Papers.
16. For Tuscany, for example, AN, F¹² 2055, Elisa Baciocchi, Princess of Tuscany, to the French Inner Minister, 27 September 1809 and 31 January 1810.
17. AN, AF^{1v} 1080, dossier II, report of De Tournon on his inquiry in Hamburg, 23 August 1807; Vogel, "Die Hansestädte," 25.
18. National Archives, Washington, T 211/1, American Consul Forbes to Secretary of State, 30 January 1807.
19. De Tournon, "Report."
20. Crouzet, **L'économie britannique**, 220-221.
21. E. Hieke, **Robert M. Sloman, Jr.** (Hamburg, 1968), 26.
22. Roger Dufraisse, "La contrebande dans les départements réunis de la Rive gauche du Rhin," **Francia**, I (1973), 508-536; and Michel Brunet, **Une société contre l'Etat, le Roussillon vers 1780-1820** (2nd éd., Perpinyà, 1990).
23. AN, F¹² 1948, Reports of the Duke of Feltre to the Inner Minister, 19 October and 7 November 1810.
24. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, **Correspondance Consulaire, Hambourg**, XVIII, 98-105, Report of Maret to Napoleon, undated [but after 28 December 1811].
25. AN, AF^{1v} 1080, Custom House Director in Hamburg to Collin de Sussy, 5 September 1810.
26. On the permeability of the Spanish border, see Brunet, **Une société**. In a confidential letter of 20 July 1810, the *procureur* of the Customs Court of Bordeaux reported to the Police Minister in Paris the discovery of Spanish colonial goods at the entrance of Bordeaux. The Director of the Customs House was accused of laxity, as he had never before controlled the wagons coming from Bayonne and Toulouse, which notoriously transported smuggled goods. On the Malta-Tunis-Livorno diverted trade route, as well as on the participation of Hamburg merchants in the Baltic trade, see Crouzet, **L'économie britannique**, 266, 370, 691.

27. Archives of the Chamber of Commerce, Livorno, *Deliberazioni*, IV, meetings of 1 and 31 October 1810.
28. For smuggling between Göteborg and Hamburg, see AN, F⁶⁵⁶⁴. Among the Hamburg merchants in Göteborg, for example, Johann Gottfried Schramm, Jr., of Schramm, Kersten and Co., a house which participated in smuggling activities from Helgoland; see Percy Ernst Schramm, "Hamburger Kaufleute in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Tradition. Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie*, II (1957), 307-332. Other evidence is in Hildegard von Marchtaler, *Aus Alt Hamburger Senatoren-hausern. Familienschicksale im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg, 1959), 112; Wilhelm Sillem, *Généalogie der Familie Sillem* (Leipzig, 1908): 16-17; and A. Heskell, "Bürgermeister Ascan W. Lutteroth Legat (22 September 1783 bis 20 Dezember 1867), zum Gedächtnis," *Hamburgische Geschichte- und Heimatblätter*, 11 (1927), 225-227.
29. Silvia Marzagalli, "Les voyages de négociants bordelais à l'étranger à l'époque napoléonienne," *Bulletin du Centre des Espaces Atlantiques*, VI (1993), 137-150.
30. AN, F⁸⁸⁴⁷, dossier 4184, letter of 26 October 1810 in which the Prefect of Livorno quotes the Customs Director.
31. Archivio di Stato, Livorno, *Prefettura del Mediterraneo*, 33, Police General Chief to the Prefect, 31 January 1811.
32. Crouzet, "La ruine;" and Butel, "Crise et mutation."
33. Y. Roustit, "Raymond Durand, commerçant à Barcelona (1808-1814)," *Estudios de Historia Moderna. Revue de la Faculté des Lettres de Barcelona*, VI (1956-1959), 313-409; Paul Butel, "Charles Fieffé, commissionaire et armateur: contribution à l'étude du négoce bordelais sous la Révolution et l'Empire" (Unpublished thèse du 3. cycle, Université de Bordeaux, 1967); and Jean Cavignac, "Les Cabarrus, négociants de Bordeaux (1755-1829)," *Revue historique de Bordeaux*, New Series, XIX (1970), 37-63.
34. Louis Bergeron, *Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du Directoire à l'Empire* (Paris, 1978), esp. 269-297; and Jean-Pierre Hirsch, *Les deux rêves du commerce. Entreprise et institution dans la région lilloise (1780-1829)* (Paris, 1991).
35. I have evaluated elsewhere the impact of the blockade on the merchants of Hamburg, Bordeaux and Livorno by measuring statistically their evolution, failures and geographic diversification; see Silvia Marzagalli, "I negozianti delle città portuali in età napoleonica: Amburgo, Bordeaux e Livorno di fronte al blocco continentale" (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 1993).
36. Some studies on smuggling have already demonstrated Napoleon's difficulty in enforcing customs policy along the borders of the Empire. See Roger Dufraisse, "Französische Zollpolitik, Kontinentalsperre und Kontinentalsystem in Deutschland der napoleonischen Zeit," in Helmut Berding and Hans-Peter Ullmann (eds.), *Deutschland zwischen Revolution und Restauration* (Dusseldorf, 1981), 328-352; Dufraisse, "La contrebande;" Janine Bertrand, "La contrebande à la frontière de l'Est, 1811, 1812, *nn*," *Annales de l'Est*, II (1951), 273-305; Geoffrey Ellis, *Napoleon's Continental Blockade: The Case of Alsace* (Oxford, 1981); Roustit, "Raymond Durand;" and Brunet, *Une société*. For a synthesis, see Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*.
37. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration*; and Crouzet, *L'économie britannique*.
38. W. Henninger, "Les renouvellements du négoce bordelais sous la Restauration; l'exemple des maisons Bethmann et De Luze," *Bulletin du Centre des Espaces Atlantiques*, 7 (1990), 77-126.
39. See, in particular, Lo Romer, *Merchants*.
40. Patricia Herlihy, "Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794-1865," *Journal of European Economic History*, V (1976), 45-68.
41. See also S. Marzagalli, "Commerce maritime et blocus continental dans l'Europe napoléonienne: une reconsidération," *Bulletin du Centre des Espaces Atlantiques*, NU (1995), 85-110.